static int
finalize_hash (struct hash_desc *desc, unsigned char * out, unsigned int out_size)
{
int ret = -1;
if (!desc || !desc->tfm || !out || !out_size)
{
printk(KERN_ERR "FIPS(%s): Invalid args", __FUNCTION__);
return ret;
}
if (crypto_hash_digestsize(desc->tfm) > out_size)
{
printk(KERN_ERR "FIPS(%s): Not enough space for digest", __FUNCTION__);
return ret;
}
ret = crypto_hash_final (desc, out);
if (ret)
{
printk(KERN_ERR "FIPS(%s): crypto_hash_final failed", __FUNCTION__);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static struct crypto_hash *pohmelfs_init_hash(struct pohmelfs_sb *psb)
{
int err;
struct crypto_hash *hash;
hash = crypto_alloc_hash(psb->hash_string, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(hash)) {
err = PTR_ERR(hash);
dprintk("%s: idx: %u: failed to allocate hash '%s', err: %d.\n",
__func__, psb->idx, psb->hash_string, err);
goto err_out_exit;
}
psb->crypto_attached_size = crypto_hash_digestsize(hash);
if (!psb->hash_keysize)
return hash;
err = crypto_hash_setkey(hash, psb->hash_key, psb->hash_keysize);
if (err) {
dprintk("%s: idx: %u: failed to set key for hash '%s', err: %d.\n",
__func__, psb->idx, psb->hash_string, err);
goto err_out_free;
}
return hash;
err_out_free:
crypto_free_hash(hash);
err_out_exit:
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
/* Initialise ESSIV - compute salt but no local memory allocations */
static int crypt_iv_essiv_init(struct crypt_config *cc)
{
struct iv_essiv_private *essiv = &cc->iv_gen_private.essiv;
struct hash_desc desc;
struct scatterlist sg;
struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
int err;
sg_init_one(&sg, cc->key, cc->key_size);
desc.tfm = essiv->hash_tfm;
desc.flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
err = crypto_hash_digest(&desc, &sg, cc->key_size, essiv->salt);
if (err)
return err;
essiv_tfm = cc->iv_private;
err = crypto_cipher_setkey(essiv_tfm, essiv->salt,
crypto_hash_digestsize(essiv->hash_tfm));
if (err)
return err;
return 0;
}
/*
* Crypto machinery: hash/cipher support for the given crypto controls.
*/
static struct crypto_hash *dst_init_hash(struct dst_crypto_ctl *ctl, u8 *key)
{
int err;
struct crypto_hash *hash;
hash = crypto_alloc_hash(ctl->hash_algo, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(hash)) {
err = PTR_ERR(hash);
dprintk("%s: failed to allocate hash '%s', err: %d.\n",
__func__, ctl->hash_algo, err);
goto err_out_exit;
}
ctl->crypto_attached_size = crypto_hash_digestsize(hash);
if (!ctl->hash_keysize)
return hash;
err = crypto_hash_setkey(hash, key, ctl->hash_keysize);
if (err) {
dprintk("%s: failed to set key for hash '%s', err: %d.\n",
__func__, ctl->hash_algo, err);
goto err_out_free;
}
return hash;
err_out_free:
crypto_free_hash(hash);
err_out_exit:
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
__be32
nfs4_make_rec_clidname(char *dname, struct xdr_netobj *clname)
{
struct xdr_netobj cksum;
struct hash_desc desc;
struct scatterlist sg;
__be32 status = nfserr_resource;
dprintk("NFSD: nfs4_make_rec_clidname for %.*s\n",
clname->len, clname->data);
desc.flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
desc.tfm = crypto_alloc_hash("md5", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(desc.tfm))
goto out_no_tfm;
cksum.len = crypto_hash_digestsize(desc.tfm);
cksum.data = kmalloc(cksum.len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (cksum.data == NULL)
goto out;
sg_init_one(&sg, clname->data, clname->len);
if (crypto_hash_digest(&desc, &sg, sg.length, cksum.data))
goto out;
md5_to_hex(dname, cksum.data);
kfree(cksum.data);
status = nfs_ok;
out:
crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm);
out_no_tfm:
return status;
}
/* checksum the plaintext data and hdrlen bytes of the token header */
s32
make_checksum(char *cksumname, char *header, int hdrlen, struct xdr_buf *body,
int body_offset, struct xdr_netobj *cksum)
{
struct hash_desc desc; /* XXX add to ctx? */
struct scatterlist sg[1];
int err;
desc.tfm = crypto_alloc_hash(cksumname, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(desc.tfm))
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
cksum->len = crypto_hash_digestsize(desc.tfm);
desc.flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
err = crypto_hash_init(&desc);
if (err)
goto out;
sg_set_buf(sg, header, hdrlen);
err = crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, hdrlen);
if (err)
goto out;
err = xdr_process_buf(body, body_offset, body->len - body_offset,
checksummer, &desc);
if (err)
goto out;
err = crypto_hash_final(&desc, cksum->data);
out:
crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm);
return err ? GSS_S_FAILURE : 0;
}
/* If hash_len pointer is NULL - destroy descriptor. */
int cfs_crypto_hash_final(struct cfs_crypto_hash_desc *hdesc,
unsigned char *hash, unsigned int *hash_len)
{
int err;
int size = crypto_hash_digestsize(((struct hash_desc *)hdesc)->tfm);
if (hash_len == NULL) {
crypto_free_hash(((struct hash_desc *)hdesc)->tfm);
kfree(hdesc);
return 0;
}
if (hash == NULL || *hash_len < size) {
*hash_len = size;
return -ENOSPC;
}
err = crypto_hash_final((struct hash_desc *) hdesc, hash);
if (err < 0) {
/* May be caller can fix error */
return err;
}
crypto_free_hash(((struct hash_desc *)hdesc)->tfm);
kfree(hdesc);
return err;
}
static int crypt_iv_essiv_ctr(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_target *ti,
const char *opts)
{
struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm = NULL;
struct crypto_hash *hash_tfm = NULL;
u8 *salt = NULL;
int err;
if (!opts) {
ti->error = "Digest algorithm missing for ESSIV mode";
return -EINVAL;
}
/* Allocate hash algorithm */
hash_tfm = crypto_alloc_hash(opts, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(hash_tfm)) {
ti->error = "Error initializing ESSIV hash";
err = PTR_ERR(hash_tfm);
goto bad;
}
salt = kzalloc(crypto_hash_digestsize(hash_tfm), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!salt) {
ti->error = "Error kmallocing salt storage in ESSIV";
err = -ENOMEM;
goto bad;
}
cc->iv_gen_private.essiv.salt = salt;
cc->iv_gen_private.essiv.hash_tfm = hash_tfm;
essiv_tfm = setup_essiv_cpu(cc, ti, salt,
crypto_hash_digestsize(hash_tfm));
if (IS_ERR(essiv_tfm)) {
crypt_iv_essiv_dtr(cc);
return PTR_ERR(essiv_tfm);
}
cc->iv_private = essiv_tfm;
return 0;
bad:
if (hash_tfm && !IS_ERR(hash_tfm))
crypto_free_hash(hash_tfm);
kfree(salt);
return err;
}
static int crypt_iv_essiv_ctr(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_target *ti,
const char *opts)
{
struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm = NULL;
struct crypto_hash *hash_tfm = NULL;
u8 *salt = NULL;
int err;
if (!opts) {
ti->error = "Digest algorithm missing for ESSIV mode";
return -EINVAL;
}
/* Allocate hash algorithm */
hash_tfm = crypto_alloc_hash(opts, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(hash_tfm)) {
ti->error = "Error initializing ESSIV hash";
err = PTR_ERR(hash_tfm);
goto bad;
}
salt = kzalloc(crypto_hash_digestsize(hash_tfm), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!salt) {
ti->error = "Error kmallocing salt storage in ESSIV";
err = -ENOMEM;
goto bad;
}
/* Allocate essiv_tfm */
essiv_tfm = crypto_alloc_cipher(cc->cipher, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(essiv_tfm)) {
ti->error = "Error allocating crypto tfm for ESSIV";
err = PTR_ERR(essiv_tfm);
goto bad;
}
if (crypto_cipher_blocksize(essiv_tfm) !=
crypto_ablkcipher_ivsize(cc->tfm)) {
ti->error = "Block size of ESSIV cipher does "
"not match IV size of block cipher";
err = -EINVAL;
goto bad;
}
cc->iv_gen_private.essiv.salt = salt;
cc->iv_gen_private.essiv.tfm = essiv_tfm;
cc->iv_gen_private.essiv.hash_tfm = hash_tfm;
return 0;
bad:
if (essiv_tfm && !IS_ERR(essiv_tfm))
crypto_free_cipher(essiv_tfm);
if (hash_tfm && !IS_ERR(hash_tfm))
crypto_free_hash(hash_tfm);
kfree(salt);
return err;
}
/* Wipe salt and reset key derived from volume key */
static int crypt_iv_essiv_wipe(struct crypt_config *cc)
{
struct iv_essiv_private *essiv = &cc->iv_gen_private.essiv;
unsigned salt_size = crypto_hash_digestsize(essiv->hash_tfm);
memset(essiv->salt, 0, salt_size);
return crypto_cipher_setkey(essiv->tfm, essiv->salt, salt_size);
}
static int
DriverEnvironment_HMAC(const char *algo,
const void *key,
size_t key_len,
const void *data,
size_t data_len,
void *result,
size_t result_len)
{
struct crypto_hash *tfm;
struct scatterlist sg[1];
struct hash_desc desc;
int ret;
tfm = crypto_alloc_hash(algo, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if(IS_ERR(tfm)) {
DE_TRACE_INT(TR_CRYPTO, "failed to allocate hash (%ld)\n", PTR_ERR(tfm));
return WIFI_ENGINE_FAILURE;
}
if(crypto_hash_digestsize(tfm) > result_len) {
crypto_free_hash(tfm);
return WIFI_ENGINE_FAILURE_INVALID_LENGTH;
}
sg_init_one(&sg[0], data, data_len);
crypto_hash_clear_flags(tfm, ~0);
ret = crypto_hash_setkey(tfm, key, key_len);
if(ret != 0) {
DE_TRACE_INT(TR_CRYPTO, "failed to set key (%d)\n", ret);
crypto_free_hash(tfm);
return WIFI_ENGINE_FAILURE;
}
desc.tfm = tfm;
desc.flags = 0;
ret = crypto_hash_digest(&desc, sg, data_len, result);
if(ret != 0) {
DE_TRACE_INT(TR_CRYPTO, "faild to digest (%d)\n", ret);
crypto_free_hash(tfm);
return WIFI_ENGINE_FAILURE;
}
crypto_free_hash(tfm);
return WIFI_ENGINE_SUCCESS;
}
/* Wipe salt and reset key derived from volume key */
static int crypt_iv_essiv_wipe(struct crypt_config *cc)
{
struct iv_essiv_private *essiv = &cc->iv_gen_private.essiv;
unsigned salt_size = crypto_hash_digestsize(essiv->hash_tfm);
struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
int r, err = 0;
memset(essiv->salt, 0, salt_size);
essiv_tfm = cc->iv_private;
r = crypto_cipher_setkey(essiv_tfm, essiv->salt, salt_size);
if (r)
err = r;
return err;
}
int __init init_mars(void)
{
MARS_INF("init_mars()\n");
set_fake();
#ifdef MARS_TRACING
{
int flags = O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_RDWR | O_LARGEFILE;
int prot = 0600;
mm_segment_t oldfs;
oldfs = get_fs();
set_fs(get_ds());
mars_log_file = filp_open("/mars/trace.csv", flags, prot);
set_fs(oldfs);
if (IS_ERR(mars_log_file)) {
MARS_ERR("cannot create trace logfile, status = %ld\n", PTR_ERR(mars_log_file));
mars_log_file = NULL;
}
}
#endif
mars_tfm = crypto_alloc_hash("md5", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (!mars_tfm) {
MARS_ERR("cannot alloc crypto hash\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
if (IS_ERR(mars_tfm)) {
MARS_ERR("alloc crypto hash failed, status = %d\n", (int)PTR_ERR(mars_tfm));
return PTR_ERR(mars_tfm);
}
#if 0
if (crypto_tfm_alg_type(crypto_hash_tfm(mars_tfm)) != CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_DIGEST) {
MARS_ERR("bad crypto hash type\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
#endif
mars_digest_size = crypto_hash_digestsize(mars_tfm);
MARS_INF("digest_size = %d\n", mars_digest_size);
return 0;
}
void s390_sha_final(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *out)
{
struct s390_sha_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
unsigned int bsize = crypto_tfm_alg_blocksize(tfm);
u64 bits;
unsigned int index, end, plen;
int ret;
/* SHA-512 uses 128 bit padding length */
plen = (bsize > SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE) ? 16 : 8;
/* must perform manual padding */
index = ctx->count & (bsize - 1);
end = (index < bsize - plen) ? bsize : (2 * bsize);
/* start pad with 1 */
ctx->buf[index] = 0x80;
index++;
/* pad with zeros */
memset(ctx->buf + index, 0x00, end - index - 8);
/*
* Append message length. Well, SHA-512 wants a 128 bit lenght value,
* nevertheless we use u64, should be enough for now...
*/
bits = ctx->count * 8;
memcpy(ctx->buf + end - 8, &bits, sizeof(bits));
ret = crypt_s390_kimd(ctx->func, ctx->state, ctx->buf, end);
BUG_ON(ret != end);
/* copy digest to out */
memcpy(out, ctx->state, crypto_hash_digestsize(crypto_hash_cast(tfm)));
/* wipe context */
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof *ctx);
}
/**
* Finish hash calculation, copy hash digest to buffer, clean up hash descriptor
*
* \param[in] hdesc hash descriptor
* \param[out] hash pointer to hash buffer to store hash digest
* \param[in,out] hash_len pointer to hash buffer size, if \a hash == NULL
* or hash_len == NULL only free \a hdesc instead
* of computing the hash
*
* \retval 0 for success
* \retval -EOVERFLOW if hash_len is too small for the hash digest
* \retval negative errno for other errors from lower layers
*/
int cfs_crypto_hash_final(struct cfs_crypto_hash_desc *hdesc,
unsigned char *hash, unsigned int *hash_len)
{
int size = crypto_hash_digestsize(((struct hash_desc *)hdesc)->tfm);
int err;
if (hash == NULL || hash_len == NULL) {
err = 0;
goto free;
}
if (*hash_len < size) {
err = -EOVERFLOW;
goto free;
}
err = crypto_hash_final((struct hash_desc *)hdesc, hash);
if (err == 0)
*hash_len = size;
free:
crypto_free_hash(((struct hash_desc *)hdesc)->tfm);
kfree(hdesc);
return err;
}
/*
* Perform the MPPE rekey algorithm, from RFC 3078, sec. 7.3.
* Well, not what's written there, but rather what they meant.
