/** Read a tagged-data file from <b>fname</b> into the
* <b>data_out_len</b>-byte buffer in <b>data_out</b>. Check that the
* typestring matches <b>typestring</b>; store the tag into a newly allocated
* string in <b>tag_out</b>. Return -1 on failure, and the number of bytes of
* data on success. Preserves the errno from reading the file. */
ssize_t
crypto_read_tagged_contents_from_file(const char *fname,
const char *typestring,
char **tag_out,
uint8_t *data_out,
ssize_t data_out_len)
{
char prefix[33];
char *content = NULL;
struct stat st;
ssize_t r = -1;
size_t st_size = 0;
int saved_errno = 0;
*tag_out = NULL;
st.st_size = 0;
content = read_file_to_str(fname, RFTS_BIN|RFTS_IGNORE_MISSING, &st);
if (! content) {
saved_errno = errno;
goto end;
}
if (st.st_size < 32 || st.st_size > 32 + data_out_len) {
saved_errno = EINVAL;
goto end;
}
st_size = (size_t)st.st_size;
memcpy(prefix, content, 32);
prefix[32] = 0;
/* Check type, extract tag. */
if (strcmpstart(prefix, "== ") || strcmpend(prefix, " ==") ||
! tor_mem_is_zero(prefix+strlen(prefix), 32-strlen(prefix))) {
saved_errno = EINVAL;
goto end;
}
if (strcmpstart(prefix+3, typestring) ||
3+strlen(typestring) >= 32 ||
strcmpstart(prefix+3+strlen(typestring), ": ")) {
saved_errno = EINVAL;
goto end;
}
*tag_out = tor_strndup(prefix+5+strlen(typestring),
strlen(prefix)-8-strlen(typestring));
memcpy(data_out, content+32, st_size-32);
r = st_size - 32;
end:
if (content)
memwipe(content, 0, st_size);
tor_free(content);
if (saved_errno)
errno = saved_errno;
return r;
}
static void
test_sigsafe_err(void *arg)
{
const char *fn=get_fname("sigsafe_err_log");
char *content=NULL;
log_severity_list_t include_bug;
smartlist_t *lines = smartlist_new();
(void)arg;
set_log_severity_config(LOG_WARN, LOG_ERR, &include_bug);
init_logging(1);
mark_logs_temp();
add_file_log(&include_bug, fn, 0);
tor_log_update_sigsafe_err_fds();
close_temp_logs();
close(STDERR_FILENO);
log_err(LD_BUG, "Say, this isn't too cool.");
tor_log_err_sigsafe("Minimal.\n", NULL);
set_log_time_granularity(100*1000);
tor_log_err_sigsafe("Testing any ",
"attempt to manually log ",
"from a signal.\n",
NULL);
mark_logs_temp();
close_temp_logs();
close(STDERR_FILENO);
content = read_file_to_str(fn, 0, NULL);
tt_assert(content != NULL);
tor_split_lines(lines, content, (int)strlen(content));
tt_int_op(smartlist_len(lines), OP_GE, 5);
if (strstr(smartlist_get(lines, 0), "opening new log file"))
smartlist_del_keeporder(lines, 0);
tt_assert(strstr(smartlist_get(lines, 0), "Say, this isn't too cool"));
/* Next line is blank. */
tt_assert(!strcmpstart(smartlist_get(lines, 1), "=============="));
tt_assert(!strcmpstart(smartlist_get(lines, 2), "Minimal."));
/* Next line is blank. */
tt_assert(!strcmpstart(smartlist_get(lines, 3), "=============="));
tt_str_op(smartlist_get(lines, 4), OP_EQ,
"Testing any attempt to manually log from a signal.");
done:
tor_free(content);
smartlist_free(lines);
}
/** Run unit tests for our random number generation function and its wrappers.
*/
static void
test_crypto_rng(void *arg)
{
int i, j, allok;
char data1[100], data2[100];
double d;
char *h=NULL;
/* Try out RNG. */
(void)arg;
tt_assert(! crypto_seed_rng());
crypto_rand(data1, 100);
crypto_rand(data2, 100);
tt_mem_op(data1,OP_NE, data2,100);
allok = 1;
for (i = 0; i < 100; ++i) {
uint64_t big;
char *host;
j = crypto_rand_int(100);
if (j < 0 || j >= 100)
allok = 0;
big = crypto_rand_uint64(UINT64_C(1)<<40);
if (big >= (UINT64_C(1)<<40))
allok = 0;
big = crypto_rand_uint64(UINT64_C(5));
if (big >= 5)
allok = 0;
d = crypto_rand_double();
tt_assert(d >= 0);
tt_assert(d < 1.0);
host = crypto_random_hostname(3,8,"www.",".onion");
if (strcmpstart(host,"www.") ||
strcmpend(host,".onion") ||
strlen(host) < 13 ||
strlen(host) > 18)
allok = 0;
tor_free(host);
}
/* Make sure crypto_random_hostname clips its inputs properly. */
h = crypto_random_hostname(20000, 9000, "www.", ".onion");
tt_assert(! strcmpstart(h,"www."));
tt_assert(! strcmpend(h,".onion"));
tt_int_op(63+4+6, OP_EQ, strlen(h));
tt_assert(allok);
done:
tor_free(h);
}
/** Return true iff we support gzip-based compression. Otherwise, we need to
* use zlib. */
int
is_gzip_supported(void)
{
if (gzip_is_supported >= 0)
return gzip_is_supported;
if (!strcmpstart(ZLIB_VERSION, "0.") ||
!strcmpstart(ZLIB_VERSION, "1.0") ||
!strcmpstart(ZLIB_VERSION, "1.1"))
gzip_is_supported = 0;
else
gzip_is_supported = 1;
return gzip_is_supported;
}
/** Decode the hashed, base64'd passwords stored in <b>passwords</b>.
