int signRequest(char* pemRequest, int days, char* pemCAKey, char* pemCaCert, int certType, char *url, char* result) {
BIO* bioReq = BIO_new_mem_buf(pemRequest, -1);
BIO* bioCAKey = BIO_new_mem_buf(pemCAKey, -1);
BIO* bioCert = BIO_new_mem_buf(pemCaCert, -1);
X509* caCert = PEM_read_bio_X509(bioCert, NULL, NULL, NULL);
int err = 0;
X509_REQ *req=NULL;
if (!(req=PEM_read_bio_X509_REQ(bioReq, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
BIO_free(bioReq);
BIO_free(bioCert);
BIO_free(bioCAKey);
return ERR_peek_error();
}
EVP_PKEY* caKey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bioCAKey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (!caKey) {
BIO_free(bioReq);
BIO_free(bioCert);
BIO_free(bioCAKey);
return ERR_peek_error();
}
X509* cert = X509_new();
EVP_PKEY* reqPub;
if(!(err = X509_set_version(cert, 2)))
{
BIO_free(bioReq);
BIO_free(bioCAKey);
return ERR_peek_error();
}
//redo all the certificate details, because OpenSSL wants us to work hard
X509_set_issuer_name(cert, X509_get_subject_name(caCert));
ASN1_UTCTIME *s=ASN1_UTCTIME_new();
// Jira-issue: WP-37
// This is temp solution for putting pzp validity 5 minutes before current time
// If there is a small clock difference between machines, it results in cert_not_yet_valid
// It does set GMT time but is relevant to machine time.
// A better solution would be to have ntp server contacted to get a proper time.
if(certType == 2) {
X509_gmtime_adj(s, long(0-300));
}
else {
X509_gmtime_adj(s, long(0));
}
// End of WP-37
X509_set_notBefore(cert, s);
X509_gmtime_adj(s, (long)60*60*24*days);
X509_set_notAfter(cert, s);
ASN1_UTCTIME_free(s);
X509_set_subject_name(cert, X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req));
reqPub = X509_REQ_get_pubkey(req);
X509_set_pubkey(cert,reqPub);
EVP_PKEY_free(reqPub);
//create a serial number at random
ASN1_INTEGER* serial = getRandomSN();
X509_set_serialNumber(cert, serial);
X509_EXTENSION *ex;
X509V3_CTX ctx;
X509V3_set_ctx_nodb(&ctx);
X509V3_set_ctx(&ctx, cert, cert, NULL, NULL, 0);
char *str = (char*)malloc(strlen("caIssuers;") + strlen(url) + 1);
if (str == NULL) {
return -10;
}
strcpy(str, "caIssuers;");
strcat(str, url);
if(!(ex = X509V3_EXT_conf_nid(NULL, &ctx, NID_info_access, (char*)str))) {
free(str);
return ERR_peek_error();
} else {
X509_add_ext(cert, ex, -1);
}
free(str);
if(!(ex = X509V3_EXT_conf_nid(NULL, &ctx, NID_subject_alt_name, (char*)url))) {
return ERR_peek_error();
} else {
X509_add_ext(cert, ex, -1);
}
if(!(ex = X509V3_EXT_conf_nid(NULL, &ctx, NID_issuer_alt_name, (char*)"issuer:copy"))) {
return ERR_peek_error();
} else {
X509_add_ext(cert, ex, -1);
}
if(!(ex = X509V3_EXT_conf_nid(NULL, &ctx, NID_subject_key_identifier, (char*)"hash"))) {
return ERR_peek_error();
} else {
X509_add_ext(cert, ex, -1);
}
if( certType == 1) {
if(!(ex = X509V3_EXT_conf_nid(NULL, &ctx, NID_basic_constraints, (char*)"critical, CA:FALSE"))) {
