Beispiel #1
0
void old_nt_password_hash_encrypted_with_new_nt_password_hash(
	const u8 *new_password, size_t new_password_len,
	const u8 *old_password, size_t old_password_len,
	u8 *encrypted_password_hash)
{
	u8 old_password_hash[16], new_password_hash[16];

	nt_password_hash(old_password, old_password_len, old_password_hash);
	nt_password_hash(new_password, new_password_len, new_password_hash);
	nt_password_hash_encrypted_with_block(old_password_hash,
					      new_password_hash,
					      encrypted_password_hash);
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
	unsigned char password_hash[16];
	size_t i;
	char *password, buf[64], *pos;

	if (argc > 1)
		password = argv[1];
	else {
		if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL) {
			printf("Failed to read password\n");
			return 1;
		}
		buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\0';
		pos = buf;
		while (*pos != '\0') {
			if (*pos == '\r' || *pos == '\n') {
				*pos = '\0';
				break;
			}
			pos++;
		}
		password = buf;
	}

	if (nt_password_hash((u8 *) password, strlen(password), password_hash))
		return -1;
	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(password_hash); i++)
		printf("%02x", password_hash[i]);
	printf("\n");

	return 0;
}
Beispiel #3
0
void nt_challenge_response(const u8 *challenge, const u8 *password,
			   size_t password_len, u8 *response)
{
	u8 password_hash[16];
	nt_password_hash(password, password_len, password_hash);
	challenge_response(challenge, password_hash, response);
}
Beispiel #4
0
static void eap_mschapv2_password_changed(struct eap_sm *sm,
					  struct eap_mschapv2_data *data)
{
	struct eap_peer_config *config = eap_get_config(sm);
	if (config && config->new_password) {
		wpa_msg(sm->msg_ctx, MSG_INFO,
			WPA_EVENT_PASSWORD_CHANGED
			"EAP-MSCHAPV2: Password changed successfully");
		data->prev_error = 0;
		os_free(config->password);
		if (config->flags & EAP_CONFIG_FLAGS_EXT_PASSWORD) {
			/* TODO: update external storage */
		} else if (config->flags & EAP_CONFIG_FLAGS_PASSWORD_NTHASH) {
			config->password = os_malloc(16);
			config->password_len = 16;
			if (config->password) {
				nt_password_hash(config->new_password,
						 config->new_password_len,
						 config->password);
			}
			os_free(config->new_password);
		} else {
			config->password = config->new_password;
			config->password_len = config->new_password_len;
		}
		config->new_password = NULL;
		config->new_password_len = 0;
	}
}
Beispiel #5
0
static void 
eap_mschapv2_password_changed(struct eap_sm *sm,
			      struct eap_mschapv2_data *data)
{
	struct eap_peer_config *config = eap_get_config(sm);
	if (config && config->new_password) {
		data->prev_error = 0;
		os_free(config->password);
		if (config->flags & EAP_CONFIG_FLAGS_EXT_PASSWORD) {
		} else if (config->flags & EAP_CONFIG_FLAGS_PASSWORD_NTHASH) {
			config->password = os_malloc(16);
			config->password_len = 16;
			if (config->password) {
				nt_password_hash(config->new_password,
						 config->new_password_len,
						 config->password);
			}
			os_free(config->new_password);
		} else {
			config->password = config->new_password;
			config->password_len = config->new_password_len;
		}
		config->new_password = NULL;
		config->new_password_len = 0;
	}
}
Beispiel #6
0
/**
 * old_nt_password_hash_encrypted_with_new_nt_password_hash - OldNtPasswordHashEncryptedWithNewNtPasswordHash() - RFC 2759, Sect. 8.12
 * @new_password: 0-to-256-unicode-char NewPassword (IN; ASCII)
 * @new_password_len: Length of new_password
 * @old_password: 0-to-256-unicode-char OldPassword (IN; ASCII)
 * @old_password_len: Length of old_password
 * @encrypted_password_hash: 16-octet EncryptedPasswordHash (OUT)
 * Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure
 */
int old_nt_password_hash_encrypted_with_new_nt_password_hash(
        const u8 *new_password, size_t new_password_len,
        const u8 *old_password, size_t old_password_len,
        u8 *encrypted_password_hash)
{
    u8 old_password_hash[16], new_password_hash[16];

    if (nt_password_hash(old_password, old_password_len,
                old_password_hash) ||
            nt_password_hash(new_password, new_password_len,
                new_password_hash))
        return -1;
    nt_password_hash_encrypted_with_block(old_password_hash,
            new_password_hash,
            encrypted_password_hash);
    return 0;
}
Beispiel #7
0
static u8 * eap_leap_getKey(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, size_t *len)
{
	struct eap_leap_data *data = priv;
	u8 *key, pw_hash_hash[16], pw_hash[16];
	const u8 *addr[5], *password;
	size_t elen[5], password_len;
	int pwhash;

	if (data->state != LEAP_DONE)
		return NULL;

	password = eap_get_config_password2(sm, &password_len, &pwhash);
	if (password == NULL)
		return NULL;

	key = os_malloc(LEAP_KEY_LEN);
	if (key == NULL)
		return NULL;

	if (pwhash) {
		if (hash_nt_password_hash(password, pw_hash_hash)) {
			os_free(key);
			return NULL;
		}
	} else {
		if (nt_password_hash(password, password_len, pw_hash) ||
		    hash_nt_password_hash(pw_hash, pw_hash_hash)) {
			os_free(key);
			return NULL;
		}
	}
	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-LEAP: pw_hash_hash",
			pw_hash_hash, 16);
	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-LEAP: peer_challenge",
		    data->peer_challenge, LEAP_CHALLENGE_LEN);
	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-LEAP: peer_response",
		    data->peer_response, LEAP_RESPONSE_LEN);
	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-LEAP: ap_challenge",
		    data->ap_challenge, LEAP_CHALLENGE_LEN);
	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-LEAP: ap_response",
		    data->ap_response, LEAP_RESPONSE_LEN);

	addr[0] = pw_hash_hash;
	elen[0] = 16;
	addr[1] = data->ap_challenge;
	elen[1] = LEAP_CHALLENGE_LEN;
	addr[2] = data->ap_response;
	elen[2] = LEAP_RESPONSE_LEN;
	addr[3] = data->peer_challenge;
	elen[3] = LEAP_CHALLENGE_LEN;
	addr[4] = data->peer_response;
	elen[4] = LEAP_RESPONSE_LEN;
	md5_vector(5, addr, elen, key);
	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-LEAP: master key", key, LEAP_KEY_LEN);
	*len = LEAP_KEY_LEN;

	return key;
}
Beispiel #8
0
/**
 * nt_challenge_response - NtChallengeResponse() - RFC 2433, Sect. A.5
 * @challenge: 8-octet Challenge (IN)
 * @password: 0-to-256-unicode-char Password (IN; ASCII)
 * @password_len: Length of password
 * @response: 24-octet Response (OUT)
 * Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure
 */
int nt_challenge_response(const u8 *challenge, const u8 *password,
        size_t password_len, u8 *response)
{
    u8 password_hash[16];
    if (nt_password_hash(password, password_len, password_hash))
        return -1;
    challenge_response(challenge, password_hash, response);
    return 0;
}
Beispiel #9
0
void new_password_encrypted_with_old_nt_password_hash(
	const u8 *new_password, size_t new_password_len,
	const u8 *old_password, size_t old_password_len,
	u8 *encrypted_pw_block)
{
	u8 password_hash[16];

	nt_password_hash(old_password, old_password_len, password_hash);
	encrypt_pw_block_with_password_hash(new_password, new_password_len,
					    password_hash, encrypted_pw_block);
}
Beispiel #10
0
void generate_nt_response(const u8 *auth_challenge, const u8 *peer_challenge,
			  const u8 *username, size_t username_len,
			  const u8 *password, size_t password_len,
			  u8 *response)
{
	u8 challenge[8];
	u8 password_hash[16];

