/* checks if ssl object was closed and can be removed */
int
check_close(SSL *ssl) {
int res, err, idx;
struct sockaddr_storage peer;
memset(&peer, 0, sizeof(peer));
(void)BIO_dgram_get_peer(SSL_get_rbio(ssl), &peer);
res = 0;
if (SSL_get_shutdown(ssl) & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
printf("SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN\n");
res = SSL_shutdown(ssl);
if (res == 0) {
printf("must call SSL_shutdown again\n");
res = SSL_shutdown(ssl);
}
if (res < 0) {
err = SSL_get_error(ssl,res);
fprintf(stderr, "shutdown: SSL error %d: %s\n", err,
ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
}
/* we can close the SSL object anyway */
/* FIXME: need to get ifindex from somewhere */
idx = get_index_of_peer((struct sockaddr *)&peer, 0);
OPENSSL_assert(idx < 0 || ssl == ssl_peer_storage[idx]->ssl);
if (idx >= 0) {
ssl_peer_storage[idx]->state = PEER_ST_CLOSED;
printf("moved SSL object %d to CLOSED\n",idx);
}
}
return res;
}
int dtls1_listen(SSL *s, struct sockaddr *client)
{
int ret;
SSL_set_options(s, SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE);
s->d1->listen = 1;
ret = SSL_accept(s);
if (ret <= 0) return ret;
(void) BIO_dgram_get_peer(SSL_get_rbio(s), client);
return 1;
}
int dtls1_listen(SSL *s, struct sockaddr *client)
{
int ret;
/* Ensure there is no state left over from a previous invocation */
SSL_clear(s);
SSL_set_options(s, SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE);
s->d1->listen = 1;
ret = SSL_accept(s);
if (ret <= 0) return ret;
(void) BIO_dgram_get_peer(SSL_get_rbio(s), client);
return 1;
}
int MS_CALLBACK generate_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len)
{
unsigned char *buffer, result[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned int length, resultlength;
struct sockaddr_in peer;
/* Initialize a random secret */
if (!cookie_initialized)
{
if (!RAND_bytes(cookie_secret, COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH))
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"error setting random cookie secret\n");
return 0;
}
cookie_initialized = 1;
}
/* Read peer information */
(void)BIO_dgram_get_peer(SSL_get_rbio(ssl), &peer);
/* Create buffer with peer's address and port */
length = sizeof(peer.sin_addr);
length += sizeof(peer.sin_port);
buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(length);
if (buffer == NULL)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"out of memory\n");
return 0;
}
memcpy(buffer, &peer.sin_addr, sizeof(peer.sin_addr));
memcpy(buffer + sizeof(peer.sin_addr), &peer.sin_port, sizeof(peer.sin_port));
/* Calculate HMAC of buffer using the secret */
HMAC(EVP_sha1(), cookie_secret, COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH,
buffer, length, result, &resultlength);
OPENSSL_free(buffer);
memcpy(cookie, result, resultlength);
*cookie_len = resultlength;
return 1;
}
void
check_peers() {
typedef struct bio_dgram_data_st
{
union {
struct sockaddr sa;
struct sockaddr_in sa_in;
struct sockaddr_in6 sa_in6;
} peer;
unsigned int connected;
unsigned int _errno;
unsigned int mtu;
struct timeval next_timeout;
struct timeval socket_timeout;
} bio_dgram_data;
struct sockaddr_in6 peer;
int i;
BIO *bio;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_SSL_PEERS; i++) {
if (ssl_peer_storage[i]) {
if (!ssl_peer_storage[i]->ssl)
fprintf(stderr, "invalid SSL object for peer %d!\n",i);
else {
bio = SSL_get_rbio(ssl_peer_storage[i]->ssl);
if (bio) {
(void) BIO_dgram_get_peer(bio, (struct sockaddr *)&peer);
if (peer.sin6_port && ssl_peer_storage[i]->h != ntohs(peer.sin6_port)) {
fprintf(stderr, " bio %p: port differs from hash: %d != %d! (%sconnected)\n", bio,
ssl_peer_storage[i]->h,
ntohs(((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&peer)->sin6_port),
