static int s2n_check_p_g_dh_params(struct s2n_dh_params *dh_params)
{
notnull_check(dh_params);
notnull_check(dh_params->dh);
const BIGNUM *p = s2n_get_p_dh_param(dh_params);
const BIGNUM *g = s2n_get_g_dh_param(dh_params);
notnull_check(g);
notnull_check(p);
if (DH_size(dh_params->dh) < S2N_MIN_DH_PRIME_SIZE_BYTES) {
S2N_ERROR(S2N_ERR_DH_PARAMS_CREATE);
}
if (BN_is_zero(g)) {
S2N_ERROR(S2N_ERR_DH_PARAMS_CREATE);
}
if (BN_is_zero(p)) {
S2N_ERROR(S2N_ERR_DH_PARAMS_CREATE);
}
return 0;
}
int s2n_shutdown(struct s2n_connection *conn, s2n_blocked_status * more)
{
notnull_check(conn);
notnull_check(more);
/* Treat this call as a no-op if already wiped */
if (conn->send == NULL && conn->recv == NULL) {
return 0;
}
uint64_t elapsed;
GUARD(s2n_timer_elapsed(conn->config, &conn->write_timer, &elapsed));
S2N_ERROR_IF(elapsed < conn->delay, S2N_ERR_SHUTDOWN_PAUSED);
/* Queue our close notify, once. Use warning level so clients don't give up */
GUARD(s2n_queue_writer_close_alert_warning(conn));
/* Write it */
GUARD(s2n_flush(conn, more));
/* Assume caller isn't interested in pending incoming data */
if (conn->in_status == PLAINTEXT) {
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_wipe(&conn->header_in));
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_wipe(&conn->in));
conn->in_status = ENCRYPTED;
}
/* Fails with S2N_ERR_SHUTDOWN_RECORD_TYPE or S2N_ERR_ALERT on receipt of anything but a close_notify */
GUARD(s2n_recv_close_notify(conn, more));
return 0;
}
int s2n_dh_compute_shared_secret_as_server(struct s2n_dh_params *server_dh_params, struct s2n_stuffer *Yc_in, struct s2n_blob *shared_key)
{
uint16_t Yc_length;
struct s2n_blob Yc;
int shared_key_size;
BIGNUM *pub_key;
GUARD(s2n_check_all_dh_params(server_dh_params));
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_read_uint16(Yc_in, &Yc_length));
Yc.size = Yc_length;
Yc.data = s2n_stuffer_raw_read(Yc_in, Yc.size);
notnull_check(Yc.data);
pub_key = BN_bin2bn((const unsigned char *)Yc.data, Yc.size, NULL);
notnull_check(pub_key);
GUARD(s2n_alloc(shared_key, DH_size(server_dh_params->dh)));
shared_key_size = DH_compute_key(shared_key->data, pub_key, server_dh_params->dh);
if (shared_key_size <= 0) {
BN_free(pub_key);
S2N_ERROR(S2N_ERR_DH_SHARED_SECRET);
}
shared_key->size = shared_key_size;
BN_free(pub_key);
return 0;
}
int s2n_kem_server_key_recv_read_data(struct s2n_connection *conn, struct s2n_blob *data_to_verify, union s2n_kex_raw_server_data *raw_server_data)
{
struct s2n_kem_raw_server_params *kem_data = &raw_server_data->kem_data;
struct s2n_stuffer *in = &conn->handshake.io;
const struct s2n_kem *kem = conn->secure.s2n_kem_keys.negotiated_kem;
kem_public_key_size key_length;
/* Keep a copy to the start of the whole structure for the signature check */
data_to_verify->data = s2n_stuffer_raw_read(in, 0);
notnull_check(data_to_verify->data);
/* the server sends the KEM ID again and this must match what was agreed upon during server hello */
kem_extension_size kem_id;
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_read_uint8(in, &kem_id));
eq_check(kem_id, kem->kem_extension_id);
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_read_uint16(in, &key_length));
S2N_ERROR_IF(key_length > s2n_stuffer_data_available(in), S2N_ERR_BAD_MESSAGE);
