static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
BIGNUM *f, *ret;
int j, num = 0, r = -1;
unsigned char *p;
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
int local_blinding = 0;
/*
* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
* instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
* the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure.
*/
BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
return -1;
}
if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
return -1;
}
/* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) {
if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
return -1;
}
}
if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
if (!f || !ret || !buf) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/*
* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things and chops off the
* top '0' bytes
*/
if (flen > num) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,
RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
goto err;
}
/* make data into a big number */
if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, f) == NULL)
goto err;
if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,
RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
goto err;
}
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) {
blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
if (blinding == NULL) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
if (blinding != NULL) {
if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
goto err;
}
/* do the decrypt */
if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
((rsa->p != NULL) &&
(rsa->q != NULL) &&
(rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) {
if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx))
goto err;
} else {
BIGNUM local_d;
BIGNUM *d = NULL;
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
d = &local_d;
BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
} else
d = rsa->d;
if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
goto err;
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_n))
goto err;
}
if (blinding)
if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
goto err;
p = buf;
j = BN_bn2bin(ret, p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
switch (padding) {
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, buf, j, num);
break;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, buf, j, num, NULL, 0);
break;
# endif
case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, buf, j, num);
break;
case RSA_NO_PADDING:
r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, j, num);
break;
default:
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
goto err;
}
if (r < 0)
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
err:
if (ctx != NULL) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
if (buf != NULL) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
OPENSSL_free(buf);
}
return (r);
}
int ec_GFp_simple_cmp (const EC_GROUP * group, const EC_POINT * a, const EC_POINT * b, BN_CTX * ctx)
{
/* return values:
* -1 error
* 0 equal (in affine coordinates)
* 1 not equal
*/
int (*field_mul) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *);
int (*field_sqr) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *);
BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
BIGNUM *tmp1, *tmp2, *Za23, *Zb23;
const BIGNUM *tmp1_, *tmp2_;
int ret = -1;
if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity (group, a))
{
return EC_POINT_is_at_infinity (group, b) ? 0 : 1;
}
if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity (group, b))
return 1;
if (a->Z_is_one && b->Z_is_one)
{
return ((BN_cmp (&a->X, &b->X) == 0) && BN_cmp (&a->Y, &b->Y) == 0) ? 0 : 1;
}
field_mul = group->meth->field_mul;
field_sqr = group->meth->field_sqr;
if (ctx == NULL)
{
ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new ();
if (ctx == NULL)
return -1;
}
BN_CTX_start (ctx);
tmp1 = BN_CTX_get (ctx);
tmp2 = BN_CTX_get (ctx);
Za23 = BN_CTX_get (ctx);
Zb23 = BN_CTX_get (ctx);
if (Zb23 == NULL)
goto end;
/* We have to decide whether
* (X_a/Z_a^2, Y_a/Z_a^3) = (X_b/Z_b^2, Y_b/Z_b^3),
* or equivalently, whether
* (X_a*Z_b^2, Y_a*Z_b^3) = (X_b*Z_a^2, Y_b*Z_a^3).
*/
if (!b->Z_is_one)
{
if (!field_sqr (group, Zb23, &b->Z, ctx))
goto end;
if (!field_mul (group, tmp1, &a->X, Zb23, ctx))
goto end;
tmp1_ = tmp1;
}
else
tmp1_ = &a->X;
if (!a->Z_is_one)
{
if (!field_sqr (group, Za23, &a->Z, ctx))
goto end;
if (!field_mul (group, tmp2, &b->X, Za23, ctx))
goto end;
tmp2_ = tmp2;
}
else
tmp2_ = &b->X;
/* compare X_a*Z_b^2 with X_b*Z_a^2 */
if (BN_cmp (tmp1_, tmp2_) != 0)
{
ret = 1; /* points differ */
goto end;
}
if (!b->Z_is_one)
{
if (!field_mul (group, Zb23, Zb23, &b->Z, ctx))
goto end;
if (!field_mul (group, tmp1, &a->Y, Zb23, ctx))
goto end;
/* tmp1_ = tmp1 */
}
else
tmp1_ = &a->Y;
if (!a->Z_is_one)
{
if (!field_mul (group, Za23, Za23, &a->Z, ctx))
goto end;
if (!field_mul (group, tmp2, &b->Y, Za23, ctx))
goto end;
/* tmp2_ = tmp2 */
}
else
tmp2_ = &b->Y;
/* compare Y_a*Z_b^3 with Y_b*Z_a^3 */
if (BN_cmp (tmp1_, tmp2_) != 0)
{
ret = 1; /* points differ */
goto end;
}
/* points are equal */
ret = 0;
end:
BN_CTX_end (ctx);
if (new_ctx != NULL)
BN_CTX_free (new_ctx);
return ret;
}
int ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve (EC_GROUP * group, const BIGNUM * p, const BIGNUM * a, const BIGNUM * b, BN_CTX * ctx)
{
int ret = 0;
BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
BIGNUM *tmp_a;
/* p must be a prime > 3 */
if (BN_num_bits (p) <= 2 || !BN_is_odd (p))
{
ECerr (EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_GROUP_SET_CURVE, EC_R_INVALID_FIELD);
return 0;
}
if (ctx == NULL)
{
ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new ();
if (ctx == NULL)
return 0;
}
BN_CTX_start (ctx);
tmp_a = BN_CTX_get (ctx);
if (tmp_a == NULL)
goto err;
/* group->field */
if (!BN_copy (&group->field, p))
goto err;
BN_set_negative (&group->field, 0);
/* group->a */
if (!BN_nnmod (tmp_a, a, p, ctx))
goto err;
if (group->meth->field_encode)
{
if (!group->meth->field_encode (group, &group->a, tmp_a, ctx))
goto err;
}
else if (!BN_copy (&group->a, tmp_a))
goto err;
/* group->b */
if (!BN_nnmod (&group->b, b, p, ctx))
goto err;
if (group->meth->field_encode)
if (!group->meth->field_encode (group, &group->b, &group->b, ctx))
goto err;
/* group->a_is_minus3 */
if (!BN_add_word (tmp_a, 3))
goto err;
group->a_is_minus3 = (0 == BN_cmp (tmp_a, &group->field));
ret = 1;
err:
BN_CTX_end (ctx);
if (new_ctx != NULL)
BN_CTX_free (new_ctx);
return ret;
}
/* Computes scalar*point and stores the result in r.
* point can not equal r.
* Uses a modified algorithm 2P of
* Lopez, J. and Dahab, R. "Fast multiplication on elliptic curves over
* GF(2^m) without precomputation" (CHES '99, LNCS 1717).
*
* To protect against side-channel attack the function uses constant time swap,
* avoiding conditional branches.
*/
static int
ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
const BIGNUM *scalar, const EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
BIGNUM *x1, *x2, *z1, *z2;
int ret = 0, i;
BN_ULONG mask, word;
if (r == point) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_MONTGOMERY_POINT_MULTIPLY, EC_R_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
return 0;
}
/* if result should be point at infinity */
if ((scalar == NULL) || BN_is_zero(scalar) || (point == NULL) ||
EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point) > 0) {
return EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r);
}
/* only support affine coordinates */
if (!point->Z_is_one)
return 0;
/* Since point_multiply is static we can guarantee that ctx != NULL. */
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
if ((x1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
goto err;
if ((z1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
goto err;
x2 = &r->X;
z2 = &r->Y;
bn_wexpand(x1, group->field.top);
bn_wexpand(z1, group->field.top);
bn_wexpand(x2, group->field.top);
bn_wexpand(z2, group->field.top);
if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(x1, &point->X, group->poly))
goto err; /* x1 = x */
if (!BN_one(z1))
goto err; /* z1 = 1 */
if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, z2, x1, ctx))
goto err; /* z2 = x1^2 = x^2 */
if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, x2, z2, ctx))
goto err;
if (!BN_GF2m_add(x2, x2, &group->b))
goto err; /* x2 = x^4 + b */
/* find top most bit and go one past it */
i = scalar->top - 1;
mask = BN_TBIT;
word = scalar->d[i];
while (!(word & mask))
mask >>= 1;
mask >>= 1;
/* if top most bit was at word break, go to next word */
if (!mask) {
i--;
mask = BN_TBIT;
}
for (; i >= 0; i--) {
word = scalar->d[i];
while (mask) {
BN_consttime_swap(word & mask, x1, x2, group->field.top);
BN_consttime_swap(word & mask, z1, z2, group->field.top);
if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x2, z2, x1, z1, ctx))
goto err;
if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x1, z1, ctx))
goto err;
BN_consttime_swap(word & mask, x1, x2, group->field.top);
BN_consttime_swap(word & mask, z1, z2, group->field.top);
mask >>= 1;
}
mask = BN_TBIT;
}
/* convert out of "projective" coordinates */
i = gf2m_Mxy(group, &point->X, &point->Y, x1, z1, x2, z2, ctx);
if (i == 0)
goto err;
else if (i == 1) {
if (!EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r))
goto err;
} else {
if (!BN_one(&r->Z))
goto err;
r->Z_is_one = 1;
}
/* GF(2^m) field elements should always have BIGNUM::neg = 0 */
BN_set_negative(&r->X, 0);
BN_set_negative(&r->Y, 0);
ret = 1;
err:
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
return ret;
}
int EC_GROUP_cmp(const EC_GROUP *a, const EC_GROUP *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
int r = 0;
BIGNUM *a1, *a2, *a3, *b1, *b2, *b3;
BN_CTX *ctx_new = NULL;
/* compare the field types*/
if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(a)) !=
EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(b)))
return 1;
/* compare the curve name (if present) */
if (EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(a) && EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(b) &&
EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(a) == EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(b))
return 0;
if (!ctx)
ctx_new = ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (!ctx)
return -1;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
a1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
a2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
a3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
b1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
b2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
b3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (!b3)
{
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
if (ctx_new)
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return -1;
}
/* XXX This approach assumes that the external representation
* of curves over the same field type is the same.