* Return a smartlist of acceptable passwords (unterminated strings of
* length S2K_RFC2440_SPECIFIER_LEN+DIGEST_LEN) on success, or NULL on
* failure.
*/
smartlist_t *
decode_hashed_passwords(config_line_t *passwords)
{
char decoded[64];
config_line_t *cl;
smartlist_t *sl = smartlist_new();
tor_assert(passwords);
for (cl = passwords; cl; cl = cl->next) {
const char *hashed = cl->value;
if (!strcmpstart(hashed, "16:")) {
if (base16_decode(decoded, sizeof(decoded), hashed+3, strlen(hashed+3))
!= S2K_RFC2440_SPECIFIER_LEN + DIGEST_LEN
|| strlen(hashed+3) != (S2K_RFC2440_SPECIFIER_LEN+DIGEST_LEN)*2) {
goto err;
}
} else {
if (base64_decode(decoded, sizeof(decoded), hashed, strlen(hashed))
!= S2K_RFC2440_SPECIFIER_LEN+DIGEST_LEN) {
goto err;
}
}
smartlist_add(sl,
tor_memdup(decoded, S2K_RFC2440_SPECIFIER_LEN+DIGEST_LEN));
}
return sl;
err:
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl, char*, cp, tor_free(cp));
smartlist_free(sl);
return NULL;
}
/** Run unit tests for our random number generation function and its wrappers.
*/
static void
test_crypto_rng(void)
{
int i, j, allok;
char data1[100], data2[100];
double d;
/* Try out RNG. */
test_assert(! crypto_seed_rng(0));
crypto_rand(data1, 100);
crypto_rand(data2, 100);
test_memneq(data1,data2,100);
allok = 1;
for (i = 0; i < 100; ++i) {
uint64_t big;
char *host;
j = crypto_rand_int(100);
if (j < 0 || j >= 100)
allok = 0;
big = crypto_rand_uint64(U64_LITERAL(1)<<40);
if (big >= (U64_LITERAL(1)<<40))
allok = 0;
big = crypto_rand_uint64(U64_LITERAL(5));
if (big >= 5)
allok = 0;
d = crypto_rand_double();
test_assert(d >= 0);
test_assert(d < 1.0);
host = crypto_random_hostname(3,8,"www.",".onion");
if (strcmpstart(host,"www.") ||
strcmpend(host,".onion") ||
strlen(host) < 13 ||
strlen(host) > 18)
allok = 0;
tor_free(host);
}
test_assert(allok);
done:
;
}
/** Return string containing the address:port part of the
* TransportProxy <b>line</b> for transport <b>transport</b>.
* If the line is corrupted, return NULL. */
static const char *
get_transport_bindaddr(const char *line, const char *transport)
{
char *line_tmp = NULL;
if (strlen(line) < strlen(transport) + 2) {
goto broken_state;
} else {
/* line should start with the name of the transport and a space.
(for example, "obfs2 127.0.0.1:47245") */
tor_asprintf(&line_tmp, "%s ", transport);
if (strcmpstart(line, line_tmp))
goto broken_state;
tor_free(line_tmp);
return (line+strlen(transport)+1);
}
broken_state:
tor_free(line_tmp);
return NULL;
}
static void
test_md_cache(void *data)
{
or_options_t *options = NULL;
microdesc_cache_t *mc = NULL ;
smartlist_t *added = NULL, *wanted = NULL;
microdesc_t *md1, *md2, *md3;
char d1[DIGEST256_LEN], d2[DIGEST256_LEN], d3[DIGEST256_LEN];
const char *test_md3_noannotation = strchr(test_md3, '\n')+1;
time_t time1, time2, time3;
char *fn = NULL, *s = NULL;
(void)data;
options = get_options_mutable();
tt_assert(options);
time1 = time(NULL);
time2 = time(NULL) - 2*24*60*60;
time3 = time(NULL) - 15*24*60*60;
/* Possibly, turn this into a test setup/cleanup pair */
tor_free(options->DataDirectory);
options->DataDirectory = tor_strdup(get_fname("md_datadir_test"));
#ifdef _WIN32
tt_int_op(0, ==, mkdir(options->DataDirectory));
#else
tt_int_op(0, ==, mkdir(options->DataDirectory, 0700));
#endif
tt_assert(!strcmpstart(test_md3_noannotation, "onion-key"));
crypto_digest256(d1, test_md1, strlen(test_md1), DIGEST_SHA256);
crypto_digest256(d2, test_md2, strlen(test_md1), DIGEST_SHA256);
crypto_digest256(d3, test_md3_noannotation, strlen(test_md3_noannotation),
DIGEST_SHA256);
mc = get_microdesc_cache();
added = microdescs_add_to_cache(mc, test_md1, NULL, SAVED_NOWHERE, 0,
time1, NULL);
tt_int_op(1, ==, smartlist_len(added));
md1 = smartlist_get(added, 0);
smartlist_free(added);
added = NULL;
wanted = smartlist_new();
added = microdescs_add_to_cache(mc, test_md2, NULL, SAVED_NOWHERE, 0,
time2, wanted);
/* Should fail, since we didn't list test_md2's digest in wanted */
