/*
* If we're proxying EAP, then there may be magic we need
* to do.
*/
static rlm_rcode_t mod_post_proxy(void *inst, REQUEST *request)
{
size_t i;
size_t len;
VALUE_PAIR *vp;
eap_handler_t *handler;
/*
* Just in case the admin lists EAP in post-proxy-type Fail.
*/
if (!request->proxy_reply) return RLM_MODULE_NOOP;
/*
* If there was a handler associated with this request,
* then it's a tunneled request which was proxied...
*/
handler = request_data_get(request, inst, REQUEST_DATA_eap_handler_t);
if (handler != NULL) {
rlm_rcode_t rcode;
eap_tunnel_data_t *data;
/*
* Grab the tunnel callbacks from the request.
*/
data = (eap_tunnel_data_t *) request_data_get(request,
request->proxy,
REQUEST_DATA_EAP_TUNNEL_CALLBACK);
if (!data) {
radlog_request(L_ERR, 0, request, "Failed to retrieve callback for tunneled session!");
eap_handler_free(inst, handler);
return RLM_MODULE_FAIL;
}
/*
* Do the callback...
*/
RDEBUG2("Doing post-proxy callback");
rcode = data->callback(handler, data->tls_session);
free(data);
if (rcode == 0) {
RDEBUG2("Failed in post-proxy callback");
eap_fail(handler);
eap_handler_free(inst, handler);
return RLM_MODULE_REJECT;
}
/*
* We are done, wrap the EAP-request in RADIUS to send
* with all other required radius attributes
*/
eap_compose(handler);
/*
* Add to the list only if it is EAP-Request, OR if
* it's LEAP, and a response.
*/
if ((handler->eap_ds->request->code == PW_EAP_REQUEST) &&
(handler->eap_ds->request->type.num >= PW_EAP_MD5)) {
if (!eaplist_add(inst, handler)) {
eap_fail(handler);
eap_handler_free(inst, handler);
return RLM_MODULE_FAIL;
}
} else { /* couldn't have been LEAP, there's no tunnel */
RDEBUG2("Freeing handler");
/* handler is not required any more, free it now */
eap_handler_free(inst, handler);
}
/*
* If it's an Access-Accept, RFC 2869, Section 2.3.1
* says that we MUST include a User-Name attribute in the
* Access-Accept.
*/
if ((request->reply->code == PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK) &&
request->username) {
/*
* Doesn't exist, add it in.
*/
vp = pairfind(request->reply->vps, PW_USER_NAME, 0, TAG_ANY);
if (!vp) {
pairmake_reply("User-Name",
request->username->vp_strvalue,
T_OP_EQ);
}
}
return RLM_MODULE_OK;
} else {
RDEBUG2("No pre-existing handler found");
}
/*
* There may be more than one Cisco-AVPair.
* Ensure we find the one with the LEAP attribute.
*/
vp = request->proxy_reply->vps;
for (;;) {
/*
* Hmm... there's got to be a better way to
* discover codes for vendor attributes.
*
* This is vendor Cisco (9), Cisco-AVPair
* attribute (1)
*/
vp = pairfind(vp, 1, 9, TAG_ANY);
if (!vp) {
return RLM_MODULE_NOOP;
}
/*
* If it's "leap:session-key", then stop.
*
* The format is VERY specific!
*/
if (strncasecmp(vp->vp_strvalue, "leap:session-key=", 17) == 0) {
break;
}
/*
* Not this AV-pair. Go to the next one.
*/
vp = vp->next;
}
/*
* The format is very specific.
*/
if (vp->length != 17 + 34) {
RDEBUG2("Cisco-AVPair with leap:session-key has incorrect length %d: Expected %d",
vp->length, 17 + 34);
return RLM_MODULE_NOOP;
}
/*
* Decrypt the session key, using the proxy data.
*/
i = 34; /* starts off with 34 octets */
len = rad_tunnel_pwdecode(vp->vp_octets + 17, &i,
request->home_server->secret,
request->proxy->vector);
/*
* FIXME: Assert that i == 16.
*/
/*
* Encrypt the session key again, using the request data.
*/
rad_tunnel_pwencode(vp->vp_strvalue + 17, &len,
request->client->secret,
request->packet->vector);
return RLM_MODULE_UPDATED;
}
/*
* Reply to the request. Also attach
* reply attribute value pairs and any user message provided.
