int
mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
Key *key;
u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
int verified = 0;
int valid_data = 0;
blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen);
data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen);
if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
!monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
if (key == NULL)
fatal("%s: bad public key blob", __func__);
switch (key_blobtype) {
case MM_USERKEY:
valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen);
break;
case MM_HOSTKEY:
valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen,
hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost);
break;
default:
valid_data = 0;
break;
}
if (!valid_data)
fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);
verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
__func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");
/* If auth was successful then record key to ensure it isn't reused */
if (verified == 1 && key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY)
auth2_record_userkey(authctxt, key);
else
key_free(key);
free(blob);
free(signature);
free(data);
auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "publickey" : "hostbased";
monitor_reset_key_state();
buffer_clear(m);
buffer_put_int(m, verified);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
return (verified == 1);
}
static int script_sign_hash(struct wallet *wallet, const uint160 *keyHash,
const uint256 *hash, enum script_hash_type hashType,
struct buff *script) {
struct key *k;
size_t siglen;
uint8 *sig;
bool s;
k = wallet_lookup_pubkey(wallet, keyHash);
if (k == NULL) {
return 1;
}
s = key_sign(k, hash, sizeof *hash, &sig, &siglen);
if (!s) {
return 1;
}
Log(LGPFX " siglen=%zu\n", siglen);
/*
* Verify the signature is good. This code is new..
*/
s = key_verify(k, hash, sizeof *hash, sig, siglen);
ASSERT(s == 1);
uint8 push_data[siglen + 1];
memcpy(push_data, sig, siglen);
free(sig);
push_data[siglen] = (uint8)hashType;
script_push_data(script, push_data, siglen + 1);
return 0;
}
int dm2016_verify(struct ys_usb_handle *handle)
{
int res,i,ret,actual_length;
unsigned char data[8],rxdata[8];
unsigned char decdata[8];
unsigned int headersize;
unsigned int *head_ptr;
unsigned char *buffer;
get_random_bytes(data, 8);
for(i = 0; i < 8; i ++)
decdata[i] = data[i];
res = key_verify(decdata,0);
if(res < 0)
return -1;
headersize = sizeof(struct usb_app_header);
buffer = (unsigned char *)malloc(headersize+8);
if(buffer==NULL){
//ysprint();
return -1;
}
memset(buffer,0,headersize+8);
head_ptr = (unsigned int *)buffer;
head_ptr[0] = CMD_DM2016_VERIFY;
head_ptr[1] = 0;
head_ptr[2] = 0;
head_ptr[3] = 0;
memcpy(buffer+headersize,decdata,8);
usb_write(handle,buffer,headersize+8);
free(buffer);
buffer = NULL;
//等待dsp返回
ret = libusb_bulk_transfer(handle->libusb_handle,handle->Endpoint_in,rxdata,sizeof(rxdata),&actual_length,5000);
if(ret<0){
return ret;
}else{
if(actual_length!=8) return -99;
if(strncmp((const char *)rxdata,(const char *)data,8)==0) return 0;
else return -98;
}
}
void
kexdh_client(Kex *kex)
{
BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL, *shared_secret = NULL;
DH *dh;
Key *server_host_key;
u_char *server_host_key_blob = NULL, *signature = NULL;
u_char *kbuf, *hash;
u_int klen, slen, sbloblen, hashlen;
int kout;
/* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
switch (kex->kex_type) {
case KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1:
dh = dh_new_group1();
break;
case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1:
dh = dh_new_group14();
break;
default:
fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
}
dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT);
packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
packet_send();
debug("sending SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT");
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
DHparams_print_fp(stderr, dh);
fprintf(stderr, "pub= ");
BN_print_fp(stderr, dh->pub_key);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
#endif
debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY");
packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY);
/* key, cert */
server_host_key_blob = packet_get_string(&sbloblen);
server_host_key = key_from_blob(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen);
if (server_host_key == NULL)
fatal("cannot decode server_host_key_blob");
if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type)
fatal("type mismatch for decoded server_host_key_blob");
if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL)
fatal("cannot verify server_host_key");
