/*
* Routine: task_for_pid_posix_check
* Purpose:
* Verify that the current process should be allowed to
* get the target process's task port. This is only
* permitted if:
* - The current process is root
* OR all of the following are true:
* - The target process's real, effective, and saved uids
* are the same as the current proc's euid,
* - The target process's group set is a subset of the
* calling process's group set, and
* - The target process hasn't switched credentials.
*
* Returns: TRUE: permitted
* FALSE: denied
*/
static int
task_for_pid_posix_check(proc_t target)
{
kauth_cred_t targetcred, mycred;
uid_t myuid;
int allowed;
/* No task_for_pid on bad targets */
if (target->p_stat == SZOMB) {
return FALSE;
}
mycred = kauth_cred_get();
myuid = kauth_cred_getuid(mycred);
/* If we're running as root, the check passes */
if (kauth_cred_issuser(mycred))
return TRUE;
/* We're allowed to get our own task port */
if (target == current_proc())
return TRUE;
/*
* Under DENY, only root can get another proc's task port,
* so no more checks are needed.
*/
if (tfp_policy == KERN_TFP_POLICY_DENY) {
return FALSE;
}
targetcred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(target);
allowed = TRUE;
/* Do target's ruid, euid, and saved uid match my euid? */
if ((kauth_cred_getuid(targetcred) != myuid) ||
(kauth_cred_getruid(targetcred) != myuid) ||
(kauth_cred_getsvuid(targetcred) != myuid)) {
allowed = FALSE;
goto out;
}
/* Are target's groups a subset of my groups? */
if (kauth_cred_gid_subset(targetcred, mycred, &allowed) ||
allowed == 0) {
allowed = FALSE;
goto out;
}
/* Has target switched credentials? */
if (target->p_flag & P_SUGID) {
allowed = FALSE;
goto out;
}
out:
kauth_cred_unref(&targetcred);
return allowed;
}
int
ktrace_read_check(void)
{
lck_mtx_assert(ktrace_lock, LCK_MTX_ASSERT_OWNED);
if (proc_uniqueid(current_proc()) == ktrace_owning_unique_id)
{
return 0;
}
return kauth_cred_issuser(kauth_cred_get()) ? 0 : EPERM;
}
int
ktrace_configure(uint32_t config_mask)
{
lck_mtx_assert(ktrace_lock, LCK_MTX_ASSERT_OWNED);
assert(config_mask != 0);
proc_t p = current_proc();
/* if process clearly owns ktrace, allow */
if (proc_uniqueid(p) == ktrace_owning_unique_id) {
ktrace_active_mask |= config_mask;
return 0;
}
/* background configure while foreground is active is not allowed */
if (proc_uniqueid(p) == ktrace_bg_unique_id &&
ktrace_state == KTRACE_STATE_FG)
{
return EBUSY;
}
ktrace_ownership_maintenance();
/* allow process to gain control when unowned or background */
if (ktrace_owning_unique_id == 0 || ktrace_state == KTRACE_STATE_BG) {
if (!kauth_cred_issuser(kauth_cred_get())) {
return EPERM;
}
ktrace_set_owning_proc(p);
ktrace_active_mask |= config_mask;
return 0;
}
/* owned by an existing, different process */
return EBUSY;
}
static int
handle_apptype( int scope,
int action,
__unused int policy,
int policy_subtype,
__unused user_addr_t attrp,
proc_t target_proc,
__unused uint64_t target_threadid)
{
int error = 0;
if (scope != PROC_POLICY_SCOPE_PROCESS)
return (EINVAL);
/* Temporary compatibility with old importance donation interface until libproc is moved to new boost calls */
switch (policy_subtype) {
case PROC_POLICY_IOS_DONATEIMP:
if (action != PROC_POLICY_ACTION_ENABLE)
return (EINVAL);
if (target_proc != current_proc())
return (EINVAL);
/* PROCESS ENABLE APPTYPE DONATEIMP */
task_importance_mark_donor(target_proc->task, TRUE);
return(0);
case PROC_POLICY_IOS_HOLDIMP:
if (action != PROC_POLICY_ACTION_ENABLE)
return (EINVAL);
if (target_proc != current_proc())
return (EINVAL);
/* PROCESS ENABLE APPTYPE HOLDIMP */
error = task_importance_hold_legacy_external_assertion(current_task(), 1);
return(error);
case PROC_POLICY_IOS_DROPIMP:
if (action != PROC_POLICY_ACTION_ENABLE)
return (EINVAL);
if (target_proc != current_proc())
return (EINVAL);
/* PROCESS ENABLE APPTYPE DROPIMP */
error = task_importance_drop_legacy_external_assertion(current_task(), 1);
return(error);
default:
/* continue to TAL handling */
break;
}
if (policy_subtype != PROC_POLICY_OSX_APPTYPE_TAL)
return (EINVAL);
/* need to be super user to do this */
if (kauth_cred_issuser(kauth_cred_get()) == 0)
return (EPERM);
if (proc_task_is_tal(target_proc->task) == FALSE)
return (EINVAL);
switch (action) {
case PROC_POLICY_ACTION_ENABLE:
/* PROCESS ENABLE APPTYPE TAL */
proc_set_task_policy(target_proc->task,
TASK_POLICY_ATTRIBUTE, TASK_POLICY_TAL,
TASK_POLICY_ENABLE);
break;
case PROC_POLICY_ACTION_DISABLE:
/* PROCESS DISABLE APPTYPE TAL */
proc_set_task_policy(target_proc->task,
TASK_POLICY_ATTRIBUTE, TASK_POLICY_TAL,
TASK_POLICY_DISABLE);
break;
default:
return (EINVAL);
}
return(0);
}
/* system call implementation */
int
process_policy(__unused struct proc *p, struct process_policy_args * uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
{
int error = 0;
int scope = uap->scope;
int policy = uap->policy;
int action = uap->action;
int policy_subtype = uap->policy_subtype;
user_addr_t attrp = uap->attrp;
pid_t target_pid = uap->target_pid;
uint64_t target_threadid = uap->target_threadid;
proc_t target_proc = PROC_NULL;
#if CONFIG_MACF || !CONFIG_EMBEDDED
proc_t curp = current_proc();
#endif
kauth_cred_t my_cred;
#if CONFIG_EMBEDDED
kauth_cred_t target_cred;
#endif
if ((scope != PROC_POLICY_SCOPE_PROCESS) && (scope != PROC_POLICY_SCOPE_THREAD)) {
return(EINVAL);
}
if (target_pid == 0 || target_pid == proc_selfpid())
target_proc = proc_self();
else
target_proc = proc_find(target_pid);
if (target_proc == PROC_NULL)
return(ESRCH);
my_cred = kauth_cred_get();
#if CONFIG_EMBEDDED
target_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(target_proc);
if (!kauth_cred_issuser(my_cred) && kauth_cred_getruid(my_cred) &&
kauth_cred_getuid(my_cred) != kauth_cred_getuid(target_cred) &&
kauth_cred_getruid(my_cred) != kauth_cred_getuid(target_cred))
#else
/*
* Resoure starvation control can be used by unpriv resource owner but priv at the time of ownership claim. This is
* checked in low resource handle routine. So bypass the checks here.
