static void
test_rend_cache_decrement_allocation(void *data)
{
(void)data;
// Test when the cache has enough allocations
rend_cache_total_allocation = 10;
rend_cache_decrement_allocation(3);
tt_int_op(rend_cache_total_allocation, OP_EQ, 7);
// Test when there are not enough allocations
rend_cache_total_allocation = 1;
setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
rend_cache_decrement_allocation(2);
tt_int_op(rend_cache_total_allocation, OP_EQ, 0);
expect_single_log_msg_containing(
"Underflow in rend_cache_decrement_allocation");
teardown_capture_of_logs();
// And again
rend_cache_decrement_allocation(2);
tt_int_op(rend_cache_total_allocation, OP_EQ, 0);
done:
teardown_capture_of_logs();
}
static void
test_rend_cache_increment_allocation(void *data)
{
(void)data;
// Test when the cache is not overflowing
rend_cache_total_allocation = 5;
rend_cache_increment_allocation(3);
tt_int_op(rend_cache_total_allocation, OP_EQ, 8);
// Test when there are too many allocations
rend_cache_total_allocation = SIZE_MAX-1;
setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
rend_cache_increment_allocation(2);
tt_u64_op(rend_cache_total_allocation, OP_EQ, SIZE_MAX);
expect_single_log_msg_containing(
"Overflow in rend_cache_increment_allocation");
teardown_capture_of_logs();
// And again
rend_cache_increment_allocation(2);
tt_u64_op(rend_cache_total_allocation, OP_EQ, SIZE_MAX);
done:
teardown_capture_of_logs();
}
/* Try sending an ESTABLISH_INTRO cell on a circuit that is already an intro
* point. Should fail. */
static void
test_establish_intro_wrong_purpose(void *arg)
{
int retval;
ssize_t cell_len = 0;
char circ_nonce[DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
uint8_t cell_body[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
or_circuit_t *intro_circ = or_circuit_new(0,NULL);
(void)arg;
/* Get the auth key of the intro point */
crypto_rand(circ_nonce, sizeof(circ_nonce));
memcpy(intro_circ->rend_circ_nonce, circ_nonce, DIGEST_LEN);
/* Set a bad circuit purpose!! :) */
circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ), CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_INTRO_POINT);
/* Create outgoing ESTABLISH_INTRO cell and extract its payload so that we
attempt to parse it. */
cell_len = new_establish_intro_encoded_cell(circ_nonce, cell_body);
tt_i64_op(cell_len, OP_GT, 0);
/* Receive the cell. Should fail. */
setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO);
retval = hs_intro_received_establish_intro(intro_circ, cell_body, cell_len);
expect_log_msg_containing("Rejecting ESTABLISH_INTRO on non-OR circuit.");
teardown_capture_of_logs();
tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, -1);
done:
circuit_free_(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ));
}
/* Send a legit ESTABLISH_INTRO cell but slightly change the signature. Should
* fail. */
static void
test_establish_intro_wrong_sig(void *arg)
{
int retval;
char circ_nonce[DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
uint8_t cell_body[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
ssize_t cell_len = 0;
or_circuit_t *intro_circ = or_circuit_new(0,NULL);
(void) arg;
/* Get the auth key of the intro point */
crypto_rand(circ_nonce, sizeof(circ_nonce));
helper_prepare_circ_for_intro(intro_circ, circ_nonce);
/* Create outgoing ESTABLISH_INTRO cell and extract its payload so that we
attempt to parse it. */
cell_len = new_establish_intro_encoded_cell(circ_nonce, cell_body);
tt_i64_op(cell_len, OP_GT, 0);
/* Mutate the last byte (signature)! :) */
cell_body[cell_len - 1]++;
/* Receive the cell. Should fail. */
setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO);
retval = hs_intro_received_establish_intro(intro_circ, cell_body,
(size_t)cell_len);
expect_log_msg_containing("Failed to verify ESTABLISH_INTRO cell.");
teardown_capture_of_logs();
tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, -1);
done:
circuit_free_(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ));
}
/** We simulate a failure to create an ESTABLISH_INTRO cell */
static void
test_gen_establish_intro_cell_bad(void *arg)
{
(void) arg;
ssize_t cell_len = 0;
trn_cell_establish_intro_t *cell = NULL;
char circ_nonce[DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
hs_service_intro_point_t *ip = NULL;
MOCK(ed25519_sign_prefixed, mock_ed25519_sign_prefixed);
crypto_rand(circ_nonce, sizeof(circ_nonce));
setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
/* Easiest way to make that function fail is to mock the
ed25519_sign_prefixed() function and make it fail. */
cell = trn_cell_establish_intro_new();
tt_assert(cell);
ip = service_intro_point_new(NULL);
cell_len = hs_cell_build_establish_intro(circ_nonce, ip, NULL);
service_intro_point_free(ip);
expect_log_msg_containing("Unable to make signature for "
"ESTABLISH_INTRO cell.");
teardown_capture_of_logs();
tt_i64_op(cell_len, OP_EQ, -1);
done:
trn_cell_establish_intro_free(cell);
UNMOCK(ed25519_sign_prefixed);
}
static void
test_address_get_if_addrs6_list_no_internal(void *arg)
{
smartlist_t *results = NULL;
(void)arg;
/* We might drop a log_err */
setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_ERR);
results = get_interface_address6_list(LOG_ERR, AF_INET6, 0);
tt_int_op(smartlist_len(mock_saved_logs()), OP_LE, 1);
if (smartlist_len(mock_saved_logs()) == 1) {
expect_log_msg_containing_either4("connect() failed",
"unable to create socket",
"Address that we determined via UDP "
"socket magic is unsuitable for public "
"comms.",
"getsockname() to determine interface "
"failed");
}
teardown_capture_of_logs();
tt_ptr_op(results, OP_NE, NULL);
/* Work even on systems without IPv6 interfaces */
tt_int_op(smartlist_len(results),OP_GE,0);
tt_assert(!smartlist_contains_localhost_tor_addr(results));
tt_assert(!smartlist_contains_multicast_tor_addr(results));
tt_assert(!smartlist_contains_internal_tor_addr(results));