if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key) == -1)
fatal("server_host_key verification failed");
/* DH parameter f, server public DH key */
if ((dh_server_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub);
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
fprintf(stderr, "dh_server_pub= ");
BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_server_pub);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_server_pub));
#endif
/* signed H */
signature = packet_get_string(&slen);
packet_check_eom();
if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub))
packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value");
klen = DH_size(dh);
kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh)) < 0)
fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
#endif
if ((shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("kexdh_client: BN_new failed");
if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
fatal("kexdh_client: BN_bin2bn failed");
memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
free(kbuf);
/* calc and verify H */
kex_dh_hash(
kex->client_version_string,
kex->server_version_string,
buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
dh->pub_key,
dh_server_pub,
shared_secret,
&hash, &hashlen
);
free(server_host_key_blob);
BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
DH_free(dh);
if (key_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash, hashlen) != 1)
fatal("key_verify failed for server_host_key");
key_free(server_host_key);
free(signature);
/* save session id */
if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
}
kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
kex_finish(kex);
}
static int
userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
Buffer b;
Key *key = NULL;
char *pkalg;
u_char *pkblob, *sig;
u_int alen, blen, slen;
int have_sig, pktype;
int authenticated = 0;
if (!authctxt->valid) {
debug2("userauth_pubkey: disabled because of invalid user");
return 0;
}
have_sig = packet_get_char();
if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
debug2("userauth_pubkey: SSH_BUG_PKAUTH");
/* no explicit pkalg given */
pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
buffer_init(&b);
buffer_append(&b, pkblob, blen);
/* so we have to extract the pkalg from the pkblob */
pkalg = buffer_get_string(&b, &alen);
buffer_free(&b);
} else {
pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen);
pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
}
pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg);
if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
/* this is perfectly legal */
logit("userauth_pubkey: unsupported public key algorithm: %s",
pkalg);
goto done;
}
key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen);
if (key == NULL) {
error("userauth_pubkey: cannot decode key: %s", pkalg);
goto done;
}
if (key->type != pktype) {
error("userauth_pubkey: type mismatch for decoded key "
"(received %d, expected %d)", key->type, pktype);
goto done;
}
if (have_sig) {
sig = packet_get_string(&slen);
packet_check_eom();
buffer_init(&b);
if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
} else {
buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
}
/* reconstruct packet */
buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user);
buffer_put_cstring(&b,
datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ?
"ssh-userauth" :
authctxt->service);
if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
} else {
buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey");
buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg);
}
buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen);
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
buffer_dump(&b);
#endif
/* test for correct signature */
authenticated = 0;
if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key)) &&
PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
buffer_len(&b))) == 1)
authenticated = 1;
buffer_free(&b);
xfree(sig);
} else {
debug("test whether pkalg/pkblob are acceptable");
packet_check_eom();
/* XXX fake reply and always send PK_OK ? */
/*
* XXX this allows testing whether a user is allowed
* to login: if you happen to have a valid pubkey this
* message is sent. the message is NEVER sent at all
* if a user is not allowed to login. is this an
* issue? -markus
*/
if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key))) {
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK);
packet_put_string(pkalg, alen);
packet_put_string(pkblob, blen);
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
authctxt->postponed = 1;
}
}
if (authenticated != 1)
auth_clear_options();
done:
debug2("userauth_pubkey: authenticated %d pkalg %s", authenticated, pkalg);
