/** Construct and return an RSA signature for the TAP onion key to
* cross-certify the RSA and Ed25519 identity keys. Set <b>len_out</b> to its
* length. */
uint8_t *
make_tap_onion_key_crosscert(const crypto_pk_t *onion_key,
const ed25519_public_key_t *master_id_key,
const crypto_pk_t *rsa_id_key,
int *len_out)
{
uint8_t signature[PK_BYTES];
uint8_t signed_data[DIGEST_LEN + ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN];
*len_out = 0;
if (crypto_pk_get_digest(rsa_id_key, (char*)signed_data) < 0) {
return NULL;
}
memcpy(signed_data + DIGEST_LEN, master_id_key->pubkey, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
int r = crypto_pk_private_sign(onion_key,
(char*)signature, sizeof(signature),
(const char*)signed_data, sizeof(signed_data));
if (r < 0)
return NULL;
*len_out = r;
return tor_memdup(signature, r);
}
/** Set <b>out</b> to the hex-encoded fingerprint of <b>pkey</b>. */
static int
get_digest(EVP_PKEY *pkey, char *out)
{
int r = 1;
crypto_pk_t *pk = _crypto_new_pk_from_rsa(EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey));
if (pk) {
r = crypto_pk_get_digest(pk, out);
crypto_pk_free(pk);
}
return r;
}
/** Given a private or public key <b>pk</b>, put a hashed fingerprint of
* the public key into <b>fp_out</b> (must have at least FINGERPRINT_LEN+1
* bytes of space). Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.
*
* Hashed fingerprints are computed as the SHA1 digest of the SHA1 digest
* of the ASN.1 encoding of the public key, converted to hexadecimal, in
* upper case.
*/
int crypto_pk_get_hashed_fingerprint(crypto_pk_t *pk, char *fp_out)
{
char digest[DIGEST_LEN], hashed_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
if (crypto_pk_get_digest(pk, digest)) {
return -1;
}
if (crypto_digest(hashed_digest, digest, DIGEST_LEN)) {
return -1;
}
base16_encode(fp_out, FINGERPRINT_LEN + 1, hashed_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
return 0;
}
static ssize_t
make_intro_from_plaintext(
void *buf, size_t len, crypto_pk_t *key, void **cell_out)
{
char *cell = NULL;
ssize_t cell_len = -1, r;
/* Assemble key digest and ciphertext, then construct the cell */
ssize_t ciphertext_size;
if (!(buf && key && len > 0 && cell_out)) goto done;
/*
* Figure out an upper bound on how big the ciphertext will be
* (see crypto_pk_public_hybrid_encrypt())
*/
ciphertext_size = PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING_OVERHEAD;
ciphertext_size += crypto_pk_keysize(key);
ciphertext_size += CIPHER_KEY_LEN;
ciphertext_size += len;
/*
* Allocate space for the cell
*/
memmgr_init_check_shared_mem(SHARED_SIZE, UIO_DEVICE, BASE_ADDRESS);
// cell = tor_malloc(DIGEST_LEN + ciphertext_size);
cell = memmgr_alloc(DIGEST_LEN + ciphertext_size);
memmgr_assert(buf);
/* Compute key digest (will be first DIGEST_LEN octets of cell) */
r = crypto_pk_get_digest(key, cell);
tt_assert(r >= 0);
/* Do encryption */
r = crypto_pk_public_hybrid_encrypt(
key, cell + DIGEST_LEN, ciphertext_size,
buf, len,
PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, 0);
tt_assert(r >= 0);
/* Figure out cell length */
cell_len = DIGEST_LEN + r;
/* Output the cell */
*cell_out = cell;
done:
// memmgr_free(cell);
return cell_len;
}
/** Given a private or public key <b>pk</b>, put a fingerprint of the
* public key into <b>fp_out</b> (must have at least FINGERPRINT_LEN+1 bytes of
* space). Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.
*
* Fingerprints are computed as the SHA1 digest of the ASN.1 encoding
* of the public key, converted to hexadecimal, in upper case, with a
* space after every four digits.
*
* If <b>add_space</b> is false, omit the spaces.
*/
int crypto_pk_get_fingerprint(crypto_pk_t *pk, char *fp_out, int add_space)
{
char digest[DIGEST_LEN];
char hexdigest[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
if (crypto_pk_get_digest(pk, digest)) {
return -1;
}
base16_encode(hexdigest,sizeof(hexdigest),digest,DIGEST_LEN);
if (add_space) {
crypto_add_spaces_to_fp(fp_out, FINGERPRINT_LEN+1, hexdigest);
} else {
sgx_strncpy(fp_out, hexdigest, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1);
}
return 0;
}
/** See dir_common_construct_vote_1.