*/
if (!a->meth->group_get_curve(a, a1, a2, a3, ctx) ||
!b->meth->group_get_curve(b, b1, b2, b3, ctx))
r = 1;
if (r || BN_cmp(a1, b1) || BN_cmp(a2, b2) || BN_cmp(a3, b3))
r = 1;
/* XXX EC_POINT_cmp() assumes that the methods are equal */
if (r || EC_POINT_cmp(a, EC_GROUP_get0_generator(a),
EC_GROUP_get0_generator(b), ctx))
r = 1;
if (!r)
{
/* compare the order and cofactor */
if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(a, a1, ctx) ||
!EC_GROUP_get_order(b, b1, ctx) ||
!EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(a, a2, ctx) ||
!EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(b, b2, ctx))
{
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
if (ctx_new)
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return -1;
}
if (BN_cmp(a1, b1) || BN_cmp(a2, b2))
r = 1;
}
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
if (ctx_new)
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return r;
}
static int encrypt(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) {
const unsigned rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa);
BIGNUM *f, *result;
uint8_t *buf = NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
int i, ret = 0;
if (rsa_size > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
return 0;
}
if (max_out < rsa_size) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
return 0;
}
/* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS &&
BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
return 0;
}
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
result = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size);
if (!f || !result || !buf) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
switch (padding) {
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, rsa_size, in, in_len);
break;
case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
/* Use the default parameters: SHA-1 for both hashes and no label. */
i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(buf, rsa_size, in, in_len,
NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
break;
case RSA_NO_PADDING:
i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, rsa_size, in, in_len);
break;
default:
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
goto err;
}
if (i <= 0) {
goto err;
}
if (BN_bin2bn(buf, rsa_size, f) == NULL) {
goto err;
}
if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
/* usually the padding functions would catch this */
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
goto err;
}
if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) {
if (BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, &rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx) ==
NULL) {
goto err;
}
}
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(result, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_n)) {
goto err;
}
/* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the
* modulus */
if (!BN_bn2bin_padded(out, rsa_size, result)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
*out_len = rsa_size;
ret = 1;
err:
if (ctx != NULL) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
if (buf != NULL) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, rsa_size);
OPENSSL_free(buf);
}
return ret;
}
int ossl_ecdsa_verify_sig(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *eckey)
{
int ret = -1, i;
BN_CTX *ctx;
const BIGNUM *order;
BIGNUM *u1, *u2, *m, *X;
EC_POINT *point = NULL;
const EC_GROUP *group;
const EC_POINT *pub_key;
/* check input values */
if (eckey == NULL || (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) == NULL ||
(pub_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(eckey)) == NULL || sig == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
return -1;
}
if (!EC_KEY_can_sign(eckey)) {
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, EC_R_CURVE_DOES_NOT_SUPPORT_SIGNING);
return -1;
}
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
u1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
u2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
m = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
X = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (X == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group);
if (order == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || BN_is_negative(sig->r) ||
BN_ucmp(sig->r, order) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(sig->s) ||
BN_is_negative(sig->s) || BN_ucmp(sig->s, order) >= 0) {
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, EC_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
ret = 0; /* signature is invalid */
goto err;
}
/* calculate tmp1 = inv(S) mod order */
if (!BN_mod_inverse(u2, sig->s, order, ctx)) {
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* digest -> m */
i = BN_num_bits(order);
/*
* Need to truncate digest if it is too long: first truncate whole bytes.
*/
if (8 * dgst_len > i)
dgst_len = (i + 7) / 8;
if (!BN_bin2bn(dgst, dgst_len, m)) {
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* If still too long truncate remaining bits with a shift */
if ((8 * dgst_len > i) && !BN_rshift(m, m, 8 - (i & 0x7))) {
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* u1 = m * tmp mod order */
if (!BN_mod_mul(u1, m, u2, order, ctx)) {
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* u2 = r * w mod q */
if (!BN_mod_mul(u2, sig->r, u2, order, ctx)) {
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
if ((point = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, point, u1, pub_key, u2, ctx)) {
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) ==
NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, X, NULL, ctx)) {
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
else { /* NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */
if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, point, X, NULL, ctx)) {
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
#endif
if (!BN_nnmod(u1, X, order, ctx)) {
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* if the signature is correct u1 is equal to sig->r */
ret = (BN_ucmp(u1, sig->r) == 0);
err:
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
EC_POINT_free(point);
return ret;
}
BN_BLINDING *rsa_setup_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *in_ctx) {
BIGNUM local_n;
BIGNUM *e, *n;
BN_CTX *ctx;
BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL;
BN_MONT_CTX *mont_ctx = NULL;
if (in_ctx == NULL) {
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
return 0;
}
} else {
ctx = in_ctx;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
e = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (e == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, rsa_setup_blinding, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (rsa->e == NULL) {
e = rsa_get_public_exp(rsa->d, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx);
if (e == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, rsa_setup_blinding, RSA_R_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT);
goto err;
}
} else {
e = rsa->e;
}
n = &local_n;
BN_with_flags(n, rsa->n, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) {
mont_ctx =
BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, &rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx);
if (mont_ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
}
}
ret = BN_BLINDING_create_param(NULL, e, n, ctx, rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp,
mont_ctx);
if (ret == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, rsa_setup_blinding, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
err:
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
if (in_ctx == NULL) {
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
if (rsa->e == NULL) {
BN_free(e);
}
return ret;
}
int
dh_im_compute_key(PACE_CTX * ctx, const BUF_MEM * s, const BUF_MEM * in,
BN_CTX *bn_ctx)
{
int ret = 0;
BUF_MEM * x_mem = NULL;
BIGNUM * x_bn = NULL, *a = NULL, *p_1 = NULL, *q = NULL;
DH *static_key = NULL, *ephemeral_key = NULL;
check((ctx && in && ctx->ka_ctx), "Invalid arguments");
if (in->length < (size_t) EVP_CIPHER_key_length(ctx->ka_ctx->cipher)
|| !ctx->static_key)
goto err;
BN_CTX_start(bn_ctx);
static_key = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(ctx->static_key);
if (!static_key)
goto err;
/* Initialize ephemeral parameters with parameters from the static key */
ephemeral_key = DHparams_dup_with_q(static_key);
if (!ephemeral_key)
goto err;
/* Perform the actual mapping */
x_mem = cipher_no_pad(ctx->ka_ctx, NULL, in, s, 1);
if (!x_mem)
goto err;
x_bn = BN_bin2bn((unsigned char *) x_mem->data, x_mem->length, x_bn);
a = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx);
q = DH_get_q(static_key, bn_ctx);
p_1 = BN_dup(static_key->p);
if (!x_bn || !a || !q || !p_1 ||
/* p_1 = p-1 */
!BN_sub_word(p_1, 1) ||
/* a = p-1 / q */
!BN_div(a, NULL, p_1, q, bn_ctx) ||
/* g~ = x^a mod p */
!BN_mod_exp(ephemeral_key->g, x_bn, a, static_key->p, bn_ctx))
goto err;
/* check if g~ != 1 */
check((!BN_is_one(ephemeral_key->g)), "Bad DH generator");
/* Copy ephemeral key to context structure */
if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_DH(ctx->ka_ctx->key, ephemeral_key))
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
if (q)
BN_clear_free(q);
if (p_1)
BN_clear_free(p_1);
if (x_bn)
BN_clear_free(x_bn);
if (x_mem)
BUF_MEM_free(x_mem);
/* Decrement reference count, keys are still available via PACE_CTX */
if (static_key)
DH_free(static_key);
if (ephemeral_key)
DH_free(ephemeral_key);
BN_CTX_end(bn_ctx);
return ret;
}
/* Actually there is no reason to insist that 'generator' be a generator.
* It's just as OK (and in some sense better) to use a generator of the
* order-q subgroup.
*/
DH *DH_generate_parameters(int prime_len, int generator,
void (*callback)(int,int,void *), void *cb_arg)
{
BIGNUM *p=NULL,*t1,*t2;
DH *ret=NULL;
int g,ok= -1;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
ret=DH_new();
if (ret == NULL) goto err;
ctx=BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
t2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (t1 == NULL || t2 == NULL) goto err;
if (generator <= 1)
goto err;
if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_2)
{
if (!BN_set_word(t1,24)) goto err;
if (!BN_set_word(t2,11)) goto err;
g=2;
}
else if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_5)
{
if (!BN_set_word(t1,10)) goto err;
if (!BN_set_word(t2,3)) goto err;
/* BN_set_word(t3,7); just have to miss
* out on these ones :-( */
g=5;
}
else
{
/* in the general case, don't worry if 'generator' is a
* generator or not: since we are using safe primes,
* it will generate either an order-q or an order-2q group,
* which both is OK */
if (!BN_set_word(t1,2)) goto err;
if (!BN_set_word(t2,1)) goto err;
g=generator;
}
p=BN_generate_prime(NULL,prime_len,1,t1,t2,callback,cb_arg);
if (p == NULL) goto err;
if (callback != NULL) callback(3,0,cb_arg);
ret->p=p;
ret->g=BN_new();
if (!BN_set_word(ret->g,g)) goto err;
ok=1;
err:
if (ok == -1)
ok=0;
if (ctx != NULL)
{
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
if (!ok && (ret != NULL))
{
DH_free(ret);
ret=NULL;
}
return(ret);
}
int RSA_recover_crt_params(RSA *rsa) {
BN_CTX *ctx;
BIGNUM *totient, *rem, *multiple, *p_plus_q, *p_minus_q;
int ok = 0;
if (rsa->n == NULL || rsa->e == NULL || rsa->d == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_recover_crt_params, RSA_R_EMPTY_PUBLIC_KEY);
return 0;
}
if (rsa->p || rsa->q || rsa->dmp1 || rsa->dmq1 || rsa->iqmp) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_recover_crt_params,
RSA_R_CRT_PARAMS_ALREADY_GIVEN);
return 0;
}
/* This uses the algorithm from section 9B of the RSA paper:
* http://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/Rsapaper.pdf */
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_recover_crt_params, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
totient = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
rem = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
multiple = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
p_plus_q = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
p_minus_q = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (totient == NULL || rem == NULL || multiple == NULL || p_plus_q == NULL ||
p_minus_q == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_recover_crt_params, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* ed-1 is a small multiple of φ(n). */
if (!BN_mul(totient, rsa->e, rsa->d, ctx) ||
!BN_sub_word(totient, 1) ||
/* φ(n) =
* pq - p - q + 1 =
* n - (p + q) + 1
*
* Thus n is a reasonable estimate for φ(n). So, (ed-1)/n will be very
* close. But, when we calculate the quotient, we'll be truncating it
* because we discard the remainder. Thus (ed-1)/multiple will be >= n,
* which the totient cannot be. So we add one to the estimate.
