/* RSA private key decryption */
int pkcs11_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to,
PKCS11_KEY *key, int padding)
{
PKCS11_SLOT *slot = KEY2SLOT(key);
PKCS11_CTX *ctx = KEY2CTX(key);
PKCS11_KEY_private *kpriv = PRIVKEY(key);
PKCS11_SLOT_private *spriv = PRIVSLOT(slot);
CK_MECHANISM mechanism;
CK_ULONG size = flen;
CK_RV rv;
if (pkcs11_mechanism(&mechanism, padding) < 0)
return -1;
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(PRIVSLOT(slot)->rwlock);
rv = CRYPTOKI_call(ctx,
C_DecryptInit(spriv->session, &mechanism, kpriv->object));
if (rv == CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN)
rv = pkcs11_authenticate(key);
if (!rv)
rv = CRYPTOKI_call(ctx,
C_Decrypt(spriv->session, (CK_BYTE *)from, size,
(CK_BYTE_PTR)to, &size));
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(PRIVSLOT(slot)->rwlock);
if (rv) {
PKCS11err(PKCS11_F_PKCS11_RSA_DECRYPT, pkcs11_map_err(rv));
return -1;
}
return size;
}
/*
* Reopens the object associated with the key
*/
int pkcs11_reload_key(PKCS11_KEY *key)
{
PKCS11_KEY_private *kpriv = PRIVKEY(key);
PKCS11_SLOT *slot = KEY2SLOT(key);
PKCS11_SLOT_private *spriv = PRIVSLOT(slot);
PKCS11_CTX *ctx = SLOT2CTX(slot);
CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_search_class =
key->isPrivate ? CKO_PRIVATE_KEY : CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
CK_ATTRIBUTE key_search_attrs[2] = {
{CKA_CLASS, &key_search_class, sizeof(key_search_class)},
{CKA_ID, kpriv->id, kpriv->id_len},
};
CK_ULONG count;
int rv;
/* this is already covered with a per-ctx lock */
rv = CRYPTOKI_call(ctx,
C_FindObjectsInit(spriv->session, key_search_attrs, 2));
CRYPTOKI_checkerr(PKCS11_F_PKCS11_ENUM_KEYS, rv);
rv = CRYPTOKI_call(ctx,
C_FindObjects(spriv->session, &kpriv->object, 1, &count));
CRYPTOKI_checkerr(PKCS11_F_PKCS11_ENUM_KEYS, rv);
CRYPTOKI_call(ctx, C_FindObjectsFinal(spriv->session));
return 0;
}
/* No padding or other stuff needed. We can call PKCS11 from here */
static int pkcs11_ecdsa_sign(const unsigned char *msg, unsigned int msg_len,
unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, PKCS11_KEY *key)
{
int rv;
PKCS11_SLOT *slot = KEY2SLOT(key);
PKCS11_CTX *ctx = KEY2CTX(key);
PKCS11_KEY_private *kpriv = PRIVKEY(key);
PKCS11_SLOT_private *spriv = PRIVSLOT(slot);
CK_MECHANISM mechanism;
CK_ULONG ck_sigsize;
ck_sigsize = *siglen;
memset(&mechanism, 0, sizeof(mechanism));
mechanism.mechanism = CKM_ECDSA;
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(PRIVSLOT(slot)->rwlock);
rv = CRYPTOKI_call(ctx,
C_SignInit(spriv->session, &mechanism, kpriv->object));
if (!rv)
rv = pkcs11_authenticate(key);
if (!rv)
rv = CRYPTOKI_call(ctx,
C_Sign(spriv->session, (CK_BYTE *)msg, msg_len, sigret, &ck_sigsize));
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(PRIVSLOT(slot)->rwlock);
if (rv) {
PKCS11err(PKCS11_F_PKCS11_EC_KEY_SIGN, pkcs11_map_err(rv));
return -1;
}
*siglen = ck_sigsize;
return ck_sigsize;
}
/* OpenSSL assumes that the output buffer is always big enough */
int pkcs11_private_encrypt(int flen,
const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to,
PKCS11_KEY *key, int padding)
{
PKCS11_SLOT *slot = KEY2SLOT(key);
PKCS11_CTX *ctx = KEY2CTX(key);
PKCS11_KEY_private *kpriv = PRIVKEY(key);
PKCS11_SLOT_private *spriv = PRIVSLOT(slot);
CK_MECHANISM mechanism;
CK_ULONG size;
int rv;
size = pkcs11_get_key_size(key);
if (pkcs11_mechanism(&mechanism, padding) < 0)
return -1;
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(PRIVSLOT(slot)->rwlock);
/* Try signing first, as applications are more likely to use it */
rv = CRYPTOKI_call(ctx,
C_SignInit(spriv->session, &mechanism, kpriv->object));
if (rv == CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN)
rv = pkcs11_authenticate(key);
if (!rv)
rv = CRYPTOKI_call(ctx,
C_Sign(spriv->session, (CK_BYTE *)from, flen, to, &size));