*/
int rad_send(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
const char *secret)
{
VALUE_PAIR *reply;
struct sockaddr_in saremote;
struct sockaddr_in *sa;
const char *what;
uint8_t ip_buffer[16];
if ((packet->code > 0) && (packet->code < 52)) {
what = packet_codes[packet->code];
} else {
what = "Reply";
}
/*
* First time through, allocate room for the packet
*/
if (!packet->data) {
radius_packet_t *hdr;
uint32_t lvalue;
uint8_t *ptr, *length_ptr, *vsa_length_ptr;
uint8_t digest[16];
int secretlen;
int vendorcode, vendorpec;
u_short total_length;
int len, allowed;
int msg_auth_offset = 0;
/*
* For simplicity in the following logic, we allow
* the attributes to "overflow" the 4k maximum
* RADIUS packet size, by one attribute.
*/
uint8_t data[MAX_PACKET_LEN + 256];
/*
* Use memory on the stack, until we know how
* large the packet will be.
*/
hdr = (radius_packet_t *) data;
/*
* Build standard header
*/
hdr->code = packet->code;
hdr->id = packet->id;
if ((packet->code == PW_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST) ||
(packet->code == PW_DISCONNECT_REQUEST)) {
memset(hdr->vector, 0, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
} else {
memcpy(hdr->vector, packet->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
}
DEBUG("Sending %s of id %d to %s:%d\n",
what, packet->id,
ip_ntoa((char *)ip_buffer, packet->dst_ipaddr),
packet->dst_port);
total_length = AUTH_HDR_LEN;
/*
* Load up the configuration values for the user
*/
ptr = hdr->data;
vendorcode = 0;
vendorpec = 0;
vsa_length_ptr = NULL;
for (reply = packet->vps; reply; reply = reply->next) {
/*
* Ignore non-wire attributes
*/
if ((VENDOR(reply->attribute) == 0) &&
((reply->attribute & 0xFFFF) > 0xff)) {
continue;
}
/*
* Check that the packet is no more than
* 4k in size, AFTER over-flowing the 4k
* boundary. Note that the 'data'
* buffer, above, is one attribute longer
* than necessary, in order to permit
* this overflow.
*/
if (total_length > MAX_PACKET_LEN) {
librad_log("ERROR: Too many attributes for packet, result is larger than RFC maximum of 4k");
return -1;
}
/*
* Do stuff for Message-Authenticator
*/
if (reply->attribute == PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR) {
/*
* Set it to zero!
*/
reply->length = AUTH_VECTOR_LEN;
memset(reply->strvalue, 0, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
msg_auth_offset = total_length;
}
/*
* Print out ONLY the attributes which
* we're sending over the wire, and print
* them out BEFORE they're encrypted.
*/
debug_pair(reply);
/*
* We have a different vendor. Re-set
* the vendor codes.
*/
if (vendorcode != VENDOR(reply->attribute)) {
vendorcode = 0;
vendorpec = 0;
vsa_length_ptr = NULL;
}
/*
* If the Vendor-Specific attribute is getting
* full, then create a new VSA attribute
*
* FIXME: Multiple VSA's per Vendor-Specific
* SHOULD be configurable. When that's done,
* the (1), below, can be changed to point to
* a configuration variable which is set TRUE
* if the NAS cannot understand multiple VSA's
* per Vendor-Specific
*/
if ((1) || /* ALWAYS create a new Vendor-Specific */
(vsa_length_ptr &&
(reply->length + *vsa_length_ptr) >= MAX_STRING_LEN)) {
vendorcode = 0;
vendorpec = 0;
vsa_length_ptr = NULL;
}
/*
* Maybe we have the start of a set of
* (possibly many) VSA attributes from
* one vendor. Set a global VSA wrapper
*/
if ((vendorcode == 0) &&
((vendorcode = VENDOR(reply->attribute)) != 0)) {
vendorpec = dict_vendorpec(vendorcode);
/*
* This is a potentially bad error...
* we can't find the vendor ID!
*/
if (vendorpec == 0) {
/* FIXME: log an error */
continue;
}
/*
* Build a VSA header.