*
* Consider ed-1 as:
*
* multiple * (n - (p+q) + 1) =
* multiple*n - multiple*(p+q) + multiple
*
* When we divide by n, the first term becomes multiple and, since
* multiple and p+q is tiny compared to n, the second and third terms can
* be ignored. Thus I claim that subtracting one from the estimate is
* sufficient. */
!BN_div(multiple, NULL, totient, rsa->n, ctx) ||
!BN_add_word(multiple, 1) ||
!BN_div(totient, rem, totient, multiple, ctx)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_recover_crt_params, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!BN_is_zero(rem)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_recover_crt_params, RSA_R_BAD_RSA_PARAMETERS);
goto err;
}
rsa->p = BN_new();
rsa->q = BN_new();
rsa->dmp1 = BN_new();
rsa->dmq1 = BN_new();
rsa->iqmp = BN_new();
if (rsa->p == NULL || rsa->q == NULL || rsa->dmp1 == NULL || rsa->dmq1 ==
NULL || rsa->iqmp == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_recover_crt_params, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* φ(n) = n - (p + q) + 1 =>
* n - totient + 1 = p + q */
if (!BN_sub(p_plus_q, rsa->n, totient) ||
!BN_add_word(p_plus_q, 1) ||
/* p - q = sqrt((p+q)^2 - 4n) */
!BN_sqr(rem, p_plus_q, ctx) ||
!BN_lshift(multiple, rsa->n, 2) ||
!BN_sub(rem, rem, multiple) ||
!BN_sqrt(p_minus_q, rem, ctx) ||
/* q is 1/2 (p+q)-(p-q) */
!BN_sub(rsa->q, p_plus_q, p_minus_q) ||
!BN_rshift1(rsa->q, rsa->q) ||
!BN_div(rsa->p, NULL, rsa->n, rsa->q, ctx) ||
!BN_mul(multiple, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_recover_crt_params, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (BN_cmp(multiple, rsa->n) != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_recover_crt_params, RSA_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!BN_sub(rem, rsa->p, BN_value_one()) ||
!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, rsa->d, rem, ctx) ||
!BN_sub(rem, rsa->q, BN_value_one()) ||
!BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, rsa->d, rem, ctx) ||
!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp, rsa->q, rsa->p, ctx)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_recover_crt_params, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
ok = 1;
err:
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
if (!ok) {
bn_free_and_null(&rsa->p);
bn_free_and_null(&rsa->q);
bn_free_and_null(&rsa->dmp1);
bn_free_and_null(&rsa->dmq1);
bn_free_and_null(&rsa->iqmp);
}
return ok;
}
BN_BLINDING *RSA_setup_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *in_ctx)
{
BIGNUM local_n;
BIGNUM *e,*n;
BN_CTX *ctx;
BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL;
if (in_ctx == NULL)
{
if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) return 0;
}
else
ctx = in_ctx;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
e = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (e == NULL)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (rsa->e == NULL)
{
e = rsa_get_public_exp(rsa->d, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx);
if (e == NULL)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING, RSA_R_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT);
goto err;
}
}
else
e = rsa->e;
if ((RAND_status() == 0) && rsa->d != NULL && rsa->d->d != NULL)
{
/* if PRNG is not properly seeded, resort to secret
* exponent as unpredictable seed */
RAND_add(rsa->d->d, rsa->d->dmax * sizeof rsa->d->d[0], 0.0);
}
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
{
/* Set BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag */
n = &local_n;
BN_with_flags(n, rsa->n, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
}
else
n = rsa->n;
ret = BN_BLINDING_create_param(NULL, e, n, ctx,
rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp, rsa->_method_mod_n);
if (ret == NULL)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
CRYPTO_THREADID_current(BN_BLINDING_thread_id(ret));
err:
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
if (in_ctx == NULL)
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
if(rsa->e == NULL)
BN_free(e);
return ret;
}
static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
BIGNUM *r1, *m1, *vrfy;
BIGNUM local_dmp1, local_dmq1, local_c, local_r1;
BIGNUM *dmp1, *dmq1, *c, *pr1;
int ret = 0;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
{
BIGNUM local_p, local_q;
BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL;
/*
* Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery intialization uses the
* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set)
*/
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
BN_init(&local_p);
p = &local_p;
BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
BN_init(&local_q);
q = &local_q;
BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
} else {
p = rsa->p;
q = rsa->q;
}
if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) {
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
(&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, p, ctx))
goto err;
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
(&rsa->_method_mod_q, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, q, ctx))
goto err;
}
}
if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
goto err;
/* compute I mod q */
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
c = &local_c;
BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->q, ctx))
goto err;
} else {
if (!BN_mod(r1, I, rsa->q, ctx))
goto err;
}
/* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
dmq1 = &local_dmq1;
BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
} else
dmq1 = rsa->dmq1;
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1, r1, dmq1, rsa->q, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_q))
goto err;
/* compute I mod p */
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
c = &local_c;
BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->p, ctx))
goto err;
} else {
if (!BN_mod(r1, I, rsa->p, ctx))
goto err;
}
/* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
dmp1 = &local_dmp1;
BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
} else
dmp1 = rsa->dmp1;
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, r1, dmp1, rsa->p, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_p))
goto err;
if (!BN_sub(r0, r0, m1))
goto err;
/*
* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does affect the
* multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size
*/
if (BN_is_negative(r0))
if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p))
goto err;
if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->iqmp, ctx))
goto err;
/* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
pr1 = &local_r1;
BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
} else
pr1 = r1;
if (!BN_mod(r0, pr1, rsa->p, ctx))
goto err;
/*
* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of adding 'p'
* if r0 is negative above to leave the result still negative. This can
* break the private key operations: the following second correction
* should *always* correct this rare occurrence. This will *never* happen
* with OpenSSL generated keys because they ensure p > q [steve]
*/
if (BN_is_negative(r0))
if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p))
goto err;
if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->q, ctx))
goto err;
if (!BN_add(r0, r1, m1))
goto err;
if (rsa->e && rsa->n) {
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy, r0, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_n))
goto err;
/*
* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation will
* be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of the
* verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check for
* absolute equality, just congruency.
*/
if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I))
goto err;
if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx))
goto err;
if (BN_is_negative(vrfy))
if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n))
goto err;
if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy)) {
/*
* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
* miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower) mod_exp and
* return that instead.
*/
BIGNUM local_d;
BIGNUM *d = NULL;
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
d = &local_d;
BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
} else
d = rsa->d;
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, I, d, rsa->n, ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_n))
goto err;
}
}
ret = 1;
err:
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
return (ret);
}
/* signature verification */
static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
BIGNUM *f, *ret;
int i, num = 0, r = -1;
unsigned char *p;
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
return -1;
}
if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
return -1;
}
/* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) {
if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
return -1;
}
}
if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
if (!f || !ret || !buf) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/*
* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things and chops off the
* top '0' bytes
*/
if (flen > num) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
goto err;
}
if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, f) == NULL)
goto err;
if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,
RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
goto err;
}
if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
goto err;
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_n))
goto err;
if ((padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) && ((ret->d[0] & 0xf) != 12))
if (!BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret))
goto err;
p = buf;
i = BN_bn2bin(ret, p);
switch (padding) {
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, buf, i, num);
break;
case RSA_X931_PADDING:
r = RSA_padding_check_X931(to, num, buf, i, num);
break;
case RSA_NO_PADDING:
r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, i, num);
break;
default:
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
goto err;
}
if (r < 0)
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
err:
if (ctx != NULL) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
if (buf != NULL) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
OPENSSL_free(buf);
}
return (r);
}
static int mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) {
BIGNUM *r1, *m1, *vrfy;
BIGNUM local_dmp1, local_dmq1, local_c, local_r1;
BIGNUM *dmp1, *dmq1, *c, *pr1;
int ret = 0;
size_t i, num_additional_primes = 0;
if (rsa->additional_primes != NULL) {
num_additional_primes = sk_RSA_additional_prime_num(rsa->additional_primes);
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
{
BIGNUM local_p, local_q;
BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL;
/* Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery intialization uses the
* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set) */
BN_init(&local_p);
p = &local_p;
BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
BN_init(&local_q);
q = &local_q;
BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) {
if (BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_p, &rsa->lock, p, ctx) ==
NULL) {
goto err;
}
if (BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_q, &rsa->lock, q, ctx) ==
NULL) {
goto err;
}
}
}
if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) {
if (BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, &rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx) ==
NULL) {
goto err;
}
}
/* compute I mod q */
c = &local_c;
BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->q, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
/* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */
dmq1 = &local_dmq1;
BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1, r1, dmq1, rsa->q, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_q)) {
goto err;
}
/* compute I mod p */
c = &local_c;
BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->p, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
/* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */
dmp1 = &local_dmp1;
BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, r1, dmp1, rsa->p, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_p)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_sub(r0, r0, m1)) {
goto err;
}
/* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
* affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */
if (BN_is_negative(r0)) {
if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p)) {
goto err;
}
}
if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->iqmp, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
/* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */
pr1 = &local_r1;
BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (!BN_mod(r0, pr1, rsa->p, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
/* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
* adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
* negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
* second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence.
