void *thread_main (void *arg)
{
int err, buflen, read;
int sd;
SSL_CTX *ctx = (SSL_CTX *) arg;
struct sockaddr_in dest_sin;
int sock;
#ifdef _WIN32
PHOSTENT phe;
WORD wVersionRequested;
WSADATA wsaData;
#endif /* */
SSL *ssl;
X509 *server_cert;
char *str;
char buf[1024];
SSL_METHOD *meth;
FILE *fp;
#ifdef _WIN32
wVersionRequested = MAKEWORD (2, 2);
err = WSAStartup (wVersionRequested, &wsaData);
if (err != 0)
{
printf ("WSAStartup err\n");
return -1;
}
#endif /* */
//首先建立连接
sock = socket (AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
dest_sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
dest_sin.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr ("127.0.0.1");
dest_sin.sin_port = htons (8888);
again:err = connect (sock, (struct sockaddr_in *) &dest_sin, sizeof (dest_sin));
if (err < 0)
{
sleep (1);
goto again;
}
//安全连接要求在连接建立后进行握手
ssl = SSL_new (ctx);
if (ssl == NULL)
{
printf ("ss new err\n");
return;
}
SSL_set_fd (ssl, sock);
//请求SSL连接
err = SSL_connect (ssl);
if (err < 0)
{
printf ("SSL_connect err\n");
return;
}
printf ("SSL connection using %s\n", SSL_get_cipher (ssl));
//
server_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate (ssl);
printf ("Server certificate:\n");
//获得服务端证书subject并转变成字符型,以便进行打印
str = X509_NAME_oneline (X509_get_subject_name (server_cert), 0, 0);
printf ("\t subject: %s\n", str);
OPENSSL_free (str);
//获得客户端证书issuer并转变成字符型,以便进行打印
str = X509_NAME_oneline (X509_get_issuer_name (server_cert), 0, 0);
printf ("\t issuer: %s\n", str);
OPENSSL_free (str);
X509_free (server_cert);
//进行安全会话
err = SSL_write (ssl, "Hello World!", strlen ("Hello World!"));
if (err < 0)
{
printf ("ssl write err\n");
return;
}
#if 0
memset (buf, 0, ONE_BUF_SIZE);
err = SSL_read (ssl, buf, sizeof (buf) - 1);
if (err < 0)
{
printf ("ssl read err\n");
return;
}
buf[err] = '\0';
printf ("Got %d chars:'%s'\n", err, buf);
#endif /* */
SSL_shutdown (ssl);
SSL_free (ssl);
close (sock);
/* send SSL/TLS close_notify */
}
/*
FIXME: Master-Key, Extensions, CA bits
(openssl x509 -text -in servcert.pem)
*/
int
_SSL_get_cert_info (struct cert_info *cert_info, SSL * ssl)
{
X509 *peer_cert;
EVP_PKEY *peer_pkey;
/* EVP_PKEY *ca_pkey; */
/* EVP_PKEY *tmp_pkey; */
char notBefore[64];
char notAfter[64];
int alg;
int sign_alg;
if (!(peer_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate (ssl)))
return (1); /* FATAL? */
X509_NAME_oneline (X509_get_subject_name (peer_cert), cert_info->subject,
sizeof (cert_info->subject));
X509_NAME_oneline (X509_get_issuer_name (peer_cert), cert_info->issuer,
sizeof (cert_info->issuer));
broke_oneline (cert_info->subject, cert_info->subject_word);
broke_oneline (cert_info->issuer, cert_info->issuer_word);
alg = OBJ_obj2nid (peer_cert->cert_info->key->algor->algorithm);
sign_alg = OBJ_obj2nid (peer_cert->sig_alg->algorithm);
ASN1_TIME_snprintf (notBefore, sizeof (notBefore),
X509_get_notBefore (peer_cert));
ASN1_TIME_snprintf (notAfter, sizeof (notAfter),
X509_get_notAfter (peer_cert));
peer_pkey = X509_get_pubkey (peer_cert);
strncpy (cert_info->algorithm,
(alg == NID_undef) ? "Unknown" : OBJ_nid2ln (alg),
sizeof (cert_info->algorithm));
cert_info->algorithm_bits = EVP_PKEY_bits (peer_pkey);
strncpy (cert_info->sign_algorithm,
(sign_alg == NID_undef) ? "Unknown" : OBJ_nid2ln (sign_alg),
sizeof (cert_info->sign_algorithm));
/* EVP_PKEY_bits(ca_pkey)); */
cert_info->sign_algorithm_bits = 0;
strncpy (cert_info->notbefore, notBefore, sizeof (cert_info->notbefore));
strncpy (cert_info->notafter, notAfter, sizeof (cert_info->notafter));
EVP_PKEY_free (peer_pkey);
/* SSL_SESSION_print_fp(stdout, SSL_get_session(ssl)); */
/*
if (ssl->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp) {
tmp_pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(tmp_pkey, ssl->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp);
cert_info->rsa_tmp_bits = EVP_PKEY_bits (tmp_pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(tmp_pkey);
} else
fprintf(stderr, "REMOTE SIDE DOESN'T PROVIDES ->peer_rsa_tmp\n");
*/
cert_info->rsa_tmp_bits = 0;
X509_free (peer_cert);
return (0);
}
/* This function is called on a socket file descriptor once the connection has been
* established and we're ready to negotiate SSL. If the SSL handshake fails for some
* reason (such as the host on the other end not using SSL), it will return 0 for
* failure. Success returns 1.
*/
static int FinishConnection(TCLinkCon *c, int sd)
{
int ssl_connected, is_error, errcode, res;
X509 *server_cert;
time_t start, remaining;
fd_set in, out, err;
struct timeval tv;
/* check if socket has connected successfully */
int val;
int /*socklen_t*/ size = 4;
getsockopt(sd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, (char*)&val, &size);
if (val != 0)
return 0;
SSL_clear(c->ssl);
SSL_set_fd(c->ssl, sd);
ssl_connected = 0;
is_error = 0;
start = time(0);
while (!ssl_connected && !is_error)
{
remaining = 5 - (time(0) - start);
if (remaining <= 0) {
is_error = 1;
break;
}
res = SSL_connect(c->ssl);
ssl_connected = ((res == 1) && SSL_is_init_finished(c->ssl));
if (!ssl_connected)
{
FD_ZERO(&in); FD_SET((unsigned)sd, &in);
FD_ZERO(&out); FD_SET((unsigned)sd, &out);
FD_ZERO(&err); FD_SET((unsigned)sd, &err);
/* the documentation does not suggest that both error types occur at the same time so
* the retry logic will consume all the outstanding events
* we do not actually use oob data, but if it is sent, it is treated as an error all the
* same
*/
errcode = SSL_get_error(c->ssl, res);
switch (errcode)
{
case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
/* no error, we should have a connection, check again */
break;
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
/* no error, just wait for more data */
tv.tv_sec = remaining; tv.tv_usec = 0;
/* posix-2001 says the function will modify the appropriate descriptors */
if (select(sd+1, &in, NULL, &err, &tv) < 0 ||
FD_ISSET((unsigned)sd, &err)
)
is_error = 1;
break;
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
/* no error, just wait for more data */
tv.tv_sec = remaining; tv.tv_usec = 0;
if (select(sd+1, NULL, &out, &err, &tv) < 0 ||
FD_ISSET((unsigned)sd, &err)
)
is_error = 1;
break;
case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: /* peer closed the connection */
case SSL_ERROR_SSL: /* error in SSL handshake */
default:
is_error = 1;
}
}
}
if (is_error) {
return 0;
}
#ifdef WIN32
u_long param = 0;
ioctlsocket(sd, FIONBIO, ¶m); // make the socket blocking again
#else
fcntl(sd, F_SETFL, 0); /* make the socket blocking again */
#endif
/* verify that server certificate is authentic */
server_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(c->ssl);
if (!server_cert) {
X509_free(server_cert);
return 0;
}
if (c->validate_cert && c->validate_cert(0, server_cert) != 0)
{
X509_free(server_cert);
return 0;
}
X509_free(server_cert);
return 1;
}
static int tls_drv_control(ErlDrvData handle,
unsigned int command,
char *buf, int len,
char **rbuf, int rlen)
{
tls_data *d = (tls_data *)handle;
int res;
int size;
ErlDrvBinary *b;
X509 *cert;
unsigned int flags = command;
command &= 0xffff;
ERR_clear_error();
switch (command)
{
case SET_CERTIFICATE_FILE_ACCEPT:
case SET_CERTIFICATE_FILE_CONNECT: {
time_t mtime = 0;
SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx = hash_table_lookup(buf, &mtime);
if (is_key_file_modified(buf, &mtime) || ssl_ctx == NULL)
{
SSL_CTX *ctx;
hash_table_insert(buf, mtime, NULL);
ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method());
die_unless(ctx, "SSL_CTX_new failed");
res = SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ctx, buf);
die_unless(res > 0, "SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file failed");
res = SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, buf, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
die_unless(res > 0, "SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file failed");
res = SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx);
die_unless(res > 0, "SSL_CTX_check_private_key failed");
SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF);
SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(ctx);
#ifdef SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS);
#endif
/* SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, "/etc/ejabberd/ca_certificates.pem", NULL); */
/* SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, NULL, "/etc/ejabberd/ca_certs/"); */
/* This IF is commented to allow verification in all cases: */
/* if (command == SET_CERTIFICATE_FILE_ACCEPT) */
/* { */
SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx,
SSL_VERIFY_PEER|SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE,
verify_callback);
/* } */
ssl_ctx = ctx;
hash_table_insert(buf, mtime, ssl_ctx);
}
d->ssl = SSL_new(ssl_ctx);
die_unless(d->ssl, "SSL_new failed");
if (flags & VERIFY_NONE)
SSL_set_verify(d->ssl, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, verify_callback);
d->bio_read = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
d->bio_write = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
SSL_set_bio(d->ssl, d->bio_read, d->bio_write);
if (command == SET_CERTIFICATE_FILE_ACCEPT) {
SSL_set_options(d->ssl, SSL_OP_NO_TICKET);
SSL_set_accept_state(d->ssl);
} else {
SSL_set_options(d->ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2|SSL_OP_NO_TICKET);
SSL_set_connect_state(d->ssl);
}
break;
}
case SET_ENCRYPTED_INPUT:
die_unless(d->ssl, "SSL not initialized");
BIO_write(d->bio_read, buf, len);
break;
case SET_DECRYPTED_OUTPUT:
die_unless(d->ssl, "SSL not initialized");
res = SSL_write(d->ssl, buf, len);
if (res <= 0)
{
res = SSL_get_error(d->ssl, res);
if (res == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ || res == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE)
{
b = driver_alloc_binary(1);
b->orig_bytes[0] = 2;
*rbuf = (char *)b;
return 1;
} else {
die_unless(0, "SSL_write failed");
}
}
break;
case GET_ENCRYPTED_OUTPUT:
die_unless(d->ssl, "SSL not initialized");
size = BIO_ctrl_pending(d->bio_write) + 1;
b = driver_alloc_binary(size);
b->orig_bytes[0] = 0;
BIO_read(d->bio_write, b->orig_bytes + 1, size - 1);
*rbuf = (char *)b;
return size;
case GET_DECRYPTED_INPUT:
if (!SSL_is_init_finished(d->ssl))
{
res = SSL_do_handshake(d->ssl);
if (res <= 0)
die_unless(SSL_get_error(d->ssl, res) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ,
"SSL_do_handshake failed");
} else {
size = BUF_SIZE + 1;
rlen = 1;
b = driver_alloc_binary(size);
b->orig_bytes[0] = 0;
while ((res = SSL_read(d->ssl,
b->orig_bytes + rlen, BUF_SIZE)) > 0)
{
//printf("%d bytes of decrypted data read from state machine\r\n",res);
rlen += res;
size += BUF_SIZE;
b = driver_realloc_binary(b, size);
}
if (res < 0)
{
int err = SSL_get_error(d->ssl, res);
if (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ)
{
//printf("SSL_read wants more data\r\n");
//return 0;
}
// TODO
}
b = driver_realloc_binary(b, rlen);
*rbuf = (char *)b;
return rlen;
}
break;
case GET_PEER_CERTIFICATE:
cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(d->ssl);
if (cert == NULL)
{
b = driver_alloc_binary(1);
b->orig_bytes[0] = 1;
*rbuf = (char *)b;
return 1;
} else {
unsigned char *tmp_buf;
rlen = i2d_X509(cert, NULL);
if (rlen >= 0)
{
rlen++;
b = driver_alloc_binary(rlen);
b->orig_bytes[0] = 0;
tmp_buf = (unsigned char *)&b->orig_bytes[1];
i2d_X509(cert, &tmp_buf);
X509_free(cert);
*rbuf = (char *)b;
return rlen;
} else
X509_free(cert);
}
break;
case GET_VERIFY_RESULT:
b = driver_alloc_binary(1);
b->orig_bytes[0] = SSL_get_verify_result(d->ssl);
*rbuf = (char *)b;
return 1;
break;
}
b = driver_alloc_binary(1);
b->orig_bytes[0] = 0;
*rbuf = (char *)b;
return 1;
}
int ssl_handshake(struct Client *cptr) {
char *str;
int err;
cptr->ssl = (struct SSL*) SSL_new (ctx);
// cptr->use_ssl=1;
CHK_NULL (cptr->ssl);
SSL_set_fd ((SSL *)cptr->ssl, cptr->fd);
set_non_blocking(cptr->fd);
err = ircd_SSL_accept (cptr, cptr->fd);
if ((err)==-1) {
irclog(L_ERROR,"Lost connection to %s:Error in SSL_accept()",
get_client_name(cptr, TRUE));
SSL_shutdown((SSL *)cptr->ssl);
SSL_free((SSL *)cptr->ssl);
cptr->ssl = NULL;
return 0;
}
/* Get the cipher - opt */
SetSecure(cptr);
irclog (L_DEBUG, "SSL connection using %s", SSL_get_cipher ((SSL *)cptr->ssl));
/* Get client's certificate (note: beware of dynamic
* allocation) - opt */
cptr->client_cert = (struct X509*)SSL_get_peer_certificate ((SSL *)cptr->ssl);
if (cptr->client_cert != NULL)
{
irclog (L_DEBUG,"Client certificate:");
str = X509_NAME_oneline (X509_get_subject_name ((X509*)cptr->client_cert), 0, 0);
CHK_NULL (str);
irclog (L_DEBUG, "\t subject: %s", str);
// Bejvavalo
// Free (str);
free(str);
str = X509_NAME_oneline (X509_get_issuer_name ((X509*)cptr->client_cert), 0, 0);
CHK_NULL (str);
irclog (L_DEBUG, "\t issuer: %s", str);
// Bejvavalo
// Free (str);
free(str);
/* We could do all sorts of certificate
* verification stuff here before
* deallocating the certificate. */
X509_free ((X509*)cptr->client_cert);
}
else
irclog (L_DEBUG, "Client does not have certificate.");
return 1;
}
tcp_stream_t *
tcp_stream_create_ssl_from_fd(int fd, const char *hostname,
const tcp_ssl_info_t *tsi,
char *errbuf, size_t errlen)
{
char errmsg[120];
tcp_stream_t *ts = calloc(1, sizeof(tcp_stream_t));
ts->ts_fd = fd;
if((ts->ts_ssl = SSL_new(ssl_ctx)) == NULL)
goto bad_ssl;
if(SSL_set_fd(ts->ts_ssl, fd) == 0)
goto bad_ssl;
if(tsi->key != NULL) {
BIO *cbio = BIO_new_mem_buf((char *)tsi->key, -1);
EVP_PKEY *key = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(cbio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
BIO_free(cbio);
if(key == NULL) {
snprintf(errbuf, errlen, "Unable to load private key");
goto bad;
}
SSL_use_PrivateKey(ts->ts_ssl, key);
EVP_PKEY_free(key);
}
if(tsi->cert != NULL) {