*/
if ((policy != PROC_POLICY_RESOURCE_STARVATION) &&
(policy != PROC_POLICY_APPTYPE) &&
(!kauth_cred_issuser(my_cred) && curp != p))
#endif
{
error = EPERM;
goto out;
}
#if CONFIG_MACF
switch (policy) {
case PROC_POLICY_BOOST:
case PROC_POLICY_RESOURCE_USAGE:
#if CONFIG_EMBEDDED
case PROC_POLICY_APPTYPE:
case PROC_POLICY_APP_LIFECYCLE:
#endif
/* These policies do their own appropriate mac checks */
break;
default:
error = mac_proc_check_sched(curp, target_proc);
if (error) goto out;
break;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_MACF */
switch(policy) {
case PROC_POLICY_BACKGROUND:
error = ENOTSUP;
break;
case PROC_POLICY_HARDWARE_ACCESS:
error = ENOTSUP;
break;
case PROC_POLICY_RESOURCE_STARVATION:
error = handle_lowresource(scope, action, policy, policy_subtype, attrp, target_proc, target_threadid);
break;
case PROC_POLICY_RESOURCE_USAGE:
switch(policy_subtype) {
case PROC_POLICY_RUSAGE_NONE:
case PROC_POLICY_RUSAGE_WIREDMEM:
case PROC_POLICY_RUSAGE_VIRTMEM:
case PROC_POLICY_RUSAGE_DISK:
case PROC_POLICY_RUSAGE_NETWORK:
case PROC_POLICY_RUSAGE_POWER:
error = ENOTSUP;
goto out;
default:
error = EINVAL;
goto out;
case PROC_POLICY_RUSAGE_CPU:
break;
}
error = handle_cpuuse(action, attrp, target_proc, target_threadid);
break;
#if CONFIG_EMBEDDED
case PROC_POLICY_APP_LIFECYCLE:
error = handle_applifecycle(scope, action, policy, policy_subtype, attrp, target_proc, target_threadid);
break;
#endif /* CONFIG_EMBEDDED */
case PROC_POLICY_APPTYPE:
error = handle_apptype(scope, action, policy, policy_subtype, attrp, target_proc, target_threadid);
break;
case PROC_POLICY_BOOST:
error = handle_boost(scope, action, policy, policy_subtype, attrp, target_proc, target_threadid);
break;
default:
error = EINVAL;
break;
}
out:
proc_rele(target_proc);
#if CONFIG_EMBEDDED
kauth_cred_unref(&target_cred);
#endif
return(error);
}
kern_return_t
task_name_for_pid(
struct task_name_for_pid_args *args)
{
mach_port_name_t target_tport = args->target_tport;
int pid = args->pid;
user_addr_t task_addr = args->t;
proc_t p = PROC_NULL;
task_t t1;
mach_port_name_t tret;
void * sright;
int error = 0, refheld = 0;
kauth_cred_t target_cred;
AUDIT_MACH_SYSCALL_ENTER(AUE_TASKNAMEFORPID);
AUDIT_ARG(pid, pid);
AUDIT_ARG(mach_port1, target_tport);
t1 = port_name_to_task(target_tport);
if (t1 == TASK_NULL) {
(void) copyout((char *)&t1, task_addr, sizeof(mach_port_name_t));
AUDIT_MACH_SYSCALL_EXIT(KERN_FAILURE);
return(KERN_FAILURE);
}
p = proc_find(pid);
if (p != PROC_NULL) {
AUDIT_ARG(process, p);
target_cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
refheld = 1;
if ((p->p_stat != SZOMB)
&& ((current_proc() == p)
|| kauth_cred_issuser(kauth_cred_get())
|| ((kauth_cred_getuid(target_cred) == kauth_cred_getuid(kauth_cred_get())) &&
((kauth_cred_getruid(target_cred) == kauth_getruid()))))) {
if (p->task != TASK_NULL) {
task_reference(p->task);
#if CONFIG_MACF
error = mac_proc_check_get_task_name(kauth_cred_get(), p);
if (error) {
task_deallocate(p->task);
goto noperm;
}
#endif
sright = (void *)convert_task_name_to_port(p->task);
tret = ipc_port_copyout_send(sright,
get_task_ipcspace(current_task()));
} else
tret = MACH_PORT_NULL;
AUDIT_ARG(mach_port2, tret);
(void) copyout((char *)&tret, task_addr, sizeof(mach_port_name_t));
task_deallocate(t1);
error = KERN_SUCCESS;
goto tnfpout;
}
}
#if CONFIG_MACF
noperm:
#endif
task_deallocate(t1);
tret = MACH_PORT_NULL;
(void) copyout((char *) &tret, task_addr, sizeof(mach_port_name_t));
error = KERN_FAILURE;
tnfpout:
if (refheld != 0)
kauth_cred_unref(&target_cred);
if (p != PROC_NULL)
proc_rele(p);
AUDIT_MACH_SYSCALL_EXIT(error);
return(error);
}
/*
* Routine: task_for_pid
* Purpose:
* Get the task port for another "process", named by its
* process ID on the same host as "target_task".
*
* Only permitted to privileged processes, or processes
* with the same user ID.
*
* Note: if pid == 0, an error is return no matter who is calling.
*
* XXX This should be a BSD system call, not a Mach trap!!!
