static void setup_tty (void)
{
TERMIO termio;
int erasechar;
int killchar;
if (GTTY (0, &termio) == 0) { /* get terminal characteristics */
/*
* Add your favorite terminal modes here ...
*/
termio.c_lflag |= ISIG | ICANON | ECHO | ECHOE;
termio.c_iflag |= ICRNL;
#if defined(ECHOKE) && defined(ECHOCTL)
termio.c_lflag |= ECHOKE | ECHOCTL;
#endif
#if defined(ECHOPRT) && defined(NOFLSH) && defined(TOSTOP)
termio.c_lflag &= ~(ECHOPRT | NOFLSH | TOSTOP);
#endif
#ifdef ONLCR
termio.c_oflag |= ONLCR;
#endif
/* leave these values unchanged if not specified in login.defs */
erasechar = getdef_num ("ERASECHAR", (int) termio.c_cc[VERASE]);
killchar = getdef_num ("KILLCHAR", (int) termio.c_cc[VKILL]);
termio.c_cc[VERASE] = (cc_t) erasechar;
termio.c_cc[VKILL] = (cc_t) killchar;
/* Make sure the values were valid.
* getdef_num cannot validate this.
*/
if (erasechar != (int) termio.c_cc[VERASE]) {
fprintf (stderr,
_("configuration error - cannot parse %s value: '%d'"),
"ERASECHAR", erasechar);
exit (1);
}
if (killchar != (int) termio.c_cc[VKILL]) {
fprintf (stderr,
_("configuration error - cannot parse %s value: '%d'"),
"KILLCHAR", killchar);
exit (1);
}
/*
* ttymon invocation prefers this, but these settings
* won't come into effect after the first username login
*/
(void) STTY (0, &termio);
}
}
static void
setup_tty()
{
TERMIO termio;
GTTY (0, &termio); /* get terminal characteristics */
/*
* Add your favorite terminal modes here ...
*/
#ifndef USE_SGTTY
termio.c_lflag |= ISIG|ICANON|ECHO|ECHOE;
termio.c_iflag |= ICRNL;
#if defined(ECHOKE) && defined(ECHOCTL)
termio.c_lflag |= ECHOKE|ECHOCTL;
#endif
#if defined(ECHOPRT) && defined(NOFLSH) && defined(TOSTOP)
termio.c_lflag &= ~(ECHOPRT|NOFLSH|TOSTOP);
#endif
#ifdef ONLCR
termio.c_oflag |= ONLCR;
#endif
#ifdef SUN4
/*
* Terminal setup for SunOS 4.1 courtesy of Steve Allen
* at UCO/Lick.
*/
termio.c_cc[VEOF] = '\04';
termio.c_cflag &= ~CSIZE;
termio.c_cflag |= (PARENB|CS7);
termio.c_lflag |= (ISIG|ICANON|ECHO|IEXTEN);
termio.c_iflag |= (BRKINT|IGNPAR|ISTRIP|IMAXBEL|ICRNL|IXON);
termio.c_iflag &= ~IXANY;
termio.c_oflag |= (XTABS|OPOST|ONLCR);
#endif
termio.c_cc[VERASE] = getdef_num("ERASECHAR", '\b');
termio.c_cc[VKILL] = getdef_num("KILLCHAR", '\025');
/*
* ttymon invocation prefers this, but these settings won't come into
* effect after the first username login
*/
#else
#endif /* !BSD */
STTY (0, &termio);
}
void Ssu::storeAuthorizedKeys(QByteArray data){
QDir dir;
SsuLog *ssuLog = SsuLog::instance();
int uid_min = getdef_num("UID_MIN", -1);
QString homePath;
if (getuid() >= uid_min){
homePath = dir.homePath();
} else if (getuid() == 0){
// place authorized_keys in the default users home when run with uid0
struct passwd *pw = getpwuid(uid_min);
if (pw == NULL){
ssuLog->print(LOG_DEBUG, QString("Unable to find password entry for uid %1")
.arg(uid_min));
return;
}
//homePath = QString(pw->pw_dir);
homePath = pw->pw_dir;
// use users uid/gid for creating the directories and files
setegid(pw->pw_gid);
seteuid(uid_min);
ssuLog->print(LOG_DEBUG, QString("Dropping to %1/%2 for writing authorized keys")
.arg(uid_min)
.arg(pw->pw_gid));
} else
return;
homePath = Sandbox::map(homePath);
if (dir.exists(homePath + "/.ssh/authorized_keys")){
ssuLog->print(LOG_DEBUG, QString(".ssh/authorized_keys already exists in %1")
.arg(homePath));
restoreUid();
return;
}
if (!dir.exists(homePath + "/.ssh"))
if (!dir.mkdir(homePath + "/.ssh")){
ssuLog->print(LOG_DEBUG, QString("Unable to create .ssh in %1")
.arg(homePath));
restoreUid();
return;
}
QFile::setPermissions(homePath + "/.ssh",
QFile::ReadOwner | QFile::WriteOwner | QFile::ExeOwner);
QFile authorizedKeys(homePath + "/.ssh/authorized_keys");
authorizedKeys.open(QIODevice::WriteOnly | QIODevice::Text | QIODevice::Truncate);
authorizedKeys.setPermissions(QFile::ReadOwner | QFile::WriteOwner);
QTextStream out(&authorizedKeys);
out << data;
out.flush();
authorizedKeys.close();
restoreUid();
}
void chown_tty (const struct passwd *info)
{
struct group *grent;
gid_t gid;
/*
* See if login.defs has some value configured for the port group
* ID. Otherwise, use the user's primary group ID.
*/
grent = getgr_nam_gid (getdef_str ("TTYGROUP"));
if (NULL != grent) {
gid = grent->gr_gid;
} else {
gid = info->pw_gid;
}
/*
* Change the permissions on the TTY to be owned by the user with
* the group as determined above.
