/*
* Find the key in client for the most preferred enctype in req_enctypes. Fill
* in *kb_out with the decrypted keyblock (which the caller must free) and set
* *kd_out to an alias to that key data entry. Set *kd_out to NULL and leave
* *kb_out zeroed if no key is found for any of the requested enctypes.
* kb_out->enctype may differ from the enctype of *kd_out for DES enctypes; in
* this case, kb_out->enctype is the requested enctype used to match the key
* data entry.
*/
static krb5_error_code
select_client_key(krb5_context context, krb5_db_entry *client,
krb5_enctype *req_enctypes, int n_req_enctypes,
krb5_keyblock *kb_out, krb5_key_data **kd_out)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_key_data *kd;
krb5_enctype etype;
int i;
memset(kb_out, 0, sizeof(*kb_out));
*kd_out = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < n_req_enctypes; i++) {
etype = req_enctypes[i];
if (!krb5_c_valid_enctype(etype))
continue;
if (krb5_dbe_find_enctype(context, client, etype, -1, 0, &kd) == 0) {
/* Decrypt the client key data and set its enctype to the request
* enctype (which may differ from the key data enctype for DES). */
ret = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(context, NULL, kd, kb_out, NULL);
if (ret)
return ret;
kb_out->enctype = etype;
*kd_out = kd;
return 0;
}
}
return 0;
}
static krb5_error_code
get_securid_key(krb5_context context, krb5_db_entry *client,
krb5_keyblock *client_securid_key)
{
krb5_db_entry *sam_securid_entry = NULL;
krb5_key_data *client_securid_key_data = NULL;
int sam_type = PA_SAM_TYPE_SECURID;
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
if (!client_securid_key)
return KRB5_PREAUTH_NO_KEY;
retval = sam_get_db_entry(context, client->princ,
&sam_type, &sam_securid_entry);
if (retval)
return KRB5_PREAUTH_NO_KEY;
/* Find key with key_type = salt_type = kvno = -1. This finds the */
/* latest kvno in the list. */
retval = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(context, sam_securid_entry,
-1, -1, -1, &client_securid_key_data);
if (retval) {
com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
"while getting key from client's SAM SecurID entry");
goto cleanup;
}
retval = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(context, NULL, client_securid_key_data,
client_securid_key, NULL);
if (retval) {
com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
"while decrypting key from client's SAM SecurID entry");
goto cleanup;
}
cleanup:
if (sam_securid_entry)
krb5_db_free_principal(context, sam_securid_entry);
return retval;
}
/* Return true if cammac's KDC verifier is valid for enc_tkt, using krbtgt to
* retrieve the TGT key indicated by the verifier. */
krb5_boolean
cammac_check_kdcver(krb5_context context, krb5_cammac *cammac,
krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt, krb5_db_entry *krbtgt)
{
krb5_verifier_mac *ver = cammac->kdc_verifier;
krb5_key_data *kd;
krb5_keyblock tgtkey;
krb5_boolean valid = FALSE;
krb5_data *der_enctkt = NULL;
memset(&tgtkey, 0, sizeof(tgtkey));
if (ver == NULL)
goto cleanup;
/* Fetch the krbtgt key indicated by the KDC verifier. Only allow the
* first krbtgt key of the specified kvno. */
if (krb5_dbe_find_enctype(context, krbtgt, -1, -1, ver->kvno, &kd) != 0)
goto cleanup;
if (krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(context, NULL, kd, &tgtkey, NULL) != 0)
goto cleanup;
if (ver->enctype != ENCTYPE_NULL && tgtkey.enctype != ver->enctype)
goto cleanup;
/* Verify the checksum over the DER-encoded enc_tkt with the CAMMAC
* elements as authdata. */
if (encode_kdcver_encpart(enc_tkt, cammac->elements, &der_enctkt) != 0)
goto cleanup;
(void)krb5_c_verify_checksum(context, &tgtkey, KRB5_KEYUSAGE_CAMMAC,
der_enctkt, &ver->checksum, &valid);
cleanup:
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &tgtkey);
krb5_free_data(context, der_enctkt);
return valid;
}
/*ARGSUSED*/
krb5_error_code
process_tgs_req(krb5_data *pkt, const krb5_fulladdr *from,
krb5_data **response)
{
krb5_keyblock * subkey = 0;
krb5_kdc_req *request = 0;
krb5_db_entry server;
krb5_kdc_rep reply;
krb5_enc_kdc_rep_part reply_encpart;
krb5_ticket ticket_reply, *header_ticket = 0;
int st_idx = 0;
krb5_enc_tkt_part enc_tkt_reply;
krb5_transited enc_tkt_transited;
int newtransited = 0;
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
krb5_keyblock encrypting_key;
int nprincs = 0;
krb5_boolean more;
krb5_timestamp kdc_time, authtime=0;
krb5_keyblock session_key;
krb5_timestamp until, rtime;
krb5_keyblock *reply_key = NULL;
krb5_keyblock *mkey_ptr;
krb5_key_data *server_key;
char *cname = 0, *sname = 0, *altcname = 0;
krb5_last_req_entry *nolrarray[2], nolrentry;
krb5_enctype useenctype;
int errcode, errcode2;
register int i;
int firstpass = 1;
const char *status = 0;
krb5_enc_tkt_part *header_enc_tkt = NULL; /* ticket granting or evidence ticket */
krb5_db_entry client, krbtgt;
int c_nprincs = 0, k_nprincs = 0;
krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user *s4u_x509_user = NULL; /* protocol transition request */
krb5_authdata **kdc_issued_auth_data = NULL; /* auth data issued by KDC */
unsigned int c_flags = 0, s_flags = 0; /* client/server KDB flags */
char *s4u_name = NULL;
krb5_boolean is_referral, db_ref_done = FALSE;
const char *emsg = NULL;
krb5_data *tgs_1 =NULL, *server_1 = NULL;
krb5_principal krbtgt_princ;
krb5_kvno ticket_kvno = 0;
struct kdc_request_state *state = NULL;
krb5_pa_data *pa_tgs_req; /*points into request*/
krb5_data scratch;
session_key.contents = NULL;
retval = decode_krb5_tgs_req(pkt, &request);
if (retval)
return retval;
/*
* setup_server_realm() sets up the global realm-specific data pointer.
*/
if ((retval = setup_server_realm(request->server))) {
krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, request);
return retval;
}
errcode = kdc_process_tgs_req(request, from, pkt, &header_ticket,
&krbtgt, &k_nprincs, &subkey, &pa_tgs_req);
if (header_ticket && header_ticket->enc_part2 &&
(errcode2 = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context,
header_ticket->enc_part2->client,
&cname))) {
status = "UNPARSING CLIENT";
errcode = errcode2;
goto cleanup;
}
limit_string(cname);
if (errcode) {
status = "PROCESS_TGS";
goto cleanup;
}
if (!header_ticket) {
errcode = KRB5_NO_TKT_SUPPLIED; /* XXX? */
status="UNEXPECTED NULL in header_ticket";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = kdc_make_rstate(&state);
if (errcode !=0) {
status = "making state";
goto cleanup;
}
scratch.length = pa_tgs_req->length;
scratch.data = (char *) pa_tgs_req->contents;
errcode = kdc_find_fast(&request, &scratch, subkey, header_ticket->enc_part2->session, state);
if (errcode !=0) {
status = "kdc_find_fast";
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Pointer to the encrypted part of the header ticket, which may be
* replaced to point to the encrypted part of the evidence ticket
* if constrained delegation is used. This simplifies the number of
* special cases for constrained delegation.
*/
header_enc_tkt = header_ticket->enc_part2;
/*
* We've already dealt with the AP_REQ authentication, so we can
* use header_ticket freely. The encrypted part (if any) has been
* decrypted with the session key.
*/
/* XXX make sure server here has the proper realm...taken from AP_REQ
header? */
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CANONICALIZE)) {
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE);
setflag(s_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE);
}
db_ref_done = FALSE;
ref_tgt_again:
nprincs = 1;
if ((errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, request->server, &sname))) {
status = "UNPARSING SERVER";
goto cleanup;
}
limit_string(sname);
errcode = krb5_db_get_principal_ext(kdc_context,
request->server,
s_flags,
&server,
&nprincs,
&more);
if (errcode) {
status = "LOOKING_UP_SERVER";
nprincs = 0;
goto cleanup;
}
tgt_again:
if (more) {
status = "NON_UNIQUE_PRINCIPAL";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_PRINCIPAL_NOT_UNIQUE;
goto cleanup;
} else if (nprincs != 1) {
/*
* might be a request for a TGT for some other realm; we
* should do our best to find such a TGS in this db
*/
if (firstpass ) {
if ( krb5_is_tgs_principal(request->server) == TRUE) { /* Principal is a name of krb ticket service */
if (krb5_princ_size(kdc_context, request->server) == 2) {
server_1 = krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, request->server, 1);
tgs_1 = krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, tgs_server, 1);
if (!tgs_1 || !data_eq(*server_1, *tgs_1)) {
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, nprincs);
find_alternate_tgs(request, &server, &more, &nprincs);
firstpass = 0;
goto tgt_again;
}
}
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, nprincs);
status = "UNKNOWN_SERVER";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto cleanup;
} else if ( db_ref_done == FALSE) {
retval = prep_reprocess_req(request, &krbtgt_princ);
if (!retval) {
krb5_free_principal(kdc_context, request->server);
retval = krb5_copy_principal(kdc_context, krbtgt_princ, &(request->server));
if (!retval) {
db_ref_done = TRUE;
if (sname != NULL)
free(sname);
goto ref_tgt_again;
}
}
}
}
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, nprincs);
status = "UNKNOWN_SERVER";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto cleanup;
}
if ((errcode = krb5_timeofday(kdc_context, &kdc_time))) {
status = "TIME_OF_DAY";
goto cleanup;
}
if ((retval = validate_tgs_request(request, server, header_ticket,
kdc_time, &status))) {
if (!status)
status = "UNKNOWN_REASON";
errcode = retval + ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
goto cleanup;
}
if (!is_local_principal(header_enc_tkt->client))
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM);
is_referral = krb5_is_tgs_principal(server.princ) &&
!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, tgs_server, server.princ);
/* Check for protocol transition */
errcode = kdc_process_s4u2self_req(kdc_context,
request,
header_enc_tkt->client,
&server,
subkey,
header_enc_tkt->session,
kdc_time,
&s4u_x509_user,
&client,
&c_nprincs,
&status);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
if (s4u_x509_user != NULL)
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION);
/*
* We pick the session keytype here....
*
* Some special care needs to be taken in the user-to-user
* case, since we don't know what keytypes the application server
* which is doing user-to-user authentication can support. We
* know that it at least must be able to support the encryption
* type of the session key in the TGT, since otherwise it won't be
* able to decrypt the U2U ticket! So we use that in preference
* to anything else.
*/
useenctype = 0;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY |
KDC_OPT_CNAME_IN_ADDL_TKT)) {
krb5_keyblock * st_sealing_key;
krb5_kvno st_srv_kvno;
krb5_enctype etype;
krb5_db_entry st_client;
int st_nprincs = 0;
/*
* Get the key for the second ticket, and decrypt it.
*/
if ((errcode = kdc_get_server_key(request->second_ticket[st_idx],
c_flags,
TRUE, /* match_enctype */
&st_client,
&st_nprincs,
&st_sealing_key,
&st_srv_kvno))) {
status = "2ND_TKT_SERVER";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = krb5_decrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, st_sealing_key,
request->second_ticket[st_idx]);
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, st_sealing_key);
if (errcode) {
status = "2ND_TKT_DECRYPT";
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &st_client, st_nprincs);
goto cleanup;
}
etype = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2->session->enctype;
if (!krb5_c_valid_enctype(etype)) {
status = "BAD_ETYPE_IN_2ND_TKT";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &st_client, st_nprincs);
goto cleanup;
}
for (i = 0; i < request->nktypes; i++) {
if (request->ktype[i] == etype) {
useenctype = etype;
break;
}
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CNAME_IN_ADDL_TKT)) {
/* Do constrained delegation protocol and authorization checks */
errcode = kdc_process_s4u2proxy_req(kdc_context,
request,
request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2,
&st_client,
header_ticket->enc_part2->client,
request->server,
&status);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION);
assert(krb5_is_tgs_principal(header_ticket->server));
/* From now on, use evidence ticket as header ticket */
header_enc_tkt = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
assert(c_nprincs == 0); /* assured by kdc_process_s4u2self_req() */
client = st_client;
c_nprincs = st_nprincs;
} else {
/* "client" is not used for user2user */
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &st_client, st_nprincs);
}
}
/*
* Select the keytype for the ticket session key.
*/
if ((useenctype == 0) &&
(useenctype = select_session_keytype(kdc_context, &server,
request->nktypes,
request->ktype)) == 0) {
/* unsupported ktype */
status = "BAD_ENCRYPTION_TYPE";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = krb5_c_make_random_key(kdc_context, useenctype, &session_key);
if (errcode) {
/* random key failed */
status = "RANDOM_KEY_FAILED";
goto cleanup;
}
authtime = header_enc_tkt->times.authtime;
if (is_referral)
ticket_reply.server = server.princ;
else
ticket_reply.server = request->server; /* XXX careful for realm... */
enc_tkt_reply.flags = 0;
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
if (isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_OK_AS_DELEGATE))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_OK_AS_DELEGATE);
/*
* Fix header_ticket's starttime; if it's zero, fill in the
* authtime's value.
