static int eap_sim_process_notification_reauth(struct eap_sim_data *data,
struct eap_hdr *req,
size_t reqDataLen,
struct eap_sim_attrs *attr)
{
struct eap_sim_attrs eattr;
if (attr->encr_data == NULL || attr->iv == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: Notification message after "
"reauth did not include encrypted data");
return -1;
}
if (eap_sim_parse_encr(data->k_encr, attr->encr_data,
attr->encr_data_len, attr->iv, &eattr, 0)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: Failed to parse encrypted "
"data from notification message");
return -1;
}
if (eattr.counter != data->counter) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: Counter in notification "
"message does not match with counter in reauth "
"message");
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static int eap_aka_process_notification_reauth(struct eap_aka_data *data,
struct eap_sim_attrs *attr)
{
struct eap_sim_attrs eattr;
u8 *decrypted;
if (attr->encr_data == NULL || attr->iv == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Notification message after "
"reauth did not include encrypted data");
return -1;
}
decrypted = eap_sim_parse_encr(data->k_encr, attr->encr_data,
attr->encr_data_len, attr->iv, &eattr,
0);
if (decrypted == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Failed to parse encrypted "
"data from notification message");
return -1;
}
if (eattr.counter < 0 || (size_t) eattr.counter != data->counter) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Counter in notification "
"message does not match with counter in reauth "
"message");
os_free(decrypted);
return -1;
}
os_free(decrypted);
return 0;
}
static u8 * eap_sim_process_reauthentication(struct eap_sm *sm,
struct eap_sim_data *data,
struct eap_hdr *req,
size_t reqDataLen,
size_t *respDataLen,
struct eap_sim_attrs *attr)
{
struct eap_sim_attrs eattr;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: subtype Reauthentication");
if (data->reauth_id == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: Server is trying "
"reauthentication, but no reauth_id available");
return eap_sim_client_error(sm, data, req, respDataLen,
EAP_SIM_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
}
data->reauth = 1;
if (eap_sim_verify_mac(data->k_aut, (u8 *) req, reqDataLen,
attr->mac, (u8 *) "", 0)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: Reauthentication "
"did not have valid AT_MAC");
return eap_sim_client_error(sm, data, req, respDataLen,
EAP_SIM_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
}
if (attr->encr_data == NULL || attr->iv == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: Reauthentication "
"message did not include encrypted data");
return eap_sim_client_error(sm, data, req, respDataLen,
EAP_SIM_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
}
if (eap_sim_parse_encr(data->k_encr, attr->encr_data,
attr->encr_data_len, attr->iv, &eattr, 0)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: Failed to parse encrypted "
"data from reauthentication message");
return eap_sim_client_error(sm, data, req, respDataLen,
EAP_SIM_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
}
if (eattr.nonce_s == NULL || eattr.counter < 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-SIM: (encr) No%s%s in reauth packet",
!eattr.nonce_s ? " AT_NONCE_S" : "",
eattr.counter < 0 ? " AT_COUNTER" : "");
return eap_sim_client_error(sm, data, req, respDataLen,
EAP_SIM_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
}
if (eattr.counter <= data->counter) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-SIM: (encr) Invalid counter "
"(%d <= %d)", eattr.counter, data->counter);
data->counter_too_small = eattr.counter;
/* Reply using Re-auth w/ AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL. The current
* reauth_id must not be used to start a new reauthentication.