*/
kern_return_t
task_for_pid(
struct task_for_pid_args *args)
{
mach_port_name_t target_tport = args->target_tport;
int pid = args->pid;
user_addr_t task_addr = args->t;
proc_t p = PROC_NULL;
task_t t1 = TASK_NULL;
mach_port_name_t tret = MACH_PORT_NULL;
ipc_port_t tfpport;
void * sright;
int error = 0;
AUDIT_MACH_SYSCALL_ENTER(AUE_TASKFORPID);
AUDIT_ARG(pid, pid);
AUDIT_ARG(mach_port1, target_tport);
/* Always check if pid == 0 */
if (pid == 0) {
(void ) copyout((char *)&t1, task_addr, sizeof(mach_port_name_t));
AUDIT_MACH_SYSCALL_EXIT(KERN_FAILURE);
return(KERN_FAILURE);
}
t1 = port_name_to_task(target_tport);
if (t1 == TASK_NULL) {
(void) copyout((char *)&t1, task_addr, sizeof(mach_port_name_t));
AUDIT_MACH_SYSCALL_EXIT(KERN_FAILURE);
return(KERN_FAILURE);
}
p = proc_find(pid);
if (p == PROC_NULL) {
error = KERN_FAILURE;
goto tfpout;
}
#if CONFIG_AUDIT
AUDIT_ARG(process, p);
#endif
if (!(task_for_pid_posix_check(p))) {
error = KERN_FAILURE;
goto tfpout;
}
if (p->task != TASK_NULL) {
/* If we aren't root and target's task access port is set... */
if (!kauth_cred_issuser(kauth_cred_get()) &&
p != current_proc() &&
(task_get_task_access_port(p->task, &tfpport) == 0) &&
(tfpport != IPC_PORT_NULL)) {
if (tfpport == IPC_PORT_DEAD) {
error = KERN_PROTECTION_FAILURE;
goto tfpout;
}
/* Call up to the task access server */
error = check_task_access(tfpport, proc_selfpid(), kauth_getgid(), pid);
if (error != MACH_MSG_SUCCESS) {
if (error == MACH_RCV_INTERRUPTED)
error = KERN_ABORTED;
else
error = KERN_FAILURE;
goto tfpout;
}
}
#if CONFIG_MACF
error = mac_proc_check_get_task(kauth_cred_get(), p);
if (error) {
error = KERN_FAILURE;
goto tfpout;
}
#endif
/* Grant task port access */
task_reference(p->task);
extmod_statistics_incr_task_for_pid(p->task);
sright = (void *) convert_task_to_port(p->task);
tret = ipc_port_copyout_send(
sright,
get_task_ipcspace(current_task()));
}
error = KERN_SUCCESS;
tfpout:
task_deallocate(t1);
AUDIT_ARG(mach_port2, tret);
(void) copyout((char *) &tret, task_addr, sizeof(mach_port_name_t));
if (p != PROC_NULL)
proc_rele(p);
AUDIT_MACH_SYSCALL_EXIT(error);
return(error);
}
static errno_t
utun_ctl_setopt(
__unused kern_ctl_ref kctlref,
__unused u_int32_t unit,
void *unitinfo,
int opt,
void *data,
size_t len)
{
struct utun_pcb *pcb = unitinfo;
errno_t result = 0;
/* check for privileges for privileged options */
switch (opt) {
case UTUN_OPT_FLAGS:
case UTUN_OPT_EXT_IFDATA_STATS:
case UTUN_OPT_SET_DELEGATE_INTERFACE:
if (kauth_cred_issuser(kauth_cred_get()) == 0) {
return EPERM;
}
break;
}
switch (opt) {
case UTUN_OPT_FLAGS:
if (len != sizeof(u_int32_t))
result = EMSGSIZE;
else
pcb->utun_flags = *(u_int32_t *)data;
break;
case UTUN_OPT_ENABLE_CRYPTO:
result = utun_ctl_enable_crypto(kctlref, unit, unitinfo, opt, data, len);
break;
case UTUN_OPT_CONFIG_CRYPTO_KEYS:
result = utun_ctl_config_crypto_keys(kctlref, unit, unitinfo, opt, data, len);
break;
case UTUN_OPT_UNCONFIG_CRYPTO_KEYS:
result = utun_ctl_unconfig_crypto_keys(kctlref, unit, unitinfo, opt, data, len);
break;
case UTUN_OPT_DISABLE_CRYPTO:
result = utun_ctl_disable_crypto(kctlref, unit, unitinfo, opt, data, len);
break;
case UTUN_OPT_STOP_CRYPTO_DATA_TRAFFIC:
result = utun_ctl_stop_crypto_data_traffic(kctlref, unit, unitinfo, opt, data, len);
break;
case UTUN_OPT_START_CRYPTO_DATA_TRAFFIC:
result = utun_ctl_start_crypto_data_traffic(kctlref, unit, unitinfo, opt, data, len);
break;
case UTUN_OPT_CONFIG_CRYPTO_FRAMER:
result = utun_ctl_config_crypto_framer(kctlref, unit, unitinfo, opt, data, len);
break;
case UTUN_OPT_UNCONFIG_CRYPTO_FRAMER:
result = utun_ctl_unconfig_crypto_framer(kctlref, unit, unitinfo, opt, data, len);
break;
case UTUN_OPT_EXT_IFDATA_STATS:
if (len != sizeof(int)) {
result = EMSGSIZE;
break;
}
pcb->utun_ext_ifdata_stats = (*(int *)data) ? 1 : 0;
break;
case UTUN_OPT_INC_IFDATA_STATS_IN:
case UTUN_OPT_INC_IFDATA_STATS_OUT: {
struct utun_stats_param *utsp = (struct utun_stats_param *)data;
if (utsp == NULL || len < sizeof(struct utun_stats_param)) {
result = EINVAL;
break;
}
if (!pcb->utun_ext_ifdata_stats) {
result = EINVAL;
break;
}
if (opt == UTUN_OPT_INC_IFDATA_STATS_IN)
ifnet_stat_increment_in(pcb->utun_ifp, utsp->utsp_packets,
utsp->utsp_bytes, utsp->utsp_errors);
else
ifnet_stat_increment_out(pcb->utun_ifp, utsp->utsp_packets,
utsp->utsp_bytes, utsp->utsp_errors);
break;
}
case UTUN_OPT_SET_DELEGATE_INTERFACE: {
ifnet_t del_ifp = NULL;
char name[IFNAMSIZ];
if (len > IFNAMSIZ - 1) {
result = EMSGSIZE;
break;
}
if (len != 0) { /* if len==0, del_ifp will be NULL causing the delegate to be removed */
bcopy(data, name, len);
name[len] = 0;
result = ifnet_find_by_name(name, &del_ifp);
}
if (result == 0) {
result = ifnet_set_delegate(pcb->utun_ifp, del_ifp);
if (del_ifp)
ifnet_release(del_ifp);
}
break;
}
default:
result = ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
return result;
}
static errno_t
utun_ctl_setopt(
__unused kern_ctl_ref kctlref,
__unused u_int32_t unit,
void *unitinfo,
int opt,
void *data,
size_t len)
{
struct utun_pcb *pcb = unitinfo;
errno_t result = 0;
/* check for privileges for privileged options */
switch (opt) {
case UTUN_OPT_FLAGS:
case UTUN_OPT_EXT_IFDATA_STATS:
case UTUN_OPT_SET_DELEGATE_INTERFACE:
if (kauth_cred_issuser(kauth_cred_get()) == 0) {
return EPERM;
}
break;
}
switch (opt) {
case UTUN_OPT_FLAGS:
if (len != sizeof(u_int32_t)) {
result = EMSGSIZE;
} else {
u_int32_t old_flags = pcb->utun_flags;
pcb->utun_flags = *(u_int32_t *)data;
if (((old_flags ^ pcb->utun_flags) & UTUN_FLAGS_ENABLE_PROC_UUID)) {
// If UTUN_FLAGS_ENABLE_PROC_UUID flag changed, update bpf
bpfdetach(pcb->utun_ifp);
bpfattach(pcb->utun_ifp, DLT_NULL, UTUN_HEADER_SIZE(pcb));
}
}
break;
case UTUN_OPT_EXT_IFDATA_STATS:
if (len != sizeof(int)) {
result = EMSGSIZE;
break;
}
pcb->utun_ext_ifdata_stats = (*(int *)data) ? 1 : 0;
break;
case UTUN_OPT_INC_IFDATA_STATS_IN:
case UTUN_OPT_INC_IFDATA_STATS_OUT: {
struct utun_stats_param *utsp = (struct utun_stats_param *)data;
if (utsp == NULL || len < sizeof(struct utun_stats_param)) {
result = EINVAL;
break;
}
if (!pcb->utun_ext_ifdata_stats) {
result = EINVAL;
break;
}
if (opt == UTUN_OPT_INC_IFDATA_STATS_IN)
ifnet_stat_increment_in(pcb->utun_ifp, utsp->utsp_packets,
utsp->utsp_bytes, utsp->utsp_errors);
else
ifnet_stat_increment_out(pcb->utun_ifp, utsp->utsp_packets,
utsp->utsp_bytes, utsp->utsp_errors);
break;
}
case UTUN_OPT_SET_DELEGATE_INTERFACE: {
ifnet_t del_ifp = NULL;
char name[IFNAMSIZ];
if (len > IFNAMSIZ - 1) {
result = EMSGSIZE;
break;
}
if (len != 0) { /* if len==0, del_ifp will be NULL causing the delegate to be removed */
bcopy(data, name, len);
name[len] = 0;
result = ifnet_find_by_name(name, &del_ifp);
}
if (result == 0) {
result = ifnet_set_delegate(pcb->utun_ifp, del_ifp);
if (del_ifp)
ifnet_release(del_ifp);
}
break;
}
case UTUN_OPT_MAX_PENDING_PACKETS: {
u_int32_t max_pending_packets = 0;
if (len != sizeof(u_int32_t)) {
result = EMSGSIZE;
break;
}
max_pending_packets = *(u_int32_t *)data;
if (max_pending_packets == 0) {
result = EINVAL;
break;
}
pcb->utun_max_pending_packets = max_pending_packets;
break;
}
default: {
result = ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
}
return result;
}
/*
* Routine: task_for_pid
* Purpose:
* Get the task port for another "process", named by its
* process ID on the same host as "target_task".