*/
if (!(header_enc_tkt->times.starttime))
header_enc_tkt->times.starttime = header_enc_tkt->times.authtime;
/* don't use new addresses unless forwarded, see below */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = header_enc_tkt->caddrs;
/* noaddrarray[0] = 0; */
reply_encpart.caddrs = 0;/* optional...don't put it in */
reply_encpart.enc_padata = NULL;
/* It should be noted that local policy may affect the */
/* processing of any of these flags. For example, some */
/* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets */
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDABLE)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION)) {
/*
* If S4U2Self principal is not forwardable, then mark ticket as
* unforwardable. This behaviour matches Windows, but it is
* different to the MIT AS-REQ path, which returns an error
* (KDC_ERR_POLICY) if forwardable tickets cannot be issued.
*
* Consider this block the S4U2Self equivalent to
* validate_forwardable().
*/
if (c_nprincs &&
isflagset(client.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
/*
* OK_TO_AUTH_AS_DELEGATE must be set on the service requesting
* S4U2Self in order for forwardable tickets to be returned.
*/
else if (!is_referral &&
!isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_OK_TO_AUTH_AS_DELEGATE))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
}
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDED)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED);
/* include new addresses in ticket & reply */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = request->addresses;
reply_encpart.caddrs = request->addresses;
}
if (isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXIABLE))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PROXIABLE);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXY)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PROXY);
/* include new addresses in ticket & reply */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = request->addresses;
reply_encpart.caddrs = request->addresses;
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ALLOW_POSTDATE))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_MAY_POSTDATE);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_POSTDATED)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_POSTDATED);
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = request->from;
} else
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_VALIDATE)) {
assert(isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U) == 0);
/* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs
to the caller */
ticket_reply = *(header_ticket);
enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2);
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEW)) {
krb5_deltat old_life;
assert(isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U) == 0);
/* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs
to the caller */
ticket_reply = *(header_ticket);
enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2);
old_life = enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime - enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime;
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime =
min(header_ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till,
kdc_time + old_life);
} else {
/* not a renew request */
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
until = (request->till == 0) ? kdc_infinity : request->till;
enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime =
min(until, min(enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime + server.max_life,
min(enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime + max_life_for_realm,
header_enc_tkt->times.endtime)));
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE_OK) &&
(enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime < request->till) &&
isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_RENEWABLE)) {
setflag(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE);
request->rtime =
min(request->till, header_enc_tkt->times.renew_till);
}
}
rtime = (request->rtime == 0) ? kdc_infinity : request->rtime;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE)) {
/* already checked above in policy check to reject request for a
renewable ticket using a non-renewable ticket */
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_RENEWABLE);
enc_tkt_reply.times.renew_till =
min(rtime,
min(header_enc_tkt->times.renew_till,
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime +
min(server.max_renewable_life,
max_renewable_life_for_realm)));
} else {
enc_tkt_reply.times.renew_till = 0;
}
/*
* Set authtime to be the same as header_ticket's
*/
enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime = header_enc_tkt->times.authtime;
/*
* Propagate the preauthentication flags through to the returned ticket.
*/
if (isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH);
if (isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH);
/* starttime is optional, and treated as authtime if not present.
so we can nuke it if it matches */
if (enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime == enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime)
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION)) {
errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, s4u_x509_user->user_id.user, &s4u_name);
} else if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION)) {
errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client, &s4u_name);
} else {
errcode = 0;
}
if (errcode) {
status = "UNPARSING S4U CLIENT";
goto cleanup;
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
encrypting_key = *(t2enc->session);
} else {
/*
* Find the server key
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, &server,
-1, /* ignore keytype */
-1, /* Ignore salttype */
0,/* Get highest kvno */
&server_key))) {
status = "FINDING_SERVER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_mkey(kdc_context, master_keylist, &server,
&mkey_ptr))) {
krb5_keylist_node *tmp_mkey_list;
/* try refreshing master key list */
/* XXX it would nice if we had the mkvno here for optimization */
if (krb5_db_fetch_mkey_list(kdc_context, master_princ,
&master_keyblock, 0, &tmp_mkey_list) == 0) {
krb5_dbe_free_key_list(kdc_context, master_keylist);
master_keylist = tmp_mkey_list;
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_mkey(kdc_context, master_keylist,
&server, &mkey_ptr))) {
status = "FINDING_MASTER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
} else {
status = "FINDING_MASTER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
}
/* convert server.key into a real key (it may be encrypted
* in the database) */
if ((errcode = krb5_dbekd_decrypt_key_data(kdc_context,
mkey_ptr,
server_key, &encrypting_key,
NULL))) {
status = "DECRYPT_SERVER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION)) {
/*
* Don't allow authorization data to be disabled if constrained
* delegation is requested. We don't want to deny the server
* the ability to validate that delegation was used.
*/
clear(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED);
}
if (isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED) == 0) {
/*
* If we are not doing protocol transition/constrained delegation
* and there was no authorization data included, try to lookup
* the client principal as it may be mapped to a local account.
*
* Always validate authorization data for constrained delegation
* because we must validate the KDC signatures.
*/
if (!isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U) &&
header_enc_tkt->authorization_data == NULL) {
/* Generate authorization data so we can include it in ticket */
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_INCLUDE_PAC);
/* Map principals from foreign (possibly non-AD) realms */
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_MAP_PRINCIPALS);
assert(c_nprincs == 0); /* should not have been looked up already */
c_nprincs = 1;
errcode = krb5_db_get_principal_ext(kdc_context,
header_enc_tkt->client,
c_flags,
&client,
&c_nprincs,
&more);
/*
* We can ignore errors because the principal may be a
* valid cross-realm principal for which we have no local
* mapping. But we do want to check that at most one entry
* was returned.
*/
if (errcode == 0 && (more || c_nprincs > 1)) {
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_PRINCIPAL_NOT_UNIQUE;
goto cleanup;
} else if (errcode) {
c_nprincs = 0;
}
}
}
enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL;
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION) &&
!isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM))
enc_tkt_reply.client = s4u_x509_user->user_id.user;
else
enc_tkt_reply.client = header_enc_tkt->client;
enc_tkt_reply.session = &session_key;
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents = empty_string; /* equivalent of "" */
errcode = handle_authdata(kdc_context,
c_flags,
(c_nprincs != 0) ? &client : NULL,
&server,
(k_nprincs != 0) ? &krbtgt : NULL,
subkey != NULL ? subkey :
header_ticket->enc_part2->session,
&encrypting_key, /* U2U or server key */
pkt,
request,
s4u_x509_user ?
s4u_x509_user->user_id.user : NULL,
header_enc_tkt,
&enc_tkt_reply);
if (errcode) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, "TGS_REQ : handle_authdata (%d)", errcode);
status = "HANDLE_AUTHDATA";
goto cleanup;
}
if (is_referral && isflagset(s_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE)) {
errcode = return_svr_referral_data(kdc_context,
&server, &reply_encpart);
if (errcode) {
status = "KDC_RETURN_ENC_PADATA";
goto cleanup;
}
}
/*
* Only add the realm of the presented tgt to the transited list if
* it is different than the local realm (cross-realm) and it is different
* than the realm of the client (since the realm of the client is already
* implicitly part of the transited list and should not be explicitly
* listed).
*/
/* realm compare is like strcmp, but knows how to deal with these args */
if (realm_compare(header_ticket->server, tgs_server) ||
realm_compare(header_ticket->server, enc_tkt_reply.client)) {
/* tgt issued by local realm or issued by realm of client */
enc_tkt_reply.transited = header_enc_tkt->transited;
} else {
/* tgt issued by some other realm and not the realm of the client */
/* assemble new transited field into allocated storage */
if (header_enc_tkt->transited.tr_type !=
KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS) {
status = "BAD_TRTYPE";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
enc_tkt_transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
enc_tkt_transited.magic = 0;
enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.magic = 0;
enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.data = 0;
enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.length = 0;
enc_tkt_reply.transited = enc_tkt_transited;
if ((errcode =
add_to_transited(&header_enc_tkt->transited.tr_contents,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents,
header_ticket->server,
enc_tkt_reply.client,
request->server))) {
status = "ADD_TR_FAIL";
goto cleanup;
}
newtransited = 1;
}
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM)) {
errcode = validate_transit_path(kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client,
&server,
(k_nprincs != 0) ? &krbtgt : NULL);
if (errcode) {
status = "NON_TRANSITIVE";
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (!isflagset (request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK)) {
unsigned int tlen;
char *tdots;
errcode = kdc_check_transited_list (kdc_context,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents,
krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client),
krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, request->server));
tlen = enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.length;
tdots = tlen > 125 ? "..." : "";
tlen = tlen > 125 ? 125 : tlen;
if (errcode == 0) {
setflag (enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED);
} else if (errcode == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_ILL_CR_TKT)
krb5_klog_syslog (LOG_INFO,
"bad realm transit path from '%s' to '%s' "
"via '%.*s%s'",
cname ? cname : "<unknown client>",
sname ? sname : "<unknown server>",
tlen,
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data,
tdots);
else {
emsg = krb5_get_error_message(kdc_context, errcode);
krb5_klog_syslog (LOG_ERR,
"unexpected error checking transit from "
"'%s' to '%s' via '%.*s%s': %s",
cname ? cname : "<unknown client>",
sname ? sname : "<unknown server>",
tlen,
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data,
tdots, emsg);
krb5_free_error_message(kdc_context, emsg);
emsg = NULL;
}
} else
krb5_klog_syslog (LOG_INFO, "not checking transit path");
if (reject_bad_transit
&& !isflagset (enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED)) {
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
status = "BAD_TRANSIT";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.enc_part2 = &enc_tkt_reply;
/*
* If we are doing user-to-user authentication, then make sure
* that the client for the second ticket matches the request
* server, and then encrypt the ticket using the session key of
* the second ticket.
*/
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
/*
* Make sure the client for the second ticket matches
* requested server.
*/
krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
krb5_principal client2 = t2enc->client;
if (!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, request->server, client2)) {
if ((errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, client2, &altcname)))
altcname = 0;
if (altcname != NULL)
limit_string(altcname);
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH;
status = "2ND_TKT_MISMATCH";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_kvno = 0;
ticket_reply.enc_part.enctype = t2enc->session->enctype;
st_idx++;
} else {
ticket_kvno = server_key->key_data_kvno;
}
errcode = krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, &encrypting_key,
&ticket_reply);
if (!isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY))
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &encrypting_key);
if (errcode) {
status = "TKT_ENCRYPT";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.enc_part.kvno = ticket_kvno;
/* Start assembling the response */
reply.msg_type = KRB5_TGS_REP;
reply.padata = 0;/* always */
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION) &&
find_pa_data(request->padata, KRB5_PADATA_S4U_X509_USER) != NULL) {
errcode = kdc_make_s4u2self_rep(kdc_context,
subkey,
header_ticket->enc_part2->session,
s4u_x509_user,
&reply,
&reply_encpart);
if (errcode) {
status = "KDC_RETURN_S4U2SELF_PADATA";
goto cleanup;
}
}
reply.client = enc_tkt_reply.client;
reply.enc_part.kvno = 0;/* We are using the session key */
reply.ticket = &ticket_reply;
reply_encpart.session = &session_key;
reply_encpart.nonce = request->nonce;
/* copy the time fields EXCEPT for authtime; its location
is used for ktime */
reply_encpart.times = enc_tkt_reply.times;
reply_encpart.times.authtime = header_enc_tkt->times.authtime;
/* starttime is optional, and treated as authtime if not present.
