static void try_fill_recv(struct virtnet_info *vi)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct scatterlist sg[1+MAX_SKB_FRAGS];
int num, err;
sg_init_table(sg, 1+MAX_SKB_FRAGS);
for (;;) {
skb = netdev_alloc_skb(vi->dev, MAX_PACKET_LEN);
if (unlikely(!skb))
break;
skb_put(skb, MAX_PACKET_LEN);
vnet_hdr_to_sg(sg, skb);
num = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg+1, 0, skb->len) + 1;
skb_queue_head(&vi->recv, skb);
err = vi->rvq->vq_ops->add_buf(vi->rvq, sg, 0, num, skb);
if (err) {
skb_unlink(skb, &vi->recv);
kfree_skb(skb);
break;
}
vi->num++;
}
if (unlikely(vi->num > vi->max))
vi->max = vi->num;
vi->rvq->vq_ops->kick(vi->rvq);
}
static int start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
{
struct virtnet_info *vi = netdev_priv(dev);
int num, err;
struct scatterlist sg[1+MAX_SKB_FRAGS];
struct virtio_net_hdr *hdr;
const unsigned char *dest = ((struct ethhdr *)skb->data)->h_dest;
DECLARE_MAC_BUF(mac);
sg_init_table(sg, 1+MAX_SKB_FRAGS);
pr_debug("%s: xmit %p %s\n", dev->name, skb, print_mac(mac, dest));
free_old_xmit_skbs(vi);
/* Encode metadata header at front. */
hdr = skb_vnet_hdr(skb);
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) {
hdr->flags = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM;
hdr->csum_start = skb->csum_start - skb_headroom(skb);
hdr->csum_offset = skb->csum_offset;
} else {
hdr->flags = 0;
hdr->csum_offset = hdr->csum_start = 0;
}
if (skb_is_gso(skb)) {
hdr->gso_size = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size;
if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCP_ECN)
hdr->gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4_ECN;
else if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCPV4)
hdr->gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4;
else if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCPV6)
hdr->gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6;
else if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_UDP)
hdr->gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP;
else
BUG();
} else {
hdr->gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE;
hdr->gso_size = 0;
}
vnet_hdr_to_sg(sg, skb);
num = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg+1, 0, skb->len) + 1;
__skb_queue_head(&vi->send, skb);
err = vi->svq->vq_ops->add_buf(vi->svq, sg, num, 0, skb);
if (err) {
pr_debug("%s: virtio not prepared to send\n", dev->name);
skb_unlink(skb, &vi->send);
netif_stop_queue(dev);
return NETDEV_TX_BUSY;
}
vi->svq->vq_ops->kick(vi->svq);
return 0;
}
uint BCMFASTPATH
osl_dma_map(osl_t *osh, void *va, uint size, int direction, void *p, hnddma_seg_map_t *dmah)
{
int dir;
ASSERT((osh && (osh->magic == OS_HANDLE_MAGIC)));
dir = (direction == DMA_TX)? PCI_DMA_TODEVICE: PCI_DMA_FROMDEVICE;
#if defined(__ARM_ARCH_7A__) && defined(BCMDMASGLISTOSL)
if (dmah != NULL) {
int32 nsegs, i, totsegs = 0, totlen = 0;
struct scatterlist *sg, _sg[16];
struct sk_buff *skb;
for (skb = (struct sk_buff *)p; skb != NULL; skb = PKTNEXT(osh, skb)) {
sg = &_sg[totsegs];
if (skb_is_nonlinear(skb)) {
nsegs = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, 0, PKTLEN(osh, skb));
ASSERT((nsegs > 0) && (nsegs <= 16));
pci_map_sg(osh->pdev, sg, nsegs, dir);
} else {
nsegs = 1;
sg->page_link = 0;
sg_set_buf(sg, PKTDATA(osh, skb), PKTLEN(osh, skb));
pci_map_single(osh->pdev, PKTDATA(osh, skb),
PKTISCTF(osh, skb) ? CTFMAPSZ : PKTLEN(osh, skb), dir);
}
totsegs += nsegs;
totlen += PKTLEN(osh, skb);
}
dmah->nsegs = totsegs;
dmah->origsize = totlen;
for (i = 0, sg = _sg; i < totsegs; i++, sg++) {
dmah->segs[i].addr = sg_phys(sg);
dmah->segs[i].length = sg->length;
}
return dmah->segs[0].addr;
}
#endif
return (pci_map_single(osh->pdev, va, size, dir));
}
static int esp6_input(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct ipv6hdr *iph;
struct ipv6_esp_hdr *esph;
struct esp_data *esp = x->data;
struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = esp->conf.tfm;
struct blkcipher_desc desc = { .tfm = tfm };
struct sk_buff *trailer;
int blksize = ALIGN(crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm), 4);
int alen = esp->auth.icv_trunc_len;
int elen = skb->len - sizeof(struct ipv6_esp_hdr) - esp->conf.ivlen - alen;
int hdr_len = skb->h.raw - skb->nh.raw;
int nfrags;
int ret = 0;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct ipv6_esp_hdr))) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (elen <= 0 || (elen & (blksize-1))) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/* If integrity check is required, do this. */
if (esp->auth.icv_full_len) {
u8 sum[alen];
ret = esp_mac_digest(esp, skb, 0, skb->len - alen);
if (ret)
goto out;
if (skb_copy_bits(skb, skb->len - alen, sum, alen))
BUG();
if (unlikely(memcmp(esp->auth.work_icv, sum, alen))) {
x->stats.integrity_failed++;
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
}
if ((nfrags = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer)) < 0) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
esph = (struct ipv6_esp_hdr*)skb->data;
iph = skb->nh.ipv6h;
/* Get ivec. This can be wrong, check against another impls. */
if (esp->conf.ivlen)
crypto_blkcipher_set_iv(tfm, esph->enc_data, esp->conf.ivlen);
{
u8 nexthdr[2];
struct scatterlist *sg = &esp->sgbuf[0];
u8 padlen;
if (unlikely(nfrags > ESP_NUM_FAST_SG)) {
sg = kmalloc(sizeof(struct scatterlist)*nfrags, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!sg) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
}
skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, sizeof(struct ipv6_esp_hdr) + esp->conf.ivlen, elen);
ret = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt(&desc, sg, sg, elen);
if (unlikely(sg != &esp->sgbuf[0]))
kfree(sg);
if (unlikely(ret))
goto out;
if (skb_copy_bits(skb, skb->len-alen-2, nexthdr, 2))
BUG();
padlen = nexthdr[0];
if (padlen+2 >= elen) {
LIMIT_NETDEBUG(KERN_WARNING "ipsec esp packet is garbage padlen=%d, elen=%d\n", padlen+2, elen);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/* ... check padding bits here. Silly. :-) */
pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - alen - padlen - 2);
ret = nexthdr[1];
}
skb->h.raw = __skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*esph) + esp->conf.ivlen) - hdr_len;
out:
return ret;
}
/*
* Note: detecting truncated vs. non-truncated authentication data is very
* expensive, so we only support truncated data, which is the recommended
* and common case.