S2N_ERROR_IF(key_length != conn->secure.s2n_kem_keys.negotiated_kem->public_key_length, S2N_ERR_BAD_MESSAGE);
kem_data->raw_public_key.data = s2n_stuffer_raw_read(in, key_length);
notnull_check(kem_data->raw_public_key.data);
kem_data->raw_public_key.size = key_length;
data_to_verify->size = sizeof(kem_extension_size) + sizeof(kem_public_key_size) + key_length;
return 0;
}
int s2n_rsa_public_encrypted_size(struct s2n_rsa_public_key *key)
{
notnull_check(key->rsa);
notnull_check(key->rsa->n);
return RSA_size(key->rsa);
}
int s2n_x509_trust_store_add_pem(struct s2n_x509_trust_store *store, const char *pem)
{
notnull_check(store);
notnull_check(pem);
if (!store->trust_store) {
store->trust_store = X509_STORE_new();
}
DEFER_CLEANUP(struct s2n_stuffer pem_in_stuffer = {{0}}, s2n_stuffer_free);
DEFER_CLEANUP(struct s2n_stuffer der_out_stuffer = {{0}}, s2n_stuffer_free);
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_alloc_ro_from_string(&pem_in_stuffer, pem));
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_growable_alloc(&der_out_stuffer, 2048));
do {
DEFER_CLEANUP(struct s2n_blob next_cert = {0}, s2n_free);
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_certificate_from_pem(&pem_in_stuffer, &der_out_stuffer));
GUARD(s2n_alloc(&next_cert, s2n_stuffer_data_available(&der_out_stuffer)));
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_read(&der_out_stuffer, &next_cert));
const uint8_t *data = next_cert.data;
DEFER_CLEANUP(X509 *ca_cert = d2i_X509(NULL, &data, next_cert.size), X509_free_pointer);
S2N_ERROR_IF(ca_cert == NULL, S2N_ERR_DECODE_CERTIFICATE);
GUARD_OSSL(X509_STORE_add_cert(store->trust_store, ca_cert), S2N_ERR_DECODE_CERTIFICATE);
} while (s2n_stuffer_data_available(&pem_in_stuffer));
return 0;
}
int s2n_dhe_server_key_recv_read_data(struct s2n_connection *conn, struct s2n_blob *data_to_verify, union s2n_kex_raw_server_data *raw_server_data)
{
struct s2n_stuffer *in = &conn->handshake.io;
struct s2n_dhe_raw_server_points *dhe_data = &raw_server_data->dhe_data;
uint16_t p_length;
uint16_t g_length;
uint16_t Ys_length;
/* Keep a copy to the start of the whole structure for the signature check */
data_to_verify->data = s2n_stuffer_raw_read(in, 0);
notnull_check(data_to_verify->data);
/* Read each of the three elements in */
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_read_uint16(in, &p_length));
dhe_data->p.size = p_length;
dhe_data->p.data = s2n_stuffer_raw_read(in, p_length);
notnull_check(dhe_data->p.data);
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_read_uint16(in, &g_length));
dhe_data->g.size = g_length;
dhe_data->g.data = s2n_stuffer_raw_read(in, g_length);
notnull_check(dhe_data->g.data);
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_read_uint16(in, &Ys_length));
dhe_data->Ys.size = Ys_length;
dhe_data->Ys.data = s2n_stuffer_raw_read(in, Ys_length);
notnull_check(dhe_data->Ys.data);
/* Now we know the total size of the structure */
data_to_verify->size = 2 + p_length + 2 + g_length + 2 + Ys_length;
return 0;
}
static int s2n_rsa_modulus_check(RSA *rsa)
{
/* RSA was made opaque starting in Openssl 1.1.0 */
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER
notnull_check(rsa->n);
#else
const BIGNUM *n = NULL;
