/*
* chap_handle_response - check the response to our challenge.
*/
static void chap_handle_response(ppp_pcb *pcb, int id,
unsigned char *pkt, int len) {
int response_len, ok, mlen;
const unsigned char *response;
unsigned char *outp;
struct pbuf *p;
const char *name = NULL; /* initialized to shut gcc up */
#if 0 /* UNUSED */
int (*verifier)(const char *, const char *, int, const struct chap_digest_type *,
const unsigned char *, const unsigned char *, char *, int);
#endif /* UNUSED */
char rname[MAXNAMELEN+1];
char message[256];
if ((pcb->chap_server.flags & LOWERUP) == 0)
return;
if (id != pcb->chap_server.challenge[PPP_HDRLEN+1] || len < 2)
return;
if (pcb->chap_server.flags & CHALLENGE_VALID) {
response = pkt;
GETCHAR(response_len, pkt);
len -= response_len + 1; /* length of name */
name = (char *)pkt + response_len;
if (len < 0)
return;
if (pcb->chap_server.flags & TIMEOUT_PENDING) {
pcb->chap_server.flags &= ~TIMEOUT_PENDING;
UNTIMEOUT(chap_timeout, pcb);
}
#if PPP_REMOTENAME
if (pcb->settings.explicit_remote) {
name = pcb->remote_name;
} else
#endif /* PPP_REMOTENAME */
{
/* Null terminate and clean remote name. */
ppp_slprintf(rname, sizeof(rname), "%.*v", len, name);
name = rname;
}
#if 0 /* UNUSED */
if (chap_verify_hook)
verifier = chap_verify_hook;
else
verifier = chap_verify_response;
ok = (*verifier)(name, pcb->chap_server.name, id, pcb->chap_server.digest,
pcb->chap_server.challenge + PPP_HDRLEN + CHAP_HDRLEN,
response, pcb->chap_server.message, sizeof(pcb->chap_server.message));
#endif /* UNUSED */
ok = chap_verify_response(pcb, name, pcb->chap_server.name, id, pcb->chap_server.digest,
pcb->chap_server.challenge + PPP_HDRLEN + CHAP_HDRLEN,
response, message, sizeof(message));
#if 0 /* UNUSED */
if (!ok || !auth_number()) {
#endif /* UNUSED */
if (!ok) {
pcb->chap_server.flags |= AUTH_FAILED;
ppp_warn("Peer %q failed CHAP authentication", name);
}
} else if ((pcb->chap_server.flags & AUTH_DONE) == 0)
return;
/* send the response */
mlen = strlen(message);
len = CHAP_HDRLEN + mlen;
p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, (u16_t)(PPP_HDRLEN +len), PPP_CTRL_PBUF_TYPE);
if(NULL == p)
return;
if(p->tot_len != p->len) {
pbuf_free(p);
return;
}
outp = (unsigned char *)p->payload;
MAKEHEADER(outp, PPP_CHAP);
outp[0] = (pcb->chap_server.flags & AUTH_FAILED)? CHAP_FAILURE: CHAP_SUCCESS;
outp[1] = id;
outp[2] = len >> 8;
outp[3] = len;
if (mlen > 0)
memcpy(outp + CHAP_HDRLEN, message, mlen);
ppp_write(pcb, p);
if (pcb->chap_server.flags & CHALLENGE_VALID) {
pcb->chap_server.flags &= ~CHALLENGE_VALID;
if (!(pcb->chap_server.flags & AUTH_DONE) && !(pcb->chap_server.flags & AUTH_FAILED)) {
#if 0 /* UNUSED */
/*
* Auth is OK, so now we need to check session restrictions
* to ensure everything is OK, but only if we used a
* plugin, and only if we're configured to check. This
* allows us to do PAM checks on PPP servers that
* authenticate against ActiveDirectory, and use AD for
* account info (like when using Winbind integrated with
* PAM).