tt_assert(!smartlist_contains_null_tor_addr(results));
/* if there are any addresses, they must be IPv6 */
tt_assert(!smartlist_contains_ipv4_tor_addr(results));
if (smartlist_len(results) > 0) {
tt_assert(smartlist_contains_ipv6_tor_addr(results));
}
done:
teardown_capture_of_logs();
interface_address6_list_free(results);
return;
}
static void
test_conn_edge_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach_closes_conn_for_excluded_exit(void *data)
{
entry_connection_t *conn = entry_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_AP, AF_INET);
addressmap_init();
origin_circuit_t *circuit = NULL;
crypt_path_t *path = NULL;
(void) data;
MOCK(get_options, get_options_mock);
MOCK(connection_ap_handshake_rewrite, connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_mock);
MOCK(connection_mark_unattached_ap_, connection_mark_unattached_ap_mock);
MOCK(node_get_by_nickname, node_get_by_nickname_mock);
init_rewrite_mock();
init_exit_node_mock();
init_mock_options();
rewrite_mock->should_close = 0;
rewrite_mock->exit_source = ADDRMAPSRC_NONE;
SET_SOCKS_ADDRESS(conn->socks_request, "http://www.wellformed.exit");
conn->socks_request->command = SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT;
strlcpy(exit_node_mock->rs->nickname, "wellformed", MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1);
options_mock->AllowDotExit = 1;
options_mock->StrictNodes = 0;
options_mock->SafeLogging_ = SAFELOG_SCRUB_NONE;
excluded_nodes = routerset_new();
smartlist_add(excluded_nodes->list, tor_strdup("wellformed"));
strmap_set(excluded_nodes->names, tor_strdup("wellformed"), exit_node_mock);
options_mock->ExcludeExitNodes = excluded_nodes;
int prev_log = setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO);
int res = connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(conn, circuit, path);
tt_int_op(unattachment_reason_spy, OP_EQ, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
tt_int_op(res, OP_EQ, -1);
tt_str_op(mock_saved_log_at(-1), OP_EQ, "Excluded relay in exit address 'http://www.exit'. Refusing.\n");
done:
UNMOCK(get_options);
UNMOCK(connection_ap_handshake_rewrite);
UNMOCK(connection_mark_unattached_ap_);
UNMOCK(node_get_by_nickname);
destroy_rewrite_mock();
destroy_mock_options();
destroy_exit_node_mock();
tor_free(excluded_nodes);
tor_free(circuit);
tor_free(path);
teardown_capture_of_logs(prev_log);
}
/** Test warn_early_consensus(), expecting no warning */
static void
test_warn_early_consensus_no(const networkstatus_t *c, time_t now,
long offset)
{
mock_apparent_skew = 0;
setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
warn_early_consensus(c, "microdesc", now + offset);
expect_no_log_msg_containing("behind the time published in the consensus");
tt_int_op(mock_apparent_skew, OP_EQ, 0);
done:
teardown_capture_of_logs();
}
/** Test warn_early_consensus(), expecting a warning */
static void
test_warn_early_consensus_yes(const networkstatus_t *c, time_t now,
long offset)
{
mock_apparent_skew = 0;
setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
warn_early_consensus(c, "microdesc", now + offset);
/* Can't use expect_single_log_msg() because of unrecognized authorities */
expect_log_msg_containing("behind the time published in the consensus");
tt_int_op(mock_apparent_skew, OP_EQ, offset);
done:
teardown_capture_of_logs();
}
/** Test non-early consensus */
static void
test_timely_consensus(void *arg)
{
time_t now = time(NULL);
unsigned long offset = 0;
int retval = 0;
retval = test_skew_common(arg, now, &offset);
(void)offset;
expect_no_log_msg_containing("behind the time published in the consensus");
tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
tt_int_op(mock_apparent_skew, OP_EQ, 0);
done:
teardown_capture_of_logs();
UNMOCK(clock_skew_warning);
}
/** Test early consensus */
static void
test_early_consensus(void *arg)
{
time_t now = time(NULL);
unsigned long offset = 0;
int retval = 0;
retval = test_skew_common(arg, now, &offset);
/* Can't use expect_single_log_msg() because of unrecognized authorities */
expect_log_msg_containing("behind the time published in the consensus");
tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
/* This depends on construct_consensus() setting valid_after=now+1000 */
tt_int_op(mock_apparent_skew, OP_EQ, offset - 1000);
done:
teardown_capture_of_logs();
UNMOCK(clock_skew_warning);
}
static void
test_util_process_clear_waitpid_callback(void *ignored)
{
(void)ignored;
waitpid_callback_t *res;
int previous_log = setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
pid_t pid = (pid_t)43;
clear_waitpid_callback(NULL);
res = set_waitpid_callback(pid, temp_callback, NULL);
clear_waitpid_callback(res);
clear_waitpid_callback(res);
// done:
teardown_capture_of_logs(previous_log);
}
static void
test_util_process_set_waitpid_callback(void *ignored)
{
(void)ignored;
waitpid_callback_t *res;
int previous_log = setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
pid_t pid = (pid_t)42;
res = set_waitpid_callback(pid, temp_callback, NULL);
tt_assert(res);
res = set_waitpid_callback(pid, temp_callback, NULL);
tt_assert(res);
tt_str_op(mock_saved_log_at(0), OP_EQ, "Replaced a waitpid monitor on pid 42. That should be impossible.\n");
done:
teardown_capture_of_logs(previous_log);
}
/* Send a legit ESTABLISH_INTRO cell but with a wrong sig length. Should
* fail. */
static void
test_establish_intro_wrong_sig_len(void *arg)
{
int retval;
char circ_nonce[DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
uint8_t cell_body[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
ssize_t cell_len = 0;
size_t bad_sig_len = ED25519_SIG_LEN - 1;
trn_cell_establish_intro_t *cell = NULL;
or_circuit_t *intro_circ = or_circuit_new(0,NULL);
(void) arg;
/* Get the auth key of the intro point */
crypto_rand(circ_nonce, sizeof(circ_nonce));
helper_prepare_circ_for_intro(intro_circ, circ_nonce);
/* Create outgoing ESTABLISH_INTRO cell and extract its payload so that we