/* RSA still owns the memory for n */
RSA_get0_key(rsa, &n, NULL, NULL);
notnull_check(n);
#endif
return 0;
}
int s2n_kem_generate_keypair(struct s2n_kem_keypair *kem_keys)
{
notnull_check(kem_keys);
const struct s2n_kem *kem = kem_keys->negotiated_kem;
notnull_check(kem->generate_keypair);
eq_check(kem_keys->public_key.size, kem->public_key_length);
notnull_check(kem_keys->public_key.data);
/* The private key is needed for client_key_recv and must be saved */
GUARD(s2n_alloc(&kem_keys->private_key, kem->private_key_length));
GUARD(kem->generate_keypair(kem_keys->public_key.data, kem_keys->private_key.data));
return 0;
}
int s2n_rsa_private_encrypted_size(struct s2n_rsa_private_key *key)
{
notnull_check(key->rsa);
GUARD(s2n_rsa_modulus_check(key->rsa));
return RSA_size(key->rsa);
}
static int s2n_evp_hmac_p_hash_digest_init(struct s2n_prf_working_space *ws)
{
notnull_check(ws->tls.p_hash.evp_hmac.evp_digest.md);
notnull_check(ws->tls.p_hash.evp_hmac.evp_digest.ctx);
notnull_check(ws->tls.p_hash.evp_hmac.mac_key);
/* Ignore the MD5 check when in FIPS mode to comply with the TLS 1.0 RFC */
if (s2n_is_in_fips_mode()) {
GUARD(s2n_digest_allow_md5_for_fips(&ws->tls.p_hash.evp_hmac.evp_digest));
}
GUARD_OSSL(EVP_DigestSignInit(ws->tls.p_hash.evp_hmac.evp_digest.ctx, NULL, ws->tls.p_hash.evp_hmac.evp_digest.md, NULL, ws->tls.p_hash.evp_hmac.mac_key),
S2N_ERR_P_HASH_INIT_FAILED);
return 0;
}
static int s2n_evp_hmac_p_hash_init(struct s2n_prf_working_space *ws, s2n_hmac_algorithm alg, struct s2n_blob *secret)
{
/* Initialize the message digest */
switch (alg) {
case S2N_HMAC_SSLv3_MD5:
case S2N_HMAC_MD5:
ws->tls.p_hash.evp_hmac.evp_digest.md = EVP_md5();
break;
case S2N_HMAC_SSLv3_SHA1:
case S2N_HMAC_SHA1:
ws->tls.p_hash.evp_hmac.evp_digest.md = EVP_sha1();
break;
case S2N_HMAC_SHA224:
ws->tls.p_hash.evp_hmac.evp_digest.md = EVP_sha224();
break;
case S2N_HMAC_SHA256:
ws->tls.p_hash.evp_hmac.evp_digest.md = EVP_sha256();
break;
case S2N_HMAC_SHA384:
ws->tls.p_hash.evp_hmac.evp_digest.md = EVP_sha384();
break;
case S2N_HMAC_SHA512:
ws->tls.p_hash.evp_hmac.evp_digest.md = EVP_sha512();
break;
default:
S2N_ERROR(S2N_ERR_P_HASH_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
}
/* Initialize the mac key using the provided secret */
notnull_check(ws->tls.p_hash.evp_hmac.mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, secret->data, secret->size));
/* Initialize the message digest context with the above message digest and mac key */
return s2n_evp_hmac_p_hash_digest_init(ws);
}
int s2n_server_extensions_recv(struct s2n_connection *conn, struct s2n_blob *extensions)
{
struct s2n_stuffer in;
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_init(&in, extensions));
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_write(&in, extensions));
while (s2n_stuffer_data_available(&in)) {
struct s2n_blob ext;
uint16_t extension_type, extension_size;
struct s2n_stuffer extension;
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_read_uint16(&in, &extension_type));
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_read_uint16(&in, &extension_size));
ext.size = extension_size;
ext.data = s2n_stuffer_raw_read(&in, ext.size);
notnull_check(ext.data);
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_init(&extension, &ext));