if (key != NULL)
key_free(key);
xfree(pkalg);
xfree(pkblob);
return authenticated;
}
static int
userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
Buffer b;
Key *key = NULL;
char *pkalg, *cuser, *chost, *service;
u_char *pkblob, *sig;
u_int alen, blen, slen;
int pktype;
int authenticated = 0;
if (!authctxt->valid) {
debug2("userauth_hostbased: disabled because of invalid user");
return 0;
}
pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen);
pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
chost = packet_get_string(NULL);
cuser = packet_get_string(NULL);
sig = packet_get_string(&slen);
debug("userauth_hostbased: cuser %s chost %s pkalg %s slen %d",
cuser, chost, pkalg, slen);
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
debug("signature:");
buffer_init(&b);
buffer_append(&b, sig, slen);
buffer_dump(&b);
buffer_free(&b);
#endif
pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg);
if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
/* this is perfectly legal */
logit("userauth_hostbased: unsupported "
"public key algorithm: %s", pkalg);
goto done;
}
key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen);
if (key == NULL) {
error("userauth_hostbased: cannot decode key: %s", pkalg);
goto done;
}
if (key->type != pktype) {
error("userauth_hostbased: type mismatch for decoded key "
"(received %d, expected %d)", key->type, pktype);
goto done;
}
service = datafellows & SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE ? __UNCONST("ssh-userauth") :
authctxt->service;
buffer_init(&b);
buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
/* reconstruct packet */
buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user);
buffer_put_cstring(&b, service);
buffer_put_cstring(&b, "hostbased");
buffer_put_string(&b, pkalg, alen);
buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen);
buffer_put_cstring(&b, chost);
buffer_put_cstring(&b, cuser);
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
buffer_dump(&b);
#endif
/* test for allowed key and correct signature */
authenticated = 0;
if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key)) &&
PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
buffer_len(&b))) == 1)
authenticated = 1;
buffer_free(&b);
done:
debug2("userauth_hostbased: authenticated %d", authenticated);
if (key != NULL)
key_free(key);
xfree(pkalg);
xfree(pkblob);
xfree(cuser);
xfree(chost);
xfree(sig);
return authenticated;
}
void
kexecdh_client(Kex *kex)
{
EC_KEY *client_key;
EC_POINT *server_public;
const EC_GROUP *group;
BIGNUM *shared_secret;
Key *server_host_key;
u_char *server_host_key_blob = NULL, *signature = NULL;
u_char *kbuf, *hash;
u_int klen, slen, sbloblen, hashlen;
if ((client_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name failed", __func__);
if (EC_KEY_generate_key(client_key) != 1)
fatal("%s: EC_KEY_generate_key failed", __func__);
group = EC_KEY_get0_group(client_key);
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT);
packet_put_ecpoint(group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(client_key));
packet_send();
debug("sending SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT");
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
fputs("client private key:\n", stderr);
key_dump_ec_key(client_key);
#endif
debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY");
packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY);
/* hostkey */
server_host_key_blob = packet_get_string(&sbloblen);
server_host_key = key_from_blob(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen);
if (server_host_key == NULL)
fatal("cannot decode server_host_key_blob");
if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type)
fatal("type mismatch for decoded server_host_key_blob");
if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL)
fatal("cannot verify server_host_key");
if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key) == -1)
fatal("server_host_key verification failed");
/* Q_S, server public key */
if ((server_public = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: EC_POINT_new failed", __func__);
packet_get_ecpoint(group, server_public);
if (key_ec_validate_public(group, server_public) != 0)
fatal("%s: invalid server public key", __func__);
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
fputs("server public key:\n", stderr);
key_dump_ec_point(group, server_public);
#endif
/* signed H */
signature = packet_get_string(&slen);
packet_check_eom();
klen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
if (ECDH_compute_key(kbuf, klen, server_public,
client_key, NULL) != (int)klen)
fatal("%s: ECDH_compute_key failed", __func__);
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