* Produces a vote with slightly different values.
*/
int
dir_common_construct_vote_2(networkstatus_t **vote, authority_cert_t *cert,
crypto_pk_t *sign_skey,
vote_routerstatus_t * (*vrs_gen)(int idx, time_t now),
networkstatus_t **vote_out, int *n_vrs,
time_t now, int clear_rl)
{
networkstatus_voter_info_t *voter;
dir_common_setup_vote(vote, now);
(*vote)->type = NS_TYPE_VOTE;
(*vote)->published += 1;
(*vote)->valid_after = now+1000;
(*vote)->fresh_until = now+3005;
(*vote)->valid_until = now+3000;
(*vote)->vote_seconds = 100;
(*vote)->dist_seconds = 300;
smartlist_split_string((*vote)->supported_methods, "1 2 3", NULL, 0, -1);
smartlist_split_string((*vote)->known_flags,
"Authority Exit Fast Guard MadeOfCheese MadeOfTin "
"Running Stable V2Dir Valid", 0,
SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 0);
voter = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(networkstatus_voter_info_t));
voter->nickname = tor_strdup("Voter2");
voter->address = tor_strdup("2.3.4.5");
voter->addr = 0x02030405;
voter->dir_port = 80;
voter->or_port = 9000;
voter->contact = tor_strdup("*****@*****.**");
crypto_pk_get_digest(cert->identity_key, voter->identity_digest);
/*
* Set up a vote; generate it; try to parse it.
*/
smartlist_add((*vote)->voters, voter);
(*vote)->cert = authority_cert_dup(cert);
if (! (*vote)->net_params)
(*vote)->net_params = smartlist_new();
smartlist_split_string((*vote)->net_params,
"bar=2000000000 circuitwindow=20",
NULL, 0, 0);
/* add routerstatuses */
/* dump the vote and try to parse it. */
dir_common_add_rs_and_parse(*vote, vote_out, vrs_gen, sign_skey,
n_vrs, now, clear_rl);
return 0;
}
/* For a given circuit and a service introduction point object, register the
* intro circuit to the circuitmap. This supports legacy intro point. */
static void
register_intro_circ(const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip,
origin_circuit_t *circ)
{
tor_assert(ip);
tor_assert(circ);
if (ip->base.is_only_legacy) {
uint8_t digest[DIGEST_LEN];
if (BUG(crypto_pk_get_digest(ip->legacy_key, (char *) digest) < 0)) {
return;
}
hs_circuitmap_register_intro_circ_v2_service_side(circ, digest);
} else {
hs_circuitmap_register_intro_circ_v3_service_side(circ,
&ip->auth_key_kp.pubkey);
}
}
/** See dir_common_construct_vote_1.
* Produces a vote with slightly different values. Adds a legacy key.
*/
int
dir_common_construct_vote_3(networkstatus_t **vote, authority_cert_t *cert,
crypto_pk_t *sign_skey,
vote_routerstatus_t * (*vrs_gen)(int idx, time_t now),
networkstatus_t **vote_out, int *n_vrs,
time_t now, int clear_rl)
{
networkstatus_voter_info_t *voter;
dir_common_setup_vote(vote, now);
(*vote)->valid_after = now+1000;
(*vote)->fresh_until = now+2003;
(*vote)->valid_until = now+3000;
(*vote)->vote_seconds = 100;
(*vote)->dist_seconds = 250;
smartlist_split_string((*vote)->supported_methods, "1 2 3 4", NULL, 0, -1);
(*vote)->client_versions = tor_strdup("0.1.2.14,0.1.2.17");
(*vote)->server_versions = tor_strdup("0.1.2.10,0.1.2.15,0.1.2.16");
smartlist_split_string((*vote)->known_flags,
"Authority Exit Fast Guard Running Stable V2Dir Valid",
0, SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 0);
voter = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(networkstatus_voter_info_t));
voter->nickname = tor_strdup("Voter2");
voter->address = tor_strdup("3.4.5.6");
voter->addr = 0x03040506;
voter->dir_port = 80;
voter->or_port = 9000;
voter->contact = tor_strdup("*****@*****.**");
crypto_pk_get_digest(cert->identity_key, voter->identity_digest);
memset(voter->legacy_id_digest, (int)'A', DIGEST_LEN);
/*
* Set up a vote; generate it; try to parse it.