tt_int_op(0, ==, smartlist_len(added));
smartlist_free(added);
added = NULL;
smartlist_add(wanted, tor_memdup(d2, DIGEST256_LEN));
smartlist_add(wanted, tor_memdup(d3, DIGEST256_LEN));
added = microdescs_add_to_cache(mc, test_md2, NULL, SAVED_NOWHERE, 0,
time2, wanted);
/* Now it can work. md2 should have been added */
tt_int_op(1, ==, smartlist_len(added));
md2 = smartlist_get(added, 0);
/* And it should have gotten removed from 'wanted' */
tt_int_op(smartlist_len(wanted), ==, 1);
test_mem_op(smartlist_get(wanted, 0), ==, d3, DIGEST256_LEN);
smartlist_free(added);
added = NULL;
added = microdescs_add_to_cache(mc, test_md3, NULL,
SAVED_NOWHERE, 0, -1, NULL);
/* Must fail, since SAVED_NOWHERE precludes annotations */
tt_int_op(0, ==, smartlist_len(added));
smartlist_free(added);
added = NULL;
added = microdescs_add_to_cache(mc, test_md3_noannotation, NULL,
SAVED_NOWHERE, 0, time3, NULL);
/* Now it can work */
tt_int_op(1, ==, smartlist_len(added));
md3 = smartlist_get(added, 0);
smartlist_free(added);
added = NULL;
/* Okay. We added 1...3. Let's poke them to see how they look, and make
* sure they're really in the journal. */
tt_ptr_op(md1, ==, microdesc_cache_lookup_by_digest256(mc, d1));
tt_ptr_op(md2, ==, microdesc_cache_lookup_by_digest256(mc, d2));
tt_ptr_op(md3, ==, microdesc_cache_lookup_by_digest256(mc, d3));
tt_int_op(md1->last_listed, ==, time1);
tt_int_op(md2->last_listed, ==, time2);
tt_int_op(md3->last_listed, ==, time3);
tt_int_op(md1->saved_location, ==, SAVED_IN_JOURNAL);
tt_int_op(md2->saved_location, ==, SAVED_IN_JOURNAL);
tt_int_op(md3->saved_location, ==, SAVED_IN_JOURNAL);
tt_int_op(md1->bodylen, ==, strlen(test_md1));
tt_int_op(md2->bodylen, ==, strlen(test_md2));
tt_int_op(md3->bodylen, ==, strlen(test_md3_noannotation));
test_mem_op(md1->body, ==, test_md1, strlen(test_md1));
test_mem_op(md2->body, ==, test_md2, strlen(test_md2));
test_mem_op(md3->body, ==, test_md3_noannotation,
strlen(test_md3_noannotation));
tor_asprintf(&fn, "%s"PATH_SEPARATOR"cached-microdescs.new",
options->DataDirectory);
s = read_file_to_str(fn, RFTS_BIN, NULL);
tt_assert(s);
test_mem_op(md1->body, ==, s + md1->off, md1->bodylen);
test_mem_op(md2->body, ==, s + md2->off, md2->bodylen);
test_mem_op(md3->body, ==, s + md3->off, md3->bodylen);
tt_ptr_op(md1->family, ==, NULL);
tt_ptr_op(md3->family, !=, NULL);
tt_int_op(smartlist_len(md3->family), ==, 3);
tt_str_op(smartlist_get(md3->family, 0), ==, "nodeX");
/* Now rebuild the cache! */
tt_int_op(microdesc_cache_rebuild(mc, 1), ==, 0);
tt_int_op(md1->saved_location, ==, SAVED_IN_CACHE);
tt_int_op(md2->saved_location, ==, SAVED_IN_CACHE);
tt_int_op(md3->saved_location, ==, SAVED_IN_CACHE);
/* The journal should be empty now */
tor_free(s);
s = read_file_to_str(fn, RFTS_BIN, NULL);
tt_str_op(s, ==, "");
tor_free(s);
tor_free(fn);
/* read the cache. */
tor_asprintf(&fn, "%s"PATH_SEPARATOR"cached-microdescs",
options->DataDirectory);
s = read_file_to_str(fn, RFTS_BIN, NULL);
test_mem_op(md1->body, ==, s + md1->off, strlen(test_md1));
test_mem_op(md2->body, ==, s + md2->off, strlen(test_md2));
test_mem_op(md3->body, ==, s + md3->off, strlen(test_md3_noannotation));
/* Okay, now we are going to forget about the cache entirely, and reload it
* from the disk. */
microdesc_free_all();
mc = get_microdesc_cache();
md1 = microdesc_cache_lookup_by_digest256(mc, d1);
md2 = microdesc_cache_lookup_by_digest256(mc, d2);
md3 = microdesc_cache_lookup_by_digest256(mc, d3);
test_assert(md1);
test_assert(md2);
test_assert(md3);
test_mem_op(md1->body, ==, s + md1->off, strlen(test_md1));
test_mem_op(md2->body, ==, s + md2->off, strlen(test_md2));
test_mem_op(md3->body, ==, s + md3->off, strlen(test_md3_noannotation));
tt_int_op(md1->last_listed, ==, time1);
tt_int_op(md2->last_listed, ==, time2);
tt_int_op(md3->last_listed, ==, time3);
/* Okay, now we are going to clear out everything older than a week old.