* However, since it was used in the last EAP-Response-Identity
* packet, it has to saved for the following fullauth to be
* used in MK derivation. */
free(data->last_eap_identity);
data->last_eap_identity = data->reauth_id;
data->last_eap_identity_len = data->reauth_id_len;
data->reauth_id = NULL;
data->reauth_id_len = 0;
return eap_sim_response_reauth(sm, data, req, respDataLen, 1);
}
data->counter = eattr.counter;
memcpy(data->nonce_s, eattr.nonce_s, EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN);
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: (encr) AT_NONCE_S",
data->nonce_s, EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN);
eap_sim_derive_keys_reauth(data->counter,
data->reauth_id, data->reauth_id_len,
data->nonce_s, data->mk, data->msk);
eap_sim_clear_identities(data, CLEAR_REAUTH_ID | CLEAR_EAP_ID);
eap_sim_learn_ids(data, &eattr);
if (data->state != FAILURE)
data->state = SUCCESS;
data->num_id_req = 0;
data->num_notification = 0;
if (data->counter > EAP_SIM_MAX_FAST_REAUTHS) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: Maximum number of "
"fast reauths performed - force fullauth");
eap_sim_clear_identities(data, CLEAR_REAUTH_ID | CLEAR_EAP_ID);
}
return eap_sim_response_reauth(sm, data, req, respDataLen, 0);
}
static u8 * eap_sim_process_challenge(struct eap_sm *sm,
struct eap_sim_data *data,
struct eap_hdr *req, size_t reqDataLen,
size_t *respDataLen,
struct eap_sim_attrs *attr)
{
struct wpa_ssid *config = eap_get_config(sm);
u8 *identity;
size_t identity_len;
struct eap_sim_attrs eattr;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: subtype Challenge");
data->reauth = 0;
if (!attr->mac || !attr->rand) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: Challenge message "
"did not include%s%s",
!attr->mac ? " AT_MAC" : "",
!attr->rand ? " AT_RAND" : "");
return eap_sim_client_error(sm, data, req, respDataLen,
EAP_SIM_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
}
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: %lu challenges",
(unsigned long) attr->num_chal);
if (attr->num_chal < data->min_num_chal) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-SIM: Insufficient number of "
"challenges (%lu)", (unsigned long) attr->num_chal);
return eap_sim_client_error(sm, data, req, respDataLen,
EAP_SIM_INSUFFICIENT_NUM_OF_CHAL);
}
if (attr->num_chal > 3) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-SIM: Too many challenges "
"(%lu)", (unsigned long) attr->num_chal);
return eap_sim_client_error(sm, data, req, respDataLen,
EAP_SIM_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
}
/* Verify that RANDs are different */
if (memcmp(attr->rand, attr->rand + GSM_RAND_LEN,
GSM_RAND_LEN) == 0 ||
(attr->num_chal > 2 &&
(memcmp(attr->rand, attr->rand + 2 * GSM_RAND_LEN,
GSM_RAND_LEN) == 0 ||
memcmp(attr->rand + GSM_RAND_LEN,
attr->rand + 2 * GSM_RAND_LEN,
GSM_RAND_LEN) == 0))) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-SIM: Same RAND used multiple times");
return eap_sim_client_error(sm, data, req, respDataLen,
EAP_SIM_RAND_NOT_FRESH);
}
memcpy(data->rand, attr->rand, attr->num_chal * GSM_RAND_LEN);
data->num_chal = attr->num_chal;
if (eap_sim_gsm_auth(sm, data)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: GSM authentication failed");
return eap_sim_client_error(sm, data, req, respDataLen,
EAP_SIM_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
}
if (data->last_eap_identity) {
identity = data->last_eap_identity;
identity_len = data->last_eap_identity_len;
} else if (data->pseudonym) {
identity = data->pseudonym;
identity_len = data->pseudonym_len;
} else {
identity = config->identity;
identity_len = config->identity_len;
}
wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: Selected identity for MK "
"derivation", identity, identity_len);
eap_sim_derive_mk(data, identity, identity_len);
eap_sim_derive_keys(data->mk, data->k_encr, data->k_aut, data->msk);
if (eap_sim_verify_mac(data->k_aut, (u8 *) req, reqDataLen, attr->mac,
data->nonce_mt, EAP_SIM_NONCE_MT_LEN)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: Challenge message "
"used invalid AT_MAC");
return eap_sim_client_error(sm, data, req, respDataLen,
EAP_SIM_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
}
/* Old reauthentication and pseudonym identities must not be used
* anymore. In other words, if no new identities are received, full