*/
smartlist_add((*vote)->voters, voter);
(*vote)->cert = authority_cert_dup(cert);
smartlist_split_string((*vote)->net_params, "circuitwindow=80 foo=660",
NULL, 0, 0);
/* add routerstatuses */
/* dump the vote and try to parse it. */
dir_common_add_rs_and_parse(*vote, vote_out, vrs_gen, sign_skey,
n_vrs, now, clear_rl);
return 0;
}
/* Return an introduction point circuit matching the given intro point object.
* NULL is returned is no such circuit can be found. */
origin_circuit_t *
hs_circ_service_get_intro_circ(const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip)
{
origin_circuit_t *circ = NULL;
tor_assert(ip);
if (ip->base.is_only_legacy) {
uint8_t digest[DIGEST_LEN];
if (BUG(crypto_pk_get_digest(ip->legacy_key, (char *) digest) < 0)) {
goto end;
}
circ = hs_circuitmap_get_intro_circ_v2_service_side(digest);
} else {
circ = hs_circuitmap_get_intro_circ_v3_service_side(
&ip->auth_key_kp.pubkey);
}
end:
return circ;
}
static void
test_routerkeys_cross_certify_tap(void *args)
{
(void)args;
uint8_t *cc = NULL;
int cc_len;
ed25519_public_key_t master_key;
crypto_pk_t *onion_key = pk_generate(2), *id_key = pk_generate(1);
char digest[20];
char buf[128];
int n;
tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, ed25519_public_from_base64(&master_key,
"IAlreadyWroteTestsForRouterdescsUsingTheseX"));
cc = make_tap_onion_key_crosscert(onion_key,
&master_key,
id_key, &cc_len);
tt_assert(cc);
tt_assert(cc_len);
n = crypto_pk_public_checksig(onion_key, buf, sizeof(buf),
(char*)cc, cc_len);
tt_int_op(n,OP_GT,0);
tt_int_op(n,OP_EQ,52);
crypto_pk_get_digest(id_key, digest);
tt_mem_op(buf,OP_EQ,digest,20);
tt_mem_op(buf+20,OP_EQ,master_key.pubkey,32);
tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, check_tap_onion_key_crosscert(cc, cc_len,
onion_key, &master_key, (uint8_t*)digest));
done:
tor_free(cc);
crypto_pk_free(id_key);
crypto_pk_free(onion_key);
}
/** Respond to an ESTABLISH_INTRO cell by checking the signed data and
* setting the circuit's purpose and service pk digest.
*/
int
rend_mid_establish_intro(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
size_t request_len)
{
crypto_pk_t *pk = NULL;
char buf[DIGEST_LEN+9];
char expected_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
char pk_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
size_t asn1len;
or_circuit_t *c;
char serviceid[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1];
int reason = END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL;
log_info(LD_REND,
"Received an ESTABLISH_INTRO request on circuit %u",
(unsigned) circ->p_circ_id);
if (circ->base_.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR || circ->base_.n_chan) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
"Rejecting ESTABLISH_INTRO on non-OR or non-edge circuit.");
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
goto err;
}
if (request_len < 2+DIGEST_LEN)
goto truncated;
/* First 2 bytes: length of asn1-encoded key. */
asn1len = ntohs(get_uint16(request));
/* Next asn1len bytes: asn1-encoded key. */
if (request_len < 2+DIGEST_LEN+asn1len)
goto truncated;
pk = crypto_pk_asn1_decode((char*)(request+2), asn1len);
if (!pk) {
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Couldn't decode public key.");
goto err;
}
/* Next 20 bytes: Hash of rend_circ_nonce | "INTRODUCE" */
memcpy(buf, circ->rend_circ_nonce, DIGEST_LEN);
memcpy(buf+DIGEST_LEN, "INTRODUCE", 9);
if (crypto_digest(expected_digest, buf, DIGEST_LEN+9) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error computing digest.");
goto err;
}
if (tor_memneq(expected_digest, request+2+asn1len, DIGEST_LEN)) {
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Hash of session info was not as expected.");
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
goto err;
}
/* Rest of body: signature of previous data */
note_crypto_pk_op(REND_MID);
if (crypto_pk_public_checksig_digest(pk,
(char*)request, 2+asn1len+DIGEST_LEN,
(char*)(request+2+DIGEST_LEN+asn1len),
request_len-(2+DIGEST_LEN+asn1len))<0) {
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,
"Incorrect signature on ESTABLISH_INTRO cell; rejecting.");
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
goto err;
}
/* The request is valid. First, compute the hash of Bob's PK.*/
if (crypto_pk_get_digest(pk, pk_digest)<0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't hash public key.");
goto err;
}
crypto_pk_free(pk); /* don't need it anymore */
pk = NULL; /* so we don't free it again if err */
base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1,
pk_digest, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN);
/* Close any other intro circuits with the same pk. */
c = NULL;
while ((c = circuit_get_intro_point((const uint8_t *)pk_digest))) {
log_info(LD_REND, "Replacing old circuit for service %s",
safe_str(serviceid));
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(c), END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