BIO *cbio = BIO_new_mem_buf((char *)tsi->cert, -1);
X509 *cert = PEM_read_bio_X509(cbio, NULL, 0, NULL);
BIO_free(cbio);
if(cert == NULL) {
snprintf(errbuf, errlen, "Unable to load certificate");
goto bad;
}
SSL_use_certificate(ts->ts_ssl, cert);
X509_free(cert);
}
if(SSL_connect(ts->ts_ssl) <= 0) {
goto bad_ssl;
}
SSL_set_mode(ts->ts_ssl, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY);
X509 *peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ts->ts_ssl);
if(peer == NULL) {
goto bad_ssl;
}
int err = SSL_get_verify_result(ts->ts_ssl);
if(err != X509_V_OK) {
snprintf(errbuf, errlen, "Certificate error: %s",
X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
X509_free(peer);
goto bad;
}
if(verify_hostname(hostname, peer, errbuf, errlen)) {
X509_free(peer);
goto bad;
}
X509_free(peer);
ts->ts_fd = fd;
htsbuf_queue_init(&ts->ts_spill, INT32_MAX);
htsbuf_queue_init(&ts->ts_sendq, INT32_MAX);
ts->ts_write = ssl_write;
ts->ts_read = ssl_read;
return ts;
bad_ssl:
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), errmsg);
snprintf(errbuf, errlen, "SSL: %s", errmsg);
bad:
tcp_close(ts);
return NULL;
}
ResponseCode OpenSSLConnection::ConnectInternal() {
ResponseCode networkResponse = ResponseCode::SUCCESS;
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = nullptr;
server_tcp_socket_fd_ = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (-1 == server_tcp_socket_fd_) {
return ResponseCode::NETWORK_TCP_SETUP_ERROR;
}
AWS_LOG_DEBUG(OPENSSL_WRAPPER_LOG_TAG, "Root CA : %s", root_ca_location_.c_str());
if (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(p_ssl_context_, root_ca_location_.c_str(), NULL)) {
AWS_LOG_ERROR(OPENSSL_WRAPPER_LOG_TAG, " Root CA Loading error");
return ResponseCode::NETWORK_SSL_ROOT_CRT_PARSE_ERROR;
}
if (0 < device_cert_location_.length() && 0 < device_private_key_location_.length()) {
AWS_LOG_DEBUG(OPENSSL_WRAPPER_LOG_TAG, "Device crt : %s", device_cert_location_.c_str());
if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(p_ssl_context_, device_cert_location_.c_str(), SSL_FILETYPE_PEM)) {
AWS_LOG_ERROR(OPENSSL_WRAPPER_LOG_TAG, " Device Certificate Loading error");
return ResponseCode::NETWORK_SSL_DEVICE_CRT_PARSE_ERROR;
}
AWS_LOG_DEBUG(OPENSSL_WRAPPER_LOG_TAG, "Device privkey : %s", device_private_key_location_.c_str());
if (1 != SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(p_ssl_context_,
device_private_key_location_.c_str(),
SSL_FILETYPE_PEM)) {
AWS_LOG_ERROR(OPENSSL_WRAPPER_LOG_TAG, " Device Private Key Loading error");
return ResponseCode::NETWORK_SSL_KEY_PARSE_ERROR;
}
}
p_ssl_handle_ = SSL_new(p_ssl_context_);
// Requires OpenSSL v1.0.2 and above
if (server_verification_flag_) {
param = SSL_get0_param(p_ssl_handle_);
// Enable automatic hostname checks
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags(param, X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS);
// Check if it is an IPv4 or an IPv6 address to enable ip checking
// Enable host name check otherwise
char dst[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
if (inet_pton(AF_INET, endpoint_.c_str(), (void *) dst) ||
inet_pton(AF_INET6, endpoint_.c_str(), (void *) dst)) {
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc(param, endpoint_.c_str());
} else {
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(param, endpoint_.c_str(), 0);
}
}
// Configure a non-zero callback if desired
SSL_set_verify(p_ssl_handle_, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, nullptr);
networkResponse = ConnectTCPSocket();
if (ResponseCode::SUCCESS != networkResponse) {
AWS_LOG_ERROR(OPENSSL_WRAPPER_LOG_TAG, "TCP Connection error");
return networkResponse;
}
SSL_set_fd(p_ssl_handle_, server_tcp_socket_fd_);
networkResponse = SetSocketToNonBlocking();
if (ResponseCode::SUCCESS != networkResponse) {
AWS_LOG_ERROR(OPENSSL_WRAPPER_LOG_TAG, " Unable to set the socket to Non-Blocking");
return networkResponse;
}
networkResponse = AttemptConnect();
if (X509_V_OK != SSL_get_verify_result(p_ssl_handle_)) {
AWS_LOG_ERROR(OPENSSL_WRAPPER_LOG_TAG, " Server Certificate Verification failed.");
networkResponse = ResponseCode::NETWORK_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
} else {
// ensure you have a valid certificate returned, otherwise no certificate exchange happened
if (nullptr == SSL_get_peer_certificate(p_ssl_handle_)) {
AWS_LOG_ERROR(OPENSSL_WRAPPER_LOG_TAG, " No certificate exchange happened");
networkResponse = ResponseCode::NETWORK_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
}
if (ResponseCode::SUCCESS == networkResponse) {
is_connected_ = true;
}
return networkResponse;
}
/**
Search for a hostname match in the SubjectAlternativeNames.
*/
uint32_t
check_san (SSL *ssl, const char *hostname)
{
X509 *cert;
int extcount, ok = 0;
/* What an OpenSSL mess ... */
if (NULL == (cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl)))
{
die ("Getting certificate failed\n");
}
if ((extcount = X509_get_ext_count(cert)) > 0)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < extcount; ++i)
{
const char *extstr;
X509_EXTENSION *ext;
ext = X509_get_ext(cert, i);
extstr = OBJ_nid2sn(OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ext)));
if (!strcmp(extstr, "subjectAltName"))
{
int j;
void *extvalstr;
const unsigned char *tmp;
STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *val;
CONF_VALUE *nval;
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10000000L
const
#endif
X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method;
if (!(method = X509V3_EXT_get(ext)))
{
break;
}
tmp = ext->value->data;
if (method->it)
{
extvalstr = ASN1_item_d2i(NULL, &tmp, ext->value->length,
ASN1_ITEM_ptr(method->it));
} else {
extvalstr = method->d2i(NULL, &tmp, ext->value->length);
}
if (!extvalstr)
{
break;
}
if (method->i2v)
{
val = method->i2v(method, extvalstr, NULL);
for (j = 0; j < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(val); ++j)
{
nval = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(val, j);
if ((!strcasecmp(nval->name, "DNS") &&
!strcasecmp(nval->value, hostname) ) ||
(!strcasecmp(nval->name, "iPAddress") &&
!strcasecmp(nval->value, hostname)))
{
verb ("V: subjectAltName matched: %s, type: %s\n", nval->value, nval->name); // We matched this; so it's safe to print
ok = 1;
break;
}
// Attempt to match subjectAltName DNS names
if (!strcasecmp(nval->name, "DNS"))
{
ok = check_wildcard_match_rfc2595(hostname, nval->value);
if (ok)
{
break;
}
}
verb ("V: subjectAltName found but not matched: %s, type: %s\n", nval->value, nval->name); // XXX: Clean this string!
}
}
} else {
verb ("V: found non subjectAltName extension\n");
}
if (ok)
{
break;
}
}
} else {
verb ("V: no X509_EXTENSION field(s) found\n");
}
X509_free(cert);
return ok;
}
Str
ssl_get_certificate(SSL * ssl, char *hostname)
{
BIO *bp;
X509 *x;
X509_NAME *xn;
char *p;
int len;
Str s;
char buf[2048];
Str amsg = NULL;
Str emsg;
char *ans;
if (ssl == NULL)
return NULL;
x = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl);
if (x == NULL) {
if (accept_this_site
&& strcasecmp(accept_this_site->ptr, hostname) == 0)
ans = "y";
else {
/* FIXME: gettextize? */
emsg = Strnew_charp("No SSL peer certificate: accept? (y/n)");
ans = inputAnswer(emsg->ptr);
}
if (ans && TOLOWER(*ans) == 'y')
/* FIXME: gettextize? */
amsg = Strnew_charp
("Accept SSL session without any peer certificate");
else {
/* FIXME: gettextize? */
char *e = "This SSL session was rejected "
"to prevent security violation: no peer certificate";
disp_err_message(e, FALSE);
free_ssl_ctx();
return NULL;
}
if (amsg)
disp_err_message(amsg->ptr, FALSE);
ssl_accept_this_site(hostname);
/* FIXME: gettextize? */
s = amsg ? amsg : Strnew_charp("valid certificate");
return s;
}
/* check the cert chain.
* The chain length is automatically checked by OpenSSL when we
* set the verify depth in the ctx.
*/
if (ssl_verify_server) {
long verr;
if ((verr = SSL_get_verify_result(ssl))
!= X509_V_OK) {
const char *em = X509_verify_cert_error_string(verr);
if (accept_this_site
&& strcasecmp(accept_this_site->ptr, hostname) == 0)
ans = "y";
else {
/* FIXME: gettextize? */
emsg = Sprintf("%s: accept? (y/n)", em);
ans = inputAnswer(emsg->ptr);
}
if (ans && TOLOWER(*ans) == 'y') {
/* FIXME: gettextize? */
amsg = Sprintf("Accept unsecure SSL session: "
"unverified: %s", em);
}
else {
/* FIXME: gettextize? */
char *e =
Sprintf("This SSL session was rejected: %s", em)->ptr;
disp_err_message(e, FALSE);
free_ssl_ctx();
return NULL;
}
}
}
emsg = ssl_check_cert_ident(x, hostname);
if (emsg != NULL) {
if (accept_this_site
&& strcasecmp(accept_this_site->ptr, hostname) == 0)
ans = "y";
else {
Str ep = Strdup(emsg);
if (ep->length > COLS - 16)
Strshrink(ep, ep->length - (COLS - 16));
Strcat_charp(ep, ": accept? (y/n)");
ans = inputAnswer(ep->ptr);
}
if (ans && TOLOWER(*ans) == 'y') {
/* FIXME: gettextize? */
amsg = Strnew_charp("Accept unsecure SSL session:");
Strcat(amsg, emsg);
}
else {
/* FIXME: gettextize? */
char *e = "This SSL session was rejected "
"to prevent security violation";
disp_err_message(e, FALSE);
free_ssl_ctx();
return NULL;
}
}
if (amsg)
disp_err_message(amsg->ptr, FALSE);
ssl_accept_this_site(hostname);
/* FIXME: gettextize? */
s = amsg ? amsg : Strnew_charp("valid certificate");
Strcat_charp(s, "\n");
xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);
if (X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(xn, NID_commonName, buf, sizeof(buf)) == -1)
Strcat_charp(s, " subject=<unknown>");
else
Strcat_m_charp(s, " subject=", buf, NULL);
xn = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
if (X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(xn, NID_commonName, buf, sizeof(buf)) == -1)
Strcat_charp(s, ": issuer=<unknown>");
else
Strcat_m_charp(s, ": issuer=", buf, NULL);
Strcat_charp(s, "\n\n");
bp = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
X509_print(bp, x);
len = (int)BIO_ctrl(bp, BIO_CTRL_INFO, 0, (char *)&p);
Strcat_charp_n(s, p, len);
BIO_free_all(bp);
X509_free(x);
return s;
}
int np_net_ssl_check_cert(int days_till_exp_warn, int days_till_exp_crit){
# ifdef USE_OPENSSL
X509 *certificate=NULL;
X509_NAME *subj=NULL;
char timestamp[50] = "";
char cn[MAX_CN_LENGTH]= "";
int cnlen =-1;
int status=STATE_UNKNOWN;
ASN1_STRING *tm;
int offset;
struct tm stamp;
float time_left;
int days_left;
int time_remaining;
time_t tm_t;
certificate=SSL_get_peer_certificate(s);
if (!certificate) {
printf("%s\n",_("CRITICAL - Cannot retrieve server certificate."));
return STATE_CRITICAL;
}
/* Extract CN from certificate subject */
subj=X509_get_subject_name(certificate);
if (!subj) {
printf("%s\n",_("CRITICAL - Cannot retrieve certificate subject."));
return STATE_CRITICAL;
}
cnlen = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(subj, NID_commonName, cn, sizeof(cn));
if (cnlen == -1)
strcpy(cn, _("Unknown CN"));
/* Retrieve timestamp of certificate */
tm = X509_get_notAfter(certificate);
/* Generate tm structure to process timestamp */
if (tm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
if (tm->length < 10) {
printf("%s\n", _("CRITICAL - Wrong time format in certificate."));
return STATE_CRITICAL;
} else {
stamp.tm_year = (tm->data[0] - '0') * 10 + (tm->data[1] - '0');
if (stamp.tm_year < 50)
stamp.tm_year += 100;
offset = 0;
}
} else {
if (tm->length < 12) {
printf("%s\n", _("CRITICAL - Wrong time format in certificate."));
return STATE_CRITICAL;
} else {
stamp.tm_year =
(tm->data[0] - '0') * 1000 + (tm->data[1] - '0') * 100 +
(tm->data[2] - '0') * 10 + (tm->data[3] - '0');
stamp.tm_year -= 1900;
offset = 2;
}
}
stamp.tm_mon =
(tm->data[2 + offset] - '0') * 10 + (tm->data[3 + offset] - '0') - 1;
stamp.tm_mday =
(tm->data[4 + offset] - '0') * 10 + (tm->data[5 + offset] - '0');
stamp.tm_hour =
(tm->data[6 + offset] - '0') * 10 + (tm->data[7 + offset] - '0');
stamp.tm_min =
(tm->data[8 + offset] - '0') * 10 + (tm->data[9 + offset] - '0');
stamp.tm_sec =
(tm->data[10 + offset] - '0') * 10 + (tm->data[11 + offset] - '0');
stamp.tm_isdst = -1;
time_left = difftime(timegm(&stamp), time(NULL));
days_left = time_left / 86400;
tm_t = mktime (&stamp);
strftime(timestamp, 50, "%c", localtime(&tm_t));
if (days_left > 0 && days_left <= days_till_exp_warn) {
printf (_("%s - Certificate '%s' expires in %d day(s) (%s).\n"), (days_left>days_till_exp_crit)?"WARNING":"CRITICAL", cn, days_left, timestamp);
if (days_left > days_till_exp_crit)
status = STATE_WARNING;
else
status = STATE_CRITICAL;
} else if (days_left == 0 && time_left > 0) {
if (time_left >= 3600)
time_remaining = (int) time_left / 3600;
else
time_remaining = (int) time_left / 60;
printf (_("%s - Certificate '%s' expires in %u %s (%s)\n"),
(days_left>days_till_exp_crit) ? "WARNING" : "CRITICAL", cn, time_remaining,
time_left >= 3600 ? "hours" : "minutes", timestamp);
if ( days_left > days_till_exp_crit)
status = STATE_WARNING;
else
status = STATE_CRITICAL;
} else if (time_left < 0) {
printf(_("CRITICAL - Certificate '%s' expired on %s.\n"), cn, timestamp);
status=STATE_CRITICAL;
} else if (days_left == 0) {
printf (_("%s - Certificate '%s' just expired (%s).\n"), (days_left>days_till_exp_crit)?"WARNING":"CRITICAL", cn, timestamp);
if (days_left > days_till_exp_crit)
status = STATE_WARNING;
else
status = STATE_CRITICAL;
} else {
printf(_("OK - Certificate '%s' will expire on %s.\n"), cn, timestamp);
status = STATE_OK;
}
X509_free(certificate);
return status;
# else /* ifndef USE_OPENSSL */
printf("%s\n", _("WARNING - Plugin does not support checking certificates."));
return STATE_WARNING;
# endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
}
//construct an SSL connection to the server at the desired address
//gives back a struct containing the BIO and SSL constructs necessary
//to manage a connection.