* This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
* they ensure p > q [steve] */
if (BN_is_negative(r0)) {
if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p)) {
goto err;
}
}
if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->q, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_add(r0, r1, m1)) {
goto err;
}
for (i = 0; i < num_additional_primes; i++) {
/* multi-prime RSA. */
BIGNUM local_exp, local_prime;
BIGNUM *exp = &local_exp, *prime = &local_prime;
RSA_additional_prime *ap =
sk_RSA_additional_prime_value(rsa->additional_primes, i);
BN_with_flags(exp, ap->exp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
BN_with_flags(prime, ap->prime, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
/* c will already point to a BIGNUM with the correct flags. */
if (!BN_mod(r1, c, prime, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) &&
!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&ap->method_mod, &rsa->lock, prime, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1, r1, exp, prime, ctx, ap->method_mod)) {
goto err;
}
BN_set_flags(m1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (!BN_sub(m1, m1, r0) ||
!BN_mul(m1, m1, ap->coeff, ctx) ||
!BN_mod(m1, m1, prime, ctx) ||
(BN_is_negative(m1) && !BN_add(m1, m1, prime)) ||
!BN_mul(m1, m1, ap->r, ctx) ||
!BN_add(r0, r0, m1)) {
goto err;
}
}
if (rsa->e && rsa->n) {
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy, r0, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_n)) {
goto err;
}
/* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation
* will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of
* the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check
* for absolute equality, just congruency. */
if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
if (BN_is_negative(vrfy)) {
if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n)) {
goto err;
}
}
if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy)) {
/* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
* miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower)
* mod_exp and return that instead. */
BIGNUM local_d;
BIGNUM *d = NULL;
d = &local_d;
BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, I, d, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_n)) {
goto err;
}
}
}
ret = 1;
err:
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
return ret;
}
int
ecdh_gm_compute_key(PACE_CTX * ctx, const BUF_MEM * s, const BUF_MEM * in,
BN_CTX *bn_ctx)
{
int ret = 0;
BUF_MEM * mem_h = NULL;
BIGNUM * bn_s = NULL, *order = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
EC_POINT * ecp_h = NULL, *ecp_g = NULL;
const ECDH_METHOD *default_method;
EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
EC_KEY *static_key = NULL, *ephemeral_key = NULL;
BN_CTX_start(bn_ctx);
check((ctx && ctx->static_key && s && ctx->ka_ctx), "Invalid arguments");
static_key = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(ctx->static_key);
check(static_key, "could not get key object");
/* Extract group parameters */
group = EC_GROUP_dup(EC_KEY_get0_group(static_key));
order = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx);
cofactor = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx);
check(group && cofactor, "internal error");
if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, bn_ctx)
|| !EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(group, cofactor, bn_ctx))
goto err;
/* Convert nonce to BIGNUM */
bn_s = BN_bin2bn((unsigned char *) s->data, s->length, bn_s);
if (!bn_s)
goto err;
default_method = ECDH_get_default_method();
ECDH_set_default_method(ECDH_OpenSSL_Point());
/* complete the ECDH and get the resulting point h */
mem_h = ecdh_compute_key(ctx->static_key, in, bn_ctx);
ECDH_set_default_method(default_method);
ecp_h = EC_POINT_new(group);
if (!mem_h || !ecp_h || !EC_POINT_oct2point(group, ecp_h,
(unsigned char *) mem_h->data, mem_h->length, bn_ctx))
goto err;
/* map to new generator */
ecp_g = EC_POINT_new(group);
/* g' = g*s + h*1 */
if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, ecp_g, bn_s, ecp_h, BN_value_one(), bn_ctx))
goto err;
/* Initialize ephemeral parameters with parameters from the static key */
ephemeral_key = EC_KEY_dup(static_key);
if (!ephemeral_key)
goto err;
EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(ctx->ka_ctx->key, ephemeral_key);
/* configure the new EC_KEY */
if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, ecp_g, order, cofactor)
|| !EC_GROUP_check(group, bn_ctx)
|| !EC_KEY_set_group(ephemeral_key, group))
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
if (ecp_g)
EC_POINT_clear_free(ecp_g);
if (ecp_h)
EC_POINT_clear_free(ecp_h);
if (mem_h)
BUF_MEM_free(mem_h);
if (bn_s)
BN_clear_free(bn_s);
BN_CTX_end(bn_ctx);
/* Decrement reference count, keys are still available via PACE_CTX */
if (static_key)
EC_KEY_free(static_key);
if (ephemeral_key)
EC_KEY_free(ephemeral_key);
if (group)
EC_GROUP_clear_free(group);
return ret;
}
static int keygen_multiprime(RSA *rsa, int bits, int num_primes,
BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb) {
BIGNUM *r0 = NULL, *r1 = NULL, *r2 = NULL, *r3 = NULL, *tmp;
BIGNUM local_r0, local_d, local_p;
BIGNUM *pr0, *d, *p;
int prime_bits, ok = -1, n = 0, i, j;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
STACK_OF(RSA_additional_prime) *additional_primes = NULL;
if (num_primes < 2) {
ok = 0; /* we set our own err */
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_MUST_HAVE_AT_LEAST_TWO_PRIMES);
goto err;
}
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
r3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (r0 == NULL || r1 == NULL || r2 == NULL || r3 == NULL) {
goto err;
}
if (num_primes > 2) {
additional_primes = sk_RSA_additional_prime_new_null();
if (additional_primes == NULL) {
goto err;
}
}
for (i = 2; i < num_primes; i++) {
RSA_additional_prime *ap = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(RSA_additional_prime));
if (ap == NULL) {
goto err;
}
memset(ap, 0, sizeof(RSA_additional_prime));
ap->prime = BN_new();
ap->exp = BN_new();
ap->coeff = BN_new();
ap->r = BN_new();
if (ap->prime == NULL ||
ap->exp == NULL ||
ap->coeff == NULL ||
ap->r == NULL ||
!sk_RSA_additional_prime_push(additional_primes, ap)) {
RSA_additional_prime_free(ap);
goto err;
}
}
/* We need the RSA components non-NULL */
if (!rsa->n && ((rsa->n = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
goto err;
}
if (!rsa->d && ((rsa->d = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
goto err;
}
if (!rsa->e && ((rsa->e = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
goto err;
}
if (!rsa->p && ((rsa->p = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
goto err;
}
if (!rsa->q && ((rsa->q = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
goto err;
}
if (!rsa->dmp1 && ((rsa->dmp1 = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
goto err;
}
if (!rsa->dmq1 && ((rsa->dmq1 = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
goto err;
}
if (!rsa->iqmp && ((rsa->iqmp = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_copy(rsa->e, e_value)) {
goto err;
}
/* generate p and q */
prime_bits = (bits + (num_primes - 1)) / num_primes;
for (;;) {
if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->p, prime_bits, 0, NULL, NULL, cb) ||
!BN_sub(r2, rsa->p, BN_value_one()) ||
!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
if (BN_is_one(r1)) {
break;
}
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++)) {
goto err;
}
}
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0)) {
goto err;
}
prime_bits = ((bits - prime_bits) + (num_primes - 2)) / (num_primes - 1);
for (;;) {
/* When generating ridiculously small keys, we can get stuck
* continually regenerating the same prime values. Check for
* this and bail if it happens 3 times. */
unsigned int degenerate = 0;
do {
if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->q, prime_bits, 0, NULL, NULL, cb)) {
goto err;
}
} while ((BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) == 0) && (++degenerate < 3));
if (degenerate == 3) {
ok = 0; /* we set our own err */
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
goto err;
}
if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one()) ||
!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
if (BN_is_one(r1)) {
break;
}
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++)) {
goto err;
}
}
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1) ||
!BN_mul(rsa->n, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
for (i = 2; i < num_primes; i++) {
RSA_additional_prime *ap =
sk_RSA_additional_prime_value(additional_primes, i - 2);
