Ejemplo n.º 1
0
BOOL CALLBACK ExpandVolProgressDlgProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT msg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam)
{
	static EXPAND_VOL_THREAD_PARAMS *pProgressDlgParam;
	static BOOL bVolTransformStarted = FALSE;
	static BOOL showRandPool = TRUE;

	WORD lw = LOWORD (wParam);

	switch (msg)
	{
	case WM_INITDIALOG:
		{
			char szOldHostSize[512], szNewHostSize[512];

			pProgressDlgParam = (EXPAND_VOL_THREAD_PARAMS*)lParam;
			bVolTransformStarted = FALSE;
			showRandPool = TRUE;

			hCurPage = hwndDlg;
			nPbar = IDC_PROGRESS_BAR;

			GetSpaceString(szOldHostSize,sizeof(szOldHostSize),pProgressDlgParam->oldSize,pProgressDlgParam->bIsDevice);
			GetSpaceString(szNewHostSize,sizeof(szNewHostSize),pProgressDlgParam->newSize,pProgressDlgParam->bIsDevice);

			SetWindowText (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_EXPAND_VOLUME_OLDSIZE), szOldHostSize);
			SetWindowText (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_EXPAND_VOLUME_NEWSIZE), szNewHostSize);
			SetWindowText (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_EXPAND_VOLUME_NAME), pProgressDlgParam->szVolumeName);
			SetWindowText (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_EXPAND_FILE_SYSTEM), szFileSystemStr[pProgressDlgParam->FileSystem]);
			SetWindowText (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_EXPAND_VOLUME_INITSPACE), pProgressDlgParam->bInitFreeSpace?"Yes":"No");

			SendMessage (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_BOX_STATUS), WM_SETFONT, (WPARAM) hBoldFont, (LPARAM) TRUE);

			SendMessage (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_RANDOM_BYTES), WM_SETFONT, (WPARAM) hFixedDigitFont, (LPARAM) TRUE);

			// set status text
			if ( !pProgressDlgParam->bInitFreeSpace && pProgressDlgParam->bIsLegacy )
			{
				showRandPool = FALSE;
				EnableWindow (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_DISPLAY_POOL_CONTENTS), FALSE);
				EnableWindow (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_RANDOM_BYTES), FALSE);
				SetDlgItemText(hwndDlg, IDC_BOX_STATUS, "Click 'Continue' to expand the volume.");
			}
			else
			{
				SetDlgItemText(hwndDlg, IDC_BOX_STATUS, "IMPORTANT: Move your mouse as randomly as possible within this window. The longer you move it, the better. This significantly increases the cryptographic strength of the encryption keys. Then click 'Continue' to expand the volume.");
			}

			SendMessage (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_DISPLAY_POOL_CONTENTS), BM_SETCHECK, showRandPool ? BST_CHECKED : BST_UNCHECKED, 0);
			SetTimer (hwndDlg, TIMER_ID_RANDVIEW, TIMER_INTERVAL_RANDVIEW, NULL);
		}
		return 0;
	case TC_APPMSG_VOL_TRANSFORM_THREAD_ENDED:
		{
			int nStatus = (int)lParam;

			NormalCursor ();
			if (nStatus != 0)
			{
				if ( nStatus != ERR_USER_ABORT )
					AddProgressDlgStatus (hwndDlg, "Error: volume expansion failed.");
				else
					AddProgressDlgStatus (hwndDlg, "Error: operation aborted by user.");
			}
			else
			{
				AddProgressDlgStatus (hwndDlg, "Finished. Volume successfully expanded.");
			}

			SetWindowText (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDOK), "Exit");
			EnableWindow (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDOK), TRUE);
			EnableWindow (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDCANCEL), FALSE);
		}
		return 1;

	case WM_TIMER:

		switch (wParam)
		{
		case TIMER_ID_RANDVIEW:
			{
				unsigned char tmp[16];
				char szRndPool[64], *t;
				DWORD *p;

				if (!showRandPool)
					return 1;

