/** @return 0 on success, -1 otherwise. */
int CryptoAuth_encrypt(struct CryptoAuth_Session* sessionPub, struct Message* msg)
{
struct CryptoAuth_Session_pvt* session =
Identity_check((struct CryptoAuth_Session_pvt*) sessionPub);
// If there has been no incoming traffic for a while, reset the connection to state 0.
// This will prevent "connection in bad state" situations from lasting forever.
// this will reset the session if it has timed out.
resetIfTimeout(session);
// If the nonce wraps, start over.
if (session->nextNonce >= 0xfffffff0) {
reset(session);
}
Assert_true(!((uintptr_t)msg->bytes % 4) || !"alignment fault");
// nextNonce 0: sending hello, we are initiating connection.
// nextNonce 1: sending another hello, nothing received yet.
// nextNonce 2: sending key, hello received.
// nextNonce 3: sending key again, no data packet recieved yet.
// nextNonce >3: handshake complete
//
// if it's a blind handshake, every message will be empty and nextNonce will remain
// zero until the first message is received back.
if (session->nextNonce < 5) {
if (session->nextNonce < 4) {
encryptHandshake(msg, session, 0);
return 0;
} else {
cryptoAuthDebug0(session, "Doing final step to send message. nonce=4");
Assert_ifParanoid(!Bits_isZero(session->ourTempPrivKey, 32));
Assert_ifParanoid(!Bits_isZero(session->herTempPubKey, 32));
getSharedSecret(session->sharedSecret,
session->ourTempPrivKey,
session->herTempPubKey,
NULL,
session->context->logger);
}
}
Assert_true(msg->length > 0 && "Empty packet during handshake");
Assert_true(msg->padding >= 36 || !"not enough padding");
encrypt(session->nextNonce, msg, session->sharedSecret, session->isInitiator);
Message_push32(msg, session->nextNonce, NULL);
session->nextNonce++;
return 0;
}
// connect an allocator to a new parent.
static void connect(struct Allocator_pvt* parent,
struct Allocator_pvt* child,
const char* file,
int line)
{
Assert_ifParanoid(child->parent == NULL);
Assert_ifParanoid(child->lastSibling == NULL);
Assert_ifParanoid(child->nextSibling == NULL);
child->nextSibling = parent->firstChild;
if (parent->firstChild) {
parent->firstChild->lastSibling = child;
}
parent->firstChild = child;
child->parent = parent;
}
/**
* If we don't know her key, the handshake has to be done backwards.
* Reverse handshake requests are signaled by sending a non-obfuscated zero nonce.
*/
static uint8_t genReverseHandshake(struct Message* message,
struct CryptoAuth_Wrapper* wrapper,
union Headers_CryptoAuth* header)
{
reset(wrapper);
Message_shift(message, -Headers_CryptoAuth_SIZE, NULL);
// Buffer the packet so it can be sent ASAP
if (wrapper->bufferedMessage != NULL) {
// Not exactly a drop but a message is not going to reach the destination.
cryptoAuthDebug0(wrapper,
"DROP Expelled a message because a session has not yet been setup");
Allocator_free(wrapper->bufferedMessage->alloc);
}
cryptoAuthDebug0(wrapper, "Buffered a message");
struct Allocator* bmalloc = Allocator_child(wrapper->externalInterface.allocator);
wrapper->bufferedMessage = Message_clone(message, bmalloc);
Assert_ifParanoid(wrapper->nextNonce == 0);
Message_shift(message, Headers_CryptoAuth_SIZE, NULL);
header = (union Headers_CryptoAuth*) message->bytes;
header->nonce = UINT32_MAX;
message->length = Headers_CryptoAuth_SIZE;
// sessionState must be 0, auth and 24 byte nonce are garbaged and public key is set
// now garbage the authenticator and the encrypted key which are not used.
Random_bytes(wrapper->context->rand, (uint8_t*) &header->handshake.authenticator, 48);
// This is a special packet which the user should never see.