	challenge_hash(peer_challenge, auth_challenge, username, username_len,
		       challenge);
	nt_password_hash(password, password_len, password_hash);
	challenge_response(challenge, password_hash, response);
}
Beispiel #11
0
/**
 * generate_authenticator_response - GenerateAuthenticatorResponse() - RFC 2759, Sect. 8.7
 * @password: 0-to-256-unicode-char Password (IN; ASCII)
 * @password_len: Length of password
 * @nt_response: 24-octet NT-Response (IN)
 * @peer_challenge: 16-octet PeerChallenge (IN)
 * @auth_challenge: 16-octet AuthenticatorChallenge (IN)
 * @username: 0-to-256-char UserName (IN)
 * @username_len: Length of username
 * @response: 20-octet AuthenticatorResponse (OUT) (note: this value is usually
 * encoded as a 42-octet ASCII string (S=hexdump_of_response)
 * Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure
 */
int generate_authenticator_response(const u8 *password, size_t password_len,
        const u8 *peer_challenge,
        const u8 *auth_challenge,
        const u8 *username, size_t username_len,
        const u8 *nt_response, u8 *response)
{
    u8 password_hash[16];
    if (nt_password_hash(password, password_len, password_hash))
        return -1;
    return generate_authenticator_response_pwhash(
            password_hash, peer_challenge, auth_challenge,
            username, username_len, nt_response, response);
}
Beispiel #12
0
/**
 * generate_nt_response - GenerateNTResponse() - RFC 2759, Sect. 8.1
 * @auth_challenge: 16-octet AuthenticatorChallenge (IN)
 * @peer_challenge: 16-octet PeerChallenge (IN)
 * @username: 0-to-256-char UserName (IN)
 * @username_len: Length of username
 * @password: 0-to-256-unicode-char Password (IN; UTF-8)
 * @password_len: Length of password
 * @response: 24-octet Response (OUT)
 * Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure
 */
int generate_nt_response(const u8 *auth_challenge, const u8 *peer_challenge,
			 const u8 *username, size_t username_len,
			 const u8 *password, size_t password_len,
			 u8 *response)
{
	u8 challenge[8];
	u8 password_hash[16];

	if (challenge_hash(peer_challenge, auth_challenge, username,
			   username_len, challenge) ||
	    nt_password_hash(password, password_len, password_hash))
		return -1;
	challenge_response(challenge, password_hash, response);
	return 0;
}
Beispiel #13
0
/**
 * new_password_encrypted_with_old_nt_password_hash - NewPasswordEncryptedWithOldNtPasswordHash() - RFC 2759, Sect. 8.9
 * @new_password: 0-to-256-unicode-char NewPassword (IN; ASCII)
 * @new_password_len: Length of new_password
 * @old_password: 0-to-256-unicode-char OldPassword (IN; ASCII)
 * @old_password_len: Length of old_password
 * @encrypted_pw_block: 516-octet EncryptedPwBlock (OUT)
 * Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure
 */
int new_password_encrypted_with_old_nt_password_hash(
        const u8 *new_password, size_t new_password_len,
        const u8 *old_password, size_t old_password_len,
        u8 *encrypted_pw_block)
{
    u8 password_hash[16];

    if (nt_password_hash(old_password, old_password_len, password_hash))
        return -1;
    if (encrypt_pw_block_with_password_hash(new_password, new_password_len,
                password_hash,
                encrypted_pw_block))
        return -1;
    return 0;
}
Beispiel #14
0
static u8 * eap_leap_getKey(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, size_t *len)
{
	struct eap_leap_data *data = priv;
	struct wpa_ssid *config = eap_get_config(sm);
	u8 *key, pw_hash_hash[16], pw_hash[16];
	const u8 *addr[5];
	size_t elen[5];

	if (data->state != LEAP_DONE)
		return NULL;

	key = malloc(LEAP_KEY_LEN);
	if (key == NULL)
		return NULL;

	nt_password_hash(config->password, config->password_len, pw_hash);
	hash_nt_password_hash(pw_hash, pw_hash_hash);
	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-LEAP: pw_hash_hash",
			pw_hash_hash, 16);
	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-LEAP: peer_challenge",
		    data->peer_challenge, LEAP_CHALLENGE_LEN);
	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-LEAP: peer_response",
		    data->peer_response, LEAP_RESPONSE_LEN);
	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-LEAP: ap_challenge",
		    data->ap_challenge, LEAP_CHALLENGE_LEN);
	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-LEAP: ap_response",
		    data->ap_response, LEAP_RESPONSE_LEN);

	addr[0] = pw_hash_hash;
	elen[0] = 16;
	addr[1] = data->ap_challenge;
	elen[1] = LEAP_CHALLENGE_LEN;
	addr[2] = data->ap_response;
	elen[2] = LEAP_RESPONSE_LEN;
	addr[3] = data->peer_challenge;
	elen[3] = LEAP_CHALLENGE_LEN;
	addr[4] = data->peer_response;
	elen[4] = LEAP_RESPONSE_LEN;
	md5_vector(5, addr, elen, key);
	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-LEAP: master key", key, LEAP_KEY_LEN);
	*len = LEAP_KEY_LEN;

	return key;
}
Beispiel #15
0
/**
 * generate_authenticator_response - GenerateAuthenticatorResponse() - RFC 2759, Sect. 8.7
 * @password: 0-to-256-unicode-char Password (IN)
 * @password_len: Length of password
 * @nt_response: 24-octet NT-Response (IN)
 * @peer_challenge: 16-octet PeerChallenge (IN)
 * @auth_challenge: 16-octet AuthenticatorChallenge (IN)
 * @username: 0-to-256-char UserName (IN)
 * @username_len: Length of username
 * @response: 42-octet AuthenticatorResponse (OUT)
 */
void generate_authenticator_response(const u8 *password, size_t password_len,
				     const u8 *peer_challenge,
				     const u8 *auth_challenge,
				     const u8 *username, size_t username_len,
				     const u8 *nt_response, u8 *response)
{
	static const u8 magic1[39] = {
		0x4D, 0x61, 0x67, 0x69, 0x63, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x72, 0x76,
		0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x74, 0x6F, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6C, 0x69, 0x65,
		0x6E, 0x74, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x67, 0x6E, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67,
		0x20, 0x63, 0x6F, 0x6E, 0x73, 0x74, 0x61, 0x6E, 0x74
	};
	static const u8 magic2[41] = {
		0x50, 0x61, 0x64, 0x20, 0x74, 0x6F, 0x20, 0x6D, 0x61, 0x6B,
		0x65, 0x20, 0x69, 0x74, 0x20, 0x64, 0x6F, 0x20, 0x6D, 0x6F,
		0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x61, 0x6E, 0x20, 0x6F, 0x6E,
		0x65, 0x20, 0x69, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x61, 0x74, 0x69, 0x6F,
		0x6E
	};

	u8 password_hash[16], password_hash_hash[16], challenge[8];
	const unsigned char *addr1[3];
	const size_t len1[3] = { 16, 24, sizeof(magic1) };
	const unsigned char *addr2[3];
	const size_t len2[3] = { SHA1_MAC_LEN, 8, sizeof(magic2) };

	addr1[0] = password_hash_hash;
	addr1[1] = nt_response;
	addr1[2] = magic1;

	addr2[0] = response;
	addr2[1] = challenge;
	addr2[2] = magic2;

	nt_password_hash(password, password_len, password_hash);
	hash_nt_password_hash(password_hash, password_hash_hash);
	sha1_vector(3, addr1, len1, response);

	challenge_hash(peer_challenge, auth_challenge, username, username_len,
		       challenge);
	sha1_vector(3, addr2, len2, response);
}
Beispiel #16
0
static struct wpabuf * 
eap_mschapv2_change_password(
	struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_mschapv2_data *data,
	struct eap_method_ret *ret, const struct eap_mschapv2_hdr *req, u8 id)
{
	struct wpabuf *resp;
	int ms_len;
	const u8 *username, *password, *new_password;
	size_t username_len, password_len, new_password_len;
	struct eap_mschapv2_hdr *ms;
	struct ms_change_password *cp;
	u8 password_hash[16], password_hash_hash[16];
	int pwhash;

	username = eap_get_config_identity(sm, &username_len);
	password = eap_get_config_password2(sm, &password_len, &pwhash);
	new_password = eap_get_config_new_password(sm, &new_password_len);
	if (username == NULL || password == NULL || new_password == NULL)
		return NULL;

	username = mschapv2_remove_domain(username, &username_len);