//
//Requires a directory where require certificates and public keys are stored and their names
struct ssl_connection * connect_to(char *address, char *certpath, char *cacert, char *cert, char *privkey)
{
struct ssl_connection *conn = calloc(1, sizeof *conn);
//BIO *bio;
//SSL *ssl;
SSL_CTX *ctx = (SSL_CTX *)SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method());
printf("LOADING CA CERT\n");
//load our ca certificate
if(SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, string_cat(3,certpath,"/",cacert), NULL) == 0)
{
printf("FAILING\n");
ssl_error("Server cert load fail");
exit(1);
}
printf("LOADING CLIENT CERT\n");
//load our certificate used to send files
if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(ctx, string_cat(3,certpath,"/",cert), SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) < 1)
{
ssl_error("failed to load client cert");
exit(1);
}
printf("LOADING PRIVATE KEY\n");
//load our private key
if(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, string_cat(3,certpath,"/",privkey), SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) < 1)
{
ssl_error("failed to load private key");
exit(1);
}
SSL_CTX_set_timeout(ctx, 5);
conn->bio = BIO_new_ssl_connect(ctx);
if(conn->bio == NULL)
{
ssl_error("bio creation fail");
exit(1);
}
//set up connection
BIO_get_ssl(conn->bio, &conn->ssl);
SSL_set_mode(conn->ssl, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY);
SSL_set_verify(conn->ssl, SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT, NULL);
//client stuff goes here
//set server hostname
if(BIO_set_conn_hostname(conn->bio, address) <= 0)
{
printf("Address error\n");
ssl_error("BIO connect error");
exit(1);
}
//printf("attempting to connect to %s\n",address);
//test connection
if(BIO_do_connect(conn->bio) <= 0)
{
printf("CONNECTION ERROR!?!?!?\n");
ssl_error("BIO connect error");
exit(1);
}
//verify the certificate
if(BIO_do_handshake(conn->bio) > 0) {
//printf("HANDSHAKE SUCCESS\n");
if(SSL_get_verify_result(conn->ssl) == X509_V_OK) {
X509 *server_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(conn->ssl);
if(server_cert == NULL) {
printf("Didn't get a server certificate\n");
return NULL;
}
return conn;
} else
printf("CANNOT VERIFY SERVER CERTIFICATE! SHUTTING DOWN!!!\n");
} else
printf("HANDSHAKE FAIL\n");
return NULL; //FAILURE
}
bool SSLSocket::waitWant(int ret, uint64_t millis) {
#ifdef HEADER_OPENSSLV_H
int err = SSL_get_error(ssl, ret);
switch(err) {
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
return wait(millis, Socket::WAIT_READ) == WAIT_READ;
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
return wait(millis, Socket::WAIT_WRITE) == WAIT_WRITE;
#else
int err = ssl->last_error;
switch(err) {
case GNUTLS_E_INTERRUPTED:
case GNUTLS_E_AGAIN:
{
int waitFor = wait(millis, Socket::WAIT_READ | Socket::WAIT_WRITE);
return (waitFor & Socket::WAIT_READ) || (waitFor & Socket::WAIT_WRITE);
}
#endif
// Check if this is a fatal error...
default: checkSSL(ret);
}
dcdebug("SSL: Unexpected fallthrough");
// There was no error?
return true;
}
int SSLSocket::read(void* aBuffer, int aBufLen) throw(SocketException) {
if(!ssl) {
return -1;
}
int len = checkSSL(SSL_read(ssl, aBuffer, aBufLen));
if(len > 0) {
stats.totalDown += len;
//dcdebug("In(s): %.*s\n", len, (char*)aBuffer);
}
return len;
}
int SSLSocket::write(const void* aBuffer, int aLen) throw(SocketException) {
if(!ssl) {
return -1;
}
int ret = checkSSL(SSL_write(ssl, aBuffer, aLen));
if(ret > 0) {
stats.totalUp += ret;
//dcdebug("Out(s): %.*s\n", ret, (char*)aBuffer);
}
return ret;
}
int SSLSocket::checkSSL(int ret) throw(SocketException) {
if(!ssl) {
return -1;
}
if(ret <= 0) {
int err = SSL_get_error(ssl, ret);
switch(err) {
case SSL_ERROR_NONE: // Fallthrough - YaSSL doesn't for example return an openssl compatible error on recv fail
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: // Fallthrough
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
return -1;
case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
#ifndef HEADER_OPENSSLV_H
if(ssl->last_error == GNUTLS_E_INTERRUPTED || ssl->last_error == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN)
return -1;
#endif
throw SocketException(STRING(CONNECTION_CLOSED));
default:
{
ssl.reset();
// @todo replace 80 with MAX_ERROR_SZ or whatever's appropriate for yaSSL in some nice way...
char errbuf[80];
/* TODO: better message for SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
* If the error queue is empty (i.e. ERR_get_error() returns 0), ret can be used to find out more about the error:
* If ret == 0, an EOF was observed that violates the protocol. If ret == -1, the underlying BIO reported an I/O error
* (for socket I/O on Unix systems, consult errno for details).
*/
int error = ERR_get_error();
sprintf(errbuf, "%s %d: %s", CSTRING(SSL_ERROR), err, (error == 0) ? CSTRING(CONNECTION_CLOSED) : ERR_reason_error_string(error));
throw SSLSocketException(errbuf);
}
}
}
return ret;
}
int SSLSocket::wait(uint64_t millis, int waitFor) throw(SocketException) {
#ifdef HEADER_OPENSSLV_H
if(ssl && (waitFor & Socket::WAIT_READ)) {
/** @todo Take writing into account as well if reading is possible? */
char c;
if(SSL_peek(ssl, &c, 1) > 0)
return WAIT_READ;
}
#endif
return Socket::wait(millis, waitFor);
}
bool SSLSocket::isTrusted() throw() {
if(!ssl) {
return false;
}
#ifdef HEADER_OPENSSLV_H
if(SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) != X509_V_OK) {
return false;
}
#else
if(gnutls_certificate_verify_peers(((SSL*)ssl)->gnutls_state) != 0) {
return false;
}
#endif
X509* cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl);
if(!cert) {
return false;
}
X509_free(cert);
return true;
}
std::string SSLSocket::getCipherName() throw() {
if(!ssl)
return Util::emptyString;
return SSL_get_cipher_name(ssl);
}
std::string SSLSocket::getDigest() const throw() {
#ifdef HEADER_OPENSSLV_H
if(!ssl)
return Util::emptyString;
X509* x509 = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl);
if(!x509)
return Util::emptyString;
return ssl::X509_digest(x509, EVP_sha1());
#else
return Util::emptyString;
#endif
}
void SSLSocket::shutdown() throw() {
if(ssl)
SSL_shutdown(ssl);
}
void SSLSocket::close() throw() {
if(ssl) {
ssl.reset();
}
Socket::shutdown();
Socket::close();
}
} // namespace dcpp
/*********************parent process tcp connection use to manage************************/
void client_mgr(char *ip, int serverPort, int pipefd, int pid)
{
int flag = 0;
char *p;
char name[256], passwd[256];
char realName[512];
int err, fd, i;
struct sockaddr_in sa;
char buf[4096];
SSL_CTX* ctx;
SSL* ssl;
//create a TCP socket
fd = socket (AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
CHK_ERR(fd, "socket");
memset (&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
sa.sin_family = AF_INET;
sa.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(ip);
sa.sin_port = htons(serverPort);
//connect step
err = connect(fd, (struct sockaddr*) &sa, sizeof(sa));
CHK_ERR(err, "connect");
sleep(2);
puts("Please input the common name: ");
scanf("%s", realName);
setupCTX(&ctx);
//build SSL on the TCP connection
ssl = SSL_new(ctx);
CHK_NULL(ssl);
SSL_set_fd (ssl, fd);
err = SSL_connect(ssl);
CHK_SSL(err);
//check certificate
SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, CACERT, NULL);
SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, NULL);
int result = SSL_get_verify_result(ssl);
if(result == X509_V_OK || result == X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN) {
printf("The certificate is valid.\n");
}
else {
printf("Invalid certificate %d\n", result);
exit(1);
}
X509* server_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl);
CHK_NULL(server_cert);
char *str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(server_cert),0,0);
CHK_NULL(str);
OPENSSL_free(str);
str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(server_cert),0,0);
CHK_NULL(str);
OPENSSL_free(str);
X509_NAME *xname = X509_get_subject_name(server_cert);
X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(xname, NID_commonName, commonName, 512);
if( strcasecmp(commonName, realName) !=0 )
{
printf("commonName is wrong.\n");
exit(1);
}
printf("commonName is right.\n");
printf("Server authentication is successful.\n");
//release!
X509_free(server_cert);
sleep(2);
while(!flag)
{
//handle the login part
printf("username: "******"%s",name);
getchar();
//safe mode
set_disp_mode(STDIN_FILENO, 0);
getpasswd(passwd, sizeof(passwd));
p = passwd;
while(*p != '\n')
p++;
*p = '\0';
//OK!