((bio_dgram_data *)bio->ptr)->connected ? "" : "not ");
}
}
}
}
}
}
int MS_CALLBACK verify_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len)
{
unsigned char *buffer, result[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned int length, resultlength;
struct sockaddr_in peer;
/* If secret isn't initialized yet, the cookie can't be valid */
if (!cookie_initialized)
return 0;
/* Read peer information */
(void)BIO_dgram_get_peer(SSL_get_rbio(ssl), &peer);
/* Create buffer with peer's address and port */
length = sizeof(peer.sin_addr);
length += sizeof(peer.sin_port);
buffer = (unsigned char*) OPENSSL_malloc(length);
if (buffer == NULL)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"out of memory\n");
return 0;
}
memcpy(buffer, &peer.sin_addr, sizeof(peer.sin_addr));
memcpy(buffer + sizeof(peer.sin_addr), &peer.sin_port, sizeof(peer.sin_port));
/* Calculate HMAC of buffer using the secret */
HMAC(EVP_sha1(), cookie_secret, COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH,
buffer, length, result, &resultlength);
OPENSSL_free(buffer);
if (cookie_len == resultlength && memcmp(result, cookie, resultlength) == 0)
return 1;
return 0;
}
int
verify_cookie_callback(SSL * ssl, const unsigned char *cookie,
unsigned int cookie_len)
{
unsigned char *buffer, result[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned int length, resultlength;
union {
struct sockaddr sa;
struct sockaddr_in s4;
struct sockaddr_in6 s6;
} peer;
/* If secret isn't initialized yet, the cookie can't be valid */
if (!cookie_initialized)
return 0;
/* Read peer information */
(void) BIO_dgram_get_peer(SSL_get_rbio(ssl), &peer);
/* Create buffer with peer's address and port */
length = 0;
switch (peer.sa.sa_family) {
case AF_INET:
length += sizeof(struct in_addr);
length += sizeof(peer.s4.sin_port);
break;
case AF_INET6:
length += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
length += sizeof(peer.s6.sin6_port);
break;
default:
OPENSSL_assert(0);
break;
}
buffer = malloc(length);
if (buffer == NULL) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "out of memory\n");
return 0;
}
switch (peer.sa.sa_family) {
case AF_INET:
memcpy(buffer, &peer.s4.sin_port, sizeof(peer.s4.sin_port));
memcpy(buffer + sizeof(peer.s4.sin_port),
&peer.s4.sin_addr, sizeof(struct in_addr));
break;
case AF_INET6:
memcpy(buffer, &peer.s6.sin6_port, sizeof(peer.s6.sin6_port));
memcpy(buffer + sizeof(peer.s6.sin6_port),
&peer.s6.sin6_addr, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
break;
default:
OPENSSL_assert(0);
break;
}
/* Calculate HMAC of buffer using the secret */
HMAC(EVP_sha1(), cookie_secret, COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH,
buffer, length, result, &resultlength);
free(buffer);
if (cookie_len == resultlength &&
memcmp(result, cookie, resultlength) == 0)
return 1;
return 0;
}
int DTLSv1_listen(SSL *s, BIO_ADDR *client)
{
int next, n, ret = 0, clearpkt = 0;
unsigned char cookie[DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH];
unsigned char seq[SEQ_NUM_SIZE];
const unsigned char *data;
unsigned char *p, *buf;
unsigned long reclen, fragoff, fraglen, msglen;
unsigned int rectype, versmajor, msgseq, msgtype, clientvers, cookielen;
BIO *rbio, *wbio;
BUF_MEM *bufm;
BIO_ADDR *tmpclient = NULL;
PACKET pkt, msgpkt, msgpayload, session, cookiepkt;
/* Ensure there is no state left over from a previous invocation */
if (!SSL_clear(s))
return -1;
ERR_clear_error();
rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
wbio = SSL_get_wbio(s);
if (!rbio || !wbio) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
return -1;
}
/*
* We only peek at incoming ClientHello's until we're sure we are going to
* to respond with a HelloVerifyRequest. If its a ClientHello with a valid
* cookie then we leave it in the BIO for accept to handle.