*/
static int esp_input(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct iphdr *iph;
struct ip_esp_hdr *esph;
struct esp_data *esp = x->data;
struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = esp->conf.tfm;
struct blkcipher_desc desc = { .tfm = tfm };
struct sk_buff *trailer;
int blksize = ALIGN(crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm), 4);
int alen = esp->auth.icv_trunc_len;
int elen = skb->len - sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) - esp->conf.ivlen - alen;
int nfrags;
int ihl;
u8 nexthdr[2];
struct scatterlist *sg;
int padlen;
int err;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr)))
goto out;
if (elen <= 0 || (elen & (blksize-1)))
goto out;
/* If integrity check is required, do this. */
if (esp->auth.icv_full_len) {
u8 sum[alen];
err = esp_mac_digest(esp, skb, 0, skb->len - alen);
if (err)
goto out;
if (skb_copy_bits(skb, skb->len - alen, sum, alen))
BUG();
if (unlikely(memcmp(esp->auth.work_icv, sum, alen))) {
x->stats.integrity_failed++;
goto out;
}
}
if ((nfrags = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer)) < 0)
goto out;
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
esph = (struct ip_esp_hdr*)skb->data;
/* Get ivec. This can be wrong, check against another impls. */
if (esp->conf.ivlen)
crypto_blkcipher_set_iv(tfm, esph->enc_data, esp->conf.ivlen);
sg = &esp->sgbuf[0];
if (unlikely(nfrags > ESP_NUM_FAST_SG)) {
sg = kmalloc(sizeof(struct scatterlist)*nfrags, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!sg)
goto out;
}
skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) + esp->conf.ivlen, elen);
err = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt(&desc, sg, sg, elen);
if (unlikely(sg != &esp->sgbuf[0]))
kfree(sg);
if (unlikely(err))
return err;
if (skb_copy_bits(skb, skb->len-alen-2, nexthdr, 2))
BUG();
padlen = nexthdr[0];
if (padlen+2 >= elen)
goto out;
/* ... check padding bits here. Silly. :-) */
iph = skb->nh.iph;
ihl = iph->ihl * 4;
if (x->encap) {
struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap = x->encap;
struct udphdr *uh = (void *)(skb->nh.raw + ihl);
/*
* 1) if the NAT-T peer's IP or port changed then
* advertize the change to the keying daemon.
* This is an inbound SA, so just compare
* SRC ports.
*/
if (iph->saddr != x->props.saddr.a4 ||
uh->source != encap->encap_sport) {
xfrm_address_t ipaddr;
ipaddr.a4 = iph->saddr;
km_new_mapping(x, &ipaddr, uh->source);
/* XXX: perhaps add an extra
* policy check here, to see
* if we should allow or
* reject a packet from a
* different source
* address/port.
*/
}
/*
* 2) ignore UDP/TCP checksums in case
* of NAT-T in Transport Mode, or
* perform other post-processing fixes
* as per draft-ietf-ipsec-udp-encaps-06,
* section 3.1.2
*/
if (x->props.mode == XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT ||
x->props.mode == XFRM_MODE_BEET)
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY;
}
iph->protocol = nexthdr[1];
pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - alen - padlen - 2);
skb->h.raw = __skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*esph) + esp->conf.ivlen) - ihl;
return 0;
out:
return -EINVAL;
}
static int esp_output(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int err;
struct iphdr *top_iph;
struct ip_esp_hdr *esph;
struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
struct blkcipher_desc desc;
struct esp_data *esp;
struct sk_buff *trailer;
int blksize;
int clen;
int alen;
int nfrags;
/* Strip IP+ESP header. */
__skb_pull(skb, skb->h.raw - skb->data);
/* Now skb is pure payload to encrypt */
err = -ENOMEM;
/* Round to block size */
clen = skb->len;
esp = x->data;
alen = esp->auth.icv_trunc_len;
tfm = esp->conf.tfm;
desc.tfm = tfm;
desc.flags = 0;
blksize = ALIGN(crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm), 4);
clen = ALIGN(clen + 2, blksize);
if (esp->conf.padlen)
clen = ALIGN(clen, esp->conf.padlen);
if ((nfrags = skb_cow_data(skb, clen-skb->len+alen, &trailer)) < 0)
goto error;
/* Fill padding... */
do {
int i;
for (i=0; i<clen-skb->len - 2; i++)
*(u8*)(trailer->tail + i) = i+1;
} while (0);
*(u8*)(trailer->tail + clen-skb->len - 2) = (clen - skb->len)-2;
pskb_put(skb, trailer, clen - skb->len);
__skb_push(skb, skb->data - skb->nh.raw);
top_iph = skb->nh.iph;
esph = (struct ip_esp_hdr *)(skb->nh.raw + top_iph->ihl*4);
top_iph->tot_len = htons(skb->len + alen);
*(u8*)(trailer->tail - 1) = top_iph->protocol;
/* this is non-NULL only with UDP Encapsulation */
if (x->encap) {
struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap = x->encap;
struct udphdr *uh;
u32 *udpdata32;
uh = (struct udphdr *)esph;
uh->source = encap->encap_sport;
uh->dest = encap->encap_dport;
uh->len = htons(skb->len + alen - top_iph->ihl*4);
uh->check = 0;
switch (encap->encap_type) {
default:
case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP:
esph = (struct ip_esp_hdr *)(uh + 1);
break;
case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE:
udpdata32 = (u32 *)(uh + 1);
udpdata32[0] = udpdata32[1] = 0;
esph = (struct ip_esp_hdr *)(udpdata32 + 2);
break;
}
top_iph->protocol = IPPROTO_UDP;
} else
top_iph->protocol = IPPROTO_ESP;
esph->spi = x->id.spi;
esph->seq_no = htonl(++x->replay.oseq);
xfrm_aevent_doreplay(x);
if (esp->conf.ivlen) {
if (unlikely(!esp->conf.ivinitted)) {
get_random_bytes(esp->conf.ivec, esp->conf.ivlen);
esp->conf.ivinitted = 1;
}
crypto_blkcipher_set_iv(tfm, esp->conf.ivec, esp->conf.ivlen);
}
do {
struct scatterlist *sg = &esp->sgbuf[0];
if (unlikely(nfrags > ESP_NUM_FAST_SG)) {
sg = kmalloc(sizeof(struct scatterlist)*nfrags, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!sg)
goto error;
}
skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, esph->enc_data+esp->conf.ivlen-skb->data, clen);
err = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, sg, sg, clen);
if (unlikely(sg != &esp->sgbuf[0]))
kfree(sg);
} while (0);
if (unlikely(err))
goto error;
if (esp->conf.ivlen) {
memcpy(esph->enc_data, esp->conf.ivec, esp->conf.ivlen);
crypto_blkcipher_get_iv(tfm, esp->conf.ivec, esp->conf.ivlen);
}
if (esp->auth.icv_full_len) {
err = esp_mac_digest(esp, skb, (u8 *)esph - skb->data,
sizeof(*esph) + esp->conf.ivlen + clen);
memcpy(pskb_put(skb, trailer, alen), esp->auth.work_icv, alen);
}
ip_send_check(top_iph);
error:
return err;
}
int esp_output(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int err;
struct dst_entry *dst = skb->dst;
struct xfrm_state *x = dst->xfrm;
struct iphdr *iph, *top_iph;
struct ip_esp_hdr *esph;
struct crypto_tfm *tfm;
struct esp_data *esp;
struct sk_buff *trailer;
struct udphdr *uh = NULL;
struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap = NULL;
int blksize;
int clen;
int alen;
int nfrags;
union {
struct iphdr iph;
char buf[60];
} tmp_iph;
/* First, if the skb is not checksummed, complete checksum. */
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_HW && skb_checksum_help(skb) == NULL) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto error_nolock;
}
spin_lock_bh(&x->lock);
err = xfrm_check_output(x, skb, AF_INET);
if (err)
goto error;
err = -ENOMEM;
/* Strip IP header in transport mode. Save it. */
if (!x->props.mode) {
iph = skb->nh.iph;
memcpy(&tmp_iph, iph, iph->ihl*4);
__skb_pull(skb, iph->ihl*4);
}
/* Now skb is pure payload to encrypt */
/* Round to block size */
clen = skb->len;
esp = x->data;
alen = esp->auth.icv_trunc_len;
tfm = esp->conf.tfm;
blksize = (crypto_tfm_alg_blocksize(tfm) + 3) & ~3;
clen = (clen + 2 + blksize-1)&~(blksize-1);
if (esp->conf.padlen)
clen = (clen + esp->conf.padlen-1)&~(esp->conf.padlen-1);
if ((nfrags = skb_cow_data(skb, clen-skb->len+alen, &trailer)) < 0)
goto error;
/* Fill padding... */
do {
int i;
for (i=0; i<clen-skb->len - 2; i++)
*(u8*)(trailer->tail + i) = i+1;
} while (0);
*(u8*)(trailer->tail + clen-skb->len - 2) = (clen - skb->len)-2;
pskb_put(skb, trailer, clen - skb->len);
encap = x->encap;
iph = skb->nh.iph;
if (x->props.mode) {
top_iph = (struct iphdr*)skb_push(skb, x->props.header_len);
esph = (struct ip_esp_hdr*)(top_iph+1);
if (encap && encap->encap_type) {
switch (encap->encap_type) {
case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP:
uh = (struct udphdr*) esph;
esph = (struct ip_esp_hdr*)(uh+1);
top_iph->protocol = IPPROTO_UDP;
break;
default:
printk(KERN_INFO
"esp_output(): Unhandled encap: %u\n",
encap->encap_type);
top_iph->protocol = IPPROTO_ESP;
break;
}
} else
top_iph->protocol = IPPROTO_ESP;
*(u8*)(trailer->tail - 1) = IPPROTO_IPIP;
top_iph->ihl = 5;
top_iph->version = 4;
top_iph->tos = iph->tos; /* DS disclosed */
if (x->props.flags & XFRM_STATE_NOECN)
IP_ECN_clear(top_iph);
top_iph->tot_len = htons(skb->len + alen);
top_iph->frag_off = iph->frag_off&htons(IP_DF);
if (!(top_iph->frag_off))
ip_select_ident(top_iph, dst, 0);
top_iph->ttl = iph->ttl; /* TTL disclosed */
top_iph->check = 0;
top_iph->saddr = x->props.saddr.a4;
top_iph->daddr = x->id.daddr.a4;
memset(&(IPCB(skb)->opt), 0, sizeof(struct ip_options));
} else {
esph = (struct ip_esp_hdr*)skb_push(skb, x->props.header_len);
top_iph = (struct iphdr*)skb_push(skb, iph->ihl*4);
memcpy(top_iph, &tmp_iph, iph->ihl*4);
if (encap && encap->encap_type) {
switch (encap->encap_type) {
case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP:
uh = (struct udphdr*) esph;
esph = (struct ip_esp_hdr*)(uh+1);
top_iph->protocol = IPPROTO_UDP;
break;
default:
printk(KERN_INFO
"esp_output(): Unhandled encap: %u\n",
encap->encap_type);
top_iph->protocol = IPPROTO_ESP;
break;
}
} else
top_iph->protocol = IPPROTO_ESP;
iph = &tmp_iph.iph;
top_iph->tot_len = htons(skb->len + alen);
top_iph->check = 0;
top_iph->frag_off = iph->frag_off;
*(u8*)(trailer->tail - 1) = iph->protocol;
}
/* this is non-NULL only with UDP Encapsulation */
if (encap && uh) {
uh->source = encap->encap_sport;
uh->dest = encap->encap_dport;
uh->len = htons(skb->len + alen - sizeof(struct iphdr));
uh->check = 0;
}
esph->spi = x->id.spi;
esph->seq_no = htonl(++x->replay.oseq);
if (esp->conf.ivlen)
crypto_cipher_set_iv(tfm, esp->conf.ivec, crypto_tfm_alg_ivsize(tfm));
do {
struct scatterlist sgbuf[nfrags>MAX_SG_ONSTACK ? 0 : nfrags];
struct scatterlist *sg = sgbuf;
if (unlikely(nfrags > MAX_SG_ONSTACK)) {
sg = kmalloc(sizeof(struct scatterlist)*nfrags, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!sg)
goto error;
}
skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, esph->enc_data+esp->conf.ivlen-skb->data, clen);
crypto_cipher_encrypt(tfm, sg, sg, clen);
if (unlikely(sg != sgbuf))
kfree(sg);
} while (0);
if (esp->conf.ivlen) {
memcpy(esph->enc_data, esp->conf.ivec, crypto_tfm_alg_ivsize(tfm));
crypto_cipher_get_iv(tfm, esp->conf.ivec, crypto_tfm_alg_ivsize(tfm));
}
if (esp->auth.icv_full_len) {
esp->auth.icv(esp, skb, (u8*)esph-skb->data,
sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) + esp->conf.ivlen+clen, trailer->tail);
pskb_put(skb, trailer, alen);
}
ip_send_check(top_iph);
skb->nh.raw = skb->data;
x->curlft.bytes += skb->len;
x->curlft.packets++;
spin_unlock_bh(&x->lock);
if ((skb->dst = dst_pop(dst)) == NULL) {
err = -EHOSTUNREACH;
goto error_nolock;
}
return NET_XMIT_BYPASS;
error:
spin_unlock_bh(&x->lock);
error_nolock:
kfree_skb(skb);
return err;
}
/*
* Note: detecting truncated vs. non-truncated authentication data is very
* expensive, so we only support truncated data, which is the recommended
* and common case.