* attempt to parse it. */
cell_len = new_establish_intro_cell(circ_nonce, &cell);
tt_i64_op(cell_len, OP_GT, 0);
tt_assert(cell);
/* Mangle the signature length. */
trn_cell_establish_intro_set_sig_len(cell, bad_sig_len);
trn_cell_establish_intro_setlen_sig(cell, bad_sig_len);
/* Encode cell. */
cell_len = trn_cell_establish_intro_encode(cell_body, sizeof(cell_body),
cell);
tt_int_op(cell_len, OP_GT, 0);
/* Receive the cell. Should fail. */
setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO);
retval = hs_intro_received_establish_intro(intro_circ, cell_body, cell_len);
expect_log_msg_containing("ESTABLISH_INTRO sig len is invalid");
teardown_capture_of_logs();
tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, -1);
done:
trn_cell_establish_intro_free(cell);
circuit_free_(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ));
}
static void
test_conn_edge_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach_closes_conn_for_unrecognized_exit_address(void *data)
{
entry_connection_t *conn = entry_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_AP, AF_INET);
addressmap_init();
origin_circuit_t *circuit = NULL;
crypt_path_t *path = NULL;
(void) data;
MOCK(get_options, get_options_mock);
MOCK(connection_ap_handshake_rewrite, connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_mock);
MOCK(connection_mark_unattached_ap_, connection_mark_unattached_ap_mock);
init_rewrite_mock();
init_mock_options();
rewrite_mock->should_close = 0;
rewrite_mock->exit_source = ADDRMAPSRC_NONE;
SET_SOCKS_ADDRESS(conn->socks_request, "http://www.wellformed.exit");
conn->socks_request->command = SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT;
options_mock->AllowDotExit = 1;
options_mock->SafeLogging_ = SAFELOG_SCRUB_NONE;
int prev_log = setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO);
int res = connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(conn, circuit, path);
tt_int_op(unattachment_reason_spy, OP_EQ, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
tt_int_op(res, OP_EQ, -1);
tt_str_op(mock_saved_log_at(-1), OP_EQ, "Unrecognized relay in exit address 'http://www.exit'. Refusing.\n");
done:
UNMOCK(get_options);
UNMOCK(connection_ap_handshake_rewrite);
UNMOCK(connection_mark_unattached_ap_);
destroy_rewrite_mock();
destroy_mock_options();
tor_free(circuit);
tor_free(path);
teardown_capture_of_logs(prev_log);
}
static void
test_util_process_set_waitpid_callback(void *ignored)
{
(void)ignored;
waitpid_callback_t *res1 = NULL, *res2 = NULL;
int previous_log = setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
pid_t pid = (pid_t)42;
res1 = set_waitpid_callback(pid, temp_callback, NULL);
tt_assert(res1);
res2 = set_waitpid_callback(pid, temp_callback, NULL);
tt_assert(res2);
expect_log_msg("Replaced a waitpid monitor on pid 42. That should be "
"impossible.\n");
done:
teardown_capture_of_logs(previous_log);
clear_waitpid_callback(res1);
clear_waitpid_callback(res2);
}
static void
test_conn_edge_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach_closes_conn_when_hostname_is_bogus(void *data)
{
entry_connection_t *conn = entry_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_AP, AF_INET);
addressmap_init();
origin_circuit_t *circuit = NULL;
crypt_path_t *path = NULL;
(void) data;
MOCK(get_options, get_options_mock);
MOCK(connection_ap_handshake_rewrite, connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_mock);
MOCK(connection_mark_unattached_ap_, connection_mark_unattached_ap_mock);
init_mock_options();
init_rewrite_mock();
options_mock->SafeLogging_ = SAFELOG_SCRUB_NONE;
rewrite_mock->should_close = 0;
SET_SOCKS_ADDRESS(conn->socks_request, "http://www.bogus.onion");
conn->socks_request->command = SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT;
int prev_log = setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO);
int res = connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(conn, circuit, path);
tt_int_op(unattachment_reason_spy, OP_EQ, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
tt_int_op(res, OP_EQ, -1);
tt_str_op(mock_saved_log_at(-1), OP_EQ, "Invalid onion hostname bogus; rejecting\n");
done:
UNMOCK(get_options);
UNMOCK(connection_ap_handshake_rewrite);
UNMOCK(connection_mark_unattached_ap_);
destroy_rewrite_mock();
tor_free(circuit);
tor_free(path);
destroy_mock_options();
teardown_capture_of_logs(prev_log);
}
/* Send an empty ESTABLISH_INTRO cell. Should fail. */
static void
test_establish_intro_wrong_keytype(void *arg)
{
int retval;
or_circuit_t *intro_circ = or_circuit_new(0,NULL);
char circ_nonce[DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
(void) arg;
/* Get the auth key of the intro point */
crypto_rand(circ_nonce, sizeof(circ_nonce));
helper_prepare_circ_for_intro(intro_circ, circ_nonce);
/* Receive the cell. Should fail. */
setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO);
retval = hs_intro_received_establish_intro(intro_circ, (uint8_t *) "", 0);
expect_log_msg_containing("Empty ESTABLISH_INTRO cell.");
teardown_capture_of_logs();
tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, -1);
done:
circuit_free_(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ));
}
static void
test_util_process_clear_waitpid_callback(void *ignored)
{
(void)ignored;
waitpid_callback_t *res;
int previous_log = setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
pid_t pid = (pid_t)43;
clear_waitpid_callback(NULL);
res = set_waitpid_callback(pid, temp_callback, NULL);
clear_waitpid_callback(res);
expect_no_log_entry();
#if 0
/* No. This is use-after-free. We don't _do_ that. XXXX */
clear_waitpid_callback(res);
expect_log_msg("Couldn't remove waitpid monitor for pid 43.\n");
#endif
done:
teardown_capture_of_logs(previous_log);
}
static void
test_virtaddrmap_persist(void *data)
{
(void)data;
const char *a, *b, *c;
tor_addr_t addr;
char *ones = NULL;
addressmap_init();
// Try a hostname.
