static void sessionsetup_start_signing_engine(const auth_serversupplied_info *server_info, char *inbuf)
{
if (!server_info->guest && !srv_signing_started()) {
/* We need to start the signing engine
* here but a W2K client sends the old
* "BSRSPYL " signature instead of the
* correct one. Subsequent packets will
* be correct.
*/
srv_check_sign_mac(inbuf, False);
}
}
BOOL receive_smb(int fd,char *buffer, unsigned int timeout)
{
if (!receive_smb_raw(fd, buffer, timeout)) {
return False;
}
/* Check the incoming SMB signature. */
if (!srv_check_sign_mac(buffer, True)) {
DEBUG(0, ("receive_smb: SMB Signature verification failed on incoming packet!\n"));
if (smb_read_error == 0)
smb_read_error = READ_BAD_SIG;
return False;
};
return(True);
}
static BOOL reply_spnego_ntlmssp(connection_struct *conn, char *inbuf, char *outbuf,
AUTH_NTLMSSP_STATE **auth_ntlmssp_state,
DATA_BLOB *ntlmssp_blob, NTSTATUS nt_status)
{
BOOL ret;
DATA_BLOB response;
struct auth_serversupplied_info *server_info = NULL;
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
server_info = (*auth_ntlmssp_state)->server_info;
} else {
nt_status = do_map_to_guest(nt_status,
&server_info,
(*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->user,
(*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->domain);
}
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
int sess_vuid;
DATA_BLOB nullblob = data_blob(NULL, 0);
DATA_BLOB session_key = data_blob((*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->session_key.data, (*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->session_key.length);
/* register_vuid keeps the server info */
sess_vuid = register_vuid(server_info, session_key, nullblob, (*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->user);
(*auth_ntlmssp_state)->server_info = NULL;
if (sess_vuid == -1) {
nt_status = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
} else {
/* current_user_info is changed on new vuid */
reload_services( True );
set_message(outbuf,4,0,True);
SSVAL(outbuf, smb_vwv3, 0);
if (server_info->guest) {
SSVAL(outbuf,smb_vwv2,1);
}
SSVAL(outbuf,smb_uid,sess_vuid);
if (!server_info->guest && !srv_signing_started()) {
/* We need to start the signing engine
* here but a W2K client sends the old
* "BSRSPYL " signature instead of the
* correct one. Subsequent packets will
* be correct.
*/
srv_check_sign_mac(inbuf, False);
}
}
}
response = spnego_gen_auth_response(ntlmssp_blob, nt_status, OID_NTLMSSP);
ret = reply_sesssetup_blob(conn, outbuf, response, nt_status);
data_blob_free(&response);
/* NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED from our NTLMSSP code tells us,
and the other end, that we are not finished yet. */
if (!ret || !NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED)) {
auth_ntlmssp_end(auth_ntlmssp_state);
}
return ret;
}
int reply_sesssetup_and_X(connection_struct *conn, char *inbuf,char *outbuf,
int length,int bufsize)
{
int sess_vuid;
int smb_bufsize;
DATA_BLOB lm_resp;
DATA_BLOB nt_resp;
DATA_BLOB plaintext_password;
fstring user;
fstring sub_user; /* Sainitised username for substituion */
fstring domain;
fstring native_os;
fstring native_lanman;
fstring primary_domain;
static BOOL done_sesssetup = False;
extern BOOL global_encrypted_passwords_negotiated;
extern BOOL global_spnego_negotiated;
extern enum protocol_types Protocol;
extern int max_send;
auth_usersupplied_info *user_info = NULL;
extern struct auth_context *negprot_global_auth_context;
auth_serversupplied_info *server_info = NULL;
NTSTATUS nt_status;
BOOL doencrypt = global_encrypted_passwords_negotiated;
DATA_BLOB session_key;
START_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
ZERO_STRUCT(lm_resp);
ZERO_STRUCT(nt_resp);
ZERO_STRUCT(plaintext_password);
DEBUG(3,("wct=%d flg2=0x%x\n", CVAL(inbuf, smb_wct), SVAL(inbuf, smb_flg2)));
/* a SPNEGO session setup has 12 command words, whereas a normal
NT1 session setup has 13. See the cifs spec. */
if (CVAL(inbuf, smb_wct) == 12 &&
(SVAL(inbuf, smb_flg2) & FLAGS2_EXTENDED_SECURITY)) {
if (!global_spnego_negotiated) {
DEBUG(0,("reply_sesssetup_and_X: Rejecting attempt at SPNEGO session setup when it was not negoitiated.\n"));
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL);
}
if (SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv4) == 0) {
setup_new_vc_session();
}
return reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego(conn, inbuf, outbuf, length, bufsize);
}
smb_bufsize = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv2);
if (Protocol < PROTOCOL_NT1) {
uint16 passlen1 = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv7);
if ((passlen1 > MAX_PASS_LEN) || (passlen1 > smb_bufrem(inbuf, smb_buf(inbuf)))) {
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
}
if (doencrypt) {
lm_resp = data_blob(smb_buf(inbuf), passlen1);
} else {
plaintext_password = data_blob(smb_buf(inbuf), passlen1+1);
/* Ensure null termination */
plaintext_password.data[passlen1] = 0;
}
srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, user, smb_buf(inbuf)+passlen1, sizeof(user), STR_TERMINATE);
*domain = 0;
} else {
uint16 passlen1 = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv7);
uint16 passlen2 = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv8);
enum remote_arch_types ra_type = get_remote_arch();
char *p = smb_buf(inbuf);
char *save_p = smb_buf(inbuf);
uint16 byte_count;
if(global_client_caps == 0) {
global_client_caps = IVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv11);
if (!(global_client_caps & CAP_STATUS32)) {
remove_from_common_flags2(FLAGS2_32_BIT_ERROR_CODES);
}
/* client_caps is used as final determination if client is NT or Win95.