*
* Only permitted to privileged processes, or processes
* with the same user ID.
*
* XXX This should be a BSD system call, not a Mach trap!!!
*/
kern_return_t
task_for_pid(
struct task_for_pid_args *args)
{
mach_port_name_t target_tport = args->target_tport;
int pid = args->pid;
user_addr_t task_addr = args->t;
struct uthread *uthread;
proc_t p = PROC_NULL;
task_t t1 = TASK_NULL;
mach_port_name_t tret = MACH_PORT_NULL;
ipc_port_t tfpport;
void * sright;
int error = 0;
AUDIT_MACH_SYSCALL_ENTER(AUE_TASKFORPID);
AUDIT_ARG(pid, pid);
AUDIT_ARG(mach_port1, target_tport);
#if defined(SECURE_KERNEL)
if (0 == pid) {
(void ) copyout((char *)&t1, task_addr, sizeof(mach_port_name_t));
AUDIT_MACH_SYSCALL_EXIT(KERN_FAILURE);
return(KERN_FAILURE);
}
#endif
t1 = port_name_to_task(target_tport);
if (t1 == TASK_NULL) {
(void) copyout((char *)&t1, task_addr, sizeof(mach_port_name_t));
AUDIT_MACH_SYSCALL_EXIT(KERN_FAILURE);
return(KERN_FAILURE);
}
/*
* Delayed binding of thread credential to process credential, if we
* are not running with an explicitly set thread credential.
*/
uthread = get_bsdthread_info(current_thread());
kauth_cred_uthread_update(uthread, current_proc());
p = proc_find(pid);
AUDIT_ARG(process, p);
if (!(task_for_pid_posix_check(p))) {
error = KERN_FAILURE;
goto tfpout;
}
if (p->task != TASK_NULL) {
/* If we aren't root and target's task access port is set... */
if (!kauth_cred_issuser(kauth_cred_get()) &&
p != current_proc() &&
(task_get_task_access_port(p->task, &tfpport) == 0) &&
(tfpport != IPC_PORT_NULL)) {
if (tfpport == IPC_PORT_DEAD) {
error = KERN_PROTECTION_FAILURE;
goto tfpout;
}
/* Call up to the task access server */
error = check_task_access(tfpport, proc_selfpid(), kauth_getgid(), pid);
if (error != MACH_MSG_SUCCESS) {
if (error == MACH_RCV_INTERRUPTED)
error = KERN_ABORTED;
else
error = KERN_FAILURE;
goto tfpout;
}
}
#if CONFIG_MACF
error = mac_proc_check_get_task(kauth_cred_get(), p);
if (error) {
error = KERN_FAILURE;
goto tfpout;
}
#endif
/* Grant task port access */
task_reference(p->task);
sright = (void *) convert_task_to_port(p->task);
tret = ipc_port_copyout_send(
sright,
get_task_ipcspace(current_task()));
}
error = KERN_SUCCESS;
tfpout:
task_deallocate(t1);
AUDIT_ARG(mach_port2, tret);
(void) copyout((char *) &tret, task_addr, sizeof(mach_port_name_t));
if (p != PROC_NULL)
proc_rele(p);
AUDIT_MACH_SYSCALL_EXIT(error);
return(error);
}
/* ARGSUSED */
int
auditon(proc_t p, struct auditon_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
{
kauth_cred_t scred;
int error = 0;
union auditon_udata udata;
proc_t tp = PROC_NULL;
struct auditinfo_addr aia;
AUDIT_ARG(cmd, uap->cmd);
#if CONFIG_MACF
error = mac_system_check_auditon(kauth_cred_get(), uap->cmd);
if (error)
return (error);
#endif
if ((uap->length <= 0) || (uap->length >
(int)sizeof(union auditon_udata)))
return (EINVAL);
memset((void *)&udata, 0, sizeof(udata));
/*
* Some of the GET commands use the arguments too.
*/
switch (uap->cmd) {
case A_SETPOLICY:
case A_OLDSETPOLICY:
case A_SETKMASK:
case A_SETQCTRL:
case A_OLDSETQCTRL:
case A_SETSTAT:
case A_SETUMASK:
case A_SETSMASK:
case A_SETCOND:
case A_OLDSETCOND:
case A_SETCLASS:
case A_SETPMASK:
case A_SETFSIZE:
case A_SETKAUDIT:
case A_GETCLASS:
case A_GETPINFO:
case A_GETPINFO_ADDR:
case A_SENDTRIGGER:
case A_GETSINFO_ADDR:
case A_GETSFLAGS:
case A_SETSFLAGS:
error = copyin(uap->data, (void *)&udata, uap->length);
if (error)
return (error);
AUDIT_ARG(auditon, &udata);
AUDIT_ARG(len, uap->length);
break;
}
/* Check appropriate privilege. */
switch (uap->cmd) {
/*
* A_GETSINFO doesn't require priviledge but only superuser
* gets to see the audit masks.
*/
case A_GETSINFO_ADDR:
if ((sizeof(udata.au_kau_info) != uap->length) ||
(audit_session_lookup(udata.au_kau_info.ai_asid,
&udata.au_kau_info) != 0))
error = EINVAL;
else if (!kauth_cred_issuser(kauth_cred_get())) {
udata.au_kau_info.ai_mask.am_success = ~0;
udata.au_kau_info.ai_mask.am_failure = ~0;
}
break;
case A_GETSFLAGS:
case A_SETSFLAGS:
/* Getting one's own audit session flags requires no
* privilege. Setting the flags is subject to access
* control implemented in audit_session_setaia().