a = addressmap_register_virtual_address(RESOLVED_TYPE_HOSTNAME,
tor_strdup("foobar.baz"));
tt_assert(a);
tt_assert(!strcmpend(a, ".virtual"));
// mock crypto_rand to repeat the same result twice; make sure we get
// different outcomes. (Because even though the odds for receiving the
// same 80-bit address twice is only 1/2^40, it could still happen for
// some user -- but running our test through 2^40 iterations isn't
// reasonable.)
canned_data = "1234567890" // the first call returns this.
"1234567890" // the second call returns this.
"abcdefghij"; // the third call returns this.
canned_data_len = 30;
MOCK(crypto_rand, crypto_canned);
a = addressmap_register_virtual_address(RESOLVED_TYPE_HOSTNAME,
tor_strdup("quuxit.baz"));
b = addressmap_register_virtual_address(RESOLVED_TYPE_HOSTNAME,
tor_strdup("nescio.baz"));
tt_assert(a);
tt_assert(b);
tt_str_op(a, OP_EQ, "gezdgnbvgy3tqojq.virtual");
tt_str_op(b, OP_EQ, "mfrggzdfmztwq2lk.virtual");
// Now try something to get us an ipv4 address
UNMOCK(crypto_rand);
tt_int_op(0,OP_EQ, parse_virtual_addr_network("192.168.0.0/16",
AF_INET, 0, NULL));
a = addressmap_register_virtual_address(RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4,
tor_strdup("foobar.baz"));
tt_assert(a);
tt_assert(!strcmpstart(a, "192.168."));
tor_addr_parse(&addr, a);
tt_int_op(AF_INET, OP_EQ, tor_addr_family(&addr));
b = addressmap_register_virtual_address(RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4,
tor_strdup("quuxit.baz"));
tt_str_op(b, OP_NE, a);
tt_assert(!strcmpstart(b, "192.168."));
// Try some canned entropy and verify all the we discard duplicates,
// addresses that end with 0, and addresses that end with 255.
MOCK(crypto_rand, crypto_canned);
canned_data = "\x01\x02\x03\x04" // okay
"\x01\x02\x03\x04" // duplicate
"\x03\x04\x00\x00" // bad ending 1
"\x05\x05\x00\xff" // bad ending 2
"\x05\x06\x07\xf0"; // okay
canned_data_len = 20;
a = addressmap_register_virtual_address(RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4,
tor_strdup("wumble.onion"));
b = addressmap_register_virtual_address(RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4,
tor_strdup("wumpus.onion"));
tt_str_op(a, OP_EQ, "192.168.3.4");
tt_str_op(b, OP_EQ, "192.168.7.240");
// Now try IPv6!
UNMOCK(crypto_rand);
tt_int_op(0,OP_EQ, parse_virtual_addr_network("1010:F000::/20",
AF_INET6, 0, NULL));
a = addressmap_register_virtual_address(RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV6,
tor_strdup("foobar.baz"));
tt_assert(a);
tt_assert(!strcmpstart(a, "[1010:f"));
tor_addr_parse(&addr, a);
tt_int_op(AF_INET6, OP_EQ, tor_addr_family(&addr));
b = addressmap_register_virtual_address(RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV6,
tor_strdup("quuxit.baz"));
tt_str_op(b, OP_NE, a);
tt_assert(!strcmpstart(b, "[1010:f"));
// Try IPv6 with canned entropy, to make sure we detect duplicates.
MOCK(crypto_rand, crypto_canned);
canned_data = "acanthopterygian" // okay
"cinematographist" // okay
"acanthopterygian" // duplicate
"acanthopterygian" // duplicate
"acanthopterygian" // duplicate
"cinematographist" // duplicate
"coadministration"; // okay
canned_data_len = 16 * 7;
a = addressmap_register_virtual_address(RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV6,
tor_strdup("wuffle.baz"));
b = addressmap_register_virtual_address(RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV6,
tor_strdup("gribble.baz"));
c = addressmap_register_virtual_address(RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV6,
tor_strdup("surprisingly-legible.baz"));
tt_str_op(a, OP_EQ, "[1010:f16e:7468:6f70:7465:7279:6769:616e]");
tt_str_op(b, OP_EQ, "[1010:fe65:6d61:746f:6772:6170:6869:7374]");
tt_str_op(c, OP_EQ, "[1010:f164:6d69:6e69:7374:7261:7469:6f6e]");
// Try address exhaustion: make sure we can actually fail if we
// get too many already-existing addresses.
canned_data_len = 128*1024;
canned_data = ones = tor_malloc(canned_data_len);
memset(ones, 1, canned_data_len);
// There is some chance this one will fail if a previous random
// allocation gave out the address already.
a = addressmap_register_virtual_address(RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4,
tor_strdup("might-work.onion"));
if (a) {
tt_str_op(a, OP_EQ, "192.168.1.1");
}
setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
// This one will definitely fail, since we've set up the RNG to hand
// out "1" forever.