* In practice, that means md3 */
microdesc_cache_clean(mc, time(NULL)-7*24*60*60, 1/*force*/);
tt_ptr_op(md1, ==, microdesc_cache_lookup_by_digest256(mc, d1));
tt_ptr_op(md2, ==, microdesc_cache_lookup_by_digest256(mc, d2));
tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, microdesc_cache_lookup_by_digest256(mc, d3));
md3 = NULL; /* it's history now! */
/* rebuild again, make sure it stays gone. */
microdesc_cache_rebuild(mc, 1);
tt_ptr_op(md1, ==, microdesc_cache_lookup_by_digest256(mc, d1));
tt_ptr_op(md2, ==, microdesc_cache_lookup_by_digest256(mc, d2));
tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, microdesc_cache_lookup_by_digest256(mc, d3));
done:
if (options)
tor_free(options->DataDirectory);
microdesc_free_all();
smartlist_free(added);
if (wanted)
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(wanted, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
smartlist_free(wanted);
tor_free(s);
tor_free(fn);
}
/** Helper function: read the next token from *s, advance *s to the end of the
* token, and return the parsed token. Parse *<b>s</b> according to the list
* of tokens in <b>table</b>.
*/
directory_token_t *
get_next_token(memarea_t *area,
const char **s, const char *eos, token_rule_t *table)
{
/** Reject any object at least this big; it is probably an overflow, an
* attack, a bug, or some other nonsense. */
#define MAX_UNPARSED_OBJECT_SIZE (128*1024)
/** Reject any line at least this big; it is probably an overflow, an
* attack, a bug, or some other nonsense. */
#define MAX_LINE_LENGTH (128*1024)
const char *next, *eol, *obstart;
size_t obname_len;
int i;
directory_token_t *tok;
obj_syntax o_syn = NO_OBJ;
char ebuf[128];
const char *kwd = "";
tor_assert(area);
tok = ALLOC_ZERO(sizeof(directory_token_t));
tok->tp = ERR_;
/* Set *s to first token, eol to end-of-line, next to after first token */
*s = eat_whitespace_eos(*s, eos); /* eat multi-line whitespace */
tor_assert(eos >= *s);
eol = memchr(*s, '\n', eos-*s);
if (!eol)
eol = eos;
if (eol - *s > MAX_LINE_LENGTH) {
RET_ERR("Line far too long");
}
next = find_whitespace_eos(*s, eol);
if (!strcmp_len(*s, "opt", next-*s)) {
/* Skip past an "opt" at the start of the line. */
*s = eat_whitespace_eos_no_nl(next, eol);
next = find_whitespace_eos(*s, eol);
} else if (*s == eos) { /* If no "opt", and end-of-line, line is invalid */
RET_ERR("Unexpected EOF");
}
/* Search the table for the appropriate entry. (I tried a binary search
* instead, but it wasn't any faster.) */
for (i = 0; table[i].t ; ++i) {
if (!strcmp_len(*s, table[i].t, next-*s)) {
/* We've found the keyword. */
kwd = table[i].t;
tok->tp = table[i].v;
o_syn = table[i].os;
*s = eat_whitespace_eos_no_nl(next, eol);
/* We go ahead whether there are arguments or not, so that tok->args is
* always set if we want arguments. */
if (table[i].concat_args) {
/* The keyword takes the line as a single argument */
tok->args = ALLOC(sizeof(char*));
tok->args[0] = STRNDUP(*s,eol-*s); /* Grab everything on line */
tok->n_args = 1;
} else {
/* This keyword takes multiple arguments. */
if (get_token_arguments(area, tok, *s, eol)<0) {
tor_snprintf(ebuf, sizeof(ebuf),"Far too many arguments to %s", kwd);
RET_ERR(ebuf);
}
*s = eol;
}
if (tok->n_args < table[i].min_args) {
tor_snprintf(ebuf, sizeof(ebuf), "Too few arguments to %s", kwd);
RET_ERR(ebuf);
} else if (tok->n_args > table[i].max_args) {
tor_snprintf(ebuf, sizeof(ebuf), "Too many arguments to %s", kwd);
RET_ERR(ebuf);
}
break;
}
}
if (tok->tp == ERR_) {
/* No keyword matched; call it an "K_opt" or "A_unrecognized" */
if (**s == '@')
tok->tp = A_UNKNOWN_;
else
tok->tp = K_OPT;
tok->args = ALLOC(sizeof(char*));
tok->args[0] = STRNDUP(*s, eol-*s);
tok->n_args = 1;
o_syn = OBJ_OK;
}
/* Check whether there's an object present */
*s = eat_whitespace_eos(eol, eos); /* Scan from end of first line */
tor_assert(eos >= *s);
eol = memchr(*s, '\n', eos-*s);
if (!eol || eol-*s<11 || strcmpstart(*s, "-----BEGIN ")) /* No object. */
goto check_object;
obstart = *s; /* Set obstart to start of object spec */
if (*s+16 >= eol || memchr(*s+11,'\0',eol-*s-16) || /* no short lines, */
strcmp_len(eol-5, "-----", 5) || /* nuls or invalid endings */
(eol-*s) > MAX_UNPARSED_OBJECT_SIZE) { /* name too long */
RET_ERR("Malformed object: bad begin line");
}
tok->object_type = STRNDUP(*s+11, eol-*s-16);
obname_len = eol-*s-16; /* store objname length here to avoid a strlen() */
*s = eol+1; /* Set *s to possible start of object data (could be eos) */
/* Go to the end of the object */
next = tor_memstr(*s, eos-*s, "-----END ");
if (!next) {
RET_ERR("Malformed object: missing object end line");
}
tor_assert(eos >= next);
eol = memchr(next, '\n', eos-next);
if (!eol) /* end-of-line marker, or eos if there's no '\n' */
eol = eos;
/* Validate the ending tag, which should be 9 + NAME + 5 + eol */
if ((size_t)(eol-next) != 9+obname_len+5 ||
strcmp_len(next+9, tok->object_type, obname_len) ||
strcmp_len(eol-5, "-----", 5)) {