*/
static void mppe_rekey(struct ppp_mppe_state * state, int initial_key)
{
struct scatterlist sg_in[1], sg_out[1];
struct blkcipher_desc desc = { .tfm = state->arc4 };
get_new_key_from_sha(state);
if (!initial_key) {
crypto_blkcipher_setkey(state->arc4, state->sha1_digest,
state->keylen);
sg_init_table(sg_in, 1);
sg_init_table(sg_out, 1);
setup_sg(sg_in, state->sha1_digest, state->keylen);
setup_sg(sg_out, state->session_key, state->keylen);
if (crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, sg_out, sg_in,
state->keylen) != 0) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "mppe_rekey: cipher_encrypt failed\n");
}
} else {
memcpy(state->session_key, state->sha1_digest, state->keylen);
}
if (state->keylen == 8) {
/* See RFC 3078 */
state->session_key[0] = 0xd1;
state->session_key[1] = 0x26;
state->session_key[2] = 0x9e;
}
crypto_blkcipher_setkey(state->arc4, state->session_key, state->keylen);
}
/*
* Allocate space for a (de)compressor.
*/
static void *mppe_alloc(unsigned char *options, int optlen)
{
struct ppp_mppe_state *state;
unsigned int digestsize;
if (optlen != CILEN_MPPE + sizeof(state->master_key)
|| options[0] != CI_MPPE || options[1] != CILEN_MPPE)
goto out;
state = kzalloc(sizeof(*state), GFP_KERNEL);
if (state == NULL)
goto out;
state->arc4 = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(arc4)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(state->arc4)) {
state->arc4 = NULL;
goto out_free;
}
state->sha1 = crypto_alloc_hash("sha1", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(state->sha1)) {
state->sha1 = NULL;
goto out_free;
}
digestsize = crypto_hash_digestsize(state->sha1);
if (digestsize < MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN)
goto out_free;
state->sha1_digest = kmalloc(digestsize, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!state->sha1_digest)
goto out_free;
/* Save keys. */
memcpy(state->master_key, &options[CILEN_MPPE],
sizeof(state->master_key));
memcpy(state->session_key, state->master_key,
sizeof(state->master_key));
/*
* We defer initial key generation until mppe_init(), as mppe_alloc()
* is called frequently during negotiation.
*/
return (void *)state;
out_free:
if (state->sha1_digest)
kfree(state->sha1_digest);
if (state->sha1)
crypto_free_hash(state->sha1);
if (state->arc4)
crypto_free_blkcipher(state->arc4);
kfree(state);
out:
return NULL;
}
/*
* Deallocate space for a (de)compressor.
*/
static void mppe_free(void *arg)
{
struct ppp_mppe_state *state = (struct ppp_mppe_state *) arg;
if (state) {
if (state->sha1_digest)
kfree(state->sha1_digest);
if (state->sha1)
crypto_free_hash(state->sha1);
if (state->arc4)
crypto_free_blkcipher(state->arc4);
kfree(state);
}
}
/*
* Initialize (de)compressor state.
*/
static int
mppe_init(void *arg, unsigned char *options, int optlen, int unit, int debug,
const char *debugstr)
{
struct ppp_mppe_state *state = (struct ppp_mppe_state *) arg;
unsigned char mppe_opts;
if (optlen != CILEN_MPPE
|| options[0] != CI_MPPE || options[1] != CILEN_MPPE)
return 0;
MPPE_CI_TO_OPTS(&options[2], mppe_opts);
if (mppe_opts & MPPE_OPT_128)
state->keylen = 16;
else if (mppe_opts & MPPE_OPT_40)
state->keylen = 8;
else {
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s[%d]: unknown key length\n", debugstr,
unit);
return 0;
}
if (mppe_opts & MPPE_OPT_STATEFUL)
state->stateful = 1;
/* Generate the initial session key. */
mppe_rekey(state, 1);
if (debug) {
int i;
char mkey[sizeof(state->master_key) * 2 + 1];
char skey[sizeof(state->session_key) * 2 + 1];
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s[%d]: initialized with %d-bit %s mode\n",
debugstr, unit, (state->keylen == 16) ? 128 : 40,
(state->stateful) ? "stateful" : "stateless");
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(state->master_key); i++)
sprintf(mkey + i * 2, "%02x", state->master_key[i]);
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(state->session_key); i++)
sprintf(skey + i * 2, "%02x", state->session_key[i]);
printk(KERN_DEBUG
"%s[%d]: keys: master: %s initial session: %s\n",
debugstr, unit, mkey, skey);
}
/*
* Initialize the coherency count. The initial value is not specified
* in RFC 3078, but we can make a reasonable assumption that it will
* start at 0. Setting it to the max here makes the comp/decomp code
* do the right thing (determined through experiment).
*/
state->ccount = MPPE_CCOUNT_SPACE - 1;
/*
* Note that even though we have initialized the key table, we don't
* set the FLUSHED bit. This is contrary to RFC 3078, sec. 3.1.
*/
state->bits = MPPE_BIT_ENCRYPTED;
state->unit = unit;
state->debug = debug;
return 1;
}
static int
mppe_comp_init(void *arg, unsigned char *options, int optlen, int unit,
int hdrlen, int debug)
{
/* ARGSUSED */
return mppe_init(arg, options, optlen, unit, debug, "mppe_comp_init");
}
/*
* We received a CCP Reset-Request (actually, we are sending a Reset-Ack),
* tell the compressor to rekey. Note that we MUST NOT rekey for
* every CCP Reset-Request; we only rekey on the next xmit packet.
* We might get multiple CCP Reset-Requests if our CCP Reset-Ack is lost.
* So, rekeying for every CCP Reset-Request is broken as the peer will not
* know how many times we've rekeyed. (If we rekey and THEN get another
* CCP Reset-Request, we must rekey again.)
*/
static void mppe_comp_reset(void *arg)
{
struct ppp_mppe_state *state = (struct ppp_mppe_state *) arg;
state->bits |= MPPE_BIT_FLUSHED;
}
/*
* Compress (encrypt) a packet.
* It's strange to call this a compressor, since the output is always
* MPPE_OVHD + 2 bytes larger than the input.
*/
static int
mppe_compress(void *arg, unsigned char *ibuf, unsigned char *obuf,
int isize, int osize)
{
struct ppp_mppe_state *state = (struct ppp_mppe_state *) arg;
struct blkcipher_desc desc = { .tfm = state->arc4 };
int proto;
struct scatterlist sg_in[1], sg_out[1];
/*
* Check that the protocol is in the range we handle.
*/
proto = PPP_PROTOCOL(ibuf);
if (proto < 0x0021 || proto > 0x00fa)
return 0;
/* Make sure we have enough room to generate an encrypted packet. */
if (osize < isize + MPPE_OVHD + 2) {
/* Drop the packet if we should encrypt it, but can't. */
printk(KERN_DEBUG "mppe_compress[%d]: osize too small! "
"(have: %d need: %d)\n", state->unit,
osize, osize + MPPE_OVHD + 2);
return -1;
}
osize = isize + MPPE_OVHD + 2;
/*
* Copy over the PPP header and set control bits.