*/
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE, 1, NULL);
/*
* Note: This check deliberately excludes DTLS1_BAD_VER because that version
* requires the MAC to be calculated *including* the first ClientHello
* (without the cookie). Since DTLSv1_listen is stateless that cannot be
* supported. DTLS1_BAD_VER must use cookies in a stateful manner (e.g. via
* SSL_accept)
*/
if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION);
return -1;
}
if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
if ((bufm = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(bufm, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
BUF_MEM_free(bufm);
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
s->init_buf = bufm;
}
buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
do {
/* Get a packet */
clear_sys_error();
/*
* Technically a ClientHello could be SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
* + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH bytes long. Normally init_buf does not store
* the record header as well, but we do here. We've set up init_buf to
* be the standard size for simplicity. In practice we shouldn't ever
* receive a ClientHello as long as this. If we do it will get dropped
* in the record length check below.
*/
n = BIO_read(rbio, buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
if (n <= 0) {
if (BIO_should_retry(rbio)) {
/* Non-blocking IO */
goto end;
}
return -1;
}
/* If we hit any problems we need to clear this packet from the BIO */
clearpkt = 1;
if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, n)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
/*
* Parse the received record. If there are any problems with it we just
* dump it - with no alert. RFC6347 says this "Unlike TLS, DTLS is
* resilient in the face of invalid records (e.g., invalid formatting,
* length, MAC, etc.). In general, invalid records SHOULD be silently
* discarded, thus preserving the association; however, an error MAY be
* logged for diagnostic purposes."
*/
/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
if (n < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
goto end;
}
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, buf,
DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
/* Get the record header */
if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &rectype)
|| !PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &versmajor)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto end;
}
if (rectype != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto end;
}
/*
* Check record version number. We only check that the major version is
* the same.
*/
if (versmajor != DTLS1_VERSION_MAJOR) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
goto end;
}
if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, 1)
/* Save the sequence number: 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
|| !PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &msgpkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto end;
}
/*
* We allow data remaining at the end of the packet because there could
* be a second record (but we ignore it)
*/
/* This is an initial ClientHello so the epoch has to be 0 */
if (seq[0] != 0 || seq[1] != 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto end;
}
/* Get a pointer to the raw message for the later callback */
data = PACKET_data(&msgpkt);
/* Finished processing the record header, now process the message */
if (!PACKET_get_1(&msgpkt, &msgtype)
|| !PACKET_get_net_3(&msgpkt, &msglen)
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(&msgpkt, &msgseq)
|| !PACKET_get_net_3(&msgpkt, &fragoff)
|| !PACKET_get_net_3(&msgpkt, &fraglen)
|| !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&msgpkt, &msgpayload, fraglen)
|| PACKET_remaining(&msgpkt) != 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto end;
}
if (msgtype != SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto end;
}
/* Message sequence number can only be 0 or 1 */
if (msgseq > 2) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_INVALID_SEQUENCE_NUMBER);
goto end;
}
/*
* We don't support fragment reassembly for ClientHellos whilst
* listening because that would require server side state (which is
* against the whole point of the ClientHello/HelloVerifyRequest
* mechanism). Instead we only look at the first ClientHello fragment
* and require that the cookie must be contained within it.
*/
if (fragoff != 0 || fraglen > msglen) {
/* Non initial ClientHello fragment (or bad fragment) */
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_FRAGMENTED_CLIENT_HELLO);
goto end;
}
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, data,
fraglen + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
s->msg_callback_arg);
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&msgpayload, &clientvers)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto end;
}
/*
* Verify client version is supported
*/
if (DTLS_VERSION_LT(clientvers, (unsigned int)s->method->version) &&
s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
goto end;
}
if (!PACKET_forward(&msgpayload, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&msgpayload, &session)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&msgpayload, &cookiepkt)) {
/*
* Could be malformed or the cookie does not fit within the initial
* ClientHello fragment. Either way we can't handle it.