tor_snprintf(ebuf, sizeof(ebuf), "Malformed object: mismatched end tag %s",
tok->object_type);
ebuf[sizeof(ebuf)-1] = '\0';
RET_ERR(ebuf);
}
if (next - *s > MAX_UNPARSED_OBJECT_SIZE)
RET_ERR("Couldn't parse object: missing footer or object much too big.");
if (!strcmp(tok->object_type, "RSA PUBLIC KEY")) { /* If it's a public key */
tok->key = crypto_pk_new();
if (crypto_pk_read_public_key_from_string(tok->key, obstart, eol-obstart))
RET_ERR("Couldn't parse public key.");
} else if (!strcmp(tok->object_type, "RSA PRIVATE KEY")) { /* private key */
tok->key = crypto_pk_new();
if (crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(tok->key, obstart, eol-obstart))
RET_ERR("Couldn't parse private key.");
} else { /* If it's something else, try to base64-decode it */
int r;
tok->object_body = ALLOC(next-*s); /* really, this is too much RAM. */
r = base64_decode(tok->object_body, next-*s, *s, next-*s);
if (r<0)
RET_ERR("Malformed object: bad base64-encoded data");
tok->object_size = r;
}
*s = eol;
check_object:
tok = token_check_object(area, kwd, tok, o_syn);
done_tokenizing:
return tok;
#undef RET_ERR
#undef ALLOC
#undef ALLOC_ZERO
#undef STRDUP
#undef STRNDUP
}
/** Parse and validate the ASCII-encoded v2 descriptor in <b>desc</b>,
* write the parsed descriptor to the newly allocated *<b>parsed_out</b>, the
* binary descriptor ID of length DIGEST_LEN to <b>desc_id_out</b>, the
* encrypted introduction points to the newly allocated
* *<b>intro_points_encrypted_out</b>, their encrypted size to
* *<b>intro_points_encrypted_size_out</b>, the size of the encoded descriptor
* to *<b>encoded_size_out</b>, and a pointer to the possibly next
* descriptor to *<b>next_out</b>; return 0 for success (including validation)
* and -1 for failure.
*
* If <b>as_hsdir</b> is 1, we're parsing this as an HSDir, and we should
* be strict about time formats.
*/
int
rend_parse_v2_service_descriptor(rend_service_descriptor_t **parsed_out,
char *desc_id_out,
char **intro_points_encrypted_out,
size_t *intro_points_encrypted_size_out,
size_t *encoded_size_out,
const char **next_out, const char *desc,
int as_hsdir)
{
rend_service_descriptor_t *result =
tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_service_descriptor_t));
char desc_hash[DIGEST_LEN];
const char *eos;
smartlist_t *tokens = smartlist_new();
directory_token_t *tok;
char secret_id_part[DIGEST_LEN];
int i, version, num_ok=1;
smartlist_t *versions;
char public_key_hash[DIGEST_LEN];
char test_desc_id[DIGEST_LEN];
memarea_t *area = NULL;
const int strict_time_fmt = as_hsdir;
tor_assert(desc);
/* Check if desc starts correctly. */
if (strcmpstart(desc, "rendezvous-service-descriptor ")) {
log_info(LD_REND, "Descriptor does not start correctly.");
goto err;
}
/* Compute descriptor hash for later validation. */
if (router_get_hash_impl(desc, strlen(desc), desc_hash,
"rendezvous-service-descriptor ",
"\nsignature", '\n', DIGEST_SHA1) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Couldn't compute descriptor hash.");
goto err;
}
/* Determine end of string. */
eos = strstr(desc, "\nrendezvous-service-descriptor ");
if (!eos)
eos = desc + strlen(desc);
else
eos = eos + 1;
/* Check length. */
if (eos-desc > REND_DESC_MAX_SIZE) {
/* XXXX+ If we are parsing this descriptor as a server, this
* should be a protocol warning. */
log_warn(LD_REND, "Descriptor length is %d which exceeds "
"maximum rendezvous descriptor size of %d bytes.",
(int)(eos-desc), REND_DESC_MAX_SIZE);
goto err;
}
/* Tokenize descriptor. */
area = memarea_new();
if (tokenize_string(area, desc, eos, tokens, desc_token_table, 0)) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Error tokenizing descriptor.");
goto err;
}
/* Set next to next descriptor, if available. */
*next_out = eos;
/* Set length of encoded descriptor. */
*encoded_size_out = eos - desc;
/* Check min allowed length of token list. */
if (smartlist_len(tokens) < 7) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Impossibly short descriptor.");
goto err;
}
/* Parse base32-encoded descriptor ID. */
tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, R_RENDEZVOUS_SERVICE_DESCRIPTOR);
tor_assert(tok == smartlist_get(tokens, 0));
tor_assert(tok->n_args == 1);
if (!rend_valid_descriptor_id(tok->args[0])) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Invalid descriptor ID: '%s'", tok->args[0]);
goto err;
}
if (base32_decode(desc_id_out, DIGEST_LEN,
tok->args[0], REND_DESC_ID_V2_LEN_BASE32) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Descriptor ID contains illegal characters: %s",
tok->args[0]);
goto err;
}
/* Parse descriptor version. */
tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, R_VERSION);
tor_assert(tok->n_args == 1);
result->version =
(int) tor_parse_long(tok->args[0], 10, 0, INT_MAX, &num_ok, NULL);
if (result->version != 2 || !num_ok) {
/* If it's <2, it shouldn't be under this format. If the number
* is greater than 2, we bumped it because we broke backward