Headers_setSetupPacket(&header->handshake.auth, 1);
return wrapper->wrappedInterface->sendMessage(message, wrapper->wrappedInterface);
}
static uint8_t sendMessage(struct Message* message, struct Interface* interface)
{
struct CryptoAuth_Wrapper* wrapper =
Identity_check((struct CryptoAuth_Wrapper*) interface->senderContext);
// If there has been no incoming traffic for a while, reset the connection to state 0.
// This will prevent "connection in bad state" situations from lasting forever.
// this will reset the session if it has timed out.
CryptoAuth_resetIfTimeout(interface);
// If the nonce wraps, start over.
if (wrapper->nextNonce >= 0xfffffff0) {
reset(wrapper);
}
Assert_true(!((uintptr_t)message->bytes % 4) || !"alignment fault");
// nextNonce 0: sending hello, we are initiating connection.
// nextNonce 1: sending another hello, nothing received yet.
// nextNonce 2: sending key, hello received.
// nextNonce 3: sending key again, no data packet recieved yet.
// nextNonce >3: handshake complete
//
// if it's a blind handshake, every message will be empty and nextNonce will remain
// zero until the first message is received back.
if (wrapper->nextNonce < 5) {
if (wrapper->nextNonce < 4) {
return encryptHandshake(message, wrapper, 0);
} else {
cryptoAuthDebug0(wrapper, "Doing final step to send message. nonce=4");
Assert_ifParanoid(!Bits_isZero(wrapper->ourTempPrivKey, 32));
Assert_ifParanoid(!Bits_isZero(wrapper->herTempPubKey, 32));
getSharedSecret(wrapper->sharedSecret,
wrapper->ourTempPrivKey,
wrapper->herTempPubKey,
NULL,
wrapper->context->logger);
}
}
Assert_true(message->length > 0 && "Empty packet during handshake");
return encryptMessage(message, wrapper);
}
static void sendMessageCallback(uv_write_t* uvReq, int error)
{
struct Pipe_WriteRequest_pvt* req = Identity_check((struct Pipe_WriteRequest_pvt*) uvReq);
if (error) {
Log_info(req->pipe->pub.logger, "Failed to write to pipe [%s] [%s]",
req->pipe->pub.fullName, uv_strerror(error) );
}
req->pipe->queueLen -= req->msg->length;
Assert_ifParanoid(req->pipe->queueLen >= 0);
Allocator_free(req->alloc);
}
static int dhtModuleHandleOutgoing(struct DHTModule* module, struct DHTMessage* message)
{
Assert_ifParanoid(module);
if (module->handleOutgoing) {
DEBUG2(">> calling: %s->handleOutgoing\n", module->name);
return module->handleOutgoing(message, module->context);
} else {
DEBUG2(">> skipping: %s->handleOutgoing\n", module->name);
}
return 0;
}
// connect an allocator to a new parent.
static void connect(struct Allocator_pvt* parent,
struct Allocator_pvt* child,
const char* file,
int line)
{
Assert_ifParanoid(child->parent == NULL);
Assert_ifParanoid(child->lastSibling == NULL);
Assert_ifParanoid(child->nextSibling == NULL);
Assert_true(parent != child);
if (Defined(PARANOIA)) {
for (struct Allocator_pvt* c = parent->firstChild; c; c = c->nextSibling) {
Assert_true(child != c);
}
}
child->nextSibling = parent->firstChild;
if (parent->firstChild) {
parent->firstChild->lastSibling = child;
}
parent->firstChild = child;
child->parent = parent;
}
// disconnect an allocator from it's parent.
static void disconnect(struct Allocator_pvt* context)
{
// Remove this allocator from the sibling list.
Assert_true(context->parent);
if (context->lastSibling) {
Assert_ifParanoid(context->lastSibling->nextSibling == context);
Assert_ifParanoid(context->parent->firstChild != context);
context->lastSibling->nextSibling = context->nextSibling;
} else {
// must be first in the list or a root allocator.