				RandpeekBytes (hwndDlg, tmp, sizeof (tmp));

				for ( p = (DWORD*)(tmp + sizeof(tmp)), t=szRndPool; p > (DWORD*)tmp; )
				{
					int len;
					if ( (len = sprintf ( t, "%08X", *--p)) < 0 )
						return 1;
					t += len;
				}

				SetWindowText (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_RANDOM_BYTES), szRndPool);

				burn (tmp, sizeof(tmp));
				burn (szRndPool, sizeof(szRndPool));
			}
			return 1;
		}
		return 0;

	case WM_COMMAND:
		if (lw == IDC_DISPLAY_POOL_CONTENTS)
		{
			showRandPool = IsButtonChecked (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_DISPLAY_POOL_CONTENTS));
			return 1;
		}
		if (lw == IDCANCEL)
		{
			if (bVolTransformStarted)
			{
				if (MessageBoxW (hwndDlg, L"Warning: Volume expansion is in progress!\n\nStopping now may result in a damaged volume.\n\nDo you really want to cancel?", lpszTitle, YES_NO|MB_ICONQUESTION|MB_DEFBUTTON2) == IDNO)
					return 1;

				// tell the volume transform thread to terminate
				bVolTransformThreadCancel = TRUE;
			}
			EndDialog (hwndDlg, lw);
			return 1;
		}

		if (lw == IDOK)
		{
			if (bVolTransformStarted)
			{
				// TransformThreadFunction finished -> OK button is now exit
				EndDialog (hwndDlg, lw);
			}
			else
			{
				showRandPool = FALSE;
				KillTimer (hwndDlg, TIMER_ID_RANDVIEW);
				EnableWindow (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_DISPLAY_POOL_CONTENTS), FALSE);
				EnableWindow (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDOK), FALSE);
				SetProgressDlgStatus (hwndDlg, "Starting volume expansion ...\r\n");
				bVolTransformStarted = TRUE;
				pProgressDlgParam->hwndDlg = hwndDlg;
				if ( _beginthread (volTransformThreadFunction, 0, pProgressDlgParam) == -1L )
				{
					handleError (hwndDlg, ERR_OS_ERROR);
					EndDialog (hwndDlg, lw);
				}
				WaitCursor();
			}
			return 1;
		}

		return 0;
	}

	return 0;
}
Ejemplo n.º 2
0
/*
	ExpandVolumeWizard

	Expands a trucrypt volume (wizard for user interface)

	Parameters:

		hwndDlg : HWND
			[in] handle to parent window (if any)

		szVolume : char *
			[in] Pointer to a string with the volume name (e.g. '\Device\Harddisk0\Partition1' or 'C:\topsecret.tc')

	Return value:

		none

*/
void ExpandVolumeWizard (HWND hwndDlg, char *lpszVolume)
{
	int nStatus = ERR_OS_ERROR;
	wchar_t szTmp[4096];
	Password VolumePassword;
	int VolumePkcs5 = 0;
	uint64 hostSize, volSize, hostSizeFree, maxSizeFS;
	BOOL bIsDevice, bIsLegacy;
	DWORD dwError;
	int driveNo;
	enum EV_FileSystem volFSType;
	char rootPath[] = "A:\\";

	switch (IsSystemDevicePath (lpszVolume, hwndDlg, TRUE))
	{
	case 1:
	case 2:
		MessageBoxW (hwndDlg, L"A VeraCrypt system volume can't be expanded.", lpszTitle, MB_OK|MB_ICONEXCLAMATION);
		goto ret;
	}

	EnableElevatedCursorChange (hwndDlg);
	WaitCursor();

	if (IsMountedVolume (lpszVolume))
	{
		Warning ("DISMOUNT_FIRST", hwndDlg);
		goto ret;
	}

	if (Randinit() != ERR_SUCCESS) {
		nStatus = ERR_PARAMETER_INCORRECT;
		goto error;
	}

	NormalCursor();

