void Page::userStyleSheetLocationChanged()
{
// FIXME: Eventually we will move to a model of just being handed the sheet
// text instead of loading the URL ourselves.
KURL url = m_settings->userStyleSheetLocation();
m_didLoadUserStyleSheet = false;
m_userStyleSheet = String();
m_userStyleSheetModificationTime = 0;
// Data URLs with base64-encoded UTF-8 style sheets are common. We can process them
// synchronously and avoid using a loader.
if (url.protocolIsData() && url.string().startsWith("data:text/css;charset=utf-8;base64,")) {
m_didLoadUserStyleSheet = true;
Vector<char> styleSheetAsUTF8;
if (base64Decode(decodeURLEscapeSequences(url.string().substring(35)), styleSheetAsUTF8, Base64IgnoreWhitespace))
m_userStyleSheet = String::fromUTF8(styleSheetAsUTF8.data(), styleSheetAsUTF8.size());
}
for (Frame* frame = mainFrame(); frame; frame = frame->tree()->traverseNext()) {
if (frame->document())
frame->document()->styleSheetCollection()->updatePageUserSheet();
}
}
void HTMLAnchorElement::handleClick(Event* event)
{
event->setDefaultHandled();
LocalFrame* frame = document().frame();
if (!frame)
return;
StringBuilder url;
url.append(stripLeadingAndTrailingHTMLSpaces(fastGetAttribute(hrefAttr)));
appendServerMapMousePosition(url, event);
KURL completedURL = document().completeURL(url.toString());
// Schedule the ping before the frame load. Prerender in Chrome may kill the renderer as soon as the navigation is
// sent out.
sendPings(completedURL);
ResourceRequest request(completedURL);
request.setUIStartTime(event->uiCreateTime());
request.setInputPerfMetricReportPolicy(InputToLoadPerfMetricReportPolicy::ReportLink);
if (hasAttribute(downloadAttr)) {
request.setRequestContext(blink::WebURLRequest::RequestContextDownload);
bool isSameOrigin = completedURL.protocolIsData() || document().securityOrigin()->canRequest(completedURL);
const AtomicString& suggestedName = (isSameOrigin ? fastGetAttribute(downloadAttr) : nullAtom);
frame->loader().client()->loadURLExternally(request, NavigationPolicyDownload, suggestedName);
} else {
request.setRequestContext(blink::WebURLRequest::RequestContextHyperlink);
FrameLoadRequest frameRequest(&document(), request, getAttribute(targetAttr));
frameRequest.setTriggeringEvent(event);
if (hasRel(RelationNoReferrer))
frameRequest.setShouldSendReferrer(NeverSendReferrer);
frame->loader().load(frameRequest);
}
}
bool ImageLoader::shouldLoadImmediately(const KURL& url) const {
// We force any image loads which might require alt content through the
// asynchronous path so that we can add the shadow DOM for the alt-text
// content when style recalc is over and DOM mutation is allowed again.
if (!url.isNull()) {
Resource* resource = memoryCache()->resourceForURL(
url, m_element->document().fetcher()->getCacheIdentifier());
if (resource && !resource->errorOccurred())
return true;
}
return (isHTMLObjectElement(m_element) || isHTMLEmbedElement(m_element) ||
url.protocolIsData());
}
bool CanvasRenderingContext::wouldTaintOrigin(const KURL& url)
{
if (!canvas()->originClean() || m_cleanURLs.contains(url.string()))
return false;
if (canvas()->securityOrigin()->taintsCanvas(url))
return true;
if (url.protocolIsData())
return false;
m_cleanURLs.add(url.string());
return false;
}
// static
bool MixedContentChecker::isMixedContent(SecurityOrigin* securityOrigin, const KURL& url)
{
if (!SchemeRegistry::shouldTreatURLSchemeAsRestrictingMixedContent(securityOrigin->protocol()))
return false;
// |url| is mixed content if its origin is not potentially trustworthy, and
// its protocol is not 'data'. We do a quick check against `SecurityOrigin::isSecure`
// to catch things like `about:blank`, which cannot be sanely passed into
// `SecurityOrigin::create` (as their origin depends on their context).
bool isAllowed = url.protocolIsData() || SecurityOrigin::isSecure(url) || SecurityOrigin::create(url)->isPotentiallyTrustworthy();
// TODO(mkwst): Remove this once 'localhost' is no longer considered potentially trustworthy:
if (isAllowed && url.protocolIs("http") && url.host() == "localhost")
isAllowed = false;
return !isAllowed;
}
bool SecurityOrigin::taintsCanvas(const KURL& url) const
{
if (canRequest(url))
return false;
// This function exists because we treat data URLs as having a unique origin,
// contrary to the current (9/19/2009) draft of the HTML5 specification.