*/
int esp_input(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_decap_state *decap, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct iphdr *iph;
struct ip_esp_hdr *esph;
struct esp_data *esp = x->data;
struct sk_buff *trailer;
int blksize = crypto_tfm_alg_blocksize(esp->conf.tfm);
int alen = esp->auth.icv_trunc_len;
int elen = skb->len - sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) - esp->conf.ivlen - alen;
int nfrags;
int encap_len = 0;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr)))
goto out;
if (elen <= 0 || (elen & (blksize-1)))
goto out;
/* If integrity check is required, do this. */
if (esp->auth.icv_full_len) {
u8 sum[esp->auth.icv_full_len];
u8 sum1[alen];
esp->auth.icv(esp, skb, 0, skb->len-alen, sum);
if (skb_copy_bits(skb, skb->len-alen, sum1, alen))
BUG();
if (unlikely(memcmp(sum, sum1, alen))) {
x->stats.integrity_failed++;
goto out;
}
}
if ((nfrags = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer)) < 0)
goto out;
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
esph = (struct ip_esp_hdr*)skb->data;
iph = skb->nh.iph;
/* Get ivec. This can be wrong, check against another impls. */
if (esp->conf.ivlen)
crypto_cipher_set_iv(esp->conf.tfm, esph->enc_data, crypto_tfm_alg_ivsize(esp->conf.tfm));
{
u8 nexthdr[2];
struct scatterlist sgbuf[nfrags>MAX_SG_ONSTACK ? 0 : nfrags];
struct scatterlist *sg = sgbuf;
u8 workbuf[60];
int padlen;
if (unlikely(nfrags > MAX_SG_ONSTACK)) {
sg = kmalloc(sizeof(struct scatterlist)*nfrags, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!sg)
goto out;
}
skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) + esp->conf.ivlen, elen);
crypto_cipher_decrypt(esp->conf.tfm, sg, sg, elen);
if (unlikely(sg != sgbuf))
kfree(sg);
if (skb_copy_bits(skb, skb->len-alen-2, nexthdr, 2))
BUG();
padlen = nexthdr[0];
if (padlen+2 >= elen)
goto out;
/* ... check padding bits here. Silly. :-) */
if (x->encap && decap && decap->decap_type) {
struct esp_decap_data *encap_data;
struct udphdr *uh = (struct udphdr *) (iph+1);
encap_data = (struct esp_decap_data *) (decap->decap_data);
encap_data->proto = 0;
switch (decap->decap_type) {
case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP:
if ((void*)uh == (void*)esph) {
printk(KERN_DEBUG
"esp_input(): Got ESP; expecting ESPinUDP\n");
break;
}
encap_data->proto = AF_INET;
encap_data->saddr.a4 = iph->saddr;
encap_data->sport = uh->source;
encap_len = (void*)esph - (void*)uh;
if (encap_len != sizeof(*uh))
printk(KERN_DEBUG
"esp_input(): UDP -> ESP: too much room: %d\n",
encap_len);
break;
default:
printk(KERN_INFO
"esp_input(): processing unknown encap type: %u\n",
decap->decap_type);
break;
}
}
iph->protocol = nexthdr[1];
pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - alen - padlen - 2);
memcpy(workbuf, skb->nh.raw, iph->ihl*4);
skb->h.raw = skb_pull(skb, sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) + esp->conf.ivlen);
skb->nh.raw += encap_len + sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) + esp->conf.ivlen;
memcpy(skb->nh.raw, workbuf, iph->ihl*4);
skb->nh.iph->tot_len = htons(skb->len);
}
return 0;
out:
return -EINVAL;
}
static int esp6_input(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_decap_state *decap, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct ipv6hdr *iph;
struct ipv6_esp_hdr *esph;
struct esp_data *esp = x->data;
struct sk_buff *trailer;
int blksize = ALIGN(crypto_tfm_alg_blocksize(esp->conf.tfm), 4);
int alen = esp->auth.icv_trunc_len;
int elen = skb->len - sizeof(struct ipv6_esp_hdr) - esp->conf.ivlen - alen;
int hdr_len = skb->h.raw - skb->nh.raw;
int nfrags;
unsigned char *tmp_hdr = NULL;
int ret = 0;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct ipv6_esp_hdr))) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_nofree;
}
esph = (struct ipv6_esp_hdr*)skb->data;
if (elen <= 0 || (elen & (blksize-1))) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_nofree;
}
tmp_hdr = kmalloc(hdr_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!tmp_hdr) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out_nofree;
}
memcpy(tmp_hdr, skb->nh.raw, hdr_len);
/* If integrity check is required, do this. */
if (esp->auth.icv_full_len) {
u8 sum[esp->auth.icv_full_len];
u8 sum1[alen];
if (x->props.replay_window && xfrm_replay_check(x, esph->seq_no)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
esp->auth.icv(esp, skb, 0, skb->len-alen, sum);
if (skb_copy_bits(skb, skb->len-alen, sum1, alen))
BUG();
if (unlikely(memcmp(sum, sum1, alen))) {
x->stats.integrity_failed++;
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (x->props.replay_window)
xfrm_replay_advance(x, esph->seq_no);
}
if ((nfrags = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer)) < 0) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
iph = skb->nh.ipv6h;
/* Get ivec. This can be wrong, check against another impls. */
if (esp->conf.ivlen)
crypto_cipher_set_iv(esp->conf.tfm, esph->enc_data, crypto_tfm_alg_ivsize(esp->conf.tfm));
{
u8 nexthdr[2];
struct scatterlist *sg = &esp->sgbuf[0];
u8 padlen;
if (unlikely(nfrags > ESP_NUM_FAST_SG)) {
sg = kmalloc(sizeof(struct scatterlist)*nfrags, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!sg) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
}
skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, sizeof(struct ipv6_esp_hdr) + esp->conf.ivlen, elen);
crypto_cipher_decrypt(esp->conf.tfm, sg, sg, elen);
if (unlikely(sg != &esp->sgbuf[0]))
kfree(sg);
if (skb_copy_bits(skb, skb->len-alen-2, nexthdr, 2))
BUG();
padlen = nexthdr[0];
if (padlen+2 >= elen) {
LIMIT_NETDEBUG(KERN_WARNING "ipsec esp packet is garbage padlen=%d, elen=%d\n", padlen+2, elen);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/* ... check padding bits here. Silly. :-) */
pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - alen - padlen - 2);
skb->h.raw = skb_pull(skb, sizeof(struct ipv6_esp_hdr) + esp->conf.ivlen);
skb->nh.raw += sizeof(struct ipv6_esp_hdr) + esp->conf.ivlen;
memcpy(skb->nh.raw, tmp_hdr, hdr_len);
skb->nh.ipv6h->payload_len = htons(skb->len - sizeof(struct ipv6hdr));
ret = nexthdr[1];
}
out:
kfree(tmp_hdr);
out_nofree:
return ret;
}
static int esp6_output(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int err;
int hdr_len;
struct ipv6hdr *top_iph;
struct ipv6_esp_hdr *esph;
struct crypto_tfm *tfm;
struct esp_data *esp;
struct sk_buff *trailer;
int blksize;
int clen;
int alen;
int nfrags;
#if defined (CONFIG_OCTEON_NATIVE_IPSEC)
if ((skb_is_nonlinear(skb) || skb_cloned(skb)) &&
skb_linearize(skb, GFP_ATOMIC) != 0) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto error;
}
#endif
esp = x->data;
hdr_len = skb->h.raw - skb->data +
sizeof(*esph) + esp->conf.ivlen;
/* Strip IP+ESP header. */
__skb_pull(skb, hdr_len);
/* Now skb is pure payload to encrypt */
err = -ENOMEM;
/* Round to block size */
clen = skb->len;
alen = esp->auth.icv_trunc_len;
tfm = esp->conf.tfm;
blksize = ALIGN(crypto_tfm_alg_blocksize(tfm), 4);
clen = ALIGN(clen + 2, blksize);
if (esp->conf.padlen)
clen = ALIGN(clen, esp->conf.padlen);
if ((nfrags = skb_cow_data(skb, clen-skb->len+alen, &trailer)) < 0) {
goto error;
}
/* Fill padding... */
do {
int i;
for (i=0; i<clen-skb->len - 2; i++)
*(u8*)(trailer->tail + i) = i+1;
} while (0);
*(u8*)(trailer->tail + clen-skb->len - 2) = (clen - skb->len)-2;
pskb_put(skb, trailer, clen - skb->len);
top_iph = (struct ipv6hdr *)__skb_push(skb, hdr_len);
esph = (struct ipv6_esp_hdr *)skb->h.raw;
top_iph->payload_len = htons(skb->len + alen - sizeof(*top_iph));
*(u8*)(trailer->tail - 1) = *skb->nh.raw;
*skb->nh.raw = IPPROTO_ESP;
esph->spi = x->id.spi;
esph->seq_no = htonl(++x->replay.oseq);
if (esp->conf.ivlen)
crypto_cipher_set_iv(tfm, esp->conf.ivec, crypto_tfm_alg_ivsize(tfm));
#if defined (CONFIG_OCTEON_NATIVE_IPSEC)
{
int ret;
int len = ((unsigned char *)esph - skb->data);
__skb_pull(skb, len);
if (esp->conf.ivlen) {
memcpy(esph->enc_data, esp->conf.ivec, crypto_tfm_alg_ivsize(tfm));
}
ret = cavium_process_esp_pkt(esp, skb);
__skb_push(skb, len);
if (esp->conf.ivlen) {
crypto_cipher_get_iv(tfm, esp->conf.ivec, crypto_tfm_alg_ivsize(tfm));
}
if (likely(!ret)) {
if (esp->auth.icv_full_len)
skb_put(skb, alen);
return 0;
}
if (unlikely(ret != -EIO))
goto error;
goto error;
/*
if (esp->conf.ivlen)
crypto_cipher_set_iv(tfm, esp->conf.ivec, crypto_tfm_alg_ivsize(tfm));
*/
}
#else
do {
struct scatterlist *sg = &esp->sgbuf[0];
if (unlikely(nfrags > ESP_NUM_FAST_SG)) {
sg = kmalloc(sizeof(struct scatterlist)*nfrags, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!sg)
goto error;
}
skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, esph->enc_data+esp->conf.ivlen-skb->data, clen);
crypto_cipher_encrypt(tfm, sg, sg, clen);
if (unlikely(sg != &esp->sgbuf[0]))
kfree(sg);
} while (0);
if (esp->conf.ivlen) {
memcpy(esph->enc_data, esp->conf.ivec, crypto_tfm_alg_ivsize(tfm));
crypto_cipher_get_iv(tfm, esp->conf.ivec, crypto_tfm_alg_ivsize(tfm));
}
if (esp->auth.icv_full_len) {
esp->auth.icv(esp, skb, (u8*)esph-skb->data,
sizeof(struct ipv6_esp_hdr) + esp->conf.ivlen+clen, trailer->tail);
pskb_put(skb, trailer, alen);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_OCTEON_NATIVE_IPSEC */
err = 0;
error:
return err;
}
static int esp6_output(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int err;
int hdr_len;
struct dst_entry *dst = skb->dst;
struct xfrm_state *x = dst->xfrm;
struct ipv6hdr *top_iph;
struct ipv6_esp_hdr *esph;
struct crypto_tfm *tfm;
struct esp_data *esp;
struct sk_buff *trailer;
int blksize;
int clen;
int alen;
int nfrags;
esp = x->data;
hdr_len = skb->h.raw - skb->data +
sizeof(*esph) + esp->conf.ivlen;
/* Strip IP+ESP header. */
__skb_pull(skb, hdr_len);
/* Now skb is pure payload to encrypt */
err = -ENOMEM;
/* Round to block size */
clen = skb->len;
alen = esp->auth.icv_trunc_len;
tfm = esp->conf.tfm;
blksize = (crypto_tfm_alg_blocksize(tfm) + 3) & ~3;
clen = (clen + 2 + blksize-1)&~(blksize-1);
if (esp->conf.padlen)
clen = (clen + esp->conf.padlen-1)&~(esp->conf.padlen-1);
if ((nfrags = skb_cow_data(skb, clen-skb->len+alen, &trailer)) < 0) {
goto error;
}
/* Fill padding... */
do {
int i;
for (i=0; i<clen-skb->len - 2; i++)
*(u8*)(trailer->tail + i) = i+1;
} while (0);
*(u8*)(trailer->tail + clen-skb->len - 2) = (clen - skb->len)-2;
pskb_put(skb, trailer, clen - skb->len);
top_iph = (struct ipv6hdr *)__skb_push(skb, hdr_len);
esph = (struct ipv6_esp_hdr *)skb->h.raw;
top_iph->payload_len = htons(skb->len + alen - sizeof(*top_iph));
*(u8*)(trailer->tail - 1) = *skb->nh.raw;
*skb->nh.raw = IPPROTO_ESP;