#endif
if ((shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL)
fatal("%s: BN_bin2bn failed", __func__);
memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
free(kbuf);
/* calc and verify H */
kex_ecdh_hash(
kex->evp_md,
group,
kex->client_version_string,
kex->server_version_string,
buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(client_key),
server_public,
shared_secret,
&hash, &hashlen
);
free(server_host_key_blob);
EC_POINT_clear_free(server_public);
EC_KEY_free(client_key);
if (key_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash, hashlen) != 1)
fatal("key_verify failed for server_host_key");
key_free(server_host_key);
free(signature);
/* save session id */
if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
}
kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
kex_finish(kex);
}
static int
userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
Buffer b;
Key *key = NULL;
char *pkalg, *userstyle;
u_char *pkblob, *sig;
u_int alen, blen, slen;
int have_sig, pktype;
int authenticated = 0;
if (!authctxt->valid) {
debug2("userauth_pubkey: disabled because of invalid user");
return 0;
}
have_sig = packet_get_char();
if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
debug2("userauth_pubkey: SSH_BUG_PKAUTH");
/* no explicit pkalg given */
pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
buffer_init(&b);
buffer_append(&b, pkblob, blen);
/* so we have to extract the pkalg from the pkblob */
pkalg = buffer_get_string(&b, &alen);
buffer_free(&b);
} else {
pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen);
pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
}
pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg);
if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
/* this is perfectly legal */
logit("userauth_pubkey: unsupported public key algorithm: %s",
pkalg);
goto done;
}
key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen);
if (key == NULL) {
error("userauth_pubkey: cannot decode key: %s", pkalg);
goto done;
}
if (key->type != pktype) {
error("userauth_pubkey: type mismatch for decoded key "
"(received %d, expected %d)", key->type, pktype);
goto done;
}
if (key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
(datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
logit("Refusing RSA key because client uses unsafe "
"signature scheme");
goto done;
}
if (auth2_userkey_already_used(authctxt, key)) {
logit("refusing previously-used %s key", key_type(key));
goto done;
}
if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key), options.pubkey_key_types,
strlen(options.pubkey_key_types), 0) != 1) {
logit("%s: key type %s not in PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes",
__func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
goto done;
}
if (have_sig) {
sig = packet_get_string(&slen);
packet_check_eom();
buffer_init(&b);
if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
} else {
buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
}
/* reconstruct packet */
buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
buffer_put_cstring(&b, userstyle);
free(userstyle);
buffer_put_cstring(&b,
datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ?
"ssh-userauth" :
authctxt->service);
if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
} else {
buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey");
buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg);
}
buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen);
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
buffer_dump(&b);
#endif
pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL);
/* test for correct signature */
authenticated = 0;
if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key)) &&
PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
buffer_len(&b))) == 1) {
authenticated = 1;
/* Record the successful key to prevent reuse */
auth2_record_userkey(authctxt, key);
key = NULL; /* Don't free below */
}
buffer_free(&b);
free(sig);
} else {
debug("test whether pkalg/pkblob are acceptable");
packet_check_eom();
/* XXX fake reply and always send PK_OK ? */
/*
* XXX this allows testing whether a user is allowed
* to login: if you happen to have a valid pubkey this
* message is sent. the message is NEVER sent at all
* if a user is not allowed to login. is this an
* issue? -markus
*/
if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key))) {
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK);
packet_put_string(pkalg, alen);
packet_put_string(pkblob, blen);
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
authctxt->postponed = 1;
}
}
if (authenticated != 1)
auth_clear_options();
done:
debug2("userauth_pubkey: authenticated %d pkalg %s", authenticated, pkalg);
if (key != NULL)
key_free(key);
free(pkalg);
free(pkblob);
return authenticated;
}
static int
userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
#ifdef WIN32_FIXME
int loginStat = 1;
char currentUser[MAX_PATH] = {0};
DWORD currentUserSize = sizeof(currentUser);
int targetIsCurrent = 0;
# ifdef USE_NTCREATETOKEN
int doOpenSSHVerify = 1;
# else
int doOpenSSHVerify = 0;
# endif
#endif
Buffer b;
Key *key = NULL;
char *pkalg, *userstyle;
u_char *pkblob, *sig;
u_int alen, blen, slen;
int have_sig, pktype;
int authenticated = 0;
if (!authctxt->valid) {
debug2("userauth_pubkey: disabled because of invalid user");
return 0;
}
have_sig = packet_get_char();
if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
debug2("userauth_pubkey: SSH_BUG_PKAUTH");
/* no explicit pkalg given */
pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
buffer_init(&b);
buffer_append(&b, pkblob, blen);
/* so we have to extract the pkalg from the pkblob */
pkalg = buffer_get_string(&b, &alen);
buffer_free(&b);
} else {
pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen);
pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
}
pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg);
if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
/* this is perfectly legal */
logit("userauth_pubkey: unsupported public key algorithm: %s",
pkalg);
goto done;
}
key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen);
if (key == NULL) {
error("userauth_pubkey: cannot decode key: %s", pkalg);
goto done;
}
if (key->type != pktype) {
error("userauth_pubkey: type mismatch for decoded key "
"(received %d, expected %d)", key->type, pktype);
goto done;
}
if (key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
(datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
logit("Refusing RSA key because client uses unsafe "
"signature scheme");
goto done;
}
if (auth2_userkey_already_used(authctxt, key)) {
logit("refusing previously-used %s key", key_type(key));
goto done;
}
if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
options.pubkey_key_types, 0) != 1) {
logit("%s: key type %s not in PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes",
__func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
goto done;
}
if (have_sig) {
sig = packet_get_string(&slen);
packet_check_eom();
buffer_init(&b);
if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
} else {
buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
}
/* reconstruct packet */
buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
buffer_put_cstring(&b, userstyle);
free(userstyle);
buffer_put_cstring(&b,
datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ?
"ssh-userauth" :
authctxt->service);
if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
} else {
buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey");
buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg);
}
buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen);
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
buffer_dump(&b);
#endif
pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL);
/* test for correct signature */
authenticated = 0;
/*
* On pure win32 try to logon using lsa first.
*/
#ifdef WIN32_FIXME
authctxt -> hTokenLsa_ = NULL;
authctxt -> methoddata = NULL;
/*
* Retrieve name of current login user (i.e. sshd process owner).
*/
GetUserName(currentUser, ¤tUserSize);
/*
* Try to get token from lsa, but only if targetUser != currentUser.
* Owerthise we already have targetUser's token in current thread, so
* we only need key verify from original OpenSSH code.
*/
targetIsCurrent = (strcmp(currentUser, authctxt -> user) == 0);
if (targetIsCurrent)
{
doOpenSSHVerify = 1;
}
else
{
loginStat = LsaLogon(&authctxt -> hTokenLsa_, HomeDirLsaW,
authctxt -> user, pkblob, blen, sig, slen,
buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b), datafellows);
/*
* If lsa logon process success.
*/
if (loginStat == 0)
{
/*
* And user authorized OK.
*/
if (authctxt -> hTokenLsa_)
{
doOpenSSHVerify = 0;
/*
* This is part of openssh authorization needed for parsing
* 'options' block in key.
*/
authctxt -> pw -> pw_dir = GetHomeDir(authctxt -> user);
if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt -> pw, key, 1))) // PRAGMA:TODO
{
authenticated = 1;
}
else
{
authenticated = 0;
}
buffer_free(&b);
free(sig);
}
}
}
if (doOpenSSHVerify)
{
/*
* If lsa fails, test for correct signature using openssh code.
*/
authctxt -> pw -> pw_dir = GetHomeDir(authctxt -> user);
if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key, 0)) //PRAGMA:TODO
&&
PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b))) == 1)
{
authenticated = 1;
}
}
/*
* Original code.