// We still want to let folks paint data URLs onto untainted canvases, so
// we special case data URLs below. If we change to match HTML5 w.r.t.
// data URL security, then we can remove this function in favor of
// !canRequest.
if (url.protocolIsData())
return false;
return true;
}
void HTMLAnchorElement::handleClick(Event* event)
{
event->setDefaultHandled();
LocalFrame* frame = document().frame();
if (!frame)
return;
StringBuilder url;
url.append(stripLeadingAndTrailingHTMLSpaces(fastGetAttribute(hrefAttr)));
appendServerMapMousePosition(url, event);
KURL completedURL = document().completeURL(url.toString());
// Schedule the ping before the frame load. Prerender in Chrome may kill the renderer as soon as the navigation is
// sent out.
sendPings(completedURL);
ResourceRequest request(completedURL);
request.setUIStartTime(event->platformTimeStamp());
request.setInputPerfMetricReportPolicy(InputToLoadPerfMetricReportPolicy::ReportLink);
ReferrerPolicy policy;
if (hasAttribute(referrerpolicyAttr) && SecurityPolicy::referrerPolicyFromString(fastGetAttribute(referrerpolicyAttr), &policy) && !hasRel(RelationNoReferrer)) {
request.setHTTPReferrer(SecurityPolicy::generateReferrer(policy, completedURL, document().outgoingReferrer()));
}
if (hasAttribute(downloadAttr)) {
request.setRequestContext(WebURLRequest::RequestContextDownload);
bool isSameOrigin = completedURL.protocolIsData() || document().getSecurityOrigin()->canRequest(completedURL);
const AtomicString& suggestedName = (isSameOrigin ? fastGetAttribute(downloadAttr) : nullAtom);
frame->loader().client()->loadURLExternally(request, NavigationPolicyDownload, suggestedName, false);
} else {
request.setRequestContext(WebURLRequest::RequestContextHyperlink);
FrameLoadRequest frameRequest(&document(), request, getAttribute(targetAttr));
frameRequest.setTriggeringEvent(event);
if (hasRel(RelationNoReferrer)) {
frameRequest.setShouldSendReferrer(NeverSendReferrer);
frameRequest.setShouldSetOpener(NeverSetOpener);
}
if (hasRel(RelationNoOpener))
frameRequest.setShouldSetOpener(NeverSetOpener);
// TODO(japhet): Link clicks can be emulated via JS without a user gesture.
// Why doesn't this go through NavigationScheduler?
frame->loader().load(frameRequest);
}
}
ResourceRequestBlockedReason FrameFetchContext::canRequestInternal(Resource::Type type, const ResourceRequest& resourceRequest, const KURL& url, const ResourceLoaderOptions& options, bool forPreload, FetchRequest::OriginRestriction originRestriction, ResourceRequest::RedirectStatus redirectStatus) const
{
if (InspectorInstrumentation::shouldBlockRequest(frame(), resourceRequest))
return ResourceRequestBlockedReasonInspector;
SecurityOrigin* securityOrigin = options.securityOrigin.get();
if (!securityOrigin && m_document)
securityOrigin = m_document->getSecurityOrigin();
if (originRestriction != FetchRequest::NoOriginRestriction && securityOrigin && !securityOrigin->canDisplay(url)) {
if (!forPreload)
FrameLoader::reportLocalLoadFailed(frame(), url.elidedString());
WTF_LOG(ResourceLoading, "ResourceFetcher::requestResource URL was not allowed by SecurityOrigin::canDisplay");
return ResourceRequestBlockedReasonOther;
}
// Some types of resources can be loaded only from the same origin. Other
// types of resources, like Images, Scripts, and CSS, can be loaded from
// any URL.
switch (type) {
case Resource::MainResource:
case Resource::Image:
case Resource::CSSStyleSheet:
case Resource::Script:
case Resource::Font:
case Resource::Raw:
case Resource::LinkPrefetch:
case Resource::LinkPreload:
case Resource::TextTrack:
case Resource::ImportResource:
case Resource::Media:
case Resource::Manifest:
// By default these types of resources can be loaded from any origin.