This is needed to return the correct error codes in some
circumstances.
*/
if(ra_type == RA_WINNT || ra_type == RA_WIN2K || ra_type == RA_WIN95) {
if(!(global_client_caps & (CAP_NT_SMBS | CAP_STATUS32))) {
set_remote_arch( RA_WIN95);
}
}
}
if (!doencrypt) {
/* both Win95 and WinNT stuff up the password lengths for
non-encrypting systems. Uggh.
if passlen1==24 its a win95 system, and its setting the
password length incorrectly. Luckily it still works with the
default code because Win95 will null terminate the password
anyway
if passlen1>0 and passlen2>0 then maybe its a NT box and its
setting passlen2 to some random value which really stuffs
things up. we need to fix that one. */
if (passlen1 > 0 && passlen2 > 0 && passlen2 != 24 && passlen2 != 1)
passlen2 = 0;
}
/* check for nasty tricks */
if (passlen1 > MAX_PASS_LEN || passlen1 > smb_bufrem(inbuf, p)) {
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
}
if (passlen2 > MAX_PASS_LEN || passlen2 > smb_bufrem(inbuf, p+passlen1)) {
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
}
/* Save the lanman2 password and the NT md4 password. */
if ((doencrypt) && (passlen1 != 0) && (passlen1 != 24)) {
doencrypt = False;
}
if (doencrypt) {
lm_resp = data_blob(p, passlen1);
nt_resp = data_blob(p+passlen1, passlen2);
} else {
pstring pass;
BOOL unic=SVAL(inbuf, smb_flg2) & FLAGS2_UNICODE_STRINGS;
#if 0
/* This was the previous fix. Not sure if it's still valid. JRA. */
if ((ra_type == RA_WINNT) && (passlen2 == 0) && unic && passlen1) {
/* NT4.0 stuffs up plaintext unicode password lengths... */
srvstr_pull(inbuf, pass, smb_buf(inbuf) + 1,
sizeof(pass), passlen1, STR_TERMINATE);
#endif
if (unic && (passlen2 == 0) && passlen1) {
/* Only a ascii plaintext password was sent. */
srvstr_pull(inbuf, pass, smb_buf(inbuf), sizeof(pass),
passlen1, STR_TERMINATE|STR_ASCII);
} else {
srvstr_pull(inbuf, pass, smb_buf(inbuf),
sizeof(pass), unic ? passlen2 : passlen1,
STR_TERMINATE);
}
plaintext_password = data_blob(pass, strlen(pass)+1);
}
p += passlen1 + passlen2;
p += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, user, p, sizeof(user), STR_TERMINATE);
p += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, domain, p, sizeof(domain), STR_TERMINATE);
p += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, native_os, p, sizeof(native_os), STR_TERMINATE);
p += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, native_lanman, p, sizeof(native_lanman), STR_TERMINATE);
/* not documented or decoded by Ethereal but there is one more string
in the extra bytes which is the same as the PrimaryDomain when using
extended security. Windows NT 4 and 2003 use this string to store
the native lanman string. Windows 9x does not include a string here
at all so we have to check if we have any extra bytes left */
byte_count = SVAL(inbuf, smb_vwv13);
if ( PTR_DIFF(p, save_p) < byte_count)
p += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, primary_domain, p, sizeof(primary_domain), STR_TERMINATE);
else
fstrcpy( primary_domain, "null" );
DEBUG(3,("Domain=[%s] NativeOS=[%s] NativeLanMan=[%s] PrimaryDomain=[%s]\n",
domain, native_os, native_lanman, primary_domain));
if ( ra_type == RA_WIN2K ) {
if ( strlen(native_lanman) == 0 )
ra_lanman_string( primary_domain );
else
ra_lanman_string( native_lanman );
}
}
if (SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv4) == 0) {
setup_new_vc_session();
}
DEBUG(3,("sesssetupX:name=[%s]\\[%s]@[%s]\n", domain, user, get_remote_machine_name()));
if (*user) {
if (global_spnego_negotiated) {
/* This has to be here, because this is a perfectly valid behaviour for guest logons :-( */
DEBUG(0,("reply_sesssetup_and_X: Rejecting attempt at 'normal' session setup after negotiating spnego.\n"));
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL);
}
fstrcpy(sub_user, user);
/* setup the string used by %U */
sub_set_smb_name(user);
} else {
fstrcpy(sub_user, lp_guestaccount());
}
sub_set_smb_name(sub_user);
reload_services(True);
if (lp_security() == SEC_SHARE) {
/* in share level we should ignore any passwords */
data_blob_free(&lm_resp);
data_blob_free(&nt_resp);
data_blob_clear_free(&plaintext_password);
map_username(sub_user);
add_session_user(sub_user);
/* Then force it to null for the benfit of the code below */
*user = 0;
}
if (!*user) {
nt_status = check_guest_password(&server_info);
} else if (doencrypt) {
if (!negprot_global_auth_context) {
DEBUG(0, ("reply_sesssetup_and_X: Attempted encrypted session setup without negprot denied!\n"));
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