*/
#else /* #ifdef WIN32_FIXME */
if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key, 1)) &&
PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
buffer_len(&b))) == 1) {
authenticated = 1;
/* Record the successful key to prevent reuse */
auth2_record_userkey(authctxt, key);
key = NULL; /* Don't free below */
}
buffer_free(&b);
free(sig);
#endif /* else #ifdef WIN32_FIXME. */
} else {
debug("test whether pkalg/pkblob are acceptable");
packet_check_eom();
/* XXX fake reply and always send PK_OK ? */
/*
* XXX this allows testing whether a user is allowed
* to login: if you happen to have a valid pubkey this
* message is sent. the message is NEVER sent at all
* if a user is not allowed to login. is this an
* issue? -markus
*/
#ifndef WIN32_FIXME
if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key, 0)))
#endif
{
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK);
packet_put_string(pkalg, alen);
packet_put_string(pkblob, blen);
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
authctxt->postponed = 1;
}
}
if (authenticated != 1)
auth_clear_options();
done:
debug2("userauth_pubkey: authenticated %d pkalg %s", authenticated, pkalg);
if (key != NULL)
key_free(key);
free(pkalg);
free(pkblob);
return authenticated;
}
void
kexgex_client(Kex *kex)
{
BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL, *shared_secret = NULL;
BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL;
Key *server_host_key;
u_char *kbuf, *hash, *signature = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
u_int klen, slen, sbloblen, hashlen;
int kout;
int min, max, nbits;
DH *dh;
nbits = dh_estimate(kex->dh_need * 8);
if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) {
/* Old GEX request */
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD);
packet_put_int(nbits);
min = DH_GRP_MIN;
max = DH_GRP_MAX;
debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD(%u) sent", nbits);
} else {
/* New GEX request */
min = DH_GRP_MIN;
max = DH_GRP_MAX;
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST);
packet_put_int(min);
packet_put_int(nbits);
packet_put_int(max);
debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST(%u<%u<%u) sent",
min, nbits, max);
}
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
fprintf(stderr, "\nmin = %d, nbits = %d, max = %d\n",
min, nbits, max);
#endif
packet_send();
debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP");
packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP);
if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("BN_new");
packet_get_bignum2(p);
if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("BN_new");
packet_get_bignum2(g);
packet_check_eom();
if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max)
fatal("DH_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d",
min, BN_num_bits(p), max);
dh = dh_new_group(g, p);
dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
DHparams_print_fp(stderr, dh);
fprintf(stderr, "pub= ");
BN_print_fp(stderr, dh->pub_key);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
#endif
debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT sent");
/* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT);
packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
packet_send();
debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY");
packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY);
/* key, cert */
server_host_key_blob = packet_get_string(&sbloblen);
server_host_key = key_from_blob(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen);
if (server_host_key == NULL)
fatal("cannot decode server_host_key_blob");
if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type)
fatal("type mismatch for decoded server_host_key_blob");
if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL)
fatal("cannot verify server_host_key");
if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key) == -1)
fatal("server_host_key verification failed");
/* DH parameter f, server public DH key */
if ((dh_server_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub);
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
fprintf(stderr, "dh_server_pub= ");
BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_server_pub);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_server_pub));
#endif
/* signed H */
signature = packet_get_string(&slen);
packet_check_eom();
if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub))
packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value");
klen = DH_size(dh);
kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh)) < 0)
fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
#endif
if ((shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("kexgex_client: BN_new failed");
if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
fatal("kexgex_client: BN_bin2bn failed");
explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen);
free(kbuf);