// FIXME: Are we sure about Resource::Font?
if (originRestriction == FetchRequest::RestrictToSameOrigin && !securityOrigin->canRequest(url)) {
printAccessDeniedMessage(url);
return ResourceRequestBlockedReasonOrigin;
}
break;
case Resource::XSLStyleSheet:
ASSERT(RuntimeEnabledFeatures::xsltEnabled());
case Resource::SVGDocument:
if (!securityOrigin->canRequest(url)) {
printAccessDeniedMessage(url);
return ResourceRequestBlockedReasonOrigin;
}
break;
}
// FIXME: Convert this to check the isolated world's Content Security Policy once webkit.org/b/104520 is solved.
bool shouldBypassMainWorldCSP = frame()->script().shouldBypassMainWorldCSP() || options.contentSecurityPolicyOption == DoNotCheckContentSecurityPolicy;
// Don't send CSP messages for preloads, we might never actually display those items.
ContentSecurityPolicy::ReportingStatus cspReporting = forPreload ?
ContentSecurityPolicy::SuppressReport : ContentSecurityPolicy::SendReport;
if (m_document) {
DCHECK(m_document->contentSecurityPolicy());
if (!shouldBypassMainWorldCSP && !m_document->contentSecurityPolicy()->allowRequest(resourceRequest.requestContext(), url, options.contentSecurityPolicyNonce, redirectStatus, cspReporting))
return ResourceRequestBlockedReasonCSP;
}
if (type == Resource::Script || type == Resource::ImportResource) {
ASSERT(frame());
if (!frame()->loader().client()->allowScriptFromSource(!frame()->settings() || frame()->settings()->scriptEnabled(), url)) {
frame()->loader().client()->didNotAllowScript();
// TODO(estark): Use a different ResourceRequestBlockedReason
// here, since this check has nothing to do with
// CSP. https://crbug.com/600795
return ResourceRequestBlockedReasonCSP;
}
} else if (type == Resource::Media || type == Resource::TextTrack) {
ASSERT(frame());
if (!frame()->loader().client()->allowMedia(url))
return ResourceRequestBlockedReasonOther;
}
// SVG Images have unique security rules that prevent all subresource requests
// except for data urls.
if (type != Resource::MainResource && frame()->chromeClient().isSVGImageChromeClient() && !url.protocolIsData())
return ResourceRequestBlockedReasonOrigin;
// Measure the number of legacy URL schemes ('ftp://') and the number of embedded-credential
// ('http://*****:*****@...') resources embedded as subresources. in the hopes that we can
// block them at some point in the future.
if (resourceRequest.frameType() != WebURLRequest::FrameTypeTopLevel) {
ASSERT(frame()->document());
if (SchemeRegistry::shouldTreatURLSchemeAsLegacy(url.protocol()) && !SchemeRegistry::shouldTreatURLSchemeAsLegacy(frame()->document()->getSecurityOrigin()->protocol()))
UseCounter::count(frame()->document(), UseCounter::LegacyProtocolEmbeddedAsSubresource);
if (!url.user().isEmpty() || !url.pass().isEmpty())
UseCounter::count(frame()->document(), UseCounter::RequestedSubresourceWithEmbeddedCredentials);
}
// Check for mixed content. We do this second-to-last so that when folks block
// mixed content with a CSP policy, they don't get a warning. They'll still
// get a warning in the console about CSP blocking the load.
MixedContentChecker::ReportingStatus mixedContentReporting = forPreload ?
MixedContentChecker::SuppressReport : MixedContentChecker::SendReport;
if (MixedContentChecker::shouldBlockFetch(frame(), resourceRequest, url, mixedContentReporting))
return ResourceRequestBlockedReasonMixedContent;
// Let the client have the final say into whether or not the load should proceed.