	// Ask the user if there is a hidden volume
	char *volTypeChoices[] = {0, "DOES_VOLUME_CONTAIN_HIDDEN", "VOLUME_CONTAINS_HIDDEN", "VOLUME_DOES_NOT_CONTAIN_HIDDEN", "IDCANCEL", 0};
	switch (AskMultiChoice ((void **) volTypeChoices, FALSE, hwndDlg))
	{
	case 1:
		MessageBoxW (hwndDlg, L"An outer volume containing a hidden volume can't be expanded, because this destroys the hidden volume.", lpszTitle, MB_OK|MB_ICONEXCLAMATION);
		goto ret;

	case 2:
		break;

	default:
		nStatus = ERR_SUCCESS;
		goto ret;
	}

	WaitCursor();

	nStatus = QueryVolumeInfo(hwndDlg,lpszVolume,&hostSizeFree,&maxSizeFS);

	if (nStatus!=ERR_SUCCESS)
	{
		nStatus = ERR_OS_ERROR;
		goto error;
	}

	NormalCursor();

	while (TRUE)
	{
		OpenVolumeContext expandVol;
		BOOL truecryptMode = FALSE;

		if (!VeraCryptExpander::ExtcvAskVolumePassword (hwndDlg, &VolumePassword, &VolumePkcs5, &truecryptMode, "ENTER_NORMAL_VOL_PASSWORD", FALSE))
		{
			goto ret;
		}

		EnableElevatedCursorChange (hwndDlg);
		WaitCursor();

		if (KeyFilesEnable && FirstKeyFile)
			KeyFilesApply (hwndDlg, &VolumePassword, FirstKeyFile);

		WaitCursor ();

		OpenVolumeThreadParam threadParam;
		threadParam.context = &expandVol;
		threadParam.volumePath = lpszVolume;
		threadParam.password = &VolumePassword;
		threadParam.pkcs5_prf = VolumePkcs5;
		threadParam.truecryptMode = FALSE;
		threadParam.write = FALSE;
		threadParam.preserveTimestamps = bPreserveTimestamp;
		threadParam.useBackupHeader = FALSE;
		threadParam.nStatus = &nStatus;

		ShowWaitDialog (hwndDlg, TRUE, OpenVolumeWaitThreadProc, &threadParam);

		NormalCursor ();

		dwError = GetLastError();

		if (nStatus == ERR_SUCCESS)
		{
			bIsDevice = expandVol.IsDevice;
			bIsLegacy = expandVol.CryptoInfo->LegacyVolume;
			hostSize = expandVol.HostSize;			
			VolumePkcs5 = expandVol.CryptoInfo->pkcs5;
			if ( bIsLegacy )
			{
				if ( bIsDevice ) 
					volSize = 0; // updated later
				else
					volSize = hostSize;
			}
			else
			{
				volSize = GetVolumeSizeByDataAreaSize (expandVol.CryptoInfo->VolumeSize.Value, bIsLegacy);
			}
			CloseVolume (&expandVol);
			break;
		}
		else if (nStatus != ERR_PASSWORD_WRONG)
		{
			SetLastError (dwError);
			goto error;
		}

		NormalCursor();

		handleError (hwndDlg, nStatus);
	}

	WaitCursor();

	// auto mount the volume to check the file system type
	nStatus=MountVolTemp(hwndDlg, lpszVolume, &driveNo, &VolumePassword, VolumePkcs5);

	if (nStatus != ERR_SUCCESS)
		goto error;

	rootPath[0] += driveNo;

	if ( !GetFileSystemType(rootPath,&volFSType) )
		volFSType = EV_FS_TYPE_RAW;

	if ( bIsLegacy && bIsDevice && volFSType == EV_FS_TYPE_NTFS )
	{
		uint64 NumberOfSectors;
		DWORD BytesPerSector;
		
		if ( !GetNtfsNumberOfSectors(rootPath, &NumberOfSectors, &BytesPerSector) )
			nStatus = ERR_OS_ERROR;

		// NTFS reported size does not include boot sector copy at volume end
		volSize = ( NumberOfSectors + 1 ) * BytesPerSector;
	}

	UnmountVolume (hwndDlg, driveNo, TRUE);

	NormalCursor();

	if (nStatus != ERR_SUCCESS)
		goto error;

	if ( bIsDevice && bIsLegacy && volFSType != EV_FS_TYPE_NTFS )
	{
		MessageBoxW (hwndDlg,
			L"Expanding a device hosted legacy volume with no NTFS file system\n"
			L"is unsupported.\n"
			L"Note that expanding the VeraCrypt volume itself is not neccessary\n"
			L"for legacy volumes.\n",
			lpszTitle, MB_OK|MB_ICONEXCLAMATION);
		goto ret;
	}