esph->spi = x->id.spi;
esph->seq_no = htonl(++x->replay.oseq);
if (esp->conf.ivlen)
crypto_cipher_set_iv(tfm, esp->conf.ivec, crypto_tfm_alg_ivsize(tfm));
do {
struct scatterlist *sg = &esp->sgbuf[0];
if (unlikely(nfrags > ESP_NUM_FAST_SG)) {
sg = kmalloc(sizeof(struct scatterlist)*nfrags, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!sg)
goto error;
}
skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, esph->enc_data+esp->conf.ivlen-skb->data, clen);
crypto_cipher_encrypt(tfm, sg, sg, clen);
if (unlikely(sg != &esp->sgbuf[0]))
kfree(sg);
} while (0);
if (esp->conf.ivlen) {
memcpy(esph->enc_data, esp->conf.ivec, crypto_tfm_alg_ivsize(tfm));
crypto_cipher_get_iv(tfm, esp->conf.ivec, crypto_tfm_alg_ivsize(tfm));
}
if (esp->auth.icv_full_len) {
esp->auth.icv(esp, skb, (u8*)esph-skb->data,
sizeof(struct ipv6_esp_hdr) + esp->conf.ivlen+clen, trailer->tail);
pskb_put(skb, trailer, alen);
}
err = 0;
error:
return err;
}
static int fill_sg_in(struct scatterlist *sg_in,
struct sk_buff *skb,
struct tls_offload_context_tx *ctx,
u64 *rcd_sn,
s32 *sync_size,
int *resync_sgs)
{
int tcp_payload_offset = skb_transport_offset(skb) + tcp_hdrlen(skb);
int payload_len = skb->len - tcp_payload_offset;
u32 tcp_seq = ntohl(tcp_hdr(skb)->seq);
struct tls_record_info *record;
unsigned long flags;
int remaining;
int i;
spin_lock_irqsave(&ctx->lock, flags);
record = tls_get_record(ctx, tcp_seq, rcd_sn);
if (!record) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ctx->lock, flags);
WARN(1, "Record not found for seq %u\n", tcp_seq);
return -EINVAL;
}
*sync_size = tcp_seq - tls_record_start_seq(record);
if (*sync_size < 0) {
int is_start_marker = tls_record_is_start_marker(record);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ctx->lock, flags);
/* This should only occur if the relevant record was
* already acked. In that case it should be ok
* to drop the packet and avoid retransmission.
*
* There is a corner case where the packet contains
* both an acked and a non-acked record.
* We currently don't handle that case and rely
* on TCP to retranmit a packet that doesn't contain
* already acked payload.
*/
if (!is_start_marker)
*sync_size = 0;
return -EINVAL;
}
remaining = *sync_size;
for (i = 0; remaining > 0; i++) {
skb_frag_t *frag = &record->frags[i];
__skb_frag_ref(frag);
sg_set_page(sg_in + i, skb_frag_page(frag),
skb_frag_size(frag), frag->page_offset);
remaining -= skb_frag_size(frag);
if (remaining < 0)
sg_in[i].length += remaining;
}
*resync_sgs = i;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ctx->lock, flags);
if (skb_to_sgvec(skb, &sg_in[i], tcp_payload_offset, payload_len) < 0)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
/*
* Note: detecting truncated vs. non-truncated authentication data is very
* expensive, so we only support truncated data, which is the recommended
* and common case.
*/
static int esp_input(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_decap_state *decap, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct iphdr *iph;
struct ip_esp_hdr *esph;
struct esp_data *esp = x->data;
struct sk_buff *trailer;
int blksize = ALIGN(crypto_tfm_alg_blocksize(esp->conf.tfm), 4);
int alen = esp->auth.icv_trunc_len;
int elen = skb->len - sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) - esp->conf.ivlen - alen;
int nfrags;
int encap_len = 0;
u8 nexthdr[2];
struct scatterlist *sg;
u8 workbuf[60];
int padlen;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr)))
goto out;
esph = (struct ip_esp_hdr*)skb->data;
if (elen <= 0 || (elen & (blksize-1)))
goto out;
/* If integrity check is required, do this. */
if (esp->auth.icv_full_len) {
u8 sum[esp->auth.icv_full_len];
u8 sum1[alen];
if (x->props.replay_window && xfrm_replay_check(x, esph->seq_no))
goto out;
esp->auth.icv(esp, skb, 0, skb->len-alen, sum);
if (skb_copy_bits(skb, skb->len-alen, sum1, alen))
BUG();
if (unlikely(memcmp(sum, sum1, alen))) {
x->stats.integrity_failed++;
goto out;
}
if (x->props.replay_window)
xfrm_replay_advance(x, esph->seq_no);
}
if ((nfrags = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer)) < 0)
goto out;
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
iph = skb->nh.iph;
/* Get ivec. This can be wrong, check against another impls. */
if (esp->conf.ivlen)
crypto_cipher_set_iv(esp->conf.tfm, esph->enc_data, crypto_tfm_alg_ivsize(esp->conf.tfm));
sg = &esp->sgbuf[0];
if (unlikely(nfrags > ESP_NUM_FAST_SG)) {
sg = kmalloc(sizeof(struct scatterlist)*nfrags, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!sg)
goto out;
}
skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) + esp->conf.ivlen, elen);
crypto_cipher_decrypt(esp->conf.tfm, sg, sg, elen);
if (unlikely(sg != &esp->sgbuf[0]))
kfree(sg);
if (skb_copy_bits(skb, skb->len-alen-2, nexthdr, 2))
BUG();
padlen = nexthdr[0];
if (padlen+2 >= elen)
goto out;
/* ... check padding bits here. Silly. :-) */
if (x->encap) {
struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap = x->encap;
struct udphdr *uh;
if (encap->encap_type != decap->decap_type)
goto out;
uh = (struct udphdr *)(iph + 1);
encap_len = (void*)esph - (void*)uh;
/*
* 1) if the NAT-T peer's IP or port changed then
* advertize the change to the keying daemon.
* This is an inbound SA, so just compare
* SRC ports.