DocumentLoader* documentLoader = masterDocumentLoader();
if (documentLoader && documentLoader->subresourceFilter() && type != Resource::MainResource && type != Resource::ImportResource && !documentLoader->subresourceFilter()->allowLoad(url, resourceRequest.requestContext()))
return ResourceRequestBlockedReasonSubresourceFilter;
return ResourceRequestBlockedReasonNone;
}
bool CSSFontFaceSrcValue::shouldSetCrossOriginAccessControl(const KURL& resource, SecurityOrigin* securityOrigin)
{
if (resource.isLocalFile() || resource.protocolIsData())
return false;
return !securityOrigin->canRequest(resource);
}
bool PageSerializer::shouldAddURL(const KURL& url)
{
return url.isValid() && !m_resourceURLs.contains(url) && !url.protocolIsData();
}
bool ImageLoader::shouldLoadImmediately(const KURL& url, LoadType loadType) const
{
return url.protocolIsData()
|| memoryCache()->resourceForURL(url)
|| loadType == ForceLoadImmediately;
}
ResourceRequestBlockedReason FrameFetchContext::canRequestInternal(Resource::Type type, const ResourceRequest& resourceRequest, const KURL& url, const ResourceLoaderOptions& options, bool forPreload, FetchRequest::OriginRestriction originRestriction) const
{
InstrumentingAgents* agents = InspectorInstrumentation::instrumentingAgentsFor(frame());
if (agents && agents->inspectorResourceAgent()) {
if (agents->inspectorResourceAgent()->shouldBlockRequest(resourceRequest))
return ResourceRequestBlockedReasonInspector;
}
SecurityOrigin* securityOrigin = options.securityOrigin.get();
if (!securityOrigin && m_document)
securityOrigin = m_document->securityOrigin();
if (originRestriction != FetchRequest::NoOriginRestriction && securityOrigin && !securityOrigin->canDisplay(url)) {
if (!forPreload)
FrameLoader::reportLocalLoadFailed(frame(), url.elidedString());
WTF_LOG(ResourceLoading, "ResourceFetcher::requestResource URL was not allowed by SecurityOrigin::canDisplay");
return ResourceRequestBlockedReasonOther;
}
// Some types of resources can be loaded only from the same origin. Other
// types of resources, like Images, Scripts, and CSS, can be loaded from
// any URL.
switch (type) {
case Resource::MainResource:
case Resource::Image:
case Resource::CSSStyleSheet:
case Resource::Script:
case Resource::Font:
case Resource::Raw:
case Resource::LinkPrefetch:
case Resource::LinkSubresource:
case Resource::LinkPreload:
case Resource::TextTrack:
case Resource::ImportResource:
case Resource::Media:
// By default these types of resources can be loaded from any origin.
// FIXME: Are we sure about Resource::Font?
if (originRestriction == FetchRequest::RestrictToSameOrigin && !securityOrigin->canRequest(url)) {
printAccessDeniedMessage(url);
return ResourceRequestBlockedReasonOrigin;
}
break;
case Resource::XSLStyleSheet:
ASSERT(RuntimeEnabledFeatures::xsltEnabled());
case Resource::SVGDocument:
if (!securityOrigin->canRequest(url)) {
printAccessDeniedMessage(url);
return ResourceRequestBlockedReasonOrigin;
}
break;
}
// FIXME: Convert this to check the isolated world's Content Security Policy once webkit.org/b/104520 is solved.
bool shouldBypassMainWorldCSP = frame()->script().shouldBypassMainWorldCSP() || options.contentSecurityPolicyOption == DoNotCheckContentSecurityPolicy;
// Don't send CSP messages for preloads, we might never actually display those items.
ContentSecurityPolicy::ReportingStatus cspReporting = forPreload ?
ContentSecurityPolicy::SuppressReport : ContentSecurityPolicy::SendReport;
// As of CSP2, for requests that are the results of redirects, the match
// algorithm should ignore the path component of the URL.
ContentSecurityPolicy::RedirectStatus redirectStatus = resourceRequest.followedRedirect() ? ContentSecurityPolicy::DidRedirect : ContentSecurityPolicy::DidNotRedirect;
// m_document can be null, but not in any of the cases where csp is actually used below.
// ImageResourceTest.MultipartImage crashes w/o the m_document null check.
// I believe it's the Resource::Raw case.
const ContentSecurityPolicy* csp = m_document ? m_document->contentSecurityPolicy() : nullptr;
// FIXME: This would be cleaner if moved this switch into an allowFromSource()
// helper on this object which took a Resource::Type, then this block would
// collapse to about 10 lines for handling Raw and Script special cases.