*/
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto end;
}
/*
* Check if we have a cookie or not. If not we need to send a
* HelloVerifyRequest.
*/
if (PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt) == 0) {
next = LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST;
} else {
/*
* We have a cookie, so lets check it.
*/
if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_COOKIE_CALLBACK);
/* This is fatal */
return -1;
}
if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookiepkt),
PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt)) ==
0) {
/*
* We treat invalid cookies in the same was as no cookie as
* per RFC6347
*/
next = LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST;
} else {
/* Cookie verification succeeded */
next = LISTEN_SUCCESS;
}
}
if (next == LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
/*
* There was no cookie in the ClientHello so we need to send a
* HelloVerifyRequest. If this fails we do not worry about trying
* to resend, we just drop it.
*/
/*
* Dump the read packet, we don't need it any more. Ignore return
* value
*/
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE, 0, NULL);
BIO_read(rbio, buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE, 1, NULL);
/* Generate the cookie */
if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, cookie, &cookielen) == 0 ||
cookielen > 255) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
/* This is fatal */
return -1;
}
p = &buf[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH];
msglen = dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(p + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
cookie, cookielen);
*p++ = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
/* Message length */
l2n3(msglen, p);
/* Message sequence number is always 0 for a HelloVerifyRequest */
s2n(0, p);
/*
* We never fragment a HelloVerifyRequest, so fragment offset is 0
* and fragment length is message length
*/
l2n3(0, p);
l2n3(msglen, p);
/* Set reclen equal to length of whole handshake message */
reclen = msglen + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
/* Add the record header */
p = buf;
*(p++) = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
/*
* Special case: for hello verify request, client version 1.0 and we
* haven't decided which version to use yet send back using version
* 1.0 header: otherwise some clients will ignore it.
*/
if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
*(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8;
*(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff;
} else {
*(p++) = s->version >> 8;
*(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
}
/*
* Record sequence number is always the same as in the received
* ClientHello
*/
memcpy(p, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE);
p += SEQ_NUM_SIZE;
/* Length */
s2n(reclen, p);
/*
* Set reclen equal to length of whole record including record
* header
*/
reclen += DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, buf,
DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
if ((tmpclient = BIO_ADDR_new()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto end;
}
/*
* This is unnecessary if rbio and wbio are one and the same - but
* maybe they're not. We ignore errors here - some BIOs do not
* support this.
*/
if (BIO_dgram_get_peer(rbio, tmpclient) > 0) {
(void)BIO_dgram_set_peer(wbio, tmpclient);
}
BIO_ADDR_free(tmpclient);
tmpclient = NULL;
if (BIO_write(wbio, buf, reclen) < (int)reclen) {
if (BIO_should_retry(wbio)) {
/*
* Non-blocking IO...but we're stateless, so we're just
* going to drop this packet.
*/
goto end;
}
return -1;
}
if (BIO_flush(wbio) <= 0) {
if (BIO_should_retry(wbio)) {
/*
* Non-blocking IO...but we're stateless, so we're just
* going to drop this packet.