so we can nuke it if it matches */
if (enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime == enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime)
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
nolrentry.lr_type = KRB5_LRQ_NONE;
nolrentry.value = 0;
nolrarray[0] = &nolrentry;
nolrarray[1] = 0;
reply_encpart.last_req = nolrarray; /* not available for TGS reqs */
reply_encpart.key_exp = 0;/* ditto */
reply_encpart.flags = enc_tkt_reply.flags;
reply_encpart.server = ticket_reply.server;
/* use the session key in the ticket, unless there's a subsession key
in the AP_REQ */
reply.enc_part.enctype = subkey ? subkey->enctype :
header_ticket->enc_part2->session->enctype;
errcode = kdc_fast_response_handle_padata(state, request, &reply,
subkey?subkey->enctype:header_ticket->enc_part2->session->enctype);
if (errcode !=0 ) {
status = "Preparing FAST padata";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode =kdc_fast_handle_reply_key(state, subkey?subkey:header_ticket->enc_part2->session, &reply_key);
if (errcode) {
status = "generating reply key";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = krb5_encode_kdc_rep(kdc_context, KRB5_TGS_REP, &reply_encpart,
subkey ? 1 : 0,
reply_key,
&reply, response);
if (errcode) {
status = "ENCODE_KDC_REP";
} else {
status = "ISSUE";
}
memset(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
/* these parts are left on as a courtesy from krb5_encode_kdc_rep so we
can use them in raw form if needed. But, we don't... */
memset(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
cleanup:
assert(status != NULL);
if (reply_key)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, reply_key);
if (errcode)
emsg = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode);
log_tgs_req(from, request, &reply, cname, sname, altcname, authtime,
c_flags, s4u_name, status, errcode, emsg);
if (errcode) {
krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, emsg);
emsg = NULL;
}
if (errcode) {
int got_err = 0;
if (status == 0) {
status = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode);
got_err = 1;
}
errcode -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
if (errcode < 0 || errcode > 128)
errcode = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
retval = prepare_error_tgs(state, request, header_ticket, errcode,
nprincs ? server.princ : NULL,
response, status);
if (got_err) {
krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, status);
status = 0;
}
}
if (header_ticket != NULL)
krb5_free_ticket(kdc_context, header_ticket);
if (request != NULL)
krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, request);
if (state)
kdc_free_rstate(state);
if (cname != NULL)
free(cname);
if (sname != NULL)
free(sname);
if (nprincs != 0)
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, 1);
if (session_key.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &session_key);
if (newtransited)
free(enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data);
if (k_nprincs)
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &krbtgt, k_nprincs);
if (c_nprincs)
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &client, c_nprincs);
if (s4u_x509_user != NULL)
krb5_free_pa_s4u_x509_user(kdc_context, s4u_x509_user);
if (kdc_issued_auth_data != NULL)
krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context, kdc_issued_auth_data);
if (s4u_name != NULL)
free(s4u_name);
if (subkey != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, subkey);
if (reply.padata)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, reply.padata);
if (reply_encpart.enc_padata)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, reply_encpart.enc_padata);
return retval;
}
/*ARGSUSED*/
krb5_error_code
process_tgs_req(struct server_handle *handle, krb5_data *pkt,
const krb5_fulladdr *from, krb5_data **response)
{
krb5_keyblock * subkey = 0;
krb5_keyblock *header_key = NULL;
krb5_kdc_req *request = 0;
krb5_db_entry *server = NULL;
krb5_db_entry *stkt_server = NULL;
krb5_kdc_rep reply;
krb5_enc_kdc_rep_part reply_encpart;
krb5_ticket ticket_reply, *header_ticket = 0;
int st_idx = 0;
krb5_enc_tkt_part enc_tkt_reply;
int newtransited = 0;
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
krb5_keyblock encrypting_key;
krb5_timestamp kdc_time, authtime = 0;
krb5_keyblock session_key;
krb5_keyblock *reply_key = NULL;
krb5_key_data *server_key;
krb5_principal cprinc = NULL, sprinc = NULL, altcprinc = NULL;
krb5_last_req_entry *nolrarray[2], nolrentry;
int errcode;
const char *status = 0;
krb5_enc_tkt_part *header_enc_tkt = NULL; /* TGT */
krb5_enc_tkt_part *subject_tkt = NULL; /* TGT or evidence ticket */
krb5_db_entry *client = NULL, *header_server = NULL;
krb5_db_entry *local_tgt, *local_tgt_storage = NULL;
krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user *s4u_x509_user = NULL; /* protocol transition request */
krb5_authdata **kdc_issued_auth_data = NULL; /* auth data issued by KDC */
unsigned int c_flags = 0, s_flags = 0; /* client/server KDB flags */
krb5_boolean is_referral;
const char *emsg = NULL;
krb5_kvno ticket_kvno = 0;
struct kdc_request_state *state = NULL;
krb5_pa_data *pa_tgs_req; /*points into request*/
krb5_data scratch;
krb5_pa_data **e_data = NULL;
kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm = NULL;
krb5_audit_state *au_state = NULL;
krb5_data **auth_indicators = NULL;
memset(&reply, 0, sizeof(reply));
memset(&reply_encpart, 0, sizeof(reply_encpart));
memset(&ticket_reply, 0, sizeof(ticket_reply));
memset(&enc_tkt_reply, 0, sizeof(enc_tkt_reply));
session_key.contents = NULL;
retval = decode_krb5_tgs_req(pkt, &request);
if (retval)
return retval;
/* Save pointer to client-requested service principal, in case of
* errors before a successful call to search_sprinc(). */
sprinc = request->server;
if (request->msg_type != KRB5_TGS_REQ) {
krb5_free_kdc_req(handle->kdc_err_context, request);
return KRB5_BADMSGTYPE;
}
/*
* setup_server_realm() sets up the global realm-specific data pointer.
*/
kdc_active_realm = setup_server_realm(handle, request->server);
if (kdc_active_realm == NULL) {
krb5_free_kdc_req(handle->kdc_err_context, request);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM;
}
errcode = kdc_make_rstate(kdc_active_realm, &state);
if (errcode !=0) {
krb5_free_kdc_req(handle->kdc_err_context, request);
return errcode;
}
/* Initialize audit state. */
errcode = kau_init_kdc_req(kdc_context, request, from, &au_state);
if (errcode) {
krb5_free_kdc_req(handle->kdc_err_context, request);
return errcode;
}
/* Seed the audit trail with the request ID and basic information. */
kau_tgs_req(kdc_context, TRUE, au_state);
errcode = kdc_process_tgs_req(kdc_active_realm,
request, from, pkt, &header_ticket,
&header_server, &header_key, &subkey,
&pa_tgs_req);
if (header_ticket && header_ticket->enc_part2)
cprinc = header_ticket->enc_part2->client;
if (errcode) {
status = "PROCESS_TGS";
goto cleanup;
}
if (!header_ticket) {
errcode = KRB5_NO_TKT_SUPPLIED; /* XXX? */
status="UNEXPECTED NULL in header_ticket";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = kau_make_tkt_id(kdc_context, header_ticket,
&au_state->tkt_in_id);
if (errcode) {
status = "GENERATE_TICKET_ID";
goto cleanup;
}
scratch.length = pa_tgs_req->length;
scratch.data = (char *) pa_tgs_req->contents;
errcode = kdc_find_fast(&request, &scratch, subkey,
header_ticket->enc_part2->session, state, NULL);
/* Reset sprinc because kdc_find_fast() can replace request. */
sprinc = request->server;
if (errcode !=0) {
status = "FIND_FAST";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = get_local_tgt(kdc_context, &sprinc->realm, header_server,
&local_tgt, &local_tgt_storage);
if (errcode) {
status = "GET_LOCAL_TGT";
goto cleanup;
}
/* Ignore (for now) the request modification due to FAST processing. */
au_state->request = request;
/*
* Pointer to the encrypted part of the header ticket, which may be
* replaced to point to the encrypted part of the evidence ticket
* if constrained delegation is used. This simplifies the number of
* special cases for constrained delegation.
*/
header_enc_tkt = header_ticket->enc_part2;
/*
* We've already dealt with the AP_REQ authentication, so we can
* use header_ticket freely. The encrypted part (if any) has been
* decrypted with the session key.
*/
au_state->stage = SRVC_PRINC;
/* XXX make sure server here has the proper realm...taken from AP_REQ
header? */
setflag(s_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_ALIAS_OK);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CANONICALIZE)) {
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE);
setflag(s_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE);
}
errcode = search_sprinc(kdc_active_realm, request, s_flags, &server,
&status);
if (errcode != 0)
goto cleanup;
sprinc = server->princ;
/* If we got a cross-realm TGS which is not the requested server, we are
* issuing a referral (or alternate TGT, which we treat similarly). */
is_referral = is_cross_tgs_principal(server->princ) &&
!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, request->server, server->princ);
au_state->stage = VALIDATE_POL;
if ((errcode = krb5_timeofday(kdc_context, &kdc_time))) {
status = "TIME_OF_DAY";
goto cleanup;
}
if ((retval = validate_tgs_request(kdc_active_realm,
request, *server, header_ticket,
kdc_time, &status, &e_data))) {
if (!status)
status = "UNKNOWN_REASON";
if (retval == KDC_ERR_POLICY || retval == KDC_ERR_BADOPTION)
au_state->violation = PROT_CONSTRAINT;
errcode = retval + ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
goto cleanup;
}
if (!is_local_principal(kdc_active_realm, header_enc_tkt->client))
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM);
/* Check for protocol transition */
errcode = kdc_process_s4u2self_req(kdc_active_realm,
request,
header_enc_tkt->client,
server,
subkey,
header_enc_tkt->session,
kdc_time,
&s4u_x509_user,
&client,
&status);
if (s4u_x509_user != NULL || errcode != 0) {
if (s4u_x509_user != NULL)
au_state->s4u2self_user = s4u_x509_user->user_id.user;
if (errcode == KDC_ERR_POLICY || errcode == KDC_ERR_BADOPTION)
au_state->violation = PROT_CONSTRAINT;
au_state->status = status;
kau_s4u2self(kdc_context, errcode ? FALSE : TRUE, au_state);
au_state->s4u2self_user = NULL;
}
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
if (s4u_x509_user != NULL) {
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION);
if (is_referral) {
/* The requesting server appears to no longer exist, and we found
* a referral instead. Treat this as a server lookup failure. */
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
status = "LOOKING_UP_SERVER";
goto cleanup;
}
}
/* Deal with user-to-user and constrained delegation */
errcode = decrypt_2ndtkt(kdc_active_realm, request, c_flags,
&stkt_server, &status);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CNAME_IN_ADDL_TKT)) {
/* Do constrained delegation protocol and authorization checks */
errcode = kdc_process_s4u2proxy_req(kdc_active_realm,
request,
request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2,
stkt_server,
header_ticket->enc_part2->client,
request->server,
&status);
if (errcode == KDC_ERR_POLICY || errcode == KDC_ERR_BADOPTION)
au_state->violation = PROT_CONSTRAINT;
else if (errcode)
au_state->violation = LOCAL_POLICY;
au_state->status = status;
retval = kau_make_tkt_id(kdc_context, request->second_ticket[st_idx],
&au_state->evid_tkt_id);
if (retval) {
status = "GENERATE_TICKET_ID";
errcode = retval;
goto cleanup;
}
kau_s4u2proxy(kdc_context, errcode ? FALSE : TRUE, au_state);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION);
assert(krb5_is_tgs_principal(header_ticket->server));
assert(client == NULL); /* assured by kdc_process_s4u2self_req() */
client = stkt_server;
stkt_server = NULL;
} else if (request->kdc_options & KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY) {
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, stkt_server);
stkt_server = NULL;
} else
assert(stkt_server == NULL);
au_state->stage = ISSUE_TKT;
errcode = gen_session_key(kdc_active_realm, request, server, &session_key,
&status);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
/*
* subject_tkt will refer to the evidence ticket (for constrained
* delegation) or the TGT. The distinction from header_enc_tkt is
* necessary because the TGS signature only protects some fields:
* the others could be forged by a malicious server.
*/
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION))
subject_tkt = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
else
subject_tkt = header_enc_tkt;
authtime = subject_tkt->times.authtime;
/* Extract auth indicators from the subject ticket, except for S4U2Proxy
* requests (where the client didn't authenticate). */
if (s4u_x509_user == NULL) {
errcode = get_auth_indicators(kdc_context, subject_tkt, local_tgt,
&auth_indicators);
if (errcode) {
status = "GET_AUTH_INDICATORS";
goto cleanup;
}
}
errcode = check_indicators(kdc_context, server, auth_indicators);
if (errcode) {
status = "HIGHER_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED";
goto cleanup;
}
if (is_referral)
ticket_reply.server = server->princ;
else
ticket_reply.server = request->server; /* XXX careful for realm... */
enc_tkt_reply.flags = OPTS2FLAGS(request->kdc_options);
enc_tkt_reply.flags |= COPY_TKT_FLAGS(header_enc_tkt->flags);
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
if (isflagset(server->attributes, KRB5_KDB_OK_AS_DELEGATE))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_OK_AS_DELEGATE);
/* Indicate support for encrypted padata (RFC 6806). */
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_ENC_PA_REP);
/* don't use new addresses unless forwarded, see below */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = header_enc_tkt->caddrs;
/* noaddrarray[0] = 0; */
reply_encpart.caddrs = 0;/* optional...don't put it in */
reply_encpart.enc_padata = NULL;
/*
* It should be noted that local policy may affect the
* processing of any of these flags. For example, some
* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets
*/
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDABLE)) {
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION)) {
/*
* If S4U2Self principal is not forwardable, then mark ticket as
* unforwardable. This behaviour matches Windows, but it is
* different to the MIT AS-REQ path, which returns an error
* (KDC_ERR_POLICY) if forwardable tickets cannot be issued.
*
* Consider this block the S4U2Self equivalent to
* validate_forwardable().
*/
if (client != NULL &&
isflagset(client->attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
/*
* Forwardable flag is propagated along referral path.
*/
else if (!isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
/*
* OK_TO_AUTH_AS_DELEGATE must be set on the service requesting
* S4U2Self in order for forwardable tickets to be returned.
*/
else if (!is_referral &&
!isflagset(server->attributes,
KRB5_KDB_OK_TO_AUTH_AS_DELEGATE))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
}
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDED) ||
isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXY)) {
/* include new addresses in ticket & reply */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = request->addresses;
reply_encpart.caddrs = request->addresses;
}
/* We don't currently handle issuing anonymous tickets based on
* non-anonymous ones, so just ignore the option. */
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_REQUEST_ANONYMOUS) &&
!isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_ANONYMOUS))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_ANONYMOUS);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_POSTDATED)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = request->from;
} else
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_VALIDATE)) {
assert(isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U) == 0);
/* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs
to the caller */
ticket_reply = *(header_ticket);
enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2);
enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL;
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEW)) {
krb5_timestamp old_starttime;
krb5_deltat old_life;
assert(isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U) == 0);
/* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs
to the caller */
ticket_reply = *(header_ticket);
enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2);
enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL;
old_starttime = enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime ?