return ERR_peek_error();
} else {
X509_add_ext(cert, ex, -1);
}
if(!(ex = X509V3_EXT_conf_nid(NULL, &ctx, NID_ext_key_usage, (char*)"critical, clientAuth, serverAuth"))) {
return ERR_peek_error();
} else {
X509_add_ext(cert, ex, -1);
}
} else if( certType == 2) {
if(!(ex = X509V3_EXT_conf_nid(NULL, &ctx, NID_basic_constraints, (char*)"critical, CA:FALSE"))) {
return ERR_peek_error();
} else {
X509_add_ext(cert, ex, -1);
}
if(!(ex = X509V3_EXT_conf_nid(NULL, &ctx, NID_ext_key_usage, (char*)"critical, clientAuth, serverAuth"))) {
return ERR_peek_error();
} else {
X509_add_ext(cert, ex, -1);
}
}
if (!(err = X509_sign(cert,caKey,EVP_sha1())))
{
BIO_free(bioReq);
BIO_free(bioCert);
BIO_free(bioCAKey);
return err;
}
BIO *mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
PEM_write_bio_X509(mem,cert);
BUF_MEM *bptr;
BIO_get_mem_ptr(mem, &bptr);
BIO_read(mem, result, bptr->length);
BIO_free(mem);
BIO_free(bioReq);
BIO_free(bioCert);
BIO_free(bioCAKey);
return 0;
}
int selfSignRequest(char* pemRequest, int days, char* pemCAKey, int certType, char *url, char* result) {
BIO* bioReq = BIO_new_mem_buf(pemRequest, -1);
BIO* bioCAKey = BIO_new_mem_buf(pemCAKey, -1);
int err = 0;
X509_REQ *req=NULL;
if (!(req=PEM_read_bio_X509_REQ(bioReq, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
BIO_free(bioReq);
BIO_free(bioCAKey);
return -5;
}
EVP_PKEY* caKey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bioCAKey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (!caKey) {
BIO_free(bioReq);
BIO_free(bioCAKey);
return -6;
}
X509* cert = X509_new();
EVP_PKEY* reqPub;
//redo all the certificate details, because OpenSSL wants us to work hard
if(!(err = X509_set_version(cert, 2)))
{
BIO_free(bioReq);
BIO_free(bioCAKey);
return err;
}
if(!(err = X509_set_issuer_name(cert, X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req))))
{
BIO_free(bioReq);
BIO_free(bioCAKey);
return err;
}
ASN1_UTCTIME *s=ASN1_UTCTIME_new();
// Jira-issue: WP-37
// This is temp solution for putting pzp validity 5 minutes before current time
// If there is a small clock difference between machines, it results in cert_not_yet_valid
// It does set GMT time but is relevant to machine time.
// A better solution would be to have ntp server contacted to get proper time.
if(certType == 2) {
X509_gmtime_adj(s, long(0-300));
}
else {
X509_gmtime_adj(s, long(0));
}
// End of WP-37
X509_set_notBefore(cert, s);
X509_gmtime_adj(s, (long)60*60*24*days);
X509_set_notAfter(cert, s);
ASN1_UTCTIME_free(s);
if(!(err = X509_set_subject_name(cert, X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req)))) {
BIO_free(bioReq);
BIO_free(bioCAKey);
return err;
}
if (!(reqPub = X509_REQ_get_pubkey(req))) {
BIO_free(bioReq);
BIO_free(bioCAKey);
return -7;
}
err = X509_set_pubkey(cert,reqPub);
EVP_PKEY_free(reqPub);
if (!err) {
return err; // an error occurred, this is terrible style.