prime_bits = ((bits - BN_num_bits(rsa->n)) + (num_primes - (i + 1))) /
(num_primes - i);
for (;;) {
if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(ap->prime, prime_bits, 0, NULL, NULL, cb)) {
goto err;
}
if (BN_cmp(rsa->p, ap->prime) == 0 ||
BN_cmp(rsa->q, ap->prime) == 0) {
continue;
}
for (j = 0; j < i - 2; j++) {
if (BN_cmp(sk_RSA_additional_prime_value(additional_primes, j)->prime,
ap->prime) == 0) {
break;
}
}
if (j != i - 2) {
continue;
}
if (!BN_sub(r2, ap->prime, BN_value_one()) ||
!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_is_one(r1)) {
continue;
}
if (i != num_primes - 1) {
break;
}
/* For the last prime we'll check that it makes n large enough. In the
* two prime case this isn't a problem because we generate primes with
* the top two bits set and so the product is always of the expected
* size. In the multi prime case, this doesn't follow. */
if (!BN_mul(r1, rsa->n, ap->prime, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
if (BN_num_bits(r1) == bits) {
break;
}
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++)) {
goto err;
}
}
/* ap->r is is the product of all the primes prior to the current one
* (including p and q). */
if (!BN_copy(ap->r, rsa->n)) {
goto err;
}
if (i == num_primes - 1) {
/* In the case of the last prime, we calculated n as |r1| in the loop
* above. */
if (!BN_copy(rsa->n, r1)) {
goto err;
}
} else if (!BN_mul(rsa->n, rsa->n, ap->prime, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1)) {
goto err;
}
}
if (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) < 0) {
tmp = rsa->p;
rsa->p = rsa->q;
rsa->q = tmp;
}
/* calculate d */
if (!BN_sub(r1, rsa->p, BN_value_one())) {
goto err; /* p-1 */
}
if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one())) {
goto err; /* q-1 */
}
if (!BN_mul(r0, r1, r2, ctx)) {
goto err; /* (p-1)(q-1) */
}
for (i = 2; i < num_primes; i++) {
RSA_additional_prime *ap =
sk_RSA_additional_prime_value(additional_primes, i - 2);
if (!BN_sub(r3, ap->prime, BN_value_one()) ||
!BN_mul(r0, r0, r3, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
}
pr0 = &local_r0;
BN_with_flags(pr0, r0, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d, rsa->e, pr0, ctx)) {
goto err; /* d */
}
/* set up d for correct BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag */
d = &local_d;
BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
/* calculate d mod (p-1) */
if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, d, r1, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
/* calculate d mod (q-1) */
if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, d, r2, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
/* calculate inverse of q mod p */
p = &local_p;
BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp, rsa->q, p, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
for (i = 2; i < num_primes; i++) {
RSA_additional_prime *ap =
sk_RSA_additional_prime_value(additional_primes, i - 2);
if (!BN_sub(ap->exp, ap->prime, BN_value_one()) ||
!BN_mod(ap->exp, rsa->d, ap->exp, ctx) ||
!BN_mod_inverse(ap->coeff, ap->r, ap->prime, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
}
ok = 1;
rsa->additional_primes = additional_primes;
additional_primes = NULL;
err:
if (ok == -1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_LIB_BN);
ok = 0;
}
if (ctx != NULL) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
sk_RSA_additional_prime_pop_free(additional_primes,
RSA_additional_prime_free);
return ok;
}
int
ecdh_im_compute_key(PACE_CTX * ctx, const BUF_MEM * s, const BUF_MEM * in,
BN_CTX *bn_ctx)
{
int ret = 0;
BUF_MEM * x_mem = NULL;
BIGNUM * a = NULL, *b = NULL, *p = NULL;
BIGNUM * x = NULL, *y = NULL, *v = NULL, *u = NULL;
BIGNUM * tmp = NULL, *tmp2 = NULL, *bn_inv = NULL;
BIGNUM * two = NULL, *three = NULL, *four = NULL, *six = NULL;
BIGNUM * twentyseven = NULL;
EC_KEY *static_key = NULL, *ephemeral_key = NULL;
EC_POINT *g = NULL;
BN_CTX_start(bn_ctx);
check((ctx && ctx->static_key && s && ctx->ka_ctx), "Invalid arguments");
static_key = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(ctx->static_key);
if (!static_key)
goto err;
/* Setup all the variables*/
a = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx);
b = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx);
p = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx);
x = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx);
y = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx);
v = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx);
two = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx);
three = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx);
four = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx);
six = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx);
twentyseven = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx);
tmp = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx);
tmp2 = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx);
bn_inv = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx);
if (!bn_inv)
goto err;
/* Encrypt the Nonce using the symmetric key in */
x_mem = cipher_no_pad(ctx->ka_ctx, NULL, in, s, 1);
if (!x_mem)
goto err;
/* Fetch the curve parameters */
if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(EC_KEY_get0_group(static_key), p, a, b, bn_ctx))
goto err;
/* Assign constants */
if ( !BN_set_word(two,2)||
!BN_set_word(three,3)||
!BN_set_word(four,4)||
!BN_set_word(six,6)||
!BN_set_word(twentyseven,27)
) goto err;
/* Check prerequisites for curve parameters */
check(
/* p > 3;*/
(BN_cmp(p, three) == 1) &&
/* p mod 3 = 2; (p has the form p=q^n, q prime) */
BN_nnmod(tmp, p, three, bn_ctx) &&
(BN_cmp(tmp, two) == 0),
"Unsuited curve");
/* Convert encrypted nonce to BIGNUM */
u = BN_bin2bn((unsigned char *) x_mem->data, x_mem->length, u);
if (!u)
goto err;
if ( /* v = (3a - u^4) / 6u mod p */
!BN_mod_mul(tmp, three, a, p, bn_ctx) ||
!BN_mod_exp(tmp2, u, four, p, bn_ctx) ||
!BN_mod_sub(v, tmp, tmp2, p, bn_ctx) ||
!BN_mod_mul(tmp, u, six, p, bn_ctx) ||
/* For division within a galois field we need to compute
* the multiplicative inverse of a number */
!BN_mod_inverse(bn_inv, tmp, p, bn_ctx) ||
!BN_mod_mul(v, v, bn_inv, p, bn_ctx) ||
/* x = (v^2 - b - ((u^6)/27)) */
!BN_mod_sqr(tmp, v, p, bn_ctx) ||
!BN_mod_sub(tmp2, tmp, b, p, bn_ctx) ||
!BN_mod_exp(tmp, u, six, p, bn_ctx) ||
!BN_mod_inverse(bn_inv, twentyseven, p, bn_ctx) ||
!BN_mod_mul(tmp, tmp, bn_inv, p, bn_ctx) ||
!BN_mod_sub(x, tmp2, tmp, p, bn_ctx) ||
/* x -> x^(1/3) = x^((2p^n -1)/3) */
!BN_mul(tmp, two, p, bn_ctx) ||
!BN_sub(tmp, tmp, BN_value_one()) ||
/* Division is defined, because p^n = 2 mod 3 */
!BN_div(tmp, y, tmp, three, bn_ctx) ||
!BN_mod_exp(tmp2, x, tmp, p, bn_ctx) ||
!BN_copy(x, tmp2) ||
/* x += (u^2)/3 */
!BN_mod_sqr(tmp, u, p, bn_ctx) ||
!BN_mod_inverse(bn_inv, three, p, bn_ctx) ||
!BN_mod_mul(tmp2, tmp, bn_inv, p, bn_ctx) ||
!BN_mod_add(tmp, x, tmp2, p, bn_ctx) ||
!BN_copy(x, tmp) ||
/* y = ux + v */
!BN_mod_mul(y, u, x, p, bn_ctx) ||
!BN_mod_add(tmp, y, v, p, bn_ctx) ||
!BN_copy(y, tmp)
)
goto err;
/* Initialize ephemeral parameters with parameters from the static key */
ephemeral_key = EC_KEY_dup(static_key);
if (!ephemeral_key)
goto err;
EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(ctx->ka_ctx->key, ephemeral_key);
/* configure the new EC_KEY */
g = EC_POINT_new(EC_KEY_get0_group(ephemeral_key));
if (!g)
goto err;
if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(EC_KEY_get0_group(ephemeral_key), g,
x, y, bn_ctx))
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
if (x_mem)
BUF_MEM_free(x_mem);
if (u)
BN_free(u);
BN_CTX_end(bn_ctx);
if (g)
EC_POINT_clear_free(g);
/* Decrement reference count, keys are still available via PACE_CTX */
if (static_key)
EC_KEY_free(static_key);
if (ephemeral_key)
EC_KEY_free(ephemeral_key);
return ret;
}
// Perform ECDSA key recovery (see SEC1 4.1.6) for curves over (mod p)-fields
// recid selects which key is recovered
// if check is non-zero, additional checks are performed
int ECDSA_SIG_recover_key_GFp(EC_KEY *eckey, ECDSA_SIG *ecsig, const unsigned char *msg, int msglen, int recid, int check)
{
if (!eckey) return 0;
int ret = 0;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BIGNUM *x = NULL;
BIGNUM *e = NULL;
BIGNUM *order = NULL;
BIGNUM *sor = NULL;
BIGNUM *eor = NULL;
BIGNUM *field = NULL;
EC_POINT *R = NULL;
EC_POINT *O = NULL;
EC_POINT *Q = NULL;
BIGNUM *rr = NULL;
BIGNUM *zero = NULL;
int n = 0;
int i = recid / 2;
const EC_GROUP *group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey);
if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { ret = -1; goto err; }
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
order = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx)) { ret = -2; goto err; }
x = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (!BN_copy(x, order)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
if (!BN_mul_word(x, i)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
if (!BN_add(x, x, ecsig->r)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
field = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(group, field, NULL, NULL, ctx)) { ret=-2; goto err; }
if (BN_cmp(x, field) >= 0) { ret=0; goto err; }
if ((R = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { ret = -2; goto err; }
if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, R, x, recid % 2, ctx)) { ret=0; goto err; }
if (check)
{
if ((O = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { ret = -2; goto err; }
if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, O, NULL, R, order, ctx)) { ret=-2; goto err; }
if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, O)) { ret = 0; goto err; }
}
if ((Q = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { ret = -2; goto err; }
n = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
e = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (!BN_bin2bn(msg, msglen, e)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
if (8*msglen > n) BN_rshift(e, e, 8-(n & 7));
zero = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (!BN_zero(zero)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
if (!BN_mod_sub(e, zero, e, order, ctx)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
rr = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (!BN_mod_inverse(rr, ecsig->r, order, ctx)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
sor = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (!BN_mod_mul(sor, ecsig->s, rr, order, ctx)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
eor = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (!BN_mod_mul(eor, e, rr, order, ctx)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, Q, eor, R, sor, ctx)) { ret=-2; goto err; }
if (!EC_KEY_set_public_key(eckey, Q)) { ret=-2; goto err; }
ret = 1;
err:
if (ctx) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
if (R != NULL) EC_POINT_free(R);
if (O != NULL) EC_POINT_free(O);
if (Q != NULL) EC_POINT_free(Q);
return ret;
}
int
dh_gm_compute_key(PACE_CTX * ctx, const BUF_MEM * s, const BUF_MEM * in,
BN_CTX *bn_ctx)
{
int ret = 0;
BUF_MEM * mem_h = NULL;
BIGNUM * bn_s = NULL, *bn_h = NULL, *bn_g = NULL;
DH *static_key = NULL, *ephemeral_key = NULL;
check(ctx && ctx->static_key && s && ctx->ka_ctx, "Invalid arguments");
BN_CTX_start(bn_ctx);
static_key = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(ctx->static_key);
if (!static_key)
goto err;
/* Convert nonce to BIGNUM */
bn_s = BN_bin2bn((unsigned char *) s->data, s->length, bn_s);
if (!bn_s)
goto err;
/* complete the DH and convert the result to a BIGNUM */
mem_h = dh_compute_key(ctx->static_key, in, bn_ctx);
if (!mem_h)
goto err;
bn_h = BN_bin2bn((unsigned char *) mem_h->data, mem_h->length, bn_h);
if (!bn_h)
goto err;
/* Initialize ephemeral parameters with parameters from the static key */
ephemeral_key = DHparams_dup_with_q(static_key);
if (!ephemeral_key)
goto err;
/* map to new generator */
bn_g = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx);
if (!bn_g ||
/* bn_g = g^s mod p */
!BN_mod_exp(bn_g, static_key->g, bn_s, static_key->p, bn_ctx) ||
/* ephemeral_key->g = bn_g * h mod p = g^s * h mod p */
!BN_mod_mul(ephemeral_key->g, bn_g, bn_h, static_key->p, bn_ctx))
goto err;
/* Copy ephemeral key to context structure */
if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_DH(ctx->ka_ctx->key, ephemeral_key))
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
if (mem_h) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(mem_h->data, mem_h->max);
BUF_MEM_free(mem_h);
}
if (bn_h)
BN_clear_free(bn_h);
if (bn_s)
BN_clear_free(bn_s);
/* Decrement reference count, keys are still available via PACE_CTX */
if (static_key)
DH_free(static_key);
if (ephemeral_key)
DH_free(ephemeral_key);
BN_CTX_end(bn_ctx);
return ret;
}
/* Compute the x, y affine coordinates from the point (x1, z1) (x2, z2)
* using Montgomery point multiplication algorithm Mxy() in appendix of
* Lopez, J. and Dahab, R. "Fast multiplication on elliptic curves over
* GF(2^m) without precomputation" (CHES '99, LNCS 1717).
* Returns:
* 0 on error
* 1 if return value should be the point at infinity
* 2 otherwise
*/
static int
gf2m_Mxy(const EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, BIGNUM *x1,
BIGNUM *z1, BIGNUM *x2, BIGNUM *z2, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
BIGNUM *t3, *t4, *t5;
int ret = 0;
if (BN_is_zero(z1)) {
BN_zero(x2);
BN_zero(z2);
return 1;
}
if (BN_is_zero(z2)) {
if (!BN_copy(x2, x))
return 0;
if (!BN_GF2m_add(z2, x, y))
return 0;
return 2;
}
/* Since Mxy is static we can guarantee that ctx != NULL. */
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
if ((t3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
goto err;
if ((t4 = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
goto err;
if ((t5 = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!BN_one(t5))
goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, t3, z1, z2, ctx))
goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, z1, z1, x, ctx))
goto err;
if (!BN_GF2m_add(z1, z1, x1))
goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, z2, z2, x, ctx))
goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, x1, z2, x1, ctx))
goto err;
if (!BN_GF2m_add(z2, z2, x2))
goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, z2, z2, z1, ctx))
goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, t4, x, ctx))
goto err;
if (!BN_GF2m_add(t4, t4, y))
goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, t4, t4, t3, ctx))
goto err;
if (!BN_GF2m_add(t4, t4, z2))
goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, t3, t3, x, ctx))
goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_div(group, t3, t5, t3, ctx))
goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, t4, t3, t4, ctx))
goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, x2, x1, t3, ctx))
goto err;
if (!BN_GF2m_add(z2, x2, x))
goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, z2, z2, t4, ctx))
goto err;
if (!BN_GF2m_add(z2, z2, y))
goto err;
ret = 2;
err:
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
return ret;
}
/* Actually there is no reason to insist that 'generator' be a generator.
* It's just as OK (and in some sense better) to use a generator of the
* order-q subgroup.
*/
static int dh_builtin_genparams(DH *ret, int prime_len, int generator, BN_GENCB *cb)
{
BIGNUM *t1,*t2;
int g,ok= -1;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
ctx=BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
t2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (t1 == NULL || t2 == NULL) goto err;
/* Make sure 'ret' has the necessary elements */
if(!ret->p && ((ret->p = BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err;
if(!ret->g && ((ret->g = BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err;
if (generator <= 1)
{
/*Begin: comment out , 17Aug2006, Chris */
#if 0
DHerr(DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS, DH_R_BAD_GENERATOR);
#endif
/*End: comment out , 17Aug2006, Chris */
goto err;
}
if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_2)
{
if (!BN_set_word(t1,24)) goto err;
if (!BN_set_word(t2,11)) goto err;
g=2;
}
#if 0 /* does not work for safe primes */
else if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_3)
{
if (!BN_set_word(t1,12)) goto err;
if (!BN_set_word(t2,5)) goto err;
g=3;
}
#endif
else if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_5)
{
if (!BN_set_word(t1,10)) goto err;
if (!BN_set_word(t2,3)) goto err;
/* BN_set_word(t3,7); just have to miss
* out on these ones :-( */
g=5;
}
else
{
/* in the general case, don't worry if 'generator' is a
* generator or not: since we are using safe primes,
* it will generate either an order-q or an order-2q group,
* which both is OK */
if (!BN_set_word(t1,2)) goto err;
if (!BN_set_word(t2,1)) goto err;
g=generator;
}
if(prime_len==3072)
get_rfc3526_prime_3072(ret->p);
else
if(!BN_generate_prime_ex(ret->p,prime_len,1,t1,t2,cb)) goto err;
if(!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0)) goto err;
if (!BN_set_word(ret->g,g)) goto err;
ok=1;
err:
if (ok == -1)
{
/*Begin: comment out , 17Aug2006, Chris */
#if 0
DHerr(DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
#endif
/*End: comment out , 17Aug2006, Chris */
ok=0;
}
if (ctx != NULL)
{
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
return ok;
}