* authentication will be used on next reauthentication. */
eap_sim_clear_identities(data, CLEAR_PSEUDONYM | CLEAR_REAUTH_ID |
CLEAR_EAP_ID);
if (attr->encr_data) {
if (eap_sim_parse_encr(data->k_encr, attr->encr_data,
attr->encr_data_len, attr->iv, &eattr,
0)) {
return eap_sim_client_error(
sm, data, req, respDataLen,
EAP_SIM_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
}
eap_sim_learn_ids(data, &eattr);
}
if (data->state != FAILURE)
data->state = SUCCESS;
data->num_id_req = 0;
data->num_notification = 0;
/* draft-haverinen-pppext-eap-sim-13.txt specifies that counter
* is initialized to one after fullauth, but initializing it to
* zero makes it easier to implement reauth verification. */
data->counter = 0;
return eap_sim_response_challenge(sm, data, req, respDataLen);
}
static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_process_reauthentication(
struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_aka_data *data, u8 id,
const struct wpabuf *reqData, struct eap_sim_attrs *attr)
{
struct eap_sim_attrs eattr;
u8 *decrypted;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: subtype Reauthentication");
if (attr->checkcode &&
eap_aka_verify_checkcode(data, attr->checkcode,
attr->checkcode_len)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Invalid AT_CHECKCODE in the "
"message");
return eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
}
if (data->reauth_id == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Server is trying "
"reauthentication, but no reauth_id available");
return eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
}
data->reauth = 1;
if (eap_aka_verify_mac(data, reqData, attr->mac, (u8 *) "", 0)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Reauthentication "
"did not have valid AT_MAC");
return eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
}
if (attr->encr_data == NULL || attr->iv == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Reauthentication "
"message did not include encrypted data");
return eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
}
decrypted = eap_sim_parse_encr(data->k_encr, attr->encr_data,
attr->encr_data_len, attr->iv, &eattr,
0);
if (decrypted == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Failed to parse encrypted "
"data from reauthentication message");
return eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
}
if (eattr.nonce_s == NULL || eattr.counter < 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: (encr) No%s%s in reauth packet",
!eattr.nonce_s ? " AT_NONCE_S" : "",
eattr.counter < 0 ? " AT_COUNTER" : "");
os_free(decrypted);
return eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
}
if (eattr.counter < 0 || (size_t) eattr.counter <= data->counter) {
struct wpabuf *res;
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: (encr) Invalid counter "
"(%d <= %d)", eattr.counter, data->counter);
data->counter_too_small = eattr.counter;
/* Reply using Re-auth w/ AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL. The current
* reauth_id must not be used to start a new reauthentication.
* However, since it was used in the last EAP-Response-Identity
* packet, it has to saved for the following fullauth to be
* used in MK derivation. */
os_free(data->last_eap_identity);
data->last_eap_identity = data->reauth_id;
data->last_eap_identity_len = data->reauth_id_len;
data->reauth_id = NULL;
data->reauth_id_len = 0;
res = eap_aka_response_reauth(data, id, 1, eattr.nonce_s);
os_free(decrypted);
return res;
}
data->counter = eattr.counter;
os_memcpy(data->nonce_s, eattr.nonce_s, EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN);
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: (encr) AT_NONCE_S",
data->nonce_s, EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN);
if (data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME) {
eap_aka_prime_derive_keys_reauth(data->k_re, data->counter,
data->reauth_id,
data->reauth_id_len,
data->nonce_s,
data->msk, data->emsk);
} else {
eap_sim_derive_keys_reauth(data->counter, data->reauth_id,
data->reauth_id_len,
data->nonce_s, data->mk,
data->msk, data->emsk);
}
eap_aka_clear_identities(data, CLEAR_REAUTH_ID | CLEAR_EAP_ID);
eap_aka_learn_ids(sm, data, &eattr);
if (data->result_ind && attr->result_ind)
data->use_result_ind = 1;
if (data->state != FAILURE && data->state != RESULT_FAILURE) {
eap_aka_state(data, data->use_result_ind ?