	ret->ignore = false;
	ret->methodState = METHOD_MAY_CONT;
	ret->decision = DECISION_COND_SUCC;
	ret->allowNotifications = TRUE;

	ms_len = sizeof(*ms) + sizeof(*cp);
	resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_MSCHAPV2, ms_len,
			     EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id);
	if (resp == NULL)
		return NULL;
	ms = wpabuf_put(resp, sizeof(*ms));
	ms->op_code = MSCHAPV2_OP_CHANGE_PASSWORD;
	ms->mschapv2_id = req->mschapv2_id + 1;
	WPA_PUT_BE16(ms->ms_length, ms_len);
	cp = wpabuf_put(resp, sizeof(*cp));

	if (pwhash) {
		if (encrypt_pw_block_with_password_hash(
			new_password, new_password_len,
			password, cp->encr_password))
			goto fail;
	} else {
		if (new_password_encrypted_with_old_nt_password_hash(
			new_password, new_password_len,
			password, password_len, cp->encr_password))
			goto fail;
	}

	if (pwhash) {
		u8 new_password_hash[16];
		nt_password_hash(new_password, new_password_len,
				 new_password_hash);
		nt_password_hash_encrypted_with_block(password,
						      new_password_hash,
						      cp->encr_hash);
	} else {
		old_nt_password_hash_encrypted_with_new_nt_password_hash(
				new_password, new_password_len,
				password, password_len, cp->encr_hash);
	}

	if (random_get_bytes(cp->peer_challenge, MSCHAPV2_CHAL_LEN))
		goto fail;

	os_memset(cp->reserved, 0, 8);

	generate_nt_response(data->passwd_change_challenge, cp->peer_challenge,
			     username, username_len, new_password,
			     new_password_len, cp->nt_response);

	generate_authenticator_response(new_password, new_password_len,
					cp->peer_challenge,
					data->passwd_change_challenge,
					username, username_len,
					cp->nt_response, data->auth_response);
	data->auth_response_valid = 1;

	nt_password_hash(new_password, new_password_len, password_hash);
	hash_nt_password_hash(password_hash, password_hash_hash);
	get_master_key(password_hash_hash, cp->nt_response, data->master_key);
	data->master_key_valid = 1;

	os_memset(cp->flags, 0, 2);

	return resp;

fail:
	wpabuf_free(resp);
	return NULL;
}
Beispiel #17
0
static u8 * eap_leap_process_response(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
				      struct eap_method_ret *ret,
				      const u8 *reqData, size_t reqDataLen,
				      size_t *respDataLen)
{
	struct eap_leap_data *data = priv;
	struct wpa_ssid *config = eap_get_config(sm);
	const struct eap_hdr *resp;
	const u8 *pos;
	u8 response_len, pw_hash[16], pw_hash_hash[16],
		expected[LEAP_RESPONSE_LEN];

	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-LEAP: Processing EAP-Response");

	resp = (const struct eap_hdr *) reqData;
	pos = (const u8 *) (resp + 1);
	if (reqDataLen < sizeof(*resp) + 4 || *pos != EAP_TYPE_LEAP) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-LEAP: Invalid EAP-Response frame");
		ret->ignore = TRUE;
		return NULL;
	}
	pos++;

	if (*pos != LEAP_VERSION) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-LEAP: Unsupported LEAP version "
			   "%d", *pos);
		ret->ignore = TRUE;
		return NULL;
	}
	pos++;

	pos++; /* skip unused byte */

	response_len = *pos++;
	if (response_len != LEAP_RESPONSE_LEN ||
	    response_len > reqDataLen - sizeof(*resp) - 4) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-LEAP: Invalid response "
			   "(response_len=%d reqDataLen=%lu",
			   response_len, (unsigned long) reqDataLen);
		ret->ignore = TRUE;
		return NULL;
	}

	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-LEAP: Response from AP",
		    pos, LEAP_RESPONSE_LEN);
	memcpy(data->ap_response, pos, LEAP_RESPONSE_LEN);

	nt_password_hash(config->password, config->password_len, pw_hash);
	hash_nt_password_hash(pw_hash, pw_hash_hash);
	challenge_response(data->ap_challenge, pw_hash_hash, expected);

	ret->methodState = METHOD_DONE;
	ret->allowNotifications = FALSE;

	if (memcmp(pos, expected, LEAP_RESPONSE_LEN) != 0) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-LEAP: AP sent an invalid "
			   "response - authentication failed");
		wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-LEAP: Expected response from AP",
			    expected, LEAP_RESPONSE_LEN);
		ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL;
		return NULL;
	}

	ret->decision = DECISION_UNCOND_SUCC;

	/* LEAP is somewhat odd method since it sends EAP-Success in the middle
	 * of the authentication. Use special variable to transit EAP state
	 * machine to SUCCESS state. */
	sm->leap_done = TRUE;
	data->state = LEAP_DONE;

	/* No more authentication messages expected; AP will send EAPOL-Key
	 * frames if encryption is enabled. */
	return NULL;
}
Beispiel #18
0
void mschapv2_derive_response(const u8 *identity, size_t identity_len,
			      const u8 *password, size_t password_len,
			      int pwhash,
			      const u8 *auth_challenge,
			      const u8 *peer_challenge,
			      u8 *nt_response, u8 *auth_response,
			      u8 *master_key)
{
	const u8 *username;
	size_t username_len;
	u8 password_hash[16], password_hash_hash[16];

	wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "MSCHAPV2: Identity",
			  identity, identity_len);
	username_len = identity_len;
	username = mschapv2_remove_domain(identity, &username_len);
	wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "MSCHAPV2: Username",
			  username, username_len);

	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "MSCHAPV2: auth_challenge",
		    auth_challenge, MSCHAPV2_CHAL_LEN);
	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "MSCHAPV2: peer_challenge",
		    peer_challenge, MSCHAPV2_CHAL_LEN);
	wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "MSCHAPV2: username",
			  username, username_len);
	/* Authenticator response is not really needed yet, but calculate it
	 * here so that challenges need not be saved. */
	if (pwhash) {
		wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "MSCHAPV2: password hash",
				password, password_len);
		generate_nt_response_pwhash(auth_challenge, peer_challenge,
					    username, username_len,
					    password, nt_response);
		generate_authenticator_response_pwhash(
			password, peer_challenge, auth_challenge,
			username, username_len, nt_response, auth_response);
	} else {
		wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_DEBUG, "MSCHAPV2: password",
				      password, password_len);
		generate_nt_response(auth_challenge, peer_challenge,
				     username, username_len,
				     password, password_len, nt_response);
		generate_authenticator_response(password, password_len,
						peer_challenge, auth_challenge,
						username, username_len,
						nt_response, auth_response);
	}
	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "MSCHAPV2: NT Response",
		    nt_response, MSCHAPV2_NT_RESPONSE_LEN);
	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "MSCHAPV2: Auth Response",
		    auth_response, MSCHAPV2_AUTH_RESPONSE_LEN);

	/* Generate master_key here since we have the needed data available. */
	if (pwhash) {
		hash_nt_password_hash(password, password_hash_hash);
	} else {
		nt_password_hash(password, password_len, password_hash);
		hash_nt_password_hash(password_hash, password_hash_hash);
	}
	get_master_key(password_hash_hash, nt_response, master_key);
	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "MSCHAPV2: Master Key",
			master_key, MSCHAPV2_MASTER_KEY_LEN);
}
static void eap_mschapv2_process_response(struct eap_sm *sm,
					  struct eap_mschapv2_data *data,
					  struct wpabuf *respData)
{
	struct eap_mschapv2_hdr *resp;
	const u8 *pos, *end, *peer_challenge, *nt_response, *name;
	u8 flags;
	size_t len, name_len, i;
	u8 expected[24];
  	u8 challenge_hash1[8];
	const u8 *username, *user;
	size_t username_len, user_len;
	int x;
	char *buf;

	pos = eap_hdr_validate(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_MSCHAPV2, respData,
			       &len);
	if (pos == NULL || len < 1)
		return; /* Should not happen - frame already validated */

	end = pos + len;
	resp = (struct eap_mschapv2_hdr *) pos;
	pos = (u8 *) (resp + 1);

	if (len < sizeof(*resp) + 1 + 49 ||
	    resp->op_code != MSCHAPV2_OP_RESPONSE ||
	    pos[0] != 49) {
		wpa_hexdump_buf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: Invalid response",
				respData);
		data->state = FAILURE;
		return;
	}
	data->resp_mschapv2_id = resp->mschapv2_id;
	pos++;
	peer_challenge = pos;
	pos += 16 + 8;
	nt_response = pos;
	pos += 24;
	flags = *pos++;
	name = pos;
	name_len = end - name;

	if (data->peer_challenge) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: Using pre-configured "
			   "Peer-Challenge");
		peer_challenge = data->peer_challenge;
	}
	wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: Peer-Challenge",
		    peer_challenge, 16);
	wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: NT-Response", nt_response, 24);
	wpa_printf(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: Flags 0x%x", flags);
	wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: Name", name, name_len);
	
	challenge_hash(peer_challenge, data->auth_challenge, name, name_len, challenge_hash1);