}
//create a serial number at random
ASN1_INTEGER* serial = getRandomSN();
X509_set_serialNumber(cert, serial);
// V3 extensions
X509_EXTENSION *ex;
X509V3_CTX ctx;
X509V3_set_ctx_nodb(&ctx);
X509V3_set_ctx(&ctx, cert, cert, NULL, NULL, 0);
if(!(ex = X509V3_EXT_conf_nid(NULL, &ctx, NID_subject_alt_name, (char*)url))) {
return ERR_peek_error();
} else {
X509_add_ext(cert, ex, -1);
}
if(!(ex = X509V3_EXT_conf_nid(NULL, &ctx, NID_subject_key_identifier, (char*)"hash"))) {
return ERR_peek_error();
} else {
X509_add_ext(cert, ex, -1);
}
if( certType == 0) {
if(!(ex = X509V3_EXT_conf_nid(NULL, &ctx, NID_basic_constraints, (char*)"critical, CA:TRUE"))) {
return ERR_peek_error();
} else {
X509_add_ext(cert, ex, -1);
}
if(!(ex = X509V3_EXT_conf_nid(NULL, &ctx, NID_key_usage, (char*)"critical, keyCertSign, digitalSignature, cRLSign"))) { /* critical, keyCertSign,cRLSign, nonRepudiation,*/
return ERR_peek_error();
} else {
X509_add_ext(cert, ex, -1);
}
if(!(ex = X509V3_EXT_conf_nid(NULL, &ctx, NID_ext_key_usage, (char*)"critical, serverAuth"))) {
return ERR_peek_error();
} else {
X509_add_ext(cert, ex, -1);
}
if(!(ex = X509V3_EXT_conf_nid(NULL, &ctx, NID_inhibit_any_policy, (char*)"0"))) {
return ERR_peek_error();
} else {
X509_add_ext(cert, ex, -1);
}
if(!(ex = X509V3_EXT_conf_nid(NULL, &ctx, NID_crl_distribution_points, (char*)url))) {
return ERR_peek_error();
} else {
X509_add_ext(cert, ex, -1);
}
}
if (!(err = X509_sign(cert,caKey,EVP_sha1()))) {
BIO_free(bioReq);
BIO_free(bioCAKey);
return err;
}
BIO *mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
PEM_write_bio_X509(mem,cert);
BUF_MEM *bptr;
BIO_get_mem_ptr(mem, &bptr);
BIO_read(mem, result, bptr->length);
BIO_free(mem);
BIO_free(bioReq);
BIO_free(bioCAKey);
return 0;
}
ASN1_UTCTIME *ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t,
int offset_day, long offset_sec)
{
char *p;
struct tm *ts;
struct tm data;
size_t len = 20;
int free_s = 0;
if (s == NULL) {
s = ASN1_UTCTIME_new();
if (s == NULL)
goto err;
free_s = 1;
}
ts = OPENSSL_gmtime(&t, &data);
if (ts == NULL)
goto err;
if (offset_day || offset_sec) {
if (!OPENSSL_gmtime_adj(ts, offset_day, offset_sec))
goto err;
}
if ((ts->tm_year < 50) || (ts->tm_year >= 150))
goto err;
p = (char *)s->data;
if ((p == NULL) || ((size_t)s->length < len)) {
p = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
if (p == NULL) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_UTCTIME_ADJ, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->data);
s->data = (unsigned char *)p;
}
BIO_snprintf(p, len, "%02d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02dZ", ts->tm_year % 100,
ts->tm_mon + 1, ts->tm_mday, ts->tm_hour, ts->tm_min,
ts->tm_sec);
s->length = strlen(p);
s->type = V_ASN1_UTCTIME;
#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC_not
ebcdic2ascii(s->data, s->data, s->length);
#endif
return (s);
err:
if (free_s)
ASN1_UTCTIME_free(s);
return NULL;
}
ASN1_UTCTIME *
ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t, int offset_day, long offset_sec)
{
ASN1_UTCTIME *tmp = NULL, *ret;
if (s == NULL) {
tmp = ASN1_UTCTIME_new();
if (tmp == NULL)
return NULL;
s = tmp;
}
ret = ASN1_UTCTIME_adj_internal(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
if (ret == NULL && tmp != NULL)
ASN1_UTCTIME_free(tmp);
return ret;
}
static int
get_times(glite_renewal_core_context ctx, char *proxy_file,
time_t *not_after_x509, time_t *not_after_voms)
{
X509 *cert = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
int ret, i;
time_t now, end_time, end_time_x509;
struct vomsdata *voms_data = NULL;
struct voms **voms_cert = NULL;
ASN1_UTCTIME *t;
char *s, *c;
ret = load_proxy(ctx, proxy_file, &cert, NULL, &chain, NULL);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = get_voms_cert(ctx, cert, chain, &voms_data);
if (ret)
goto end;
end_time = 0;
if (voms_data != NULL) {
for (voms_cert = voms_data->data; voms_cert && *voms_cert; voms_cert++) {
t = ASN1_UTCTIME_new();