*/
if ( (fchown (STDIN_FILENO, info->pw_uid, gid) != 0)
|| (fchmod (STDIN_FILENO, getdef_num ("TTYPERM", 0600)) != 0)) {
int err = errno;
fprintf (stderr,
_("Unable to change owner or mode of tty stdin: %s"),
strerror (err));
SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN,
"unable to change owner or mode of tty stdin for user `%s': %s\n",
info->pw_name, strerror (err)));
if (EROFS != err) {
closelog ();
exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
#ifdef __linux__
/*
* Please don't add code to chown /dev/vcs* to the user logging in -
* it's a potential security hole. I wouldn't like the previous user
* to hold the file descriptor open and watch my screen. We don't
* have the *BSD revoke() system call yet, and vhangup() only works
* for tty devices (which vcs* is not). --marekm
*/
#endif
}
QDBusConnection SsuCoreConfig::userSessionBus(){
int uid_min = getdef_num("UID_MIN", -1);
// For calls from valid UID we assume that they are properly logged in users.
// If they are not the call will fail, but it's their fault.
if (getuid() >= uid_min){
return QDBusConnection::sessionBus();
} else {
// DBus security policy will prevent this beeing used by callers other
// than root at the moment. Still do it generic in case DBus policy will
// be extended later, and just use the usual 'DBus: THOU SHALL NOT PASS!'
// @TODO the uid to be used should be determined using the logind API from
// systemd package to support multiuser systems in the future
QString sessionBusAddress=QString("unix:path=/run/user/%1/dbus/user_bus_socket")
.arg(uid_min);
return QDBusConnection::connectToBus(sessionBusAddress, "userSessionBus");
}
}
/*
* check_pw_file - check the content of the passwd file
*/
static void check_pw_file (int *errors, bool *changed)
{
struct commonio_entry *pfe, *tpfe;
struct passwd *pwd;
struct spwd *spw;
/*
* Loop through the entire password file.
*/
for (pfe = __pw_get_head (); NULL != pfe; pfe = pfe->next) {
/*
* If this is a NIS line, skip it. You can't "know" what NIS
* is going to do without directly asking NIS ...
*/
if (('+' == pfe->line[0]) || ('-' == pfe->line[0])) {
continue;
}
/*
* Start with the entries that are completely corrupt. They
* have no (struct passwd) entry because they couldn't be
* parsed properly.
*/
if (NULL == pfe->eptr) {
/*
* Tell the user this entire line is bogus and ask
* them to delete it.
*/
puts (_("invalid password file entry"));
printf (_("delete line '%s'? "), pfe->line);
*errors += 1;
/*
* prompt the user to delete the entry or not
*/
if (!yes_or_no (read_only)) {
continue;
}
/*
* All password file deletions wind up here. This
* code removes the current entry from the linked
* list. When done, it skips back to the top of the
* loop to try out the next list element.
*/
delete_pw:
SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "delete passwd line '%s'",
pfe->line));
*changed = true;
__pw_del_entry (pfe);
continue;
}
/*
* Password structure is good, start using it.
*/
pwd = pfe->eptr;
/*
* Make sure this entry has a unique name.
*/
for (tpfe = __pw_get_head (); NULL != tpfe; tpfe = tpfe->next) {
const struct passwd *ent = tpfe->eptr;
/*
* Don't check this entry
*/
if (tpfe == pfe) {
continue;
}
/*
* Don't check invalid entries.
*/
if (NULL == ent) {
continue;
}
if (strcmp (pwd->pw_name, ent->pw_name) != 0) {
continue;
}
/*
* Tell the user this entry is a duplicate of
* another and ask them to delete it.
*/
puts (_("duplicate password entry"));
printf (_("delete line '%s'? "), pfe->line);
*errors += 1;
/*
* prompt the user to delete the entry or not
*/
if (yes_or_no (read_only)) {
goto delete_pw;
}
}
/*
* Check for invalid usernames. --marekm
*/
if (!is_valid_user_name (pwd->pw_name)) {
printf (_("invalid user name '%s'\n"), pwd->pw_name);
*errors += 1;
}
/*
* Check for invalid user ID.
*/
if (pwd->pw_uid == (uid_t)-1) {
printf (_("invalid user ID '%lu'\n"), (long unsigned int)pwd->pw_uid);
*errors += 1;
}
/*
* Make sure the primary group exists
*/
/* local, no need for xgetgrgid */
if (!quiet && (NULL == getgrgid (pwd->pw_gid))) {
/*
* No primary group, just give a warning
*/
printf (_("user '%s': no group %lu\n"),
pwd->pw_name, (unsigned long) pwd->pw_gid);
*errors += 1;
}
/*
* Make sure the home directory exists
*/
if (!quiet && (access (pwd->pw_dir, F_OK) != 0)) {
/*
* Home directory doesn't exist, give a warning
*/
printf (_("user '%s': directory '%s' does not exist\n"),
pwd->pw_name, pwd->pw_dir);
*errors += 1;
}
/*
* Make sure the login shell is executable
*/
if ( !quiet
&& ('\0' != pwd->pw_shell[0])
&& (access (pwd->pw_shell, F_OK) != 0)) {
/*
* Login shell doesn't exist, give a warning
*/
printf (_("user '%s': program '%s' does not exist\n"),
pwd->pw_name, pwd->pw_shell);
*errors += 1;
}
/*
* Make sure this entry exists in the /etc/shadow file.
*/
if (is_shadow) {
spw = (struct spwd *) spw_locate (pwd->pw_name);
if (NULL == spw) {
printf (_("no matching password file entry in %s\n"),
spw_file);
printf (_("add user '%s' in %s? "),
pwd->pw_name, spw_file);
*errors += 1;
if (yes_or_no (read_only)) {
struct spwd sp;
struct passwd pw;
sp.sp_namp = pwd->pw_name;
sp.sp_pwdp = pwd->pw_passwd;
sp.sp_min =
getdef_num ("PASS_MIN_DAYS", -1);
sp.sp_max =
getdef_num ("PASS_MAX_DAYS", -1);
sp.sp_warn =
getdef_num ("PASS_WARN_AGE", -1);
sp.sp_inact = -1;
sp.sp_expire = -1;
sp.sp_flag = SHADOW_SP_FLAG_UNSET;
sp.sp_lstchg = (long) time ((time_t *) 0) / SCALE;
if (0 == sp.sp_lstchg) {
/* Better disable aging than
* requiring a password change
*/
sp.sp_lstchg = -1;
}
*changed = true;
if (spw_update (&sp) == 0) {
fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: failed to prepare the new %s entry '%s'\n"),
Prog, spw_dbname (), sp.sp_namp);
exit (E_CANTUPDATE);
}
/* remove password from /etc/passwd */
pw = *pwd;
pw.pw_passwd = SHADOW_PASSWD_STRING; /* XXX warning: const */
if (pw_update (&pw) == 0) {
fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: failed to prepare the new %s entry '%s'\n"),
Prog, pw_dbname (), pw.pw_name);
exit (E_CANTUPDATE);
}
}
} else {
/* The passwd entry has a shadow counterpart.