set_disp_mode(STDIN_FILENO, 1);
sendName(ssl, name);
sendPass(ssl, passwd);
SSL_read(ssl, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1);
putchar(10);
if( buf[0] == 'o' )
{
puts("Connect successfully");
flag = 1;
}
else {
puts("wrong password, please try again!");
}
}
//clean the password for security reason
memset(passwd, 0, sizeof(passwd));
genKey(key);
sendKey(ssl, key);
while (1) {
talkToudp(key, pipefd, 'k');
printf("1. ipnut 'q' to quit.\n");
printf("2. input 'c' to change the key.\n");
scanf("%s", buf);
if (strlen(buf) == 1) {
if (buf[0]=='q') {
break;
}
else if( buf[0]=='r'){
genKey(key);
sendKey(ssl, key);
}
}
else {
printf("Invalid.\n");
continue;
}
}
memset(key, 0, KEYSIZE);
memset(IV, 0, IVSIZE);
sendKey(ssl, key);
sleep(1);
kill(pid, SIGTERM);
wait(0);
SSL_shutdown(ssl); /* send SSL/TLS close_notify */
close(fd);
SSL_free(ssl);
SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
}
static int
amqp_ssl_socket_open(void *base, const char *host, int port, struct timeval *timeout)
{
struct amqp_ssl_socket_t *self = (struct amqp_ssl_socket_t *)base;
long result;
int status;
amqp_time_t deadline;
X509 *cert;
BIO *bio;
if (-1 != self->sockfd) {
return AMQP_STATUS_SOCKET_INUSE;
}
ERR_clear_error();
self->ssl = SSL_new(self->ctx);
if (!self->ssl) {
self->internal_error = ERR_peek_error();
status = AMQP_STATUS_SSL_ERROR;
goto exit;
}
status = amqp_time_from_now(&deadline, timeout);
if (AMQP_STATUS_OK != status) {
return status;
}
self->sockfd = amqp_open_socket_inner(host, port, deadline);
if (0 > self->sockfd) {
status = self->sockfd;
self->internal_error = amqp_os_socket_error();
self->sockfd = -1;
goto error_out1;
}
bio = BIO_new(amqp_openssl_bio());
if (!bio) {
status = AMQP_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
goto error_out2;
}
BIO_set_fd(bio, self->sockfd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
SSL_set_bio(self->ssl, bio, bio);
start_connect:
status = SSL_connect(self->ssl);
if (status != 1) {
self->internal_error = SSL_get_error(self->ssl, status);
switch (self->internal_error) {
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
status = amqp_poll(self->sockfd, AMQP_SF_POLLIN, deadline);
break;
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
status = amqp_poll(self->sockfd, AMQP_SF_POLLOUT, deadline);
break;
default:
status = AMQP_STATUS_SSL_CONNECTION_FAILED;
}
if (AMQP_STATUS_OK == status) {
goto start_connect;
}
goto error_out2;
}
cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(self->ssl);
if (self->verify_peer) {
if (!cert) {
self->internal_error = 0;
status = AMQP_STATUS_SSL_PEER_VERIFY_FAILED;
goto error_out3;
}
result = SSL_get_verify_result(self->ssl);
if (X509_V_OK != result) {
self->internal_error = result;
status = AMQP_STATUS_SSL_PEER_VERIFY_FAILED;
goto error_out4;
}
}
if (self->verify_hostname) {
if (!cert) {
self->internal_error = 0;
status = AMQP_STATUS_SSL_HOSTNAME_VERIFY_FAILED;
goto error_out3;
}
if (AMQP_HVR_MATCH_FOUND != amqp_ssl_validate_hostname(host, cert)) {
self->internal_error = 0;
status = AMQP_STATUS_SSL_HOSTNAME_VERIFY_FAILED;
goto error_out4;
}
}
X509_free(cert);
self->internal_error = 0;
status = AMQP_STATUS_OK;
exit:
return status;
error_out4:
X509_free(cert);
error_out3:
SSL_shutdown(self->ssl);
error_out2:
amqp_os_socket_close(self->sockfd);
self->sockfd = -1;
error_out1:
SSL_free(self->ssl);
self->ssl = NULL;
goto exit;
}
NOEXPORT int connect_local(CLI *c) { /* spawn local process */
char *name, host[40];
int fd[2], pid;
X509 *peer;
#ifdef HAVE_PTHREAD_SIGMASK
sigset_t newmask;
#endif
if(c->opt->option.pty) {
char tty[64];
if(pty_allocate(fd, fd+1, tty))
longjmp(c->err, 1);
s_log(LOG_DEBUG, "TTY=%s allocated", tty);
} else
if(make_sockets(fd))
longjmp(c->err, 1);
pid=fork();
c->pid=(unsigned long)pid;
switch(pid) {
case -1: /* error */
closesocket(fd[0]);
closesocket(fd[1]);
ioerror("fork");
longjmp(c->err, 1);
case 0: /* child */
closesocket(fd[0]);
set_nonblock(fd[1], 0); /* switch back to blocking mode */
/* dup2() does not copy FD_CLOEXEC flag */
dup2(fd[1], 0);
dup2(fd[1], 1);
if(!global_options.option.foreground)
dup2(fd[1], 2);
closesocket(fd[1]); /* not really needed due to FD_CLOEXEC */
if(!getnameinfo(&c->peer_addr.sa, c->peer_addr_len,
host, 40, NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST)) {
/* just don't set these variables if getnameinfo() fails */
putenv(str_printf("REMOTE_HOST=%s", host));
if(c->opt->option.transparent_src) {
#ifndef LIBDIR
#define LIBDIR "."
#endif
#ifdef MACH64
putenv("LD_PRELOAD_32=" LIBDIR "/libstunnel.so");
putenv("LD_PRELOAD_64=" LIBDIR "/" MACH64 "/libstunnel.so");
#elif __osf /* for Tru64 _RLD_LIST is used instead */
putenv("_RLD_LIST=" LIBDIR "/libstunnel.so:DEFAULT");
#else
putenv("LD_PRELOAD=" LIBDIR "/libstunnel.so");
#endif
}
}
if(c->ssl) {
peer=SSL_get_peer_certificate(c->ssl);
if(peer) {
name=X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(peer), NULL, 0);
safestring(name);
putenv(str_printf("SSL_CLIENT_DN=%s", name));
name=X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(peer), NULL, 0);
safestring(name);
putenv(str_printf("SSL_CLIENT_I_DN=%s", name));
X509_free(peer);
}
}
#ifdef HAVE_PTHREAD_SIGMASK
sigemptyset(&newmask);
sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &newmask, NULL);
#endif
signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL);
signal(SIGUSR1, SIG_DFL);
signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL);
signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL);
execvp(c->opt->execname, c->opt->execargs);
ioerror(c->opt->execname); /* execvp failed */
_exit(1);
default: /* parent */
s_log(LOG_INFO, "Local mode child started (PID=%lu)", c->pid);
closesocket(fd[1]);
return fd[0];
}
}
/*
* Attempt to negotiate SSL connection.
*/
int
be_tls_open_server(Port *port)
{
int r;
int err;
int waitfor;
unsigned long ecode;
Assert(!port->ssl);
Assert(!port->peer);
if (!(port->ssl = SSL_new(SSL_context)))
{
ereport(COMMERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
errmsg("could not initialize SSL connection: %s",
SSLerrmessage(ERR_get_error()))));
return -1;
}
if (!my_SSL_set_fd(port, port->sock))
{
ereport(COMMERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
errmsg("could not set SSL socket: %s",
SSLerrmessage(ERR_get_error()))));
return -1;
}
port->ssl_in_use = true;
aloop:
/*
* Prepare to call SSL_get_error() by clearing thread's OpenSSL error
* queue. In general, the current thread's error queue must be empty
* before the TLS/SSL I/O operation is attempted, or SSL_get_error()
* will not work reliably. An extension may have failed to clear the
* per-thread error queue following another call to an OpenSSL I/O
* routine.
*/
ERR_clear_error();
r = SSL_accept(port->ssl);
if (r <= 0)
{
err = SSL_get_error(port->ssl, r);
/*
* Other clients of OpenSSL in the backend may fail to call
* ERR_get_error(), but we always do, so as to not cause problems
* for OpenSSL clients that don't call ERR_clear_error()
* defensively. Be sure that this happens by calling now.
* SSL_get_error() relies on the OpenSSL per-thread error queue
* being intact, so this is the earliest possible point
* ERR_get_error() may be called.
*/
ecode = ERR_get_error();
switch (err)
{
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
/* not allowed during connection establishment */
Assert(!port->noblock);
/*
* No need to care about timeouts/interrupts here. At this
* point authentication_timeout still employs
* StartupPacketTimeoutHandler() which directly exits.
*/
if (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ)
waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
else
waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
WaitLatchOrSocket(MyLatch, waitfor, port->sock, 0);
goto aloop;
case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
if (r < 0)
ereport(COMMERROR,
(errcode_for_socket_access(),
errmsg("could not accept SSL connection: %m")));
else
ereport(COMMERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
errmsg("could not accept SSL connection: EOF detected")));
break;
case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
ereport(COMMERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
errmsg("could not accept SSL connection: %s",
SSLerrmessage(ecode))));
break;
case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
ereport(COMMERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
errmsg("could not accept SSL connection: EOF detected")));
break;
default:
ereport(COMMERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
errmsg("unrecognized SSL error code: %d",
err)));
break;
}
return -1;
}
port->count = 0;
/* Get client certificate, if available. */
port->peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(port->ssl);
/* and extract the Common Name from it. */
port->peer_cn = NULL;
port->peer_cert_valid = false;
if (port->peer != NULL)
{
int len;
len = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name(port->peer),
NID_commonName, NULL, 0);
if (len != -1)
{
char *peer_cn;
peer_cn = MemoryContextAlloc(TopMemoryContext, len + 1);
r = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name(port->peer),
NID_commonName, peer_cn, len + 1);
peer_cn[len] = '\0';
if (r != len)
{
/* shouldn't happen */
pfree(peer_cn);
return -1;
}
/*
* Reject embedded NULLs in certificate common name to prevent
* attacks like CVE-2009-4034.
*/
if (len != strlen(peer_cn))
{
ereport(COMMERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
errmsg("SSL certificate's common name contains embedded null")));
pfree(peer_cn);
return -1;
}
port->peer_cn = peer_cn;
}
port->peer_cert_valid = true;
}
ereport(DEBUG2,
(errmsg("SSL connection from \"%s\"",
port->peer_cn ? port->peer_cn : "(anonymous)")));
/* set up debugging/info callback */
SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_context, info_cb);
return 0;
}
/* this is called after the connection on the client side by us to check
other aspects about the connection */
int
netsnmp_tlsbase_verify_server_cert(SSL *ssl, _netsnmpTLSBaseData *tlsdata) {
/* XXX */
X509 *remote_cert;
char *check_name;
int ret;
netsnmp_assert_or_return(ssl != NULL, SNMPERR_GENERR);
netsnmp_assert_or_return(tlsdata != NULL, SNMPERR_GENERR);
if (NULL == (remote_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl))) {
/* no peer cert */
DEBUGMSGTL(("tls_x509:verify",
"remote connection provided no certificate (yet)\n"));
return SNMPERR_TLS_NO_CERTIFICATE;
}
/* make sure that the fingerprint matches */
ret = _netsnmp_tlsbase_verify_remote_fingerprint(remote_cert, tlsdata, 1);
switch(ret) {
case VERIFIED_FINGERPRINT:
return SNMPERR_SUCCESS;
case FAILED_FINGERPRINT_VERIFY:
return SNMPERR_GENERR;
case NO_FINGERPRINT_AVAILABLE:
if (tlsdata->their_hostname && tlsdata->their_hostname[0] != '\0') {
GENERAL_NAMES *onames;
const GENERAL_NAME *oname = NULL;
int i, j;
int count;
char buf[SPRINT_MAX_LEN];
int is_wildcarded = 0;
char *compare_to;
/* see if the requested hostname has a wildcard prefix */
if (strncmp(tlsdata->their_hostname, "*.", 2) == 0) {
is_wildcarded = 1;
compare_to = tlsdata->their_hostname + 2;
} else {
compare_to = tlsdata->their_hostname;
}
/* if the hostname we were expecting to talk to matches
the cert, then we can accept this connection. */
/* check against the DNS subjectAltName */
onames = (GENERAL_NAMES *)X509_get_ext_d2i(remote_cert,
NID_subject_alt_name,
NULL, NULL );
if (NULL != onames) {
count = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(onames);
for (i=0 ; i <count; ++i) {
oname = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(onames, i);
if (GEN_DNS == oname->type) {
/* get the value */
ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((unsigned char**)&check_name,
oname->d.ia5);
/* convert to lowercase for comparisons */
for (j = 0 ;
*check_name && j < sizeof(buf)-1;
++check_name, ++j ) {
if (isascii(*check_name))
buf[j] = tolower(0xFF & *check_name);
}
if (j < sizeof(buf))
buf[j] = '\0';
check_name = buf;
if (is_wildcarded) {
/* we *only* allow passing till the first '.' */
/* ie *.example.com can't match a.b.example.com */
check_name = strchr(check_name, '.') + 1;
}
DEBUGMSGTL(("tls_x509:verify", "checking subjectAltname of dns:%s\n", check_name));
if (strcmp(compare_to, check_name) == 0) {
DEBUGMSGTL(("tls_x509:verify", "Successful match on a subjectAltname of dns:%s\n", check_name));
return SNMPERR_SUCCESS;
}
}
}
}
/* check the common name for a match */
check_name =
netsnmp_openssl_cert_get_commonName(remote_cert, NULL, NULL);
if (is_wildcarded) {
/* we *only* allow passing till the first '.' */
/* ie *.example.com can't match a.b.example.com */
check_name = strchr(check_name, '.') + 1;
}
if (strcmp(compare_to, check_name) == 0) {
DEBUGMSGTL(("tls_x509:verify", "Successful match on a common name of %s\n", check_name));
return SNMPERR_SUCCESS;
}
snmp_log(LOG_ERR, "No matching names in the certificate to match the expected %s\n", tlsdata->their_hostname);
return SNMPERR_GENERR;
}
/* XXX: check for hostname match instead */
snmp_log(LOG_ERR, "Can not verify a remote server identity without configuration\n");
return SNMPERR_GENERR;
}
DEBUGMSGTL(("tls_x509:verify", "shouldn't get here\n"));
return SNMPERR_GENERR;
}
/*
* This is the actual startup routine for the connection. We expect that the
* buffers are flushed and the "220 Ready to start TLS" was received by us,
* so that we can immediately start the TLS handshake process.
*/
TLS_SESS_STATE *tls_client_start(const TLS_CLIENT_START_PROPS *props)
{
int sts;
int protomask;
const char *cipher_list;
SSL_SESSION *session = 0;
SSL_CIPHER_const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
X509 *peercert;
TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext;
TLS_APPL_STATE *app_ctx = props->ctx;
char *myserverid;
int log_mask = app_ctx->log_mask;
/*
* When certificate verification is required, log trust chain validation
* errors even when disabled by default for opportunistic sessions. For
* DANE this only applies when using trust-anchor associations.
*/
if (TLS_MUST_TRUST(props->tls_level)
&& (!TLS_DANE_BASED(props->tls_level) || TLS_DANE_HASTA(props->dane)))
log_mask |= TLS_LOG_UNTRUSTED;
if (log_mask & TLS_LOG_VERBOSE)
msg_info("setting up TLS connection to %s", props->namaddr);
/*
* First make sure we have valid protocol and cipher parameters
*
* Per-session protocol restrictions must be applied to the SSL connection,
* as restrictions in the global context cannot be cleared.
*/
protomask = tls_protocol_mask(props->protocols);
if (protomask == TLS_PROTOCOL_INVALID) {
/* tls_protocol_mask() logs no warning. */
msg_warn("%s: Invalid TLS protocol list \"%s\": aborting TLS session",
props->namaddr, props->protocols);
return (0);
}
/* DANE requires SSLv3 or later, not SSLv2. */
if (TLS_DANE_BASED(props->tls_level))
protomask |= TLS_PROTOCOL_SSLv2;
/*
* Per session cipher selection for sessions with mandatory encryption
*
* The cipherlist is applied to the global SSL context, since it is likely
* to stay the same between connections, so we make use of a 1-element
* cache to return the same result for identical inputs.