int BN_MONT_CTX_set(BN_MONT_CTX *mont, const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx) {
int ret = 0;
BIGNUM *Ri, *R;
BIGNUM tmod;
BN_ULONG buf[2];
if (BN_is_zero(mod)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_DIV_BY_ZERO);
return 0;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
Ri = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (Ri == NULL) {
goto err;
}
R = &mont->RR; /* grab RR as a temp */
if (!BN_copy(&mont->N, mod)) {
goto err; /* Set N */
}
mont->N.neg = 0;
BN_init(&tmod);
tmod.d = buf;
tmod.dmax = 2;
tmod.neg = 0;
BN_zero(R);
if (!BN_set_bit(R, BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS * BN_BITS2)) {
goto err;
}
tmod.top = 0;
buf[0] = mod->d[0];
if (buf[0] != 0) {
tmod.top = 1;
}
buf[1] = 0;
if (BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS == 2 && mod->top > 1 && mod->d[1] != 0) {
buf[1] = mod->d[1];
tmod.top = 2;
}
if (BN_mod_inverse(Ri, R, &tmod, ctx) == NULL) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_lshift(Ri, Ri, BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS * BN_BITS2)) {
goto err; /* R*Ri */
}
const BIGNUM *Ri_dividend;
if (!BN_is_zero(Ri)) {
if (!BN_sub_word(Ri, 1)) {
goto err;
}
Ri_dividend = Ri;
} else {
/* Ri == 0 so Ri - 1 == -1. -1 % tmod == 0xff..ff. */
static const BN_ULONG kMinusOneLimbs[BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS] = {
BN_MASK2,
#if BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS == 2
BN_MASK2
#endif
};
STATIC_BIGNUM_DIAGNOSTIC_PUSH
static const BIGNUM kMinusOne = STATIC_BIGNUM(kMinusOneLimbs);
STATIC_BIGNUM_DIAGNOSTIC_POP
Ri_dividend = &kMinusOne;
}
if (!BN_div(Ri, NULL, Ri_dividend, &tmod, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
mont->n0[0] = 0;
if (Ri->top > 0) {
mont->n0[0] = Ri->d[0];
}
mont->n0[1] = 0;
if (BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS == 2 && Ri->top > 1) {
mont->n0[1] = Ri->d[1];
}
/* RR = (2^ri)^2 == 2^(ri*2) == 1 << (ri*2), which has its (ri*2)th bit set. */
int ri = (BN_num_bits(mod) + (BN_BITS2 - 1)) / BN_BITS2 * BN_BITS2;
BN_zero(&(mont->RR));
if (!BN_set_bit(&(mont->RR), ri * 2)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_mod(&(mont->RR), &(mont->RR), &(mont->N), ctx)) {
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
return ret;
}
DSA *DSA_generate_parameters(FIPS_DSA_SIZE_T bits,
unsigned char *seed_in, FIPS_DSA_SIZE_T seed_len,
int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret,
void (*callback)(int, int, void *),
void *cb_arg)
{
int ok=0;
unsigned char seed[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
unsigned char buf[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH],buf2[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
BIGNUM *r0,*W,*X,*c,*test;
BIGNUM *g=NULL,*q=NULL,*p=NULL;
BN_MONT_CTX *mont=NULL;
int k,n=0,i,b,m=0;
int counter=0;
int r=0;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL,*ctx2=NULL,*ctx3=NULL;
unsigned int h=2;
DSA *ret=NULL;
unsigned char *seed_out=seed_in;
if(FIPS_selftest_failed())
{
FIPSerr(FIPS_F_DSA_GENERATE_PARAMETERS,
FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
goto err;
}
if (bits < 512) bits=512;
bits=(bits+63)/64*64;
if (seed_len < 20)
seed_in = NULL; /* seed buffer too small -- ignore */
if (seed_len > 20)
seed_len = 20; /* App. 2.2 of FIPS PUB 186 allows larger SEED,
* but our internal buffers are restricted to 160 bits*/
if ((seed_in != NULL) && (seed_len == 20))
memcpy(seed,seed_in,seed_len);
if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
if ((ctx2=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
if ((ctx3=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
if ((ret=DSA_new()) == NULL) goto err;
if ((mont=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx2);
r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx2);
g = BN_CTX_get(ctx2);
W = BN_CTX_get(ctx2);
q = BN_CTX_get(ctx2);
X = BN_CTX_get(ctx2);
c = BN_CTX_get(ctx2);
p = BN_CTX_get(ctx2);
test = BN_CTX_get(ctx2);
BN_lshift(test,BN_value_one(),bits-1);
for (;;)
{
for (;;) /* find q */
{
int seed_is_random;
/* step 1 */
if (callback != NULL) callback(0,m++,cb_arg);
if (!seed_len)
{
if(RAND_pseudo_bytes(seed,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) < 0)
goto err;
seed_is_random = 1;
}
else
{
seed_is_random = 0;
seed_len=0; /* use random seed if 'seed_in' turns out to be bad*/
}
memcpy(buf,seed,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
memcpy(buf2,seed,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
/* precompute "SEED + 1" for step 7: */
for (i=SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH-1; i >= 0; i--)
{
buf[i]++;
if (buf[i] != 0) break;
}
/* step 2 */
EVP_Digest(seed,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,md,NULL,HASH, NULL);
EVP_Digest(buf,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,buf2,NULL,HASH, NULL);
for (i=0; i<SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
md[i]^=buf2[i];
/* step 3 */
md[0]|=0x80;
md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH-1]|=0x01;
if (!BN_bin2bn(md,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,q)) goto err;
/* step 4 */
r = BN_is_prime_fasttest(q, DSS_prime_checks, callback, ctx3, cb_arg, seed_is_random);
if (r > 0)
break;
if (r != 0)
goto err;
/* do a callback call */
/* step 5 */
}
if (callback != NULL) callback(2,0,cb_arg);
if (callback != NULL) callback(3,0,cb_arg);
/* step 6 */
counter=0;
/* "offset = 2" */
n=(bits-1)/160;
b=(bits-1)-n*160;
for (;;)
{
if (callback != NULL && counter != 0)
callback(0,counter,cb_arg);
/* step 7 */
BN_zero(W);
/* now 'buf' contains "SEED + offset - 1" */
for (k=0; k<=n; k++)
{
/* obtain "SEED + offset + k" by incrementing: */
for (i=SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH-1; i >= 0; i--)
{
buf[i]++;
if (buf[i] != 0) break;
}
EVP_Digest(buf,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,md,NULL,HASH, NULL);
/* step 8 */
if (!BN_bin2bn(md,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,r0))
goto err;
BN_lshift(r0,r0,160*k);
BN_add(W,W,r0);
}
/* more of step 8 */
BN_mask_bits(W,bits-1);
BN_copy(X,W); /* this should be ok */
BN_add(X,X,test); /* this should be ok */
/* step 9 */
BN_lshift1(r0,q);
BN_mod(c,X,r0,ctx);
BN_sub(r0,c,BN_value_one());
BN_sub(p,X,r0);
/* step 10 */
if (BN_cmp(p,test) >= 0)
{
/* step 11 */
r = BN_is_prime_fasttest(p, DSS_prime_checks, callback, ctx3, cb_arg, 1);
if (r > 0)
goto end; /* found it */
if (r != 0)
goto err;
}
/* step 13 */
counter++;
/* "offset = offset + n + 1" */
/* step 14 */
if (counter >= 4096) break;
}
}
end:
if (callback != NULL) callback(2,1,cb_arg);
/* We now need to generate g */
/* Set r0=(p-1)/q */
BN_sub(test,p,BN_value_one());
BN_div(r0,NULL,test,q,ctx);
BN_set_word(test,h);
BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont,p,ctx);
for (;;)
{
/* g=test^r0%p */
BN_mod_exp_mont(g,test,r0,p,ctx,mont);
if (!BN_is_one(g)) break;
BN_add(test,test,BN_value_one());
h++;
}
if (callback != NULL) callback(3,1,cb_arg);
ok=1;
err:
if (!ok)
{
if (ret != NULL) DSA_free(ret);
}
else
{
ret->p=BN_dup(p);
ret->q=BN_dup(q);
ret->g=BN_dup(g);
if(seed_out != NULL) memcpy(seed_out,seed,20);
if (counter_ret != NULL) *counter_ret=counter;
if (h_ret != NULL) *h_ret=h;
}
if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
if (ctx2 != NULL)
{
BN_CTX_end(ctx2);
BN_CTX_free(ctx2);
}
if (ctx3 != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx3);
if (mont != NULL) BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
return(ok?ret:NULL);
}
int ec_GFp_simple_is_on_curve (const EC_GROUP * group, const EC_POINT * point, BN_CTX * ctx)
{
int (*field_mul) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *);
int (*field_sqr) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *);
const BIGNUM *p;
BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
BIGNUM *rh, *tmp, *Z4, *Z6;
int ret = -1;
if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity (group, point))
return 1;
field_mul = group->meth->field_mul;
field_sqr = group->meth->field_sqr;
p = &group->field;
if (ctx == NULL)
{
ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new ();
if (ctx == NULL)
return -1;
}
BN_CTX_start (ctx);
rh = BN_CTX_get (ctx);
tmp = BN_CTX_get (ctx);
Z4 = BN_CTX_get (ctx);
Z6 = BN_CTX_get (ctx);
if (Z6 == NULL)
goto err;
/* We have a curve defined by a Weierstrass equation
* y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b.
* The point to consider is given in Jacobian projective coordinates
* where (X, Y, Z) represents (x, y) = (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3).
* Substituting this and multiplying by Z^6 transforms the above equation into
* Y^2 = X^3 + a*X*Z^4 + b*Z^6.
* To test this, we add up the right-hand side in 'rh'.