switch (type) {
case Resource::XSLStyleSheet:
ASSERT(RuntimeEnabledFeatures::xsltEnabled());
ASSERT(ContentSecurityPolicy::isScriptResource(resourceRequest));
if (!shouldBypassMainWorldCSP && !csp->allowScriptFromSource(url, redirectStatus, cspReporting))
return ResourceRequestBlockedReasonCSP;
break;
case Resource::Script:
case Resource::ImportResource:
ASSERT(ContentSecurityPolicy::isScriptResource(resourceRequest));
if (!shouldBypassMainWorldCSP && !csp->allowScriptFromSource(url, redirectStatus, cspReporting))
return ResourceRequestBlockedReasonCSP;
if (!frame()->loader().client()->allowScriptFromSource(!frame()->settings() || frame()->settings()->scriptEnabled(), url)) {
frame()->loader().client()->didNotAllowScript();
return ResourceRequestBlockedReasonCSP;
}
break;
case Resource::CSSStyleSheet:
ASSERT(ContentSecurityPolicy::isStyleResource(resourceRequest));
if (!shouldBypassMainWorldCSP && !csp->allowStyleFromSource(url, redirectStatus, cspReporting))
return ResourceRequestBlockedReasonCSP;
break;
case Resource::SVGDocument:
case Resource::Image:
ASSERT(ContentSecurityPolicy::isImageResource(resourceRequest));
if (!shouldBypassMainWorldCSP && !csp->allowImageFromSource(url, redirectStatus, cspReporting))
return ResourceRequestBlockedReasonCSP;
break;
case Resource::Font: {
ASSERT(ContentSecurityPolicy::isFontResource(resourceRequest));
if (!shouldBypassMainWorldCSP && !csp->allowFontFromSource(url, redirectStatus, cspReporting))
return ResourceRequestBlockedReasonCSP;
break;
}
case Resource::MainResource:
case Resource::Raw:
case Resource::LinkPrefetch:
case Resource::LinkSubresource:
case Resource::LinkPreload:
break;
case Resource::Media:
case Resource::TextTrack:
ASSERT(ContentSecurityPolicy::isMediaResource(resourceRequest));
if (!shouldBypassMainWorldCSP && !csp->allowMediaFromSource(url, redirectStatus, cspReporting))
return ResourceRequestBlockedReasonCSP;
if (!frame()->loader().client()->allowMedia(url))
return ResourceRequestBlockedReasonOther;
break;
}
// SVG Images have unique security rules that prevent all subresource requests
// except for data urls.
if (type != Resource::MainResource && frame()->chromeClient().isSVGImageChromeClient() && !url.protocolIsData())
return ResourceRequestBlockedReasonOrigin;
// FIXME: Once we use RequestContext for CSP (http://crbug.com/390497), remove this extra check.
if (resourceRequest.requestContext() == WebURLRequest::RequestContextManifest) {
if (!shouldBypassMainWorldCSP && !csp->allowManifestFromSource(url, redirectStatus, cspReporting))
return ResourceRequestBlockedReasonCSP;
}
// Measure the number of legacy URL schemes ('ftp://') and the number of embedded-credential
// ('http://*****:*****@...') resources embedded as subresources. in the hopes that we can
// block them at some point in the future.
if (resourceRequest.frameType() != WebURLRequest::FrameTypeTopLevel) {
ASSERT(frame()->document());
if (SchemeRegistry::shouldTreatURLSchemeAsLegacy(url.protocol()) && !SchemeRegistry::shouldTreatURLSchemeAsLegacy(frame()->document()->securityOrigin()->protocol()))
UseCounter::count(frame()->document(), UseCounter::LegacyProtocolEmbeddedAsSubresource);
if (!url.user().isEmpty() || !url.pass().isEmpty())
UseCounter::count(frame()->document(), UseCounter::RequestedSubresourceWithEmbeddedCredentials);
}
// Measure the number of pages that load resources after a redirect
// when a CSP is active, to see if implementing CSP
// 'unsafe-redirect' is feasible.
if (csp && csp->isActive() && resourceRequest.frameType() != WebURLRequest::FrameTypeTopLevel && resourceRequest.frameType() != WebURLRequest::FrameTypeAuxiliary && redirectStatus == ContentSecurityPolicy::DidRedirect) {
ASSERT(frame()->document());
UseCounter::count(frame()->document(), UseCounter::ResourceLoadedAfterRedirectWithCSP);
}
// Last of all, check for mixed content. We do this last so that when
// folks block mixed content with a CSP policy, they don't get a warning.
// They'll still get a warning in the console about CSP blocking the load.
MixedContentChecker::ReportingStatus mixedContentReporting = forPreload ?
MixedContentChecker::SuppressReport : MixedContentChecker::SendReport;
if (MixedContentChecker::shouldBlockFetch(MixedContentChecker::effectiveFrameForFrameType(frame(), resourceRequest.frameType()), resourceRequest, url, mixedContentReporting))
return ResourceRequestBlockedReasonMixedContent;
return ResourceRequestBlockedReasonNone;
}