if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_DHGEX)
min = max = -1;
/* calc and verify H */
kexgex_hash(
kex->hash_alg,
kex->client_version_string,
kex->server_version_string,
buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
min, nbits, max,
dh->p, dh->g,
dh->pub_key,
dh_server_pub,
shared_secret,
&hash, &hashlen
);
/* have keys, free DH */
DH_free(dh);
free(server_host_key_blob);
BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
if (key_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash, hashlen) != 1)
fatal("key_verify failed for server_host_key");
key_free(server_host_key);
free(signature);
/* save session id */
if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
}
kex_derive_keys_bn(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
kex_finish(kex);
}
static int
verify_signature(struct key *key, FILE *fin)
{
struct gzip_header gh;
struct gzip_xfield *gx;
struct gzsig_data *gd;
u_char *sig, digest[20], buf[8192], sbuf[4096];
SHA_CTX ctx;
int i, siglen;
/* Read gzip header. */
if ((i = fread((u_char *)&gh, 1, sizeof(gh), fin)) != sizeof(gh)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error reading gzip header: %s\n",
strerror(errno));
return (-1);
}
/* Verify gzip header. */
if (memcmp(gh.magic, GZIP_MAGIC, sizeof(gh.magic)) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid gzip file\n");
return (-1);
} else if (gh.flags & GZIP_FCONT){
fprintf(stderr, "Multi-part gzip files not supported\n");
return (-1);
} else if ((gh.flags & GZIP_FEXTRA) == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "No gzip signature found\n");
return (-1);
}
/* Read signature. */
gx = (struct gzip_xfield *)buf;
if ((i = fread((u_char *)gx, 1, sizeof(*gx), fin)) != sizeof(*gx)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error reading extra field: %s\n",
strerror(errno));
return (-1);
}
if (memcmp(gx->subfield.id, GZSIG_ID, sizeof(gx->subfield.id)) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unknown extra field\n");
return (-1);
}
gx->subfield.len = letoh16(gx->subfield.len);
if (gx->subfield.len <= 0 || gx->subfield.len > sizeof(sbuf)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid signature length\n");
return (-1);
}
gd = (struct gzsig_data *)sbuf;
if ((i = fread((u_char *)gd, 1, gx->subfield.len, fin)) !=
gx->subfield.len) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error reading signature: %s\n",
strerror(errno));
return (-1);
}
/* Skip over any options. */
if (gh.flags & GZIP_FNAME) {
if (skip_string(fin))
return (-1);
}
if (gh.flags & GZIP_FCOMMENT) {
if (skip_string(fin))
return (-1);
}
if (gh.flags & GZIP_FENCRYPT &&
fread(buf, 1, GZIP_FENCRYPT_LEN, fin) != GZIP_FENCRYPT_LEN)
return (-1);
/* Check signature version. */
if (gd->version != GZSIG_VERSION) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unknown signature version: %d\n",
gd->version);
return (-1);
}
/* Compute SHA1 checksum over compressed data and trailer. */
sig = (u_char *)(gd + 1);
siglen = gx->subfield.len - sizeof(*gd);
SHA1_Init(&ctx);
while ((i = fread(buf, 1, sizeof(buf), fin)) > 0) {
SHA1_Update(&ctx, buf, i);
}
SHA1_Final(digest, &ctx);
/* Verify signature. */
if (key_verify(key, digest, sizeof(digest), sig, siglen) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error verifying signature\n");
return (-1);
}
return (0);
}
static void
userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
Buffer b;
Key *key = NULL;
char *pkalg;
u_char *pkblob, *sig;
u_int alen, blen, slen;
int have_sig, pktype;
int authenticated = 0;
if (!authctxt || !authctxt->method)
fatal("%s: missing context", __func__);
have_sig = packet_get_char();
if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
debug2("userauth_pubkey: SSH_BUG_PKAUTH");
/* no explicit pkalg given */
pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
buffer_init(&b);
buffer_append(&b, pkblob, blen);
/* so we have to extract the pkalg from the pkblob */
pkalg = buffer_get_string(&b, &alen);
buffer_free(&b);
} else {
pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen);
pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
}
pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg);
if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
/* this is perfectly legal */
log("userauth_pubkey: unsupported public key algorithm: %s",
pkalg);
goto done;
}
key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen);
if (key == NULL) {
error("userauth_pubkey: cannot decode key: %s", pkalg);
goto done;
}
if (key->type != pktype) {
error("userauth_pubkey: type mismatch for decoded key "
"(received %d, expected %d)", key->type, pktype);
goto done;
}
/* Detect and count abandonment */
if (authctxt->method->method_data) {
Key *prev_key;
unsigned char *prev_pkblob;
int prev_blen;
/*
* Check for earlier test of a key that was allowed but
* not followed up with a pubkey req for the same pubkey
* and with a signature.