if (rv == CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED) {
/* OpenSSL may use it for encryption rather than signing */
rv = CRYPTOKI_call(ctx,
C_EncryptInit(spriv->session, &mechanism, kpriv->object));
if (rv == CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN)
rv = pkcs11_authenticate(key);
if (!rv)
rv = CRYPTOKI_call(ctx,
C_Encrypt(spriv->session, (CK_BYTE *)from, flen, to, &size));
}
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(PRIVSLOT(slot)->rwlock);
if (rv) {
PKCS11err(PKCS11_F_PKCS11_RSA_ENCRYPT, pkcs11_map_err(rv));
return -1;
}
return size;
}
/* initial code will only support what is needed for pkcs11_ec_ckey
* i.e. CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE
* and CK_EC_KDF_TYPE supported by token
* The secret key object is deleted
*
* In future CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE with CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS
* could also be supported, and the secret key object could be returned.
*/
static int pkcs11_ecdh_derive(unsigned char **out, size_t *outlen,
const unsigned long ecdh_mechanism,
const void * ec_params,
void *outnewkey,
PKCS11_KEY * key)
{
PKCS11_SLOT *slot = KEY2SLOT(key);
PKCS11_CTX *ctx = KEY2CTX(key);
PKCS11_TOKEN *token = KEY2TOKEN(key);
PKCS11_KEY_private *kpriv = PRIVKEY(key);
PKCS11_SLOT_private *spriv = PRIVSLOT(slot);
CK_MECHANISM mechanism;
int rv;
CK_BBOOL true = TRUE;
CK_BBOOL false = FALSE;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE newkey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS newkey_class= CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE newkey_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE * tmpnewkey = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *)outnewkey;
CK_ATTRIBUTE newkey_template[] = {
{CKA_TOKEN, &false, sizeof(false)}, /* session only object */
{CKA_CLASS, &newkey_class, sizeof(newkey_class)},
{CKA_KEY_TYPE, &newkey_type, sizeof(newkey_type)},
{CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
{CKA_DECRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)}
};
memset(&mechanism, 0, sizeof(mechanism));
mechanism.mechanism = ecdh_mechanism;
mechanism.pParameter = (void*)ec_params;
switch (ecdh_mechanism) {
case CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE:
case CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE:
mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS);
break;
#if 0
/* TODO */
case CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS:
mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS);
break;
#endif
default:
PKCS11err(PKCS11_F_PKCS11_EC_KEY_COMPUTE_KEY, pkcs11_map_err(PKCS11_NOT_SUPPORTED));
return -1;
}
rv = CRYPTOKI_call(ctx, C_DeriveKey(spriv->session, &mechanism, kpriv->object, newkey_template, 5, &newkey));
CRYPTOKI_checkerr(PKCS11_F_PKCS11_EC_KEY_COMPUTE_KEY, rv);
/* Return the value of the secret key and/or the object handle of the secret key */
if (out && outlen) { /* pkcs11_ec_ckey only asks for the value */
if (pkcs11_getattr_alloc(token, newkey, CKA_VALUE, out, outlen)) {
PKCS11err(PKCS11_F_PKCS11_EC_KEY_COMPUTE_KEY,
pkcs11_map_err(CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID));
CRYPTOKI_call(ctx, C_DestroyObject(spriv->session, newkey));
return -1;
}
}
if (tmpnewkey) /* For future use (not used by pkcs11_ec_ckey) */
*tmpnewkey = newkey;
else /* Destroy the temporary key */
CRYPTOKI_call(ctx, C_DestroyObject(spriv->session, newkey));
return 0;
}
/* initial code will only support what is needed for pkcs11_ec_ckey
* i.e. CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE
* and CK_EC_KDF_TYPE supported by token
* The secret key object is deleted
*
* In future CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE with CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS
* could also be supported, and the secret key object could be returned.