*/
goto end;
}
return -1;
}
}
int MS_CALLBACK generate_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len)
{
unsigned char *buffer, result[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned int length, resultlength;
union {
struct sockaddr sa;
struct sockaddr_in s4;
#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
struct sockaddr_in6 s6;
#endif
} peer;
/* Initialize a random secret */
if (!cookie_initialized)
{
if (!RAND_bytes(cookie_secret, COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH))
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"error setting random cookie secret\n");
return 0;
}
cookie_initialized = 1;
}
/* Read peer information */
(void)BIO_dgram_get_peer(SSL_get_rbio(ssl), &peer);
/* Create buffer with peer's address and port */
length = 0;
switch (peer.sa.sa_family)
{
case AF_INET:
length += sizeof(struct in_addr);
length += sizeof(peer.s4.sin_port);
break;
#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
case AF_INET6:
length += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
length += sizeof(peer.s6.sin6_port);
break;
#endif
default:
OPENSSL_assert(0);
break;
}
buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(length);
if (buffer == NULL)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"out of memory\n");
return 0;
}
switch (peer.sa.sa_family)
{
case AF_INET:
memcpy(buffer,
&peer.s4.sin_port,
sizeof(peer.s4.sin_port));
memcpy(buffer + sizeof(peer.s4.sin_port),
&peer.s4.sin_addr,
sizeof(struct in_addr));
break;
#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
case AF_INET6:
memcpy(buffer,
&peer.s6.sin6_port,
sizeof(peer.s6.sin6_port));
memcpy(buffer + sizeof(peer.s6.sin6_port),
&peer.s6.sin6_addr,
sizeof(struct in6_addr));
break;
#endif
default:
OPENSSL_assert(0);
break;
}
/* Calculate HMAC of buffer using the secret */
HMAC(EVP_sha1(), cookie_secret, COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH,
buffer, length, result, &resultlength);
OPENSSL_free(buffer);
memcpy(cookie, result, resultlength);
*cookie_len = resultlength;
return 1;
}
static int generate_cookie(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len)
{
unsigned char *buffer, result[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned int length = 0, resultlength;
union {
struct sockaddr_storage ss;
struct sockaddr_in6 s6;
struct sockaddr_in s4;
} peer;
/* Initialize a random secret */
if (!cookie_initialized)
{
if (!RAND_bytes(cookie_secret, COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH))
{
printf("error setting random cookie secret\n");
return 0;
}
cookie_initialized = 1;
}
/* Read peer information */
(void) BIO_dgram_get_peer(SSL_get_rbio(ssl), &peer);
/* Create buffer with peer's address and port */
length = 0;
switch (peer.ss.ss_family) {
case AF_INET:
length += sizeof(struct in_addr);
break;
case AF_INET6:
length += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
break;
default:
OPENSSL_assert(0);
break;
}
length += sizeof(in_port_t);
buffer = (unsigned char*) OPENSSL_malloc(length);
if (buffer == NULL)
{
printf("out of memory\n");
return 0;
}
switch (peer.ss.ss_family) {
case AF_INET:
memcpy(buffer,
&peer.s4.sin_port,
sizeof(in_port_t));
memcpy(buffer + sizeof(peer.s4.sin_port),
&peer.s4.sin_addr,
sizeof(struct in_addr));
break;
case AF_INET6:
memcpy(buffer,
&peer.s6.sin6_port,
sizeof(in_port_t));
memcpy(buffer + sizeof(in_port_t),
&peer.s6.sin6_addr,
sizeof(struct in6_addr));
break;
default:
OPENSSL_assert(0);
break;
}
/* Calculate HMAC of buffer using the secret */
HMAC(EVP_sha1(), (const void*) cookie_secret, COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH,
(const unsigned char*) buffer, length, result, &resultlength);
OPENSSL_free(buffer);
memcpy(cookie, result, resultlength);
*cookie_len = resultlength;
return 1;
}
static int generate_cookie(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len)
{
unsigned char *buffer, result[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned int length = 0, resultlength;
ioa_addr peer;
unsigned char cookie_secret[COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH];
calculate_cookie(ssl, cookie_secret, sizeof(cookie_secret));
/* Read peer information */
(void) BIO_dgram_get_peer(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), &peer);
/* Create buffer with peer's address and port */
length = 0;
switch (peer.ss.ss_family) {
case AF_INET:
length += sizeof(struct in_addr);
break;
case AF_INET6:
length += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
break;
default:
OPENSSL_assert(0);
break;
}
length += sizeof(in_port_t);
buffer = (unsigned char*) OPENSSL_malloc(length);
if (buffer == NULL) {
TURN_LOG_FUNC(TURN_LOG_LEVEL_INFO,"out of memory\n");
return 0;
}
switch (peer.ss.ss_family) {
case AF_INET:
memcpy(buffer,
&peer.s4.sin_port,
sizeof(in_port_t));
memcpy(buffer + sizeof(peer.s4.sin_port),
&peer.s4.sin_addr,
sizeof(struct in_addr));
break;
case AF_INET6:
memcpy(buffer,
&peer.s6.sin6_port,
sizeof(in_port_t));
memcpy(buffer + sizeof(in_port_t),
&peer.s6.sin6_addr,
sizeof(struct in6_addr));
break;
default:
OPENSSL_assert(0);
break;
}
/* Calculate HMAC of buffer using the secret */
HMAC(EVP_sha1(), (const void*) cookie_secret, COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH,
(const unsigned char*) buffer, length, result, &resultlength);
OPENSSL_free(buffer);
memcpy(cookie, result, resultlength);
*cookie_len = resultlength;
return 1;
}
/**
* This function tracks the status changes from libssl to manage local
* object state.