/* Now it's marked, and it won't be returned next time. */
}
/* Acknowledge the request. */
if (relay_send_command_from_edge(0, TO_CIRCUIT(circ),
RELAY_COMMAND_INTRO_ESTABLISHED,
"", 0, NULL)<0) {
log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't send INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell.");
goto err;
}
/* Now, set up this circuit. */
circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_INTRO_POINT);
circuit_set_intro_point_digest(circ, (uint8_t *)pk_digest);
log_info(LD_REND,
"Established introduction point on circuit %u for service %s",
(unsigned) circ->p_circ_id, safe_str(serviceid));
return 0;
truncated:
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Rejecting truncated ESTABLISH_INTRO cell.");
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
err:
if (pk) crypto_pk_free(pk);
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), reason);
return -1;
}
/** Based on our interval and our estimated bandwidth, choose a
* deterministic (but random-ish) time to wake up. */
static void
accounting_set_wakeup_time(void)
{
char buf[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
char digest[DIGEST_LEN];
crypto_digest_env_t *d_env;
int time_in_interval;
uint64_t time_to_exhaust_bw;
int time_to_consider;
if (! identity_key_is_set()) {
if (init_keys() < 0) {
log_err(LD_BUG, "Error initializing keys");
tor_assert(0);
}
}
format_iso_time(buf, interval_start_time);
crypto_pk_get_digest(get_identity_key(), digest);
d_env = crypto_new_digest_env();
crypto_digest_add_bytes(d_env, buf, ISO_TIME_LEN);
crypto_digest_add_bytes(d_env, digest, DIGEST_LEN);
crypto_digest_get_digest(d_env, digest, DIGEST_LEN);
crypto_free_digest_env(d_env);
if (!expected_bandwidth_usage) {
char buf1[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
char buf2[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
format_local_iso_time(buf1, interval_start_time);
format_local_iso_time(buf2, interval_end_time);
time_to_exhaust_bw = GUESS_TIME_TO_USE_BANDWIDTH;
interval_wakeup_time = interval_start_time;
log_notice(LD_ACCT,
"Configured hibernation. This interval begins at %s "
"and ends at %s. We have no prior estimate for bandwidth, so "
"we will start out awake and hibernate when we exhaust our quota.",
buf1, buf2);
return;
}
time_in_interval = (int)(interval_end_time - interval_start_time);
time_to_exhaust_bw =
(get_options()->AccountingMax/expected_bandwidth_usage)*60;
if (time_to_exhaust_bw > TIME_MAX) {
time_to_exhaust_bw = TIME_MAX;
time_to_consider = 0;
} else {
time_to_consider = time_in_interval - (int)time_to_exhaust_bw;
}
if (time_to_consider<=0) {
interval_wakeup_time = interval_start_time;
} else {
/* XXX can we simplify this just by picking a random (non-deterministic)
* time to be up? If we go down and come up, then we pick a new one. Is
* that good enough? -RD */
/* This is not a perfectly unbiased conversion, but it is good enough:
* in the worst case, the first half of the day is 0.06 percent likelier
* to be chosen than the last half. */
interval_wakeup_time = interval_start_time +
(get_uint32(digest) % time_to_consider);
format_iso_time(buf, interval_wakeup_time);
}
{
char buf1[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
char buf2[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
char buf3[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
char buf4[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
time_t down_time;
if (interval_wakeup_time+time_to_exhaust_bw > TIME_MAX)
down_time = TIME_MAX;
else
down_time = (time_t)(interval_wakeup_time+time_to_exhaust_bw);
if (down_time>interval_end_time)
down_time = interval_end_time;
format_local_iso_time(buf1, interval_start_time);
format_local_iso_time(buf2, interval_wakeup_time);
format_local_iso_time(buf3, down_time);
format_local_iso_time(buf4, interval_end_time);
log_notice(LD_ACCT,
"Configured hibernation. This interval began at %s; "
"the scheduled wake-up time %s %s; "
"we expect%s to exhaust our quota for this interval around %s; "
"the next interval begins at %s (all times local)",
buf1,
time(NULL)<interval_wakeup_time?"is":"was", buf2,
time(NULL)<down_time?"":"ed", buf3,
buf4);
}
}
/* Test good certs cells */
static void
test_link_handshake_certs_ok(void *arg)
{
(void) arg;
or_connection_t *c1 = or_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_OR, AF_INET);
or_connection_t *c2 = or_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_OR, AF_INET);
var_cell_t *cell1 = NULL, *cell2 = NULL;
certs_cell_t *cc1 = NULL, *cc2 = NULL;
channel_tls_t *chan1 = NULL, *chan2 = NULL;
crypto_pk_t *key1 = NULL, *key2 = NULL;
scheduler_init();
MOCK(tor_tls_cert_matches_key, mock_tls_cert_matches_key);
MOCK(connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf, mock_write_var_cell);
MOCK(connection_or_send_netinfo, mock_send_netinfo);
key1 = pk_generate(2);
key2 = pk_generate(3);
/* We need to make sure that our TLS certificates are set up before we can
* actually generate a CERTS cell.