RESULT_SUCCESS : SUCCESS);
}
data->num_id_req = 0;
data->num_notification = 0;
if (data->counter > EAP_AKA_MAX_FAST_REAUTHS) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Maximum number of "
"fast reauths performed - force fullauth");
eap_aka_clear_identities(data, CLEAR_REAUTH_ID | CLEAR_EAP_ID);
}
os_free(decrypted);
return eap_aka_response_reauth(data, id, 0, data->nonce_s);
}
static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_process_challenge(struct eap_sm *sm,
struct eap_aka_data *data,
u8 id,
const struct wpabuf *reqData,
struct eap_sim_attrs *attr)
{
const u8 *identity;
size_t identity_len;
int res;
struct eap_sim_attrs eattr;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: subtype Challenge");
if (attr->checkcode &&
eap_aka_verify_checkcode(data, attr->checkcode,
attr->checkcode_len)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Invalid AT_CHECKCODE in the "
"message");
return eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
}
#ifdef EAP_AKA_PRIME
if (data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME) {
if (!attr->kdf_input || attr->kdf_input_len == 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA': Challenge message "
"did not include non-empty AT_KDF_INPUT");
/* Fail authentication as if AUTN had been incorrect */
return eap_aka_authentication_reject(data, id);
}
os_free(data->network_name);
data->network_name = os_malloc(attr->kdf_input_len);
if (data->network_name == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA': No memory for "
"storing Network Name");
return eap_aka_authentication_reject(data, id);
}
os_memcpy(data->network_name, attr->kdf_input,
attr->kdf_input_len);
data->network_name_len = attr->kdf_input_len;
wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA': Network Name "
"(AT_KDF_INPUT)",
data->network_name, data->network_name_len);
/* TODO: check Network Name per 3GPP.33.402 */
if (!eap_aka_prime_kdf_valid(data, attr))
return eap_aka_authentication_reject(data, id);
if (attr->kdf[0] != EAP_AKA_PRIME_KDF)
return eap_aka_prime_kdf_neg(data, id, attr);
data->kdf = EAP_AKA_PRIME_KDF;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA': KDF %d selected", data->kdf);
}
if (data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA && attr->bidding) {
u16 flags = WPA_GET_BE16(attr->bidding);
if ((flags & EAP_AKA_BIDDING_FLAG_D) &&
eap_allowed_method(sm, EAP_VENDOR_IETF,
EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Bidding down from "
"AKA' to AKA detected");
/* Fail authentication as if AUTN had been incorrect */
return eap_aka_authentication_reject(data, id);
}
}
#endif /* EAP_AKA_PRIME */
data->reauth = 0;
if (!attr->mac || !attr->rand || !attr->autn) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Challenge message "
"did not include%s%s%s",
!attr->mac ? " AT_MAC" : "",
!attr->rand ? " AT_RAND" : "",
!attr->autn ? " AT_AUTN" : "");
return eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
}
os_memcpy(data->rand, attr->rand, EAP_AKA_RAND_LEN);
os_memcpy(data->autn, attr->autn, EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN);
res = eap_aka_umts_auth(sm, data);
if(res != 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "EAP-AKA: No more data send to APDU server");
//SCardDisconnect(0,0);
}
if (res == -1) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: UMTS authentication "
"failed (AUTN)");
return eap_aka_authentication_reject(data, id);
} else if (res == -2) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: UMTS authentication "
"failed (AUTN seq# -> AUTS)");
return eap_aka_synchronization_failure(data, id);
} else if (res) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: UMTS authentication failed");
return eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
}
#ifdef EAP_AKA_PRIME
if (data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME) {
/* Note: AUTN = (SQN ^ AK) || AMF || MAC which gives us the
* needed 6-octet SQN ^ AK for CK',IK' derivation */
u16 amf = WPA_GET_BE16(data->autn + 6);
if (!(amf & 0x8000)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA': AMF separation bit "
"not set (AMF=0x%4x)", amf);
return eap_aka_authentication_reject(data, id);
}
eap_aka_prime_derive_ck_ik_prime(data->ck, data->ik,
data->autn,
data->network_name,
data->network_name_len);
}
#endif /* EAP_AKA_PRIME */