* Make sure no passwords are in passwd.
*/
if (strcmp (pwd->pw_passwd, SHADOW_PASSWD_STRING) != 0) {
printf (_("user %s has an entry in %s, but its password field in %s is not set to 'x'\n"),
pwd->pw_name, spw_file, pwd_file);
*errors += 1;
}
}
}
}
}
int main (int argc, char **argv)
{
const struct passwd *pw;
struct passwd pwent;
const struct spwd *sp;
struct spwd spent;
Prog = Basename (argv[0]);
(void) setlocale (LC_ALL, "");
(void) bindtextdomain (PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
(void) textdomain (PACKAGE);
process_root_flag ("-R", argc, argv);
OPENLOG ("pwconv");
process_flags (argc, argv);
#ifdef WITH_TCB
if (getdef_bool("USE_TCB")) {
fprintf (stderr, _("%s: can't work with tcb enabled\n"), Prog);
exit (E_FAILURE);
}
#endif /* WITH_TCB */
if (pw_lock () == 0) {
fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
Prog, pw_dbname ());
fail_exit (E_PWDBUSY);
}
pw_locked = true;
if (pw_open (O_RDWR) == 0) {
fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: cannot open %s\n"), Prog, pw_dbname ());
fail_exit (E_MISSING);
}
if (spw_lock () == 0) {
fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
Prog, spw_dbname ());
fail_exit (E_PWDBUSY);
}
spw_locked = true;
if (spw_open (O_CREAT | O_RDWR) == 0) {
fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: cannot open %s\n"), Prog, spw_dbname ());
fail_exit (E_FAILURE);
}
/*
* Remove /etc/shadow entries for users not in /etc/passwd.
*/
(void) spw_rewind ();
while ((sp = spw_next ()) != NULL) {
if (pw_locate (sp->sp_namp) != NULL) {
continue;
}
if (spw_remove (sp->sp_namp) == 0) {
/*
* This shouldn't happen (the entry exists) but...
*/
fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: cannot remove entry '%s' from %s\n"),
Prog, sp->sp_namp, spw_dbname ());
fail_exit (E_FAILURE);
}
}
/*
* Update shadow entries which don't have "x" as pw_passwd. Add any
* missing shadow entries.
*/
(void) pw_rewind ();
while ((pw = pw_next ()) != NULL) {
sp = spw_locate (pw->pw_name);
if (NULL != sp) {
/* do we need to update this entry? */
if (strcmp (pw->pw_passwd, SHADOW_PASSWD_STRING) == 0) {
continue;
}
/* update existing shadow entry */
spent = *sp;
} else {
/* add new shadow entry */
memset (&spent, 0, sizeof spent);
spent.sp_namp = pw->pw_name;
spent.sp_min = getdef_num ("PASS_MIN_DAYS", -1);
spent.sp_max = getdef_num ("PASS_MAX_DAYS", -1);
spent.sp_warn = getdef_num ("PASS_WARN_AGE", -1);
spent.sp_inact = -1;
spent.sp_expire = -1;
spent.sp_flag = SHADOW_SP_FLAG_UNSET;
}
spent.sp_pwdp = pw->pw_passwd;
spent.sp_lstchg = (long) time ((time_t *) 0) / SCALE;
if (0 == spent.sp_lstchg) {
/* Better disable aging than requiring a password
* change */
spent.sp_lstchg = -1;
}
if (spw_update (&spent) == 0) {
fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: failed to prepare the new %s entry '%s'\n"),
Prog, spw_dbname (), spent.sp_namp);
fail_exit (E_FAILURE);
}
/* remove password from /etc/passwd */
pwent = *pw;
pwent.pw_passwd = SHADOW_PASSWD_STRING; /* XXX warning: const */
if (pw_update (&pwent) == 0) {
fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: failed to prepare the new %s entry '%s'\n"),
Prog, pw_dbname (), pwent.pw_name);
fail_exit (E_FAILURE);
}
}
if (spw_close () == 0) {
fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"),
Prog, spw_dbname ());
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failure while writing changes to %s", spw_dbname ()));
fail_exit (E_FAILURE);
}
if (pw_close () == 0) {
fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"),
Prog, pw_dbname ());
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failure while writing changes to %s", pw_dbname ()));
fail_exit (E_FAILURE);
}
/* /etc/passwd- (backup file) */
if (chmod (PASSWD_FILE "-", 0600) != 0) {
fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: failed to change the mode of %s to 0600\n"),
Prog, PASSWD_FILE "-");
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to change the mode of %s to 0600", PASSWD_FILE "-"));
/* continue */
}
if (pw_unlock () == 0) {
fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, pw_dbname ());
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", pw_dbname ()));
/* continue */
}
if (spw_unlock () == 0) {
fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, spw_dbname ());
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", spw_dbname ()));
/* continue */
}
nscd_flush_cache ("passwd");
return E_SUCCESS;
}
/*
* add_passwd - add or update the encrypted password
*/
static int add_passwd (struct passwd *pwd, const char *password)
{
const struct spwd *sp;
struct spwd spent;
char *cp;
#ifndef USE_PAM
void *crypt_arg = NULL;
if (crypt_method != NULL) {
#ifdef USE_SHA_CRYPT
if (sflg) {
crypt_arg = &sha_rounds;
}
#endif /* USE_SHA_CRYPT */
}
/*
* In the case of regular password files, this is real easy - pwd
* points to the entry in the password file. Shadow files are
* harder since there are zillions of things to do ...