*/
*ptr++ = PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC;
vsa_length_ptr = ptr;
*ptr++ = 6;
lvalue = htonl(vendorpec);
memcpy(ptr, &lvalue, 4);
ptr += 4;
total_length += 6;
}
if (vendorpec == VENDORPEC_USR) {
lvalue = htonl(reply->attribute & 0xFFFF);
memcpy(ptr, &lvalue, 4);
length_ptr = vsa_length_ptr;
total_length += 4;
*length_ptr += 4;
ptr += 4;
/*
* Each USR attribute gets it's own
* VSA wrapper, so we re-set the
* vendor specific information.
*/
vendorcode = 0;
vendorpec = 0;
vsa_length_ptr = NULL;
} else {
/*
* All other attributes are as
* per the RFC spec.
*/
*ptr++ = (reply->attribute & 0xFF);
length_ptr = ptr;
if (vsa_length_ptr) *vsa_length_ptr += 2;
*ptr++ = 2;
total_length += 2;
}
switch(reply->type) {
/*
* Ascend binary attributes are
* stored internally in binary form.
*/
case PW_TYPE_ABINARY:
case PW_TYPE_STRING:
case PW_TYPE_OCTETS:
/*
* FIXME: HACK for non-updated dictionaries.
* REMOVE in a future release.
*/
if ((strcmp(reply->name, "Ascend-Send-Secret") == 0) ||
(strcmp(reply->name, "Ascend-Receive-Secret") == 0)) {
reply->flags.encrypt = FLAG_ENCRYPT_ASCEND_SECRET;
}
if (reply->attribute == PW_USER_PASSWORD) {
reply->flags.encrypt = FLAG_ENCRYPT_USER_PASSWORD;
}
/*
* Encrypt the various password styles
*/
switch (reply->flags.encrypt) {
default:
break;
case FLAG_ENCRYPT_USER_PASSWORD:
rad_pwencode((char *)reply->strvalue,
&(reply->length),
(const char *)secret,
(const char *)packet->vector);
break;
case FLAG_ENCRYPT_TUNNEL_PASSWORD:
rad_tunnel_pwencode(reply->strvalue,
&(reply->length),
secret,
packet->vector);
break;
case FLAG_ENCRYPT_ASCEND_SECRET:
make_secret(digest, packet->vector,
secret, reply->strvalue);
memcpy(reply->strvalue, digest, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN );
reply->length = AUTH_VECTOR_LEN;
} /* switch over encryption flags */
len = reply->length;
/*
* Set the TAG at the beginning
* of the string if tagged. If
* tag value is not valid for
* tagged attribute, make it 0x00
* per RFC 2868. -cparker
*/
if (reply->flags.has_tag) {
if (TAG_VALID(reply->flags.tag)) {
len++;
*ptr++ = reply->flags.tag;
} else if (reply->flags.encrypt == FLAG_ENCRYPT_TUNNEL_PASSWORD) {
/*
* Tunnel passwords
* REQUIRE a tag,
* even if we don't
* have a valid
* tag.
*/
len++;
*ptr++ = 0x00;
} /* else don't write a tag */
} /* else the attribute doesn't have a tag */
/*
* Ensure we don't go too far.
* The 'length' of the attribute
* may be 0..255, minus whatever
* octets are used in the attribute
* header.
*/
allowed = 255;
if (vsa_length_ptr) {
allowed -= *vsa_length_ptr;
} else {
allowed -= *length_ptr;
}
if (len > allowed) {
len = allowed;
}
*length_ptr += len;
if (vsa_length_ptr) *vsa_length_ptr += len;
/*
* If we have tagged attributes we can't assume that
* len == reply->length. Use reply->length for copying
* the string data into the packet. Use len for the
* true length of the string+tags.
*/
memcpy(ptr, reply->strvalue, reply->length);
ptr += reply->length;
total_length += len;
break;
case PW_TYPE_INTEGER:
case PW_TYPE_IPADDR:
*length_ptr += 4;
if (vsa_length_ptr) *vsa_length_ptr += 4;
if (reply->type == PW_TYPE_INTEGER ) {
/* If tagged, the tag becomes the MSB of the value */
if(reply->flags.has_tag) {
/* Tag must be ( 0x01 -> 0x1F ) OR 0x00 */
if(!TAG_VALID(reply->flags.tag)) {
reply->flags.tag = 0x00;
}
lvalue = htonl((reply->lvalue & 0xffffff) |
((reply->flags.tag & 0xff) << 24));
} else {
lvalue = htonl(reply->lvalue);
}
} else {
/*
* IP address is already in
* network byte order.