* compatibility. See how version numbers in our other formats
* work. */
log_warn(LD_REND, "Unrecognized descriptor version: %s",
escaped(tok->args[0]));
goto err;
}
/* Parse public key. */
tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, R_PERMANENT_KEY);
result->pk = tok->key;
tok->key = NULL; /* Prevent free */
/* Parse secret ID part. */
tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, R_SECRET_ID_PART);
tor_assert(tok->n_args == 1);
if (strlen(tok->args[0]) != REND_SECRET_ID_PART_LEN_BASE32 ||
strspn(tok->args[0], BASE32_CHARS) != REND_SECRET_ID_PART_LEN_BASE32) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Invalid secret ID part: '%s'", tok->args[0]);
goto err;
}
if (base32_decode(secret_id_part, DIGEST_LEN, tok->args[0], 32) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Secret ID part contains illegal characters: %s",
tok->args[0]);
goto err;
}
/* Parse publication time -- up-to-date check is done when storing the
* descriptor. */
tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, R_PUBLICATION_TIME);
tor_assert(tok->n_args == 1);
if (parse_iso_time_(tok->args[0], &result->timestamp,
strict_time_fmt, 0) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Invalid publication time: '%s'", tok->args[0]);
goto err;
}
/* Parse protocol versions. */
tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, R_PROTOCOL_VERSIONS);
tor_assert(tok->n_args == 1);
versions = smartlist_new();
smartlist_split_string(versions, tok->args[0], ",",
SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 0);
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(versions); i++) {
version = (int) tor_parse_long(smartlist_get(versions, i),
10, 0, INT_MAX, &num_ok, NULL);
if (!num_ok) /* It's a string; let's ignore it. */
continue;
if (version >= REND_PROTOCOL_VERSION_BITMASK_WIDTH)
/* Avoid undefined left-shift behaviour. */
continue;
result->protocols |= 1 << version;
}
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(versions, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
smartlist_free(versions);
/* Parse encrypted introduction points. Don't verify. */
tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, R_INTRODUCTION_POINTS);
if (tok) {
if (strcmp(tok->object_type, "MESSAGE")) {
log_warn(LD_DIR, "Bad object type: introduction points should be of "
"type MESSAGE");
goto err;
}
*intro_points_encrypted_out = tor_memdup(tok->object_body,
tok->object_size);
*intro_points_encrypted_size_out = tok->object_size;
} else {
*intro_points_encrypted_out = NULL;
*intro_points_encrypted_size_out = 0;
}
/* Parse and verify signature. */
tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, R_SIGNATURE);
if (check_signature_token(desc_hash, DIGEST_LEN, tok, result->pk, 0,
"v2 rendezvous service descriptor") < 0)
goto err;
/* Verify that descriptor ID belongs to public key and secret ID part. */
if (crypto_pk_get_digest(result->pk, public_key_hash) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Unable to compute rend descriptor public key digest");
goto err;
}
rend_get_descriptor_id_bytes(test_desc_id, public_key_hash,
secret_id_part);
if (tor_memneq(desc_id_out, test_desc_id, DIGEST_LEN)) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Parsed descriptor ID does not match "
"computed descriptor ID.");
goto err;
}
goto done;
err:
rend_service_descriptor_free(result);
result = NULL;
done:
if (tokens) {
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(tokens, directory_token_t *, t, token_clear(t));
smartlist_free(tokens);
}
if (area)
memarea_drop_all(area);
*parsed_out = result;
if (result)
return 0;
return -1;
}
/** Parse the content of a client_key file in <b>ckstr</b> and add
* rend_authorized_client_t's for each parsed client to
* <b>parsed_clients</b>. Return the number of parsed clients as result
* or -1 for failure. */
int
rend_parse_client_keys(strmap_t *parsed_clients, const char *ckstr)
{
int result = -1;
smartlist_t *tokens;
directory_token_t *tok;
const char *current_entry = NULL;
memarea_t *area = NULL;
char *err_msg = NULL;
if (!ckstr || strlen(ckstr) == 0)
return -1;
tokens = smartlist_new();
/* Begin parsing with first entry, skipping comments or whitespace at the
* beginning. */
area = memarea_new();
current_entry = eat_whitespace(ckstr);
while (!strcmpstart(current_entry, "client-name ")) {
rend_authorized_client_t *parsed_entry;
/* Determine end of string. */
const char *eos = strstr(current_entry, "\nclient-name ");
if (!eos)
eos = current_entry + strlen(current_entry);
else
eos = eos + 1;
/* Free tokens and clear token list. */
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(tokens, directory_token_t *, t, token_clear(t));
smartlist_clear(tokens);
memarea_clear(area);
/* Tokenize string. */
if (tokenize_string(area, current_entry, eos, tokens,
client_keys_token_table, 0)) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Error tokenizing client keys file.");
goto err;
}