*/
obuf[0] = PPP_ADDRESS(ibuf);
obuf[1] = PPP_CONTROL(ibuf);
obuf[2] = PPP_COMP >> 8; /* isize + MPPE_OVHD + 1 */
obuf[3] = PPP_COMP; /* isize + MPPE_OVHD + 2 */
obuf += PPP_HDRLEN;
state->ccount = (state->ccount + 1) % MPPE_CCOUNT_SPACE;
if (state->debug >= 7)
printk(KERN_DEBUG "mppe_compress[%d]: ccount %d\n", state->unit,
state->ccount);
obuf[0] = state->ccount >> 8;
obuf[1] = state->ccount & 0xff;
if (!state->stateful || /* stateless mode */
((state->ccount & 0xff) == 0xff) || /* "flag" packet */
(state->bits & MPPE_BIT_FLUSHED)) { /* CCP Reset-Request */
/* We must rekey */
if (state->debug && state->stateful)
printk(KERN_DEBUG "mppe_compress[%d]: rekeying\n",
state->unit);
mppe_rekey(state, 0);
state->bits |= MPPE_BIT_FLUSHED;
}
obuf[0] |= state->bits;
state->bits &= ~MPPE_BIT_FLUSHED; /* reset for next xmit */
obuf += MPPE_OVHD;
ibuf += 2; /* skip to proto field */
isize -= 2;
/* Encrypt packet */
sg_init_table(sg_in, 1);
sg_init_table(sg_out, 1);
setup_sg(sg_in, ibuf, isize);
setup_sg(sg_out, obuf, osize);
if (crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, sg_out, sg_in, isize) != 0) {
printk(KERN_DEBUG "crypto_cypher_encrypt failed\n");
return -1;
}
state->stats.unc_bytes += isize;
state->stats.unc_packets++;
state->stats.comp_bytes += osize;
state->stats.comp_packets++;
return osize;
}
/*
* Since every frame grows by MPPE_OVHD + 2 bytes, this is always going
* to look bad ... and the longer the link is up the worse it will get.
*/
static void mppe_comp_stats(void *arg, struct compstat *stats)
{
struct ppp_mppe_state *state = (struct ppp_mppe_state *) arg;
*stats = state->stats;
}
static int
mppe_decomp_init(void *arg, unsigned char *options, int optlen, int unit,
int hdrlen, int mru, int debug)
{
/* ARGSUSED */
return mppe_init(arg, options, optlen, unit, debug, "mppe_decomp_init");
}
/*
* We received a CCP Reset-Ack. Just ignore it.
*/
static void mppe_decomp_reset(void *arg)
{
/* ARGSUSED */
return;
}
/*
* Decompress (decrypt) an MPPE packet.
*/
static int
mppe_decompress(void *arg, unsigned char *ibuf, int isize, unsigned char *obuf,
int osize)
{
struct ppp_mppe_state *state = (struct ppp_mppe_state *) arg;
struct blkcipher_desc desc = { .tfm = state->arc4 };
unsigned ccount;
int flushed = MPPE_BITS(ibuf) & MPPE_BIT_FLUSHED;
int sanity = 0;
struct scatterlist sg_in[1], sg_out[1];
if (isize <= PPP_HDRLEN + MPPE_OVHD) {
if (state->debug)
printk(KERN_DEBUG
"mppe_decompress[%d]: short pkt (%d)\n",
state->unit, isize);
return DECOMP_ERROR;
}
/*
* Make sure we have enough room to decrypt the packet.
* Note that for our test we only subtract 1 byte whereas in
* mppe_compress() we added 2 bytes (+MPPE_OVHD);
* this is to account for possible PFC.
*/
if (osize < isize - MPPE_OVHD - 1) {
printk(KERN_DEBUG "mppe_decompress[%d]: osize too small! "
"(have: %d need: %d)\n", state->unit,
osize, isize - MPPE_OVHD - 1);
return DECOMP_ERROR;
}
osize = isize - MPPE_OVHD - 2; /* assume no PFC */
ccount = MPPE_CCOUNT(ibuf);
if (state->debug >= 7)
printk(KERN_DEBUG "mppe_decompress[%d]: ccount %d\n",
state->unit, ccount);
/* sanity checks -- terminate with extreme prejudice */
if (!(MPPE_BITS(ibuf) & MPPE_BIT_ENCRYPTED)) {
printk(KERN_DEBUG
"mppe_decompress[%d]: ENCRYPTED bit not set!\n",
state->unit);
state->sanity_errors += 100;
sanity = 1;
}
if (!state->stateful && !flushed) {
printk(KERN_DEBUG "mppe_decompress[%d]: FLUSHED bit not set in "
"stateless mode!\n", state->unit);
state->sanity_errors += 100;
sanity = 1;
}
if (state->stateful && ((ccount & 0xff) == 0xff) && !flushed) {
printk(KERN_DEBUG "mppe_decompress[%d]: FLUSHED bit not set on "
"flag packet!\n", state->unit);
state->sanity_errors += 100;
sanity = 1;
}
if (sanity) {
if (state->sanity_errors < SANITY_MAX)
return DECOMP_ERROR;
else
/*
* Take LCP down if the peer is sending too many bogons.
* We don't want to do this for a single or just a few
* instances since it could just be due to packet corruption.
*/
return DECOMP_FATALERROR;
}
/*
* Check the coherency count.
*/
if (!state->stateful) {
/* RFC 3078, sec 8.1. Rekey for every packet. */
while (state->ccount != ccount) {
mppe_rekey(state, 0);
state->ccount = (state->ccount + 1) % MPPE_CCOUNT_SPACE;
}
} else {
/* RFC 3078, sec 8.2. */
if (!state->discard) {
/* normal state */
state->ccount = (state->ccount + 1) % MPPE_CCOUNT_SPACE;
if (ccount != state->ccount) {
/*
* (ccount > state->ccount)
* Packet loss detected, enter the discard state.
* Signal the peer to rekey (by sending a CCP Reset-Request).
*/
state->discard = 1;
return DECOMP_ERROR;
}
} else {
/* discard state */
if (!flushed) {
/* ccp.c will be silent (no additional CCP Reset-Requests). */
return DECOMP_ERROR;
} else {
/* Rekey for every missed "flag" packet. */
while ((ccount & ~0xff) !=
(state->ccount & ~0xff)) {
mppe_rekey(state, 0);
state->ccount =
(state->ccount +
256) % MPPE_CCOUNT_SPACE;
}
/* reset */
state->discard = 0;
state->ccount = ccount;
/*
* Another problem with RFC 3078 here. It implies that the
* peer need not send a Reset-Ack packet. But RFC 1962
* requires it. Hopefully, M$ does send a Reset-Ack; even
* though it isn't required for MPPE synchronization, it is
* required to reset CCP state.
*/
}
}
if (flushed)
mppe_rekey(state, 0);
}
/*
* Fill in the first part of the PPP header. The protocol field
* comes from the decrypted data.
*/
obuf[0] = PPP_ADDRESS(ibuf); /* +1 */
obuf[1] = PPP_CONTROL(ibuf); /* +1 */
obuf += 2;
ibuf += PPP_HDRLEN + MPPE_OVHD;
isize -= PPP_HDRLEN + MPPE_OVHD; /* -6 */
/* net osize: isize-4 */
/*
* Decrypt the first byte in order to check if it is
* a compressed or uncompressed protocol field.
*/
sg_init_table(sg_in, 1);
sg_init_table(sg_out, 1);
setup_sg(sg_in, ibuf, 1);
setup_sg(sg_out, obuf, 1);
if (crypto_blkcipher_decrypt(&desc, sg_out, sg_in, 1) != 0) {
printk(KERN_DEBUG "crypto_cypher_decrypt failed\n");
return DECOMP_ERROR;
}
/*
* Do PFC decompression.
* This would be nicer if we were given the actual sk_buff
* instead of a char *.
*/
if ((obuf[0] & 0x01) != 0) {
obuf[1] = obuf[0];
obuf[0] = 0;
obuf++;
osize++;
}
/* And finally, decrypt the rest of the packet. */
setup_sg(sg_in, ibuf + 1, isize - 1);
setup_sg(sg_out, obuf + 1, osize - 1);
if (crypto_blkcipher_decrypt(&desc, sg_out, sg_in, isize - 1)) {
printk(KERN_DEBUG "crypto_cypher_decrypt failed\n");
return DECOMP_ERROR;
}
state->stats.unc_bytes += osize;
state->stats.unc_packets++;
state->stats.comp_bytes += isize;
state->stats.comp_packets++;
/* good packet credit */
state->sanity_errors >>= 1;
return osize;
}
/*
* Incompressible data has arrived (this should never happen!).