*/
void
info_callback(const SSL *ssl, int where, int ret) {
int idx, i;
struct sockaddr_storage peer;
struct sockaddr_storage peer2;
char addr[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
char port[6];
if (where & SSL_CB_LOOP) /* do not care for intermediary states */
return;
memset(&peer, 0, sizeof(peer));
(void) BIO_dgram_get_peer(SSL_get_rbio(ssl), &peer);
/* lookup SSL object */ /* FIXME: need to get the ifindex */
idx = get_index_of_peer((struct sockaddr *)&peer, 0);
if (idx >= 0)
fprintf(stderr, "info_callback: assert: %d < 0 || %p == %p (storage: %p)\n",
idx, ssl, ssl_peer_storage[idx]->ssl, ssl_peer_storage[idx]);
if (idx >= 0 && ssl != ssl_peer_storage[idx]->ssl) {
getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&peer, sizeof(peer),
addr, sizeof(addr), port, sizeof(port),
NI_NUMERICHOST | NI_NUMERICSERV);
fprintf(stderr," ssl: [%s]:%s ", addr, port);
(void) BIO_dgram_get_peer(SSL_get_rbio(ssl_peer_storage[idx]->ssl), &peer2);
getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&peer2, sizeof(peer2),
addr, sizeof(addr), port, sizeof(port),
NI_NUMERICHOST | NI_NUMERICSERV);
fprintf(stderr," ssl_peer_storage[idx]->ssl: [%s]:%s\n", addr, port);
fprintf(stderr, " hash:%lu h: %lu\n",
hash_peer((const struct sockaddr *)&peer, 0),
ssl_peer_storage[idx]->h);
for (i = 0; i < MAX_SSL_PEERS; i++) {
if (ssl_peer_storage[i]) {
fprintf(stderr, "%02d: %p ssl: %p ",
i, ssl_peer_storage[i] ,ssl_peer_storage[i]->ssl);
(void) BIO_dgram_get_peer(SSL_get_rbio(ssl_peer_storage[i]->ssl), &peer2);
getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&peer2, sizeof(peer2),
addr, sizeof(addr), port, sizeof(port),
NI_NUMERICHOST | NI_NUMERICSERV);
fprintf(stderr," peer: [%s]:%s h: %lu\n", addr, port, ssl_peer_storage[i]->h);
}
}
fprintf(stderr, "***** ASSERT FAILED ******\n");
memset(&peer, 0, sizeof(peer));
(void) BIO_dgram_get_peer(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), &peer);
idx = get_index_of_peer((struct sockaddr *)&peer, 0);
fprintf(stderr, " get_index_of_peer for wbio returns %d, type is %04x\n",
idx, where);
}
#if 1
check_peers();
OPENSSL_assert((idx < 0) || (ssl == ssl_peer_storage[idx]->ssl));
#endif
if (where & SSL_CB_ALERT) {
#ifndef NDEBUG
if (ret != 0)
fprintf(stderr,"%s:%s:%s\n", SSL_alert_type_string(ret),
SSL_alert_desc_string(ret), SSL_alert_desc_string_long(ret));
#endif
/* examine alert type */
switch (*SSL_alert_type_string(ret)) {
case 'F':
/* move SSL object from pending to close */
if (idx >= 0) {
ssl_peer_storage[idx]->state = PEER_ST_CLOSED;
pending--;
}
break;
case 'W':
if ((ret & 0xff) == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
if (where == SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT)
fprintf(stderr,"sent CLOSE_NOTIFY\n");
else /* received CN */
fprintf(stderr,"received CLOSE_NOTIFY\n");
}
break;
default: /* handle unknown alert types */
#ifndef NDEBUG
printf("not handled!\n");
#endif
}
}
if (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE) {
/* move SSL object from pending to established */
printf("HANDSHAKE_DONE ");
if (idx >= 0) {
if (ssl_peer_storage[idx]->state == PEER_ST_PENDING) {