*/
if (session_mgmt &&
session_check(name, NULL, devnam, NULL) == 0) {
pcb->chap_server.flags |= AUTH_FAILED;
ppp_warn("Peer %q failed CHAP Session verification", name);
}
#endif /* UNUSED */
}
if (pcb->chap_server.flags & AUTH_FAILED) {
auth_peer_fail(pcb, PPP_CHAP);
} else {
if ((pcb->chap_server.flags & AUTH_DONE) == 0)
auth_peer_success(pcb, PPP_CHAP,
pcb->chap_server.digest->code,
name, strlen(name));
if (pcb->settings.chap_rechallenge_time) {
pcb->chap_server.flags |= TIMEOUT_PENDING;
TIMEOUT(chap_timeout, pcb,
pcb->settings.chap_rechallenge_time);
}
}
pcb->chap_server.flags |= AUTH_DONE;
}
}
/*
* upap_rauth - Receive Authenticate.
*/
static void upap_rauthreq(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *inp, int id, int len) {
u_char ruserlen, rpasswdlen;
char *ruser;
char *rpasswd;
char rhostname[256];
int retcode;
const char *msg;
int msglen;
if (pcb->upap.us_serverstate < UPAPSS_LISTEN)
return;
/*
* If we receive a duplicate authenticate-request, we are
* supposed to return the same status as for the first request.
*/
if (pcb->upap.us_serverstate == UPAPSS_OPEN) {
upap_sresp(pcb, UPAP_AUTHACK, id, "", 0); /* return auth-ack */
return;
}
if (pcb->upap.us_serverstate == UPAPSS_BADAUTH) {
upap_sresp(pcb, UPAP_AUTHNAK, id, "", 0); /* return auth-nak */
return;
}
/*
* Parse user/passwd.
*/
if (len < 1) {
UPAPDEBUG(("pap_rauth: rcvd short packet."));
return;
}
GETCHAR(ruserlen, inp);
len -= sizeof (u_char) + ruserlen + sizeof (u_char);
if (len < 0) {
UPAPDEBUG(("pap_rauth: rcvd short packet."));
return;
}
ruser = (char *) inp;
INCPTR(ruserlen, inp);
GETCHAR(rpasswdlen, inp);
if (len < rpasswdlen) {
UPAPDEBUG(("pap_rauth: rcvd short packet."));
return;
}
rpasswd = (char *) inp;
/*
* Check the username and password given.
*/
retcode = UPAP_AUTHNAK;
if (auth_check_passwd(pcb, ruser, ruserlen, rpasswd, rpasswdlen, &msg, &msglen)) {
retcode = UPAP_AUTHACK;
}
BZERO(rpasswd, rpasswdlen);
#if 0 /* UNUSED */
/*
* Check remote number authorization. A plugin may have filled in
* the remote number or added an allowed number, and rather than
* return an authenticate failure, is leaving it for us to verify.
*/
if (retcode == UPAP_AUTHACK) {
if (!auth_number()) {
/* We do not want to leak info about the pap result. */
retcode = UPAP_AUTHNAK; /* XXX exit value will be "wrong" */
warn("calling number %q is not authorized", remote_number);
}
}
msglen = strlen(msg);
if (msglen > 255)
msglen = 255;
#endif /* UNUSED */
upap_sresp(pcb, retcode, id, msg, msglen);
/* Null terminate and clean remote name. */
ppp_slprintf(rhostname, sizeof(rhostname), "%.*v", ruserlen, ruser);
if (retcode == UPAP_AUTHACK) {
pcb->upap.us_serverstate = UPAPSS_OPEN;
ppp_notice("PAP peer authentication succeeded for %q", rhostname);
auth_peer_success(pcb, PPP_PAP, 0, ruser, ruserlen);
} else {
pcb->upap.us_serverstate = UPAPSS_BADAUTH;
ppp_warn("PAP peer authentication failed for %q", rhostname);
auth_peer_fail(pcb, PPP_PAP);
}
if (pcb->settings.pap_req_timeout > 0)
UNTIMEOUT(upap_reqtimeout, pcb);
}