	// check if there is enough free space on host device/drive to expand the volume
	if ( (bIsDevice && hostSize < volSize + TC_MINVAL_FS_EXPAND) || (!bIsDevice && hostSizeFree < TC_MINVAL_FS_EXPAND) )
	{
		MessageBoxW (hwndDlg, L"Not enough free space to expand the volume", lpszTitle, MB_OK|MB_ICONEXCLAMATION);
		goto ret;
	}

	if (!bIsDevice && hostSize != volSize ) {
		// there is some junk data at the end of the volume
		if (MessageBoxW (hwndDlg, L"Warning: The container file is larger than the VeraCrypt volume area. The data after the VeraCrypt volume area will be overwritten.\n\nDo you want to continue?", lpszTitle, YES_NO|MB_ICONQUESTION|MB_DEFBUTTON2) == IDNO)
			goto ret;
	}

	switch (volFSType)
	{
	case EV_FS_TYPE_NTFS:
		break;
	case EV_FS_TYPE_FAT:
		if (MessageBoxW (hwndDlg,L"Warning: The VeraCrypt volume contains a FAT file system!\n\nOnly the VeraCrypt volume itself will be expanded, but not the file system.\n\nDo you want to continue?",
			lpszTitle, YES_NO|MB_ICONQUESTION|MB_DEFBUTTON2) == IDNO)
			goto ret;
		break;
	default:
		if (MessageBoxW (hwndDlg,L"Warning: The VeraCrypt volume contains an unknown or no file system!\n\nOnly the VeraCrypt volume itself will be expanded, the file system remains unchanged.\n\nDo you want to continue?",
			lpszTitle, YES_NO|MB_ICONQUESTION|MB_DEFBUTTON2) == IDNO)
			goto ret;
	}

	EXPAND_VOL_THREAD_PARAMS VolExpandParam;

	VolExpandParam.bInitFreeSpace = (bIsLegacy && bIsDevice) ? FALSE:TRUE;
	VolExpandParam.szVolumeName = lpszVolume;
	VolExpandParam.FileSystem = volFSType;
	VolExpandParam.pVolumePassword = &VolumePassword;
	VolExpandParam.VolumePkcs5 = VolumePkcs5;
	VolExpandParam.bIsDevice = bIsDevice;
	VolExpandParam.bIsLegacy = bIsLegacy;
	VolExpandParam.oldSize = bIsDevice ? volSize : hostSize;
	VolExpandParam.newSize = hostSize;
	VolExpandParam.hostSizeFree = hostSizeFree;

	while (1)
	{
		uint64 newVolumeSize;

		if (IDCANCEL == DialogBoxParamW (hInst,
			MAKEINTRESOURCEW (IDD_SIZE_DIALOG), hwndDlg,
			(DLGPROC) ExpandVolSizeDlgProc, (LPARAM) &VolExpandParam))
		{
			goto ret;
		}

		newVolumeSize = VolExpandParam.newSize;

		if ( !bIsDevice )
		{
			if ( newVolumeSize < hostSize + TC_MINVAL_FS_EXPAND)
			{
				swprintf(szTmp,L"New volume size too small, must be at least %I64u kB larger than the current size.",TC_MINVAL_FS_EXPAND/BYTES_PER_KB);
				MessageBoxW (hwndDlg, szTmp, lpszTitle, MB_OK | MB_ICONEXCLAMATION );
				continue;
			}

			if ( newVolumeSize - hostSize > hostSizeFree )
			{
				swprintf(szTmp,L"New volume size too large, not enough space on host drive.");
				MessageBoxW (hwndDlg, szTmp, lpszTitle, MB_OK | MB_ICONEXCLAMATION );
				continue;
			}

			if ( newVolumeSize>maxSizeFS )
			{
				swprintf(szTmp,L"Maximum file size of %I64u MB on host drive exceeded.",maxSizeFS/BYTES_PER_MB);
				MessageBoxW (hwndDlg, L"!\n",lpszTitle, MB_OK | MB_ICONEXCLAMATION );
				continue;
			}
		}