}
nt_status = make_user_info_for_reply_enc(&user_info, user, domain,
lm_resp, nt_resp);
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
nt_status = negprot_global_auth_context->check_ntlm_password(negprot_global_auth_context,
user_info,
&server_info);
}
} else {
struct auth_context *plaintext_auth_context = NULL;
const uint8 *chal;
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status = make_auth_context_subsystem(&plaintext_auth_context))) {
chal = plaintext_auth_context->get_ntlm_challenge(plaintext_auth_context);
if (!make_user_info_for_reply(&user_info,
user, domain, chal,
plaintext_password)) {
nt_status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
nt_status = plaintext_auth_context->check_ntlm_password(plaintext_auth_context,
user_info,
&server_info);
(plaintext_auth_context->free)(&plaintext_auth_context);
}
}
}
free_user_info(&user_info);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
nt_status = do_map_to_guest(nt_status, &server_info, user, domain);
}
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
data_blob_free(&nt_resp);
data_blob_free(&lm_resp);
data_blob_clear_free(&plaintext_password);
return ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(nt_status));
}
if (server_info->user_session_key.data) {
session_key = data_blob(server_info->user_session_key.data, server_info->user_session_key.length);
} else {
session_key = data_blob(NULL, 0);
}
data_blob_clear_free(&plaintext_password);
/* it's ok - setup a reply */
set_message(outbuf,3,0,True);
if (Protocol >= PROTOCOL_NT1) {
char *p = smb_buf( outbuf );
p += add_signature( outbuf, p );
set_message_end( outbuf, p );
/* perhaps grab OS version here?? */
}
if (server_info->guest) {
SSVAL(outbuf,smb_vwv2,1);
}
/* register the name and uid as being validated, so further connections
to a uid can get through without a password, on the same VC */
/* register_vuid keeps the server info */
sess_vuid = register_vuid(server_info, session_key, nt_resp.data ? nt_resp : lm_resp, sub_user);
data_blob_free(&nt_resp);
data_blob_free(&lm_resp);
if (sess_vuid == -1) {
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
}
/* current_user_info is changed on new vuid */
reload_services( True );
if (!server_info->guest && !srv_signing_started() && !srv_check_sign_mac(inbuf, True)) {
exit_server("reply_sesssetup_and_X: bad smb signature");
}
SSVAL(outbuf,smb_uid,sess_vuid);
SSVAL(inbuf,smb_uid,sess_vuid);
if (!done_sesssetup)
max_send = MIN(max_send,smb_bufsize);
done_sesssetup = True;
END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
return chain_reply(inbuf,outbuf,length,bufsize);
}
/****************************************************************************
reply to a session setup spnego negotiate packet for kerberos
****************************************************************************/
static int reply_spnego_kerberos(connection_struct *conn,
char *inbuf, char *outbuf,
int length, int bufsize,
DATA_BLOB *secblob)
{
DATA_BLOB ticket;
char *client, *p, *domain;
fstring netbios_domain_name;
struct passwd *pw;
char *user;
int sess_vuid;
NTSTATUS ret;
DATA_BLOB auth_data;
DATA_BLOB ap_rep, ap_rep_wrapped, response;
auth_serversupplied_info *server_info = NULL;
DATA_BLOB session_key = data_blob(NULL, 0);
uint8 tok_id[2];
DATA_BLOB nullblob = data_blob(NULL, 0);
fstring real_username;
ZERO_STRUCT(ticket);
ZERO_STRUCT(auth_data);
ZERO_STRUCT(ap_rep);
ZERO_STRUCT(ap_rep_wrapped);
ZERO_STRUCT(response);
if (!spnego_parse_krb5_wrap(*secblob, &ticket, tok_id)) {
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
}
ret = ads_verify_ticket(lp_realm(), &ticket, &client, &auth_data, &ap_rep, &session_key);
data_blob_free(&ticket);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
DEBUG(1,("Failed to verify incoming ticket!\n"));
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
}
data_blob_free(&auth_data);
DEBUG(3,("Ticket name is [%s]\n", client));
p = strchr_m(client, '@');
if (!p) {
DEBUG(3,("Doesn't look like a valid principal\n"));
data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
data_blob_free(&session_key);
SAFE_FREE(client);
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
}
*p = 0;
if (!strequal(p+1, lp_realm())) {
DEBUG(3,("Ticket for foreign realm %s@%s\n", client, p+1));
if (!lp_allow_trusted_domains()) {
data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
data_blob_free(&session_key);
SAFE_FREE(client);
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
}
}
/* this gives a fully qualified user name (ie. with full realm).