*/
tt_int_op(tor_tls_context_init(TOR_TLS_CTX_IS_PUBLIC_SERVER,
key1, key2, 86400), ==, 0);
c1->base_.state = OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3;
c1->link_proto = 3;
tt_int_op(connection_init_or_handshake_state(c1, 1), ==, 0);
c2->base_.state = OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3;
c2->link_proto = 3;
tt_int_op(connection_init_or_handshake_state(c2, 0), ==, 0);
tt_int_op(0, ==, connection_or_send_certs_cell(c1));
tt_assert(mock_got_var_cell);
cell1 = mock_got_var_cell;
tt_int_op(0, ==, connection_or_send_certs_cell(c2));
tt_assert(mock_got_var_cell);
cell2 = mock_got_var_cell;
tt_int_op(cell1->command, ==, CELL_CERTS);
tt_int_op(cell1->payload_len, >, 1);
tt_int_op(cell2->command, ==, CELL_CERTS);
tt_int_op(cell2->payload_len, >, 1);
tt_int_op(cell1->payload_len, ==,
certs_cell_parse(&cc1, cell1->payload, cell1->payload_len));
tt_int_op(cell2->payload_len, ==,
certs_cell_parse(&cc2, cell2->payload, cell2->payload_len));
tt_int_op(2, ==, cc1->n_certs);
tt_int_op(2, ==, cc2->n_certs);
tt_int_op(certs_cell_get_certs(cc1, 0)->cert_type, ==,
CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_AUTH);
tt_int_op(certs_cell_get_certs(cc1, 1)->cert_type, ==,
CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_ID);
tt_int_op(certs_cell_get_certs(cc2, 0)->cert_type, ==,
CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_LINK);
tt_int_op(certs_cell_get_certs(cc2, 1)->cert_type, ==,
CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_ID);
chan1 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*chan1));
channel_tls_common_init(chan1);
c1->chan = chan1;
chan1->conn = c1;
c1->base_.address = tor_strdup("C1");
c1->tls = tor_tls_new(-1, 0);
c1->link_proto = 4;
c1->base_.conn_array_index = -1;
crypto_pk_get_digest(key2, c1->identity_digest);
channel_tls_process_certs_cell(cell2, chan1);
tt_assert(c1->handshake_state->received_certs_cell);
tt_assert(c1->handshake_state->auth_cert == NULL);
tt_assert(c1->handshake_state->id_cert);
tt_assert(! tor_mem_is_zero(
(char*)c1->handshake_state->authenticated_peer_id, 20));
chan2 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*chan2));
channel_tls_common_init(chan2);
c2->chan = chan2;
chan2->conn = c2;
c2->base_.address = tor_strdup("C2");
c2->tls = tor_tls_new(-1, 1);
c2->link_proto = 4;
c2->base_.conn_array_index = -1;
crypto_pk_get_digest(key1, c2->identity_digest);
channel_tls_process_certs_cell(cell1, chan2);
tt_assert(c2->handshake_state->received_certs_cell);
tt_assert(c2->handshake_state->auth_cert);
tt_assert(c2->handshake_state->id_cert);
tt_assert(tor_mem_is_zero(
(char*)c2->handshake_state->authenticated_peer_id, 20));
done:
UNMOCK(tor_tls_cert_matches_key);
UNMOCK(connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf);
UNMOCK(connection_or_send_netinfo);
connection_free_(TO_CONN(c1));
connection_free_(TO_CONN(c2));
tor_free(cell1);
tor_free(cell2);
certs_cell_free(cc1);
certs_cell_free(cc2);
if (chan1)
circuitmux_free(chan1->base_.cmux);
tor_free(chan1);
if (chan2)
circuitmux_free(chan2->base_.cmux);
tor_free(chan2);
crypto_pk_free(key1);
crypto_pk_free(key2);
}
/** Test utility function: checks that the <b>plaintext_len</b>-byte string at
* <b>plaintext</b> is at least superficially parseable.