*/
break;
default:
error = suser(kauth_cred_get(), &p->p_acflag);
break;
}
if (error)
return (error);
/*
* XXX Need to implement these commands by accessing the global
* values associated with the commands.
*/
switch (uap->cmd) {
case A_OLDGETPOLICY:
case A_GETPOLICY:
if (sizeof(udata.au_policy64) == uap->length) {
mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
if (!audit_fail_stop)
udata.au_policy64 |= AUDIT_CNT;
if (audit_panic_on_write_fail)
udata.au_policy64 |= AUDIT_AHLT;
if (audit_argv)
udata.au_policy64 |= AUDIT_ARGV;
if (audit_arge)
udata.au_policy64 |= AUDIT_ARGE;
mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
break;
}
if (sizeof(udata.au_policy) != uap->length)
return (EINVAL);
mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
if (!audit_fail_stop)
udata.au_policy |= AUDIT_CNT;
if (audit_panic_on_write_fail)
udata.au_policy |= AUDIT_AHLT;
if (audit_argv)
udata.au_policy |= AUDIT_ARGV;
if (audit_arge)
udata.au_policy |= AUDIT_ARGE;
mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
break;
case A_OLDSETPOLICY:
case A_SETPOLICY:
if (sizeof(udata.au_policy64) == uap->length) {
if (udata.au_policy64 & ~(AUDIT_CNT|AUDIT_AHLT|
AUDIT_ARGV|AUDIT_ARGE))
return (EINVAL);
mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
audit_fail_stop = ((udata.au_policy64 & AUDIT_CNT) ==
0);
audit_panic_on_write_fail = (udata.au_policy64 &
AUDIT_AHLT);
audit_argv = (udata.au_policy64 & AUDIT_ARGV);
audit_arge = (udata.au_policy64 & AUDIT_ARGE);
mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
break;
}
if ((sizeof(udata.au_policy) != uap->length) ||
(udata.au_policy & ~(AUDIT_CNT|AUDIT_AHLT|AUDIT_ARGV|
AUDIT_ARGE)))
return (EINVAL);
/*
* XXX - Need to wake up waiters if the policy relaxes?
*/
mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
audit_fail_stop = ((udata.au_policy & AUDIT_CNT) == 0);
audit_panic_on_write_fail = (udata.au_policy & AUDIT_AHLT);
audit_argv = (udata.au_policy & AUDIT_ARGV);
audit_arge = (udata.au_policy & AUDIT_ARGE);
mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
break;
case A_GETKMASK:
if (sizeof(udata.au_mask) != uap->length)
return (EINVAL);
mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
udata.au_mask = audit_nae_mask;
mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
break;
case A_SETKMASK:
if (sizeof(udata.au_mask) != uap->length)
return (EINVAL);
mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
audit_nae_mask = udata.au_mask;
AUDIT_CHECK_IF_KEVENTS_MASK(audit_nae_mask);
mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
break;
case A_OLDGETQCTRL:
case A_GETQCTRL:
if (sizeof(udata.au_qctrl64) == uap->length) {
mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_hiwater =
(u_int64_t)audit_qctrl.aq_hiwater;
udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_lowater =
(u_int64_t)audit_qctrl.aq_lowater;
udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_bufsz =
(u_int64_t)audit_qctrl.aq_bufsz;
udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_delay =
(u_int64_t)audit_qctrl.aq_delay;
udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_minfree =
(int64_t)audit_qctrl.aq_minfree;
mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
break;
}
if (sizeof(udata.au_qctrl) != uap->length)
return (EINVAL);
mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
udata.au_qctrl = audit_qctrl;
mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
break;
case A_OLDSETQCTRL:
case A_SETQCTRL:
if (sizeof(udata.au_qctrl64) == uap->length) {
if ((udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_hiwater > AQ_MAXHIGH) ||
(udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_lowater >=
udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_hiwater) ||
(udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_bufsz > AQ_MAXBUFSZ) ||
(udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_minfree < 0) ||
(udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_minfree > 100))
return (EINVAL);
mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
audit_qctrl.aq_hiwater =
(int)udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_hiwater;
audit_qctrl.aq_lowater =
(int)udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_lowater;
audit_qctrl.aq_bufsz =
(int)udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_bufsz;
audit_qctrl.aq_minfree =
(int)udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_minfree;
audit_qctrl.aq_delay = -1; /* Not used. */
mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
break;
}
if ((sizeof(udata.au_qctrl) != uap->length) ||
(udata.au_qctrl.aq_hiwater > AQ_MAXHIGH) ||
(udata.au_qctrl.aq_lowater >= udata.au_qctrl.aq_hiwater) ||
(udata.au_qctrl.aq_bufsz > AQ_MAXBUFSZ) ||
(udata.au_qctrl.aq_minfree < 0) ||
(udata.au_qctrl.aq_minfree > 100))
return (EINVAL);
mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
audit_qctrl = udata.au_qctrl;
/* XXX The queue delay value isn't used with the kernel. */
audit_qctrl.aq_delay = -1;
mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
break;
case A_GETCWD:
return (ENOSYS);
case A_GETCAR:
return (ENOSYS);
case A_GETSTAT:
return (ENOSYS);
case A_SETSTAT:
return (ENOSYS);
case A_SETUMASK:
return (ENOSYS);
case A_SETSMASK:
return (ENOSYS);
case A_OLDGETCOND:
case A_GETCOND:
if (sizeof(udata.au_cond64) == uap->length) {
mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
if (audit_enabled && !audit_suspended)
udata.au_cond64 = AUC_AUDITING;
else
udata.au_cond64 = AUC_NOAUDIT;
mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
break;
}
if (sizeof(udata.au_cond) != uap->length)
return (EINVAL);
mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
if (audit_enabled && !audit_suspended)
udata.au_cond = AUC_AUDITING;
else
udata.au_cond = AUC_NOAUDIT;
mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
break;
case A_OLDSETCOND:
case A_SETCOND:
if (sizeof(udata.au_cond64) == uap->length) {
mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
if (udata.au_cond64 == AUC_NOAUDIT)
audit_suspended = 1;
if (udata.au_cond64 == AUC_AUDITING)
audit_suspended = 0;
if (udata.au_cond64 == AUC_DISABLED) {
audit_suspended = 1;
mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
audit_shutdown();
break;
}
mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
break;
}
if (sizeof(udata.au_cond) != uap->length) {
return (EINVAL);
}
mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
if (udata.au_cond == AUC_NOAUDIT)
audit_suspended = 1;
if (udata.au_cond == AUC_AUDITING)
audit_suspended = 0;
if (udata.au_cond == AUC_DISABLED) {
audit_suspended = 1;
mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
audit_shutdown();
break;
}
mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
break;
case A_GETCLASS:
if (sizeof(udata.au_evclass) != uap->length)
return (EINVAL);
udata.au_evclass.ec_class = au_event_class(
udata.au_evclass.ec_number);
break;
case A_SETCLASS:
if (sizeof(udata.au_evclass) != uap->length)
return (EINVAL);
au_evclassmap_insert(udata.au_evclass.ec_number,
udata.au_evclass.ec_class);
break;
case A_GETPINFO:
if ((sizeof(udata.au_aupinfo) != uap->length) ||
IS_NOT_VALID_PID(udata.au_aupinfo.ap_pid))
return (EINVAL);
if ((tp = proc_find(udata.au_aupinfo.ap_pid)) == NULL)
return (ESRCH);
scred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(tp);
if (scred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_termid.at_type == AU_IPv6) {
kauth_cred_unref(&scred);
proc_rele(tp);
return (EINVAL);
}
udata.au_aupinfo.ap_auid =
scred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_auid;
udata.au_aupinfo.ap_mask.am_success =
scred->cr_audit.as_mask.am_success;
udata.au_aupinfo.ap_mask.am_failure =
scred->cr_audit.as_mask.am_failure;
udata.au_aupinfo.ap_termid.machine =
scred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_termid.at_addr[0];
udata.au_aupinfo.ap_termid.port =
scred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_termid.at_port;
udata.au_aupinfo.ap_asid =
scred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_asid;
kauth_cred_unref(&scred);
proc_rele(tp);
tp = PROC_NULL;
break;
case A_SETPMASK:
if ((sizeof(udata.au_aupinfo) != uap->length) ||
IS_NOT_VALID_PID(udata.au_aupinfo.ap_pid))
return (EINVAL);
if ((tp = proc_find(udata.au_aupinfo.ap_pid)) == NULL)
return (ESRCH);
scred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(tp);
bcopy(scred->cr_audit.as_aia_p, &aia, sizeof(aia));
kauth_cred_unref(&scred);
aia.ai_mask.am_success =
udata.au_aupinfo.ap_mask.am_success;
aia.ai_mask.am_failure =
udata.au_aupinfo.ap_mask.am_failure;
AUDIT_CHECK_IF_KEVENTS_MASK(aia.ai_mask);
error = audit_session_setaia(tp, &aia);
proc_rele(tp);
tp = PROC_NULL;
if (error)
return (error);
break;
case A_SETFSIZE:
if ((sizeof(udata.au_fstat) != uap->length) ||
((udata.au_fstat.af_filesz != 0) &&
(udata.au_fstat.af_filesz < MIN_AUDIT_FILE_SIZE)))
return (EINVAL);
mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
audit_fstat.af_filesz = udata.au_fstat.af_filesz;
mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
break;
case A_GETFSIZE:
if (sizeof(udata.au_fstat) != uap->length)
return (EINVAL);
mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
udata.au_fstat.af_filesz = audit_fstat.af_filesz;
udata.au_fstat.af_currsz = audit_fstat.af_currsz;
mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
break;
case A_GETPINFO_ADDR:
if ((sizeof(udata.au_aupinfo_addr) != uap->length) ||
IS_NOT_VALID_PID(udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_pid))
return (EINVAL);
if ((tp = proc_find(udata.au_aupinfo.ap_pid)) == NULL)
return (ESRCH);
WARN_IF_AINFO_ADDR_CHANGED(uap->length,
sizeof(auditpinfo_addr_t), "auditon(A_GETPINFO_ADDR,...)",
"auditpinfo_addr_t");
scred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(tp);
udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_auid =
scred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_auid;
udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_asid =
scred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_asid;
udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_mask.am_success =
scred->cr_audit.as_mask.am_success;
udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_mask.am_failure =
scred->cr_audit.as_mask.am_failure;
bcopy(&scred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_termid,
&udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_termid,
sizeof(au_tid_addr_t));
udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_flags =
scred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_flags;
kauth_cred_unref(&scred);
proc_rele(tp);
tp = PROC_NULL;
break;
case A_GETKAUDIT:
if (sizeof(udata.au_kau_info) != uap->length)
return (EINVAL);
audit_get_kinfo(&udata.au_kau_info);
break;
case A_SETKAUDIT:
if ((sizeof(udata.au_kau_info) != uap->length) ||
(udata.au_kau_info.ai_termid.at_type != AU_IPv4 &&
udata.au_kau_info.ai_termid.at_type != AU_IPv6))
return (EINVAL);
audit_set_kinfo(&udata.au_kau_info);
break;
case A_SENDTRIGGER:
if ((sizeof(udata.au_trigger) != uap->length) ||
(udata.au_trigger < AUDIT_TRIGGER_MIN) ||
(udata.au_trigger > AUDIT_TRIGGER_MAX))
return (EINVAL);
return (audit_send_trigger(udata.au_trigger));
case A_GETSINFO_ADDR:
/* Handled above before switch(). */
break;
case A_GETSFLAGS:
if (sizeof(udata.au_flags) != uap->length)
return (EINVAL);
bcopy(&(kauth_cred_get()->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_flags),
&udata.au_flags, sizeof(udata.au_flags));
break;
case A_SETSFLAGS:
if (sizeof(udata.au_flags) != uap->length)
return (EINVAL);
bcopy(kauth_cred_get()->cr_audit.as_aia_p, &aia, sizeof(aia));
aia.ai_flags = udata.au_flags;
error = audit_session_setaia(p, &aia);
if (error)
return (error);
break;
default:
return (EINVAL);
}
/*
* Copy data back to userspace for the GET comands.
*/
switch (uap->cmd) {
case A_GETPOLICY:
case A_OLDGETPOLICY:
case A_GETKMASK:
case A_GETQCTRL:
case A_OLDGETQCTRL:
case A_GETCWD:
case A_GETCAR:
case A_GETSTAT:
case A_GETCOND:
case A_OLDGETCOND:
case A_GETCLASS:
case A_GETPINFO:
case A_GETFSIZE:
case A_GETPINFO_ADDR:
case A_GETKAUDIT:
case A_GETSINFO_ADDR:
case A_GETSFLAGS:
error = copyout((void *)&udata, uap->data, uap->length);
if (error)
return (ENOSYS);
break;
}
return (0);
}
int
ptrace(struct proc *p, struct ptrace_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
{
struct proc *t = current_proc(); /* target process */
task_t task;
thread_t th_act;
struct uthread *ut;
int tr_sigexc = 0;
int error = 0;
int stopped = 0;
AUDIT_ARG(cmd, uap->req);
AUDIT_ARG(pid, uap->pid);
AUDIT_ARG(addr, uap->addr);
AUDIT_ARG(value32, uap->data);
if (uap->req == PT_DENY_ATTACH) {
proc_lock(p);
if (ISSET(p->p_lflag, P_LTRACED)) {
proc_unlock(p);
KERNEL_DEBUG_CONSTANT(BSDDBG_CODE(DBG_BSD_PROC, BSD_PROC_FRCEXIT) | DBG_FUNC_NONE,
p->p_pid, W_EXITCODE(ENOTSUP, 0), 4, 0, 0);
exit1(p, W_EXITCODE(ENOTSUP, 0), retval);
thread_exception_return();
/* NOTREACHED */
}
SET(p->p_lflag, P_LNOATTACH);
proc_unlock(p);
return(0);
}
if (uap->req == PT_FORCEQUOTA) {
if (kauth_cred_issuser(kauth_cred_get())) {
OSBitOrAtomic(P_FORCEQUOTA, &t->p_flag);
return (0);
} else
return (EPERM);
}
/*
* Intercept and deal with "please trace me" request.