if (data->last_eap_identity) {
identity = data->last_eap_identity;
identity_len = data->last_eap_identity_len;
} else if (data->pseudonym) {
identity = data->pseudonym;
identity_len = data->pseudonym_len;
} else
identity = eap_get_config_identity(sm, &identity_len);
wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Selected identity for MK "
"derivation", identity, identity_len);
if (data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME) {
eap_aka_prime_derive_keys(identity, identity_len, data->ik,
data->ck, data->k_encr, data->k_aut,
data->k_re, data->msk, data->emsk);
} else {
eap_aka_derive_mk(identity, identity_len, data->ik, data->ck,
data->mk);
eap_sim_derive_keys(data->mk, data->k_encr, data->k_aut,
data->msk, data->emsk);
}
if (eap_aka_verify_mac(data, reqData, attr->mac, (u8 *) "", 0)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Challenge message "
"used invalid AT_MAC");
return eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
}
/* Old reauthentication identity must not be used anymore. In
* other words, if no new identities are received, full
* authentication will be used on next reauthentication (using
* pseudonym identity or permanent identity). */
eap_aka_clear_identities(data, CLEAR_REAUTH_ID | CLEAR_EAP_ID);
if (attr->encr_data) {
u8 *decrypted;
decrypted = eap_sim_parse_encr(data->k_encr, attr->encr_data,
attr->encr_data_len, attr->iv,
&eattr, 0);
if (decrypted == NULL) {
return eap_aka_client_error(
data, id, EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
}
eap_aka_learn_ids(sm, data, &eattr);
os_free(decrypted);
}
if (data->result_ind && attr->result_ind)
data->use_result_ind = 1;
if (data->state != FAILURE && data->state != RESULT_FAILURE) {
eap_aka_state(data, data->use_result_ind ?
RESULT_SUCCESS : SUCCESS);
}
data->num_id_req = 0;
data->num_notification = 0;
/* RFC 4187 specifies that counter is initialized to one after
* fullauth, but initializing it to zero makes it easier to implement
* reauth verification. */
data->counter = 0;
return eap_aka_response_challenge(data, id);
}
static struct wpabuf * eap_sim_process_challenge(struct eap_sm *sm,
struct eap_sim_data *data,
u8 id,
const struct wpabuf *reqData,
struct eap_sim_attrs *attr)
{
const u8 *identity;
size_t identity_len;
struct eap_sim_attrs eattr;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: subtype Challenge");
data->reauth = 0;
if (!attr->mac || !attr->rand) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: Challenge message "
"did not include%s%s",
!attr->mac ? " AT_MAC" : "",
!attr->rand ? " AT_RAND" : "");
return eap_sim_client_error(data, id,
EAP_SIM_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
}
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: %lu challenges",
(unsigned long) attr->num_chal);
if (attr->num_chal < data->min_num_chal) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-SIM: Insufficient number of "
"challenges (%lu)", (unsigned long) attr->num_chal);
return eap_sim_client_error(data, id,
EAP_SIM_INSUFFICIENT_NUM_OF_CHAL);
}
if (attr->num_chal > 3) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-SIM: Too many challenges "
"(%lu)", (unsigned long) attr->num_chal);
return eap_sim_client_error(data, id,
EAP_SIM_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
}
/* Verify that RANDs are different */
if (os_memcmp(attr->rand, attr->rand + GSM_RAND_LEN,
GSM_RAND_LEN) == 0 ||
(attr->num_chal > 2 &&
(os_memcmp(attr->rand, attr->rand + 2 * GSM_RAND_LEN,
GSM_RAND_LEN) == 0 ||
os_memcmp(attr->rand + GSM_RAND_LEN,
attr->rand + 2 * GSM_RAND_LEN,
GSM_RAND_LEN) == 0))) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-SIM: Same RAND used multiple times");
return eap_sim_client_error(data, id,
EAP_SIM_RAND_NOT_FRESH);
}
os_memcpy(data->rand, attr->rand, attr->num_chal * GSM_RAND_LEN);
data->num_chal = attr->num_chal;
if (eap_sim_gsm_auth(sm, data)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: GSM authentication failed");
return eap_sim_client_error(data, id,
EAP_SIM_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
}
if (data->last_eap_identity) {
identity = data->last_eap_identity;
identity_len = data->last_eap_identity_len;
} else if (data->pseudonym) {
identity = data->pseudonym;
identity_len = data->pseudonym_len;
} else
identity = eap_get_config_identity(sm, &identity_len);
wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: Selected identity for MK "
"derivation", identity, identity_len);
eap_sim_derive_mk(identity, identity_len, data->nonce_mt,
data->selected_version, data->ver_list,
data->ver_list_len, data->num_chal,
(const u8 *) data->kc, data->mk);
eap_sim_derive_keys(data->mk, data->k_encr, data->k_aut, data->msk,
data->emsk);
if (eap_sim_verify_mac(data->k_aut, reqData, attr->mac, data->nonce_mt,
EAP_SIM_NONCE_MT_LEN)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: Challenge message "
"used invalid AT_MAC");
return eap_sim_client_error(data, id,
EAP_SIM_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
}
/* Old reauthentication identity must not be used anymore. In
* other words, if no new reauth identity is received, full
* authentication will be used on next reauthentication (using
* pseudonym identity or permanent identity). */
eap_sim_clear_identities(data, CLEAR_REAUTH_ID | CLEAR_EAP_ID);
if (attr->encr_data) {
u8 *decrypted;
decrypted = eap_sim_parse_encr(data->k_encr, attr->encr_data,
attr->encr_data_len, attr->iv,
&eattr, 0);
if (decrypted == NULL) {
return eap_sim_client_error(
data, id, EAP_SIM_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
}
eap_sim_learn_ids(sm, data, &eattr);
os_free(decrypted);
}
if (data->result_ind && attr->result_ind)
data->use_result_ind = 1;
if (data->state != FAILURE && data->state != RESULT_FAILURE) {
eap_sim_state(data, data->use_result_ind ?
RESULT_SUCCESS : SUCCESS);
}
data->num_id_req = 0;
data->num_notification = 0;
/* RFC 4186 specifies that counter is initialized to one after
* fullauth, but initializing it to zero makes it easier to implement
* reauth verification. */
data->counter = 0;
return eap_sim_response_challenge(data, id);
}
static void eap_aka_process_reauth(struct eap_sm *sm,
struct eap_aka_data *data,
struct wpabuf *respData,
struct eap_sim_attrs *attr)
{
struct eap_sim_attrs eattr;
u8 *decrypted = NULL;
const u8 *identity, *id2;
size_t identity_len, id2_len;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Processing Reauthentication");
if (attr->mac == NULL ||
eap_aka_verify_mac(data, respData, attr->mac, data->nonce_s,
EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Re-authentication message "
"did not include valid AT_MAC");
goto fail;
}
if (attr->encr_data == NULL || attr->iv == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Reauthentication "
"message did not include encrypted data");
goto fail;
}
decrypted = eap_sim_parse_encr(data->k_encr, attr->encr_data,
attr->encr_data_len, attr->iv, &eattr,
0);
if (decrypted == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Failed to parse encrypted "
"data from reauthentication message");
goto fail;
}
if (eattr.counter != data->counter) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Re-authentication message "
"used incorrect counter %u, expected %u",
eattr.counter, data->counter);
goto fail;
}
os_free(decrypted);
decrypted = NULL;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Re-authentication response includes "
"the correct AT_MAC");
if (eattr.counter_too_small) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Re-authentication response "
"included AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL - starting full "
"authentication");
eap_aka_determine_identity(sm, data, 0, 1);
return;
}
if (sm->eap_sim_aka_result_ind && attr->result_ind) {
data->use_result_ind = 1;
data->notification = EAP_SIM_SUCCESS;
eap_aka_state(data, NOTIFICATION);
} else
eap_aka_state(data, SUCCESS);
if (data->reauth) {
identity = data->reauth->identity;
identity_len = data->reauth->identity_len;
} else {
identity = sm->identity;
identity_len = sm->identity_len;
}
id2 = eap_sim_db_get_permanent(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, identity,
identity_len, &id2_len);
if (id2) {
identity = id2;
identity_len = id2_len;
}
if (data->next_pseudonym) {
eap_sim_db_add_pseudonym(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, identity,
identity_len, data->next_pseudonym);
data->next_pseudonym = NULL;
}
if (data->next_reauth_id) {
if (data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME) {
#ifdef EAP_SERVER_AKA_PRIME
eap_sim_db_add_reauth_prime(sm->eap_sim_db_priv,
identity,
identity_len,
data->next_reauth_id,