*/
static void
do_parse_test(uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_len, int phase)
{
crypto_pk_t *k = NULL;
ssize_t r;
uint8_t *cell = NULL;
size_t cell_len;
rend_intro_cell_t *parsed_req = NULL;
char *err_msg = NULL;
char digest[DIGEST_LEN];
/* Get a key */
k = crypto_pk_new();
tt_assert(k);
r = crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(k, AUTHORITY_SIGNKEY_1, -1);
tt_assert(!r);
/* Get digest for future comparison */
r = crypto_pk_get_digest(k, digest);
tt_assert(r >= 0);
/* Make a cell out of it */
memmgr_init_check_shared_mem(SHARED_SIZE, UIO_DEVICE, BASE_ADDRESS);
char* plaintext_buf = memmgr_alloc(plaintext_len);
memcpy(plaintext_buf, plaintext, plaintext_len);
r = make_intro_from_plaintext(
plaintext_buf, plaintext_len,
k, (void **)(&cell));
tt_assert(r > 0);
tt_assert(cell);
cell_len = r;
memmgr_free(plaintext_buf);
/* Do early parsing */
parsed_req = rend_service_begin_parse_intro(cell, cell_len, 2, &err_msg);
tt_assert(parsed_req);
tt_assert(!err_msg);
tt_mem_op(parsed_req->pk,OP_EQ, digest, DIGEST_LEN);
tt_assert(parsed_req->ciphertext);
tt_assert(parsed_req->ciphertext_len > 0);
if (phase == EARLY_PARSE_ONLY)
goto done;
printf("\nHere");
/* Do decryption */
r = rend_service_decrypt_intro(parsed_req, k, &err_msg);
tt_assert(!r);
tt_assert(!err_msg);
tt_assert(parsed_req->plaintext);
tt_assert(parsed_req->plaintext_len > 0);
if (phase == DECRYPT_ONLY)
goto done;
/* Do late parsing */
r = rend_service_parse_intro_plaintext(parsed_req, &err_msg);
tt_assert(!r);
tt_assert(!err_msg);
tt_assert(parsed_req->parsed);
done:
// tor_free(cell);
memmgr_assert(cell);
memmgr_free(cell);
crypto_pk_free(k);
rend_service_free_intro(parsed_req);
tor_free(err_msg);
}
/** Parse and validate the ASCII-encoded v2 descriptor in <b>desc</b>,
* write the parsed descriptor to the newly allocated *<b>parsed_out</b>, the
* binary descriptor ID of length DIGEST_LEN to <b>desc_id_out</b>, the
* encrypted introduction points to the newly allocated
* *<b>intro_points_encrypted_out</b>, their encrypted size to
* *<b>intro_points_encrypted_size_out</b>, the size of the encoded descriptor
* to *<b>encoded_size_out</b>, and a pointer to the possibly next
* descriptor to *<b>next_out</b>; return 0 for success (including validation)
* and -1 for failure.
*
* If <b>as_hsdir</b> is 1, we're parsing this as an HSDir, and we should
* be strict about time formats.