that leads to very long usernames, but what else can we do? */
domain = p+1;
{
/* If we have winbind running, we can (and must) shorten the
username by using the short netbios name. Otherwise we will
have inconsistent user names. With Kerberos, we get the
fully qualified realm, with ntlmssp we get the short
name. And even w2k3 does use ntlmssp if you for example
connect to an ip address. */
struct winbindd_request wb_request;
struct winbindd_response wb_response;
NSS_STATUS wb_result;
ZERO_STRUCT(wb_request);
ZERO_STRUCT(wb_response);
DEBUG(10, ("Mapping [%s] to short name\n", domain));
fstrcpy(wb_request.domain_name, domain);
wb_result = winbindd_request(WINBINDD_DOMAIN_INFO,
&wb_request, &wb_response);
if (wb_result == NSS_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
fstrcpy(netbios_domain_name,
wb_response.data.domain_info.name);
domain = netbios_domain_name;
DEBUG(10, ("Mapped to [%s]\n", domain));
} else {
DEBUG(3, ("Could not find short name -- winbind "
"not running?\n"));
}
}
asprintf(&user, "%s%c%s", domain, *lp_winbind_separator(), client);
/* lookup the passwd struct, create a new user if necessary */
map_username( user );
pw = smb_getpwnam( user, real_username, True );
if (!pw) {
DEBUG(1,("Username %s is invalid on this system\n",user));
SAFE_FREE(user);
SAFE_FREE(client);
data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
data_blob_free(&session_key);
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
}
/* setup the string used by %U */
sub_set_smb_name( real_username );
reload_services(True);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret = make_server_info_pw(&server_info, real_username, pw)))
{
DEBUG(1,("make_server_info_from_pw failed!\n"));
SAFE_FREE(user);
SAFE_FREE(client);
data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
data_blob_free(&session_key);
return ERROR_NT(ret);
}
/* make_server_info_pw does not set the domain. Without this we end up
* with the local netbios name in substitutions for %D. */
if (server_info->sam_account != NULL) {
pdb_set_domain(server_info->sam_account, domain, PDB_SET);
}
/* register_vuid keeps the server info */
/* register_vuid takes ownership of session_key, no need to free after this.
A better interface would copy it.... */
sess_vuid = register_vuid(server_info, session_key, nullblob, client);
SAFE_FREE(user);
SAFE_FREE(client);
if (sess_vuid == -1) {
ret = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
} else {
/* current_user_info is changed on new vuid */
reload_services( True );
set_message(outbuf,4,0,True);
SSVAL(outbuf, smb_vwv3, 0);
if (server_info->guest) {
SSVAL(outbuf,smb_vwv2,1);
}
SSVAL(outbuf, smb_uid, sess_vuid);
if (!server_info->guest && !srv_signing_started()) {
/* We need to start the signing engine
* here but a W2K client sends the old
* "BSRSPYL " signature instead of the
* correct one. Subsequent packets will
* be correct.
*/
srv_check_sign_mac(inbuf, False);
}
}
/* wrap that up in a nice GSS-API wrapping */
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
ap_rep_wrapped = spnego_gen_krb5_wrap(ap_rep, TOK_ID_KRB_AP_REP);
} else {
ap_rep_wrapped = data_blob(NULL, 0);
}
response = spnego_gen_auth_response(&ap_rep_wrapped, ret, OID_KERBEROS5_OLD);
reply_sesssetup_blob(conn, outbuf, response, ret);
data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
data_blob_free(&ap_rep_wrapped);
data_blob_free(&response);
return -1; /* already replied */
}