data->counter + 1,
data->k_encr, data->k_aut,
data->k_re);
#endif /* EAP_SERVER_AKA_PRIME */
} else {
eap_sim_db_add_reauth(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, identity,
identity_len,
data->next_reauth_id,
data->counter + 1,
data->mk);
}
data->next_reauth_id = NULL;
} else {
eap_sim_db_remove_reauth(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, data->reauth);
data->reauth = NULL;
}
return;
fail:
data->notification = EAP_SIM_GENERAL_FAILURE_BEFORE_AUTH;
eap_aka_state(data, NOTIFICATION);
eap_sim_db_remove_reauth(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, data->reauth);
data->reauth = NULL;
os_free(decrypted);
}
static void eap_sim_process_reauth(struct eap_sm *sm,
struct eap_sim_data *data,
struct wpabuf *respData,
struct eap_sim_attrs *attr)
{
struct eap_sim_attrs eattr;
u8 *decrypted = NULL;
const u8 *identity, *id2;
size_t identity_len, id2_len;
if (attr->mac == NULL ||
eap_sim_verify_mac(data->k_aut, respData, attr->mac, data->nonce_s,
EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: Re-authentication message "
"did not include valid AT_MAC");
goto fail;
}
if (attr->encr_data == NULL || attr->iv == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: Reauthentication "
"message did not include encrypted data");
goto fail;
}
decrypted = eap_sim_parse_encr(data->k_encr, attr->encr_data,
attr->encr_data_len, attr->iv, &eattr,
0);
if (decrypted == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: Failed to parse encrypted "
"data from reauthentication message");
goto fail;
}
if (eattr.counter != data->counter) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: Re-authentication message "
"used incorrect counter %u, expected %u",
eattr.counter, data->counter);
goto fail;
}
os_free(decrypted);
decrypted = NULL;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: Re-authentication response includes "
"the correct AT_MAC");
if (sm->eap_sim_aka_result_ind && attr->result_ind) {
data->use_result_ind = 1;
data->notification = EAP_SIM_SUCCESS;
eap_sim_state(data, NOTIFICATION);
} else
eap_sim_state(data, SUCCESS);
if (data->reauth) {
identity = data->reauth->identity;
identity_len = data->reauth->identity_len;
} else {
identity = sm->identity;
identity_len = sm->identity_len;
}
id2 = eap_sim_db_get_permanent(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, identity,
identity_len, &id2_len);
if (id2) {
identity = id2;
identity_len = id2_len;
}
if (data->next_pseudonym) {
eap_sim_db_add_pseudonym(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, identity,
identity_len, data->next_pseudonym);
data->next_pseudonym = NULL;
}
if (data->next_reauth_id) {
eap_sim_db_add_reauth(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, identity,
identity_len, data->next_reauth_id,
data->counter + 1, data->mk);
data->next_reauth_id = NULL;
} else {
eap_sim_db_remove_reauth(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, data->reauth);
data->reauth = NULL;
}
return;
fail:
eap_sim_state(data, FAILURE);
eap_sim_db_remove_reauth(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, data->reauth);
data->reauth = NULL;
os_free(decrypted);
}
static u8 * eap_aka_process_challenge(struct eap_sm *sm,
struct eap_aka_data *data,
const struct eap_hdr *req,
size_t reqDataLen,
size_t *respDataLen,
struct eap_sim_attrs *attr)
{
const u8 *identity;
size_t identity_len;
int res;
struct eap_sim_attrs eattr;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: subtype Challenge");
data->reauth = 0;
if (!attr->mac || !attr->rand || !attr->autn) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Challenge message "
"did not include%s%s%s",
!attr->mac ? " AT_MAC" : "",
!attr->rand ? " AT_RAND" : "",
!attr->autn ? " AT_AUTN" : "");
return eap_aka_client_error(data, req, respDataLen,
EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
}
os_memcpy(data->rand, attr->rand, EAP_AKA_RAND_LEN);
os_memcpy(data->autn, attr->autn, EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN);
res = eap_aka_umts_auth(sm, data);
if (res == -1) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: UMTS authentication "
"failed (AUTN)");
return eap_aka_authentication_reject(data, req, respDataLen);
} else if (res == -2) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: UMTS authentication "