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_write(&extension, &ext));
switch (extension_type) {
case TLS_EXTENSION_ALPN:
GUARD(s2n_recv_server_alpn(conn, &extension));
break;
case TLS_EXTENSION_STATUS_REQUEST:
GUARD(s2n_recv_server_status_request(conn, &extension));
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
int s2n_ecdsa_der_signature_size(const struct s2n_pkey *pkey)
{
const struct s2n_ecdsa_key *ecdsa_key = &pkey->key.ecdsa_key;
notnull_check(ecdsa_key->ec_key);
return ECDSA_size(ecdsa_key->ec_key);
}
static int s2n_evp_hmac_p_hash_free(struct s2n_prf_working_space *ws)
{
notnull_check(ws->tls.p_hash.evp_hmac.evp_digest.ctx);
S2N_EVP_MD_CTX_FREE(ws->tls.p_hash.evp_hmac.evp_digest.ctx);
ws->tls.p_hash.evp_hmac.evp_digest.ctx = NULL;
return 0;
}
int s2n_dh_params_free(struct s2n_dh_params *dh_params)
{
notnull_check(dh_params);
DH_free(dh_params->dh);
dh_params->dh = NULL;
return 0;
}
/* See http://www-archive.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss/ssl/draft02.html 2.5 */
int s2n_sslv2_client_hello_recv(struct s2n_connection *conn)
{
struct s2n_stuffer *in = &conn->handshake.io;
uint16_t session_id_length;
uint16_t cipher_suites_length;
uint16_t challenge_length;
uint8_t *cipher_suites;
if (conn->client_protocol_version < conn->config->cipher_preferences->minimum_protocol_version || conn->client_protocol_version > conn->server_protocol_version) {
GUARD(s2n_queue_reader_unsupported_protocol_version_alert(conn));
S2N_ERROR(S2N_ERR_BAD_MESSAGE);
}
conn->actual_protocol_version = MIN(conn->client_protocol_version, conn->server_protocol_version);
conn->client_hello_version = S2N_SSLv2;
/* We start 5 bytes into the record */
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_read_uint16(in, &cipher_suites_length));
if (cipher_suites_length % S2N_SSLv2_CIPHER_SUITE_LEN) {
S2N_ERROR(S2N_ERR_BAD_MESSAGE);
}
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_read_uint16(in, &session_id_length));
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_read_uint16(in, &challenge_length));
if (challenge_length > S2N_TLS_RANDOM_DATA_LEN) {
S2N_ERROR(S2N_ERR_BAD_MESSAGE);
}
cipher_suites = s2n_stuffer_raw_read(in, cipher_suites_length);
notnull_check(cipher_suites);
GUARD(s2n_set_cipher_as_sslv2_server(conn, cipher_suites, cipher_suites_length / S2N_SSLv2_CIPHER_SUITE_LEN));
if (session_id_length > s2n_stuffer_data_available(in)) {
S2N_ERROR(S2N_ERR_BAD_MESSAGE);
}
if (session_id_length > 0 && session_id_length <= S2N_TLS_SESSION_ID_MAX_LEN) {
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_read_bytes(in, conn->session_id, session_id_length));
conn->session_id_len = (uint8_t) session_id_length;
} else {
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_skip_read(in, session_id_length));
}
struct s2n_blob b;
b.data = conn->secure.client_random;
b.size = S2N_TLS_RANDOM_DATA_LEN;
b.data += S2N_TLS_RANDOM_DATA_LEN - challenge_length;
b.size -= S2N_TLS_RANDOM_DATA_LEN - challenge_length;
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_read(in, &b));
conn->server->chosen_cert_chain = conn->config->cert_and_key_pairs;
GUARD(s2n_conn_set_handshake_type(conn));
return 0;
}
int s2n_server_key_recv(struct s2n_connection *conn)
{