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime : enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime;
old_life = enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime - old_starttime;
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime =
min(header_ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till,
kdc_time + old_life);
} else {
/* not a renew request */
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
kdc_get_ticket_endtime(kdc_active_realm, enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime,
header_enc_tkt->times.endtime, request->till,
client, server, &enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime);
}
kdc_get_ticket_renewtime(kdc_active_realm, request, header_enc_tkt, client,
server, &enc_tkt_reply);
/*
* Set authtime to be the same as header or evidence ticket's
*/
enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime = authtime;
/* starttime is optional, and treated as authtime if not present.
so we can nuke it if it matches */
if (enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime == enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime)
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION)) {
altcprinc = s4u_x509_user->user_id.user;
} else if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION)) {
altcprinc = subject_tkt->client;
} else {
altcprinc = NULL;
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
encrypting_key = *(t2enc->session);
} else {
/*
* Find the server key
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, server,
-1, /* ignore keytype */
-1, /* Ignore salttype */
0, /* Get highest kvno */
&server_key))) {
status = "FINDING_SERVER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Convert server.key into a real key
* (it may be encrypted in the database)
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(kdc_context, NULL,
server_key, &encrypting_key,
NULL))) {
status = "DECRYPT_SERVER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION)) {
/*
* Don't allow authorization data to be disabled if constrained
* delegation is requested. We don't want to deny the server
* the ability to validate that delegation was used.
*/
clear(server->attributes, KRB5_KDB_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED);
}
if (isflagset(server->attributes, KRB5_KDB_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED) == 0) {
/*
* If we are not doing protocol transition/constrained delegation
* try to lookup the client principal so plugins can add additional
* authorization information.
*
* Always validate authorization data for constrained delegation
* because we must validate the KDC signatures.
*/
if (!isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U)) {
/* Generate authorization data so we can include it in ticket */
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_INCLUDE_PAC);
/* Map principals from foreign (possibly non-AD) realms */
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_MAP_PRINCIPALS);
assert(client == NULL); /* should not have been set already */
errcode = krb5_db_get_principal(kdc_context, subject_tkt->client,
c_flags, &client);
}
}
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION) &&
!isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM))
enc_tkt_reply.client = s4u_x509_user->user_id.user;
else
enc_tkt_reply.client = subject_tkt->client;
enc_tkt_reply.session = &session_key;
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents = empty_string; /* equivalent of "" */
/*
* Only add the realm of the presented tgt to the transited list if
* it is different than the local realm (cross-realm) and it is different
* than the realm of the client (since the realm of the client is already
* implicitly part of the transited list and should not be explicitly
* listed).
*/
/* realm compare is like strcmp, but knows how to deal with these args */
if (krb5_realm_compare(kdc_context, header_ticket->server, tgs_server) ||
krb5_realm_compare(kdc_context, header_ticket->server,
enc_tkt_reply.client)) {
/* tgt issued by local realm or issued by realm of client */
enc_tkt_reply.transited = header_enc_tkt->transited;
} else {
/* tgt issued by some other realm and not the realm of the client */
/* assemble new transited field into allocated storage */
if (header_enc_tkt->transited.tr_type !=
KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS) {
status = "VALIDATE_TRANSIT_TYPE";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
memset(&enc_tkt_reply.transited, 0, sizeof(enc_tkt_reply.transited));
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
if ((errcode =
add_to_transited(&header_enc_tkt->transited.tr_contents,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents,
header_ticket->server,
enc_tkt_reply.client,
request->server))) {
status = "ADD_TO_TRANSITED_LIST";
goto cleanup;
}
newtransited = 1;
}
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM)) {
errcode = validate_transit_path(kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client,
server, header_server);
if (errcode) {
status = "NON_TRANSITIVE";
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (!isflagset (request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK)) {
errcode = kdc_check_transited_list (kdc_active_realm,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents,
krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client),
krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, request->server));
if (errcode == 0) {
setflag (enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED);
} else {
log_tgs_badtrans(kdc_context, cprinc, sprinc,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents, errcode);
}
} else
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("not checking transit path"));
if (kdc_active_realm->realm_reject_bad_transit &&
!isflagset(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED)) {
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
status = "BAD_TRANSIT";
au_state->violation = LOCAL_POLICY;
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = handle_authdata(kdc_context, c_flags, client, server,
header_server, local_tgt,
subkey != NULL ? subkey :
header_ticket->enc_part2->session,
&encrypting_key, /* U2U or server key */
header_key,
pkt,
request,
s4u_x509_user ?
s4u_x509_user->user_id.user : NULL,
subject_tkt,
auth_indicators,
&enc_tkt_reply);
if (errcode) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("TGS_REQ : handle_authdata (%d)"),
errcode);
status = "HANDLE_AUTHDATA";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.enc_part2 = &enc_tkt_reply;
/*
* If we are doing user-to-user authentication, then make sure
* that the client for the second ticket matches the request
* server, and then encrypt the ticket using the session key of
* the second ticket.
*/
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
/*
* Make sure the client for the second ticket matches
* requested server.
*/
krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
krb5_principal client2 = t2enc->client;
if (!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, request->server, client2)) {
altcprinc = client2;
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH;
status = "2ND_TKT_MISMATCH";
au_state->status = status;
kau_u2u(kdc_context, FALSE, au_state);
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_kvno = 0;
ticket_reply.enc_part.enctype = t2enc->session->enctype;
kau_u2u(kdc_context, TRUE, au_state);
st_idx++;
} else {
ticket_kvno = server_key->key_data_kvno;
}
errcode = krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, &encrypting_key,
&ticket_reply);
if (!isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY))
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &encrypting_key);
if (errcode) {
status = "ENCRYPT_TICKET";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.enc_part.kvno = ticket_kvno;
/* Start assembling the response */
au_state->stage = ENCR_REP;
reply.msg_type = KRB5_TGS_REP;
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION) &&
krb5int_find_pa_data(kdc_context, request->padata,
KRB5_PADATA_S4U_X509_USER) != NULL) {
errcode = kdc_make_s4u2self_rep(kdc_context,
subkey,
header_ticket->enc_part2->session,
s4u_x509_user,
&reply,
&reply_encpart);
if (errcode) {
status = "MAKE_S4U2SELF_PADATA";
au_state->status = status;
}
kau_s4u2self(kdc_context, errcode ? FALSE : TRUE, au_state);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
}
reply.client = enc_tkt_reply.client;
reply.enc_part.kvno = 0;/* We are using the session key */
reply.ticket = &ticket_reply;
reply_encpart.session = &session_key;
reply_encpart.nonce = request->nonce;
/* copy the time fields */
reply_encpart.times = enc_tkt_reply.times;
nolrentry.lr_type = KRB5_LRQ_NONE;
nolrentry.value = 0;
nolrentry.magic = 0;
nolrarray[0] = &nolrentry;
nolrarray[1] = 0;
reply_encpart.last_req = nolrarray; /* not available for TGS reqs */
reply_encpart.key_exp = 0;/* ditto */
reply_encpart.flags = enc_tkt_reply.flags;
reply_encpart.server = ticket_reply.server;
/* use the session key in the ticket, unless there's a subsession key
in the AP_REQ */
reply.enc_part.enctype = subkey ? subkey->enctype :
header_ticket->enc_part2->session->enctype;
errcode = kdc_fast_response_handle_padata(state, request, &reply,
subkey ? subkey->enctype : header_ticket->enc_part2->session->enctype);
if (errcode !=0 ) {
status = "MAKE_FAST_RESPONSE";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode =kdc_fast_handle_reply_key(state,
subkey?subkey:header_ticket->enc_part2->session, &reply_key);
if (errcode) {
status = "MAKE_FAST_REPLY_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = return_enc_padata(kdc_context, pkt, request,
reply_key, server, &reply_encpart,
is_referral &&
isflagset(s_flags,
KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE));
if (errcode) {
status = "KDC_RETURN_ENC_PADATA";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = kau_make_tkt_id(kdc_context, &ticket_reply, &au_state->tkt_out_id);
if (errcode) {
status = "GENERATE_TICKET_ID";
goto cleanup;
}
if (kdc_fast_hide_client(state))
reply.client = (krb5_principal)krb5_anonymous_principal();
errcode = krb5_encode_kdc_rep(kdc_context, KRB5_TGS_REP, &reply_encpart,
subkey ? 1 : 0,
reply_key,
&reply, response);
if (errcode) {
status = "ENCODE_KDC_REP";
} else {
status = "ISSUE";
}
memset(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
/* these parts are left on as a courtesy from krb5_encode_kdc_rep so we
can use them in raw form if needed. But, we don't... */
memset(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
cleanup:
assert(status != NULL);
if (reply_key)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, reply_key);
if (errcode)
emsg = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode);
au_state->status = status;
if (!errcode)
au_state->reply = &reply;
kau_tgs_req(kdc_context, errcode ? FALSE : TRUE, au_state);
kau_free_kdc_req(au_state);
log_tgs_req(kdc_context, from, request, &reply, cprinc,
sprinc, altcprinc, authtime,
c_flags, status, errcode, emsg);
if (errcode) {
krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, emsg);
emsg = NULL;
}
if (errcode) {
int got_err = 0;
if (status == 0) {
status = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode);
got_err = 1;
}
errcode -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
if (errcode < 0 || errcode > KRB_ERR_MAX)
errcode = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
retval = prepare_error_tgs(state, request, header_ticket, errcode,
(server != NULL) ? server->princ : NULL,
response, status, e_data);
if (got_err) {
krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, status);
status = 0;
}
}
if (header_ticket != NULL)
krb5_free_ticket(kdc_context, header_ticket);
if (request != NULL)
krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, request);
if (state)
kdc_free_rstate(state);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, server);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, header_server);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, client);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, local_tgt_storage);
if (session_key.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &session_key);
if (newtransited)
free(enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data);
if (s4u_x509_user != NULL)
krb5_free_pa_s4u_x509_user(kdc_context, s4u_x509_user);
if (kdc_issued_auth_data != NULL)
krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context, kdc_issued_auth_data);
if (subkey != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, subkey);
if (header_key != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, header_key);
if (reply.padata)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, reply.padata);
if (reply_encpart.enc_padata)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, reply_encpart.enc_padata);
if (enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data != NULL)
krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context, enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data);
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, e_data);
k5_free_data_ptr_list(auth_indicators);
return retval;
}
static void
finish_process_as_req(struct as_req_state *state, krb5_error_code errcode)
{
krb5_key_data *server_key;
krb5_key_data *client_key;
krb5_keyblock *as_encrypting_key = NULL;
krb5_data *response = NULL;
const char *emsg = 0;
int did_log = 0;
register int i;
krb5_enctype useenctype;
loop_respond_fn oldrespond;
void *oldarg;
kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm = state->active_realm;
assert(state);
oldrespond = state->respond;
oldarg = state->arg;
if (errcode)
goto egress;
if ((errcode = validate_forwardable(state->request, *state->client,
*state->server, state->kdc_time,
&state->status))) {
errcode += ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
goto egress;
}
state->ticket_reply.enc_part2 = &state->enc_tkt_reply;
/*
* Find the server key
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, state->server,
-1, /* ignore keytype */
-1, /* Ignore salttype */
0, /* Get highest kvno */
&server_key))) {
state->status = "FINDING_SERVER_KEY";
goto egress;
}
/*
* Convert server->key into a real key
* (it may be encrypted in the database)
*
* server_keyblock is later used to generate auth data signatures
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(kdc_context, NULL,
server_key,
&state->server_keyblock,
NULL))) {
state->status = "DECRYPT_SERVER_KEY";
goto egress;
}
/*
* Find the appropriate client key. We search in the order specified
* by request keytype list.