"failed (AUTN seq# -> AUTS)");
return eap_aka_synchronization_failure(data, req, respDataLen);
} else if (res) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: UMTS authentication failed");
return eap_aka_client_error(data, req, respDataLen,
EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
}
if (data->last_eap_identity) {
identity = data->last_eap_identity;
identity_len = data->last_eap_identity_len;
} else if (data->pseudonym) {
identity = data->pseudonym;
identity_len = data->pseudonym_len;
} else
identity = eap_get_config_identity(sm, &identity_len);
wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Selected identity for MK "
"derivation", identity, identity_len);
eap_aka_derive_mk(identity, identity_len, data->ik, data->ck,
data->mk);
eap_sim_derive_keys(data->mk, data->k_encr, data->k_aut, data->msk,
data->emsk);
if (eap_sim_verify_mac(data->k_aut, (const u8 *) req, reqDataLen,
attr->mac, (u8 *) "", 0)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Challenge message "
"used invalid AT_MAC");
return eap_aka_client_error(data, req, respDataLen,
EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
}
/* Old reauthentication and pseudonym identities must not be used
* anymore. In other words, if no new identities are received, full
* authentication will be used on next reauthentication. */
eap_aka_clear_identities(data, CLEAR_PSEUDONYM | CLEAR_REAUTH_ID |
CLEAR_EAP_ID);
if (attr->encr_data) {
u8 *decrypted;
decrypted = eap_sim_parse_encr(data->k_encr, attr->encr_data,
attr->encr_data_len, attr->iv,
&eattr, 0);
if (decrypted == NULL) {
return eap_aka_client_error(
data, req, respDataLen,
EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
}
eap_aka_learn_ids(data, &eattr);
os_free(decrypted);
}
if (data->state != FAILURE)
data->state = SUCCESS;
data->num_id_req = 0;
data->num_notification = 0;
/* RFC 4187 specifies that counter is initialized to one after
* fullauth, but initializing it to zero makes it easier to implement
* reauth verification. */
data->counter = 0;
return eap_aka_response_challenge(data, req, respDataLen);
}
static void eap_sim_process_reauth(struct eap_sm *sm,
struct eap_sim_data *data,
struct wpabuf *respData,
struct eap_sim_attrs *attr)
{
struct eap_sim_attrs eattr;
u8 *decrypted = NULL;
if (attr->mac == NULL ||
eap_sim_verify_mac(data->k_aut, respData, attr->mac, data->nonce_s,
EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: Re-authentication message "
"did not include valid AT_MAC");
goto fail;
}
if (attr->encr_data == NULL || attr->iv == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: Reauthentication "
"message did not include encrypted data");
goto fail;
}
decrypted = eap_sim_parse_encr(data->k_encr, attr->encr_data,
attr->encr_data_len, attr->iv, &eattr,
0);
if (decrypted == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: Failed to parse encrypted "
"data from reauthentication message");
goto fail;
}
if (eattr.counter != data->counter) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: Re-authentication message "
"used incorrect counter %u, expected %u",
eattr.counter, data->counter);
goto fail;
}
os_free(decrypted);
decrypted = NULL;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: Re-authentication response includes "
"the correct AT_MAC");
if (eattr.counter_too_small) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Re-authentication response "
"included AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL - starting full "
"authentication");
data->start_round = -1;
eap_sim_state(data, START);
return;
}
if (sm->eap_sim_aka_result_ind && attr->result_ind) {
data->use_result_ind = 1;
data->notification = EAP_SIM_SUCCESS;
eap_sim_state(data, NOTIFICATION);
} else
eap_sim_state(data, SUCCESS);
if (data->next_reauth_id) {
eap_sim_db_add_reauth(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, data->permanent,
data->next_reauth_id,
data->counter + 1, data->mk);
data->next_reauth_id = NULL;
} else {
eap_sim_db_remove_reauth(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, data->reauth);
data->reauth = NULL;
}
return;
fail:
data->notification = EAP_SIM_GENERAL_FAILURE_BEFORE_AUTH;
eap_sim_state(data, NOTIFICATION);
eap_sim_db_remove_reauth(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, data->reauth);
data->reauth = NULL;
os_free(decrypted);
}