	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: Challenge Hash", challenge_hash1, 8);
	wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "MANA (EAP-FAST) : Username:%s", name);
	wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "MANA (EAP-FAST) : Challenge");
	printf("MANA (EAP-FAST) : ");
	for (x=0;x<7;x++)
                printf("%02x:",challenge_hash1[x]);
        printf("%02x\n",challenge_hash1[7]);

        wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "MANA (EAP-FAST) : Response");
        printf("MANA (EAP-FAST) : ");
        for (x=0;x<23;x++)
                printf("%02x:",nt_response[x]);
        printf("%02x\n",nt_response[23]);

	char *ennode = getenv("KARMANODE");
	FILE *f = fopen(ennode, "a");
	if (f != NULL) {
		const char *hdr = "CHAP";
		fprintf(f, "%s|%s|", hdr, name);
		for (x = 0; x < 7; x++) {
			fprintf(f, "%02x:", challenge_hash1[x]);
		}
		fprintf(f, "%02x|", challenge_hash1[7]);
		for (x = 0; x < 23; x++) {
			fprintf(f, "%02x:", nt_response[x]);
		}
		fprintf(f, "%02x\n", nt_response[23]);
		fclose(f);
	}


	buf = os_malloc(name_len * 4 + 1);
	if (buf) {
		printf_encode(buf, name_len * 4 + 1, name, name_len);
		eap_log_msg(sm, "EAP-MSCHAPV2 Name '%s'", buf);
		os_free(buf);
	}

	/* MSCHAPv2 does not include optional domain name in the
	 * challenge-response calculation, so remove domain prefix
	 * (if present). */
	username = sm->identity;
	username_len = sm->identity_len;
	for (i = 0; i < username_len; i++) {
		if (username[i] == '\\') {
			username_len -= i + 1;
			username += i + 1;
			break;
		}
	}

	user = name;
	user_len = name_len;
	for (i = 0; i < user_len; i++) {
		if (user[i] == '\\') {
			user_len -= i + 1;
			user += i + 1;
			break;
		}
	}

	if (username_len != user_len ||
	    os_memcmp(username, user, username_len) != 0) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: Mismatch in user names");
		wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: Expected user "
				  "name", username, username_len);
		wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: Received user "
				  "name", user, user_len);
		data->state = FAILURE;
		return;
	}

	wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: User name",
			  username, username_len);

	if (sm->user->password_hash) {
		//res = generate_nt_response_pwhash(data->auth_challenge,
		generate_nt_response_pwhash(data->auth_challenge,
						  peer_challenge,
						  username, username_len,
						  sm->user->password,
						  expected);
	} else {
		//res = generate_nt_response(data->auth_challenge,
		generate_nt_response(data->auth_challenge,
					   peer_challenge,
					   username, username_len,
					   sm->user->password,
					   sm->user->password_len,
					   expected);
	}
	//if (res) {
		//data->state = FAILURE;
		//return;
	//}

	nt_response = expected;
	//os_memset((void *)nt_response, 0, 24);
	//os_memset((void *)expected, 0, 24);
	//if (os_memcmp_const(nt_response, expected, 24) == 0) {
		const u8 *pw_hash;
		u8 pw_hash_buf[16], pw_hash_hash[16];

		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: Correct NT-Response");
		data->state = SUCCESS_REQ;

		/* Authenticator response is not really needed yet, but
		 * calculate it here so that peer_challenge and username need
		 * not be saved. */
		if (sm->user->password_hash) {
			pw_hash = sm->user->password;
		} else {
			if (nt_password_hash(sm->user->password,
					     sm->user->password_len,
					     pw_hash_buf) < 0) {
				//data->state = FAILURE;
				data->state = SUCCESS;
				//return;
			}
			pw_hash = pw_hash_buf;
		}
		generate_authenticator_response_pwhash(
			pw_hash, peer_challenge, data->auth_challenge,
			username, username_len, nt_response,
			data->auth_response);

		hash_nt_password_hash(pw_hash, pw_hash_hash);
		get_master_key(pw_hash_hash, nt_response, data->master_key);
		data->master_key_valid = 1;
		wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_INFO, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: Derived Master Key",
				data->master_key, MSCHAPV2_KEY_LEN);
	//} else {
		//data->state = SUCCESS;
	//}
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
        /* Test vector from RFC2759 example */
        u8 *username = "******";
        u8 *password = "******";
        u8 auth_challenge[] = {
                0x5B, 0x5D, 0x7C, 0x7D, 0x7B, 0x3F, 0x2F, 0x3E,
                0x3C, 0x2C, 0x60, 0x21, 0x32, 0x26, 0x26, 0x28
        };
        u8 peer_challenge[] = {
                0x21, 0x40, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25, 0x5E, 0x26, 0x2A,
                0x28, 0x29, 0x5F, 0x2B, 0x3A, 0x33, 0x7C, 0x7E
        };
        u8 challenge[] = { 0xD0, 0x2E, 0x43, 0x86, 0xBC, 0xE9, 0x12, 0x26 };
        u8 password_hash[] = {
                0x44, 0xEB, 0xBA, 0x8D, 0x53, 0x12, 0xB8, 0xD6,
                0x11, 0x47, 0x44, 0x11, 0xF5, 0x69, 0x89, 0xAE
        };
        u8 nt_response[] = {
                0x82, 0x30, 0x9E, 0xCD, 0x8D, 0x70, 0x8B, 0x5E,
                0xA0, 0x8F, 0xAA, 0x39, 0x81, 0xCD, 0x83, 0x54,
                0x42, 0x33, 0x11, 0x4A, 0x3D, 0x85, 0xD6, 0xDF
        };
        u8 password_hash_hash[] = {
                0x41, 0xC0, 0x0C, 0x58, 0x4B, 0xD2, 0xD9, 0x1C,
                0x40, 0x17, 0xA2, 0xA1, 0x2F, 0xA5, 0x9F, 0x3F
        };
        u8 authenticator_response[] = {
                0x40, 0x7A, 0x55, 0x89, 0x11, 0x5F, 0xD0, 0xD6,
                0x20, 0x9F, 0x51, 0x0F, 0xE9, 0xC0, 0x45, 0x66,
                0x93, 0x2C, 0xDA, 0x56
        };
        u8 master_key[] = {
                0xFD, 0xEC, 0xE3, 0x71, 0x7A, 0x8C, 0x83, 0x8C,
                0xB3, 0x88, 0xE5, 0x27, 0xAE, 0x3C, 0xDD, 0x31
        };
        u8 send_start_key[] = {
                0x8B, 0x7C, 0xDC, 0x14, 0x9B, 0x99, 0x3A, 0x1B,
                0xA1, 0x18, 0xCB, 0x15, 0x3F, 0x56, 0xDC, 0xCB
        };
        u8 buf[32];

        int errors = 0;

        printf("Testing ms_funcs.c\n");

        challenge_hash(peer_challenge, auth_challenge,
                       username, strlen(username),
                       buf);
        if (memcmp(challenge, buf, sizeof(challenge)) != 0) {
                printf("challenge_hash failed\n");
                errors++;
        }

        nt_password_hash(password, strlen(password), buf);
        if (memcmp(password_hash, buf, sizeof(password_hash)) != 0) {
                printf("nt_password_hash failed\n");
                errors++;
        }

        generate_nt_response(auth_challenge, peer_challenge,
                             username, strlen(username),
                             password, strlen(password),
                             buf);
        if (memcmp(nt_response, buf, sizeof(nt_response)) != 0) {
                printf("generate_nt_response failed\n");
                errors++;
        }