*/
client_key = NULL;
useenctype = 0;
for (i = 0; i < state->request->nktypes; i++) {
useenctype = state->request->ktype[i];
if (!krb5_c_valid_enctype(useenctype))
continue;
if (!krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, state->client,
useenctype, -1, 0, &client_key))
break;
}
if (!(client_key)) {
/* Cannot find an appropriate key */
state->status = "CANT_FIND_CLIENT_KEY";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
goto egress;
}
state->rock.client_key = client_key;
/* convert client.key_data into a real key */
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(kdc_context, NULL,
client_key,
&state->client_keyblock,
NULL))) {
state->status = "DECRYPT_CLIENT_KEY";
goto egress;
}
state->client_keyblock.enctype = useenctype;
/* Start assembling the response */
state->reply.msg_type = KRB5_AS_REP;
state->reply.client = state->enc_tkt_reply.client; /* post canonization */
state->reply.ticket = &state->ticket_reply;
state->reply_encpart.session = &state->session_key;
if ((errcode = fetch_last_req_info(state->client,
&state->reply_encpart.last_req))) {
state->status = "FETCH_LAST_REQ";
goto egress;
}
state->reply_encpart.nonce = state->request->nonce;
state->reply_encpart.key_exp = get_key_exp(state->client);
state->reply_encpart.flags = state->enc_tkt_reply.flags;
state->reply_encpart.server = state->ticket_reply.server;
/* copy the time fields EXCEPT for authtime; it's location
* is used for ktime
*/
state->reply_encpart.times = state->enc_tkt_reply.times;
state->reply_encpart.times.authtime = state->authtime = state->kdc_time;
state->reply_encpart.caddrs = state->enc_tkt_reply.caddrs;
state->reply_encpart.enc_padata = NULL;
/* Fetch the padata info to be returned (do this before
* authdata to handle possible replacement of reply key
*/
errcode = return_padata(kdc_context, &state->rock, state->req_pkt,
state->request, &state->reply,
&state->client_keyblock, &state->pa_context);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "KDC_RETURN_PADATA";
goto egress;
}
errcode = handle_authdata(kdc_context,
state->c_flags,
state->client,
state->server,
state->server,
&state->client_keyblock,
&state->server_keyblock,
&state->server_keyblock,
state->req_pkt,
state->request,
NULL, /* for_user_princ */
NULL, /* enc_tkt_request */
&state->enc_tkt_reply);
if (errcode) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("AS_REQ : handle_authdata (%d)"),
errcode);
state->status = "HANDLE_AUTHDATA";
goto egress;
}
errcode = krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, &state->server_keyblock,
&state->ticket_reply);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "ENCRYPTING_TICKET";
goto egress;
}
state->ticket_reply.enc_part.kvno = server_key->key_data_kvno;
errcode = kdc_fast_response_handle_padata(state->rstate,
state->request,
&state->reply,
state->client_keyblock.enctype);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "fast response handling";
goto egress;
}
/* now encode/encrypt the response */
state->reply.enc_part.enctype = state->client_keyblock.enctype;
errcode = kdc_fast_handle_reply_key(state->rstate, &state->client_keyblock,
&as_encrypting_key);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "generating reply key";
goto egress;
}
errcode = return_enc_padata(kdc_context, state->req_pkt, state->request,
as_encrypting_key, state->server,
&state->reply_encpart, FALSE);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "KDC_RETURN_ENC_PADATA";
goto egress;
}
errcode = krb5_encode_kdc_rep(kdc_context, KRB5_AS_REP,
&state->reply_encpart, 0,
as_encrypting_key,
&state->reply, &response);
state->reply.enc_part.kvno = client_key->key_data_kvno;
if (errcode) {
state->status = "ENCODE_KDC_REP";
goto egress;
}
/* these parts are left on as a courtesy from krb5_encode_kdc_rep so we
can use them in raw form if needed. But, we don't... */
memset(state->reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
state->reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(state->reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
log_as_req(kdc_context, state->from, state->request, &state->reply,
state->client, state->cname, state->server,
state->sname, state->authtime, 0, 0, 0);
did_log = 1;
egress:
if (errcode != 0)
assert (state->status != 0);
free_padata_context(kdc_context, state->pa_context);
if (as_encrypting_key)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, as_encrypting_key);
if (errcode)
emsg = krb5_get_error_message(kdc_context, errcode);
if (state->status) {
log_as_req(kdc_context,
state->from, state->request, &state->reply, state->client,
state->cname, state->server, state->sname, state->authtime,
state->status, errcode, emsg);
did_log = 1;
}
if (errcode) {
if (state->status == 0) {
state->status = emsg;
}
if (errcode != KRB5KDC_ERR_DISCARD) {
errcode -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
if (errcode < 0 || errcode > 128)
errcode = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
errcode = prepare_error_as(state->rstate, state->request,
errcode, state->e_data,
state->typed_e_data,
((state->client != NULL) ?
state->client->princ : NULL),
&response, state->status);
state->status = 0;
}
}
if (emsg)
krb5_free_error_message(kdc_context, emsg);
if (state->enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data != NULL)
krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context,
state->enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data);
if (state->server_keyblock.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &state->server_keyblock);
if (state->client_keyblock.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &state->client_keyblock);
if (state->reply.padata != NULL)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, state->reply.padata);
if (state->reply_encpart.enc_padata)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, state->reply_encpart.enc_padata);
if (state->cname != NULL)
free(state->cname);
if (state->sname != NULL)
free(state->sname);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, state->client);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, state->server);
if (state->session_key.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &state->session_key);
if (state->ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data != NULL) {
memset(state->ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data , 0,
state->ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(state->ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
}
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, state->e_data);
krb5_free_data(kdc_context, state->inner_body);
kdc_free_rstate(state->rstate);
krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, state->request);
assert(did_log != 0);
free(state);
(*oldrespond)(oldarg, errcode, response);
}
krb5_error_code
verify_securid_data_2(krb5_context context, krb5_db_entry *client,
krb5_sam_response_2 *sr2,
krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_reply, krb5_pa_data *pa,
krb5_sam_challenge_2 **sc2_out)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
int new_pin = 0;
krb5_key_data *client_key_data = NULL;
krb5_keyblock client_key;
krb5_data scratch;
krb5_enc_sam_response_enc_2 *esre2 = NULL;
struct securid_track_data sid_track_data, *trackp = NULL;
krb5_data tmp_data;
SDI_HANDLE sd_handle = SDI_HANDLE_NONE;
krb5_sam_challenge_2 *sc2p = NULL;
char *cp, *user = NULL;
char *securid_user = NULL;
char passcode[LENPRNST+1];
char max_pin_len, min_pin_len, alpha_pin;
memset(&client_key, 0, sizeof(client_key));
memset(&scratch, 0, sizeof(scratch));
*sc2_out = NULL;
retval = krb5_unparse_name(context, client->princ, &user);
if (retval != 0) {
com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
"while unparsing client name in verify_securid_data_2");
return retval;
}
if ((sr2->sam_enc_nonce_or_sad.ciphertext.data == NULL) ||
(sr2->sam_enc_nonce_or_sad.ciphertext.length <= 0)) {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval,
"No preauth data supplied in "
"verify_securid_data_2 (%s)", user);
goto cleanup;
}
retval = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(context, client,
sr2->sam_enc_nonce_or_sad.enctype,
KRB5_KDB_SALTTYPE_NORMAL,
sr2->sam_enc_nonce_or_sad.kvno,
&client_key_data);
if (retval) {
com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
"while getting client key in verify_securid_data_2 (%s)",
user);
goto cleanup;
}
retval = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(context, NULL, client_key_data,
&client_key, NULL);
if (retval != 0) {
com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
"while decrypting client key in verify_securid_data_2 (%s)",
user);
goto cleanup;
}
scratch.length = sr2->sam_enc_nonce_or_sad.ciphertext.length;
scratch.data = k5alloc(scratch.length, &retval);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
retval = krb5_c_decrypt(context, &client_key,
KRB5_KEYUSAGE_PA_SAM_RESPONSE, 0,
&sr2->sam_enc_nonce_or_sad, &scratch);
if (retval) {
com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
"while decrypting SAD in verify_securid_data_2 (%s)", user);
goto cleanup;
}
retval = decode_krb5_enc_sam_response_enc_2(&scratch, &esre2);
if (retval) {
com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
"while decoding SAD in verify_securid_data_2 (%s)", user);
esre2 = NULL;
goto cleanup;
}
if (sr2->sam_nonce != esre2->sam_nonce) {
com_err("krb5kdc", KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED,
"while checking nonce in verify_securid_data_2 (%s)", user);
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
if (esre2->sam_sad.length == 0 || esre2->sam_sad.data == NULL) {
com_err("krb5kdc", KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED,
"No SecurID passcode in verify_securid_data_2 (%s)", user);
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Copy out SAD to null-terminated buffer */
memset(passcode, 0, sizeof(passcode));
if (esre2->sam_sad.length > (sizeof(passcode) - 1)) {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
"SecurID passcode/PIN too long (%d bytes) in "
"verify_securid_data_2 (%s)",
esre2->sam_sad.length, user);
goto cleanup;
}
memcpy(passcode, esre2->sam_sad.data, esre2->sam_sad.length);
securid_user = strdup(user);
if (!securid_user) {
retval = ENOMEM;
com_err("krb5kdc", ENOMEM,
"while copying user name in verify_securid_data_2 (%s)", user);
goto cleanup;
}
cp = strchr(securid_user, '@');
if (cp != NULL)
*cp = '\0';
/* Check for any track_id data that may have state from a previous attempt
* at SecurID authentication. */
if (sr2->sam_track_id.data && (sr2->sam_track_id.length > 0)) {
krb5_data track_id_data;
memset(&track_id_data, 0, sizeof(track_id_data));
retval = securid_decrypt_track_data_2(context, client,
&sr2->sam_track_id,
&track_id_data);
if (retval) {
com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
"while decrypting SecurID trackID in "
"verify_securid_data_2 (%s)", user);
goto cleanup;
}
if (track_id_data.length < sizeof (struct securid_track_data)) {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
com_err("krb5kdc", retval, "Length of track data incorrect");
goto cleanup;
}
trackp = (struct securid_track_data *)track_id_data.data;
if(trackp->hostid != gethostid()) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, "Unexpected challenge response");
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_DISCARD;
goto cleanup;
}
switch(trackp->state) {
case SECURID_STATE_INITIAL:
goto initial;
break;
case SECURID_STATE_NEW_PIN_AGAIN:
{
int pin1_len, pin2_len;
trackp->handle = ntohl(trackp->handle);
pin2_len = strlen(passcode);
pin1_len = strlen(trackp->passcode);
if ((pin1_len != pin2_len) ||
(memcmp(passcode, trackp->passcode, pin1_len) != 0)) {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, "New SecurID PIN Failed for user "
"%s: PIN mis-match", user);
break;
}
retval = SD_Pin(trackp->handle, passcode);
SD_Close(trackp->handle);
if (retval == ACM_NEW_PIN_ACCEPTED) {
enc_tkt_reply->flags|= TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH;
enc_tkt_reply->flags|= TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH;
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, "SecurID PIN Accepted for %s in "
"verify_securid_data_2",
securid_user);
retval = 0;
} else {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO,
"SecurID PIN Failed for user %s (AceServer "
"returns %d) in verify_securid_data_2",
user, retval);
}
break;
}
case SECURID_STATE_NEW_PIN: {
krb5_sam_challenge_2_body sc2b;
sc2p = k5alloc(sizeof *sc2p, &retval);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
memset(sc2p, 0, sizeof(*sc2p));
memset(&sc2b, 0, sizeof(sc2b));
sc2b.sam_type = PA_SAM_TYPE_SECURID;
sc2b.sam_response_prompt.data = NEW_PIN_AGAIN_message;
sc2b.sam_response_prompt.length =
strlen(sc2b.sam_response_prompt.data);
sc2b.sam_flags = KRB5_SAM_SEND_ENCRYPTED_SAD;
sc2b.sam_etype = client_key.enctype;
tmp_data.data = (char *)&sc2b.sam_nonce;
tmp_data.length = sizeof(sc2b.sam_nonce);
if ((retval = krb5_c_random_make_octets(context, &tmp_data))) {
com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
"while making nonce for SecurID new "
"PIN2 SAM_CHALLENGE_2 (%s)", user);
goto cleanup;
}
sid_track_data.state = SECURID_STATE_NEW_PIN_AGAIN;
sid_track_data.handle = trackp->handle;
sid_track_data.hostid = gethostid();
/* Should we complain if sizes don't work ?? */
memcpy(sid_track_data.passcode, passcode,
sizeof(sid_track_data.passcode));
tmp_data.data = (char *)&sid_track_data;
tmp_data.length = sizeof(sid_track_data);
if ((retval = securid_encrypt_track_data_2(context, client,
&tmp_data,
&sc2b.sam_track_id))) {
com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
"while encrypting NEW PIN2 SecurID "
"track data for SAM_CHALLENGE_2 (%s)",
securid_user);
goto cleanup;
}
retval = securid_make_sam_challenge_2_and_cksum(context, sc2p,
&sc2b,
&client_key);
if (retval) {
com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
"while making cksum for "
"SAM_CHALLENGE_2 (new PIN2) (%s)", securid_user);
goto cleanup;
}
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO,
"Requesting verification of new PIN for user %s",
securid_user);
*sc2_out = sc2p;
sc2p = NULL;
/*sc2_out may be set even on error path*/
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED;
goto cleanup;
}
case SECURID_STATE_NEXT_CODE:
trackp->handle = ntohl(trackp->handle);
retval = SD_Next(trackp->handle, passcode);
SD_Close(trackp->handle);
if (retval == ACM_OK) {
enc_tkt_reply->flags |= TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH | TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH;
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, "Next SecurID Code Accepted for "
"user %s", securid_user);
retval = 0;
} else {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, "Next SecurID Code Failed for user "
"%s (AceServer returns %d) in "
"verify_securid_data_2", user, retval);
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
break;
}
} else { /* No track data, this is first of N attempts */
initial:
retval = SD_Init(&sd_handle);
if (retval) {
com_err("krb5kdc", KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED,
"SD_Init() returns error %d in verify_securid_data_2 (%s)",
retval, securid_user);
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
retval = SD_Lock(sd_handle, securid_user);
if (retval != ACM_OK) {
SD_Close(sd_handle);
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO,
"SD_Lock() failed (AceServer returns %d) for %s",
retval, securid_user);
goto cleanup;
}
retval = SD_Check(sd_handle, passcode, securid_user);
switch (retval) {
case ACM_OK:
SD_Close(sd_handle);
enc_tkt_reply->flags|= TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH;
enc_tkt_reply->flags|= TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH;
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, "SecurID passcode accepted for user %s",
user);
retval = 0;
break;
case ACM_ACCESS_DENIED:
SD_Close(sd_handle);
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, "AceServer returns Access Denied for "
"user %s (SAM2)", user);
goto cleanup;
case ACM_NEW_PIN_REQUIRED:
new_pin = 1;
/*fall through*/
case ACM_NEXT_CODE_REQUIRED: {
krb5_sam_challenge_2_body sc2b;
sc2p = k5alloc(sizeof *sc2p, &retval);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
memset(sc2p, 0, sizeof(*sc2p));
memset(&sc2b, 0, sizeof(sc2b));
sc2b.sam_type = PA_SAM_TYPE_SECURID;
sc2b.sam_response_prompt.data = NEXT_PASSCODE_message;
sc2b.sam_response_prompt.length =
strlen(sc2b.sam_response_prompt.data);
sc2b.sam_flags = KRB5_SAM_SEND_ENCRYPTED_SAD;
sc2b.sam_etype = client_key.enctype;
if (new_pin) {
if ((AceGetMaxPinLen(sd_handle, &max_pin_len) == ACE_SUCCESS)
&& (AceGetMinPinLen(sd_handle,
&min_pin_len) == ACE_SUCCESS)
&& (AceGetAlphanumeric(sd_handle,
&alpha_pin) == ACE_SUCCESS)) {
sprintf(PIN_message,
"New PIN must contain %d to %d %sdigits",
min_pin_len, max_pin_len,
(alpha_pin == 0) ? "" : "alphanumeric ");
sc2b.sam_challenge_label.data = PIN_message;
sc2b.sam_challenge_label.length =
strlen(sc2b.sam_challenge_label.data);
} else {
sc2b.sam_challenge_label.length = 0;
}
}
tmp_data.data = (char *)&sc2b.sam_nonce;
tmp_data.length = sizeof(sc2b.sam_nonce);
if ((retval = krb5_c_random_make_octets(context, &tmp_data))) {
com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
"while making nonce for SecurID SAM_CHALLENGE_2 (%s)",
user);
goto cleanup;
}
if (new_pin)
sid_track_data.state = SECURID_STATE_NEW_PIN;
else
sid_track_data.state = SECURID_STATE_NEXT_CODE;
sid_track_data.handle = htonl(sd_handle);
sid_track_data.hostid = gethostid();
tmp_data.data = (char *)&sid_track_data;
tmp_data.length = sizeof(sid_track_data);
retval = securid_encrypt_track_data_2(context, client, &tmp_data,
&sc2b.sam_track_id);
if (retval) {
com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
"while encrypting SecurID track "
"data for SAM_CHALLENGE_2 (%s)",
securid_user);
goto cleanup;
}
retval = securid_make_sam_challenge_2_and_cksum(context, sc2p,
&sc2b,
&client_key);
if (retval) {
com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
"while making cksum for SAM_CHALLENGE_2 (%s)",
securid_user);
}
if (new_pin)
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, "New SecurID PIN required for "
"user %s", securid_user);
else
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, "Next SecurID passcode required "
"for user %s", securid_user);
*sc2_out = sc2p;
sc2p = NULL;
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED;
/*sc2_out is permitted as an output on error path*/
goto cleanup;
}
default:
com_err("krb5kdc", KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED,
"AceServer returns unknown error code %d "
"in verify_securid_data_2\n", retval);
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
} /* no track_id data */
cleanup:
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &client_key);
free(scratch.data);
krb5_free_enc_sam_response_enc_2(context, esre2);
free(user);
free(securid_user);
free(trackp);
krb5_free_sam_challenge_2(context, sc2p);
return retval;
}
/*
* Function: kdb_init_hist
*
* Purpose: Initializes the global history variables.