* We should probably drop the link if the protocol is in the range
* of what should be encrypted. At the least, we should drop this
* packet. (How to do this?)
*/
static void mppe_incomp(void *arg, unsigned char *ibuf, int icnt)
{
struct ppp_mppe_state *state = (struct ppp_mppe_state *) arg;
if (state->debug &&
(PPP_PROTOCOL(ibuf) >= 0x0021 && PPP_PROTOCOL(ibuf) <= 0x00fa))
printk(KERN_DEBUG
"mppe_incomp[%d]: incompressible (unencrypted) data! "
"(proto %04x)\n", state->unit, PPP_PROTOCOL(ibuf));
state->stats.inc_bytes += icnt;
state->stats.inc_packets++;
state->stats.unc_bytes += icnt;
state->stats.unc_packets++;
}
/*************************************************************
* Module interface table
*************************************************************/
/*
* Procedures exported to if_ppp.c.
*/
static struct compressor ppp_mppe = {
.compress_proto = CI_MPPE,
.comp_alloc = mppe_alloc,
.comp_free = mppe_free,
.comp_init = mppe_comp_init,
.comp_reset = mppe_comp_reset,
.compress = mppe_compress,
.comp_stat = mppe_comp_stats,
.decomp_alloc = mppe_alloc,
.decomp_free = mppe_free,
.decomp_init = mppe_decomp_init,
.decomp_reset = mppe_decomp_reset,
.decompress = mppe_decompress,
.incomp = mppe_incomp,
.decomp_stat = mppe_comp_stats,
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.comp_extra = MPPE_PAD,
};
/*
* ppp_mppe_init()
*
* Prior to allowing load, try to load the arc4 and sha1 crypto
* libraries. The actual use will be allocated later, but
* this way the module will fail to insmod if they aren't available.
*/
static int __init ppp_mppe_init(void)
{
int answer;
if (!(crypto_has_blkcipher("ecb(arc4)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC) &&
crypto_has_hash("sha1", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC)))
return -ENODEV;
sha_pad = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sha_pad), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sha_pad)
return -ENOMEM;
sha_pad_init(sha_pad);
answer = ppp_register_compressor(&ppp_mppe);
if (answer == 0)
printk(KERN_INFO "PPP MPPE Compression module registered\n");
else
kfree(sha_pad);
return answer;
}
static void __exit ppp_mppe_cleanup(void)
{
ppp_unregister_compressor(&ppp_mppe);
kfree(sha_pad);
}
module_init(ppp_mppe_init);
module_exit(ppp_mppe_cleanup);
static int esp_init_state(struct xfrm_state *x)
{
struct esp_data *esp = NULL;
struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
u32 align;
/* null auth and encryption can have zero length keys */
if (x->aalg) {
if (x->aalg->alg_key_len > 512)
goto error;
}
if (x->ealg == NULL)
goto error;
esp = kzalloc(sizeof(*esp), GFP_KERNEL);
if (esp == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
if (x->aalg) {
struct xfrm_algo_desc *aalg_desc;
struct crypto_hash *hash;
esp->auth.key = x->aalg->alg_key;
esp->auth.key_len = (x->aalg->alg_key_len+7)/8;
hash = crypto_alloc_hash(x->aalg->alg_name, 0,
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(hash))
goto error;
esp->auth.tfm = hash;
if (crypto_hash_setkey(hash, esp->auth.key, esp->auth.key_len))
goto error;
aalg_desc = xfrm_aalg_get_byname(x->aalg->alg_name, 0);
BUG_ON(!aalg_desc);
if (aalg_desc->uinfo.auth.icv_fullbits/8 !=
crypto_hash_digestsize(hash)) {
NETDEBUG(KERN_INFO "ESP: %s digestsize %u != %hu\n",
x->aalg->alg_name,
crypto_hash_digestsize(hash),
aalg_desc->uinfo.auth.icv_fullbits/8);
goto error;
}
esp->auth.icv_full_len = aalg_desc->uinfo.auth.icv_fullbits/8;
esp->auth.icv_trunc_len = aalg_desc->uinfo.auth.icv_truncbits/8;
esp->auth.work_icv = kmalloc(esp->auth.icv_full_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!esp->auth.work_icv)
goto error;
}
esp->conf.key = x->ealg->alg_key;
esp->conf.key_len = (x->ealg->alg_key_len+7)/8;
tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(x->ealg->alg_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(tfm))
goto error;
esp->conf.tfm = tfm;
esp->conf.ivlen = crypto_blkcipher_ivsize(tfm);
esp->conf.padlen = 0;
if (esp->conf.ivlen) {
esp->conf.ivec = kmalloc(esp->conf.ivlen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(esp->conf.ivec == NULL))
goto error;
esp->conf.ivinitted = 0;
}
if (crypto_blkcipher_setkey(tfm, esp->conf.key, esp->conf.key_len))
goto error;
x->props.header_len = sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) + esp->conf.ivlen;
if (x->props.mode == XFRM_MODE_TUNNEL)
x->props.header_len += sizeof(struct iphdr);
else if (x->props.mode == XFRM_MODE_BEET)
x->props.header_len += IPV4_BEET_PHMAXLEN;
if (x->encap) {
struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap = x->encap;
switch (encap->encap_type) {
default:
goto error;
case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP:
x->props.header_len += sizeof(struct udphdr);
break;
case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE:
x->props.header_len += sizeof(struct udphdr) + 2 * sizeof(u32);
break;
}
}
x->data = esp;
align = ALIGN(crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(esp->conf.tfm), 4);
if (esp->conf.padlen)
align = max_t(u32, align, esp->conf.padlen);
x->props.trailer_len = align + 1 + esp->auth.icv_trunc_len;
return 0;
error:
x->data = esp;
esp_destroy(x);
x->data = NULL;
return -EINVAL;
}
int pohmelfs_crypto_process_input_data(struct pohmelfs_crypto_engine *e, u64 cmd_iv,
void *data, struct page *page, unsigned int size)
{
int err;
struct scatterlist sg;
if (!e->cipher && !e->hash)
return 0;
dprintk("%s: eng: %p, iv: %llx, data: %p, page: %p/%lu, size: %u.\n",
__func__, e, cmd_iv, data, page, (page) ? page->index : 0, size);
if (data) {
sg_init_one(&sg, data, size);
} else {
sg_init_table(&sg, 1);
sg_set_page(&sg, page, size, 0);
}
if (e->cipher) {
struct ablkcipher_request *req = e->data + crypto_hash_digestsize(e->hash);
u8 iv[32];
memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
memcpy(iv, &cmd_iv, sizeof(cmd_iv));
ablkcipher_request_set_tfm(req, e->cipher);
err = pohmelfs_crypto_process(req, &sg, &sg, iv, 0, e->timeout);
if (err)
goto err_out_exit;
}
if (e->hash) {
struct hash_desc desc;
void *dst = e->data + e->size/2;
desc.tfm = e->hash;
desc.flags = 0;
err = crypto_hash_init(&desc);
if (err)
goto err_out_exit;
err = crypto_hash_update(&desc, &sg, size);
if (err)
goto err_out_exit;
err = crypto_hash_final(&desc, dst);
if (err)
goto err_out_exit;
err = !!memcmp(dst, e->data, crypto_hash_digestsize(e->hash));
if (err) {