*/
prev_key = authctxt->method->method_data;
if ((prev_blen = key_to_blob(prev_key,
&prev_pkblob, NULL))) {
if (prev_blen != blen ||
memcmp(prev_pkblob, pkblob, blen) != 0) {
authctxt->method->abandons++;
authctxt->method->attempts++;
}
}
key_free(prev_key);
authctxt->method->method_data = NULL;
}
if (have_sig) {
sig = packet_get_string(&slen);
packet_check_eom();
buffer_init(&b);
if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
} else {
buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
}
/* reconstruct packet */
buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user);
buffer_put_cstring(&b,
datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ?
"ssh-userauth" :
authctxt->service);
if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
} else {
buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey");
buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg);
}
buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen);
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
buffer_dump(&b);
#endif
/* test for correct signature */
if (user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key) &&
key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
buffer_len(&b)) == 1) {
authenticated = 1;
}
authctxt->method->postponed = 0;
buffer_free(&b);
xfree(sig);
} else {
debug("test whether pkalg/pkblob are acceptable");
packet_check_eom();
/* XXX fake reply and always send PK_OK ? */
/*
* XXX this allows testing whether a user is allowed
* to login: if you happen to have a valid pubkey this
* message is sent. the message is NEVER sent at all
* if a user is not allowed to login. is this an
* issue? -markus
*/
if (user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key)) {
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK);
packet_put_string(pkalg, alen);
packet_put_string(pkblob, blen);
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
authctxt->method->postponed = 1;
/*
* Remember key that was tried so we can
* correctly detect abandonment. See above.
*/
authctxt->method->method_data = (void *) key;
key = NULL;
}
}
if (authenticated != 1)
auth_clear_options();
done:
/*
* XXX TODO: add config options for specifying users for whom
* this userauth is insufficient and what userauths may
* continue.
*/
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (authenticated) {
if (!do_pam_non_initial_userauth(authctxt))
authenticated = 0;
}
#endif /* USE_PAM */
debug2("userauth_pubkey: authenticated %d pkalg %s", authenticated, pkalg);
if (key != NULL)
key_free(key);
xfree(pkalg);
xfree(pkblob);
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
if (check_nt_auth(0, authctxt->pw) == 0)
return;
#endif
if (authenticated)
authctxt->method->authenticated = 1;
}
static int cuckoo_hash_get(struct cuckoo_filter_table *table, uint8_t *key, uint32_t *p_index)
{
int i, j;
uint32_t tag[2], index;
struct hash_slot_cache *slot;
tag[0] = cuckoo_hash_lsb(key, table->bucket_num);
tag[1] = cuckoo_hash_msb(key, table->bucket_num);
#ifdef CUCKOO_DBG
printf("get t0:%x t1:%x\n", tag[0], tag[1]);
#endif
dump_md5_key(key);
/* Filter the key and verify if it exists. */
slot = table->buckets[tag[0]];
for (i = 0; i < ASSOC_WAY; i++) {
if (cuckoo_hash_msb(key, table->bucket_num) == slot[i].tag) {
if (slot[i].status == OCCUPIED) {
index = slot[i].index;
if (key_verify(key, index)) {
if(p_index != NULL) *p_index = index;
break;
}
} else if (slot[i].status == DELETED) {
#ifdef CUCKOO_DBG
printf("Key has been deleted!\n");
#endif
return DELETED;
}
}
}
if (i == ASSOC_WAY) {
slot = table->buckets[tag[1]];
for (j = 0; j < ASSOC_WAY; j++) {
if (cuckoo_hash_lsb(key, table->bucket_num) == slot[j].tag) {
if (slot[j].status == OCCUPIED) {
index = slot[j].index;
if (key_verify(key, index)) {
if (p_index != NULL) *p_index = index;
break;
}
} else if (slot[j].status == DELETED) {
#ifdef CUCKOO_DBG
printf("Key has been deleted!\n");
#endif
return DELETED;
}
}
}
if (j == ASSOC_WAY) {
#ifdef CUCKOO_DBG
printf("Key not exists!\n");
#endif
return AVAILIBLE;
}
}
return OCCUPIED;
}