b = addressmap_register_virtual_address(RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4,
tor_strdup("wont-work.onion"));
tt_assert(b == NULL);
expect_single_log_msg_containing("Ran out of virtual addresses!");
done:
UNMOCK(crypto_rand);
tor_free(ones);
addressmap_free_all();
teardown_capture_of_logs();
}
static void
test_channel_duplicates(void *arg)
{
channel_t *chan = NULL;
routerstatus_t rs;
(void) arg;
setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO);
/* Try a flat call with channel nor connections. */
channel_check_for_duplicates();
expect_log_msg_containing(
"Found 0 connections to 0 relays. Found 0 current canonical "
"connections, in 0 of which we were a non-canonical peer. "
"0 relays had more than 1 connection, 0 had more than 2, and "
"0 had more than 4 connections.");
mock_ns = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*mock_ns));
mock_ns->routerstatus_list = smartlist_new();
MOCK(networkstatus_get_latest_consensus,
mock_networkstatus_get_latest_consensus);
chan = new_fake_channel();
tt_assert(chan);
chan->is_canonical = test_chan_is_canonical;
memset(chan->identity_digest, 'A', sizeof(chan->identity_digest));
channel_add_to_digest_map(chan);
tt_ptr_op(channel_find_by_remote_identity(chan->identity_digest, NULL),
OP_EQ, chan);
/* No relay has been associated with this channel. */
channel_check_for_duplicates();
expect_log_msg_containing(
"Found 0 connections to 0 relays. Found 0 current canonical "
"connections, in 0 of which we were a non-canonical peer. "
"0 relays had more than 1 connection, 0 had more than 2, and "
"0 had more than 4 connections.");
/* Associate relay to this connection in the consensus. */
memset(&rs, 0, sizeof(rs));
memset(rs.identity_digest, 'A', sizeof(rs.identity_digest));
smartlist_add(mock_ns->routerstatus_list, &rs);
/* Non opened channel. */
chan->state = CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING;
channel_check_for_duplicates();
expect_log_msg_containing(
"Found 0 connections to 0 relays. Found 0 current canonical "
"connections, in 0 of which we were a non-canonical peer. "
"0 relays had more than 1 connection, 0 had more than 2, and "
"0 had more than 4 connections.");
chan->state = CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN;
channel_check_for_duplicates();
expect_log_msg_containing(
"Found 1 connections to 1 relays. Found 0 current canonical "
"connections, in 0 of which we were a non-canonical peer. "
"0 relays had more than 1 connection, 0 had more than 2, and "
"0 had more than 4 connections.");
test_chan_should_be_canonical = 1;
channel_check_for_duplicates();
expect_log_msg_containing(
"Found 1 connections to 1 relays. Found 1 current canonical "
"connections, in 1 of which we were a non-canonical peer. "
"0 relays had more than 1 connection, 0 had more than 2, and "
"0 had more than 4 connections.");
teardown_capture_of_logs();
done:
free_fake_channel(chan);
smartlist_clear(mock_ns->routerstatus_list);
networkstatus_vote_free(mock_ns);
UNMOCK(networkstatus_get_latest_consensus);
}
/* Send a legit ESTABLISH_INTRO cell but with a wrong MAC. Should fail. */
static void
test_establish_intro_wrong_mac(void *arg)
{
int retval;
char circ_nonce[DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
ssize_t cell_len = 0;
uint8_t cell_body[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
trn_cell_establish_intro_t *cell = NULL;
or_circuit_t *intro_circ = or_circuit_new(0,NULL);
(void) arg;
/* Get the auth key of the intro point */
crypto_rand(circ_nonce, sizeof(circ_nonce));
helper_prepare_circ_for_intro(intro_circ, circ_nonce);
/* Create outgoing ESTABLISH_INTRO cell and extract its payload so that we
* attempt to parse it. */
cell_len = new_establish_intro_cell(circ_nonce, &cell);
tt_i64_op(cell_len, OP_GT, 0);
tt_assert(cell);
/* Mangle one byte of the MAC. */
uint8_t *handshake_ptr =
trn_cell_establish_intro_getarray_handshake_mac(cell);
handshake_ptr[TRUNNEL_SHA3_256_LEN - 1]++;
/* We need to resign the payload with that change. */
{
ed25519_signature_t sig;
ed25519_keypair_t key_struct;
/* New keypair for the signature since we don't have access to the private
* key material generated earlier when creating the cell. */
retval = ed25519_keypair_generate(&key_struct, 0);
tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
uint8_t *auth_key_ptr =
trn_cell_establish_intro_getarray_auth_key(cell);
memcpy(auth_key_ptr, key_struct.pubkey.pubkey, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
/* Encode payload so we can sign it. */
cell_len = trn_cell_establish_intro_encode(cell_body, sizeof(cell_body),
cell);
tt_i64_op(cell_len, OP_GT, 0);
retval = ed25519_sign_prefixed(&sig, cell_body,
cell_len -
(ED25519_SIG_LEN + sizeof(cell->sig_len)),
ESTABLISH_INTRO_SIG_PREFIX, &key_struct);
tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
/* And write the signature to the cell */
uint8_t *sig_ptr =
trn_cell_establish_intro_getarray_sig(cell);
memcpy(sig_ptr, sig.sig, cell->sig_len);
/* Re-encode with the new signature. */
cell_len = trn_cell_establish_intro_encode(cell_body, sizeof(cell_body),
cell);
tt_i64_op(cell_len, OP_GT, 0);
}
/* Receive the cell. Should fail because our MAC is wrong. */
setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO);
retval = hs_intro_received_establish_intro(intro_circ, cell_body, cell_len);
expect_log_msg_containing("ESTABLISH_INTRO handshake_auth not as expected");
teardown_capture_of_logs();
tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, -1);
done:
trn_cell_establish_intro_free(cell);
circuit_free_(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ));
}
static void
test_router_get_my_family(void *arg)
{
(void)arg;
or_options_t *options = options_new();
smartlist_t *sl = NULL;
char *join = NULL;
// Overwrite the result of router_get_my_identity_digest(). This
// happens to be okay, but only for testing.