*/
if (!is_shadow) {
return update_passwd (pwd, password);
}
#endif /* USE_PAM */
/*
* Do the first and easiest shadow file case. The user already
* exists in the shadow password file.
*/
sp = spw_locate (pwd->pw_name);
#ifndef USE_PAM
if (NULL != sp) {
spent = *sp;
if ( (NULL != crypt_method)
&& (0 == strcmp(crypt_method, "NONE"))) {
spent.sp_pwdp = (char *)password;
} else {
const char *salt = crypt_make_salt (crypt_method,
crypt_arg);
cp = pw_encrypt (password, salt);
if (NULL == cp) {
fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: failed to crypt password with salt '%s': %s\n"),
Prog, salt, strerror (errno));
return 1;
}
spent.sp_pwdp = cp;
}
spent.sp_lstchg = (long) gettime () / SCALE;
if (0 == spent.sp_lstchg) {
/* Better disable aging than requiring a password
* change */
spent.sp_lstchg = -1;
}
return (spw_update (&spent) == 0);
}
/*
* Pick the next easiest case - the user has an encrypted password
* which isn't equal to "x". The password was set to "x" earlier
* when the entry was created, so this user would have to have had
* the password set someplace else.
*/
if (strcmp (pwd->pw_passwd, "x") != 0) {
return update_passwd (pwd, password);
}
#else /* USE_PAM */
/*
* If there is already a shadow entry, do not touch it.
* If there is already a passwd entry with a password, do not
* touch it.
* The password will be updated later for all users using PAM.
*/
if ( (NULL != sp)
|| (strcmp (pwd->pw_passwd, "x") != 0)) {
return 0;
}
#endif /* USE_PAM */
/*
* Now the really hard case - I need to create an entirely new
* shadow password file entry.
*/
spent.sp_namp = pwd->pw_name;
#ifndef USE_PAM
if ((crypt_method != NULL) && (0 == strcmp(crypt_method, "NONE"))) {
spent.sp_pwdp = (char *)password;
} else {
const char *salt = crypt_make_salt (crypt_method, crypt_arg);
cp = pw_encrypt (password, salt);
if (NULL == cp) {
fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: failed to crypt password with salt '%s': %s\n"),
Prog, salt, strerror (errno));
return 1;
}
spent.sp_pwdp = cp;
}
#else
/*
* Lock the password.
* The password will be updated later for all users using PAM.
*/
spent.sp_pwdp = "!";
#endif
spent.sp_lstchg = (long) gettime () / SCALE;
if (0 == spent.sp_lstchg) {
/* Better disable aging than requiring a password change */
spent.sp_lstchg = -1;
}
spent.sp_min = getdef_num ("PASS_MIN_DAYS", 0);
/* 10000 is infinity this week */
spent.sp_max = getdef_num ("PASS_MAX_DAYS", 10000);
spent.sp_warn = getdef_num ("PASS_WARN_AGE", -1);
spent.sp_inact = -1;
spent.sp_expire = -1;
spent.sp_flag = SHADOW_SP_FLAG_UNSET;
return (spw_update (&spent) == 0);
}
/*
* login - create a new login session for a user
*
* login is typically called by getty as the second step of a
* new user session. getty is responsible for setting the line
* characteristics to a reasonable set of values and getting
* the name of the user to be logged in. login may also be
* called to create a new user session on a pty for a variety
* of reasons, such as X servers or network logins.
*
* the flags which login supports are
*
* -p - preserve the environment
* -r - perform autologin protocol for rlogin
* -f - do not perform authentication, user is preauthenticated
* -h - the name of the remote host
*/
int main (int argc, char **argv)
{
const char *tmptty;
char tty[BUFSIZ];
#ifdef RLOGIN
char term[128] = "";
#endif /* RLOGIN */
#if defined(HAVE_STRFTIME) && !defined(USE_PAM)
char ptime[80];
#endif
unsigned int delay;
unsigned int retries;
bool failed;
bool subroot = false;
#ifndef USE_PAM
bool is_console;
#endif
int err;
const char *cp;
char *tmp;
char fromhost[512];
struct passwd *pwd = NULL;
char **envp = environ;
const char *failent_user;
/*@null@*/struct utmp *utent;
#ifdef USE_PAM
int retcode;
pid_t child;
char *pam_user = NULL;
#else
struct spwd *spwd = NULL;
#endif
/*
* Some quick initialization.
*/
sanitize_env ();
(void) setlocale (LC_ALL, "");
(void) bindtextdomain (PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
(void) textdomain (PACKAGE);
initenv ();
amroot = (getuid () == 0);
Prog = Basename (argv[0]);
if (geteuid() != 0) {
fprintf (stderr, _("%s: Cannot possibly work without effective root\n"), Prog);
exit (1);
}
process_flags (argc, argv);
if ((isatty (0) == 0) || (isatty (1) == 0) || (isatty (2) == 0)) {
exit (1); /* must be a terminal */
}
utent = get_current_utmp ();
/*
* Be picky if run by normal users (possible if installed setuid
* root), but not if run by root. This way it still allows logins
* even if your getty is broken, or if something corrupts utmp,
* but users must "exec login" which will use the existing utmp
* entry (will not overwrite remote hostname). --marekm
*/
if (!amroot && (NULL == utent)) {
(void) puts (_("No utmp entry. You must exec \"login\" from the lowest level \"sh\""));
exit (1);
}
/* NOTE: utent might be NULL afterwards */
tmptty = ttyname (0);
if (NULL == tmptty) {
tmptty = "UNKNOWN";
}
STRFCPY (tty, tmptty);
#ifndef USE_PAM
is_console = console (tty);
#endif
if (rflg || hflg) {
/*
* Add remote hostname to the environment. I think
* (not sure) I saw it once on Irix. --marekm
*/
addenv ("REMOTEHOST", hostname);
}
if (fflg) {
preauth_flag = true;
}
if (hflg) {
reason = PW_RLOGIN;
}
#ifdef RLOGIN
if (rflg) {
assert (NULL == username);
username = xmalloc (USER_NAME_MAX_LENGTH + 1);
username[USER_NAME_MAX_LENGTH] = '\0';
if (do_rlogin (hostname, username, USER_NAME_MAX_LENGTH, term, sizeof term)) {
preauth_flag = true;
} else {
free (username);
username = NULL;
}
}
#endif /* RLOGIN */
OPENLOG ("login");
setup_tty ();
#ifndef USE_PAM
(void) umask (getdef_num ("UMASK", GETDEF_DEFAULT_UMASK));
{
/*
* Use the ULIMIT in the login.defs file, and if
* there isn't one, use the default value. The
* user may have one for themselves, but otherwise,
* just take what you get.