		if ( newVolumeSize > TC_MAX_VOLUME_SIZE )
		{
			// note: current limit TC_MAX_VOLUME_SIZE is 1 PetaByte
			swprintf(szTmp,L"Maximum VeraCrypt volume size of %I64u TB exceeded!\n",TC_MAX_VOLUME_SIZE/BYTES_PER_TB);
			MessageBoxW (hwndDlg, szTmp,lpszTitle, MB_OK | MB_ICONEXCLAMATION );
			if (bIsDevice)
				break; // TODO: ask to limit volume size to TC_MAX_VOLUME_SIZE
			continue;
		}

		break;
	}

	VolExpandParam.oldSize = volSize;

	// start progress dialog
	DialogBoxParamW (hInst,	MAKEINTRESOURCEW (IDD_EXPAND_PROGRESS_DLG), hwndDlg,
		(DLGPROC) ExpandVolProgressDlgProc, (LPARAM) &VolExpandParam );

ret:
	nStatus = ERR_SUCCESS;

error:

	if (nStatus != 0)
		handleError (hwndDlg, nStatus);

	burn (&VolumePassword, sizeof (VolumePassword));

	RestoreDefaultKeyFilesParam();
	RandStop (FALSE);
	NormalCursor();

	return;
}
Ejemplo n.º 3
0
int ChangePwd (const char *lpszVolume, Password *oldPassword, int old_pkcs5, int old_pim, BOOL truecryptMode, Password *newPassword, int pkcs5, int pim, int wipePassCount, HWND hwndDlg)
{
	int nDosLinkCreated = 1, nStatus = ERR_OS_ERROR;
	char szDiskFile[TC_MAX_PATH], szCFDevice[TC_MAX_PATH];
	char szDosDevice[TC_MAX_PATH];
	char buffer[TC_VOLUME_HEADER_EFFECTIVE_SIZE];
	PCRYPTO_INFO cryptoInfo = NULL, ci = NULL;
	void *dev = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
	DWORD dwError;
	DWORD bytesRead;
	BOOL bDevice;
	unsigned __int64 hostSize = 0;
	int volumeType;
	int wipePass;
	FILETIME ftCreationTime;
	FILETIME ftLastWriteTime;
	FILETIME ftLastAccessTime;
	BOOL bTimeStampValid = FALSE;
	LARGE_INTEGER headerOffset;
	BOOL backupHeader;
	DISK_GEOMETRY driveInfo;

	if (oldPassword->Length == 0 || newPassword->Length == 0) return -1;

	if ((wipePassCount <= 0) || (truecryptMode && (old_pkcs5 == SHA256)))
	{
      nStatus = ERR_PARAMETER_INCORRECT;
      handleError (hwndDlg, nStatus, SRC_POS);
      return nStatus;
	}

   if (!lpszVolume)
   {
      nStatus = ERR_OUTOFMEMORY;
      handleError (hwndDlg, nStatus, SRC_POS);
      return nStatus;
   }

	WaitCursor ();

	CreateFullVolumePath (szDiskFile, sizeof(szDiskFile), lpszVolume, &bDevice);

	if (bDevice == FALSE)
	{
		strcpy (szCFDevice, szDiskFile);
	}
	else
	{
		nDosLinkCreated = FakeDosNameForDevice (szDiskFile, szDosDevice, sizeof(szDosDevice), szCFDevice, sizeof(szCFDevice),FALSE);
		
		if (nDosLinkCreated != 0)
			goto error;
	}

	dev = CreateFile (szCFDevice, GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, 0, NULL);

	if (dev == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) 
		goto error;

	if (bDevice)
	{
		/* This is necessary to determine the hidden volume header offset */

		if (dev == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
		{
			goto error;
		}
		else
		{
			PARTITION_INFORMATION diskInfo;
			DWORD dwResult;
			BOOL bResult;

			bResult = DeviceIoControl (dev, IOCTL_DISK_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY, NULL, 0,
				&driveInfo, sizeof (driveInfo), &dwResult, NULL);