/* Advance to next entry, if available. */
current_entry = eos;
/* Check minimum allowed length of token list. */
if (smartlist_len(tokens) < 2) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Impossibly short client key entry.");
goto err;
}
/* Parse client name. */
tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, C_CLIENT_NAME);
tor_assert(tok == smartlist_get(tokens, 0));
tor_assert(tok->n_args == 1);
if (!rend_valid_client_name(tok->args[0])) {
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Illegal client name: %s. (Length must be "
"between 1 and %d, and valid characters are "
"[A-Za-z0-9+-_].)", tok->args[0], REND_CLIENTNAME_MAX_LEN);
goto err;
}
/* Check if client name is duplicate. */
if (strmap_get(parsed_clients, tok->args[0])) {
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient contains a "
"duplicate client name: '%s'. Ignoring.", tok->args[0]);
goto err;
}
parsed_entry = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_authorized_client_t));
parsed_entry->client_name = tor_strdup(tok->args[0]);
strmap_set(parsed_clients, parsed_entry->client_name, parsed_entry);
/* Parse client key. */
tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, C_CLIENT_KEY);
if (tok) {
parsed_entry->client_key = tok->key;
tok->key = NULL; /* Prevent free */
}
/* Parse descriptor cookie. */
tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, C_DESCRIPTOR_COOKIE);
tor_assert(tok->n_args == 1);
if (rend_auth_decode_cookie(tok->args[0], parsed_entry->descriptor_cookie,
NULL, &err_msg) < 0) {
tor_assert(err_msg);
log_warn(LD_REND, "%s", err_msg);
tor_free(err_msg);
goto err;
}
}
result = strmap_size(parsed_clients);
goto done;
err:
result = -1;
done:
/* Free tokens and clear token list. */
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(tokens, directory_token_t *, t, token_clear(t));
smartlist_free(tokens);
if (area)
memarea_drop_all(area);
return result;
}
static void
test_virtaddrmap_persist(void *data)
{
(void)data;
const char *a, *b, *c;
tor_addr_t addr;
char *ones = NULL;
addressmap_init();
// Try a hostname.
a = addressmap_register_virtual_address(RESOLVED_TYPE_HOSTNAME,
tor_strdup("foobar.baz"));
tt_assert(a);
tt_assert(!strcmpend(a, ".virtual"));
// mock crypto_rand to repeat the same result twice; make sure we get
// different outcomes. (Because even though the odds for receiving the
// same 80-bit address twice is only 1/2^40, it could still happen for
// some user -- but running our test through 2^40 iterations isn't
// reasonable.)
canned_data = "1234567890" // the first call returns this.
"1234567890" // the second call returns this.
"abcdefghij"; // the third call returns this.
canned_data_len = 30;
MOCK(crypto_rand, crypto_canned);
a = addressmap_register_virtual_address(RESOLVED_TYPE_HOSTNAME,
tor_strdup("quuxit.baz"));
b = addressmap_register_virtual_address(RESOLVED_TYPE_HOSTNAME,
tor_strdup("nescio.baz"));
tt_assert(a);
tt_assert(b);
tt_str_op(a, OP_EQ, "gezdgnbvgy3tqojq.virtual");
tt_str_op(b, OP_EQ, "mfrggzdfmztwq2lk.virtual");
// Now try something to get us an ipv4 address
UNMOCK(crypto_rand);
tt_int_op(0,OP_EQ, parse_virtual_addr_network("192.168.0.0/16",
AF_INET, 0, NULL));
a = addressmap_register_virtual_address(RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4,
tor_strdup("foobar.baz"));
tt_assert(a);
tt_assert(!strcmpstart(a, "192.168."));
tor_addr_parse(&addr, a);
tt_int_op(AF_INET, OP_EQ, tor_addr_family(&addr));
b = addressmap_register_virtual_address(RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4,
tor_strdup("quuxit.baz"));
tt_str_op(b, OP_NE, a);
tt_assert(!strcmpstart(b, "192.168."));
// Try some canned entropy and verify all the we discard duplicates,
// addresses that end with 0, and addresses that end with 255.
MOCK(crypto_rand, crypto_canned);
canned_data = "\x01\x02\x03\x04" // okay
"\x01\x02\x03\x04" // duplicate
"\x03\x04\x00\x00" // bad ending 1
"\x05\x05\x00\xff" // bad ending 2
"\x05\x06\x07\xf0"; // okay
canned_data_len = 20;
a = addressmap_register_virtual_address(RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4,
tor_strdup("wumble.onion"));
b = addressmap_register_virtual_address(RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4,
tor_strdup("wumpus.onion"));
tt_str_op(a, OP_EQ, "192.168.3.4");
tt_str_op(b, OP_EQ, "192.168.7.240");
// Now try IPv6!
UNMOCK(crypto_rand);
tt_int_op(0,OP_EQ, parse_virtual_addr_network("1010:F000::/20",
AF_INET6, 0, NULL));
a = addressmap_register_virtual_address(RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV6,
tor_strdup("foobar.baz"));
tt_assert(a);
tt_assert(!strcmpstart(a, "[1010:f"));
tor_addr_parse(&addr, a);
tt_int_op(AF_INET6, OP_EQ, tor_addr_family(&addr));
b = addressmap_register_virtual_address(RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV6,
tor_strdup("quuxit.baz"));
tt_str_op(b, OP_NE, a);
tt_assert(!strcmpstart(b, "[1010:f"));
// Try IPv6 with canned entropy, to make sure we detect duplicates.