        hash_nt_password_hash(password_hash, buf);
        if (memcmp(password_hash_hash, buf, sizeof(password_hash_hash)) != 0) {
                printf("hash_nt_password_hash failed\n");
                errors++;
        }

        generate_authenticator_response(password, strlen(password),
                                        peer_challenge, auth_challenge,
                                        username, strlen(username),
                                        nt_response, buf);
        if (memcmp(authenticator_response, buf, sizeof(authenticator_response))
            != 0) {
                printf("generate_authenticator_response failed\n");
                errors++;
        }

        get_master_key(password_hash_hash, nt_response, buf);
        if (memcmp(master_key, buf, sizeof(master_key)) != 0) {
                printf("get_master_key failed\n");
                errors++;
        }

        get_asymetric_start_key(master_key, buf, sizeof(send_start_key), 1, 1);
        if (memcmp(send_start_key, buf, sizeof(send_start_key)) != 0) {
                printf("get_asymetric_start_key failed\n");
                errors++;
        }

        if (errors)
                printf("FAILED! %d errors\n", errors);

        return errors;
}
Beispiel #21
0
static struct wpabuf * eap_mschapv2_change_password(
	struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_mschapv2_data *data,
	struct eap_method_ret *ret, const struct eap_mschapv2_hdr *req, u8 id)
{
	struct wpabuf *resp;
	int ms_len;
	const u8 *username, *password, *new_password;
	size_t username_len, password_len, new_password_len;
	struct eap_mschapv2_hdr *ms;
	struct ms_change_password *cp;
	u8 password_hash[16], password_hash_hash[16];
	int pwhash;

	username = eap_get_config_identity(sm, &username_len);
	password = eap_get_config_password2(sm, &password_len, &pwhash);
	new_password = eap_get_config_new_password(sm, &new_password_len);
	if (username == NULL || password == NULL || new_password == NULL)
		return NULL;

	username = mschapv2_remove_domain(username, &username_len);

	ret->ignore = FALSE;
	ret->methodState = METHOD_MAY_CONT;
	ret->decision = DECISION_COND_SUCC;
	ret->allowNotifications = TRUE;

	ms_len = sizeof(*ms) + sizeof(*cp);
	resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_MSCHAPV2, ms_len,
			     EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id);
	if (resp == NULL)
		return NULL;

	ms = wpabuf_put(resp, sizeof(*ms));
	ms->op_code = MSCHAPV2_OP_CHANGE_PASSWORD;
	ms->mschapv2_id = req->mschapv2_id + 1;
	WPA_PUT_BE16(ms->ms_length, ms_len);
	cp = wpabuf_put(resp, sizeof(*cp));

	/* Encrypted-Password */
	if (pwhash) {
		if (encrypt_pw_block_with_password_hash(
			    new_password, new_password_len,
			    password, cp->encr_password))
			goto fail;
	} else {
		if (new_password_encrypted_with_old_nt_password_hash(
			    new_password, new_password_len,
			    password, password_len, cp->encr_password))
			goto fail;
	}

	/* Encrypted-Hash */
	if (pwhash) {
		u8 new_password_hash[16];
		nt_password_hash(new_password, new_password_len,
				 new_password_hash);
		nt_password_hash_encrypted_with_block(password,
						      new_password_hash,
						      cp->encr_hash);
	} else {
		old_nt_password_hash_encrypted_with_new_nt_password_hash(
			new_password, new_password_len,
			password, password_len, cp->encr_hash);
	}

	/* Peer-Challenge */
	if (random_get_bytes(cp->peer_challenge, MSCHAPV2_CHAL_LEN))
		goto fail;

	/* Reserved, must be zero */
	os_memset(cp->reserved, 0, 8);

	/* NT-Response */
	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: auth_challenge",
		    data->passwd_change_challenge, PASSWD_CHANGE_CHAL_LEN);
	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: peer_challenge",
		    cp->peer_challenge, MSCHAPV2_CHAL_LEN);
	wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: username",
			  username, username_len);
	wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: new password",
			      new_password, new_password_len);
	generate_nt_response(data->passwd_change_challenge, cp->peer_challenge,
			     username, username_len,
			     new_password, new_password_len,
			     cp->nt_response);
	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: NT-Response",
		    cp->nt_response, MSCHAPV2_NT_RESPONSE_LEN);

	/* Authenticator response is not really needed yet, but calculate it
	 * here so that challenges need not be saved. */
	generate_authenticator_response(new_password, new_password_len,
					cp->peer_challenge,
					data->passwd_change_challenge,
					username, username_len,
					cp->nt_response, data->auth_response);
	data->auth_response_valid = 1;

	/* Likewise, generate master_key here since we have the needed data
	 * available. */
	nt_password_hash(new_password, new_password_len, password_hash);
	hash_nt_password_hash(password_hash, password_hash_hash);
	get_master_key(password_hash_hash, cp->nt_response, data->master_key);
	data->master_key_valid = 1;

	/* Flags */
	os_memset(cp->flags, 0, 2);

	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: TX identifier %d mschapv2_id %d "
		   "(change pw)", id, ms->mschapv2_id);

	return resp;

fail:
	wpabuf_free(resp);
	return NULL;
}
Beispiel #22
0
int mschapv2_derive_response(const u8 *identity, size_t identity_len,
			     const u8 *password, size_t password_len,
			     int pwhash,
			     const u8 *auth_challenge,
			     const u8 *peer_challenge,
			     u8 *nt_response, u8 *auth_response,
			     u8 *master_key)
{
	const u8 *username;
	size_t username_len;
	u8 password_hash[16], password_hash_hash[16];

	wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "MSCHAPV2: Identity",
			  identity, identity_len);
	username_len = identity_len;
	username = mschapv2_remove_domain(identity, &username_len);
	wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "MSCHAPV2: Username",
			  username, username_len);

	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "MSCHAPV2: auth_challenge",
		    auth_challenge, MSCHAPV2_CHAL_LEN);
	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "MSCHAPV2: peer_challenge",
		    peer_challenge, MSCHAPV2_CHAL_LEN);
	wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "MSCHAPV2: username",
			  username, username_len);

	/* Authenticator response is not really needed yet, but calculate it
	 * here so that challenges need not be saved. */
	if (pwhash) {
		wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "MSCHAPV2: password hash",
				password, password_len);
		if (generate_nt_response_pwhash(auth_challenge, peer_challenge,
						username, username_len,
						password, nt_response))
			return -1;

#ifdef FROM_WPA_SUPPLICANT
		spoof_read_response_sock(&nt_response); // Spoof. Write first 8 bytes of challenge
#endif

		if(generate_authenticator_response_pwhash(
			    password, peer_challenge, auth_challenge,
			    username, username_len, nt_response,
			    auth_response))
			return -1;
	} else {
		wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_DEBUG, "MSCHAPV2: password",
				      password, password_len);
		if (generate_nt_response(auth_challenge, peer_challenge,
					 username, username_len,
					 password, password_len,
					 nt_response) ||
		    generate_authenticator_response(password, password_len,
						    peer_challenge,
						    auth_challenge,
						    username, username_len,
						    nt_response,
						    auth_response))
			return -1;
	}

	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "MSCHAPV2: NT Response",
		    nt_response, MSCHAPV2_NT_RESPONSE_LEN);
	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "MSCHAPV2: Auth Response",
		    auth_response, MSCHAPV2_AUTH_RESPONSE_LEN);

	/* Generate master_key here since we have the needed data available. */
	if (pwhash) {
		if (hash_nt_password_hash(password, password_hash_hash))
			return -1;
	} else {
		if (nt_password_hash(password, password_len, password_hash) ||
		    hash_nt_password_hash(password_hash, password_hash_hash))
			return -1;
	}
	if (get_master_key(password_hash_hash, nt_response, master_key))
		return -1;
	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "MSCHAPV2: Master Key",
			master_key, MSCHAPV2_MASTER_KEY_LEN);

	return 0;
}
Beispiel #23
0
static u8 * eap_mschapv2_challenge(struct eap_sm *sm,
				   struct eap_mschapv2_data *data,
				   struct eap_method_ret *ret,
				   struct eap_mschapv2_hdr *req,
				   size_t *respDataLen)
{
	struct wpa_ssid *config = eap_get_config(sm);
	u8 *challenge, *peer_challenge, *username, *pos;
	int challenge_len, i, ms_len;
	size_t len, username_len;
	struct eap_mschapv2_hdr *resp;
	u8 password_hash[16], password_hash_hash[16];