*/
cipher_list = tls_set_ciphers(app_ctx, "TLS", props->cipher_grade,
props->cipher_exclusions);
if (cipher_list == 0) {
msg_warn("%s: %s: aborting TLS session",
props->namaddr, vstring_str(app_ctx->why));
return (0);
}
if (log_mask & TLS_LOG_VERBOSE)
msg_info("%s: TLS cipher list \"%s\"", props->namaddr, cipher_list);
/*
* OpenSSL will ignore cached sessions that use the wrong protocol. So we
* do not need to filter out cached sessions with the "wrong" protocol,
* rather OpenSSL will simply negotiate a new session.
*
* We salt the session lookup key with the protocol list, so that sessions
* found in the cache are plausibly acceptable.
*
* By the time a TLS client is negotiating ciphers it has already offered to
* re-use a session, it is too late to renege on the offer. So we must
* not attempt to re-use sessions whose ciphers are too weak. We salt the
* session lookup key with the cipher list, so that sessions found in the
* cache are always acceptable.
*
* With DANE, (more generally any TLScontext where we specified explicit
* trust-anchor or end-entity certificates) the verification status of
* the SSL session depends on the specified list. Since we verify the
* certificate only during the initial handshake, we must segregate
* sessions with different TA lists. Note, that TA re-verification is
* not possible with cached sessions, since these don't hold the complete
* peer trust chain. Therefore, we compute a digest of the sorted TA
* parameters and append it to the serverid.
*/
myserverid = tls_serverid_digest(props, protomask, cipher_list);
/*
* Allocate a new TLScontext for the new connection and get an SSL
* structure. Add the location of TLScontext to the SSL to later retrieve
* the information inside the tls_verify_certificate_callback().
*
* If session caching was enabled when TLS was initialized, the cache type
* is stored in the client SSL context.
*/
TLScontext = tls_alloc_sess_context(log_mask, props->namaddr);
TLScontext->cache_type = app_ctx->cache_type;
TLScontext->serverid = myserverid;
TLScontext->stream = props->stream;
TLScontext->mdalg = props->mdalg;
/* Alias DANE digest info from props */
TLScontext->dane = props->dane;
if ((TLScontext->con = SSL_new(app_ctx->ssl_ctx)) == NULL) {
msg_warn("Could not allocate 'TLScontext->con' with SSL_new()");
tls_print_errors();
tls_free_context(TLScontext);
return (0);
}
if (!SSL_set_ex_data(TLScontext->con, TLScontext_index, TLScontext)) {
msg_warn("Could not set application data for 'TLScontext->con'");
tls_print_errors();
tls_free_context(TLScontext);
return (0);
}
/*
* Apply session protocol restrictions.
*/
if (protomask != 0)
SSL_set_options(TLScontext->con, TLS_SSL_OP_PROTOMASK(protomask));
#ifdef SSL_SECOP_PEER
/* When authenticating the peer, use 80-bit plus OpenSSL security level */
if (TLS_MUST_MATCH(props->tls_level))
SSL_set_security_level(TLScontext->con, 1);
#endif
/*
* XXX To avoid memory leaks we must always call SSL_SESSION_free() after
* calling SSL_set_session(), regardless of whether or not the session
* will be reused.
*/
if (TLScontext->cache_type) {
session = load_clnt_session(TLScontext);
if (session) {
SSL_set_session(TLScontext->con, session);
SSL_SESSION_free(session); /* 200411 */
}
}
#ifdef TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name
if (TLS_DANE_BASED(props->tls_level)
&& strlen(props->host) <= TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
/*
* With DANE sessions, send an SNI hint. We don't care whether the
* server reports finding a matching certificate or not, so no
* callback is required to process the server response. Our use of
* SNI is limited to giving servers that are (mis)configured to use
* SNI the best opportunity to find the certificate they promised via
* the associated TLSA RRs. (Generally, server administrators should
* avoid SNI, and there are no plans to support SNI in the Postfix
* SMTP server).
*
* Since the hostname is DNSSEC-validated, it must be a DNS FQDN and
* thererefore valid for use with SNI. Failure to set a valid SNI
* hostname is a memory allocation error, and thus transient. Since
* we must not cache the session if we failed to send the SNI name,
* we have little choice but to abort.
*/
if (!SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(TLScontext->con, props->host)) {
msg_warn("%s: error setting SNI hostname to: %s", props->namaddr,
props->host);
tls_free_context(TLScontext);
return (0);
}
if (log_mask & TLS_LOG_DEBUG)
msg_info("%s: SNI hostname: %s", props->namaddr, props->host);
}
#endif
/*
* Before really starting anything, try to seed the PRNG a little bit
* more.
*/
tls_int_seed();
(void) tls_ext_seed(var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes);
/*
* Initialize the SSL connection to connect state. This should not be
* necessary anymore since 0.9.3, but the call is still in the library
* and maintaining compatibility never hurts.
*/
SSL_set_connect_state(TLScontext->con);
/*
* Connect the SSL connection with the network socket.
*/
if (SSL_set_fd(TLScontext->con, vstream_fileno(props->stream)) != 1) {
msg_info("SSL_set_fd error to %s", props->namaddr);
tls_print_errors();
uncache_session(app_ctx->ssl_ctx, TLScontext);
tls_free_context(TLScontext);
return (0);
}
/*
* Turn on non-blocking I/O so that we can enforce timeouts on network
* I/O.
*/
non_blocking(vstream_fileno(props->stream), NON_BLOCKING);
/*
* If the debug level selected is high enough, all of the data is dumped:
* TLS_LOG_TLSPKTS will dump the SSL negotiation, TLS_LOG_ALLPKTS will
* dump everything.
*
* We do have an SSL_set_fd() and now suddenly a BIO_ routine is called?
* Well there is a BIO below the SSL routines that is automatically
* created for us, so we can use it for debugging purposes.
*/
if (log_mask & TLS_LOG_TLSPKTS)
BIO_set_callback(SSL_get_rbio(TLScontext->con), tls_bio_dump_cb);
tls_dane_set_callback(app_ctx->ssl_ctx, TLScontext);
/*
* Start TLS negotiations. This process is a black box that invokes our
* call-backs for certificate verification.
*
* Error handling: If the SSL handhake fails, we print out an error message
* and remove all TLS state concerning this session.
*/
sts = tls_bio_connect(vstream_fileno(props->stream), props->timeout,
TLScontext);
if (sts <= 0) {
if (ERR_peek_error() != 0) {
msg_info("SSL_connect error to %s: %d", props->namaddr, sts);
tls_print_errors();
} else if (errno != 0) {
msg_info("SSL_connect error to %s: %m", props->namaddr);
} else {
msg_info("SSL_connect error to %s: lost connection",
props->namaddr);
}
uncache_session(app_ctx->ssl_ctx, TLScontext);
tls_free_context(TLScontext);
return (0);
}
/* Turn off packet dump if only dumping the handshake */
if ((log_mask & TLS_LOG_ALLPKTS) == 0)
BIO_set_callback(SSL_get_rbio(TLScontext->con), 0);
/*
* The caller may want to know if this session was reused or if a new
* session was negotiated.
*/
TLScontext->session_reused = SSL_session_reused(TLScontext->con);
if ((log_mask & TLS_LOG_CACHE) && TLScontext->session_reused)
msg_info("%s: Reusing old session", TLScontext->namaddr);
/*
* Do peername verification if requested and extract useful information
* from the certificate for later use.
*/
if ((peercert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(TLScontext->con)) != 0) {
TLScontext->peer_status |= TLS_CERT_FLAG_PRESENT;
/*
* Peer name or fingerprint verification as requested.
* Unconditionally set peer_CN, issuer_CN and peer_cert_fprint. Check
* fingerprint first, and avoid logging verified as untrusted in the
* call to verify_extract_name().
*/
verify_extract_print(TLScontext, peercert, props);
verify_extract_name(TLScontext, peercert, props);
if (TLScontext->log_mask &
(TLS_LOG_CERTMATCH | TLS_LOG_VERBOSE | TLS_LOG_PEERCERT))
msg_info("%s: subject_CN=%s, issuer_CN=%s, "
"fingerprint=%s, pkey_fingerprint=%s", props->namaddr,
TLScontext->peer_CN, TLScontext->issuer_CN,
TLScontext->peer_cert_fprint,
TLScontext->peer_pkey_fprint);
X509_free(peercert);
} else {
TLScontext->issuer_CN = mystrdup("");
TLScontext->peer_CN = mystrdup("");
TLScontext->peer_cert_fprint = mystrdup("");
TLScontext->peer_pkey_fprint = mystrdup("");
}
/*
* Finally, collect information about protocol and cipher for logging
*/
TLScontext->protocol = SSL_get_version(TLScontext->con);
cipher = SSL_get_current_cipher(TLScontext->con);
TLScontext->cipher_name = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher);
TLScontext->cipher_usebits = SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(cipher,
&(TLScontext->cipher_algbits));
/*
* The TLS engine is active. Switch to the tls_timed_read/write()
* functions and make the TLScontext available to those functions.
*/
tls_stream_start(props->stream, TLScontext);
/*
* Fully secured only if trusted, matched and not insecure like halfdane.
* Should perhaps also exclude "verify" (as opposed to "secure") here,
* because that can be subject to insecure MX indirection, but that's
* rather incompatible. Users have been warned.
*/
if (TLS_CERT_IS_PRESENT(TLScontext)
&& TLS_CERT_IS_TRUSTED(TLScontext)
&& TLS_CERT_IS_MATCHED(TLScontext)
&& !TLS_NEVER_SECURED(props->tls_level))
TLScontext->peer_status |= TLS_CERT_FLAG_SECURED;
/*
* All the key facts in a single log entry.
*/
if (log_mask & TLS_LOG_SUMMARY)
msg_info("%s TLS connection established to %s: %s with cipher %s "
"(%d/%d bits)",
!TLS_CERT_IS_PRESENT(TLScontext) ? "Anonymous" :
TLS_CERT_IS_SECURED(TLScontext) ? "Verified" :
TLS_CERT_IS_TRUSTED(TLScontext) ? "Trusted" : "Untrusted",
props->namaddr, TLScontext->protocol, TLScontext->cipher_name,
TLScontext->cipher_usebits, TLScontext->cipher_algbits);
tls_int_seed();
return (TLScontext);
}
int main ()
{
int err;
int sd;
struct sockaddr_in sa;
SSL_CTX* ctx;
SSL* ssl;
X509* server_cert;
char* str;
char buf [4096];
SSL_METHOD *meth;
SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms(); //设置支持SSL算法
meth = (SSL_METHOD*)SSLv2_client_method(); //客户端设置SSLV2版本
SSL_load_error_strings(); //提供将错误解析为字符串的功能
ctx = SSL_CTX_new (meth); CHK_NULL(ctx);
//创建一个SSL上下文环境，每个进程守护一个SSL_CTX结构体
CHK_SSL(err);
/* ----------------------------------------------- */
/* Create a socket and connect to server using normal socket calls. */
sd = socket (AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); CHK_ERR(sd, "socket"); //
memset (&sa, '\0', sizeof(sa));
sa.sin_family = AF_INET;
sa.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr ("127.0.0.1"); /* Server IP */
sa.sin_port = htons (1111); /* Server Port number */
err = connect(sd, (struct sockaddr*) &sa,
sizeof(sa)); CHK_ERR(err, "connect");
/* ----------------------------------------------- */
/* Now we have TCP conncetion. Start SSL negotiation. */
//创建一个维护当前连接信息
ssl = SSL_new (ctx); CHK_NULL(ssl);
//将SSL绑定到套接字上
SSL_set_fd (ssl, sd);
//建立SSL连接
err = SSL_connect (ssl); CHK_SSL(err);
/* Following two steps are optional and not required for
data exchange to be successful. */
/* Get the cipher - opt */
printf ("SSL connection using %s\n", SSL_get_cipher (ssl));
/* Get server's certificate (note: beware of dynamic allocation) - opt */
//获取服务端证书
server_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate (ssl); CHK_NULL(server_cert);
printf ("Server certificate:\n");
str = X509_NAME_oneline (X509_get_subject_name (server_cert),0,0);
CHK_NULL(str);
printf ("\t subject: %s\n", str);
OPENSSL_free (str);
str = X509_NAME_oneline (X509_get_issuer_name (server_cert),0,0);
CHK_NULL(str);
printf ("\t issuer: %s\n", str);
OPENSSL_free (str);
/* We could do all sorts of certificate verification stuff here before
deallocating the certificate. */
//释放服务端证书
X509_free (server_cert);
/* --------------------------------------------------- */
/* DATA EXCHANGE - Send a message and receive a reply. */
err = SSL_write (ssl, "Hello World!", strlen("Hello World!")); CHK_SSL(err);
err = SSL_read (ssl, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1); CHK_SSL(err);
buf[err] = '\0';
printf ("Got %d chars:'%s'\n", err, buf);
SSL_shutdown (ssl); /* send SSL/TLS close_notify */
/* Clean up. */
close(sd);
SSL_free (ssl);
SSL_CTX_free (ctx);
}
int OpenSSLVerifyCertificate(STREAM *S)
{
int RetVal=FALSE;
#ifdef HAVE_LIBSSL
char *Name=NULL, *Value=NULL, *ptr;
int val;
X509 *cert=NULL;
SSL *ssl;
ptr=STREAMGetItem(S,"LIBUSEFUL-SSL-CTX");
if (! ptr) return(FALSE);
ssl=(SSL *) ptr;
cert=SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl);
if (cert)
{
STREAMSetValue(S,"SSL-Certificate-Issuer",X509_NAME_oneline( X509_get_issuer_name(cert),NULL, 0));
ptr=X509_NAME_oneline( X509_get_subject_name(cert),NULL, 0);
STREAMSetValue(S,"SSL-Certificate-Subject", ptr);
ptr=GetNameValuePair(ptr,"/","=",&Name,&Value);
while (ptr)
{
if (StrLen(Name) && (strcmp(Name,"CN")==0)) STREAMSetValue(S,"SSL-Certificate-CommonName",Value);
ptr=GetNameValuePair(ptr,"/","=",&Name,&Value);
}
val=SSL_get_verify_result(ssl);
switch(val)
{
case X509_V_OK: STREAMSetValue(S,"SSL-Certificate-Verify","OK"); RetVal=TRUE; break;
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: STREAMSetValue(S,"SSL-Certificate-Verify","unable to get issuer"); break;
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL: STREAMSetValue(S,"SSL-Certificate-Verify","unable to get certificate CRL"); break;
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: STREAMSetValue(S,"SSL-Certificate-Verify","unable to decrypt certificate's signature"); break;
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: STREAMSetValue(S,"SSL-Certificate-Verify","unable to decrypt CRL's signature"); break;
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: STREAMSetValue(S,"SSL-Certificate-Verify","unable to decode issuer public key"); break;
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: STREAMSetValue(S,"SSL-Certificate-Verify","certificate signature invalid"); break;
case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: STREAMSetValue(S,"SSL-Certificate-Verify","CRL signature invalid"); break;
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: STREAMSetValue(S,"SSL-Certificate-Verify","certificate is not yet valid"); break;
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: STREAMSetValue(S,"SSL-Certificate-Verify","certificate has expired"); break;
case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: STREAMSetValue(S,"SSL-Certificate-Verify","CRL is not yet valid the CRL is not yet valid."); break;
case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: STREAMSetValue(S,"SSL-Certificate-Verify","CRL has expired the CRL has expired."); break;
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: STREAMSetValue(S,"SSL-Certificate-Verify","invalid notBefore value"); break;
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: STREAMSetValue(S,"SSL-Certificate-Verify","invalid notAfter value"); break;
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: STREAMSetValue(S,"SSL-Certificate-Verify","invalid CRL lastUpdate value"); break;
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: STREAMSetValue(S,"SSL-Certificate-Verify","invalid CRL nextUpdate value"); break;
case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: STREAMSetValue(S,"SSL-Certificate-Verify","out of memory"); break;
case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: STREAMSetValue(S,"SSL-Certificate-Verify","self signed certificate"); break;
case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: STREAMSetValue(S,"SSL-Certificate-Verify","self signed certificate in certificate chain"); break;
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: STREAMSetValue(S,"SSL-Certificate-Verify","cant find root certificate in local database"); break;
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: STREAMSetValue(S,"SSL-Certificate-Verify","ERROR: unable to verify the first certificate"); break;
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: STREAMSetValue(S,"SSL-Certificate-Verify","certificate chain too long"); break;
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: STREAMSetValue(S,"SSL-Certificate-Verify","certificate revoked"); break;
case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: STREAMSetValue(S,"SSL-Certificate-Verify","invalid CA certificate"); break;
case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: STREAMSetValue(S,"SSL-Certificate-Verify","path length constraint exceeded"); break;
case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: STREAMSetValue(S,"SSL-Certificate-Verify","unsupported certificate purpose"); break;
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: STREAMSetValue(S,"SSL-Certificate-Verify","certificate not trusted"); break;
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: STREAMSetValue(S,"SSL-Certificate-Verify","certificate rejected"); break;
case X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH: STREAMSetValue(S,"SSL-Certificate-Verify","subject issuer mismatch"); break;
case X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH: STREAMSetValue(S,"SSL-Certificate-Verify","authority and subject key identifier mismatch"); break;
case X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH: STREAMSetValue(S,"SSL-Certificate-Verify","authority and issuer serial number mismatch"); break;
case X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN: STREAMSetValue(S,"SSL-Certificate-Verify","key usage does not include certificate signing"); break;
case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: STREAMSetValue(S,"SSL-Certificate-Verify","application verification failure"); break;
}
}
else
{
STREAMSetValue(S,"SSL-Certificate-Verify","no certificate");
}
DestroyString(Name);
DestroyString(Value);
#endif
return(RetVal);
}
static CURLcode
cyassl_connect_step2(struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex)
{
int ret = -1;
struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
struct ssl_connect_data* conssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
conn->recv[sockindex] = cyassl_recv;
conn->send[sockindex] = cyassl_send;
/* Enable RFC2818 checks */
if(data->set.ssl.verifyhost) {
ret = CyaSSL_check_domain_name(conssl->handle, conn->host.name);
if(ret == SSL_FAILURE)
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
ret = SSL_connect(conssl->handle);
if(ret != 1) {
char error_buffer[CYASSL_MAX_ERROR_SZ];
int detail = SSL_get_error(conssl->handle, ret);
if(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ == detail) {
conssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2_reading;
return CURLE_OK;
}
else if(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE == detail) {
conssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2_writing;
return CURLE_OK;
}
/* There is no easy way to override only the CN matching.