*/
int
rend_parse_v2_service_descriptor(rend_service_descriptor_t **parsed_out,
char *desc_id_out,
char **intro_points_encrypted_out,
size_t *intro_points_encrypted_size_out,
size_t *encoded_size_out,
const char **next_out, const char *desc,
int as_hsdir)
{
rend_service_descriptor_t *result =
tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_service_descriptor_t));
char desc_hash[DIGEST_LEN];
const char *eos;
smartlist_t *tokens = smartlist_new();
directory_token_t *tok;
char secret_id_part[DIGEST_LEN];
int i, version, num_ok=1;
smartlist_t *versions;
char public_key_hash[DIGEST_LEN];
char test_desc_id[DIGEST_LEN];
memarea_t *area = NULL;
const int strict_time_fmt = as_hsdir;
tor_assert(desc);
/* Check if desc starts correctly. */
if (strcmpstart(desc, "rendezvous-service-descriptor ")) {
log_info(LD_REND, "Descriptor does not start correctly.");
goto err;
}
/* Compute descriptor hash for later validation. */
if (router_get_hash_impl(desc, strlen(desc), desc_hash,
"rendezvous-service-descriptor ",
"\nsignature", '\n', DIGEST_SHA1) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Couldn't compute descriptor hash.");
goto err;
}
/* Determine end of string. */
eos = strstr(desc, "\nrendezvous-service-descriptor ");
if (!eos)
eos = desc + strlen(desc);
else
eos = eos + 1;
/* Check length. */
if (eos-desc > REND_DESC_MAX_SIZE) {
/* XXXX+ If we are parsing this descriptor as a server, this
* should be a protocol warning. */
log_warn(LD_REND, "Descriptor length is %d which exceeds "
"maximum rendezvous descriptor size of %d bytes.",
(int)(eos-desc), REND_DESC_MAX_SIZE);
goto err;
}
/* Tokenize descriptor. */
area = memarea_new();
if (tokenize_string(area, desc, eos, tokens, desc_token_table, 0)) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Error tokenizing descriptor.");
goto err;
}
/* Set next to next descriptor, if available. */
*next_out = eos;
/* Set length of encoded descriptor. */
*encoded_size_out = eos - desc;
/* Check min allowed length of token list. */
if (smartlist_len(tokens) < 7) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Impossibly short descriptor.");
goto err;
}
/* Parse base32-encoded descriptor ID. */
tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, R_RENDEZVOUS_SERVICE_DESCRIPTOR);
tor_assert(tok == smartlist_get(tokens, 0));
tor_assert(tok->n_args == 1);
if (!rend_valid_descriptor_id(tok->args[0])) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Invalid descriptor ID: '%s'", tok->args[0]);
goto err;
}
if (base32_decode(desc_id_out, DIGEST_LEN,
tok->args[0], REND_DESC_ID_V2_LEN_BASE32) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Descriptor ID contains illegal characters: %s",
tok->args[0]);
goto err;
}
/* Parse descriptor version. */
tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, R_VERSION);
tor_assert(tok->n_args == 1);
result->version =
(int) tor_parse_long(tok->args[0], 10, 0, INT_MAX, &num_ok, NULL);
if (result->version != 2 || !num_ok) {
/* If it's <2, it shouldn't be under this format. If the number
* is greater than 2, we bumped it because we broke backward
* compatibility. See how version numbers in our other formats
* work. */
log_warn(LD_REND, "Unrecognized descriptor version: %s",
escaped(tok->args[0]));
goto err;
}
/* Parse public key. */
tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, R_PERMANENT_KEY);
result->pk = tok->key;
tok->key = NULL; /* Prevent free */
/* Parse secret ID part. */
tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, R_SECRET_ID_PART);
tor_assert(tok->n_args == 1);
if (strlen(tok->args[0]) != REND_SECRET_ID_PART_LEN_BASE32 ||
strspn(tok->args[0], BASE32_CHARS) != REND_SECRET_ID_PART_LEN_BASE32) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Invalid secret ID part: '%s'", tok->args[0]);
goto err;
}
if (base32_decode(secret_id_part, DIGEST_LEN, tok->args[0], 32) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Secret ID part contains illegal characters: %s",
tok->args[0]);
goto err;
}
/* Parse publication time -- up-to-date check is done when storing the
* descriptor. */
tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, R_PUBLICATION_TIME);
tor_assert(tok->n_args == 1);
if (parse_iso_time_(tok->args[0], &result->timestamp,
strict_time_fmt, 0) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Invalid publication time: '%s'", tok->args[0]);
goto err;
}
/* Parse protocol versions. */
tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, R_PROTOCOL_VERSIONS);
tor_assert(tok->n_args == 1);
versions = smartlist_new();
smartlist_split_string(versions, tok->args[0], ",",
SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 0);
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(versions); i++) {