*/
long limit = getdef_long ("ULIMIT", -1L);
if (limit != -1) {
set_filesize_limit (limit);
}
}
#endif
/*
* The entire environment will be preserved if the -p flag
* is used.
*/
if (pflg) {
while (NULL != *envp) { /* add inherited environment, */
addenv (*envp, NULL); /* some variables change later */
envp++;
}
}
#ifdef RLOGIN
if (term[0] != '\0') {
addenv ("TERM", term);
} else
#endif /* RLOGIN */
{
/* preserve TERM from getty */
if (!pflg) {
tmp = getenv ("TERM");
if (NULL != tmp) {
addenv ("TERM", tmp);
}
}
}
init_env ();
if (optind < argc) { /* now set command line variables */
set_env (argc - optind, &argv[optind]);
}
if (rflg || hflg) {
cp = hostname;
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_HOST
} else if ((NULL != utent) && ('\0' != utent->ut_host[0])) {
cp = utent->ut_host;
#endif /* HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_HOST */
} else {
cp = "";
}
if ('\0' != *cp) {
snprintf (fromhost, sizeof fromhost,
" on '%.100s' from '%.200s'", tty, cp);
} else {
snprintf (fromhost, sizeof fromhost,
" on '%.100s'", tty);
}
top:
/* only allow ALARM sec. for login */
(void) signal (SIGALRM, alarm_handler);
timeout = getdef_unum ("LOGIN_TIMEOUT", ALARM);
if (timeout > 0) {
(void) alarm (timeout);
}
environ = newenvp; /* make new environment active */
delay = getdef_unum ("FAIL_DELAY", 1);
retries = getdef_unum ("LOGIN_RETRIES", RETRIES);
#ifdef USE_PAM
retcode = pam_start ("login", username, &conv, &pamh);
if (retcode != PAM_SUCCESS) {
fprintf (stderr,
_("login: PAM Failure, aborting: %s\n"),
pam_strerror (pamh, retcode));
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "Couldn't initialize PAM: %s",
pam_strerror (pamh, retcode)));
exit (99);
}
/*
* hostname & tty are either set to NULL or their correct values,
* depending on how much we know. We also set PAM's fail delay to
* ours.
*
* PAM_RHOST and PAM_TTY are used for authentication, only use
* information coming from login or from the caller (e.g. no utmp)
*/
retcode = pam_set_item (pamh, PAM_RHOST, hostname);
PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
retcode = pam_set_item (pamh, PAM_TTY, tty);
PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
#ifdef HAS_PAM_FAIL_DELAY
retcode = pam_fail_delay (pamh, 1000000 * delay);
PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
#endif
/* if fflg, then the user has already been authenticated */
if (!fflg) {
unsigned int failcount = 0;
char hostn[256];
char loginprompt[256]; /* That's one hell of a prompt :) */
/* Make the login prompt look like we want it */
if (gethostname (hostn, sizeof (hostn)) == 0) {
snprintf (loginprompt,
sizeof (loginprompt),
_("%s login: "******"login: "******"TOO MANY LOGIN TRIES (%u)%s FOR '%s'",
failcount, fromhost, failent_user));
fprintf(stderr,
_("Maximum number of tries exceeded (%u)\n"),
failcount);
PAM_END;
exit(0);
} else if (retcode == PAM_ABORT) {
/* Serious problems, quit now */
(void) fputs (_("login: abort requested by PAM\n"), stderr);
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,"PAM_ABORT returned from pam_authenticate()"));
PAM_END;
exit(99);
} else if (retcode != PAM_SUCCESS) {
SYSLOG ((LOG_NOTICE,"FAILED LOGIN (%u)%s FOR '%s', %s",
failcount, fromhost, failent_user,
pam_strerror (pamh, retcode)));
failed = true;
}
if (!failed) {
break;
}
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_fd = audit_open ();
audit_log_acct_message (audit_fd,
AUDIT_USER_LOGIN,
NULL, /* Prog. name */
"login",
failent_user,
AUDIT_NO_ID,
hostname,
NULL, /* addr */
tty,
0); /* result */
close (audit_fd);
#endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
(void) puts ("");
(void) puts (_("Login incorrect"));
if (failcount >= retries) {
SYSLOG ((LOG_NOTICE,
"TOO MANY LOGIN TRIES (%u)%s FOR '%s'",
failcount, fromhost, failent_user));
fprintf(stderr,
_("Maximum number of tries exceeded (%u)\n"),
failcount);
PAM_END;
exit(0);
}
/*
* Let's give it another go around.
* Even if a username was given on the command
* line, prompt again for the username.
*/
retcode = pam_set_item (pamh, PAM_USER, NULL);
PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
}
/* We don't get here unless they were authenticated above */
(void) alarm (0);
}
/* Check the account validity */
retcode = pam_acct_mgmt (pamh, 0);
if (retcode == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) {
retcode = pam_chauthtok (pamh, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK);
}
PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
/* Open the PAM session */
get_pam_user (&pam_user);
retcode = pam_open_session (pamh, hushed (pam_user) ? PAM_SILENT : 0);
PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
/* Grab the user information out of the password file for future usage
* First get the username that we are actually using, though.
*
* From now on, we will discard changes of the user (PAM_USER) by
* PAM APIs.
*/
get_pam_user (&pam_user);
if (NULL != username) {
free (username);
}
username = pam_user;
failent_user = get_failent_user (username);
pwd = xgetpwnam (username);
if (NULL == pwd) {
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "cannot find user %s", failent_user));
exit (1);
}
/* This set up the process credential (group) and initialize the
* supplementary group access list.