set_server_identity_key_digest_testing(
(const uint8_t*)"holeinthebottomofthe");
setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
// No family listed -- so there's no list.
sl = get_my_declared_family(options);
tt_ptr_op(sl, OP_EQ, NULL);
expect_no_log_entry();
#define CLEAR() do { \
if (sl) { \
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl, char *, cp, tor_free(cp)); \
smartlist_free(sl); \
} \
tor_free(join); \
mock_clean_saved_logs(); \
} while (0)
// Add a single nice friendly hex member. This should be enough
// to have our own ID added.
tt_ptr_op(options->MyFamily, OP_EQ, NULL);
config_line_append(&options->MyFamily, "MyFamily",
"$AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA");
sl = get_my_declared_family(options);
tt_ptr_op(sl, OP_NE, NULL);
tt_int_op(smartlist_len(sl), OP_EQ, 2);
join = smartlist_join_strings(sl, " ", 0, NULL);
tt_str_op(join, OP_EQ,
"$686F6C65696E746865626F74746F6D6F66746865 "
"$AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA");
expect_no_log_entry();
CLEAR();
// Add a hex member with a ~. The ~ part should get removed.
config_line_append(&options->MyFamily, "MyFamily",
"$0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567~Muffin");
sl = get_my_declared_family(options);
tt_ptr_op(sl, OP_NE, NULL);
tt_int_op(smartlist_len(sl), OP_EQ, 3);
join = smartlist_join_strings(sl, " ", 0, NULL);
tt_str_op(join, OP_EQ,
"$0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF01234567 "
"$686F6C65696E746865626F74746F6D6F66746865 "
"$AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA");
expect_no_log_entry();
CLEAR();
// Nickname lookup will fail, so a nickname will appear verbatim.
config_line_append(&options->MyFamily, "MyFamily",
"BAGEL");
sl = get_my_declared_family(options);
tt_ptr_op(sl, OP_NE, NULL);
tt_int_op(smartlist_len(sl), OP_EQ, 4);
join = smartlist_join_strings(sl, " ", 0, NULL);
tt_str_op(join, OP_EQ,
"$0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF01234567 "
"$686F6C65696E746865626F74746F6D6F66746865 "
"$AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA "
"bagel");
expect_single_log_msg_containing(
"There is a router named \"BAGEL\" in my declared family, but "
"I have no descriptor for it.");
CLEAR();
// A bogus digest should fail entirely.
config_line_append(&options->MyFamily, "MyFamily",
"$painauchocolat");
sl = get_my_declared_family(options);
tt_ptr_op(sl, OP_NE, NULL);
tt_int_op(smartlist_len(sl), OP_EQ, 4);
join = smartlist_join_strings(sl, " ", 0, NULL);
tt_str_op(join, OP_EQ,
"$0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF01234567 "
"$686F6C65696E746865626F74746F6D6F66746865 "
"$AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA "
"bagel");
// "BAGEL" is still there, but it won't make a warning, because we already
// warned about it.
expect_single_log_msg_containing(
"There is a router named \"$painauchocolat\" in my declared "
"family, but that isn't a legal digest or nickname. Skipping it.");
CLEAR();
// Let's introduce a node we can look up by nickname
memset(&fake_node, 0, sizeof(fake_node));
memcpy(fake_node.identity, "whydoyouasknonononon", DIGEST_LEN);
MOCK(node_get_by_nickname, mock_node_get_by_nickname);
config_line_append(&options->MyFamily, "MyFamily",
"CRUmpeT");
sl = get_my_declared_family(options);
tt_ptr_op(sl, OP_NE, NULL);
tt_int_op(smartlist_len(sl), OP_EQ, 5);
join = smartlist_join_strings(sl, " ", 0, NULL);
tt_str_op(join, OP_EQ,
"$0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF01234567 "
"$686F6C65696E746865626F74746F6D6F66746865 "
"$776879646F796F7561736B6E6F6E6F6E6F6E6F6E "
"$AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA "
"bagel");
// "BAGEL" is still there, but it won't make a warning, because we already
// warned about it. Some with "$painauchocolat".
expect_single_log_msg_containing(
"There is a router named \"CRUmpeT\" in my declared "
"family, but it wasn't listed by digest. Please consider saying "
"$776879646F796F7561736B6E6F6E6F6E6F6E6F6E instead, if that's "
"what you meant.");
CLEAR();
UNMOCK(node_get_by_nickname);
// Try a singleton list containing only us: It should give us NULL.