if (t == NULL) {
glite_renewal_core_set_err(ctx, "ASN1_UTCTIME_new() failed");
ret = 1;
goto end;
}
/* date2 contains a GENERALIZEDTIME format (YYYYMMDDHHSS[.fff]Z)
* value, which must be converted to the UTC (YYMMDDHHSSZ) format */
s = strdup((*voms_cert)->date2 + 2);
if (s == NULL) {
glite_renewal_core_set_err(ctx, "Not enough memory");
ret = ENOMEM;
goto end;
}
c = strchr(s, '.');
if (c) {
*c++ = 'Z';
*c = '\0';
}
ret = ASN1_UTCTIME_set_string(t, s);
if (ret == 0) {
glite_renewal_core_set_err(ctx, "ASN1_UTCTIME_set_string() failed\n");
ret = 1;
free(s);
goto end;
}
if (end_time == 0 || ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t(t, end_time) < 0)
globus_gsi_cert_utils_make_time(t, &end_time);
ASN1_UTCTIME_free(t);
free(s);
}
}
globus_gsi_cert_utils_make_time(X509_get_notAfter(cert), &end_time_x509);
now = time(NULL);
if (end_time_x509 + RENEWAL_CLOCK_SKEW < now) {
glite_renewal_core_set_err(ctx, "Expired proxy in %s", proxy_file);
ret = EDG_WLPR_PROXY_EXPIRED;
goto end;
}
/* Myproxy seems not to do check on expiration and return expired proxies
if credentials in repository are expired */
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
t = X509_get_notAfter(sk_X509_value(chain, i));
if (ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t(t, now - RENEWAL_CLOCK_SKEW) < 0) {
glite_renewal_core_set_err(ctx, "Expired proxy in %s", proxy_file);
ret = EDG_WLPR_PROXY_EXPIRED;
goto end;
}
}
*not_after_voms = end_time;
*not_after_x509 = end_time_x509;
ret = 0;
end:
if (voms_data)
VOMS_Destroy(voms_data);
if (chain)
sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
if (cert)
X509_free(cert);
return ret;
}
char* /* returns contents of the signed message, NULL if error */
smime_verify_signature(const char* pubkey,
const char* sig_entity, /* signed entity
or just the sigature */
const char* detached_data, /* possibly NULL */
int detached_data_len)
{
X509* x509 = NULL;
PKCS7* p7 = NULL;
STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO)* sigs = NULL;
X509_STORE* certs=NULL;
BIO* detached = NULL;
BIO* p7bio = NULL;
BIO* wbio = NULL;
char* data = NULL;
char buf[4096];
int i,x;
if (!sig_entity || !pubkey) GOTO_ERR("NULL arg(s)");
if (!(p7 = get_pkcs7_from_pem(sig_entity))) goto err;
/* Hmm, if its clear signed, we already provided the detached sig, but
* if its one sig blob, may be PKCS7_get_detached() provides BIO connected
* to the detached part. Go figure.
*/
if (detached_data && detached_data_len) {
if (!(detached = set_read_BIO_from_buf(detached_data, detached_data_len)))
goto err;
} else {
if (!PKCS7_get_detached(p7))
GOTO_ERR("15 cant extract signed data from signed entity (PKCS7_get_detached)");
}
if (!(p7bio=PKCS7_dataInit(p7,detached))) GOTO_ERR("PKCS7_dataInit");
if (!(wbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()))) GOTO_ERR("no memory?");
/* We now have to 'read' from p7bio to calculate message digest(s).
* I also take the opportunity to save the signed data. */
for (;;) {
i = BIO_read(p7bio,buf,sizeof(buf));
if (i <= 0) break;
BIO_write(wbio, buf, i);
}
if (get_written_BIO_data(wbio, &data)==-1) goto err;
BIO_free_all(wbio);
wbio = NULL;
/* We can now verify signatures */
if (!(sigs=PKCS7_get_signer_info(p7)))
GOTO_ERR("13 no sigs? (PKCS7_get_signer_info)");
/* Ok, first we need to, for each subject entry, see if we can verify */
for (i=0; i<sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_num(sigs); i++) {
X509_STORE_CTX cert_ctx;
PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si;
ASN1_UTCTIME *tm;
char *str1,*str2;
si=sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_value(sigs,i);
/* The bio is needed here only to lookup the message digest context
* which presumably now contains the message digest. It will not be
* read, and hence its good for any number of iterations. This is so
* because MD bios pass the data right thru so they can be stacked
* to calculate multiple message digests simultaneously. Clever, eh?