*/
int pkcs11_ecdh_derive_internal(unsigned char **out, size_t *outlen,
const unsigned long ecdh_mechanism,
const void * ec_params,
void *outnewkey,
PKCS11_KEY * key)
{
int rv;
int ret = -1;
unsigned char * buf = NULL;
size_t buflen;
PKCS11_KEY_private *priv;
PKCS11_SLOT *slot;
PKCS11_CTX *ctx;
PKCS11_TOKEN *token;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
CK_MECHANISM mechanism;
CK_BBOOL true = TRUE;
CK_BBOOL false = FALSE;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE newkey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS newkey_class= CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE newkey_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE * tmpnewkey = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *)outnewkey;
CK_ATTRIBUTE newkey_template[] = {
{CKA_TOKEN, &false, sizeof(false)}, /* session only object */
{CKA_CLASS, &newkey_class, sizeof(newkey_class)},
{CKA_KEY_TYPE, &newkey_type, sizeof(newkey_type)},
{CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
{CKA_DECRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)}
};
ctx = KEY2CTX(key);
priv = PRIVKEY(key);
token = KEY2TOKEN(key);
slot = KEY2SLOT(key);
CHECK_KEY_FORK(key);
session = PRIVSLOT(slot)->session;
memset(&mechanism, 0, sizeof(mechanism));
mechanism.mechanism = ecdh_mechanism;
mechanism.pParameter = (void*)ec_params;
switch (ecdh_mechanism) {
case CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE:
case CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE:
mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS);
break;
// case CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS:
// mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS);
// break;
default:
PKCS11err(PKCS11_F_PKCS11_EC_KEY_COMPUTE_KEY, PKCS11_NOT_SUPPORTED);
goto err;
}
CRYPTO_w_lock(PRIVSLOT(slot)->lockid);
rv = CRYPTOKI_call(ctx, C_DeriveKey(session, &mechanism, priv->object, newkey_template, 5, &newkey));
if (rv) {
PKCS11err(PKCS11_F_PKCS11_EC_KEY_COMPUTE_KEY, pkcs11_map_err(rv));
goto err;
}
/* Return the value of the secret key and/or the object handle of the secret key */
/* pkcs11_ec_ckey only asks for the value */
if (out && outlen) {
/* get size of secret key value */
if (!pkcs11_getattr_var(token, newkey, CKA_VALUE, NULL, &buflen)
&& buflen > 0) {
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(buflen);
if (buf == NULL) {
PKCS11err(PKCS11_F_PKCS11_EC_KEY_COMPUTE_KEY,
pkcs11_map_err(CKR_HOST_MEMORY));
goto err;
}
} else {
PKCS11err(PKCS11_F_PKCS11_EC_KEY_COMPUTE_KEY,
pkcs11_map_err(CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID));
goto err;
}
pkcs11_getattr_var(token, newkey, CKA_VALUE, buf, &buflen);
*out = buf;
*outlen = buflen;
buf = NULL;
}
/* not used by pkcs11_ec_ckey for future use */
if (tmpnewkey) {
*tmpnewkey = newkey;
newkey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
}
ret = 1;
err:
if (buf)
OPENSSL_free(buf);
if (newkey != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
CRYPTOKI_call(ctx, C_DestroyObject(session, newkey));
return ret;
}