*/
if (uap->req == PT_TRACE_ME) {
retry_trace_me:;
proc_t pproc = proc_parent(p);
if (pproc == NULL)
return (EINVAL);
#if CONFIG_MACF
/*
* NB: Cannot call kauth_authorize_process(..., KAUTH_PROCESS_CANTRACE, ...)
* since that assumes the process being checked is the current process
* when, in this case, it is the current process's parent.
* Most of the other checks in cantrace() don't apply either.
*/
if ((error = mac_proc_check_debug(pproc, p)) == 0) {
#endif
proc_lock(p);
/* Make sure the process wasn't re-parented. */
if (p->p_ppid != pproc->p_pid) {
proc_unlock(p);
proc_rele(pproc);
goto retry_trace_me;
}
SET(p->p_lflag, P_LTRACED);
/* Non-attached case, our tracer is our parent. */
p->p_oppid = p->p_ppid;
proc_unlock(p);
/* Child and parent will have to be able to run modified code. */
cs_allow_invalid(p);
cs_allow_invalid(pproc);
#if CONFIG_MACF
}
#endif
proc_rele(pproc);
return (error);
}
if (uap->req == PT_SIGEXC) {
proc_lock(p);
if (ISSET(p->p_lflag, P_LTRACED)) {
SET(p->p_lflag, P_LSIGEXC);
proc_unlock(p);
return(0);
} else {
proc_unlock(p);
return(EINVAL);
}
}
/*
* We do not want ptrace to do anything with kernel or launchd
*/
if (uap->pid < 2) {
return(EPERM);
}
/*
* Locate victim, and make sure it is traceable.
*/
if ((t = proc_find(uap->pid)) == NULL)
return (ESRCH);
AUDIT_ARG(process, t);
task = t->task;
if (uap->req == PT_ATTACHEXC) {
#pragma clang diagnostic push
#pragma clang diagnostic ignored "-Wdeprecated-declarations"
uap->req = PT_ATTACH;
tr_sigexc = 1;
}
if (uap->req == PT_ATTACH) {
#pragma clang diagnostic pop
int err;
if ( kauth_authorize_process(proc_ucred(p), KAUTH_PROCESS_CANTRACE,
t, (uintptr_t)&err, 0, 0) == 0 ) {
/* it's OK to attach */
proc_lock(t);
SET(t->p_lflag, P_LTRACED);
if (tr_sigexc)
SET(t->p_lflag, P_LSIGEXC);
t->p_oppid = t->p_ppid;
/* Check whether child and parent are allowed to run modified
* code (they'll have to) */
proc_unlock(t);
cs_allow_invalid(t);
cs_allow_invalid(p);
if (t->p_pptr != p)
proc_reparentlocked(t, p, 1, 0);
proc_lock(t);
if (get_task_userstop(task) > 0 ) {
stopped = 1;
}
t->p_xstat = 0;
proc_unlock(t);
psignal(t, SIGSTOP);
/*
* If the process was stopped, wake up and run through
* issignal() again to properly connect to the tracing
* process.
*/
if (stopped)
task_resume(task);
error = 0;
goto out;
}
else {
/* not allowed to attach, proper error code returned by kauth_authorize_process */
if (ISSET(t->p_lflag, P_LNOATTACH)) {
psignal(p, SIGSEGV);
}
error = err;
goto out;
}
}
/*
* You can't do what you want to the process if:
* (1) It's not being traced at all,
*/
proc_lock(t);
if (!ISSET(t->p_lflag, P_LTRACED)) {
proc_unlock(t);
error = EPERM;
goto out;
}
/*
* (2) it's not being traced by _you_, or
*/
if (t->p_pptr != p) {
proc_unlock(t);
error = EBUSY;
goto out;
}
/*
* (3) it's not currently stopped.
*/
if (t->p_stat != SSTOP) {
proc_unlock(t);
error = EBUSY;
goto out;
}
/*
* Mach version of ptrace executes request directly here,
* thus simplifying the interaction of ptrace and signals.
*/
/* proc lock is held here */
switch (uap->req) {
case PT_DETACH:
if (t->p_oppid != t->p_ppid) {
struct proc *pp;
proc_unlock(t);
pp = proc_find(t->p_oppid);
if (pp != PROC_NULL) {
proc_reparentlocked(t, pp, 1, 0);
proc_rele(pp);
} else {
/* original parent exited while traced */
proc_list_lock();
t->p_listflag |= P_LIST_DEADPARENT;
proc_list_unlock();
proc_reparentlocked(t, initproc, 1, 0);
}
proc_lock(t);
}
t->p_oppid = 0;
CLR(t->p_lflag, P_LTRACED);
CLR(t->p_lflag, P_LSIGEXC);
proc_unlock(t);
goto resume;
case PT_KILL:
/*
* Tell child process to kill itself after it
* is resumed by adding NSIG to p_cursig. [see issig]
*/
proc_unlock(t);
#if CONFIG_MACF
error = mac_proc_check_signal(p, t, SIGKILL);
if (0 != error)
goto resume;
#endif
psignal(t, SIGKILL);
goto resume;
case PT_STEP: /* single step the child */
case PT_CONTINUE: /* continue the child */
proc_unlock(t);
th_act = (thread_t)get_firstthread(task);
if (th_act == THREAD_NULL) {
error = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/* force use of Mach SPIs (and task_for_pid security checks) to adjust PC */
if (uap->addr != (user_addr_t)1) {
error = ENOTSUP;
goto out;
}
if ((unsigned)uap->data >= NSIG) {
error = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (uap->data != 0) {
#if CONFIG_MACF
error = mac_proc_check_signal(p, t, uap->data);
if (0 != error)
goto out;
#endif
psignal(t, uap->data);
}
if (uap->req == PT_STEP) {
/*
* set trace bit
* we use sending SIGSTOP as a comparable security check.
*/
#if CONFIG_MACF
error = mac_proc_check_signal(p, t, SIGSTOP);
if (0 != error) {
goto out;
}
#endif
if (thread_setsinglestep(th_act, 1) != KERN_SUCCESS) {
error = ENOTSUP;
goto out;
}
} else {
/*
* clear trace bit if on
* we use sending SIGCONT as a comparable security check.