* This will enable the override of both mismatching SubjectAltNames
* as also mismatching CN fields */
else if(DOMAIN_NAME_MISMATCH == detail) {
#if 1
failf(data, "\tsubject alt name(s) or common name do not match \"%s\"\n",
conn->host.dispname);
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
#else
/* When the CyaSSL_check_domain_name() is used and you desire to continue
* on a DOMAIN_NAME_MISMATCH, i.e. 'data->set.ssl.verifyhost == 0',
* CyaSSL version 2.4.0 will fail with an INCOMPLETE_DATA error. The only
* way to do this is currently to switch the CyaSSL_check_domain_name()
* in and out based on the 'data->set.ssl.verifyhost' value. */
if(data->set.ssl.verifyhost) {
failf(data,
"\tsubject alt name(s) or common name do not match \"%s\"\n",
conn->host.dispname);
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
else {
infof(data,
"\tsubject alt name(s) and/or common name do not match \"%s\"\n",
conn->host.dispname);
return CURLE_OK;
}
#endif
}
#if LIBCYASSL_VERSION_HEX >= 0x02007000 /* 2.7.0 */
else if(ASN_NO_SIGNER_E == detail) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
failf(data, "\tCA signer not available for verification\n");
return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
}
else {
/* Just continue with a warning if no strict certificate
verification is required. */
infof(data, "CA signer not available for verification, "
"continuing anyway\n");
}
}
#endif
else {
failf(data, "SSL_connect failed with error %d: %s", detail,
ERR_error_string(detail, error_buffer));
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
}
if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY]) {
X509 *x509;
const char *x509_der;
int x509_der_len;
curl_X509certificate x509_parsed;
curl_asn1Element *pubkey;
CURLcode result;
x509 = SSL_get_peer_certificate(conssl->handle);
if(!x509) {
failf(data, "SSL: failed retrieving server certificate");
return CURLE_SSL_PINNEDPUBKEYNOTMATCH;
}
x509_der = (const char *)CyaSSL_X509_get_der(x509, &x509_der_len);
if(!x509_der) {
failf(data, "SSL: failed retrieving ASN.1 server certificate");
return CURLE_SSL_PINNEDPUBKEYNOTMATCH;
}
memset(&x509_parsed, 0, sizeof x509_parsed);
Curl_parseX509(&x509_parsed, x509_der, x509_der + x509_der_len);
pubkey = &x509_parsed.subjectPublicKeyInfo;
if(!pubkey->header || pubkey->end <= pubkey->header) {
failf(data, "SSL: failed retrieving public key from server certificate");
return CURLE_SSL_PINNEDPUBKEYNOTMATCH;
}
result = Curl_pin_peer_pubkey(data,
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY],
(const unsigned char *)pubkey->header,
(size_t)(pubkey->end - pubkey->header));
if(result) {
failf(data, "SSL: public key does not match pinned public key!");
return result;
}
}
conssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_3;
infof(data, "SSL connected\n");
return CURLE_OK;
}
/* sqAcceptSSL: Start/continue an SSL server handshake.
Arguments:
handle - the SSL handle
srcBuf - the input token sent by the remote peer
srcLen - the size of the input token
dstBuf - the output buffer for a new token
dstLen - the size of the output buffer
Returns: The size of the output token or an error code.
*/
sqInt sqAcceptSSL(sqInt handle, char* srcBuf, sqInt srcLen, char *dstBuf, sqInt dstLen) {
int result, n;
char peerName[256];
X509 *cert;
sqSSL *ssl = sslFromHandle(handle);
/* Verify state of session */
if(ssl == NULL || (ssl->state != SQSSL_UNUSED && ssl->state != SQSSL_ACCEPTING)) {
return SQSSL_INVALID_STATE;
}
/* Establish initial connection */
if(ssl->state == SQSSL_UNUSED) {
ssl->state = SQSSL_ACCEPTING;
if(ssl->loglevel) printf("sqAcceptSSL: Setting up SSL\n");
if(!sqSetupSSL(ssl, 1)) return SQSSL_GENERIC_ERROR;
if(ssl->loglevel) printf("sqAcceptSSL: setting accept state\n");
SSL_set_accept_state(ssl->ssl);
}
if(ssl->loglevel) printf("sqAcceptSSL: BIO_write %d bytes\n", srcLen);
n = BIO_write(ssl->bioRead, srcBuf, srcLen);
if(n < srcLen) {
if(ssl->loglevel) printf("sqAcceptSSL: BIO_write wrote less than expected\n");
return SQSSL_GENERIC_ERROR;
}
if(n < 0) {
if(ssl->loglevel) printf("sqAcceptSSL: BIO_write failed\n");
return SQSSL_GENERIC_ERROR;
}
if(ssl->loglevel) printf("sqAcceptSSL: SSL_accept\n");
result = SSL_accept(ssl->ssl);
if(result <= 0) {
int count = 0;
int error = SSL_get_error(ssl->ssl, result);
if(error != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) {
if(ssl->loglevel) printf("sqAcceptSSL: SSL_accept failed\n");
ERR_print_errors_fp(stdout);
return SQSSL_GENERIC_ERROR;
}
if(ssl->loglevel) printf("sqAcceptSSL: sqCopyBioSSL\n");
count = sqCopyBioSSL(ssl, ssl->bioWrite, dstBuf, dstLen);
return count ? count : SQSSL_NEED_MORE_DATA;
}
/* We are connected. Verify the cert. */
ssl->state = SQSSL_CONNECTED;
if(ssl->loglevel) printf("sqAcceptSSL: SSL_get_peer_certificate\n");
cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl->ssl);
if(ssl->loglevel) printf("sqAcceptSSL: cert = %x\n", (int)cert);
if(cert) {
X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name(cert),
NID_commonName, peerName,
sizeof(peerName));
if(ssl->loglevel) printf("sqAcceptSSL: peerName = %s\n", peerName);
ssl->peerName = strdup(peerName);
X509_free(cert);
/* Check the result of verification */
result = SSL_get_verify_result(ssl->ssl);
if(ssl->loglevel) printf("sqAcceptSSL: SSL_get_verify_result = %d\n", result);
/* FIXME: Figure out the actual failure reason */
ssl->certFlags = result ? SQSSL_OTHER_ISSUE : SQSSL_OK;
} else {
ssl->certFlags = SQSSL_NO_CERTIFICATE;
}
return sqCopyBioSSL(ssl, ssl->bioWrite, dstBuf, dstLen);
}
static int verify_server_cert(gitno_ssl *ssl, const char *host)
{
X509 *cert;
X509_NAME *peer_name;
ASN1_STRING *str;
unsigned char *peer_cn = NULL;
int matched = -1, type = GEN_DNS;
GENERAL_NAMES *alts;
struct in6_addr addr6;
struct in_addr addr4;
void *addr;
int i = -1,j;
if (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl->ssl) != X509_V_OK) {
giterr_set(GITERR_SSL, "The SSL certificate is invalid");
return -1;
}
/* Try to parse the host as an IP address to see if it is */
if (p_inet_pton(AF_INET, host, &addr4)) {
type = GEN_IPADD;
addr = &addr4;
} else {
if(p_inet_pton(AF_INET6, host, &addr6)) {
type = GEN_IPADD;
addr = &addr6;
}
}
cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl->ssl);
/* Check the alternative names */
alts = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
if (alts) {
int num;
num = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(alts);
for (i = 0; i < num && matched != 1; i++) {
const GENERAL_NAME *gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(alts, i);
const char *name = (char *) ASN1_STRING_data(gn->d.ia5);
size_t namelen = (size_t) ASN1_STRING_length(gn->d.ia5);
/* Skip any names of a type we're not looking for */
if (gn->type != type)
continue;
if (type == GEN_DNS) {
/* If it contains embedded NULs, don't even try */
if (memchr(name, '\0', namelen))
continue;
if (check_host_name(name, host) < 0)
matched = 0;
else
matched = 1;
} else if (type == GEN_IPADD) {
/* Here name isn't so much a name but a binary representation of the IP */
matched = !!memcmp(name, addr, namelen);
}
}
}
GENERAL_NAMES_free(alts);
if (matched == 0)
goto cert_fail;
if (matched == 1)
return 0;
/* If no alternative names are available, check the common name */
peer_name = X509_get_subject_name(cert);
if (peer_name == NULL)
goto on_error;
if (peer_name) {
/* Get the index of the last CN entry */
while ((j = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(peer_name, NID_commonName, i)) >= 0)
i = j;
}
if (i < 0)
goto on_error;
str = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(X509_NAME_get_entry(peer_name, i));
if (str == NULL)
goto on_error;
/* Work around a bug in OpenSSL whereby ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 fails if it's already in utf-8 */
if (ASN1_STRING_type(str) == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) {
int size = ASN1_STRING_length(str);
if (size > 0) {
peer_cn = OPENSSL_malloc(size + 1);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC(peer_cn);
memcpy(peer_cn, ASN1_STRING_data(str), size);
peer_cn[size] = '\0';
}
} else {
int size = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&peer_cn, str);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC(peer_cn);
if (memchr(peer_cn, '\0', size))
goto cert_fail;
}
if (check_host_name((char *)peer_cn, host) < 0)
goto cert_fail;
OPENSSL_free(peer_cn);
return 0;
on_error:
OPENSSL_free(peer_cn);
return ssl_set_error(ssl, 0);
cert_fail:
OPENSSL_free(peer_cn);
giterr_set(GITERR_SSL, "Certificate host name check failed");
return -1;
}
static void
mta_io(struct io *io, int evt)
{
struct mta_session *s = io->arg;
char *line, *msg, *p;
size_t len;
const char *error;
int cont;
X509 *x;
log_trace(TRACE_IO, "mta: %p: %s %s", s, io_strevent(evt),
io_strio(io));
switch (evt) {
case IO_CONNECTED:
log_info("smtp-out: Connected on session %016"PRIx64, s->id);
if (s->use_smtps) {
io_set_write(io);
mta_start_tls(s);
}
else {
mta_enter_state(s, MTA_BANNER);
io_set_read(io);
}
break;
case IO_TLSREADY:
log_info("smtp-out: Started TLS on session %016"PRIx64": %s",
s->id, ssl_to_text(s->io.ssl));
s->flags |= MTA_TLS;
if (mta_verify_certificate(s)) {
io_pause(&s->io, IO_PAUSE_IN);
break;
}
case IO_TLSVERIFIED:
x = SSL_get_peer_certificate(s->io.ssl);
if (x) {
log_info("smtp-out: Server certificate verification %s "
"on session %016"PRIx64,
(s->flags & MTA_VERIFIED) ? "succeeded" : "failed",
s->id);
X509_free(x);
}
if (s->use_smtps) {
mta_enter_state(s, MTA_BANNER);
io_set_read(io);
}
else
mta_enter_state(s, MTA_EHLO);
break;
case IO_DATAIN:
nextline:
line = iobuf_getline(&s->iobuf, &len);
if (line == NULL) {
if (iobuf_len(&s->iobuf) >= LINE_MAX) {
mta_error(s, "Input too long");
mta_free(s);
return;
}
iobuf_normalize(&s->iobuf);
break;
}
log_trace(TRACE_MTA, "mta: %p: <<< %s", s, line);
if ((error = parse_smtp_response(line, len, &msg, &cont))) {
mta_error(s, "Bad response: %s", error);
mta_free(s);
return;
}
/* read extensions */
if (s->state == MTA_EHLO) {
if (strcmp(msg, "STARTTLS") == 0)
s->ext |= MTA_EXT_STARTTLS;
else if (strncmp(msg, "AUTH ", 5) == 0) {
s->ext |= MTA_EXT_AUTH;
if ((p = strstr(msg, " PLAIN")) &&
(*(p+6) == '\0' || *(p+6) == ' '))
s->ext |= MTA_EXT_AUTH_PLAIN;
if ((p = strstr(msg, " LOGIN")) &&
(*(p+6) == '\0' || *(p+6) == ' '))
s->ext |= MTA_EXT_AUTH_LOGIN;
}
else if (strcmp(msg, "PIPELINING") == 0)
s->ext |= MTA_EXT_PIPELINING;
else if (strcmp(msg, "DSN") == 0)
s->ext |= MTA_EXT_DSN;
}
/* continuation reply, we parse out the repeating statuses and ESC */
if (cont) {
if (s->replybuf[0] == '\0')
(void)strlcat(s->replybuf, line, sizeof s->replybuf);
else {
line = line + 4;
if (isdigit((int)*line) && *(line + 1) == '.' &&
isdigit((int)*line+2) && *(line + 3) == '.' &&
isdigit((int)*line+4) && isspace((int)*(line + 5)))
(void)strlcat(s->replybuf, line+5, sizeof s->replybuf);
else
(void)strlcat(s->replybuf, line, sizeof s->replybuf);
}
goto nextline;
}
/* last line of a reply, check if we're on a continuation to parse out status and ESC.