config_free_lines(options->MyFamily);
config_line_append(&options->MyFamily, "MyFamily",
"$686F6C65696E746865626F74746F6D6F66746865");
sl = get_my_declared_family(options);
tt_ptr_op(sl, OP_EQ, NULL);
expect_no_log_entry();
done:
or_options_free(options);
teardown_capture_of_logs();
CLEAR();
UNMOCK(node_get_by_nickname);
#undef CLEAR
}
static void
test_router_check_descriptor_bandwidth_changed(void *arg)
{
(void)arg;
routerinfo_t routerinfo;
memset(&routerinfo, 0, sizeof(routerinfo));
mock_router_get_my_routerinfo_result = NULL;
MOCK(we_are_hibernating, mock_we_are_not_hibernating);
MOCK(router_get_my_routerinfo, mock_router_get_my_routerinfo);
mock_router_get_my_routerinfo_result = &routerinfo;
/* When uptime is less than 24h, no previous bandwidth, no last_changed
* Uptime: 10800, last_changed: 0, Previous bw: 0, Current bw: 0 */
routerinfo.bandwidthcapacity = 0;
MOCK(get_uptime, mock_get_uptime_3h);
setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO);
check_descriptor_bandwidth_changed(time(NULL));
expect_log_msg_not_containing(
"Measured bandwidth has changed; rebuilding descriptor.");
teardown_capture_of_logs();
/* When uptime is less than 24h, previous bandwidth,
* last_changed more than 3h ago
* Uptime: 10800, last_changed: 0, Previous bw: 10000, Current bw: 0 */
routerinfo.bandwidthcapacity = 10000;
setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO);
check_descriptor_bandwidth_changed(time(NULL));
expect_log_msg_containing(
"Measured bandwidth has changed; rebuilding descriptor.");
teardown_capture_of_logs();
/* When uptime is less than 24h, previous bandwidth,
* last_changed more than 3h ago, and hibernating
* Uptime: 10800, last_changed: 0, Previous bw: 10000, Current bw: 0 */
UNMOCK(we_are_hibernating);
MOCK(we_are_hibernating, mock_we_are_hibernating);
routerinfo.bandwidthcapacity = 10000;
setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO);
check_descriptor_bandwidth_changed(time(NULL));
expect_log_msg_not_containing(
"Measured bandwidth has changed; rebuilding descriptor.");
teardown_capture_of_logs();
UNMOCK(we_are_hibernating);
MOCK(we_are_hibernating, mock_we_are_not_hibernating);
/* When uptime is less than 24h, last_changed is not more than 3h ago
* Uptime: 10800, last_changed: x, Previous bw: 10000, Current bw: 0 */
setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO);
check_descriptor_bandwidth_changed(time(NULL));
expect_log_msg_not_containing(
"Measured bandwidth has changed; rebuilding descriptor.");
teardown_capture_of_logs();
/* When uptime is less than 24h and bandwidthcapacity does not change
* Uptime: 10800, last_changed: x, Previous bw: 10000, Current bw: 20001 */
MOCK(rep_hist_bandwidth_assess, mock_rep_hist_bandwidth_assess);
setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO);
check_descriptor_bandwidth_changed(time(NULL) + 6*60*60 + 1);
expect_log_msg_containing(
"Measured bandwidth has changed; rebuilding descriptor.");
UNMOCK(get_uptime);
UNMOCK(rep_hist_bandwidth_assess);
teardown_capture_of_logs();
/* When uptime is more than 24h */
MOCK(get_uptime, mock_get_uptime_1d);
setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO);
check_descriptor_bandwidth_changed(time(NULL));
expect_log_msg_not_containing(
"Measured bandwidth has changed; rebuilding descriptor.");
teardown_capture_of_logs();
done:
UNMOCK(get_uptime);
UNMOCK(router_get_my_routerinfo);
UNMOCK(we_are_hibernating);
}
static void
test_invalid_service_v2(void *arg)
{
int validate_only = 1, ret;
(void) arg;
/* Try with a missing port configuration. */
{
const char *conf =
"HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n"
"HiddenServiceVersion 2\n";
setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
ret = helper_config_service(conf, validate_only);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
expect_log_msg_containing("with no ports configured.");
teardown_capture_of_logs();
}
/* Too many introduction points. */
{
const char *conf =
"HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n"
"HiddenServiceVersion 2\n"
"HiddenServicePort 80\n"
"HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints 11\n"; /* One too many. */
setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
ret = helper_config_service(conf, validate_only);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
expect_log_msg_containing("HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints should "
"be between 0 and 10, not 11");
teardown_capture_of_logs();
}
/* Too little introduction points. */
{
const char *conf =
"HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n"
"HiddenServiceVersion 2\n"
"HiddenServicePort 80\n"
"HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints -1\n";
setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
ret = helper_config_service(conf, validate_only);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
expect_log_msg_containing("HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints should "
"be between 0 and 10, not -1");
teardown_capture_of_logs();
}
/* Bad authorized client type. */
{
const char *conf =
"HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n"
"HiddenServiceVersion 2\n"
"HiddenServicePort 80\n"
"HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient blah alice,bob\n"; /* blah is no good. */
setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
ret = helper_config_service(conf, validate_only);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
expect_log_msg_containing("HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient contains "
"unrecognized auth-type");
teardown_capture_of_logs();
}
done:
;
}
static void
test_invalid_service_v3(void *arg)
{
int validate_only = 1, ret;
(void) arg;
/* Try with a missing port configuration. */
{
const char *conf =
"HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n"
"HiddenServiceVersion 3\n";
setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
ret = helper_config_service(conf, validate_only);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
expect_log_msg_containing("with no ports configured.");
teardown_capture_of_logs();
}
/* Too many introduction points. */
{
const char *conf =
"HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n"
"HiddenServiceVersion 3\n"
"HiddenServicePort 80\n"
"HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints 21\n"; /* One too many. */
setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
ret = helper_config_service(conf, validate_only);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
expect_log_msg_containing("HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints must "
"be between 3 and 20, not 21.");
teardown_capture_of_logs();
}
/* Too little introduction points. */
{
const char *conf =
"HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n"
"HiddenServiceVersion 3\n"
"HiddenServicePort 80\n"
"HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints 1\n";
setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
ret = helper_config_service(conf, validate_only);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
expect_log_msg_containing("HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints must "
"be between 3 and 20, not 1.");
teardown_capture_of_logs();
}
/* v2-specific HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient set. */
{
const char *conf =
"HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n"
"HiddenServiceVersion 3\n"
"HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient stealth client1\n";
setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
ret = helper_config_service(conf, validate_only);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