#ifdef CONFIG_POHMELFS_DEBUG
unsigned int i;
unsigned char *recv = e->data, *calc = dst;
dprintk("%s: eng: %p, hash: %p, cipher: %p: iv : %llx, hash mismatch (recv/calc): ",
__func__, e, e->hash, e->cipher, cmd_iv);
for (i = 0; i < crypto_hash_digestsize(e->hash); ++i) {
#if 0
dprintka("%02x ", recv[i]);
if (recv[i] != calc[i]) {
dprintka("| calc byte: %02x.\n", calc[i]);
break;
}
#else
dprintka("%02x/%02x ", recv[i], calc[i]);
#endif
}
dprintk("\n");
#endif
goto err_out_exit;
} else {
dprintk("%s: eng: %p, hash: %p, cipher: %p: hashes matched.\n",
__func__, e, e->hash, e->cipher);
}
}
dprintk("%s: eng: %p, size: %u, hash: %p, cipher: %p: completed.\n",
__func__, e, e->size, e->hash, e->cipher);
return 0;
err_out_exit:
dprintk("%s: eng: %p, hash: %p, cipher: %p: err: %d.\n",
__func__, e, e->hash, e->cipher, err);
return err;
}
static int tf_self_test_integrity(const char *alg_name, struct module *mod)
{
unsigned char expected[32];
unsigned char actual[32];
struct scatterlist *sg = NULL;
struct hash_desc desc = {NULL, 0};
size_t digest_length;
unsigned char *const key = tf_integrity_hmac_sha256_key;
size_t const key_length = sizeof(tf_integrity_hmac_sha256_key);
int error;
if (mod->raw_binary_ptr == NULL)
return -ENXIO;
if (tf_integrity_hmac_sha256_expected_value == NULL)
return -ENOENT;
INFO("expected=%s", tf_integrity_hmac_sha256_expected_value);
error = scan_hex(expected, sizeof(expected),
tf_integrity_hmac_sha256_expected_value);
if (error < 0) {
pr_err("tf_driver: Badly formatted hmac_sha256 parameter "
"(should be a hex string)\n");
return -EIO;
};
desc.tfm = crypto_alloc_hash(alg_name, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(desc.tfm)) {
ERROR("crypto_alloc_hash(%s) failed", alg_name);
error = (desc.tfm == NULL ? -ENOMEM : (int)desc.tfm);
goto abort;
}
digest_length = crypto_hash_digestsize(desc.tfm);
INFO("alg_name=%s driver_name=%s digest_length=%u",
alg_name,
crypto_tfm_alg_driver_name(crypto_hash_tfm(desc.tfm)),
digest_length);
error = crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, key, key_length);
if (error) {
ERROR("crypto_hash_setkey(%s) failed: %d",
alg_name, error);
goto abort;
}
sg = vmalloc_to_sg(mod->raw_binary_ptr, mod->raw_binary_size);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(sg)) {
ERROR("vmalloc_to_sg(%lu) failed: %d",
mod->raw_binary_size, (int)sg);
error = (sg == NULL ? -ENOMEM : (int)sg);
goto abort;
}
error = crypto_hash_digest(&desc, sg, mod->raw_binary_size, actual);
if (error) {
ERROR("crypto_hash_digest(%s) failed: %d",
alg_name, error);
goto abort;
}
kfree(sg);
crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm);
#ifdef CONFIG_TF_DRIVER_FAULT_INJECTION
if (tf_fault_injection_mask & TF_CRYPTO_ALG_INTEGRITY) {
pr_warning("TF: injecting fault in integrity check!\n");
actual[0] = 0xff;
actual[1] ^= 0xff;
}
#endif
TF_TRACE_ARRAY(expected, digest_length);
TF_TRACE_ARRAY(actual, digest_length);
if (memcmp(expected, actual, digest_length)) {
ERROR("wrong %s digest value", alg_name);
error = -EINVAL;
} else {
INFO("%s: digest successful", alg_name);
error = 0;
}
return error;
abort:
if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(sg))
kfree(sg);
if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(desc.tfm))
crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm);
return error == -ENOMEM ? error : -EIO;
}
static int tf_self_test_digest(const char *alg_name,
const struct digest_test_vector *tv)
{
unsigned char digest[64];
unsigned char input[256];
struct scatterlist sg;
struct hash_desc desc = {NULL, 0};
int error;
size_t digest_length;
desc.tfm = crypto_alloc_hash(alg_name, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(desc.tfm)) {
ERROR("crypto_alloc_hash(%s) failed", alg_name);
error = (desc.tfm == NULL ? -ENOMEM : (int)desc.tfm);
goto abort;
}
digest_length = crypto_hash_digestsize(desc.tfm);
INFO("alg_name=%s driver_name=%s digest_length=%u",
alg_name,
crypto_tfm_alg_driver_name(crypto_hash_tfm(desc.tfm)),
digest_length);
if (digest_length > sizeof(digest)) {
ERROR("digest length too large (%zu > %zu)",
digest_length, sizeof(digest));
error = -ENOMEM;
goto abort;
}
if (tv->key != NULL) {
error = crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, tv->key, tv->key_length);
if (error) {
ERROR("crypto_hash_setkey(%s) failed: %d",
alg_name, error);
goto abort;
}
TF_TRACE_ARRAY(tv->key, tv->key_length);
}
error = crypto_hash_init(&desc);
if (error) {
ERROR("crypto_hash_init(%s) failed: %d", alg_name, error);
goto abort;
}
/* The test vector data is in vmalloc'ed memory since it's a module
global. Copy it to the stack, since the crypto API doesn't support
vmalloc'ed memory. */
if (tv->length > sizeof(input)) {
ERROR("data too large (%zu > %zu)",
tv->length, sizeof(input));
error = -ENOMEM;
goto abort;
}
memcpy(input, tv->text, tv->length);
INFO("sg_init_one(%p, %p, %u)", &sg, input, tv->length);
sg_init_one(&sg, input, tv->length);
TF_TRACE_ARRAY(input, tv->length);
error = crypto_hash_update(&desc, &sg, tv->length);
if (error) {
ERROR("crypto_hash_update(%s) failed: %d",
alg_name, error);
goto abort;
}
error = crypto_hash_final(&desc, digest);
if (error) {
ERROR("crypto_hash_final(%s) failed: %d", alg_name, error);
goto abort;
}
crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm);
desc.tfm = NULL;
if (memcmp(digest, tv->digest, digest_length)) {
TF_TRACE_ARRAY(digest, digest_length);
ERROR("wrong %s digest value", alg_name);
pr_err("[SMC Driver] error: SMC Driver POST FAILURE (%s)\n",
alg_name);
error = -EINVAL;
} else {
INFO("%s: digest successful", alg_name);
error = 0;
}
return error;
abort:
if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(desc.tfm))
crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm);
pr_err("[SMC Driver] error: SMC Driver POST FAILURE (%s)\n", alg_name);
return error;
}
static int esp6_init_state(struct xfrm_state *x)
{
struct esp_data *esp = NULL;
struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
/* null auth and encryption can have zero length keys */
if (x->aalg) {
if (x->aalg->alg_key_len > 512)
goto error;
}
if (x->ealg == NULL)
goto error;
if (x->encap)
goto error;
esp = kzalloc(sizeof(*esp), GFP_KERNEL);
if (esp == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
if (x->aalg) {
struct xfrm_algo_desc *aalg_desc;
struct crypto_hash *hash;
esp->auth.key = x->aalg->alg_key;
