int vlock_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
{
#ifdef __linux__
struct vt_mode vtm;
struct vt_mode ovtm;
#endif
struct termios term;
struct termios oterm;
struct passwd *pw;
pw = xgetpwuid(getuid());
opt_complementary = "=0"; /* no params! */
getopt32(argv, "a");
/* Ignore some signals so that we don't get killed by them */
bb_signals(0
+ (1 << SIGTSTP)
+ (1 << SIGTTIN)
+ (1 << SIGTTOU)
+ (1 << SIGHUP )
+ (1 << SIGCHLD) /* paranoia :) */
+ (1 << SIGQUIT)
+ (1 << SIGINT )
, SIG_IGN);
#ifdef __linux__
/* We will use SIGUSRx for console switch control: */
/* 1: set handlers */
signal_SA_RESTART_empty_mask(SIGUSR1, release_vt);
signal_SA_RESTART_empty_mask(SIGUSR2, acquire_vt);
/* 2: unmask them */
sig_unblock(SIGUSR1);
sig_unblock(SIGUSR2);
#endif
/* Revert stdin/out to our controlling tty
* (or die if we have none) */
xmove_fd(xopen(CURRENT_TTY, O_RDWR), STDIN_FILENO);
xdup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO);
#ifdef __linux__
xioctl(STDIN_FILENO, VT_GETMODE, &vtm);
ovtm = vtm;
/* "console switches are controlled by us, not kernel!" */
vtm.mode = VT_PROCESS;
vtm.relsig = SIGUSR1;
vtm.acqsig = SIGUSR2;
ioctl(STDIN_FILENO, VT_SETMODE, &vtm);
#endif
//TODO: use set_termios_to_raw()
tcgetattr(STDIN_FILENO, &oterm);
term = oterm;
term.c_iflag |= IGNBRK; /* ignore serial break (why? VTs don't have breaks, right?) */
term.c_iflag &= ~BRKINT; /* redundant? "dont translate break to SIGINT" */
term.c_lflag &= ~(ISIG | ECHO | ECHOCTL); /* ignore ^C ^Z, echo off */
tcsetattr_stdin_TCSANOW(&term);
while (1) {
printf("Virtual console%s locked by %s.\n",
/* "s" if -a, else "": */ "s" + !option_mask32,
pw->pw_name
);
if (ask_and_check_password(pw) > 0) {
break;
}
bb_do_delay(LOGIN_FAIL_DELAY);
puts("Incorrect password");
}
#ifdef __linux__
ioctl(STDIN_FILENO, VT_SETMODE, &ovtm);
#endif
tcsetattr_stdin_TCSANOW(&oterm);
fflush_stdout_and_exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
int su_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
{
unsigned flags;
char *opt_shell = NULL;
char *opt_command = NULL;
const char *opt_username = "******";
struct passwd *pw;
uid_t cur_uid = getuid();
const char *tty;
#if ENABLE_FEATURE_UTMP
char user_buf[64];
#endif
const char *old_user;
flags = getopt32(argv, "mplc:s:", &opt_command, &opt_shell);
//argc -= optind;
argv += optind;
if (argv[0] && LONE_DASH(argv[0])) {
flags |= SU_OPT_l;
argv++;
}
/* get user if specified */
if (argv[0]) {
opt_username = argv[0];
argv++;
}
if (ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_SYSLOG) {
/* The utmp entry (via getlogin) is probably the best way to
* identify the user, especially if someone su's from a su-shell.
* But getlogin can fail -- usually due to lack of utmp entry.
* in this case resort to getpwuid. */
#if ENABLE_FEATURE_UTMP
old_user = user_buf;
if (getlogin_r(user_buf, sizeof(user_buf)) != 0)
#endif
{
pw = getpwuid(cur_uid);
old_user = pw ? xstrdup(pw->pw_name) : "";
}
tty = xmalloc_ttyname(2);
if (!tty) {
tty = "none";
}
openlog(applet_name, 0, LOG_AUTH);
}
pw = xgetpwnam(opt_username);
if (cur_uid == 0 || ask_and_check_password(pw) > 0) {
if (ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_SYSLOG)
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "%c %s %s:%s",
'+', tty, old_user, opt_username);
} else {
if (ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_SYSLOG)
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "%c %s %s:%s",
'-', tty, old_user, opt_username);
bb_do_delay(LOGIN_FAIL_DELAY);
bb_error_msg_and_die("incorrect password");
}
if (ENABLE_FEATURE_CLEAN_UP && ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_SYSLOG) {
closelog();
}
if (!opt_shell && (flags & SU_OPT_mp)) {
/* -s SHELL is not given, but "preserve env" opt is */
opt_shell = getenv("SHELL");
}
#if ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_CHECKS_SHELLS
if (opt_shell && cur_uid != 0 && pw->pw_shell && restricted_shell(pw->pw_shell)) {
/* The user being su'd to has a nonstandard shell, and so is
* probably a uucp account or has restricted access. Don't
* compromise the account by allowing access with a standard
* shell. */
bb_error_msg("using restricted shell");
opt_shell = NULL; /* ignore -s PROG */
}
/* else: user can run whatever he wants via "su -s PROG USER".
* This is safe since PROG is run under user's uid/gid. */
#endif
if (!opt_shell)
opt_shell = pw->pw_shell;
change_identity(pw);
setup_environment(opt_shell,
((flags & SU_OPT_l) / SU_OPT_l * SETUP_ENV_CLEARENV)
+ (!(flags & SU_OPT_mp) * SETUP_ENV_CHANGEENV)
+ (!(flags & SU_OPT_l) * SETUP_ENV_NO_CHDIR),
pw);
IF_SELINUX(set_current_security_context(NULL);)