expect_log_msg_containing("Hidden service option "
"HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient is incompatible "
"with version 3 of service in "
"/tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1");
teardown_capture_of_logs();
}
done:
;
}
static void
test_invalid_service(void *arg)
{
int ret;
(void) arg;
/* Try with a missing port configuration. */
{
const char *conf =
"HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n"
"HiddenServiceVersion 1\n"; /* Wrong not supported version. */
setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
ret = helper_config_service(conf, 1);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
expect_log_msg_containing("HiddenServiceVersion must be between 2 and 3");
teardown_capture_of_logs();
}
/* Bad value of HiddenServiceAllowUnknownPorts. */
{
const char *conf =
"HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n"
"HiddenServiceVersion 2\n"
"HiddenServiceAllowUnknownPorts 2\n"; /* Should be 0 or 1. */
setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
ret = helper_config_service(conf, 1);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
expect_log_msg_containing("HiddenServiceAllowUnknownPorts must be "
"between 0 and 1, not 2");
teardown_capture_of_logs();
}
/* Bad value of HiddenServiceDirGroupReadable */
{
const char *conf =
"HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n"
"HiddenServiceVersion 2\n"
"HiddenServiceDirGroupReadable 2\n"; /* Should be 0 or 1. */
setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
ret = helper_config_service(conf, 1);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
expect_log_msg_containing("HiddenServiceDirGroupReadable must be "
"between 0 and 1, not 2");
teardown_capture_of_logs();
}
/* Bad value of HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit */
{
const char *conf =
"HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n"
"HiddenServiceVersion 2\n"
"HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit 2\n"; /* Should be 0 or 1. */
setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
ret = helper_config_service(conf, 1);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
expect_log_msg_containing("HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit must "
"be between 0 and 1, not 2");
teardown_capture_of_logs();
}
/* Too much max streams. */
{
const char *conf =
"HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n"
"HiddenServiceVersion 2\n"
"HiddenServicePort 80\n"
"HiddenServiceMaxStreams 65536\n"; /* One too many. */
setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
ret = helper_config_service(conf, 1);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
expect_log_msg_containing("HiddenServiceMaxStreams must be between "
"0 and 65535, not 65536");
teardown_capture_of_logs();
}
/* Duplicate directory directive. */
{
const char *conf =
"HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n"
"HiddenServiceVersion 2\n"
"HiddenServicePort 80\n"
"HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n"
"HiddenServiceVersion 2\n"
"HiddenServicePort 81\n";
setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
ret = helper_config_service(conf, 1);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
expect_log_msg_containing("Another hidden service is already "
"configured for directory");
teardown_capture_of_logs();
}
/* Bad port. */
{
const char *conf =
"HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n"
"HiddenServiceVersion 2\n"
"HiddenServicePort 65536\n";
setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
ret = helper_config_service(conf, 1);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
expect_log_msg_containing("Missing or invalid port");
teardown_capture_of_logs();
}
/* Bad target addr:port separation. */
{
const char *conf =
"HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n"
"HiddenServiceVersion 2\n"
"HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1 8000\n";
setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
ret = helper_config_service(conf, 1);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
expect_log_msg_containing("HiddenServicePort parse error: "
"invalid port mapping");
teardown_capture_of_logs();
}
/* Out of order directives. */
{
const char *conf =
"HiddenServiceVersion 2\n"
"HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n"
"HiddenServicePort 80\n";
setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
ret = helper_config_service(conf, 1);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
expect_log_msg_containing("HiddenServiceVersion with no preceding "
"HiddenServiceDir directive");
teardown_capture_of_logs();
}
done:
;
}
/** Test that we will use our directory guards to fetch mds even if we don't
* have any dirinfo (tests bug #23862). */
static void
test_directory_guard_fetch_with_no_dirinfo(void *arg)
{
int retval;
char *consensus_text_md = NULL;
or_options_t *options = get_options_mutable();
time_t now = time(NULL);
(void) arg;
hibernate_set_state_for_testing_(HIBERNATE_STATE_LIVE);
/* Initialize the SRV subsystem */
MOCK(get_my_v3_authority_cert, get_my_v3_authority_cert_m);
mock_cert = authority_cert_parse_from_string(AUTHORITY_CERT_1,
strlen(AUTHORITY_CERT_1),
NULL);
sr_init(0);
UNMOCK(get_my_v3_authority_cert);
/* Initialize the entry node configuration from the ticket */
options->UseEntryGuards = 1;
options->StrictNodes = 1;
get_options_mutable()->EntryNodes = routerset_new();
routerset_parse(get_options_mutable()->EntryNodes,
"2121212121212121212121212121212121212121", "foo");
/* Mock some functions */
dummy_state = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(or_state_t));
MOCK(get_or_state, get_or_state_replacement);
MOCK(directory_initiate_request, mock_directory_initiate_request);
/* we need to mock this one to avoid memleaks */
MOCK(circuit_guard_state_new, mock_circuit_guard_state_new);
/* Call guards_update_all() to simulate loading our state file (see
* entry_guards_load_guards_from_state() and ticket #23989). */
guards_update_all();
/* Test logic: Simulate the arrival of a new consensus when we have no
* dirinfo at all. Tor will need to fetch the mds from the consensus. Make
* sure that Tor will use the specified entry guard instead of relying on the
* fallback directories. */
/* Fixup the dirconn that will deliver the consensus */
dir_connection_t *conn = dir_connection_new(AF_INET);
tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&conn->base_.addr, 0x7f000001);
conn->base_.port = 8800;
TO_CONN(conn)->address = tor_strdup("127.0.0.1");
conn->base_.purpose = DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_CONSENSUS;
conn->requested_resource = tor_strdup("ns");
/* Construct a consensus */
construct_consensus(&consensus_text_md, now);
tt_assert(consensus_text_md);
/* Place the consensus in the dirconn */
response_handler_args_t args;
memset(&args, 0, sizeof(response_handler_args_t));
args.status_code = 200;
args.body = consensus_text_md;
args.body_len = strlen(consensus_text_md);
/* Update approx time so that the consensus is considered live */
update_approx_time(now+1010);
setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_DEBUG);
/* Now handle the consensus */
retval = handle_response_fetch_consensus(conn, &args);
tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
/* Make sure that our primary guard was chosen */
expect_log_msg_containing("Selected primary guard router3");
done:
tor_free(consensus_text_md);
tor_free(dummy_state);
connection_free_minimal(TO_CONN(conn));
entry_guards_free_all();
teardown_capture_of_logs();
}