esp->auth.key_len = (x->aalg->alg_key_len+7)/8;
hash = crypto_alloc_hash(x->aalg->alg_name, 0,
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(hash))
goto error;
esp->auth.tfm = hash;
if (crypto_hash_setkey(hash, esp->auth.key, esp->auth.key_len))
goto error;
aalg_desc = xfrm_aalg_get_byname(x->aalg->alg_name, 0);
BUG_ON(!aalg_desc);
if (aalg_desc->uinfo.auth.icv_fullbits/8 !=
crypto_hash_digestsize(hash)) {
NETDEBUG(KERN_INFO "ESP: %s digestsize %u != %hu\n",
x->aalg->alg_name,
crypto_hash_digestsize(hash),
aalg_desc->uinfo.auth.icv_fullbits/8);
goto error;
}
esp->auth.icv_full_len = aalg_desc->uinfo.auth.icv_fullbits/8;
esp->auth.icv_trunc_len = aalg_desc->uinfo.auth.icv_truncbits/8;
esp->auth.work_icv = kmalloc(esp->auth.icv_full_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!esp->auth.work_icv)
goto error;
}
esp->conf.key = x->ealg->alg_key;
esp->conf.key_len = (x->ealg->alg_key_len+7)/8;
tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(x->ealg->alg_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(tfm))
goto error;
esp->conf.tfm = tfm;
esp->conf.ivlen = crypto_blkcipher_ivsize(tfm);
esp->conf.padlen = 0;
if (esp->conf.ivlen) {
esp->conf.ivec = kmalloc(esp->conf.ivlen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(esp->conf.ivec == NULL))
goto error;
esp->conf.ivinitted = 0;
}
if (crypto_blkcipher_setkey(tfm, esp->conf.key, esp->conf.key_len))
goto error;
x->props.header_len = sizeof(struct ipv6_esp_hdr) + esp->conf.ivlen;
if (x->props.mode == XFRM_MODE_TUNNEL)
x->props.header_len += sizeof(struct ipv6hdr);
x->data = esp;
return 0;
error:
x->data = esp;
esp6_destroy(x);
x->data = NULL;
return -EINVAL;
}
static int ah_init_state(struct xfrm_state *x)
{
struct ah_data *ahp = NULL;
struct xfrm_algo_desc *aalg_desc;
struct crypto_hash *tfm;
if (!x->aalg)
goto error;
if (x->encap)
goto error;
ahp = kzalloc(sizeof(*ahp), GFP_KERNEL);
if (ahp == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
tfm = crypto_alloc_hash(x->aalg->alg_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(tfm))
goto error;
ahp->tfm = tfm;
if (crypto_hash_setkey(tfm, x->aalg->alg_key,
(x->aalg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8))
goto error;
/*
* Lookup the algorithm description maintained by xfrm_algo,
* verify crypto transform properties, and store information
* we need for AH processing. This lookup cannot fail here
* after a successful crypto_alloc_hash().
*/
aalg_desc = xfrm_aalg_get_byname(x->aalg->alg_name, 0);
BUG_ON(!aalg_desc);
if (aalg_desc->uinfo.auth.icv_fullbits/8 !=
crypto_hash_digestsize(tfm)) {
printk(KERN_INFO "AH: %s digestsize %u != %hu\n",
x->aalg->alg_name, crypto_hash_digestsize(tfm),
aalg_desc->uinfo.auth.icv_fullbits/8);
goto error;
}
ahp->icv_full_len = aalg_desc->uinfo.auth.icv_fullbits/8;
ahp->icv_trunc_len = aalg_desc->uinfo.auth.icv_truncbits/8;
BUG_ON(ahp->icv_trunc_len > MAX_AH_AUTH_LEN);
ahp->work_icv = kmalloc(ahp->icv_full_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ahp->work_icv)
goto error;
x->props.header_len = XFRM_ALIGN8(sizeof(struct ip_auth_hdr) +
ahp->icv_trunc_len);
if (x->props.mode == XFRM_MODE_TUNNEL)
x->props.header_len += sizeof(struct iphdr);
x->data = ahp;
return 0;
error:
if (ahp) {
kfree(ahp->work_icv);
crypto_free_hash(ahp->tfm);
kfree(ahp);
}
return -EINVAL;
}
static int ah_init_state(struct xfrm_state *x)
{
struct ah_data *ahp = NULL;
struct xfrm_algo_desc *aalg_desc;
struct crypto_hash *tfm;
if (!x->aalg)
goto error;
if (x->encap)
goto error;
ahp = kzalloc(sizeof(*ahp), GFP_KERNEL);
if (ahp == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
tfm = crypto_alloc_hash(x->aalg->alg_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(tfm))
goto error;
ahp->tfm = tfm;
if (crypto_hash_setkey(tfm, x->aalg->alg_key,
(x->aalg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8))
goto error;
aalg_desc = xfrm_aalg_get_byname(x->aalg->alg_name, 0);
BUG_ON(!aalg_desc);
if (aalg_desc->uinfo.auth.icv_fullbits/8 !=
crypto_hash_digestsize(tfm)) {
printk(KERN_INFO "AH: %s digestsize %u != %hu\n",
x->aalg->alg_name, crypto_hash_digestsize(tfm),
aalg_desc->uinfo.auth.icv_fullbits/8);
goto error;
}
ahp->icv_full_len = aalg_desc->uinfo.auth.icv_fullbits/8;
ahp->icv_trunc_len = aalg_desc->uinfo.auth.icv_truncbits/8;
BUG_ON(ahp->icv_trunc_len > MAX_AH_AUTH_LEN);
ahp->work_icv = kmalloc(ahp->icv_full_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ahp->work_icv)
goto error;
x->props.header_len = XFRM_ALIGN8(sizeof(struct ip_auth_hdr) +
ahp->icv_trunc_len);
if (x->props.mode == XFRM_MODE_TUNNEL)
x->props.header_len += sizeof(struct iphdr);
x->data = ahp;
return 0;
error:
if (ahp) {
kfree(ahp->work_icv);
crypto_free_hash(ahp->tfm);
kfree(ahp);
}
return -EINVAL;
}
static int cs598_kernel_thread_fn(void *unused)
{
unsigned long curr_pfn;
struct page *page;
void *data, *pagebuf;
struct crypto_hash *tfm;
struct scatterlist sg;
struct hash_desc desc; //Hopefully this can go on the stack
int err;
/* Declare a waitqueue */
DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait,current);
/* Add wait queue to the head */
add_wait_queue(&cs598_waitqueue,&wait);
while (1) {
/* Set current state to interruptible */
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
/* give up the control */
schedule();
/* coming back to running state, check if it needs to stop */
if (kthread_should_stop()) {
printk(KERN_INFO "cs598: thread needs to stop\n");
break;
}
printk(KERN_INFO "cs598: hash invoked by procfs\n");
/* Loop over all of phys memory */
printk(KERN_INFO "cs598: number of physical pages %lu\n", num_physpages);
printk(KERN_INFO "cs598: number of pages that will be hashed %lu\n", NPAGES);
for(curr_pfn=1;curr_pfn<NPAGES;curr_pfn++) {
page = pfn_to_page(curr_pfn);
data = kmap(page);
if(!data) {
printk(KERN_ALERT "cs598: couldn't map page with pfn %lu\n", curr_pfn);
break;
}
tfm = crypto_alloc_hash(HASH_ALG, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if(tfm == NULL) {
printk(KERN_ALERT "cs598: got NULL tfm \n");
kunmap(data);
break;
}
desc.tfm = tfm;
desc.flags = 0;
if(curr_pfn == 1)
printk(KERN_INFO "cs598: hash size %d\n", crypto_hash_digestsize(tfm));
if(crypto_hash_digestsize(tfm) > HASH_SIZE) {
printk(KERN_ALERT "cs598: hash alg report size of %d, but HASH_SIZE = %d\n", crypto_hash_digestsize(tfm),HASH_SIZE);
goto done_error;
}