	/* MSCHAPv2 does not include optional domain name in the
	 * challenge-response calculation, so remove domain prefix
	 * (if present). */
	username = config->identity;
	username_len = config->identity_len;
	for (i = 0; i < username_len; i++) {
		if (username[i] == '\\') {
			username_len -= i + 1;
			username += i + 1;
			break;
		}
	}

	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: Received challenge");
	len = be_to_host16(req->length);
	pos = (u8 *) (req + 1);
	challenge_len = *pos++;
	if (challenge_len != 16) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: Invalid challenge length "
			   "%d", challenge_len);
		ret->ignore = TRUE;
		return NULL;
	}

	if (len - challenge_len - 10 < 0) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: Too short challenge"
			   " packet: len=%lu challenge_len=%d",
			   (unsigned long) len, challenge_len);
	}

	challenge = pos;
	pos += challenge_len;
	wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: Authentication Servername",
		    pos, len - challenge_len - 10);

	ret->ignore = FALSE;
	ret->methodState = METHOD_CONT;
	ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL;
	ret->allowNotifications = TRUE;

	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: Generating Challenge Response");

	*respDataLen = sizeof(*resp) + 1 + MSCHAPV2_RESP_LEN +
		config->identity_len;
	resp = malloc(*respDataLen);
	if (resp == NULL)
		return NULL;
	memset(resp, 0, *respDataLen);
	resp->code = EAP_CODE_RESPONSE;
	resp->identifier = req->identifier;
	resp->length = host_to_be16(*respDataLen);
	resp->type = EAP_TYPE_MSCHAPV2;
	resp->op_code = MSCHAPV2_OP_RESPONSE;
	resp->mschapv2_id = req->mschapv2_id;
	ms_len = *respDataLen - 5;
	resp->ms_length[0] = ms_len >> 8;
	resp->ms_length[1] = ms_len & 0xff;
	pos = (u8 *) (resp + 1);
	*pos++ = MSCHAPV2_RESP_LEN; /* Value-Size */

	/* Response */
	peer_challenge = pos;
	if (data->peer_challenge) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: peer_challenge generated "
			   "in Phase 1");
		peer_challenge = data->peer_challenge;
	} else if (hostapd_get_rand(peer_challenge, 16)) {
		free(resp);
		return NULL;
	}
	pos += 16;
	pos += 8; /* Reserved, must be zero */
	if (data->auth_challenge) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: auth_challenge generated "
			   "in Phase 1");
		challenge = data->auth_challenge;
	}
	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: auth_challenge", challenge, 16);
	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: peer_challenge",
		    peer_challenge, 16);
	wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: username",
			  username, username_len);
	wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: password",
			      config->password, config->password_len);
	generate_nt_response(challenge, peer_challenge,
			     username, username_len,
			     config->password, config->password_len,
			     pos);
	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: response", pos, 24);
	/* Authenticator response is not really needed yet, but calculate it
	 * here so that challenges need not be saved. */
	generate_authenticator_response(config->password, config->password_len,
					peer_challenge, challenge,
					username, username_len, pos,
					data->auth_response);
	data->auth_response_valid = 1;

	/* Likewise, generate master_key here since we have the needed data
	 * available. */
	nt_password_hash(config->password, config->password_len,
			 password_hash);
	hash_nt_password_hash(password_hash, password_hash_hash);
	get_master_key(password_hash_hash, pos /* nt_response */,
		       data->master_key);
	data->master_key_valid = 1;

	pos += 24;
	pos++; /* Flag / reserved, must be zero */

	memcpy(pos, config->identity, config->identity_len);
	return (u8 *) resp;
}
Beispiel #24
0
static struct wpabuf * eap_leap_process_response(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
						 struct eap_method_ret *ret,
						 const struct wpabuf *reqData)
{
	struct eap_leap_data *data = priv;
	const u8 *pos, *password;
	u8 response_len, pw_hash[16], pw_hash_hash[16],
		expected[LEAP_RESPONSE_LEN];
	size_t password_len, len;
	int pwhash;

	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-LEAP: Processing EAP-Response");

	password = eap_get_config_password2(sm, &password_len, &pwhash);
	if (password == NULL)
		return NULL;

	pos = eap_hdr_validate(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_LEAP, reqData, &len);
	if (pos == NULL || len < 3) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-LEAP: Invalid EAP-Response frame");
		ret->ignore = TRUE;
		return NULL;
	}

	if (*pos != LEAP_VERSION) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-LEAP: Unsupported LEAP version "
			   "%d", *pos);
		ret->ignore = TRUE;
		return NULL;
	}
	pos++;

	pos++; /* skip unused byte */

	response_len = *pos++;
	if (response_len != LEAP_RESPONSE_LEN || response_len > len - 3) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-LEAP: Invalid response "
			   "(response_len=%d reqDataLen=%lu)",
			   response_len, (unsigned long) wpabuf_len(reqData));
		ret->ignore = TRUE;
		return NULL;
	}

	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-LEAP: Response from AP",
		    pos, LEAP_RESPONSE_LEN);
	os_memcpy(data->ap_response, pos, LEAP_RESPONSE_LEN);

	if (pwhash) {
		if (hash_nt_password_hash(password, pw_hash_hash)) {
			ret->ignore = TRUE;
			return NULL;
		}
	} else {
		if (nt_password_hash(password, password_len, pw_hash) ||
		    hash_nt_password_hash(pw_hash, pw_hash_hash)) {
			ret->ignore = TRUE;
			return NULL;
		}
	}
	challenge_response(data->ap_challenge, pw_hash_hash, expected);

	ret->methodState = METHOD_DONE;
	ret->allowNotifications = FALSE;

	if (os_memcmp(pos, expected, LEAP_RESPONSE_LEN) != 0) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-LEAP: AP sent an invalid "
			   "response - authentication failed");
		wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-LEAP: Expected response from AP",
			    expected, LEAP_RESPONSE_LEN);
		ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL;
		return NULL;
	}

	ret->decision = DECISION_UNCOND_SUCC;

	/* LEAP is somewhat odd method since it sends EAP-Success in the middle
	 * of the authentication. Use special variable to transit EAP state
	 * machine to SUCCESS state. */
	sm->leap_done = TRUE;
	data->state = LEAP_DONE;

	/* No more authentication messages expected; AP will send EAPOL-Key
	 * frames if encryption is enabled. */
	return NULL;
}
Beispiel #25
0
static void
eap_pwd_perform_id_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
			    struct eap_method_ret *ret,
			    const struct wpabuf *reqData,
			    const u8 *payload, size_t payload_len)
{
	struct eap_pwd_id *id;
	const u8 *password;
	size_t password_len;
	u8 pwhashhash[16];
	int res;

	if (data->state != PWD_ID_Req) {
		ret->ignore = TRUE;
		eap_pwd_state(data, FAILURE);
		return;
	}

	if (payload_len < sizeof(struct eap_pwd_id)) {
		ret->ignore = TRUE;
		eap_pwd_state(data, FAILURE);
		return;
	}

	id = (struct eap_pwd_id *) payload;
	data->group_num = be_to_host16(id->group_num);
	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
		   "EAP-PWD: Server EAP-pwd-ID proposal: group=%u random=%u prf=%u prep=%u",
		   data->group_num, id->random_function, id->prf, id->prep);
	if ((id->random_function != EAP_PWD_DEFAULT_RAND_FUNC) ||
	    (id->prf != EAP_PWD_DEFAULT_PRF)) {
		ret->ignore = TRUE;
		eap_pwd_state(data, FAILURE);
		return;
	}

	if (id->prep != EAP_PWD_PREP_NONE &&
	    id->prep != EAP_PWD_PREP_MS) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
			   "EAP-PWD: Unsupported password pre-processing technique (Prep=%u)",
			   id->prep);
		eap_pwd_state(data, FAILURE);
		return;
	}

	if (id->prep == EAP_PWD_PREP_NONE && data->password_hash) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
			   "EAP-PWD: Unhashed password not available");
		eap_pwd_state(data, FAILURE);
		return;
	}