*/
/* rh := X^2 */
if (!field_sqr (group, rh, &point->X, ctx))
goto err;
if (!point->Z_is_one)
{
if (!field_sqr (group, tmp, &point->Z, ctx))
goto err;
if (!field_sqr (group, Z4, tmp, ctx))
goto err;
if (!field_mul (group, Z6, Z4, tmp, ctx))
goto err;
/* rh := (rh + a*Z^4)*X */
if (group->a_is_minus3)
{
if (!BN_mod_lshift1_quick (tmp, Z4, p))
goto err;
if (!BN_mod_add_quick (tmp, tmp, Z4, p))
goto err;
if (!BN_mod_sub_quick (rh, rh, tmp, p))
goto err;
if (!field_mul (group, rh, rh, &point->X, ctx))
goto err;
}
else
{
if (!field_mul (group, tmp, Z4, &group->a, ctx))
goto err;
if (!BN_mod_add_quick (rh, rh, tmp, p))
goto err;
if (!field_mul (group, rh, rh, &point->X, ctx))
goto err;
}
/* rh := rh + b*Z^6 */
if (!field_mul (group, tmp, &group->b, Z6, ctx))
goto err;
if (!BN_mod_add_quick (rh, rh, tmp, p))
goto err;
}
else
{
/* point->Z_is_one */
/* rh := (rh + a)*X */
if (!BN_mod_add_quick (rh, rh, &group->a, p))
goto err;
if (!field_mul (group, rh, rh, &point->X, ctx))
goto err;
/* rh := rh + b */
if (!BN_mod_add_quick (rh, rh, &group->b, p))
goto err;
}
/* 'lh' := Y^2 */
if (!field_sqr (group, tmp, &point->Y, ctx))
goto err;
ret = (0 == BN_ucmp (tmp, rh));
err:
BN_CTX_end (ctx);
if (new_ctx != NULL)
BN_CTX_free (new_ctx);
return ret;
}
static int verify_raw(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) {
const unsigned rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa);
BIGNUM *f, *result;
int ret = 0;
int r = -1;
uint8_t *buf = NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
return 0;
}
if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
return 0;
}
if (max_out < rsa_size) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
/* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS &&
BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
return 0;
}
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
result = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
buf = out;
} else {
/* Allocate a temporary buffer to hold the padded plaintext. */
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size);
if (buf == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
if (!f || !result) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (in_len != rsa_size) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_LEN_NOT_EQUAL_TO_MOD_LEN);
goto err;
}
if (BN_bin2bn(in, in_len, f) == NULL) {
goto err;
}
if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
goto err;
}
if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) {
if (BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, &rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx) ==
NULL) {
goto err;
}
}
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(result, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_n)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_bn2bin_padded(buf, rsa_size, result)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
switch (padding) {
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(out, rsa_size, buf, rsa_size);
break;
case RSA_NO_PADDING:
r = rsa_size;
break;
default:
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
goto err;
}
if (r < 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
} else {
*out_len = r;
ret = 1;
}
err:
if (ctx != NULL) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
if (padding != RSA_NO_PADDING && buf != NULL) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, rsa_size);
OPENSSL_free(buf);
}
return ret;
}
int ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (const EC_GROUP * group, size_t num, EC_POINT * points[], BN_CTX * ctx)
{
BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
BIGNUM *tmp, *tmp_Z;
BIGNUM **prod_Z = NULL;
size_t i;
int ret = 0;
if (num == 0)
return 1;
if (ctx == NULL)
{
ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new ();
if (ctx == NULL)
return 0;
}
BN_CTX_start (ctx);
tmp = BN_CTX_get (ctx);
tmp_Z = BN_CTX_get (ctx);
if (tmp == NULL || tmp_Z == NULL)
goto err;
prod_Z = OPENSSL_malloc (num * sizeof prod_Z[0]);
if (prod_Z == NULL)
goto err;
for (i = 0; i < num; i++)
{
prod_Z[i] = BN_new ();
if (prod_Z[i] == NULL)
goto err;
}
/* Set each prod_Z[i] to the product of points[0]->Z .. points[i]->Z,
* skipping any zero-valued inputs (pretend that they're 1). */
if (!BN_is_zero (&points[0]->Z))
{
if (!BN_copy (prod_Z[0], &points[0]->Z))
goto err;
}
else
{
if (group->meth->field_set_to_one != 0)
{
if (!group->meth->field_set_to_one (group, prod_Z[0], ctx))
goto err;
}
else
{
if (!BN_one (prod_Z[0]))
goto err;
}
}
for (i = 1; i < num; i++)
{
if (!BN_is_zero (&points[i]->Z))
{
if (!group->meth->field_mul (group, prod_Z[i], prod_Z[i - 1], &points[i]->Z, ctx))
goto err;
}
else
{
if (!BN_copy (prod_Z[i], prod_Z[i - 1]))
goto err;
}
}
/* Now use a single explicit inversion to replace every
* non-zero points[i]->Z by its inverse. */
if (!BN_mod_inverse (tmp, prod_Z[num - 1], &group->field, ctx))
{
ECerr (EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINTS_MAKE_AFFINE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (group->meth->field_encode != 0)
{
/* In the Montgomery case, we just turned R*H (representing H)
* into 1/(R*H), but we need R*(1/H) (representing 1/H);
* i.e. we need to multiply by the Montgomery factor twice. */
if (!group->meth->field_encode (group, tmp, tmp, ctx))
goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_encode (group, tmp, tmp, ctx))
goto err;
}
for (i = num - 1; i > 0; --i)
{
/* Loop invariant: tmp is the product of the inverses of
* points[0]->Z .. points[i]->Z (zero-valued inputs skipped). */
if (!BN_is_zero (&points[i]->Z))
{
/* Set tmp_Z to the inverse of points[i]->Z (as product
* of Z inverses 0 .. i, Z values 0 .. i - 1). */
if (!group->meth->field_mul (group, tmp_Z, prod_Z[i - 1], tmp, ctx))
goto err;
/* Update tmp to satisfy the loop invariant for i - 1. */
if (!group->meth->field_mul (group, tmp, tmp, &points[i]->Z, ctx))
goto err;
/* Replace points[i]->Z by its inverse. */
if (!BN_copy (&points[i]->Z, tmp_Z))
goto err;
}
}
if (!BN_is_zero (&points[0]->Z))
{
/* Replace points[0]->Z by its inverse. */
if (!BN_copy (&points[0]->Z, tmp))
goto err;
}
/* Finally, fix up the X and Y coordinates for all points. */
for (i = 0; i < num; i++)
{
EC_POINT *p = points[i];
if (!BN_is_zero (&p->Z))
{
/* turn (X, Y, 1/Z) into (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3, 1) */
if (!group->meth->field_sqr (group, tmp, &p->Z, ctx))
goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_mul (group, &p->X, &p->X, tmp, ctx))
goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_mul (group, tmp, tmp, &p->Z, ctx))
goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_mul (group, &p->Y, &p->Y, tmp, ctx))
goto err;
if (group->meth->field_set_to_one != 0)
{
if (!group->meth->field_set_to_one (group, &p->Z, ctx))
goto err;
}
else
{
if (!BN_one (&p->Z))
goto err;
}
p->Z_is_one = 1;
}
}
ret = 1;
err:
BN_CTX_end (ctx);
if (new_ctx != NULL)
BN_CTX_free (new_ctx);
if (prod_Z != NULL)
{
for (i = 0; i < num; i++)
{
if (prod_Z[i] == NULL)
break;
BN_clear_free (prod_Z[i]);
}
OPENSSL_free (prod_Z);
}
return ret;
}
static int private_transform(RSA *rsa, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in,
size_t len) {
BIGNUM *f, *result;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
unsigned blinding_index = 0;
BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
int ret = 0;
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
result = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (f == NULL || result == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (BN_bin2bn(in, len, f) == NULL) {
goto err;
}
if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
/* Usually the padding functions would catch this. */
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
goto err;
}
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) {
blinding = rsa_blinding_get(rsa, &blinding_index, ctx);
if (blinding == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, blinding, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
}
if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
((rsa->p != NULL) && (rsa->q != NULL) && (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
(rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) {
if (!rsa->meth->mod_exp(result, f, rsa, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
} else {
BIGNUM local_d;
BIGNUM *d = NULL;
BN_init(&local_d);
d = &local_d;
BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) {
if (BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, &rsa->lock, rsa->n,
ctx) == NULL) {
goto err;
}
}
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(result, f, d, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_n)) {
goto err;
}
}
if (blinding) {
if (!BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(result, NULL, blinding, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
}
if (!BN_bn2bin_padded(out, len, result)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
if (ctx != NULL) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
if (blinding != NULL) {
rsa_blinding_release(rsa, blinding, blinding_index);
}
return ret;
}
int ec_GFp_simple_group_check_discriminant (const EC_GROUP * group, BN_CTX * ctx)
{
int ret = 0;
BIGNUM *a, *b, *order, *tmp_1, *tmp_2;
const BIGNUM *p = &group->field;
BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
if (ctx == NULL)
{
ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new ();
if (ctx == NULL)
{
ECerr (EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_GROUP_CHECK_DISCRIMINANT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
BN_CTX_start (ctx);
a = BN_CTX_get (ctx);
b = BN_CTX_get (ctx);
tmp_1 = BN_CTX_get (ctx);
tmp_2 = BN_CTX_get (ctx);
order = BN_CTX_get (ctx);
if (order == NULL)
goto err;
if (group->meth->field_decode)
{
if (!group->meth->field_decode (group, a, &group->a, ctx))
goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_decode (group, b, &group->b, ctx))
goto err;
}
else
{
if (!BN_copy (a, &group->a))
goto err;
if (!BN_copy (b, &group->b))
goto err;
}
/* check the discriminant:
* y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b is an elliptic curve <=> 4*a^3 + 27*b^2 != 0 (mod p)
* 0 =< a, b < p */
if (BN_is_zero (a))
{
if (BN_is_zero (b))
goto err;
}
else if (!BN_is_zero (b))
{
if (!BN_mod_sqr (tmp_1, a, p, ctx))
goto err;
if (!BN_mod_mul (tmp_2, tmp_1, a, p, ctx))
goto err;
if (!BN_lshift (tmp_1, tmp_2, 2))
goto err;
/* tmp_1 = 4*a^3 */
if (!BN_mod_sqr (tmp_2, b, p, ctx))
goto err;
if (!BN_mul_word (tmp_2, 27))
goto err;
/* tmp_2 = 27*b^2 */
if (!BN_mod_add (a, tmp_1, tmp_2, p, ctx))
goto err;
if (BN_is_zero (a))
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
if (ctx != NULL)
BN_CTX_end (ctx);
if (new_ctx != NULL)
BN_CTX_free (new_ctx);
return ret;
}
/* signing */
static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res;
int i, j, k, num = 0, r = -1;
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
int local_blinding = 0;
/*
* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
* instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
* the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure.
*/
BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
if (!f || !ret || !buf) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
switch (padding) {
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen);
break;
case RSA_X931_PADDING:
i = RSA_padding_add_X931(buf, num, from, flen);
break;
case RSA_NO_PADDING:
i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
break;
case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
default:
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
goto err;
}
if (i <= 0)
goto err;
if (BN_bin2bn(buf, num, f) == NULL)
goto err;
if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
/* usually the padding functions would catch this */
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,
RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
goto err;
}
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) {
blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
if (blinding == NULL) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
if (blinding != NULL) {
if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
goto err;
}
if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
((rsa->p != NULL) &&
(rsa->q != NULL) &&
(rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) {
if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx))
goto err;
} else {
BIGNUM local_d;
BIGNUM *d = NULL;
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
BN_init(&local_d);
d = &local_d;
BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
} else
d = rsa->d;
if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
goto err;
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_n))
goto err;
}
if (blinding)
if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
goto err;
if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
BN_sub(f, rsa->n, ret);
if (BN_cmp(ret, f) > 0)
res = f;
else
res = ret;
} else
res = ret;
/*
* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the
* modulus
*/
j = BN_num_bytes(res);
i = BN_bn2bin(res, &(to[num - j]));
for (k = 0; k < (num - i); k++)
to[k] = 0;
r = num;
err:
if (ctx != NULL) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
if (buf != NULL) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
OPENSSL_free(buf);
}
return (r);
}