//pagebuf = kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_USER);
//memcpy(pagebuf, data, PAGE_SIZE);
sg_init_one(&sg, data, PAGE_SIZE);
crypto_hash_init(&desc);
err = crypto_hash_update(&desc, &sg, PAGE_SIZE);
if(err) {
printk(KERN_ALERT "cs598: crypto_shash_update returned: %d\n",
err);
goto done_error;
}
err = crypto_hash_final(&desc, vmalloc_buffer+(curr_pfn*HASH_SIZE));
if(err) {
printk(KERN_ALERT "cs598: crypto_shash_digest returned: %d\n",
err);
goto done_error;
}
kunmap(data);
crypto_free_hash(tfm);
//Don't bring everything to an absolute halt
if(curr_pfn % 10000)
schedule();
}
hash_done_flag = 1;
printk(KERN_INFO "cs598: Finished computing hashes\n");
}
/* exiting thread, set it to running state */
set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
/* remove the waitqueue */
remove_wait_queue(&cs598_waitqueue, &wait);
printk(KERN_INFO "cs598: thread killed\n");
return 0;
done_error:
kunmap(data);
crypto_free_hash(tfm);
printk(KERN_INFO "cs598: aborted computing hashes\n");
set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
remove_wait_queue(&cs598_waitqueue, &wait);
return 0;
}
int calculate_integrity(struct file *filp,
char *ibuf,
int ilen)
{
int r = -1 , ret = -1;
ssize_t vfs_read_retval = 0;
loff_t file_offset = 0;
mm_segment_t oldfs = get_fs();
char *buf = kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
struct scatterlist sg;
struct crypto_hash *tfm = NULL;
struct hash_desc desc;
char *algo = kmalloc(1024, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!algo) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
__initialize_with_null(algo, 1024);
#ifdef EXTRA_CREDIT
ret = vfs_getxattr(filp->f_path.dentry,
INT_TYPE_XATTR,
algo,
1024);
if (ret <= 0)
__initialize_with_null(algo, 1024);
#endif
if (*algo == '\0')
strcpy(algo, DEFAULT_ALGO);
if (!buf)
goto out;
__initialize_with_null(ibuf, ilen);
if (!filp->f_op->read) {
r = -2;
goto out;
}
filp->f_pos = 0;
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
tfm = crypto_alloc_hash(algo, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
r = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
desc.tfm = tfm;
desc.flags = 0;
if (crypto_hash_digestsize(tfm) > ilen) {
r = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
crypto_hash_setkey(tfm, key, strlen(key));
ret = crypto_hash_init(&desc);
if (ret) {
r = ret;
goto out;
}
sg_init_table(&sg, 1);
file_offset = 0;
do {
vfs_read_retval = vfs_read(filp, buf, PAGE_SIZE, &file_offset);
if (vfs_read_retval < 0) {
ret = vfs_read_retval;
goto out;
}
sg_set_buf(&sg, (u8 *)buf, vfs_read_retval);
ret = crypto_hash_update(&desc, &sg, sg.length);
if (ret) {
r = ret;
goto out;
}
if (vfs_read_retval < ksize(buf))
break;
} while (1);
ret = crypto_hash_final(&desc, ibuf);
if (ret) {
r = ret;
goto out;
}
out:
kfree(buf);
kfree(algo);
if (!IS_ERR(tfm))
crypto_free_hash(tfm);
set_fs(oldfs);
return ret;
}
u32
spkm3_make_token(struct spkm3_ctx *ctx,
struct xdr_buf * text, struct xdr_netobj * token,
int toktype)
{
s32 checksum_type;
char tokhdrbuf[25];
char cksumdata[16];
struct xdr_netobj md5cksum = {.len = 0, .data = cksumdata};
struct xdr_netobj mic_hdr = {.len = 0, .data = tokhdrbuf};
int tokenlen = 0;
unsigned char *ptr;
s32 now;
int ctxelen = 0, ctxzbit = 0;
int md5elen = 0, md5zbit = 0;
now = jiffies;
if (ctx->ctx_id.len != 16) {
dprintk("RPC: spkm3_make_token BAD ctx_id.len %d\n",
ctx->ctx_id.len);
goto out_err;
}
if (!g_OID_equal(&ctx->intg_alg, &hmac_md5_oid)) {
dprintk("RPC: gss_spkm3_seal: unsupported I-ALG "
"algorithm. only support hmac-md5 I-ALG.\n");
goto out_err;
} else
checksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5;
if (!g_OID_equal(&ctx->conf_alg, &cast5_cbc_oid)) {
dprintk("RPC: gss_spkm3_seal: unsupported C-ALG "
"algorithm\n");
goto out_err;
}
if (toktype == SPKM_MIC_TOK) {
/* Calculate checksum over the mic-header */
asn1_bitstring_len(&ctx->ctx_id, &ctxelen, &ctxzbit);
spkm3_mic_header(&mic_hdr.data, &mic_hdr.len, ctx->ctx_id.data,
ctxelen, ctxzbit);
if (make_spkm3_checksum(checksum_type, &ctx->derived_integ_key,
(char *)mic_hdr.data, mic_hdr.len,
text, 0, &md5cksum))
goto out_err;
asn1_bitstring_len(&md5cksum, &md5elen, &md5zbit);
tokenlen = 10 + ctxelen + 1 + md5elen + 1;
/* Create token header using generic routines */
token->len = g_token_size(&ctx->mech_used, tokenlen);
ptr = token->data;
g_make_token_header(&ctx->mech_used, tokenlen, &ptr);
spkm3_make_mic_token(&ptr, tokenlen, &mic_hdr, &md5cksum, md5elen, md5zbit);
} else if (toktype == SPKM_WRAP_TOK) { /* Not Supported */
dprintk("RPC: gss_spkm3_seal: SPKM_WRAP_TOK "
"not supported\n");
goto out_err;
}
/* XXX need to implement sequence numbers, and ctx->expired */
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
out_err:
token->data = NULL;
token->len = 0;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
static int
spkm3_checksummer(struct scatterlist *sg, void *data)
{
struct hash_desc *desc = data;
return crypto_hash_update(desc, sg, sg->length);
}
/* checksum the plaintext data and hdrlen bytes of the token header */
s32
make_spkm3_checksum(s32 cksumtype, struct xdr_netobj *key, char *header,
unsigned int hdrlen, struct xdr_buf *body,
unsigned int body_offset, struct xdr_netobj *cksum)
{
char *cksumname;
struct hash_desc desc; /* XXX add to ctx? */
struct scatterlist sg[1];
int err;
switch (cksumtype) {
case CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5:
cksumname = "hmac(md5)";
break;
default:
dprintk("RPC: spkm3_make_checksum:"
" unsupported checksum %d", cksumtype);
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
if (key->data == NULL || key->len <= 0) return GSS_S_FAILURE;
desc.tfm = crypto_alloc_hash(cksumname, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(desc.tfm))
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
cksum->len = crypto_hash_digestsize(desc.tfm);
desc.flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
err = crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, key->data, key->len);
if (err)
goto out;
err = crypto_hash_init(&desc);
if (err)
goto out;
sg_set_buf(sg, header, hdrlen);
crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, sg->length);
xdr_process_buf(body, body_offset, body->len - body_offset,
spkm3_checksummer, &desc);
crypto_hash_final(&desc, cksum->data);
out:
crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm);
return err ? GSS_S_FAILURE : 0;
}