* if we overflow reply buffer or are not on continuation, log entire last line.
*/
if (s->replybuf[0] != '\0') {
p = line + 4;
if (isdigit((int)*p) && *(p + 1) == '.' &&
isdigit((int)*p+2) && *(p + 3) == '.' &&
isdigit((int)*p+4) && isspace((int)*(p + 5)))
p += 5;
if (strlcat(s->replybuf, p, sizeof s->replybuf) >= sizeof s->replybuf)
(void)strlcpy(s->replybuf, line, sizeof s->replybuf);
}
else
(void)strlcpy(s->replybuf, line, sizeof s->replybuf);
if (s->state == MTA_QUIT) {
log_info("smtp-out: Closing session %016"PRIx64
": %zu message%s sent.", s->id, s->msgcount,
(s->msgcount > 1) ? "s" : "");
mta_free(s);
return;
}
io_set_write(io);
mta_response(s, s->replybuf);
if (s->flags & MTA_FREE) {
mta_free(s);
return;
}
if (s->flags & MTA_RECONN) {
s->flags &= ~MTA_RECONN;
mta_connect(s);
return;
}
iobuf_normalize(&s->iobuf);
if (iobuf_len(&s->iobuf)) {
log_debug("debug: mta: remaining data in input buffer");
mta_error(s, "Remote host sent too much data");
if (s->flags & MTA_WAIT)
s->flags |= MTA_FREE;
else
mta_free(s);
}
break;
case IO_LOWAT:
if (s->state == MTA_BODY) {
mta_enter_state(s, MTA_BODY);
if (s->flags & MTA_FREE) {
mta_free(s);
return;
}
}
if (iobuf_queued(&s->iobuf) == 0)
io_set_read(io);
break;
case IO_TIMEOUT:
log_debug("debug: mta: %p: connection timeout", s);
mta_error(s, "Connection timeout");
if (!s->ready)
mta_connect(s);
else
mta_free(s);
break;
case IO_ERROR:
log_debug("debug: mta: %p: IO error: %s", s, io->error);
if (!s->ready) {
mta_error(s, "IO Error: %s", io->error);
mta_connect(s);
break;
}
else if (!(s->flags & (MTA_FORCE_TLS|MTA_FORCE_ANYSSL))) {
/* error in non-strict SSL negotiation, downgrade to plain */
if (s->flags & MTA_TLS) {
log_info("smtp-out: Error on session %016"PRIx64
": opportunistic TLS failed, "
"downgrading to plain", s->id);
s->flags &= ~MTA_TLS;
s->flags |= MTA_DOWNGRADE_PLAIN;
mta_connect(s);
break;
}
}
mta_error(s, "IO Error: %s", io->error);
mta_free(s);
break;
case IO_TLSERROR:
log_debug("debug: mta: %p: TLS IO error: %s", s, io->error);
if (!(s->flags & (MTA_FORCE_TLS|MTA_FORCE_ANYSSL))) {
/* error in non-strict SSL negotiation, downgrade to plain */
log_info("smtp-out: TLS Error on session %016"PRIx64
": TLS failed, "
"downgrading to plain", s->id);
s->flags &= ~MTA_TLS;
s->flags |= MTA_DOWNGRADE_PLAIN;
mta_connect(s);
break;
}
mta_error(s, "IO Error: %s", io->error);
mta_free(s);
break;
case IO_DISCONNECTED:
log_debug("debug: mta: %p: disconnected in state %s",
s, mta_strstate(s->state));
mta_error(s, "Connection closed unexpectedly");
if (!s->ready)
mta_connect(s);
else
mta_free(s);
break;
default:
fatalx("mta_io() bad event");
}
}
/*! \brief
* creates a FILE * from the fd passed by the accept thread.
* This operation is potentially expensive (certificate verification),
* so we do it in the child thread context.
*
* \note must decrement ref count before returning NULL on error
*/
static void *handle_tcptls_connection(void *data)
{
struct ast_tcptls_session_instance *tcptls_session = data;
#ifdef DO_SSL
int (*ssl_setup)(SSL *) = (tcptls_session->client) ? SSL_connect : SSL_accept;
int ret;
char err[256];
#endif
/*
* open a FILE * as appropriate.
*/
if (!tcptls_session->parent->tls_cfg) {
if ((tcptls_session->f = fdopen(tcptls_session->fd, "w+"))) {
if(setvbuf(tcptls_session->f, NULL, _IONBF, 0)) {
ast_tcptls_close_session_file(tcptls_session);
}
}
}
#ifdef DO_SSL
else if ( (tcptls_session->ssl = SSL_new(tcptls_session->parent->tls_cfg->ssl_ctx)) ) {
SSL_set_fd(tcptls_session->ssl, tcptls_session->fd);
if ((ret = ssl_setup(tcptls_session->ssl)) <= 0) {
ast_verb(2, "Problem setting up ssl connection: %s\n", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), err));
} else {
#if defined(HAVE_FUNOPEN) /* the BSD interface */
tcptls_session->f = funopen(tcptls_session->ssl, ssl_read, ssl_write, NULL, ssl_close);
#elif defined(HAVE_FOPENCOOKIE) /* the glibc/linux interface */
static const cookie_io_functions_t cookie_funcs = {
ssl_read, ssl_write, NULL, ssl_close
};
tcptls_session->f = fopencookie(tcptls_session->ssl, "w+", cookie_funcs);
#else
/* could add other methods here */
ast_debug(2, "no tcptls_session->f methods attempted!\n");
#endif
if ((tcptls_session->client && !ast_test_flag(&tcptls_session->parent->tls_cfg->flags, AST_SSL_DONT_VERIFY_SERVER))
|| (!tcptls_session->client && ast_test_flag(&tcptls_session->parent->tls_cfg->flags, AST_SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT))) {
X509 *peer;
long res;
peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tcptls_session->ssl);
if (!peer) {
ast_log(LOG_ERROR, "No peer SSL certificate to verify\n");
ast_tcptls_close_session_file(tcptls_session);
ao2_ref(tcptls_session, -1);
return NULL;
}
res = SSL_get_verify_result(tcptls_session->ssl);
if (res != X509_V_OK) {
ast_log(LOG_ERROR, "Certificate did not verify: %s\n", X509_verify_cert_error_string(res));
X509_free(peer);
ast_tcptls_close_session_file(tcptls_session);
ao2_ref(tcptls_session, -1);
return NULL;
}
if (!ast_test_flag(&tcptls_session->parent->tls_cfg->flags, AST_SSL_IGNORE_COMMON_NAME)) {
ASN1_STRING *str;
unsigned char *str2;
X509_NAME *name = X509_get_subject_name(peer);
int pos = -1;
int found = 0;
for (;;) {
/* Walk the certificate to check all available "Common Name" */
/* XXX Probably should do a gethostbyname on the hostname and compare that as well */
pos = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, NID_commonName, pos);
if (pos < 0) {
break;
}
str = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(X509_NAME_get_entry(name, pos));
ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&str2, str);
if (str2) {
if (!strcasecmp(tcptls_session->parent->hostname, (char *) str2)) {
found = 1;
}
ast_debug(3, "SSL Common Name compare s1='%s' s2='%s'\n", tcptls_session->parent->hostname, str2);
OPENSSL_free(str2);
}
if (found) {
break;
}
}
if (!found) {
ast_log(LOG_ERROR, "Certificate common name did not match (%s)\n", tcptls_session->parent->hostname);
X509_free(peer);
ast_tcptls_close_session_file(tcptls_session);
ao2_ref(tcptls_session, -1);
return NULL;
}
}
X509_free(peer);
}
}
if (!tcptls_session->f) { /* no success opening descriptor stacking */
SSL_free(tcptls_session->ssl);
}
}
#endif /* DO_SSL */
if (!tcptls_session->f) {
ast_tcptls_close_session_file(tcptls_session);
ast_log(LOG_WARNING, "FILE * open failed!\n");
#ifndef DO_SSL
if (tcptls_session->parent->tls_cfg) {
ast_log(LOG_WARNING, "Attempted a TLS connection without OpenSSL support. This will not work!\n");
}
#endif
ao2_ref(tcptls_session, -1);
return NULL;
}
if (tcptls_session->parent->worker_fn) {
return tcptls_session->parent->worker_fn(tcptls_session);
} else {
return tcptls_session;
}
}
static int
mta_verify_certificate(struct mta_session *s)
{
#define MAX_CERTS 16
#define MAX_CERT_LEN (MAX_IMSGSIZE - (IMSG_HEADER_SIZE + sizeof(req_ca_vrfy)))
struct ca_vrfy_req_msg req_ca_vrfy;
struct iovec iov[2];
X509 *x;
STACK_OF(X509) *xchain;
const char *name;
unsigned char *cert_der[MAX_CERTS];
int cert_len[MAX_CERTS];
int i, cert_count, res;
res = 0;
memset(cert_der, 0, sizeof(cert_der));
memset(&req_ca_vrfy, 0, sizeof req_ca_vrfy);
/* Send the client certificate */
if (s->relay->ca_name) {
name = s->relay->ca_name;
req_ca_vrfy.fallback = 0;
}
else {
name = s->helo;
req_ca_vrfy.fallback = 1;
}
if (strlcpy(req_ca_vrfy.name, name, sizeof req_ca_vrfy.name)
>= sizeof req_ca_vrfy.name)
return 0;
x = SSL_get_peer_certificate(s->io.ssl);
if (x == NULL)
return 0;
xchain = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(s->io.ssl);
/*
* Client provided a certificate and possibly a certificate chain.
* SMTP can't verify because it does not have the information that
* it needs, instead it will pass the certificate and chain to the
* lookup process and wait for a reply.