*/
#if CONFIG_MACF
error = mac_proc_check_signal(p, t, SIGCONT);
if (0 != error) {
goto out;
}
#endif
if (thread_setsinglestep(th_act, 0) != KERN_SUCCESS) {
error = ENOTSUP;
goto out;
}
}
resume:
proc_lock(t);
t->p_xstat = uap->data;
t->p_stat = SRUN;
if (t->sigwait) {
wakeup((caddr_t)&(t->sigwait));
proc_unlock(t);
if ((t->p_lflag & P_LSIGEXC) == 0) {
task_resume(task);
}
} else
proc_unlock(t);
break;
case PT_THUPDATE: {
proc_unlock(t);
if ((unsigned)uap->data >= NSIG) {
error = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
th_act = port_name_to_thread(CAST_MACH_PORT_TO_NAME(uap->addr));
if (th_act == THREAD_NULL) {
error = ESRCH;
goto out;
}
ut = (uthread_t)get_bsdthread_info(th_act);
if (uap->data)
ut->uu_siglist |= sigmask(uap->data);
proc_lock(t);
t->p_xstat = uap->data;
t->p_stat = SRUN;
proc_unlock(t);
thread_deallocate(th_act);
error = 0;
}
break;
default:
proc_unlock(t);
error = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
error = 0;
out:
proc_rele(t);
return(error);
}
static errno_t
ipsec_ctl_setopt(__unused kern_ctl_ref kctlref,
__unused u_int32_t unit,
void *unitinfo,
int opt,
void *data,
size_t len)
{
struct ipsec_pcb *pcb = unitinfo;
errno_t result = 0;
/* check for privileges for privileged options */
switch (opt) {
case IPSEC_OPT_FLAGS:
case IPSEC_OPT_EXT_IFDATA_STATS:
case IPSEC_OPT_SET_DELEGATE_INTERFACE:
case IPSEC_OPT_OUTPUT_TRAFFIC_CLASS:
if (kauth_cred_issuser(kauth_cred_get()) == 0) {
return EPERM;
}
break;
}
switch (opt) {
case IPSEC_OPT_FLAGS:
if (len != sizeof(u_int32_t))
result = EMSGSIZE;
else
pcb->ipsec_flags = *(u_int32_t *)data;
break;
case IPSEC_OPT_EXT_IFDATA_STATS:
if (len != sizeof(int)) {
result = EMSGSIZE;
break;
}
pcb->ipsec_ext_ifdata_stats = (*(int *)data) ? 1 : 0;
break;
case IPSEC_OPT_INC_IFDATA_STATS_IN:
case IPSEC_OPT_INC_IFDATA_STATS_OUT: {
struct ipsec_stats_param *utsp = (struct ipsec_stats_param *)data;
if (utsp == NULL || len < sizeof(struct ipsec_stats_param)) {
result = EINVAL;
break;
}
if (!pcb->ipsec_ext_ifdata_stats) {
result = EINVAL;
break;
}
if (opt == IPSEC_OPT_INC_IFDATA_STATS_IN)
ifnet_stat_increment_in(pcb->ipsec_ifp, utsp->utsp_packets,
utsp->utsp_bytes, utsp->utsp_errors);
else
ifnet_stat_increment_out(pcb->ipsec_ifp, utsp->utsp_packets,
utsp->utsp_bytes, utsp->utsp_errors);
break;
}
case IPSEC_OPT_SET_DELEGATE_INTERFACE: {
ifnet_t del_ifp = NULL;
char name[IFNAMSIZ];
if (len > IFNAMSIZ - 1) {
result = EMSGSIZE;
break;
}
if (len != 0) { /* if len==0, del_ifp will be NULL causing the delegate to be removed */
bcopy(data, name, len);
name[len] = 0;
result = ifnet_find_by_name(name, &del_ifp);
}
if (result == 0) {
result = ifnet_set_delegate(pcb->ipsec_ifp, del_ifp);
if (del_ifp)
ifnet_release(del_ifp);
}
break;
}
case IPSEC_OPT_OUTPUT_TRAFFIC_CLASS: {
if (len != sizeof(int)) {
result = EMSGSIZE;
break;
}
mbuf_svc_class_t output_service_class = so_tc2msc(*(int *)data);
if (output_service_class == MBUF_SC_UNSPEC) {
pcb->ipsec_output_service_class = MBUF_SC_OAM;
} else {
pcb->ipsec_output_service_class = output_service_class;
}
break;
}
default:
result = ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
return result;
}
int grab_pgo_data(struct proc *p,
struct grab_pgo_data_args *uap,
register_t *retval)
{
char *buffer = NULL;
int err = 0;
(void) p;
if (!kauth_cred_issuser(kauth_cred_get())) {
err = EPERM;
goto out;
}
#if CONFIG_MACF
err = mac_system_check_info(kauth_cred_get(), "kern.profiling_data");
if (err) {
goto out;
}
#endif
if ( uap->flags & ~PGO_ALL_FLAGS ||
uap->size < 0 ||
(uap->size > 0 && uap->buffer == 0))
{
err = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if ( uap->flags & PGO_RESET_ALL ) {
if (uap->flags != PGO_RESET_ALL || uap->uuid || uap->buffer || uap->size ) {
err = EINVAL;
} else {
kern_return_t r = pgo_reset_counters();
switch (r) {
case KERN_SUCCESS:
err = 0;
break;
case KERN_OPERATION_TIMED_OUT:
err = ETIMEDOUT;
break;
default:
err = EIO;
break;
}
}
goto out;
}
*retval = 0;
if (uap->uuid) {
uuid_t uuid;
err = copyin(uap->uuid, &uuid, sizeof(uuid));
if (err) {
goto out;
}
if (uap->buffer == 0 && uap->size == 0) {
uint64_t size64;
if (uap->flags & PGO_WAIT_FOR_UNLOAD) {
err = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
err = OSKextGrabPgoData(uuid, &size64, NULL, 0, 0, !!(uap->flags & PGO_METADATA));
if (err) {
goto out;
}
ssize_t size = size64;
if ( ((uint64_t) size) != size64 ||
size < 0 )
{
err = ERANGE;
goto out;
}
*retval = size;
err = 0;
goto out;
} else if (!uap->buffer || uap->size <= 0) {
err = EINVAL;
goto out;
} else {
MALLOC(buffer, char *, uap->size, M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
if (!buffer) {
err = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
uint64_t size64;
err = OSKextGrabPgoData(uuid, &size64, buffer, uap->size,
!!(uap->flags & PGO_WAIT_FOR_UNLOAD),
!!(uap->flags & PGO_METADATA));
if (err) {
goto out;
}
ssize_t size = size64;
if ( ((uint64_t) size) != size64 ||
size < 0 )
{
err = ERANGE;
goto out;
}
err = copyout(buffer, uap->buffer, size);
if (err) {
goto out;
}
*retval = size;
goto out;
}
}
int
PRIV_POLICY_ONLY(void *cr, int priv, int boolean)
{
#pragma unused(priv, boolean)
return kauth_cred_issuser(cr); /* XXX TODO: HAS_PRIVILEGE(cr, priv); */
}
int PRIV_POLICY_CHOICE(void* cred, int priv, int all)
{
#pragma unused(priv, all)
return kauth_cred_issuser(cred); /* XXX TODO: How is this different from PRIV_POLICY_ONLY? */
}