	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PWD (peer): using group %d",
		   data->group_num);

	data->id_server = os_malloc(payload_len - sizeof(struct eap_pwd_id));
	if (data->id_server == NULL) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD: memory allocation id fail");
		eap_pwd_state(data, FAILURE);
		return;
	}
	data->id_server_len = payload_len - sizeof(struct eap_pwd_id);
	os_memcpy(data->id_server, id->identity, data->id_server_len);
	wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (peer): server sent id of",
			  data->id_server, data->id_server_len);

	data->grp = os_zalloc(sizeof(EAP_PWD_group));
	if (data->grp == NULL) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD: failed to allocate memory for "
			   "group");
		eap_pwd_state(data, FAILURE);
		return;
	}

	if (id->prep == EAP_PWD_PREP_MS) {
		if (data->password_hash) {
			res = hash_nt_password_hash(data->password, pwhashhash);
		} else {
			u8 pwhash[16];

			res = nt_password_hash(data->password,
					       data->password_len, pwhash);
			if (res == 0)
				res = hash_nt_password_hash(pwhash, pwhashhash);
			os_memset(pwhash, 0, sizeof(pwhash));
		}

		if (res) {
			eap_pwd_state(data, FAILURE);
			return;
		}

		password = pwhashhash;
		password_len = sizeof(pwhashhash);
	} else {
		password = data->password;
		password_len = data->password_len;
	}

	/* compute PWE */
	res = compute_password_element(data->grp, data->group_num,
				       password, password_len,
				       data->id_server, data->id_server_len,
				       data->id_peer, data->id_peer_len,
				       id->token);
	os_memset(pwhashhash, 0, sizeof(pwhashhash));
	if (res) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (peer): unable to compute PWE");
		eap_pwd_state(data, FAILURE);
		return;
	}

	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PWD (peer): computed %d bit PWE...",
		   BN_num_bits(data->grp->prime));

	data->outbuf = wpabuf_alloc(sizeof(struct eap_pwd_id) +
				    data->id_peer_len);
	if (data->outbuf == NULL) {
		eap_pwd_state(data, FAILURE);
		return;
	}
	wpabuf_put_be16(data->outbuf, data->group_num);
	wpabuf_put_u8(data->outbuf, EAP_PWD_DEFAULT_RAND_FUNC);
	wpabuf_put_u8(data->outbuf, EAP_PWD_DEFAULT_PRF);
	wpabuf_put_data(data->outbuf, id->token, sizeof(id->token));
	wpabuf_put_u8(data->outbuf, EAP_PWD_PREP_NONE);
	wpabuf_put_data(data->outbuf, data->id_peer, data->id_peer_len);

	eap_pwd_state(data, PWD_Commit_Req);
}
static int eap_ttls_phase2_request_mschapv2(struct eap_sm *sm,
					    struct eap_ttls_data *data,
					    struct eap_method_ret *ret,
					    u8 **resp, size_t *resp_len)
{
	struct wpa_ssid *config = eap_get_config(sm);
	u8 *buf, *pos, *challenge, *username, *peer_challenge;
	size_t username_len, i;

	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: Phase 2 MSCHAPV2 Request");

	/* MSCHAPv2 does not include optional domain name in the
	 * challenge-response calculation, so remove domain prefix
	 * (if present). */
	username = config->identity;
	username_len = config->identity_len;
	pos = username;
	for (i = 0; i < username_len; i++) {
		if (username[i] == '\\') {
			username_len -= i + 1;
			username += i + 1;
			break;
		}
	}

	pos = buf = os_malloc(config->identity_len + 1000);
	if (buf == NULL) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
			   "EAP-TTLS/MSCHAPV2: Failed to allocate memory");
		return -1;
	}

	/* User-Name */
	pos = eap_ttls_avp_add(buf, pos, RADIUS_ATTR_USER_NAME, 0, 1,
			       config->identity, config->identity_len);

	/* MS-CHAP-Challenge */
	challenge = eap_ttls_implicit_challenge(
		sm, data, EAP_TTLS_MSCHAPV2_CHALLENGE_LEN + 1);
	if (challenge == NULL) {
		os_free(buf);
		wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "EAP-TTLS/MSCHAPV2: Failed to derive "
			   "implicit challenge");
		return -1;
	}
	peer_challenge = challenge + 1 + EAP_TTLS_MSCHAPV2_CHALLENGE_LEN;

	pos = eap_ttls_avp_add(buf, pos, RADIUS_ATTR_MS_CHAP_CHALLENGE,
			       RADIUS_VENDOR_ID_MICROSOFT, 1,
			       challenge, EAP_TTLS_MSCHAPV2_CHALLENGE_LEN);

	/* MS-CHAP2-Response */
	pos = eap_ttls_avp_hdr(pos, RADIUS_ATTR_MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE,
			       RADIUS_VENDOR_ID_MICROSOFT, 1,
			       EAP_TTLS_MSCHAPV2_RESPONSE_LEN);
	data->ident = challenge[EAP_TTLS_MSCHAPV2_CHALLENGE_LEN];
	*pos++ = data->ident;
	*pos++ = 0; /* Flags */
	os_memcpy(pos, peer_challenge, EAP_TTLS_MSCHAPV2_CHALLENGE_LEN);
	pos += EAP_TTLS_MSCHAPV2_CHALLENGE_LEN;
	os_memset(pos, 0, 8); /* Reserved, must be zero */
	pos += 8;
	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: MSCHAPV2: implicit auth_challenge",
		    challenge, EAP_TTLS_MSCHAPV2_CHALLENGE_LEN);
	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: MSCHAPV2: peer_challenge",
		    peer_challenge, EAP_TTLS_MSCHAPV2_CHALLENGE_LEN);
	wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: MSCHAPV2 username",
			  username, username_len);
	wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: MSCHAPV2 password",
			      config->password, config->password_len);
	generate_nt_response(challenge, peer_challenge,
			     username, username_len,
			     config->password, config->password_len,
			     pos);
	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: MSCHAPV2 response", pos, 24);
	generate_authenticator_response(config->password, config->password_len,
					peer_challenge, challenge,
					username, username_len,
					pos, data->auth_response);
	data->auth_response_valid = 1;

	if (data->ttls_version > 0) {
		u8 pw_hash[16], pw_hash_hash[16], master_key[16];
		u8 session_key[2 * MSCHAPV2_KEY_LEN];
		nt_password_hash(config->password, config->password_len,
				 pw_hash);
		hash_nt_password_hash(pw_hash, pw_hash_hash);
		get_master_key(pw_hash_hash, pos /* nt_response */,
			       master_key);
		get_asymetric_start_key(master_key, session_key,
					MSCHAPV2_KEY_LEN, 0, 0);
		get_asymetric_start_key(master_key,
					session_key + MSCHAPV2_KEY_LEN,
					MSCHAPV2_KEY_LEN, 1, 0);
		eap_ttls_ia_permute_inner_secret(sm, data,
						 session_key,
						 sizeof(session_key));
	}

	pos += 24;
	os_free(challenge);
	AVP_PAD(buf, pos);

	*resp = buf;
	*resp_len = pos - buf;

	if (sm->workaround && data->ttls_version == 0) {
		/* At least FreeRADIUS seems to be terminating
		 * EAP-TTLS/MSHCAPV2 without the expected MS-CHAP-v2 Success
		 * packet. */
		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS/MSCHAPV2: EAP workaround - "
			   "allow success without tunneled response");
		ret->methodState = METHOD_MAY_CONT;
		ret->decision = DECISION_COND_SUCC;
	}

	return 0;
}
static u8 * eap_mschapv2_challenge(struct eap_sm *sm,
				   struct eap_mschapv2_data *data,
				   struct eap_method_ret *ret,
				   const struct eap_mschapv2_hdr *req,
				   size_t *respDataLen)
{
	u8 *challenge, *peer_challenge, *pos;
	int ms_len;
	size_t i, len, challenge_len, username_len, identity_len, password_len;
	struct eap_mschapv2_hdr *resp;
	u8 password_hash[16], password_hash_hash[16];
	const u8 *username, *identity, *password;

	identity = eap_get_config_identity(sm, &identity_len);
	password = eap_get_config_password(sm, &password_len);
	if (identity == NULL || password == NULL)
		return NULL;