*
* Arguments:
*
* handle (r) kadm5 api server handle
* r (r) realm of history principal to use, or NULL
*
* Effects: This function sets the value of the following global
* variables:
*
* hist_princ krb5_principal holding the history principal
* hist_db krb5_db_entry of the history principal
* hist_key krb5_keyblock holding the history principal's key
* hist_encblock krb5_encrypt_block holding the procssed hist_key
* hist_kvno the version number of the history key
*
* If the history principal does not already exist, this function
* attempts to create it with kadm5_create_principal. WARNING!
* If the history principal is deleted and this function is executed
* (by kadmind, or kadmin.local, or anything else with permission),
* the principal will be assigned a new random key and all existing
* password history information will become useless.
*/
krb5_error_code kdb_init_hist(kadm5_server_handle_t handle, char *r)
{
int ret = 0;
char *realm, *hist_name;
krb5_key_data *key_data;
krb5_key_salt_tuple ks[1];
if (r == NULL) {
if ((ret = krb5_get_default_realm(handle->context, &realm)))
return ret;
} else {
realm = r;
}
if ((hist_name = (char *) malloc(strlen(KADM5_HIST_PRINCIPAL) +
strlen(realm) + 2)) == NULL)
goto done;
(void) sprintf(hist_name, "%s@%s", KADM5_HIST_PRINCIPAL, realm);
if ((ret = krb5_parse_name(handle->context, hist_name, &hist_princ)))
goto done;
if ((ret = kdb_get_entry(handle, hist_princ, &hist_db, NULL))) {
kadm5_principal_ent_rec ent;
if (ret != KADM5_UNK_PRINC)
goto done;
/* try to create the principal */
memset(&ent, 0, sizeof(ent));
ent.principal = hist_princ;
ent.max_life = KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX;
ent.attributes = 0;
/* this uses hist_kvno. So we set it to 2, which will be the
correct value once the principal is created and randomized.
Of course, it doesn't make sense to keep a history for the
history principal, anyway. */
hist_kvno = 2;
ks[0].ks_enctype = handle->params.enctype;
ks[0].ks_salttype = KRB5_KDB_SALTTYPE_NORMAL;
ret = kadm5_create_principal_3(handle, &ent,
(KADM5_PRINCIPAL |
KADM5_MAX_LIFE |
KADM5_ATTRIBUTES),
1, ks,
"to-be-random");
if (ret)
goto done;
/* this won't let us randomize the hist_princ. So we cheat. */
hist_princ = NULL;
ret = kadm5_randkey_principal_3(handle, ent.principal, 0, 1, ks,
NULL, NULL);
hist_princ = ent.principal;
if (ret)
goto done;
/* now read the newly-created kdb record out of the
database. */
if ((ret = kdb_get_entry(handle, hist_princ, &hist_db, NULL)))
goto done;
}
ret = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(handle->context, &hist_db,
handle->params.enctype, -1, -1, &key_data);
if (ret)
goto done;
ret = krb5_dbekd_decrypt_key_data(handle->context,
&handle->master_keyblock, key_data, &hist_key, NULL);
if (ret)
goto done;
hist_kvno = key_data->key_data_kvno;
done:
free(hist_name);
if (r == NULL)
free(realm);
return ret;
}
/*ARGSUSED*/
krb5_error_code
process_tgs_req(krb5_data *pkt, const krb5_fulladdr *from,
krb5_data **response)
{
krb5_keyblock * subkey = 0;
krb5_kdc_req *request = 0;
krb5_db_entry server;
krb5_kdc_rep reply;
krb5_enc_kdc_rep_part reply_encpart;
krb5_ticket ticket_reply, *header_ticket = 0;
int st_idx = 0;
krb5_enc_tkt_part enc_tkt_reply;
krb5_transited enc_tkt_transited;
int newtransited = 0;
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
int nprincs = 0;
krb5_boolean more;
krb5_timestamp kdc_time, authtime=0;
krb5_keyblock session_key;
krb5_timestamp until, rtime;
krb5_keyblock encrypting_key;
krb5_key_data *server_key;
char *cname = 0, *sname = 0, *tmp = 0;
const char *fromstring = 0;
krb5_last_req_entry *nolrarray[2], nolrentry;
/* krb5_address *noaddrarray[1]; */
krb5_enctype useenctype;
int errcode, errcode2;
register int i;
int firstpass = 1;
const char *status = 0;
char ktypestr[128];
char rep_etypestr[128];
char fromstringbuf[70];
session_key.contents = 0;
retval = decode_krb5_tgs_req(pkt, &request);
if (retval)
return retval;
if (request->msg_type != KRB5_TGS_REQ)
return KRB5_BADMSGTYPE;
ktypes2str(ktypestr, sizeof(ktypestr),
request->nktypes, request->ktype);
/*
* setup_server_realm() sets up the global realm-specific data pointer.
*/
if ((retval = setup_server_realm(request->server))) {
krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, request);
return retval;
}
fromstring = inet_ntop(ADDRTYPE2FAMILY(from->address->addrtype),
from->address->contents,
fromstringbuf, sizeof(fromstringbuf));
if (!fromstring)
fromstring = "<unknown>";
if ((errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, request->server, &sname))) {
status = "UNPARSING SERVER";
goto cleanup;
}
limit_string(sname);
/* errcode = kdc_process_tgs_req(request, from, pkt, &req_authdat); */
errcode = kdc_process_tgs_req(request, from, pkt, &header_ticket, &subkey);
if (header_ticket && header_ticket->enc_part2 &&
(errcode2 = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context,
header_ticket->enc_part2->client,
&cname))) {
status = "UNPARSING CLIENT";
errcode = errcode2;
goto cleanup;
}
limit_string(cname);
if (errcode) {
status = "PROCESS_TGS";
goto cleanup;
}
if (!header_ticket) {
errcode = KRB5_NO_TKT_SUPPLIED; /* XXX? */
status="UNEXPECTED NULL in header_ticket";
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* We've already dealt with the AP_REQ authentication, so we can
* use header_ticket freely. The encrypted part (if any) has been
* decrypted with the session key.
*/
authtime = header_ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime;
/* XXX make sure server here has the proper realm...taken from AP_REQ
header? */
nprincs = 1;
if ((errcode = get_principal(kdc_context, request->server, &server,
&nprincs, &more))) {
status = "LOOKING_UP_SERVER";
nprincs = 0;
goto cleanup;
}
tgt_again:
if (more) {
status = "NON_UNIQUE_PRINCIPAL";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_PRINCIPAL_NOT_UNIQUE;
goto cleanup;
} else if (nprincs != 1) {
/*
* might be a request for a TGT for some other realm; we
* should do our best to find such a TGS in this db
*/
if (firstpass && krb5_is_tgs_principal(request->server) == TRUE) {
if (krb5_princ_size(kdc_context, request->server) == 2) {
krb5_data *server_1 =
krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, request->server, 1);
krb5_data *tgs_1 =
krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, tgs_server, 1);
if (!tgs_1 || !data_eq(*server_1, *tgs_1)) {
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, nprincs);
find_alternate_tgs(request, &server, &more, &nprincs);
firstpass = 0;
goto tgt_again;
}
}
}
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, nprincs);
status = "UNKNOWN_SERVER";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto cleanup;
}
if ((errcode = krb5_timeofday(kdc_context, &kdc_time))) {
status = "TIME_OF_DAY";
goto cleanup;
}
if ((retval = validate_tgs_request(request, server, header_ticket,
kdc_time, &status))) {
if (!status)
status = "UNKNOWN_REASON";
errcode = retval + ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* We pick the session keytype here....
*
* Some special care needs to be taken in the user-to-user
* case, since we don't know what keytypes the application server
* which is doing user-to-user authentication can support. We
* know that it at least must be able to support the encryption
* type of the session key in the TGT, since otherwise it won't be
* able to decrypt the U2U ticket! So we use that in preference
* to anything else.
*/
useenctype = 0;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
krb5_keyblock * st_sealing_key;
krb5_kvno st_srv_kvno;
krb5_enctype etype;
/*
* Get the key for the second ticket, and decrypt it.
*/
if ((errcode = kdc_get_server_key(request->second_ticket[st_idx],
&st_sealing_key,
&st_srv_kvno))) {
status = "2ND_TKT_SERVER";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = krb5_decrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, st_sealing_key,
request->second_ticket[st_idx]);
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, st_sealing_key);
if (errcode) {
status = "2ND_TKT_DECRYPT";
goto cleanup;
}
etype = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2->session->enctype;
if (!krb5_c_valid_enctype(etype)) {
status = "BAD_ETYPE_IN_2ND_TKT";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
for (i = 0; i < request->nktypes; i++) {
if (request->ktype[i] == etype) {
useenctype = etype;
break;
}
}
}
/*
* Select the keytype for the ticket session key.
*/
if ((useenctype == 0) &&
(useenctype = select_session_keytype(kdc_context, &server,
request->nktypes,
request->ktype)) == 0) {
/* unsupported ktype */
status = "BAD_ENCRYPTION_TYPE";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = krb5_c_make_random_key(kdc_context, useenctype, &session_key);
if (errcode) {
/* random key failed */
status = "RANDOM_KEY_FAILED";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.server = request->server; /* XXX careful for realm... */
enc_tkt_reply.flags = 0;
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
/*
* Fix header_ticket's starttime; if it's zero, fill in the
* authtime's value.