* This has to be done before pam_setcred
*/
if (setup_groups (pwd) != 0) {
exit (1);
}
retcode = pam_setcred (pamh, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED);
PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
/* NOTE: If pam_setcred changes PAM_USER, this will not be taken
* into account.
*/
#else /* ! USE_PAM */
while (true) { /* repeatedly get login/password pairs */
/* user_passwd is always a pointer to this constant string
* or a passwd or shadow password that will be memzero by
* pw_free / spw_free.
* Do not free() user_passwd. */
const char *user_passwd = "!";
/* Do some cleanup to avoid keeping entries we do not need
* anymore. */
if (NULL != pwd) {
pw_free (pwd);
pwd = NULL;
}
if (NULL != spwd) {
spw_free (spwd);
spwd = NULL;
}
failed = false; /* haven't failed authentication yet */
if (NULL == username) { /* need to get a login id */
if (subroot) {
closelog ();
exit (1);
}
preauth_flag = false;
username = xmalloc (USER_NAME_MAX_LENGTH + 1);
username[USER_NAME_MAX_LENGTH] = '\0';
login_prompt (_("\n%s login: "******"!",
* the account is locked and the user cannot
* login, even if they have been
* "pre-authenticated."
*/
if ( ('!' == user_passwd[0])
|| ('*' == user_passwd[0])) {
failed = true;
}
}
if (strcmp (user_passwd, SHADOW_PASSWD_STRING) == 0) {
spwd = xgetspnam (username);
if (NULL != spwd) {
user_passwd = spwd->sp_pwdp;
} else {
/* The user exists in passwd, but not in
* shadow. SHADOW_PASSWD_STRING indicates
* that the password shall be in shadow.
*/
SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN,
"no shadow password for '%s'%s",
username, fromhost));
}
}
/*
* The -r and -f flags provide a name which has already
* been authenticated by some server.
*/
if (preauth_flag) {
goto auth_ok;
}
if (pw_auth (user_passwd, username, reason, (char *) 0) == 0) {
goto auth_ok;
}
SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "invalid password for '%s' %s",
failent_user, fromhost));
failed = true;
auth_ok:
/*
* This is the point where all authenticated users wind up.
* If you reach this far, your password has been
* authenticated and so on.
*/
if ( !failed
&& (NULL != pwd)
&& (0 == pwd->pw_uid)
&& !is_console) {
SYSLOG ((LOG_CRIT, "ILLEGAL ROOT LOGIN %s", fromhost));
failed = true;
}
if ( !failed
&& !login_access (username, ('\0' != *hostname) ? hostname : tty)) {
SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "LOGIN '%s' REFUSED %s",
username, fromhost));
failed = true;
}
if ( (NULL != pwd)
&& getdef_bool ("FAILLOG_ENAB")
&& !failcheck (pwd->pw_uid, &faillog, failed)) {
SYSLOG ((LOG_CRIT,
"exceeded failure limit for '%s' %s",
username, fromhost));
failed = true;
}
if (!failed) {
break;
}
/* don't log non-existent users */
if ((NULL != pwd) && getdef_bool ("FAILLOG_ENAB")) {
failure (pwd->pw_uid, tty, &faillog);
}
if (getdef_str ("FTMP_FILE") != NULL) {
#ifdef USE_UTMPX
struct utmpx *failent =
prepare_utmpx (failent_user,
tty,
/* FIXME: or fromhost? */hostname,
utent);
#else /* !USE_UTMPX */
struct utmp *failent =
prepare_utmp (failent_user,
tty,
hostname,
utent);
#endif /* !USE_UTMPX */
failtmp (failent_user, failent);
free (failent);
}
retries--;
if (retries <= 0) {
SYSLOG ((LOG_CRIT, "REPEATED login failures%s",
fromhost));
}
/*
* If this was a passwordless account and we get here, login
* was denied (securetty, faillog, etc.). There was no
* password prompt, so do it now (will always fail - the bad
* guys won't see that the passwordless account exists at
* all). --marekm
*/
if (user_passwd[0] == '\0') {
pw_auth ("!", username, reason, (char *) 0);
}
/*
* Authentication of this user failed.
* The username must be confirmed in the next try.
*/
free (username);
username = NULL;
/*
* Wait a while (a la SVR4 /usr/bin/login) before attempting
* to login the user again. If the earlier alarm occurs
* before the sleep() below completes, login will exit.
*/
if (delay > 0) {
(void) sleep (delay);
}
(void) puts (_("Login incorrect"));
/* allow only one attempt with -r or -f */
if (rflg || fflg || (retries <= 0)) {
closelog ();
exit (1);
}
} /* while (true) */
#endif /* ! USE_PAM */
assert (NULL != username);
assert (NULL != pwd);
(void) alarm (0); /* turn off alarm clock */
#ifndef USE_PAM /* PAM does this */
/*
* porttime checks moved here, after the user has been
* authenticated. now prints a message, as suggested
* by Ivan Nejgebauer <*****@*****.**>. --marekm
*/
if ( getdef_bool ("PORTTIME_CHECKS_ENAB")
&& !isttytime (username, tty, time ((time_t *) 0))) {
SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "invalid login time for '%s'%s",
username, fromhost));
closelog ();
bad_time_notify ();
exit (1);
}
check_nologin (pwd->pw_uid == 0);
#endif
if (getenv ("IFS")) { /* don't export user IFS ... */
addenv ("IFS= \t\n", NULL); /* ... instead, set a safe IFS */
}
if (pwd->pw_shell[0] == '*') { /* subsystem root */
pwd->pw_shell++; /* skip the '*' */
subsystem (pwd); /* figure out what to execute */
subroot = true; /* say I was here again */
endpwent (); /* close all of the file which were */
endgrent (); /* open in the original rooted file */
endspent (); /* system. they will be re-opened */
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
endsgent (); /* in the new rooted file system */
#endif
goto top; /* go do all this all over again */
}
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_fd = audit_open ();
audit_log_acct_message (audit_fd,
AUDIT_USER_LOGIN,
NULL, /* Prog. name */
"login",
username,
AUDIT_NO_ID,
hostname,
NULL, /* addr */
tty,
1); /* result */
close (audit_fd);
#endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
#ifndef USE_PAM /* pam_lastlog handles this */
if (getdef_bool ("LASTLOG_ENAB")) { /* give last login and log this one */
dolastlog (&ll, pwd, tty, hostname);
}
#endif
#ifndef USE_PAM /* PAM handles this as well */
/*
* Have to do this while we still have root privileges, otherwise we
* don't have access to /etc/shadow.