*
*/
cert_len[0] = i2d_X509(x, &cert_der[0]);
X509_free(x);
if (cert_len[0] < 0) {
log_warnx("warn: failed to encode certificate");
goto end;
}
log_debug("debug: certificate 0: len=%d", cert_len[0]);
if (cert_len[0] > (int)MAX_CERT_LEN) {
log_warnx("warn: certificate too long");
goto end;
}
if (xchain) {
cert_count = sk_X509_num(xchain);
log_debug("debug: certificate chain len: %d", cert_count);
if (cert_count >= MAX_CERTS) {
log_warnx("warn: certificate chain too long");
goto end;
}
}
else
cert_count = 0;
for (i = 0; i < cert_count; ++i) {
x = sk_X509_value(xchain, i);
cert_len[i+1] = i2d_X509(x, &cert_der[i+1]);
if (cert_len[i+1] < 0) {
log_warnx("warn: failed to encode certificate");
goto end;
}
log_debug("debug: certificate %i: len=%d", i+1, cert_len[i+1]);
if (cert_len[i+1] > (int)MAX_CERT_LEN) {
log_warnx("warn: certificate too long");
goto end;
}
}
tree_xset(&wait_ssl_verify, s->id, s);
s->flags |= MTA_WAIT;
/* Send the client certificate */
req_ca_vrfy.reqid = s->id;
req_ca_vrfy.cert_len = cert_len[0];
req_ca_vrfy.n_chain = cert_count;
iov[0].iov_base = &req_ca_vrfy;
iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(req_ca_vrfy);
iov[1].iov_base = cert_der[0];
iov[1].iov_len = cert_len[0];
m_composev(p_lka, IMSG_MTA_TLS_VERIFY_CERT, 0, 0, -1,
iov, nitems(iov));
memset(&req_ca_vrfy, 0, sizeof req_ca_vrfy);
req_ca_vrfy.reqid = s->id;
/* Send the chain, one cert at a time */
for (i = 0; i < cert_count; ++i) {
req_ca_vrfy.cert_len = cert_len[i+1];
iov[1].iov_base = cert_der[i+1];
iov[1].iov_len = cert_len[i+1];
m_composev(p_lka, IMSG_MTA_TLS_VERIFY_CHAIN, 0, 0, -1,
iov, nitems(iov));
}
/* Tell lookup process that it can start verifying, we're done */
memset(&req_ca_vrfy, 0, sizeof req_ca_vrfy);
req_ca_vrfy.reqid = s->id;
m_compose(p_lka, IMSG_MTA_TLS_VERIFY, 0, 0, -1,
&req_ca_vrfy, sizeof req_ca_vrfy);
res = 1;
end:
for (i = 0; i < MAX_CERTS; ++i)
free(cert_der[i]);
return res;
}
Octstr *conn_read_withlen(Connection *conn)
{
Octstr *result = NULL;
unsigned char lengthbuf[4];
long length = 0; /* for compiler please */
int try, retry;
lock_in(conn);
for (try = 1; try <= 2; try++) {
if (try > 1)
unlocked_read(conn);
do {
retry = 0;
/* First get the length. */
if (unlocked_inbuf_len(conn) < 4)
continue;
octstr_get_many_chars(lengthbuf, conn->inbuf, conn->inbufpos, 4);
length = decode_network_long(lengthbuf);
if (length < 0) {
warning(0, "conn_read_withlen: got negative length, skipping");
conn->inbufpos += 4;
retry = 1;
}
} while(retry == 1);
/* Then get the data. */
if (unlocked_inbuf_len(conn) - 4 < length)
continue;
conn->inbufpos += 4;
result = unlocked_get(conn, length);
gw_claim_area(result);
break;
}
unlock_in(conn);
return result;
}
Octstr *conn_read_packet(Connection *conn, int startmark, int endmark)
{
int startpos, endpos;
Octstr *result = NULL;
int try;
lock_in(conn);
for (try = 1; try <= 2; try++) {
if (try > 1)
unlocked_read(conn);
/* Find startmark, and discard everything up to it */
if (startmark >= 0) {
startpos = octstr_search_char(conn->inbuf, startmark, conn->inbufpos);
if (startpos < 0) {
conn->inbufpos = octstr_len(conn->inbuf);
continue;
} else {
conn->inbufpos = startpos;
}
} else {
startpos = conn->inbufpos;
}
/* Find first endmark after startmark */
endpos = octstr_search_char(conn->inbuf, endmark, conn->inbufpos);
if (endpos < 0)
continue;
result = unlocked_get(conn, endpos - startpos + 1);
gw_claim_area(result);
break;
}
unlock_in(conn);
return result;
}
#ifdef HAVE_LIBSSL
X509 *conn_get_peer_certificate(Connection *conn)
{
/* Don't know if it needed to be locked , but better safe as crash */
lock_out(conn);
lock_in(conn);
if (conn->peer_certificate == NULL && conn->ssl != NULL)
conn->peer_certificate = SSL_get_peer_certificate(conn->ssl);
unlock_in(conn);
unlock_out(conn);
return conn->peer_certificate;
}
/*
* XXX Alex decalred the RSA callback routine static and now we're getting
* warning messages for our automatic compilation tests. So we are commenting
* the function out to avoid the warnings.
*
static RSA *tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl, int export, int key_len)
{
static RSA *rsa = NULL;
debug("gwlib.http", 0, "SSL: Generating new RSA key (export=%d, keylen=%d)", export, key_len);
if (export) {
rsa = RSA_generate_key(key_len, RSA_F4, NULL, NULL);
} else {
debug("gwlib.http", 0, "SSL: Export not set");
}
return rsa;
}
*/
static Mutex **ssl_static_locks = NULL;
/* the call-back function for the openssl crypto thread locking */
static void openssl_locking_function(int mode, int n, const char *file, int line)
{
if (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK)
mutex_lock(ssl_static_locks[n-1]);
else
mutex_unlock(ssl_static_locks[n-1]);
}
void openssl_init_locks(void)
{
int c, maxlocks = CRYPTO_num_locks();
gw_assert(ssl_static_locks == NULL);
ssl_static_locks = gw_malloc(sizeof(Mutex *) * maxlocks);
for (c = 0; c < maxlocks; c++)
ssl_static_locks[c] = mutex_create();
/* after the mutexes have been created, apply the call-back to it */
CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(openssl_locking_function);
CRYPTO_set_id_callback((CRYPTO_CALLBACK_PTR)gwthread_self);
}
/** check if a provided cert matches a passed hostname
*/
bool
_mongoc_ssl_check_cert (SSL *ssl,
const char *host,
bool weak_cert_validation)
{
X509 *peer;
X509_NAME *subject_name;
X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry;
ASN1_STRING *entry_data;
char *check;
int length;
int idx;
int r = 0;
long verify_status;
size_t addrlen = 0;
struct in_addr addr;
int i;
int n_sans = -1;
int target = GEN_DNS;
STACK_OF (GENERAL_NAME) * sans = NULL;
BSON_ASSERT (ssl);
BSON_ASSERT (host);
if (weak_cert_validation) {
return true;
}
/** if the host looks like an IP address, match that, otherwise we assume we
* have a DNS name */
if (inet_pton (AF_INET, host, &addr)) {
target = GEN_IPADD;
addrlen = sizeof (struct in_addr);
}
peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate (ssl);
if (!peer) {
return false;
}
verify_status = SSL_get_verify_result (ssl);
/** TODO: should we return this somehow? */
if (verify_status == X509_V_OK) {
/* get's a stack of alt names that we can iterate through */
sans = X509_get_ext_d2i ((X509 *)peer, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
if (sans) {
n_sans = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num (sans);
/* loop through the stack, or until we find a match */
for (i = 0; i < n_sans && !r; i++) {
const GENERAL_NAME *name = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value (sans, i);
/* skip entries that can't apply, I.e. IP entries if we've got a
* DNS host */
if (name->type == target) {
check = (char *)ASN1_STRING_data (name->d.ia5);
length = ASN1_STRING_length (name->d.ia5);
switch (target) {
case GEN_DNS:
/* check that we don't have an embedded null byte */
if ((length == bson_strnlen (check, length)) &&
_mongoc_ssl_hostcheck (check, host)) {
r = 1;
}
break;
case GEN_IPADD:
if ((length == addrlen) && !memcmp (check, &addr, length)) {
r = 1;
}
break;
default:
assert (0);
break;
}
}
}
GENERAL_NAMES_free (sans);
} else {
subject_name = X509_get_subject_name (peer);
if (subject_name) {
idx = -1;
i = -1;
/* skip to the last common name */
while ((idx =
X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID (subject_name, NID_commonName, i)) >= 0) {
i = idx;
}
if (i >= 0) {
entry = X509_NAME_get_entry (subject_name, i);
entry_data = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data (entry);
if (entry_data) {
/* TODO: I've heard tell that old versions of SSL crap out
* when calling ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 on already utf8 data.
* Check up on that */
length = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 ((unsigned char **)&check,
entry_data);
if (length >= 0) {
/* check for embedded nulls */
if ((length == bson_strnlen (check, length)) &&
_mongoc_ssl_hostcheck (check, host)) {
r = 1;
}
OPENSSL_free (check);
}
}
}
}
}
}
X509_free (peer);
return r;
}
void main() {
int err;
int listen_sock;
int sock;
struct sockaddr_in sa_serv;
struct sockaddr_in sa_cli;
size_t client_len;
char *str;
char buffer[4096];
SSL_CTX *ctx;
SSL *ssl;
SSL_METHOD *meth;
X509 *client_cert = NULL;
short int s_port = 5555;
/* inicializar la librería SSL y registrar los métodos de cifrado soportados */
SSL_library_init();
/* cargar mensajes de error que serán usados */
SSL_load_error_strings();
/* añade soporte para las versión SSL 2 y 3 */
meth = SSLv23_method();
/* crea un nuevo contexto para la utilización de la capa SSL */
ctx = SSL_CTX_new(meth);
if (!ctx) {
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
exit(1);
}
/* especificar el certificado que utilizará nuestra aplicación */
if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(ctx, RSA_SERVER_CERT, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) <= 0) {
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
exit(1);
}
/* clave privada de nuestra aplicación */
if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, RSA_SERVER_KEY, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) <= 0) {
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
exit(1);
}
/* verifica si la clave esta asociada al certificado */
if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx)) {
fprintf(stderr,"Hay un problema con el certificado y clave privada del servidor\n");
exit(1);
}
/* CA utilizado para validar los certificados recibidos por la aplicación */
if (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, RSA_SERVER_CA_CERT, NULL)) {
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
exit(1);
}
/* garantizar que se verifica la autenticidad del otro extremo */
SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx,SSL_VERIFY_PEER,NULL);
SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(ctx,1);
listen_sock = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP);
RETURN_ERR(listen_sock, "socket");
memset (&sa_serv, '\0', sizeof(sa_serv));
sa_serv.sin_family = AF_INET;
sa_serv.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
sa_serv.sin_port = htons (s_port);
err = bind(listen_sock, (struct sockaddr*)&sa_serv,sizeof(sa_serv));
RETURN_ERR(err, "bind");
err = listen(listen_sock, 5);
RETURN_ERR(err, "listen");
client_len = sizeof(sa_cli);
sock = accept(listen_sock, (struct sockaddr*)&sa_cli, &client_len);
RETURN_ERR(sock, "accept");
close (listen_sock);
char clientIpString[INET_ADDRSTRLEN];
int clientIpInt = sa_cli.sin_addr.s_addr;
inet_ntop( AF_INET, &clientIpInt, clientIpString, INET_ADDRSTRLEN );
printf ("Conexion con %s en el puerto %x\n",
clientIpString,
sa_cli.sin_port);
/* crear una estructura SSL */
ssl = SSL_new(ctx);
RETURN_NULL(ssl);
/* asociar la estructura SSL creada al canal de comunicación */
SSL_set_fd(ssl, sock);
/* inicializará el handshake con el servidor */
err = SSL_accept(ssl);
RETURN_SSL(err);
printf("Cifrado elegido: %s\n", SSL_get_cipher (ssl));
/* Certificado del cliente */
client_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl);
if (client_cert != NULL) {
printf ("Certificado del cliente:\n");
str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(client_cert), 0, 0);
RETURN_NULL(str);
printf ("\t subject: %s\n", str);
free (str);
str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(client_cert), 0, 0);
RETURN_NULL(str);
printf ("\t issuer: %s\n", str);
free (str);
X509_free(client_cert);
} else printf("El cliente no tiene certificado.\n");
err = SSL_read(ssl, buffer, sizeof(buffer) - 1);
RETURN_SSL(err);
buffer[err] = '\0';
printf ("Mensaje del cliente: %s\n", buffer);
err = SSL_write(ssl, buffer, strlen(buffer));
RETURN_SSL(err);
/* cerrar el canal de comunicación */
err = SSL_shutdown(ssl);
RETURN_SSL(err);
err = close(sock);
RETURN_ERR(err, "close");
/* liberar las estructuras creadas de forma dinámica */
SSL_free(ssl);
SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
}
int main() {
//char dest_url[] = "https://www.hp.com";
char dest_url[] = "https://www.baidu.com";
BIO *certbio = NULL;
BIO *outbio = NULL;
X509 *cert = NULL;
X509_NAME *certname = NULL;
const SSL_METHOD *method;
SSL_CTX *ctx;
SSL *ssl;
int server = 0;
int ret, i;
/* ---------------------------------------------------------- *
* These function calls initialize openssl for correct work. *
* ---------------------------------------------------------- */
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
ERR_load_BIO_strings();
ERR_load_crypto_strings();
SSL_load_error_strings();
/* ---------------------------------------------------------- *
* Create the Input/Output BIO's. *
* ---------------------------------------------------------- */
certbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
outbio = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE);
/* ---------------------------------------------------------- *
* initialize SSL library and register algorithms *
* ---------------------------------------------------------- */
if(SSL_library_init() < 0)
BIO_printf(outbio, "Could not initialize the OpenSSL library !\n");
/* ---------------------------------------------------------- *
* Set SSLv2 client hello, also announce SSLv3 and TLSv1 *
* ---------------------------------------------------------- */
method = SSLv23_client_method();
/* ---------------------------------------------------------- *
* Try to create a new SSL context *
* ---------------------------------------------------------- */
if ( (ctx = SSL_CTX_new(method)) == NULL)
BIO_printf(outbio, "Unable to create a new SSL context structure.\n");
/* ---------------------------------------------------------- *
* Disabling SSLv2 will leave v3 and TSLv1 for negotiation *
* ---------------------------------------------------------- */
SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
/* ---------------------------------------------------------- *
* Create new SSL connection state object *
* ---------------------------------------------------------- */
ssl = SSL_new(ctx);
/* ---------------------------------------------------------- *
* Make the underlying TCP socket connection *
* ---------------------------------------------------------- */
server = create_socket(dest_url, outbio);
if(server != 0)
BIO_printf(outbio, "Successfully made the TCP connection to: %s.\n", dest_url);
/* ---------------------------------------------------------- *
* Attach the SSL session to the socket descriptor *
* ---------------------------------------------------------- */
SSL_set_fd(ssl, server);
/* ---------------------------------------------------------- *
* Try to SSL-connect here, returns 1 for success *
* ---------------------------------------------------------- */
if ( SSL_connect(ssl) != 1 )
BIO_printf(outbio, "Error: Could not build a SSL session to: %s.\n", dest_url);
else
BIO_printf(outbio, "Successfully enabled SSL/TLS session to: %s.\n", dest_url);
/* ---------------------------------------------------------- *
* Get the remote certificate into the X509 structure *
* ---------------------------------------------------------- */
cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl);
if (cert == NULL)
BIO_printf(outbio, "Error: Could not get a certificate from: %s.\n", dest_url);
else
BIO_printf(outbio, "Retrieved the server's certificate from: %s.\n", dest_url);
/* ---------------------------------------------------------- *
* extract various certificate information *
* -----------------------------------------------------------*/
certname = X509_NAME_new();
certname = X509_get_subject_name(cert);
/* ---------------------------------------------------------- *
* display the cert subject here *
* -----------------------------------------------------------*/
BIO_printf(outbio, "Displaying the certificate subject data:\n");
X509_NAME_print_ex(outbio, certname, 0, 0);
BIO_printf(outbio, "\n");
/* ---------------------------------------------------------- *
* Free the structures we don't need anymore *
* -----------------------------------------------------------*/
SSL_free(ssl);
close(server);
X509_free(cert);
SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
BIO_printf(outbio, "Finished SSL/TLS connection with server: %s.\n", dest_url);
return(0);
}