			if (!bResult)
				goto error;

			bResult = GetPartitionInfo (lpszVolume, &diskInfo);

			if (bResult)
			{
				hostSize = diskInfo.PartitionLength.QuadPart;
			}
			else
			{
				hostSize = driveInfo.Cylinders.QuadPart * driveInfo.BytesPerSector *
					driveInfo.SectorsPerTrack * driveInfo.TracksPerCylinder;
			}

			if (hostSize == 0)
			{
				nStatus = ERR_VOL_SIZE_WRONG;
				goto error;
			}
		}
	}
	else
	{
		LARGE_INTEGER fileSize;
		if (!GetFileSizeEx (dev, &fileSize))
		{
			nStatus = ERR_OS_ERROR;
			goto error;
		}

		hostSize = fileSize.QuadPart;
	}

	if (Randinit ())
	{
		if (CryptoAPILastError == ERROR_SUCCESS)
			nStatus = ERR_RAND_INIT_FAILED;
		else
			nStatus = ERR_CAPI_INIT_FAILED;
		goto error;
	}

	SetRandomPoolEnrichedByUserStatus (FALSE); /* force the display of the random enriching dialog */

	if (!bDevice && bPreserveTimestamp)
	{
		if (GetFileTime ((HANDLE) dev, &ftCreationTime, &ftLastAccessTime, &ftLastWriteTime) == 0)
			bTimeStampValid = FALSE;
		else
			bTimeStampValid = TRUE;
	}

	for (volumeType = TC_VOLUME_TYPE_NORMAL; volumeType < TC_VOLUME_TYPE_COUNT; volumeType++)
	{
		// Seek the volume header
		switch (volumeType)
		{
		case TC_VOLUME_TYPE_NORMAL:
			headerOffset.QuadPart = TC_VOLUME_HEADER_OFFSET;
			break;

		case TC_VOLUME_TYPE_HIDDEN:
			if (TC_HIDDEN_VOLUME_HEADER_OFFSET + TC_VOLUME_HEADER_SIZE > hostSize)
				continue;

			headerOffset.QuadPart = TC_HIDDEN_VOLUME_HEADER_OFFSET;
			break;

		}

		if (!SetFilePointerEx ((HANDLE) dev, headerOffset, NULL, FILE_BEGIN))
		{
			nStatus = ERR_OS_ERROR;
			goto error;
		}

		/* Read in volume header */
		if (!ReadEffectiveVolumeHeader (bDevice, dev, buffer, &bytesRead))
		{
			nStatus = ERR_OS_ERROR;
			goto error;
		}

		if (bytesRead != sizeof (buffer))
		{
			// Windows may report EOF when reading sectors from the last cluster of a device formatted as NTFS 
			memset (buffer, 0, sizeof (buffer));
		}

		/* Try to decrypt the header */

		nStatus = ReadVolumeHeader (FALSE, buffer, oldPassword, old_pkcs5, old_pim, truecryptMode, &cryptoInfo, NULL);
		if (nStatus == ERR_CIPHER_INIT_WEAK_KEY)
			nStatus = 0;	// We can ignore this error here

		if (nStatus == ERR_PASSWORD_WRONG)
		{
			continue;		// Try next volume type
		}
		else if (nStatus != 0)
		{
			cryptoInfo = NULL;
			goto error;
		}
		else 
			break;
	}

	if (nStatus != 0)
	{
		cryptoInfo = NULL;
		goto error;
	}

	if (cryptoInfo->HeaderFlags & TC_HEADER_FLAG_ENCRYPTED_SYSTEM)
	{
		nStatus = ERR_SYS_HIDVOL_HEAD_REENC_MODE_WRONG;
		goto error;
	}

	// Change the PKCS-5 PRF if requested by user
	if (pkcs5 != 0)
		cryptoInfo->pkcs5 = pkcs5;

	RandSetHashFunction (cryptoInfo->pkcs5);

	NormalCursor();
	UserEnrichRandomPool (hwndDlg);
	EnableElevatedCursorChange (hwndDlg);
	WaitCursor();