*/
if (iph->saddr != x->props.saddr.a4 ||
uh->source != encap->encap_sport) {
xfrm_address_t ipaddr;
ipaddr.a4 = iph->saddr;
km_new_mapping(x, &ipaddr, uh->source);
/* XXX: perhaps add an extra
* policy check here, to see
* if we should allow or
* reject a packet from a
* different source
* address/port.
*/
}
/*
* 2) ignore UDP/TCP checksums in case
* of NAT-T in Transport Mode, or
* perform other post-processing fixes
* as per draft-ietf-ipsec-udp-encaps-06,
* section 3.1.2
*/
if (!x->props.mode)
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY;
}
iph->protocol = nexthdr[1];
pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - alen - padlen - 2);
memcpy(workbuf, skb->nh.raw, iph->ihl*4);
skb->h.raw = skb_pull(skb, sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) + esp->conf.ivlen);
skb->nh.raw += encap_len + sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) + esp->conf.ivlen;
memcpy(skb->nh.raw, workbuf, iph->ihl*4);
skb->nh.iph->tot_len = htons(skb->len);
return 0;
out:
return -EINVAL;
}
static int start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
{
struct virtnet_info *vi = netdev_priv(dev);
int num, err;
struct scatterlist sg[1+MAX_SKB_FRAGS];
struct virtio_net_hdr *hdr;
const unsigned char *dest = ((struct ethhdr *)skb->data)->h_dest;
sg_init_table(sg, 1+MAX_SKB_FRAGS);
pr_debug("%s: xmit %p " MAC_FMT "\n", dev->name, skb,
dest[0], dest[1], dest[2],
dest[3], dest[4], dest[5]);
/* Encode metadata header at front. */
hdr = skb_vnet_hdr(skb);
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) {
hdr->flags = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM;
hdr->csum_start = skb->csum_start - skb_headroom(skb);
hdr->csum_offset = skb->csum_offset;
} else {
hdr->flags = 0;
hdr->csum_offset = hdr->csum_start = 0;
}
if (skb_is_gso(skb)) {
hdr->hdr_len = skb_transport_header(skb) - skb->data;
hdr->gso_size = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size;
if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCPV4)
hdr->gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4;
else if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCPV6)
hdr->gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6;
else if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_UDP)
hdr->gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP;
else
BUG();
if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCP_ECN)
hdr->gso_type |= VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_ECN;
} else {
hdr->gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE;
hdr->gso_size = hdr->hdr_len = 0;
}
vnet_hdr_to_sg(sg, skb);
num = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg+1, 0, skb->len) + 1;
__skb_queue_head(&vi->send, skb);
again:
/* Free up any pending old buffers before queueing new ones. */
free_old_xmit_skbs(vi);
err = vi->svq->vq_ops->add_buf(vi->svq, sg, num, 0, skb);
if (err) {
pr_debug("%s: virtio not prepared to send\n", dev->name);
netif_stop_queue(dev);
/* Activate callback for using skbs: if this returns false it
* means some were used in the meantime. */
if (unlikely(!vi->svq->vq_ops->enable_cb(vi->svq))) {
vi->svq->vq_ops->disable_cb(vi->svq);
netif_start_queue(dev);
goto again;
}
__skb_unlink(skb, &vi->send);
return NETDEV_TX_BUSY;
}
vi->svq->vq_ops->kick(vi->svq);
return 0;
}
static int esp6_output(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int err;
int hdr_len;
struct ipv6hdr *top_iph;
struct ipv6_esp_hdr *esph;
struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
struct blkcipher_desc desc;
struct esp_data *esp;
struct sk_buff *trailer;
int blksize;
int clen;
int alen;
int nfrags;
esp = x->data;
hdr_len = skb->h.raw - skb->data +
sizeof(*esph) + esp->conf.ivlen;
/* Strip IP+ESP header. */
__skb_pull(skb, hdr_len);
/* Now skb is pure payload to encrypt */
err = -ENOMEM;
/* Round to block size */
clen = skb->len;
alen = esp->auth.icv_trunc_len;
tfm = esp->conf.tfm;
desc.tfm = tfm;
desc.flags = 0;
blksize = ALIGN(crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm), 4);
clen = ALIGN(clen + 2, blksize);
if (esp->conf.padlen)
clen = ALIGN(clen, esp->conf.padlen);
if ((nfrags = skb_cow_data(skb, clen-skb->len+alen, &trailer)) < 0) {
goto error;
}
/* Fill padding... */
do {
int i;
for (i=0; i<clen-skb->len - 2; i++)
*(u8*)(trailer->tail + i) = i+1;
} while (0);
*(u8*)(trailer->tail + clen-skb->len - 2) = (clen - skb->len)-2;
pskb_put(skb, trailer, clen - skb->len);
top_iph = (struct ipv6hdr *)__skb_push(skb, hdr_len);
esph = (struct ipv6_esp_hdr *)skb->h.raw;
top_iph->payload_len = htons(skb->len + alen - sizeof(*top_iph));
*(u8*)(trailer->tail - 1) = *skb->nh.raw;
*skb->nh.raw = IPPROTO_ESP;
esph->spi = x->id.spi;
esph->seq_no = htonl(++x->replay.oseq);
xfrm_aevent_doreplay(x);
if (esp->conf.ivlen) {
if (unlikely(!esp->conf.ivinitted)) {
get_random_bytes(esp->conf.ivec, esp->conf.ivlen);
esp->conf.ivinitted = 1;
}
crypto_blkcipher_set_iv(tfm, esp->conf.ivec, esp->conf.ivlen);
}
do {
struct scatterlist *sg = &esp->sgbuf[0];
if (unlikely(nfrags > ESP_NUM_FAST_SG)) {
sg = kmalloc(sizeof(struct scatterlist)*nfrags, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!sg)
goto error;
}
skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, esph->enc_data+esp->conf.ivlen-skb->data, clen);
err = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, sg, sg, clen);
if (unlikely(sg != &esp->sgbuf[0]))
kfree(sg);
} while (0);
if (unlikely(err))
goto error;
if (esp->conf.ivlen) {
memcpy(esph->enc_data, esp->conf.ivec, esp->conf.ivlen);
crypto_blkcipher_get_iv(tfm, esp->conf.ivec, esp->conf.ivlen);
}