*/
lvalue = reply->lvalue;
}
memcpy(ptr, &lvalue, 4);
ptr += 4;
total_length += 4;
break;
/*
* There are no tagged date attributes.
*/
case PW_TYPE_DATE:
*length_ptr += 4;
if (vsa_length_ptr) *vsa_length_ptr += 4;
lvalue = htonl(reply->lvalue);
memcpy(ptr, &lvalue, 4);
ptr += 4;
total_length += 4;
break;
default:
break;
}
} /* done looping over all attributes */
/*
* Fill in the rest of the fields, and copy
* the data over from the local stack to
* the newly allocated memory.
*
* Yes, all this 'memcpy' is slow, but it means
* that we only allocate the minimum amount of
* memory for a request.
*/
packet->data_len = total_length;
packet->data = (uint8_t *) malloc(packet->data_len);
if (!packet->data) {
librad_log("Out of memory");
return -1;
}
memcpy(packet->data, data, packet->data_len);
hdr = (radius_packet_t *) packet->data;
total_length = htons(total_length);
memcpy(hdr->length, &total_length, sizeof(u_short));
/*
* If this is not an authentication request, we
* need to calculate the md5 hash over the entire packet
* and put it in the vector.
*/
secretlen = strlen(secret);
if (packet->code != PW_AUTHENTICATION_REQUEST &&
packet->code != PW_STATUS_SERVER) {
MD5_CTX context;
/*
* Set the Message-Authenticator attribute,
* BEFORE setting the reply authentication vector
* for CHALLENGE, ACCEPT and REJECT.
*/
if (msg_auth_offset) {
uint8_t calc_auth_vector[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
switch (packet->code) {
default:
break;
case PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK:
case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
if (original) {
memcpy(hdr->vector, original->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
}
break;
}
memset(packet->data + msg_auth_offset + 2, 0,
AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
lrad_hmac_md5(packet->data, packet->data_len,
secret, secretlen, calc_auth_vector);
memcpy(packet->data + msg_auth_offset + 2,
calc_auth_vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
memcpy(hdr->vector, packet->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
}
MD5Init(&context);
MD5Update(&context, packet->data, packet->data_len);
MD5Update(&context, secret, strlen(secret));
MD5Final(digest, &context);
memcpy(hdr->vector, digest, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
memcpy(packet->vector, digest, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
}
/*
* Set the Message-Authenticator attribute,
* AFTER setting the authentication vector
* only for ACCESS-REQUESTS
*/
else if (msg_auth_offset) {
uint8_t calc_auth_vector[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
switch (packet->code) {
default:
break;
case PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK:
case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
if (original) {
memcpy(hdr->vector, original->vector,
AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
}
break;
}
memset(packet->data + msg_auth_offset + 2,
0, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
lrad_hmac_md5(packet->data, packet->data_len,
secret, secretlen, calc_auth_vector);
memcpy(packet->data + msg_auth_offset + 2,
calc_auth_vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
memcpy(hdr->vector, packet->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
}
/*
* If packet->data points to data, then we print out
* the VP list again only for debugging.
*/
} else if (librad_debug) {
DEBUG("Re-sending %s of id %d to %s:%d\n", what, packet->id,
ip_ntoa((char *)ip_buffer, packet->dst_ipaddr),
packet->dst_port);
for (reply = packet->vps; reply; reply = reply->next) {
/* FIXME: ignore attributes > 0xff */
debug_pair(reply);
}
}
/*
* And send it on it's way.
*/
sa = (struct sockaddr_in *) &saremote;
memset ((char *) sa, '\0', sizeof (saremote));
sa->sin_family = AF_INET;
sa->sin_addr.s_addr = packet->dst_ipaddr;
sa->sin_port = htons(packet->dst_port);
return sendto(packet->sockfd, packet->data, (int)packet->data_len, 0,
(struct sockaddr *)&saremote, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));
}