MOCK(crypto_rand, crypto_canned);
canned_data = "acanthopterygian" // okay
"cinematographist" // okay
"acanthopterygian" // duplicate
"acanthopterygian" // duplicate
"acanthopterygian" // duplicate
"cinematographist" // duplicate
"coadministration"; // okay
canned_data_len = 16 * 7;
a = addressmap_register_virtual_address(RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV6,
tor_strdup("wuffle.baz"));
b = addressmap_register_virtual_address(RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV6,
tor_strdup("gribble.baz"));
c = addressmap_register_virtual_address(RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV6,
tor_strdup("surprisingly-legible.baz"));
tt_str_op(a, OP_EQ, "[1010:f16e:7468:6f70:7465:7279:6769:616e]");
tt_str_op(b, OP_EQ, "[1010:fe65:6d61:746f:6772:6170:6869:7374]");
tt_str_op(c, OP_EQ, "[1010:f164:6d69:6e69:7374:7261:7469:6f6e]");
// Try address exhaustion: make sure we can actually fail if we
// get too many already-existing addresses.
canned_data_len = 128*1024;
canned_data = ones = tor_malloc(canned_data_len);
memset(ones, 1, canned_data_len);
// There is some chance this one will fail if a previous random
// allocation gave out the address already.
a = addressmap_register_virtual_address(RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4,
tor_strdup("might-work.onion"));
if (a) {
tt_str_op(a, OP_EQ, "192.168.1.1");
}
setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
// This one will definitely fail, since we've set up the RNG to hand
// out "1" forever.
b = addressmap_register_virtual_address(RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4,
tor_strdup("wont-work.onion"));
tt_assert(b == NULL);
expect_single_log_msg_containing("Ran out of virtual addresses!");
done:
UNMOCK(crypto_rand);
tor_free(ones);
addressmap_free_all();
teardown_capture_of_logs();
}
/**
* Helper function to parse out a line in the measured bandwidth file
* into a measured_bw_line_t output structure.
*
* If <b>line_is_after_headers</b> is true, then if we encounter an incomplete
* bw line, return -1 and warn, since we are after the headers and we should
* only parse bw lines. Return 0 otherwise.
*
* If <b>line_is_after_headers</b> is false then it means that we are not past
* the header block yet. If we encounter an incomplete bw line, return -1 but
* don't warn since there could be additional header lines coming. If we
* encounter a proper bw line, return 0 (and we got past the headers).
*
* If the line contains "vote=0", stop parsing it, and return -1, so that the
* line is ignored during voting.
*/
STATIC int
measured_bw_line_parse(measured_bw_line_t *out, const char *orig_line,
int line_is_after_headers)
{
char *line = tor_strdup(orig_line);
char *cp = line;
int got_bw = 0;
int got_node_id = 0;
char *strtok_state; /* lame sauce d'jour */
if (strlen(line) == 0) {
log_warn(LD_DIRSERV, "Empty line in bandwidth file");
tor_free(line);
return -1;
}
/* Remove end of line character, so that is not part of the token */
if (line[strlen(line) - 1] == '\n') {
line[strlen(line) - 1] = '\0';
}
cp = tor_strtok_r(cp, " \t", &strtok_state);
if (!cp) {
log_warn(LD_DIRSERV, "Invalid line in bandwidth file: %s",
escaped(orig_line));
tor_free(line);
return -1;
}
if (orig_line[strlen(orig_line)-1] != '\n') {
log_warn(LD_DIRSERV, "Incomplete line in bandwidth file: %s",
escaped(orig_line));
tor_free(line);
return -1;
}
do {
// If the line contains vote=0, ignore it.
if (strcmpstart(cp, "vote=0") == 0) {
log_debug(LD_DIRSERV, "Ignoring bandwidth file line that contains "
"vote=0: %s",escaped(orig_line));
tor_free(line);
return -1;
} else if (strcmpstart(cp, "bw=") == 0) {
int parse_ok = 0;
char *endptr;
if (got_bw) {
log_warn(LD_DIRSERV, "Double bw= in bandwidth file line: %s",
escaped(orig_line));
tor_free(line);
return -1;
}
cp+=strlen("bw=");
out->bw_kb = tor_parse_long(cp, 10, 0, LONG_MAX, &parse_ok, &endptr);
if (!parse_ok || (*endptr && !TOR_ISSPACE(*endptr))) {
log_warn(LD_DIRSERV, "Invalid bandwidth in bandwidth file line: %s",
escaped(orig_line));
tor_free(line);
return -1;
}
got_bw=1;
} else if (strcmpstart(cp, "node_id=$") == 0) {
if (got_node_id) {
log_warn(LD_DIRSERV, "Double node_id= in bandwidth file line: %s",
escaped(orig_line));
tor_free(line);
return -1;
}
cp+=strlen("node_id=$");
if (strlen(cp) != HEX_DIGEST_LEN ||
base16_decode(out->node_id, DIGEST_LEN,
cp, HEX_DIGEST_LEN) != DIGEST_LEN) {
log_warn(LD_DIRSERV, "Invalid node_id in bandwidth file line: %s",
escaped(orig_line));
tor_free(line);
return -1;
}
strlcpy(out->node_hex, cp, sizeof(out->node_hex));
got_node_id=1;
}
} while ((cp = tor_strtok_r(NULL, " \t", &strtok_state)));
if (got_bw && got_node_id) {
tor_free(line);
return 0;
} else if (line_is_after_headers == 0) {
/* There could be additional header lines, therefore do not give warnings
* but returns -1 since it's not a complete bw line. */
log_debug(LD_DIRSERV, "Missing bw or node_id in bandwidth file line: %s",
escaped(orig_line));
tor_free(line);
return -1;
} else {
log_warn(LD_DIRSERV, "Incomplete line in bandwidth file: %s",
escaped(orig_line));
tor_free(line);
return -1;
}
}