*/
if (!(header_ticket->enc_part2->times.starttime))
header_ticket->enc_part2->times.starttime =
header_ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime;
/* don't use new addresses unless forwarded, see below */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = header_ticket->enc_part2->caddrs;
/* noaddrarray[0] = 0; */
reply_encpart.caddrs = 0; /* optional...don't put it in */
/* It should be noted that local policy may affect the */
/* processing of any of these flags. For example, some */
/* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets */
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDABLE))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDED)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED);
/* include new addresses in ticket & reply */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = request->addresses;
reply_encpart.caddrs = request->addresses;
}
if (isflagset(header_ticket->enc_part2->flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXIABLE))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PROXIABLE);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXY)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PROXY);
/* include new addresses in ticket & reply */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = request->addresses;
reply_encpart.caddrs = request->addresses;
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ALLOW_POSTDATE))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_MAY_POSTDATE);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_POSTDATED)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_POSTDATED);
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = request->from;
} else
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_VALIDATE)) {
/* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs
to the caller */
ticket_reply = *(header_ticket);
enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2);
enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL;
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEW)) {
krb5_deltat old_life;
/* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs
to the caller */
ticket_reply = *(header_ticket);
enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2);
enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL;
old_life = enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime - enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime;
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime =
min(header_ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till,
kdc_time + old_life);
} else {
/* not a renew request */
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
until = (request->till == 0) ? kdc_infinity : request->till;
enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime =
min(until, min(enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime + server.max_life,
min(enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime + max_life_for_realm,
header_ticket->enc_part2->times.endtime)));
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE_OK) &&
(enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime < request->till) &&
isflagset(header_ticket->enc_part2->flags,
TKT_FLG_RENEWABLE)) {
setflag(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE);
request->rtime =
min(request->till,
header_ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till);
}
}
rtime = (request->rtime == 0) ? kdc_infinity : request->rtime;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE)) {
/* already checked above in policy check to reject request for a
renewable ticket using a non-renewable ticket */
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_RENEWABLE);
enc_tkt_reply.times.renew_till =
min(rtime,
min(header_ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till,
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime +
min(server.max_renewable_life,
max_renewable_life_for_realm)));
} else {
enc_tkt_reply.times.renew_till = 0;
}
/*
* Set authtime to be the same as header_ticket's
*/
enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime = header_ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime;
/*
* Propagate the preauthentication flags through to the returned ticket.
*/
if (isflagset(header_ticket->enc_part2->flags, TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH);
if (isflagset(header_ticket->enc_part2->flags, TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH);
/* starttime is optional, and treated as authtime if not present.
so we can nuke it if it matches */
if (enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime == enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime)
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
/* assemble any authorization data */
if (request->authorization_data.ciphertext.data) {
krb5_data scratch;
scratch.length = request->authorization_data.ciphertext.length;
if (!(scratch.data =
malloc(request->authorization_data.ciphertext.length))) {
status = "AUTH_NOMEM";
errcode = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
if ((errcode = krb5_c_decrypt(kdc_context,
header_ticket->enc_part2->session,
KRB5_KEYUSAGE_TGS_REQ_AD_SESSKEY,
0, &request->authorization_data,
&scratch))) {
status = "AUTH_ENCRYPT_FAIL";
free(scratch.data);
goto cleanup;
}
/* scratch now has the authorization data, so we decode it */
errcode = decode_krb5_authdata(&scratch, &(request->unenc_authdata));
free(scratch.data);
if (errcode) {
status = "AUTH_DECODE";
goto cleanup;
}
if ((errcode =
concat_authorization_data(request->unenc_authdata,
header_ticket->enc_part2->authorization_data,
&enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data))) {
status = "CONCAT_AUTH";
goto cleanup;
}
} else
enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data =
header_ticket->enc_part2->authorization_data;
enc_tkt_reply.session = &session_key;
enc_tkt_reply.client = header_ticket->enc_part2->client;
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents = empty_string; /* equivalent of "" */
/*
* Only add the realm of the presented tgt to the transited list if
* it is different than the local realm (cross-realm) and it is different
* than the realm of the client (since the realm of the client is already
* implicitly part of the transited list and should not be explicitly
* listed).
*/
/* realm compare is like strcmp, but knows how to deal with these args */
if (realm_compare(header_ticket->server, tgs_server) ||
realm_compare(header_ticket->server, enc_tkt_reply.client)) {
/* tgt issued by local realm or issued by realm of client */
enc_tkt_reply.transited = header_ticket->enc_part2->transited;
} else {
/* tgt issued by some other realm and not the realm of the client */
/* assemble new transited field into allocated storage */
if (header_ticket->enc_part2->transited.tr_type !=
KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS) {
status = "BAD_TRTYPE";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
enc_tkt_transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
enc_tkt_transited.magic = 0;
enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.magic = 0;
enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.data = 0;
enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.length = 0;
enc_tkt_reply.transited = enc_tkt_transited;
if ((errcode =
add_to_transited(&header_ticket->enc_part2->transited.tr_contents,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents,
header_ticket->server,
enc_tkt_reply.client,
request->server))) {
status = "ADD_TR_FAIL";
goto cleanup;
}
newtransited = 1;
}
if (!isflagset (request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK)) {
unsigned int tlen;
char *tdots;
errcode = krb5_check_transited_list (kdc_context,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents,
krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, header_ticket->enc_part2->client),
krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, request->server));
tlen = enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.length;
tdots = tlen > 125 ? "..." : "";
tlen = tlen > 125 ? 125 : tlen;
if (errcode == 0) {
setflag (enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED);
} else if (errcode == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_ILL_CR_TKT)
krb5_klog_syslog (LOG_INFO,
"bad realm transit path from '%s' to '%s' "
"via '%.*s%s'",
cname ? cname : "<unknown client>",
sname ? sname : "<unknown server>",
tlen,
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data,
tdots);
else {
const char *emsg = krb5_get_error_message(kdc_context, errcode);
krb5_klog_syslog (LOG_ERR,
"unexpected error checking transit from "
"'%s' to '%s' via '%.*s%s': %s",
cname ? cname : "<unknown client>",
sname ? sname : "<unknown server>",
tlen,
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data,
tdots, emsg);
krb5_free_error_message(kdc_context, emsg);
}
} else
krb5_klog_syslog (LOG_INFO, "not checking transit path");
if (reject_bad_transit
&& !isflagset (enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED)) {
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
status = "BAD_TRANSIT";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.enc_part2 = &enc_tkt_reply;
/*
* If we are doing user-to-user authentication, then make sure
* that the client for the second ticket matches the request
* server, and then encrypt the ticket using the session key of
* the second ticket.
*/
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
/*
* Make sure the client for the second ticket matches
* requested server.
*/
krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
krb5_principal client2 = t2enc->client;
if (!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, request->server, client2)) {
if ((errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, client2, &tmp)))
tmp = 0;
if (tmp != NULL)
limit_string(tmp);
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO,
"TGS_REQ %s: 2ND_TKT_MISMATCH: "
"authtime %d, %s for %s, 2nd tkt client %s",
fromstring, authtime,
cname ? cname : "<unknown client>",
sname ? sname : "<unknown server>",
tmp ? tmp : "<unknown>");
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH;
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.enc_part.kvno = 0;
ticket_reply.enc_part.enctype = t2enc->session->enctype;
if ((errcode = krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, t2enc->session,
&ticket_reply))) {
status = "2ND_TKT_ENCRYPT";
goto cleanup;
}
st_idx++;
} else {
/*
* Find the server key
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, &server,
-1, /* ignore keytype */
-1, /* Ignore salttype */
0, /* Get highest kvno */
&server_key))) {
status = "FINDING_SERVER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
/* convert server.key into a real key (it may be encrypted
* in the database) */
if ((errcode = krb5_dbekd_decrypt_key_data(kdc_context,
&master_keyblock,
server_key, &encrypting_key,
NULL))) {
status = "DECRYPT_SERVER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, &encrypting_key,
&ticket_reply);
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &encrypting_key);
if (errcode) {
status = "TKT_ENCRYPT";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.enc_part.kvno = server_key->key_data_kvno;
}
/* Start assembling the response */
reply.msg_type = KRB5_TGS_REP;
reply.padata = 0; /* always */
reply.client = header_ticket->enc_part2->client;
reply.enc_part.kvno = 0; /* We are using the session key */
reply.ticket = &ticket_reply;
reply_encpart.session = &session_key;
reply_encpart.nonce = request->nonce;
/* copy the time fields EXCEPT for authtime; its location
is used for ktime */
reply_encpart.times = enc_tkt_reply.times;
reply_encpart.times.authtime = header_ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime;
/* starttime is optional, and treated as authtime if not present.
so we can nuke it if it matches */
if (enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime == enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime)
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
nolrentry.lr_type = KRB5_LRQ_NONE;
nolrentry.value = 0;
nolrarray[0] = &nolrentry;
nolrarray[1] = 0;
reply_encpart.last_req = nolrarray; /* not available for TGS reqs */
reply_encpart.key_exp = 0; /* ditto */
reply_encpart.flags = enc_tkt_reply.flags;
reply_encpart.server = ticket_reply.server;
/* use the session key in the ticket, unless there's a subsession key
in the AP_REQ */
reply.enc_part.enctype = subkey ? subkey->enctype :
header_ticket->enc_part2->session->enctype;
errcode = krb5_encode_kdc_rep(kdc_context, KRB5_TGS_REP, &reply_encpart,
subkey ? 1 : 0,
subkey ? subkey :
header_ticket->enc_part2->session,
&reply, response);
if (errcode) {
status = "ENCODE_KDC_REP";
} else {
status = "ISSUE";
}
memset(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
/* these parts are left on as a courtesy from krb5_encode_kdc_rep so we
can use them in raw form if needed. But, we don't... */
memset(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
cleanup:
if (status) {
const char * emsg = NULL;
if (!errcode)
rep_etypes2str(rep_etypestr, sizeof(rep_etypestr), &reply);
if (errcode)
emsg = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode);
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO,
"TGS_REQ (%s) %s: %s: authtime %d, "
"%s%s %s for %s%s%s",
ktypestr,
fromstring, status, authtime,
!errcode ? rep_etypestr : "",
!errcode ? "," : "",
cname ? cname : "<unknown client>",
sname ? sname : "<unknown server>",
errcode ? ", " : "",
errcode ? emsg : "");
if (errcode)
krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, emsg);
}
if (errcode) {
int got_err = 0;
if (status == 0) {
status = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode);
got_err = 1;
}
errcode -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
if (errcode < 0 || errcode > 128)
errcode = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
retval = prepare_error_tgs(request, header_ticket, errcode,
fromstring, response, status);
if (got_err) {
krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, status);
status = 0;
}
}
if (header_ticket)
krb5_free_ticket(kdc_context, header_ticket);
if (request)
krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, request);
if (cname)
free(cname);
if (sname)
free(sname);
if (nprincs)
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, 1);
if (session_key.contents)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &session_key);
if (newtransited)
free(enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data);
if (subkey)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, subkey);
return retval;
}
static void
finish_process_as_req(struct as_req_state *state, krb5_error_code errcode)
{
krb5_key_data *server_key;
krb5_keyblock *as_encrypting_key = NULL;
krb5_data *response = NULL;
const char *emsg = 0;
int did_log = 0;
loop_respond_fn oldrespond;
void *oldarg;
kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm = state->active_realm;
krb5_audit_state *au_state = state->au_state;
assert(state);
oldrespond = state->respond;
oldarg = state->arg;
if (errcode)
goto egress;
au_state->stage = ENCR_REP;
if ((errcode = validate_forwardable(state->request, *state->client,
*state->server, state->kdc_time,
&state->status))) {
errcode += ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
goto egress;
}
errcode = check_indicators(kdc_context, state->server,
state->auth_indicators);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "HIGHER_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED";
goto egress;
}
state->ticket_reply.enc_part2 = &state->enc_tkt_reply;
/*
* Find the server key
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, state->server,
-1, /* ignore keytype */
-1, /* Ignore salttype */
0, /* Get highest kvno */
&server_key))) {
state->status = "FINDING_SERVER_KEY";
goto egress;
}
/*
* Convert server->key into a real key
* (it may be encrypted in the database)
*
* server_keyblock is later used to generate auth data signatures
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(kdc_context, NULL,
server_key,
&state->server_keyblock,
NULL))) {
state->status = "DECRYPT_SERVER_KEY";
goto egress;
}
/* Start assembling the response */
state->reply.msg_type = KRB5_AS_REP;
state->reply.client = state->enc_tkt_reply.client; /* post canonization */
state->reply.ticket = &state->ticket_reply;
state->reply_encpart.session = &state->session_key;
if ((errcode = fetch_last_req_info(state->client,
&state->reply_encpart.last_req))) {
state->status = "FETCH_LAST_REQ";
goto egress;
}
state->reply_encpart.nonce = state->request->nonce;
state->reply_encpart.key_exp = get_key_exp(state->client);
state->reply_encpart.flags = state->enc_tkt_reply.flags;
state->reply_encpart.server = state->ticket_reply.server;
/* copy the time fields EXCEPT for authtime; it's location
* is used for ktime
*/
state->reply_encpart.times = state->enc_tkt_reply.times;
state->reply_encpart.times.authtime = state->authtime = state->kdc_time;
state->reply_encpart.caddrs = state->enc_tkt_reply.caddrs;
state->reply_encpart.enc_padata = NULL;
/* Fetch the padata info to be returned (do this before
* authdata to handle possible replacement of reply key
*/
errcode = return_padata(kdc_context, &state->rock, state->req_pkt,
state->request, &state->reply,
&state->client_keyblock, &state->pa_context);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "KDC_RETURN_PADATA";
goto egress;
}
/* If we didn't find a client long-term key and no preauth mechanism
* replaced the reply key, error out now. */
if (state->client_keyblock.enctype == ENCTYPE_NULL) {
state->status = "CANT_FIND_CLIENT_KEY";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
goto egress;
}
errcode = handle_authdata(kdc_context,
state->c_flags,
state->client,
state->server,
NULL,
state->local_tgt,
&state->client_keyblock,
&state->server_keyblock,
NULL,
state->req_pkt,
state->request,
NULL, /* for_user_princ */
NULL, /* enc_tkt_request */
state->auth_indicators,
&state->enc_tkt_reply);
if (errcode) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("AS_REQ : handle_authdata (%d)"),
errcode);
state->status = "HANDLE_AUTHDATA";
goto egress;
}
errcode = krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, &state->server_keyblock,
&state->ticket_reply);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "ENCRYPT_TICKET";
goto egress;
}
errcode = kau_make_tkt_id(kdc_context, &state->ticket_reply,
&au_state->tkt_out_id);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "GENERATE_TICKET_ID";
goto egress;
}
state->ticket_reply.enc_part.kvno = server_key->key_data_kvno;
errcode = kdc_fast_response_handle_padata(state->rstate,
state->request,
&state->reply,
state->client_keyblock.enctype);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "MAKE_FAST_RESPONSE";
goto egress;
}
/* now encode/encrypt the response */
state->reply.enc_part.enctype = state->client_keyblock.enctype;
errcode = kdc_fast_handle_reply_key(state->rstate, &state->client_keyblock,
&as_encrypting_key);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "MAKE_FAST_REPLY_KEY";
goto egress;
}
errcode = return_enc_padata(kdc_context, state->req_pkt, state->request,
as_encrypting_key, state->server,
&state->reply_encpart, FALSE);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "KDC_RETURN_ENC_PADATA";
goto egress;
}
if (kdc_fast_hide_client(state->rstate))
state->reply.client = (krb5_principal)krb5_anonymous_principal();
errcode = krb5_encode_kdc_rep(kdc_context, KRB5_AS_REP,
&state->reply_encpart, 0,
as_encrypting_key,
&state->reply, &response);
if (state->client_key != NULL)
state->reply.enc_part.kvno = state->client_key->key_data_kvno;
if (errcode) {
state->status = "ENCODE_KDC_REP";
goto egress;
}
/* these parts are left on as a courtesy from krb5_encode_kdc_rep so we
can use them in raw form if needed. But, we don't... */
memset(state->reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
state->reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(state->reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
log_as_req(kdc_context, state->from, state->request, &state->reply,
state->client, state->cname, state->server,
state->sname, state->authtime, 0, 0, 0);
did_log = 1;
egress:
if (errcode != 0)
assert (state->status != 0);
au_state->status = state->status;
au_state->reply = &state->reply;
kau_as_req(kdc_context,
(errcode || state->preauth_err) ? FALSE : TRUE, au_state);
kau_free_kdc_req(au_state);
free_padata_context(kdc_context, state->pa_context);
if (as_encrypting_key)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, as_encrypting_key);
if (errcode)
emsg = krb5_get_error_message(kdc_context, errcode);
if (state->status) {
log_as_req(kdc_context,
state->from, state->request, &state->reply, state->client,
state->cname, state->server, state->sname, state->authtime,
state->status, errcode, emsg);
did_log = 1;
}
if (errcode) {
if (state->status == 0) {
state->status = emsg;
}
if (errcode != KRB5KDC_ERR_DISCARD) {
errcode -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
if (errcode < 0 || errcode > KRB_ERR_MAX)
errcode = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
errcode = prepare_error_as(state->rstate, state->request,
state->local_tgt, errcode,
state->e_data, state->typed_e_data,
((state->client != NULL) ?