version = (int) tor_parse_long(smartlist_get(versions, i),
10, 0, INT_MAX, &num_ok, NULL);
if (!num_ok) /* It's a string; let's ignore it. */
continue;
if (version >= REND_PROTOCOL_VERSION_BITMASK_WIDTH)
/* Avoid undefined left-shift behaviour. */
continue;
result->protocols |= 1 << version;
}
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(versions, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
smartlist_free(versions);
/* Parse encrypted introduction points. Don't verify. */
tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, R_INTRODUCTION_POINTS);
if (tok) {
if (strcmp(tok->object_type, "MESSAGE")) {
log_warn(LD_DIR, "Bad object type: introduction points should be of "
"type MESSAGE");
goto err;
}
*intro_points_encrypted_out = tor_memdup(tok->object_body,
tok->object_size);
*intro_points_encrypted_size_out = tok->object_size;
} else {
*intro_points_encrypted_out = NULL;
*intro_points_encrypted_size_out = 0;
}
/* Parse and verify signature. */
tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, R_SIGNATURE);
if (check_signature_token(desc_hash, DIGEST_LEN, tok, result->pk, 0,
"v2 rendezvous service descriptor") < 0)
goto err;
/* Verify that descriptor ID belongs to public key and secret ID part. */
if (crypto_pk_get_digest(result->pk, public_key_hash) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Unable to compute rend descriptor public key digest");
goto err;
}
rend_get_descriptor_id_bytes(test_desc_id, public_key_hash,
secret_id_part);
if (tor_memneq(desc_id_out, test_desc_id, DIGEST_LEN)) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Parsed descriptor ID does not match "
"computed descriptor ID.");
goto err;
}
goto done;
err:
rend_service_descriptor_free(result);
result = NULL;
done:
if (tokens) {
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(tokens, directory_token_t *, t, token_clear(t));
smartlist_free(tokens);
}
if (area)
memarea_drop_all(area);
*parsed_out = result;
if (result)
return 0;
return -1;
}
/** Successfully register a v2 intro point and a v3 intro point. Ensure that HS
* circuitmap is maintained properly. */
static void
test_intro_point_registration(void *arg)
{
int retval;
hs_circuitmap_ht *the_hs_circuitmap = NULL;
or_circuit_t *intro_circ = NULL;
trn_cell_establish_intro_t *establish_intro_cell = NULL;
ed25519_public_key_t auth_key;
crypto_pk_t *legacy_auth_key = NULL;
or_circuit_t *legacy_intro_circ = NULL;
or_circuit_t *returned_intro_circ = NULL;
(void) arg;
MOCK(hs_intro_send_intro_established_cell, mock_send_intro_established_cell);
hs_circuitmap_init();
/* Check that the circuitmap is currently empty */
{
the_hs_circuitmap = get_hs_circuitmap();
tt_assert(the_hs_circuitmap);
tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, HT_SIZE(the_hs_circuitmap));
/* Do a circuitmap query in any case */
returned_intro_circ =hs_circuitmap_get_intro_circ_v3_relay_side(&auth_key);
tt_ptr_op(returned_intro_circ, OP_EQ, NULL);
}
/* Create a v3 intro point */
{
intro_circ = or_circuit_new(0, NULL);
tt_assert(intro_circ);
establish_intro_cell = helper_establish_intro_v3(intro_circ);
/* Check that the intro point was registered on the HS circuitmap */
the_hs_circuitmap = get_hs_circuitmap();
tt_assert(the_hs_circuitmap);
tt_int_op(1, OP_EQ, HT_SIZE(the_hs_circuitmap));
get_auth_key_from_cell(&auth_key, RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_INTRO,
establish_intro_cell);
returned_intro_circ =
hs_circuitmap_get_intro_circ_v3_relay_side(&auth_key);
tt_ptr_op(intro_circ, OP_EQ, returned_intro_circ);
}
/* Create a v2 intro point */
{
char key_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
legacy_intro_circ = or_circuit_new(1, NULL);
tt_assert(legacy_intro_circ);
legacy_auth_key = helper_establish_intro_v2(legacy_intro_circ);
tt_assert(legacy_auth_key);
/* Check that the circuitmap now has two elements */
the_hs_circuitmap = get_hs_circuitmap();
tt_assert(the_hs_circuitmap);
tt_int_op(2, OP_EQ, HT_SIZE(the_hs_circuitmap));
/* Check that the new element is our legacy intro circuit. */
retval = crypto_pk_get_digest(legacy_auth_key, key_digest);
tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
returned_intro_circ =
hs_circuitmap_get_intro_circ_v2_relay_side((uint8_t*)key_digest);
tt_ptr_op(legacy_intro_circ, OP_EQ, returned_intro_circ);
}
/* XXX Continue test and try to register a second v3 intro point with the
* same auth key. Make sure that old intro circuit gets closed. */
done:
crypto_pk_free(legacy_auth_key);
circuit_free_(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ));
circuit_free_(TO_CIRCUIT(legacy_intro_circ));
trn_cell_establish_intro_free(establish_intro_cell);
test_circuitmap_free_all();
UNMOCK(hs_intro_send_intro_established_cell);
}