ssl_peer_storage[idx]->state = PEER_ST_ESTABLISHED;
pending--;
printf("moved SSL object %d to ESTABLISHED\n", idx);
printf("%d objects pending\n", pending);
} else {
#ifndef NDEBUG
printf("huh, object %d was not pending? (%d)\n", idx,
ssl_peer_storage[idx]->state);
#endif
}
return;
}
return;
}
return;
}
SSL *
get_ssl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int sockfd, struct sockaddr *src, int ifindex) {
int idx;
BIO *bio;
SSL *ssl;
#ifndef NDEBUG
struct sockaddr_storage peer;
char addr[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
char port[6];
int i;
#endif
idx = get_index_of_peer(src,ifindex);
if (idx >= 0) {
fprintf(stderr,"found peer %d ",idx);
switch (ssl_peer_storage[idx]->state) {
case PEER_ST_ESTABLISHED: fprintf(stderr,"established\n"); break;
case PEER_ST_PENDING: fprintf(stderr,"pending\n"); break;
case PEER_ST_CLOSED: fprintf(stderr,"closed\n"); break;
default:
OPENSSL_assert(0);
}
#ifndef NDEBUG
memset(&peer, 0, sizeof(peer));
(void) BIO_dgram_get_peer(SSL_get_rbio(ssl_peer_storage[idx]->ssl), &peer);
getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&peer, sizeof(peer),
addr, sizeof(addr), port, sizeof(port),
NI_NUMERICHOST | NI_NUMERICSERV);
fprintf(stderr," [%s]:%s \n", addr, port);
#endif
return ssl_peer_storage[idx]->ssl;
}
/* none found, create new if sufficient space available */
if (pending < MAX_SSL_PENDING) {
for (idx = 0; idx < MAX_SSL_PEERS; idx++) {
if (ssl_peer_storage[idx] == NULL) { /* found space */
ssl = SSL_new(ctx);
if (ssl) {
bio = BIO_new_dgram(sockfd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
if (!bio) {
SSL_free(ssl);
return NULL;
}
SSL_set_bio(ssl, bio, bio);
SSL_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE);
SSL_set_accept_state(ssl);
ssl_peer_storage[idx] = (ssl_peer_t *) malloc(sizeof(ssl_peer_t));
if (!ssl_peer_storage[idx]) {
SSL_free(ssl);
return NULL;
}
ssl_peer_storage[idx]->state = PEER_ST_PENDING;
ssl_peer_storage[idx]->h = hash_peer(src,ifindex);
ssl_peer_storage[idx]->ssl = ssl;
pending++;
fprintf(stderr,
"created new SSL peer %d for ssl object %p (storage: %p)\n",
idx, ssl, ssl_peer_storage[idx]);
#ifndef NDEBUG
if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&src, sizeof(src),
addr, sizeof(addr), port, sizeof(port),
NI_NUMERICHOST | NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) {
perror("getnameinfo");
fprintf(stderr, "port was %u\n", ntohs(((struct sockaddr_in6 *)src)->sin6_port));
} else {
fprintf(stderr," [%s]:%s \n", addr, port);
}
#endif
OPENSSL_assert(ssl_peer_storage[idx]->ssl == ssl);
fprintf(stderr,"%d objects pending\n", pending);
check_peers();
return ssl;
}
}
}
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "too many pending SSL objects\n");
return NULL;
}
fprintf(stderr, "too many peers\n");
return NULL;
}
int MS_CALLBACK verify_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len)
{
unsigned char *buffer, result[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned int length, resultlength;
union {
struct TINYCLR_SSL_SOCKADDR sa;
struct TINYCLR_SSL_SOCKADDR_IN s4;
#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
struct sockaddr_in6 s6;
#endif
} peer;