*/
#if 0
/* *** this is currently broken and thus disabled. --Sampo */
/* verifies by looking up the certificate from certs database,
* verifying the validity of the certificate, and finally
* validity of the signature */
x=PKCS7_dataVerify(certs, &cert_ctx, p7bio, p7, si);
#else
/* just verify the signature, given that we already have certificate
* candidate (see crypto/pk7_doit.c around line 675) */
if (!(x509 = extract_certificate(pubkey))) goto err;
x=PKCS7_signatureVerify(p7bio, p7, si, x509);
#endif
if (x <= 0) GOTO_ERR("14 sig verify failed");
#if 0
if ((tm=get_signed_time(si)) != NULL) {
//fprintf(stderr,"Signed time:");
//ASN1_UTCTIME_print(bio_out,tm);
ASN1_UTCTIME_free(tm);
//BIO_printf(bio_out,"\n");
}
#endif
#if 0
if (get_signed_seq2string(si,&str1,&str2)) {
fprintf(stderr,"String 1 is %s\n",str1);
fprintf(stderr,"String 2 is %s\n",str2);
}
#endif
}
BIO_free_all(p7bio);
PKCS7_free(p7);
X509_STORE_free(certs);
return data; /* return the signed plain text */
err:
if (wbio) BIO_free_all(wbio);
if (p7bio) BIO_free_all(p7bio);
if (p7) PKCS7_free(p7);
if (certs) X509_STORE_free(certs);
if (data) Free(data);
return NULL;
}
KSSLCertificate*
KSSLCertificateFactory::generateSelfSigned(KSSLKeyType /*keytype*/) {
#if 0
//#ifdef KSSL_HAVE_SSL
X509_NAME *x509name = X509_NAME_new();
X509 *x509;
ASN1_UTCTIME *beforeafter;
KSSLCertificate *newcert;
int rc;
// FIXME: generate the private key
if (keytype == KEYTYPE_UNKNOWN || (key=EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) {
X509_NAME_free(x509name);
return NULL;
}
switch(keytype) {
case KEYTYPE_RSA:
if (!EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(key, RSA_generate_key(newkey,0x10001,
req_cb,bio_err))) {
}
break;
case KEYTYPE_DSA:
if (!DSA_generate_key(dsa_params)) goto end;
if (!EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey,dsa_params)) goto end;
dsa_params=NULL;
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
digest=EVP_dss1();
break;
}
// FIXME: dn doesn't exist
// FIXME: allow the notAfter value to be parameterized
// FIXME: allow a password to lock the key with
// Fill in the certificate
X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(x509name, OBJ_txt2nid("CN"), 0x1001,
(unsigned char *) dn, -1, -1, 0);
x509 = X509_new();
rc = X509_set_issuer_name(x509, x509name);
if (rc != 0) {
X509_free(x509);
X509_NAME_free(x509name);
return NULL;
}
rc = X509_set_subject_name(x509, x509name);
if (rc != 0) {
X509_free(x509);
X509_NAME_free(x509name);
return NULL;
}
ASN1_INTEGER_set(X509_get_serialNumber(*x509), 0);
X509_NAME_free(x509name);
// Make it a 1 year certificate
beforeafter = ASN1_UTCTIME_new();
if (!X509_gmtime_adj(beforeafter, -60*60*24)) { // yesterday
X509_free(x509);
return NULL;
}
if (!X509_set_notBefore(x509, beforeafter)) {
X509_free(x509);
return NULL;
}
if (!X509_gmtime_adj(beforeafter, 60*60*24*364)) { // a year from yesterday
X509_free(x509);
return NULL;
}
if (!X509_set_notAfter(x509, beforeafter)) {
X509_free(x509);
return NULL;
}
ASN1_UTCTIME_free(beforeafter);
if (!X509_set_pubkey(x509, key)) {
X509_free(x509);
return NULL;
}
rc = X509_sign(x509, key, EVP_sha1());
if (rc != 0) {
X509_free(x509);
return NULL;
}
newCert = new KSSLCertificate;
newCert->setCert(x509);
return newCert;
#else
return NULL;
#endif
}