	/* Re-encrypt the volume header */ 
	backupHeader = FALSE;

	while (TRUE)
	{
		/* The header will be re-encrypted wipePassCount times to prevent adversaries from using 
		techniques such as magnetic force microscopy or magnetic force scanning tunnelling microscopy
		to recover the overwritten header. According to Peter Gutmann, data should be overwritten 22
		times (ideally, 35 times) using non-random patterns and pseudorandom data. However, as users might
		impatiently interupt the process (etc.) we will not use the Gutmann's patterns but will write the
		valid re-encrypted header, i.e. pseudorandom data, and there will be many more passes than Guttman
		recommends. During each pass we will write a valid working header. Each pass will use the same master
		key, and also the same header key, secondary key (XTS), etc., derived from the new password. The only
		item that will be different for each pass will be the salt. This is sufficient to cause each "version"
		of the header to differ substantially and in a random manner from the versions written during the
		other passes. */

		for (wipePass = 0; wipePass < wipePassCount; wipePass++)
		{
			// Prepare new volume header
			nStatus = CreateVolumeHeaderInMemory (hwndDlg, FALSE,
				buffer,
				cryptoInfo->ea,
				cryptoInfo->mode,
				newPassword,
				cryptoInfo->pkcs5,
				pim,
				cryptoInfo->master_keydata,
				&ci,
				cryptoInfo->VolumeSize.Value,
				(volumeType == TC_VOLUME_TYPE_HIDDEN) ? cryptoInfo->hiddenVolumeSize : 0,
				cryptoInfo->EncryptedAreaStart.Value,
				cryptoInfo->EncryptedAreaLength.Value,
				truecryptMode? 0 : cryptoInfo->RequiredProgramVersion,
				cryptoInfo->HeaderFlags,
				cryptoInfo->SectorSize,
				wipePass < wipePassCount - 1);

			if (ci != NULL)
				crypto_close (ci);

			if (nStatus != 0)
				goto error;

			if (!SetFilePointerEx ((HANDLE) dev, headerOffset, NULL, FILE_BEGIN))
			{
				nStatus = ERR_OS_ERROR;
				goto error;
			}

			if (!WriteEffectiveVolumeHeader (bDevice, dev, buffer))
			{
				nStatus = ERR_OS_ERROR;
				goto error;
			}

			if (bDevice
				&& !cryptoInfo->LegacyVolume
				&& !cryptoInfo->hiddenVolume
				&& cryptoInfo->HeaderVersion == 4
				&& (cryptoInfo->HeaderFlags & TC_HEADER_FLAG_NONSYS_INPLACE_ENC) != 0
				&& (cryptoInfo->HeaderFlags & ~TC_HEADER_FLAG_NONSYS_INPLACE_ENC) == 0)
			{
				nStatus = WriteRandomDataToReservedHeaderAreas (hwndDlg, dev, cryptoInfo, cryptoInfo->VolumeSize.Value, !backupHeader, backupHeader);
				if (nStatus != ERR_SUCCESS)
					goto error;
			}

			FlushFileBuffers (dev);
		}

		if (backupHeader || cryptoInfo->LegacyVolume)
			break;
			
		backupHeader = TRUE;
		headerOffset.QuadPart += hostSize - TC_VOLUME_HEADER_GROUP_SIZE;
	}

	/* Password successfully changed */
	nStatus = 0;

error:
	dwError = GetLastError ();

	burn (buffer, sizeof (buffer));

	if (cryptoInfo != NULL)
		crypto_close (cryptoInfo);

	if (bTimeStampValid)
		SetFileTime (dev, &ftCreationTime, &ftLastAccessTime, &ftLastWriteTime);

	if (dev != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
		CloseHandle ((HANDLE) dev);

	if (nDosLinkCreated == 0)
		RemoveFakeDosName (szDiskFile, szDosDevice);

	RandStop (FALSE);
	NormalCursor ();

	SetLastError (dwError);

	if (nStatus == ERR_OS_ERROR && dwError == ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED
		&& bDevice
		&& !UacElevated
		&& IsUacSupported ())
		return nStatus;

	if (nStatus != 0)
		handleError (hwndDlg, nStatus, SRC_POS);

	return nStatus;
}