struct s2n_hash_state *signature_hash = &conn->secure.signature_hash;
const struct s2n_kex *key_exchange = conn->secure.cipher_suite->key_exchange_alg;
struct s2n_stuffer *in = &conn->handshake.io;
struct s2n_blob data_to_verify = {0};
/* Read the KEX data */
union s2n_kex_raw_server_data kex_data = {{{0}}};
GUARD(s2n_kex_server_key_recv_read_data(key_exchange, conn, &data_to_verify, &kex_data));
/* Add common signature data */
if (conn->actual_protocol_version == S2N_TLS12) {
s2n_hash_algorithm hash_algorithm;
s2n_signature_algorithm signature_algorithm;
GUARD(s2n_get_signature_hash_pair_if_supported(in, &hash_algorithm, &signature_algorithm));
GUARD(s2n_hash_init(signature_hash, hash_algorithm));
} else {
GUARD(s2n_hash_init(signature_hash, conn->secure.conn_hash_alg));
}
GUARD(s2n_hash_update(signature_hash, conn->secure.client_random, S2N_TLS_RANDOM_DATA_LEN));
GUARD(s2n_hash_update(signature_hash, conn->secure.server_random, S2N_TLS_RANDOM_DATA_LEN));
/* Add KEX specific data */
GUARD(s2n_hash_update(signature_hash, data_to_verify.data, data_to_verify.size));
/* Verify the signature */
uint16_t signature_length;
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_read_uint16(in, &signature_length));
struct s2n_blob signature = {.size = signature_length, .data = s2n_stuffer_raw_read(in, signature_length)};
notnull_check(signature.data);
gt_check(signature_length, 0);
S2N_ERROR_IF(s2n_pkey_verify(&conn->secure.server_public_key, signature_hash, &signature) < 0, S2N_ERR_BAD_MESSAGE);
/* We don't need the key any more, so free it */
GUARD(s2n_pkey_free(&conn->secure.server_public_key));
/* Parse the KEX data into whatever form needed and save it to the connection object */
GUARD(s2n_kex_server_key_recv_parse_data(key_exchange, conn, &kex_data));
return 0;
}
int s2n_ecdhe_server_key_recv_read_data(struct s2n_connection *conn, struct s2n_blob *data_to_verify, union s2n_kex_raw_server_data *raw_server_data)
{
struct s2n_stuffer *in = &conn->handshake.io;
GUARD(s2n_ecc_read_ecc_params(in, data_to_verify, &raw_server_data->ecdhe_data));
return 0;
}
int s2n_ecdhe_server_key_recv_parse_data(struct s2n_connection *conn, union s2n_kex_raw_server_data *raw_server_data)
{
GUARD(s2n_ecc_parse_ecc_params(&conn->secure.server_ecc_params, &raw_server_data->ecdhe_data));
return 0;
}
int s2n_config_set_cache_delete_callback(struct s2n_config *config, int (*cache_delete)(void *, const void *key, uint64_t key_size), void *data)
{
notnull_check(cache_delete);
config->cache_delete = cache_delete;
config->cache_delete_data = data;
return 0;
}
int s2n_config_set_cache_retrieve_callback(struct s2n_config *config, int (*cache_retrieve)(void *, const void *key, uint64_t key_size, void *value, uint64_t *value_size), void *data)
{
notnull_check(cache_retrieve);
config->cache_retrieve = cache_retrieve;
config->cache_retrieve_data = data;
return 0;
}
int s2n_kem_decapsulate(const struct s2n_kem_keypair *kem_keys, struct s2n_blob *shared_secret,
const struct s2n_blob *ciphertext)
{
notnull_check(kem_keys);
const struct s2n_kem *kem = kem_keys->negotiated_kem;
notnull_check(kem->decapsulate);
eq_check(kem_keys->private_key.size, kem->private_key_length);
notnull_check(kem_keys->private_key.data);
eq_check(ciphertext->size, kem->ciphertext_length);
