void * sgx_ocalloc(size_t size)
{
// read the outside stack address from current SSA
thread_data_t *thread_data = get_thread_data();
ssa_gpr_t *ssa_gpr = reinterpret_cast<ssa_gpr_t *>(thread_data->first_ssa_gpr);
size_t addr = ssa_gpr->REG(sp_u);
// check u_rsp points to the untrusted address.
// if the check fails, it should be hacked. call abort directly
if(!sgx_is_outside_enclave(reinterpret_cast<void *>(addr), sizeof(size_t)))
{
abort();
}
// size is too large to allocate. call abort() directly.
if(addr < size)
{
abort();
}
// calculate the start address for the allocated memory
addr -= size;
addr &= ~(static_cast<size_t>(OC_ROUND - 1)); // for stack alignment
// the allocated memory has overlap with enclave, abort the enclave
if(!sgx_is_outside_enclave(reinterpret_cast<void *>(addr), size))
{
abort();
}
// probe the outside stack to ensure that we do not skip over the stack3 guard page
// we need to probe all the pages including the first page and the last page
// the first page need to be probed in case uRTS didnot touch that page before EENTER enclave
// the last page need to be probed in case the enclave didnot touch that page before another OCALLOC
size_t first_page = TRIM_TO_PAGE(ssa_gpr->REG(sp_u) - 1);
size_t last_page = TRIM_TO_PAGE(addr);
// To avoid the dead-loop in the following for(...) loop.
// Attacker might fake a stack address that is within address 0x4095.
if (last_page == 0)
{
abort();
}
// the compiler may optimize the following code to probe the pages in any order
// while we only expect the probe order should be from higher addr to lower addr
// so use volatile to avoid optimization by the compiler
for(volatile size_t page = first_page; page >= last_page; page -= SE_PAGE_SIZE)
{
*reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(page) = 0;
}
// update the outside stack address in the SSA
ssa_gpr->REG(sp_u) = addr;
return reinterpret_cast<void *>(addr);
}
int CLoader::build_mem_region(const section_info_t * const sec_info)
{
int ret = SGX_SUCCESS;
uint8_t added_page[SE_PAGE_SIZE];
uint64_t offset = 0;
uint8_t *raw_ptr = NULL;
uint64_t rva = 0;
sec_info_t sinfo;
memset(&sinfo, 0, sizeof(sinfo));
rva = sec_info->rva + offset;
while(offset < TRIM_TO_PAGE(sec_info->raw_data_size))
{
raw_ptr = sec_info->raw_data + offset;
sinfo.flags = sec_info->flag;
//check if the page is writable.
if(sec_info->bitmap && sec_info->bitmap->size())
{
uint64_t page_frame = rva >> SE_PAGE_SHIFT;
//NOTE:
// Current enclave size is not beyond 64G, so the type-casting from (uint64>>15) to (size_t) is OK.
// In the future, if the max enclave size is extended to beyond (1<<49), this type-casting will not work.
// It only impacts the enclave signing process. (32bit signing tool to sign 64 bit enclaves)
if((*sec_info->bitmap)[(size_t)(page_frame / 8)] & (1 << (page_frame % 8)))
sinfo.flags = sec_info->flag | SI_FLAG_W;
}
//call driver API to add page; raw_ptr needn't be page align, driver will handle page align;
if(SGX_SUCCESS != (ret = get_enclave_creator()->add_enclave_page(ENCLAVE_ID_IOCTL, raw_ptr, rva, sinfo, ADD_EXTEND_PAGE)))
{
//if add page failed , we should remove enclave somewhere;
return ret;
}
offset += SE_PAGE_SIZE;
rva = sec_info->rva + offset;
}