if (esp->auth.icv_full_len) {
err = esp_mac_digest(esp, skb, (u8 *)esph - skb->data,
sizeof(*esph) + esp->conf.ivlen + clen);
memcpy(pskb_put(skb, trailer, alen), esp->auth.work_icv, alen);
}
error:
return err;
}
int
skb_to_sgvec(struct sk_buff *skb, struct scatterlist *sg, int offset, int len)
{
int start = skb_headlen(skb);
int i, copy = start - offset;
int elt = 0;
if (copy > 0) {
if (copy > len)
copy = len;
sg[elt].page = virt_to_page(skb->data + offset);
sg[elt].offset = (unsigned long)(skb->data + offset) % PAGE_SIZE;
sg[elt].length = copy;
elt++;
if ((len -= copy) == 0)
return elt;
offset += copy;
}
for (i = 0; i < skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags; i++) {
int end;
BUG_TRAP(start <= offset + len);
end = start + skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i].size;
if ((copy = end - offset) > 0) {
skb_frag_t *frag = &skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i];
if (copy > len)
copy = len;
sg[elt].page = frag->page;
sg[elt].offset = frag->page_offset+offset-start;
sg[elt].length = copy;
elt++;
if (!(len -= copy))
return elt;
offset += copy;
}
start = end;
}
if (skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list) {
struct sk_buff *list = skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list;
for (; list; list = list->next) {
int end;
BUG_TRAP(start <= offset + len);
end = start + list->len;
if ((copy = end - offset) > 0) {
if (copy > len)
copy = len;
elt += skb_to_sgvec(list, sg+elt, offset - start, copy);
if ((len -= copy) == 0)
return elt;
offset += copy;
}
start = end;
}
}
BUG_ON(len);
return elt;
}
int esp6_output(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int err;
int hdr_len = 0;
struct dst_entry *dst = skb->dst;
struct xfrm_state *x = dst->xfrm;
struct ipv6hdr *iph = NULL, *top_iph;
struct ipv6_esp_hdr *esph;
struct crypto_tfm *tfm;
struct esp_data *esp;
struct sk_buff *trailer;
int blksize;
int clen;
int alen;
int nfrags;
u8 *prevhdr;
u8 nexthdr = 0;
/* First, if the skb is not checksummed, complete checksum. */
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_HW && skb_checksum_help(skb) == NULL) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto error_nolock;
}
spin_lock_bh(&x->lock);
err = xfrm_check_output(x, skb, AF_INET6);
if (err)
goto error;
err = -ENOMEM;
/* Strip IP header in transport mode. Save it. */
if (!x->props.mode) {
hdr_len = ip6_find_1stfragopt(skb, &prevhdr);
nexthdr = *prevhdr;
*prevhdr = IPPROTO_ESP;
iph = kmalloc(hdr_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!iph) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto error;
}
memcpy(iph, skb->nh.raw, hdr_len);
__skb_pull(skb, hdr_len);
}
/* Now skb is pure payload to encrypt */
/* Round to block size */
clen = skb->len;
esp = x->data;
alen = esp->auth.icv_trunc_len;
tfm = esp->conf.tfm;
blksize = (crypto_tfm_alg_blocksize(tfm) + 3) & ~3;
clen = (clen + 2 + blksize-1)&~(blksize-1);
if (esp->conf.padlen)
clen = (clen + esp->conf.padlen-1)&~(esp->conf.padlen-1);
if ((nfrags = skb_cow_data(skb, clen-skb->len+alen, &trailer)) < 0) {
if (!x->props.mode && iph) kfree(iph);
goto error;
}
/* Fill padding... */
do {
int i;
for (i=0; i<clen-skb->len - 2; i++)
*(u8*)(trailer->tail + i) = i+1;
} while (0);
*(u8*)(trailer->tail + clen-skb->len - 2) = (clen - skb->len)-2;
pskb_put(skb, trailer, clen - skb->len);
if (x->props.mode) {
iph = skb->nh.ipv6h;
top_iph = (struct ipv6hdr*)skb_push(skb, x->props.header_len);
esph = (struct ipv6_esp_hdr*)(top_iph+1);
*(u8*)(trailer->tail - 1) = IPPROTO_IPV6;
top_iph->version = 6;
top_iph->priority = iph->priority;
top_iph->flow_lbl[0] = iph->flow_lbl[0];
top_iph->flow_lbl[1] = iph->flow_lbl[1];
top_iph->flow_lbl[2] = iph->flow_lbl[2];
if (x->props.flags & XFRM_STATE_NOECN)
IP6_ECN_clear(top_iph);
top_iph->nexthdr = IPPROTO_ESP;
top_iph->payload_len = htons(skb->len + alen - sizeof(struct ipv6hdr));
top_iph->hop_limit = iph->hop_limit;
ipv6_addr_copy(&top_iph->saddr,
(struct in6_addr *)&x->props.saddr);
ipv6_addr_copy(&top_iph->daddr,
(struct in6_addr *)&x->id.daddr);
} else {
esph = (struct ipv6_esp_hdr*)skb_push(skb, x->props.header_len);
skb->h.raw = (unsigned char*)esph;
top_iph = (struct ipv6hdr*)skb_push(skb, hdr_len);
memcpy(top_iph, iph, hdr_len);
kfree(iph);
top_iph->payload_len = htons(skb->len + alen - sizeof(struct ipv6hdr));
*(u8*)(trailer->tail - 1) = nexthdr;
}
esph->spi = x->id.spi;
esph->seq_no = htonl(++x->replay.oseq);
if (esp->conf.ivlen)
crypto_cipher_set_iv(tfm, esp->conf.ivec, crypto_tfm_alg_ivsize(tfm));
do {
struct scatterlist sgbuf[nfrags>MAX_SG_ONSTACK ? 0 : nfrags];
struct scatterlist *sg = sgbuf;
if (unlikely(nfrags > MAX_SG_ONSTACK)) {
sg = kmalloc(sizeof(struct scatterlist)*nfrags, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!sg)
goto error;
}
skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, esph->enc_data+esp->conf.ivlen-skb->data, clen);
crypto_cipher_encrypt(tfm, sg, sg, clen);
if (unlikely(sg != sgbuf))
kfree(sg);
} while (0);
if (esp->conf.ivlen) {
memcpy(esph->enc_data, esp->conf.ivec, crypto_tfm_alg_ivsize(tfm));
crypto_cipher_get_iv(tfm, esp->conf.ivec, crypto_tfm_alg_ivsize(tfm));
}
if (esp->auth.icv_full_len) {
esp->auth.icv(esp, skb, (u8*)esph-skb->data,
sizeof(struct ipv6_esp_hdr) + esp->conf.ivlen+clen, trailer->tail);
pskb_put(skb, trailer, alen);
}
skb->nh.raw = skb->data;
x->curlft.bytes += skb->len;
x->curlft.packets++;
spin_unlock_bh(&x->lock);
if ((skb->dst = dst_pop(dst)) == NULL) {
err = -EHOSTUNREACH;
goto error_nolock;
}
return NET_XMIT_BYPASS;
error:
spin_unlock_bh(&x->lock);
error_nolock:
kfree_skb(skb);
return err;
}