int pubkey::encrypt (const bvector&in, bvector&out, const bvector&errors)
{
if (in.size() != plain_size() ) return 2;
if (errors.size() != cipher_size() ) return 2;
G.mult_vecT_left (in, out);
out.add (errors);
return 0;
}
int pubkey::encrypt (const bvector & in, bvector & out, const bvector&errors)
{
uint t = 1 << T;
bvector p, g, r, cksum;
uint i, j;
/*
* shortened checksum pair of G is computed blockwise accordingly to
* the t-sized square dyadic blocks.
*/
//some checks
if (!qd_sigs.width() ) return 1;
if (qd_sigs.height() % t) return 1;
if (in.size() != plain_size() ) return 2;
if (errors.size() != cipher_size() ) return 2;
uint blocks = qd_sigs.height() / t;
cksum.resize (qd_sigs.height(), 0);
p.resize (t);
g.resize (t);
r.resize (t);
std::vector<int> c1, c2, c3;
c1.resize (t);
c2.resize (t);
c3.resize (t);
for (i = 0; i < qd_sigs.size(); ++i) {
//plaintext block
in.get_block (i * t, t, p);
for (j = 0; j < blocks; ++j) {
//checksum block
qd_sigs[i].get_block (j * t, t, g);
//block result
fwht_dyadic_multiply (p, g, r, c1, c2, c3);
cksum.add_offset (r, t * j);
}
}
//compute ciphertext
out = in;
out.insert (out.end(), cksum.begin(), cksum.end() );
out.add (errors);
return 0;
}
int privkey::sign (const bvector&in, bvector&out, uint delta, uint attempts, prng&rng)
{
uint i, s, t;
bvector p, e, synd, synd_orig, e2;
std::vector<uint> epos;
permutation hpermInv;
polynomial loc, Synd;
s = hash_size();
if (in.size() != s) return 2;
//first, prepare the codeword to canonical form for decoding
Pinv.permute (in, e2);
hperm.compute_inversion (hpermInv);
hpermInv.permute (e2, p);
//prepare extra error vector
e.resize (s, 0);
epos.resize (delta, 0);
h.mult_vec_right (p, synd_orig);
for (t = 0; t < attempts; ++t) {
synd = synd_orig;
for (i = 0; i < delta; ++i) {
epos[i] = rng.random (s);
/* we don't care about (unlikely) error bit collisions
(they actually don't harm anything) */
if (!e[epos[i]]) synd.add (h[epos[i]]);
e[epos[i]] = 1;
}
synd.to_poly (Synd, fld);
compute_goppa_error_locator (Synd, fld, g, sqInv, loc);
if (evaluate_error_locator_trace (loc, e2, fld) ) {
//recreate the decodable codeword
p.add (e);
p.add (e2);
hperm.permute (p, e2); //back to systematic
e2.resize (signature_size() ); //strip to message
Sinv.mult_vecT_left (e2, out); //signature
return 0;
}
//if this round failed, we try a new error pattern.
for (i = 0; i < delta; ++i) {
//clear the errors for next cycle
e[epos[i]] = 0;
}
}
return 1; //couldn't decode
}
int pubkey::verify (const bvector&in, const bvector&hash, uint delta)
{
bvector tmp;
if (!G.mult_vecT_left (in, tmp) ) return 2; //wrong size of input
if (hash.size() != tmp.size() ) return 1; //wrong size of hash, not a sig.
tmp.add (hash);
if (tmp.hamming_weight() > (t + delta) ) return 1; //not a signature
return 0; //sig OK
}
int privkey::decrypt (const bvector & in, bvector & out, bvector & errors)
{
if (in.size() != cipher_size() ) return 2;
polynomial synd;
uint i, j, tmp;
/*
* compute the syndrome from alternant check matrix
* that is H_alt = Vdm(L) * Diag(g(L_i)^{-2})
*/
uint h_size = 1 << (T + 1); //= 2*block_size
synd.clear();
synd.resize (h_size, 0);
for (i = 0; i < cipher_size(); ++i) if (in[i]) {
tmp = fld.inv (g.eval (permuted_support[i], fld) );
tmp = fld.mult (tmp, tmp); //g(Li)^{-2}
synd[0] = fld.add (synd[0], tmp);
for (j = 1; j < h_size; ++j) {
tmp = fld.mult (tmp, permuted_support[i]);
synd[j] = fld.add (synd[j], tmp);
}
}
//decoding
polynomial loc;
compute_alternant_error_locator (synd, fld, 1 << T, loc);
bvector ev;
if (!evaluate_error_locator_trace (loc, ev, fld) )
return 1; //couldn't decode
//TODO evaluator should return error positions, not bvector. fix it everywhere!
out = in;
out.resize (plain_size() );
errors.clear();
errors.resize (cipher_size(), 0);
//flip error positions of out.
for (i = 0; i < ev.size(); ++i) if (ev[i]) {
uint epos = support_pos[fld.inv (i)];
if (epos == fld.n) {
//found unexpected support, die.
out.clear();
return 1;
}
if (epos >= cipher_size() ) return 1;
errors[epos] = 1;
if (epos < plain_size() )
out[epos] = !out[epos];
}
return 0;
}
/*
* we expect correct parameter size and preallocated out. Last 3 parameters are
* used as a cache - just supply the same vectors everytime when you're doing
* this multiple times.
*/
void fwht_dyadic_multiply (const bvector& a, const bvector& b, bvector& out,
std::vector<int>&t,
std::vector<int>&A,
std::vector<int>&B)
{
uint i;
//lift everyting to Z.
for (i = 0; i < a.size(); ++i) t[i] = a[i];
fwht (t, A);
for (i = 0; i < b.size(); ++i) t[i] = b[i];
fwht (t, B);
//multiply diagonals to A
for (i = 0; i < A.size(); ++i) A[i] *= B[i];
fwht (A, t);
uint bitpos = a.size(); //no problem as a.size() == 1<<m == 2^m
for (i = 0; i < t.size(); ++i) out[i] = (t[i] & bitpos) ? 1 : 0;
}
int privkey::decrypt (const bvector&in, bvector&out, bvector&errors)
{
if (in.size() != cipher_size() ) return 2;
//remove the P permutation
bvector not_permuted;
Pinv.permute (in, not_permuted);
//prepare for decoding
permutation hpermInv; //TODO pre-invert it in prepare()
hperm.compute_inversion (hpermInv);
bvector canonical, syndrome;
hpermInv.permute (not_permuted, canonical);
h.mult_vec_right (canonical, syndrome);
//decode
polynomial synd, loc;
syndrome.to_poly (synd, fld);
compute_goppa_error_locator (synd, fld, g, sqInv, loc);
bvector ev;
if (!evaluate_error_locator_trace (loc, ev, fld) )
return 1; //if decoding somehow failed, fail as well.
//correct the errors
canonical.add (ev);
//shuffle back into systematic order
hperm.permute (canonical, not_permuted);
hperm.permute (ev, errors);
//get rid of redundancy bits
not_permuted.resize (plain_size() );
//unscramble the result
Sinv.mult_vecT_left (not_permuted, out);
return 0;
}