notnull_check(ciphertext->data);
GUARD(s2n_alloc(shared_secret, kem_keys->negotiated_kem->shared_secret_key_length));
GUARD(kem->decapsulate(shared_secret->data, ciphertext->data, kem_keys->private_key.data));
return 0;
}
int s2n_client_extensions_recv(struct s2n_connection *conn, struct s2n_blob *extensions)
{
struct s2n_stuffer in;
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_init(&in, extensions));
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_write(&in, extensions));
while (s2n_stuffer_data_available(&in)) {
struct s2n_blob ext;
uint16_t extension_type, extension_size;
struct s2n_stuffer extension;
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_read_uint16(&in, &extension_type));
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_read_uint16(&in, &extension_size));
ext.size = extension_size;
lte_check(extension_size, s2n_stuffer_data_available(&in));
ext.data = s2n_stuffer_raw_read(&in, ext.size);
notnull_check(ext.data);
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_init(&extension, &ext));
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_write(&extension, &ext));
switch (extension_type) {
case TLS_EXTENSION_SERVER_NAME:
GUARD(s2n_recv_client_server_name(conn, &extension));
break;
case TLS_EXTENSION_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS:
GUARD(s2n_recv_client_signature_algorithms(conn, &extension, &conn->secure.conn_hash_alg, &conn->secure.conn_sig_alg));
break;
case TLS_EXTENSION_ALPN:
GUARD(s2n_recv_client_alpn(conn, &extension));
break;
case TLS_EXTENSION_STATUS_REQUEST:
GUARD(s2n_recv_client_status_request(conn, &extension));
break;
case TLS_EXTENSION_ELLIPTIC_CURVES:
GUARD(s2n_recv_client_elliptic_curves(conn, &extension));
break;
case TLS_EXTENSION_EC_POINT_FORMATS:
GUARD(s2n_recv_client_ec_point_formats(conn, &extension));
break;
case TLS_EXTENSION_RENEGOTIATION_INFO:
GUARD(s2n_recv_client_renegotiation_info(conn, &extension));
break;
case TLS_EXTENSION_SCT_LIST:
GUARD(s2n_recv_client_sct_list(conn, &extension));
break;
case TLS_EXTENSION_MAX_FRAG_LEN:
GUARD(s2n_recv_client_max_frag_len(conn, &extension));
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
int s2n_x509_validator_set_max_chain_depth(struct s2n_x509_validator *validator, uint16_t max_depth) {
notnull_check(validator);
if (max_depth > 0) {
validator->max_chain_depth = max_depth;
return 0;
}
return -1;
}
int s2n_dh_params_to_p_g_Ys(struct s2n_dh_params *server_dh_params, struct s2n_stuffer *out, struct s2n_blob *output)
{
GUARD(s2n_check_all_dh_params(server_dh_params));
const BIGNUM *bn_p = s2n_get_p_dh_param(server_dh_params);
const BIGNUM *bn_g = s2n_get_g_dh_param(server_dh_params);
const BIGNUM *bn_Ys = s2n_get_Ys_dh_param(server_dh_params);
uint16_t p_size = BN_num_bytes(bn_p);
uint16_t g_size = BN_num_bytes(bn_g);
uint16_t Ys_size = BN_num_bytes(bn_Ys);
uint8_t *p;
uint8_t *g;
uint8_t *Ys;
output->data = s2n_stuffer_raw_write(out, 0);
notnull_check(output->data);
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_write_uint16(out, p_size));
p = s2n_stuffer_raw_write(out, p_size);
notnull_check(p);
if (BN_bn2bin(bn_p, p) != p_size) {
S2N_ERROR(S2N_ERR_DH_SERIALIZING);
}
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_write_uint16(out, g_size));