Assert_ifParanoid(context->parent->firstChild == context || context->parent == context);
Assert_ifParanoid(context->parent != context || !context->nextSibling);
context->parent->firstChild = context->nextSibling;
}
if (context->nextSibling) {
Assert_ifParanoid(context->nextSibling->lastSibling == context);
context->nextSibling->lastSibling = context->lastSibling;
}
context->lastSibling = NULL;
context->nextSibling = NULL;
context->parent = NULL;
}
// Shallow first search to prevent lots of flapping while we tear down the tree.
static int pivotChildrenToAdoptedParents0(struct Allocator_pvt* context,
int depth,
int maxDepth,
const char* file,
int line)
{
int out = 0;
if (depth == maxDepth) {
if (context->pub.isFreeing) { return 0; }
if (context->adoptions) {
// Attempt to pivot around to a parent in order to save this allocator
if (context->adoptions->parents) {
Assert_true(!context->adoptions->parents->alloc->pub.isFreeing);
disconnect(context);
connect(context->adoptions->parents->alloc, context, file, line);
disconnectAdopted(context->adoptions->parents->alloc, context);
return 0;
}
// No saving it, drop it's adoptions.
for (struct Allocator_List* c = context->adoptions->children; c; c = c->next) {
Assert_true(!c->alloc->pub.isFreeing);
disconnectAdopted(context, c->alloc);
}
}
Assert_true(!context->pub.isFreeing);
context->pub.isFreeing = 1;
out++;
} else {
struct Allocator_pvt* child = context->firstChild;
while (child) {
Assert_ifParanoid(child != context);
struct Allocator_pvt* nextChild = child->nextSibling;
out += pivotChildrenToAdoptedParents0(child, depth+1, maxDepth, file, line);
child = nextChild;
}
}
return out;
}
int main(int argc, char** argv)
{
#ifdef Log_KEYS
fprintf(stderr, "Log_LEVEL = KEYS, EXPECT TO SEE PRIVATE KEYS IN YOUR LOGS!\n");
#endif
if (argc < 2) {
// Fall through.
} else if (!CString_strcmp("angel", argv[1])) {
return AngelInit_main(argc, argv);
} else if (!CString_strcmp("core", argv[1])) {
return Core_main(argc, argv);
}
Assert_ifParanoid(argc > 0);
struct Except* eh = NULL;
// Allow it to allocate 8MB
struct Allocator* allocator = MallocAllocator_new(1<<23);
struct Random* rand = Random_new(allocator, NULL, eh);
struct EventBase* eventBase = EventBase_new(allocator);
if (argc == 2) {
// one argument
if ((CString_strcmp(argv[1], "--help") == 0) || (CString_strcmp(argv[1], "-h") == 0)) {
return usage(allocator, argv[0]);
} else if (CString_strcmp(argv[1], "--genconf") == 0) {
return genconf(rand);
} else if (CString_strcmp(argv[1], "--pidfile") == 0) {
// deprecated
fprintf(stderr, "'--pidfile' option is deprecated.\n");
return 0;
} else if (CString_strcmp(argv[1], "--reconf") == 0) {
// Performed after reading the configuration
} else if (CString_strcmp(argv[1], "--bench") == 0) {
return benchmark();
} else if ((CString_strcmp(argv[1], "--version") == 0)
|| (CString_strcmp(argv[1], "-v") == 0))
{
printf("Cjdns protocol version: %d\n", Version_CURRENT_PROTOCOL);
return 0;
} else if (CString_strcmp(argv[1], "--cleanconf") == 0) {
// Performed after reading configuration
} else if (CString_strcmp(argv[1], "--nobg") == 0) {
// Performed while reading configuration
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: unrecognized option '%s'\n", argv[0], argv[1]);
fprintf(stderr, "Try `%s --help' for more information.\n", argv[0]);
return -1;
}
} else if (argc > 2) {
// more than one argument?
fprintf(stderr, "%s: too many arguments [%s]\n", argv[0], argv[1]);
fprintf(stderr, "Try `%s --help' for more information.\n", argv[0]);
// because of '--pidfile $filename'?