*/
if (NULL != spwd) { /* check for age of password */
if (expire (pwd, spwd)) {
/* The user updated her password, get the new
* entries.
* Use the x variants because we need to keep the
* entry for a long time, and there might be other
* getxxyy in between.
*/
pw_free (pwd);
pwd = xgetpwnam (username);
if (NULL == pwd) {
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,
"cannot find user %s after update of expired password",
username));
exit (1);
}
spw_free (spwd);
spwd = xgetspnam (username);
}
}
setup_limits (pwd); /* nice, ulimit etc. */
#endif /* ! USE_PAM */
chown_tty (pwd);
#ifdef USE_PAM
/*
* We must fork before setuid() because we need to call
* pam_close_session() as root.
*/
(void) signal (SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
child = fork ();
if (child < 0) {
/* error in fork() */
fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failure forking: %s"),
Prog, strerror (errno));
PAM_END;
exit (0);
} else if (child != 0) {
/*
* parent - wait for child to finish, then cleanup
* session
*/
wait (NULL);
PAM_END;
exit (0);
}
/* child */
#endif
/* If we were init, we need to start a new session */
if (getppid() == 1) {
setsid();
if (ioctl(0, TIOCSCTTY, 1) != 0) {
fprintf (stderr, _("TIOCSCTTY failed on %s"), tty);
}
}
/*
* The utmp entry needs to be updated to indicate the new status
* of the session, the new PID and SID.
*/
update_utmp (username, tty, hostname, utent);
/* The pwd and spwd entries for the user have been copied.
*
* Close all the files so that unauthorized access won't occur.
*/
endpwent (); /* stop access to password file */
endgrent (); /* stop access to group file */
endspent (); /* stop access to shadow passwd file */
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
endsgent (); /* stop access to shadow group file */
#endif
/* Drop root privileges */
#ifndef USE_PAM
if (setup_uid_gid (pwd, is_console))
#else
/* The group privileges were already dropped.
* See setup_groups() above.
*/
if (change_uid (pwd))
#endif
{
exit (1);
}
setup_env (pwd); /* set env vars, cd to the home dir */
#ifdef USE_PAM
{
const char *const *env;
env = (const char *const *) pam_getenvlist (pamh);
while ((NULL != env) && (NULL != *env)) {
addenv (*env, NULL);
env++;
}
}
#endif
(void) setlocale (LC_ALL, "");
(void) bindtextdomain (PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
(void) textdomain (PACKAGE);
if (!hushed (username)) {
addenv ("HUSHLOGIN=FALSE", NULL);
/*
* pam_unix, pam_mail and pam_lastlog should take care of
* this
*/
#ifndef USE_PAM
motd (); /* print the message of the day */
if ( getdef_bool ("FAILLOG_ENAB")
&& (0 != faillog.fail_cnt)) {
failprint (&faillog);
/* Reset the lockout times if logged in */
if ( (0 != faillog.fail_max)
&& (faillog.fail_cnt >= faillog.fail_max)) {
(void) puts (_("Warning: login re-enabled after temporary lockout."));
SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN,
"login '%s' re-enabled after temporary lockout (%d failures)",
username, (int) faillog.fail_cnt));
}
}
if ( getdef_bool ("LASTLOG_ENAB")
&& (ll.ll_time != 0)) {
time_t ll_time = ll.ll_time;
#ifdef HAVE_STRFTIME
(void) strftime (ptime, sizeof (ptime),
"%a %b %e %H:%M:%S %z %Y",
localtime (&ll_time));
printf (_("Last login: %s on %s"),
ptime, ll.ll_line);
#else
printf (_("Last login: %.19s on %s"),
ctime (&ll_time), ll.ll_line);
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_LL_HOST /* __linux__ || SUN4 */
if ('\0' != ll.ll_host[0]) {
printf (_(" from %.*s"),
(int) sizeof ll.ll_host, ll.ll_host);
}
#endif
printf (".\n");
}
agecheck (spwd);
mailcheck (); /* report on the status of mail */
#endif /* !USE_PAM */
} else {
addenv ("HUSHLOGIN=TRUE", NULL);
}
ttytype (tty);
(void) signal (SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL); /* default quit signal */
(void) signal (SIGTERM, SIG_DFL); /* default terminate signal */
(void) signal (SIGALRM, SIG_DFL); /* default alarm signal */
(void) signal (SIGHUP, SIG_DFL); /* added this. --marekm */
(void) signal (SIGINT, SIG_DFL); /* default interrupt signal */
if (0 == pwd->pw_uid) {
SYSLOG ((LOG_NOTICE, "ROOT LOGIN %s", fromhost));
} else if (getdef_bool ("LOG_OK_LOGINS")) {
SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "'%s' logged in %s", username, fromhost));
}
closelog ();
tmp = getdef_str ("FAKE_SHELL");
if (NULL != tmp) {
err = shell (tmp, pwd->pw_shell, newenvp); /* fake shell */
} else {
/* exec the shell finally */
err = shell (pwd->pw_shell, (char *) 0, newenvp);
}
return ((err == ENOENT) ? E_CMD_NOTFOUND : E_CMD_NOEXEC);
}
/*
* new_password - validate old password and replace with new (both old and
* new in global "char crypt_passwd[128]")
*/
static int new_password (const struct passwd *pw)
{
char *clear; /* Pointer to clear text */
char *cipher; /* Pointer to cipher text */
char *cp; /* Pointer to getpass() response */
char orig[200]; /* Original password */
char pass[200]; /* New password */
int i; /* Counter for retries */
int warned;
int pass_max_len = -1;
char *method;
#ifdef HAVE_LIBCRACK_HIST
int HistUpdate (const char *, const char *);
#endif /* HAVE_LIBCRACK_HIST */
/*
* Authenticate the user. The user will be prompted for their own
* password.