state->client->princ : NULL),
&response, state->status);
state->status = 0;
}
}
if (emsg)
krb5_free_error_message(kdc_context, emsg);
if (state->enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data != NULL)
krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context,
state->enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data);
if (state->server_keyblock.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &state->server_keyblock);
if (state->client_keyblock.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &state->client_keyblock);
if (state->reply.padata != NULL)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, state->reply.padata);
if (state->reply_encpart.enc_padata)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, state->reply_encpart.enc_padata);
if (state->cname != NULL)
free(state->cname);
if (state->sname != NULL)
free(state->sname);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, state->client);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, state->server);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, state->local_tgt_storage);
if (state->session_key.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &state->session_key);
if (state->ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data != NULL) {
memset(state->ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data , 0,
state->ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(state->ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
}
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, state->e_data);
krb5_free_data(kdc_context, state->inner_body);
kdc_free_rstate(state->rstate);
krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, state->request);
k5_free_data_ptr_list(state->auth_indicators);
assert(did_log != 0);
free(state);
(*oldrespond)(oldarg, errcode, response);
}
/*
* Create a CAMMAC for contents, using enc_tkt and the first key from krbtgt
* for the KDC verifier. Set *cammac_out to a single-element authdata list
* containing the CAMMAC inside an IF-RELEVANT container.
*/
krb5_error_code
cammac_create(krb5_context context, krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt,
krb5_keyblock *server_key, krb5_db_entry *krbtgt,
krb5_authdata **contents, krb5_authdata ***cammac_out)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_data *der_authdata = NULL, *der_enctkt = NULL, *der_cammac = NULL;
krb5_authdata ad, *list[2];
krb5_cammac cammac;
krb5_verifier_mac kdc_verifier, svc_verifier;
krb5_key_data *kd;
krb5_keyblock tgtkey;
krb5_checksum kdc_cksum, svc_cksum;
*cammac_out = NULL;
memset(&tgtkey, 0, sizeof(tgtkey));
memset(&kdc_cksum, 0, sizeof(kdc_cksum));
memset(&svc_cksum, 0, sizeof(svc_cksum));
/* Fetch the first krbtgt key for the KDC verifier. */
ret = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(context, krbtgt, -1, -1, 0, &kd);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ret = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(context, NULL, kd, &tgtkey, NULL);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* Checksum the reply with contents as authdata for the KDC verifier. */
ret = encode_kdcver_encpart(enc_tkt, contents, &der_enctkt);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ret = krb5_c_make_checksum(context, 0, &tgtkey, KRB5_KEYUSAGE_CAMMAC,
der_enctkt, &kdc_cksum);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
kdc_verifier.princ = NULL;
kdc_verifier.kvno = kd->key_data_kvno;
kdc_verifier.enctype = ENCTYPE_NULL;
kdc_verifier.checksum = kdc_cksum;
/* Encode the authdata and checksum it for the service verifier. */
ret = encode_krb5_authdata(contents, &der_authdata);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ret = krb5_c_make_checksum(context, 0, server_key, KRB5_KEYUSAGE_CAMMAC,
der_authdata, &svc_cksum);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
svc_verifier.princ = NULL;
svc_verifier.kvno = 0;
svc_verifier.enctype = ENCTYPE_NULL;
svc_verifier.checksum = svc_cksum;
cammac.elements = contents;
cammac.kdc_verifier = &kdc_verifier;
cammac.svc_verifier = &svc_verifier;
cammac.other_verifiers = NULL;
ret = encode_krb5_cammac(&cammac, &der_cammac);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* Wrap the encoded CAMMAC in an IF-RELEVANT container and return it as a
* single-element authdata list. */
ad.ad_type = KRB5_AUTHDATA_CAMMAC;
ad.length = der_cammac->length;
ad.contents = (uint8_t *)der_cammac->data;
list[0] = &ad;
list[1] = NULL;
ret = krb5_encode_authdata_container(context, KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT,
list, cammac_out);
cleanup:
krb5_free_data(context, der_enctkt);
krb5_free_data(context, der_authdata);
krb5_free_data(context, der_cammac);
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &tgtkey);
krb5_free_checksum_contents(context, &kdc_cksum);
krb5_free_checksum_contents(context, &svc_cksum);
return ret;
}
/*
* Previously this code returned either a v4 key or a v5 key and you
* could tell from the enctype of the v5 key whether the v4 key was
* useful. Now we return both keys so the code can try both des3 and
* des decryption. We fail if the ticket doesn't have a v4 key.
* Also, note as a side effect, the v5 key is basically useless in
* the client case. It is still returned so the caller can free it.
*/
static int
kerb_get_principal(char *name, char *inst, /* could have wild cards */
Principal *principal,
int *more, /* more tuples than room for */
krb5_keyblock *k5key, krb5_kvno kvno,
int issrv, /* true if retrieving a service key */
krb5_deltat *k5life)
{
/* Note that this structure should not be passed to the
krb5_free* functions, because the pointers within it point
to data with other references. */
krb5_principal search;
krb5_db_entry entries; /* filled in by krb5_db_get_principal() */
int nprinc; /* how many found */
krb5_boolean more5; /* are there more? */
C_Block k;
short toggle = 0;
unsigned long *date;
char* text;
struct tm *tp;
krb5_key_data *pkey;
krb5_error_code retval;
*more = 0;
/* begin setting up the principal structure
* with the first info we have:
*/
memcpy( principal->name, name, 1 + strlen( name));
memcpy( principal->instance, inst, 1 + strlen( inst));
/* the principal-name format changed between v4 & v5:
* v4: name.instance@realm
* v5: realm/name/instance
* in v5, null instance means the null-component doesn't exist.
*/
if ((retval = krb5_425_conv_principal(kdc_context, name, inst,
local_realm, &search)))
return(0);
if ((retval = krb5_db_get_principal(kdc_context, search, &entries,
&nprinc, &more5))) {
krb5_free_principal(kdc_context, search);
return(0);
}
principal->key_low = principal->key_high = 0;
krb5_free_principal(kdc_context, search);
if (nprinc < 1) {
*more = (int)more5 || (nprinc > 1);
return(nprinc);
}
if (!issrv) {
if (krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context,
&entries,
ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC,
KRB5_KDB_SALTTYPE_V4,
kvno,
&pkey) &&
krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context,
&entries,
ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC,
-1,
kvno,
&pkey)) {
lt = klog(L_KRB_PERR,
"KDC V4: principal %s.%s isn't V4 compatible",
name, inst);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &entries, nprinc);
return(0);
}
} else {
if ( krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, &entries,
ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC,
KRB5_KDB_SALTTYPE_V4, kvno, &pkey) &&
krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, &entries,
ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC,
-1, kvno, &pkey)) {
lt = klog(L_KRB_PERR,
"KDC V4: failed to find key for %s.%s #%d",
name, inst, kvno);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &entries, nprinc);
return(0);
}
}
if (!compat_decrypt_key(pkey, k, k5key, issrv)) {
memcpy( &principal->key_low, k, LONGLEN);
memcpy( &principal->key_high, (krb5_ui_4 *) k + 1, LONGLEN);
}
memset(k, 0, sizeof k);
if (issrv) {
krb5_free_keyblock_contents (kdc_context, k5key);
if (krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, &entries,
ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW,
-1, kvno, &pkey) &&
krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, &entries,
ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1,
-1, kvno, &pkey) &&
krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, &entries,
ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC,
KRB5_KDB_SALTTYPE_V4, kvno, &pkey) &&
krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, &entries,
ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC,
-1, kvno, &pkey)) {
lt = klog(L_KRB_PERR,
"KDC V4: failed to find key for %s.%s #%d (after having found it once)",
name, inst, kvno);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &entries, nprinc);
return(0);
}
compat_decrypt_key(pkey, k, k5key, issrv);
memset (k, 0, sizeof k);
}
/*
* Convert v5's entries struct to v4's Principal struct:
* v5's time-unit for lifetimes is 1 sec, while v4 uses 5 minutes,
* and gets weirder above (128 * 300) seconds.
*/
principal->max_life = krb_time_to_life(0, entries.max_life);
if (k5life != NULL)
*k5life = entries.max_life;
/*
* This is weird, but the intent is that the expiration is the minimum
* of the principal expiration and key expiration
*/
principal->exp_date = (unsigned long)
entries.expiration && entries.pw_expiration ?
min(entries.expiration, entries.pw_expiration) :
(entries.pw_expiration ? entries.pw_expiration :
entries.expiration);
/* principal->mod_date = (unsigned long) entries.mod_date; */
/* Set the master key version to 1. It's not really useful because all keys
* will be encrypted in the same master key version, and digging out the
* actual key version will be harder than it's worth --proven */
/* principal->kdc_key_ver = entries.mkvno; */
principal->kdc_key_ver = 1;
principal->key_version = pkey->key_data_kvno;
/* We overload the attributes with the relevant v5 ones */
principal->attributes = 0;
if (isflagset(entries.attributes, KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_HW_AUTH) ||
isflagset(entries.attributes, KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PRE_AUTH)) {
principal->attributes |= V4_KDB_REQUIRES_PREAUTH;
}
if (isflagset(entries.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX)) {
principal->attributes |= V4_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX;
}
if (issrv && isflagset(entries.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_SVR)) {
principal->attributes |= V4_KDB_DISALLOW_SVR;
}
if (isflagset(entries.attributes, KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE)) {
principal->attributes |= V4_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE;
}
/* set up v4 format of each date's text: */
for ( date = &principal->exp_date, text = principal->exp_date_txt;
toggle ^= 1;
date = &principal->mod_date, text = principal->mod_date_txt) {
tp = localtime( (time_t *) date);
sprintf( text, "%4d-%02d-%02d",
tp->tm_year > 1900 ? tp->tm_year : tp->tm_year + 1900,
tp->tm_mon + 1, tp->tm_mday); /* January is 0, not 1 */
}
/*
* free the storage held by the v5 entry struct,
* which was allocated by krb5_db_get_principal().
* this routine clears the keyblock's contents for us.
*/
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &entries, nprinc);
*more = (int) more5 || (nprinc > 1);
return( nprinc);
}