/* If secret isn't initialized yet, the cookie can't be valid */
if (!cookie_initialized)
return 0;
/* Read peer information */
(void)BIO_dgram_get_peer(SSL_get_rbio(ssl), &peer);
/* Create buffer with peer's address and port */
length = 0;
switch (peer.sa.sa_family)
{
case AF_INET:
length += sizeof(struct in_addr);
length += sizeof(peer.s4.sin_port);
break;
#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
case AF_INET6:
length += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
length += sizeof(peer.s6.sin6_port);
break;
#endif
default:
TINYCLR_SSL_ASSERT(0);
break;
}
buffer = (unsigned char*)OPENSSL_malloc(length);
if (buffer == NULL)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"out of memory\n");
return 0;
}
switch (peer.sa.sa_family)
{
case AF_INET:
TINYCLR_SSL_MEMCPY(buffer,
&peer.s4.sin_port,
sizeof(peer.s4.sin_port));
TINYCLR_SSL_MEMCPY(buffer + sizeof(peer.s4.sin_port),
&peer.s4.sin_addr,
sizeof(struct in_addr));
break;
#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
case AF_INET6:
TINYCLR_SSL_MEMCPY(buffer,
&peer.s6.sin6_port,
sizeof(peer.s6.sin6_port));
TINYCLR_SSL_MEMCPY(buffer + sizeof(peer.s6.sin6_port),
&peer.s6.sin6_addr,
sizeof(struct in6_addr));
break;
#endif
default:
TINYCLR_SSL_ASSERT(0);
break;
}
/* Calculate HMAC of buffer using the secret */
HMAC(EVP_sha1(), cookie_secret, COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH,
buffer, length, result, &resultlength);
OPENSSL_free(buffer);
if (cookie_len == resultlength && TINYCLR_SSL_MEMCMP(result, cookie, resultlength) == 0)
return 1;
return 0;
}
int DataPlaneServer::verify_cookie(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len) {
unsigned char *buffer, result[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned int length = 0, resultlength;
union {
struct sockaddr_storage ss;
struct sockaddr_in6 s6;
struct sockaddr_in s4;
} peer;
/* If secret isn't initialized yet, the cookie can't be valid */
if (!cookie_initialized)
return 0;
/* Read peer information */
(void) BIO_dgram_get_peer(SSL_get_rbio(ssl), &peer);
/* Create buffer with peer's address and port */
length = 0;
switch (peer.ss.ss_family) {
case AF_INET:
length += sizeof(struct in_addr);
break;
case AF_INET6:
length += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
break;
default:
OPENSSL_assert(0);
break;
}
length += sizeof(in_port_t);
buffer = (unsigned char*) OPENSSL_malloc(length);
if (buffer == NULL) {
qWarning("out of memory");
return 0;
}
switch (peer.ss.ss_family) {
case AF_INET:
memcpy(buffer,
&peer.s4.sin_port,
sizeof(in_port_t));
memcpy(buffer + sizeof(in_port_t),
&peer.s4.sin_addr,
sizeof(struct in_addr));
break;
case AF_INET6:
memcpy(buffer,
&peer.s6.sin6_port,
sizeof(in_port_t));
memcpy(buffer + sizeof(in_port_t),
&peer.s6.sin6_addr,
sizeof(struct in6_addr));
break;
default:
OPENSSL_assert(0);
break;
}
/* Calculate HMAC of buffer using the secret */
HMAC(EVP_sha1(), (const void*) cookie_secret, COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH,
(const unsigned char*) buffer, length, result, &resultlength);
OPENSSL_free(buffer);
if (cookie_len == resultlength && memcmp(result, cookie, resultlength) == 0)
return 1;
return 0;
}