g = s2n_stuffer_raw_write(out, g_size);
notnull_check(g);
if (BN_bn2bin(bn_g, g) != g_size) {
S2N_ERROR(S2N_ERR_DH_SERIALIZING);
}
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_write_uint16(out, Ys_size));
Ys = s2n_stuffer_raw_write(out, Ys_size);
notnull_check(Ys);
if (BN_bn2bin(bn_Ys, Ys) != Ys_size) {
S2N_ERROR(S2N_ERR_DH_SERIALIZING);
}
output->size = p_size + 2 + g_size + 2 + Ys_size + 2;
return 0;
}
int s2n_stuffer_read_bytes(struct s2n_stuffer *stuffer, uint8_t *data, uint32_t size)
{
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_skip_read(stuffer, size));
void *ptr = stuffer->blob.data + stuffer->read_cursor - size;
notnull_check(ptr);
memcpy_check(data, ptr, size);
return 0;
}
static int s2n_check_pub_key_dh_params(struct s2n_dh_params *dh_params)
{
const BIGNUM *pub_key = s2n_get_Ys_dh_param(dh_params);
notnull_check(pub_key);
if (BN_is_zero(pub_key)) {
S2N_ERROR(S2N_ERR_DH_PARAMS_CREATE);
}
return 0;
}
static int s2n_evp_hmac_p_hash_cleanup(struct s2n_prf_working_space *ws)
{
/* Prepare the workspace md_ctx for the next p_hash */
GUARD(s2n_evp_hmac_p_hash_wipe(ws));
/* Free mac key - PKEYs cannot be reused */
notnull_check(ws->tls.p_hash.evp_hmac.mac_key);
EVP_PKEY_free(ws->tls.p_hash.evp_hmac.mac_key);
ws->tls.p_hash.evp_hmac.mac_key = NULL;
return 0;
}
int s2n_kem_server_key_send(struct s2n_connection *conn, struct s2n_blob *data_to_sign)
{
struct s2n_stuffer *out = &conn->handshake.io;
const struct s2n_kem *kem = conn->secure.s2n_kem_keys.negotiated_kem;
data_to_sign->data = s2n_stuffer_raw_write(out, 0);
notnull_check(data_to_sign->data);
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_write_uint8(out, kem->kem_extension_id));
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_write_uint16(out, kem->public_key_length));
/* The public key is not needed after this method, write it straight to the stuffer */
struct s2n_blob *public_key = &conn->secure.s2n_kem_keys.public_key;
public_key->data = s2n_stuffer_raw_write(out, kem->public_key_length);
notnull_check(public_key->data);
public_key->size = kem->public_key_length;
GUARD(s2n_kem_generate_keypair(&conn->secure.s2n_kem_keys));
data_to_sign->size = sizeof(kem_extension_size) + sizeof(kem_public_key_size) + public_key->size;
return 0;
}
int s2n_set_cipher_as_client(struct s2n_connection *conn, uint8_t wire[S2N_TLS_CIPHER_SUITE_LEN])
{
/* See if the cipher is one we support */
conn->secure.cipher_suite = s2n_cipher_suite_from_wire(wire);
S2N_ERROR_IF(conn->secure.cipher_suite == NULL, S2N_ERR_CIPHER_NOT_SUPPORTED);
/* For SSLv3 use SSLv3-specific ciphers */
if (conn->actual_protocol_version == S2N_SSLv3) {
conn->secure.cipher_suite = conn->secure.cipher_suite->sslv3_cipher_suite;
notnull_check(conn->secure.cipher_suite);
}
return 0;
}
int s2n_x509_validator_init(struct s2n_x509_validator *validator, struct s2n_x509_trust_store *trust_store, uint8_t check_ocsp) {
notnull_check(trust_store);
validator->trust_store = trust_store;
validator->skip_cert_validation = 0;
validator->check_stapled_ocsp = check_ocsp;
validator->max_chain_depth = DEFAULT_MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH;
validator->cert_chain = NULL;
if (validator->trust_store->trust_store) {
validator->cert_chain = sk_X509_new_null();
}
return 0;
}