	/* MSCHAPv2 does not include optional domain name in the
	 * challenge-response calculation, so remove domain prefix
	 * (if present). */
	username = identity;
	username_len = identity_len;
	for (i = 0; i < username_len; i++) {
		if (username[i] == '\\') {
			username_len -= i + 1;
			username += i + 1;
			break;
		}
	}

	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: Received challenge");
	len = be_to_host16(req->length);
	pos = (u8 *) (req + 1);
	challenge_len = *pos++;
	if (challenge_len != 16) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: Invalid challenge length "
			   "%lu", (unsigned long) challenge_len);
		ret->ignore = TRUE;
		return NULL;
	}

	if (len < 10 || len - 10 < challenge_len) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: Too short challenge"
			   " packet: len=%lu challenge_len=%lu",
			   (unsigned long) len, (unsigned long) challenge_len);
		ret->ignore = TRUE;
		return NULL;
	}

	if (data->passwd_change_challenge_valid) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: Using challenge from the "
			   "failure message");
		challenge = data->passwd_change_challenge;
	} else
		challenge = pos;
	pos += challenge_len;
	wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: Authentication Servername",
		    pos, len - challenge_len - 10);

	ret->ignore = FALSE;
	ret->methodState = METHOD_MAY_CONT;
	ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL;
	ret->allowNotifications = TRUE;

	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: Generating Challenge Response");

	*respDataLen = sizeof(*resp) + 1 + MSCHAPV2_RESP_LEN + identity_len;
	resp = wpa_zalloc(*respDataLen);
	if (resp == NULL)
		return NULL;
	resp->code = EAP_CODE_RESPONSE;
	resp->identifier = req->identifier;
	resp->length = host_to_be16(*respDataLen);
	resp->type = EAP_TYPE_MSCHAPV2;
	resp->op_code = MSCHAPV2_OP_RESPONSE;
	resp->mschapv2_id = req->mschapv2_id;
	if (data->prev_error) {
		/*
		 * TODO: this does not seem to be enough when processing two
		 * or more failure messages. IAS did not increment mschapv2_id
		 * in its own packets, but it seemed to expect the peer to
		 * increment this for all packets(?).
		 */
		resp->mschapv2_id++;
	}
	ms_len = *respDataLen - 5;
	WPA_PUT_BE16(resp->ms_length, ms_len);
	pos = (u8 *) (resp + 1);
	*pos++ = MSCHAPV2_RESP_LEN; /* Value-Size */

	/* Response */
	peer_challenge = pos;
	if (data->peer_challenge) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: peer_challenge generated "
			   "in Phase 1");
		peer_challenge = data->peer_challenge;
	} else if (hostapd_get_rand(peer_challenge, 16)) {
		free(resp);
		return NULL;
	}
	pos += 16;
	pos += 8; /* Reserved, must be zero */
	if (data->auth_challenge) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: auth_challenge generated "
			   "in Phase 1");
		challenge = data->auth_challenge;
	}
	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: auth_challenge", challenge, 16);
	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: peer_challenge",
		    peer_challenge, 16);
	wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: username",
			  username, username_len);
	wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: password",
			      password, password_len);
	generate_nt_response(challenge, peer_challenge, username, username_len,
			     password, password_len, pos);
	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: response", pos, 24);
	/* Authenticator response is not really needed yet, but calculate it
	 * here so that challenges need not be saved. */
	generate_authenticator_response(password, password_len,
					peer_challenge, challenge,
					username, username_len, pos,
					data->auth_response);
	data->auth_response_valid = 1;

	/* Likewise, generate master_key here since we have the needed data
	 * available. */
	nt_password_hash(password, password_len, password_hash);
	hash_nt_password_hash(password_hash, password_hash_hash);
	get_master_key(password_hash_hash, pos /* nt_response */,
		       data->master_key);
	data->master_key_valid = 1;

	pos += 24;
	pos++; /* Flag / reserved, must be zero */

	memcpy(pos, identity, identity_len);
	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: TX identifier %d mschapv2_id %d "
		   "(response)", resp->identifier, resp->mschapv2_id);
	return (u8 *) resp;
}
Beispiel #28
0
static void eap_mschapv2_process_response(struct eap_sm *sm,
					  struct eap_mschapv2_data *data,
					  u8 *respData, size_t respDataLen)
{
	struct eap_mschapv2_hdr *resp;
	const u8 *pos, *end, *peer_challenge, *nt_response, *name;
	u8 flags;
	size_t len, name_len, i;
	u8 expected[24];
	const u8 *username, *user;
	size_t username_len, user_len;

	pos = eap_hdr_validate(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_MSCHAPV2,
			       respData, respDataLen, &len);
	if (pos == NULL || len < 1)
		return; /* Should not happen - frame already validated */

	end = pos + len;
	resp = (struct eap_mschapv2_hdr *) pos;
	pos = (u8 *) (resp + 1);

	if (len < sizeof(*resp) + 1 + 49 ||
	    resp->op_code != MSCHAPV2_OP_RESPONSE ||
	    pos[0] != 49) {
		wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: Invalid response",
			    respData, respDataLen);
		data->state = FAILURE;
		return;
	}
	data->resp_mschapv2_id = resp->mschapv2_id;
	pos++;
	peer_challenge = pos;
	pos += 16 + 8;
	nt_response = pos;
	pos += 24;
	flags = *pos++;
	name = pos;
	name_len = end - name;

	wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: Peer-Challenge",
		    peer_challenge, 16);
	wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: NT-Response", nt_response, 24);
	wpa_printf(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: Flags 0x%x", flags);
	wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: Name", name, name_len);

	/* MSCHAPv2 does not include optional domain name in the
	 * challenge-response calculation, so remove domain prefix
	 * (if present). */
	username = sm->identity;
	username_len = sm->identity_len;
	for (i = 0; i < username_len; i++) {
		if (username[i] == '\\') {
			username_len -= i + 1;
			username += i + 1;
			break;
		}
	}

	user = name;
	user_len = name_len;
	for (i = 0; i < user_len; i++) {
		if (user[i] == '\\') {
			user_len -= i + 1;
			user += i + 1;
			break;
		}
	}

	if (username_len != user_len ||
	    memcmp(username, user, username_len) != 0) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: Mismatch in user names");
		wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: Expected user "
				  "name", username, username_len);
		wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: Received user "
				  "name", user, user_len);
		data->state = FAILURE;
		return;
	}

	wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: User name",
			  username, username_len);

	if (sm->user->password_hash) {
		generate_nt_response_pwhash(data->auth_challenge,
					    peer_challenge,
					    username, username_len,
					    sm->user->password,
					    expected);
	} else {
		generate_nt_response(data->auth_challenge, peer_challenge,
				     username, username_len,
				     sm->user->password,
				     sm->user->password_len,
				     expected);
	}

	if (memcmp(nt_response, expected, 24) == 0) {
		const u8 *pw_hash;
		u8 pw_hash_buf[16], pw_hash_hash[16];

		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: Correct NT-Response");
		data->state = SUCCESS_REQ;

		/* Authenticator response is not really needed yet, but
		 * calculate it here so that peer_challenge and username need
		 * not be saved. */
		if (sm->user->password_hash) {
			pw_hash = sm->user->password;
			generate_authenticator_response_pwhash(
				sm->user->password, peer_challenge,
				data->auth_challenge, username, username_len,
				nt_response, data->auth_response);
		} else {
			nt_password_hash(sm->user->password,
					 sm->user->password_len,
					 pw_hash_buf);
			pw_hash = pw_hash_buf;
			generate_authenticator_response(sm->user->password,
							sm->user->password_len,
							peer_challenge,
							data->auth_challenge,
							username, username_len,
							nt_response,
							data->auth_response);
		}

		hash_nt_password_hash(pw_hash, pw_hash_hash);
		get_master_key(pw_hash_hash, nt_response, data->master_key);
		data->master_key_valid = 1;
		wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: Derived Master Key",
				data->master_key, MSCHAPV2_KEY_LEN);
	} else {
		wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: Expected NT-Response",
			    expected, 24);
		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-MSCHAPV2: Invalid NT-Response");
		data->state = FAILURE_REQ;
	}
}