*/
if (!amroot && crypt_passwd[0]) {
clear = getpass (_("Old password: "******"incorrect password for %s",
pw->pw_name));
sleep (1);
fprintf (stderr,
_("Incorrect password for %s.\n"),
pw->pw_name);
return -1;
}
STRFCPY (orig, clear);
strzero (clear);
strzero (cipher);
} else {
orig[0] = '\0';
}
/*
* Get the new password. The user is prompted for the new password
* and has five tries to get it right. The password will be tested
* for strength, unless it is the root user. This provides an escape
* for initial login passwords.
*/
if ((method = getdef_str ("ENCRYPT_METHOD")) == NULL) {
if (!getdef_bool ("MD5_CRYPT_ENAB")) {
pass_max_len = getdef_num ("PASS_MAX_LEN", 8);
}
} else {
if ( (strcmp (method, "MD5") == 0)
#ifdef USE_SHA_CRYPT
|| (strcmp (method, "SHA256") == 0)
|| (strcmp (method, "SHA512") == 0)
#endif /* USE_SHA_CRYPT */
) {
pass_max_len = -1;
} else {
pass_max_len = getdef_num ("PASS_MAX_LEN", 8);
}
}
if (!qflg) {
if (pass_max_len == -1) {
printf (_(
"Enter the new password (minimum of %d characters)\n"
"Please use a combination of upper and lower case letters and numbers.\n"),
getdef_num ("PASS_MIN_LEN", 5));
} else {
printf (_(
"Enter the new password (minimum of %d, maximum of %d characters)\n"
"Please use a combination of upper and lower case letters and numbers.\n"),
getdef_num ("PASS_MIN_LEN", 5), pass_max_len);
}
}
warned = 0;
for (i = getdef_num ("PASS_CHANGE_TRIES", 5); i > 0; i--) {
cp = getpass (_("New password: "******"Try again."));
continue;
}
/*
* If enabled, warn about weak passwords even if you are
* root (enter this password again to use it anyway).
* --marekm
*/
if (amroot && !warned && getdef_bool ("PASS_ALWAYS_WARN")
&& (!obscure (orig, pass, pw) || reuse (pass, pw))) {
puts (_("\nWarning: weak password (enter it again to use it anyway)."));
warned++;
continue;
}
cp = getpass (_("Re-enter new password: "******"They don't match; try again.\n"), stderr);
} else {
strzero (cp);
break;
}
}
memzero (orig, sizeof orig);
if (i == 0) {
memzero (pass, sizeof pass);
return -1;
}
/*
* Encrypt the password, then wipe the cleartext password.
*/
cp = pw_encrypt (pass, crypt_make_salt (NULL, NULL));
memzero (pass, sizeof pass);
#ifdef HAVE_LIBCRACK_HIST
HistUpdate (pw->pw_name, crypt_passwd);
#endif /* HAVE_LIBCRACK_HIST */
STRFCPY (crypt_passwd, cp);
return 0;
}
static char *
prompt_password(const char *prompt, int with_echo)
{
static char nostring[1] = "";
static char *return_value;
volatile int tty_opened;
static FILE *ifp, *ofp;
volatile int is_tty;
#ifdef HAVE_SIGACTION
struct sigaction old_sigact;
#else
RETSIGTYPE (*old_signal)();
#endif
TERMIO old_modes;
int max_asterisks = getdef_num("GETPASS_ASTERISKS", -1);
/*
* set a flag so the SIGINT signal can be re-sent if it
* is caught
*/
sig_caught = 0;
return_value = NULL;
tty_opened = 0;
/*
* if /dev/tty can't be opened, getpass() needs to read
* from stdin and write to stderr instead.
*/
if (!(ifp = fopen("/dev/tty", "r+"))) {
ifp = stdin;
ofp = stderr;
} else {
ofp = ifp;
tty_opened = 1;
}
setbuf(ifp, (char *) 0);
/*
* the current tty modes must be saved so they can be
* restored later on. echo will be turned off, except
* for the newline character
*/
is_tty = 1;
if (GTTY(fileno(ifp), &old_modes)) {
is_tty = 0;
#if 0 /* to make getpass work with redirected stdin */
return_value = NULL;
goto out2;
#endif
}
#ifdef USE_SETJMP
/*
* If we get a SIGINT, sig_catch() will jump here -
* no need to press Enter after Ctrl-C.
*/
if (sigsetjmp(intr, 1))
goto out;
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SIGACTION
sigact.sa_handler = sig_catch;
sigemptyset(&sigact.sa_mask);
sigact.sa_flags = 0;
sigaction(SIGINT, &sigact, &old_sigact);
#else
old_signal = signal(SIGINT, sig_catch);
#endif
if (is_tty) {
TERMIO new_modes = old_modes;
if (max_asterisks < 0)
new_modes.c_lflag |= ICANON;
else
new_modes.c_lflag &= ~(ICANON);
if (with_echo)
new_modes.c_lflag |= (ECHO | ECHOE | ECHOK);
else
new_modes.c_lflag &= ~(ECHO | ECHOE | ECHOK);
new_modes.c_lflag |= ECHONL;
if (STTY(fileno(ifp), &new_modes))
goto out;
}
/*
* the prompt is output, and the response read without
* echoing. the trailing newline must be removed. if
* the fgets() returns an error, a NULL pointer is
* returned.
*/
if ((fputs(prompt, ofp) != EOF) && (fflush(ofp) != EOF))
return_value = readpass(ifp, ofp, with_echo, max_asterisks);
out:
/*
* the old SIGINT handler is restored after the tty
* modes. then /dev/tty is closed if it was opened in
* the beginning. finally, if a signal was caught it
* is sent to this process for normal processing.
*/
if (is_tty) {
if (STTY(fileno(ifp), &old_modes))
return_value = NULL;
}
#ifdef HAVE_SIGACTION
(void) sigaction (SIGINT, &old_sigact, NULL);
#else
(void) signal (SIGINT, old_signal);
#endif
#if 0
out2:
#endif
if (tty_opened)
(void) fclose(ifp);
if (sig_caught) {
kill(getpid(), SIGINT);
return_value = NULL;
}
if (!return_value) {
nostring[0] = '\0';
return_value = nostring;
}
return return_value;
}