if (CString_strcmp(argv[1], "--pidfile") == 0)
{
fprintf(stderr, "\n'--pidfile' option is deprecated.\n");
}
return -1;
}
if (isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) {
// We were started from a terminal
// The chances an user wants to type in a configuration
// bij hand are pretty slim so we show him the usage
return usage(allocator, argv[0]);
} else {
// We assume stdin is a configuration file and that we should
// start routing
}
struct Reader* stdinReader = FileReader_new(stdin, allocator);
Dict config;
if (JsonBencSerializer_get()->parseDictionary(stdinReader, allocator, &config)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to parse configuration.\n");
return -1;
}
if (argc == 2 && CString_strcmp(argv[1], "--cleanconf") == 0) {
struct Writer* stdoutWriter = FileWriter_new(stdout, allocator);
JsonBencSerializer_get()->serializeDictionary(stdoutWriter, &config);
printf("\n");
return 0;
}
int forceNoBackground = 0;
if (argc == 2 && CString_strcmp(argv[1], "--nobg") == 0) {
forceNoBackground = 1;
}
struct Writer* logWriter = FileWriter_new(stdout, allocator);
struct Log* logger = WriterLog_new(logWriter, allocator);
// --------------------- Get Admin --------------------- //
Dict* configAdmin = Dict_getDict(&config, String_CONST("admin"));
String* adminPass = Dict_getString(configAdmin, String_CONST("password"));
String* adminBind = Dict_getString(configAdmin, String_CONST("bind"));
if (!adminPass) {
adminPass = String_newBinary(NULL, 32, allocator);
Random_base32(rand, (uint8_t*) adminPass->bytes, 32);
adminPass->len = CString_strlen(adminPass->bytes);
}
if (!adminBind) {
Except_throw(eh, "You must specify admin.bind in the cjdroute.conf file.");
}
// --------------------- Welcome to cjdns ---------------------- //
char* archInfo = ArchInfo_describe(ArchInfo_detect(), allocator);
char* sysInfo = SysInfo_describe(SysInfo_detect(), allocator);
Log_info(logger, "Cjdns %s %s", archInfo, sysInfo);
// --------------------- Check for running instance --------------------- //
Log_info(logger, "Checking for running instance...");
checkRunningInstance(allocator, eventBase, adminBind, adminPass, logger, eh);
// --------------------- Setup Pipes to Angel --------------------- //
char angelPipeName[64] = "client-angel-";
Random_base32(rand, (uint8_t*)angelPipeName+13, 31);
Assert_ifParanoid(EventBase_eventCount(eventBase) == 0);
struct Pipe* angelPipe = Pipe_named(angelPipeName, eventBase, eh, allocator);
Assert_ifParanoid(EventBase_eventCount(eventBase) == 2);
angelPipe->logger = logger;
char* args[] = { "angel", angelPipeName, NULL };
// --------------------- Spawn Angel --------------------- //
String* privateKey = Dict_getString(&config, String_CONST("privateKey"));
char* corePath = Process_getPath(allocator);
if (!corePath) {
Except_throw(eh, "Can't find a usable cjdns core executable, "
"make sure it is in the same directory as cjdroute");
}
if (!privateKey) {
Except_throw(eh, "Need to specify privateKey.");
}
Log_info(logger, "Forking angel to background.");
Process_spawn(corePath, args, eventBase, allocator);
// --------------------- Get user for angel to setuid() ---------------------- //
String* securityUser = NULL;
List* securityConf = Dict_getList(&config, String_CONST("security"));
for (int i = 0; securityConf && i < List_size(securityConf); i++) {
securityUser = Dict_getString(List_getDict(securityConf, i), String_CONST("setuser"));
if (securityUser) {
int64_t* ea = Dict_getInt(List_getDict(securityConf, i), String_CONST("exemptAngel"));
if (ea && *ea) {
securityUser = NULL;
}
break;
}
}
// --------------------- Pre-Configure Angel ------------------------- //
Dict* preConf = Dict_new(allocator);
Dict* adminPreConf = Dict_new(allocator);
Dict_putDict(preConf, String_CONST("admin"), adminPreConf, allocator);
Dict_putString(adminPreConf, String_CONST("core"), String_new(corePath, allocator), allocator);
Dict_putString(preConf, String_CONST("privateKey"), privateKey, allocator);
Dict_putString(adminPreConf, String_CONST("bind"), adminBind, allocator);
Dict_putString(adminPreConf, String_CONST("pass"), adminPass, allocator);
if (securityUser) {
Dict_putString(adminPreConf, String_CONST("user"), securityUser, allocator);
}
Dict* logging = Dict_getDict(&config, String_CONST("logging"));
if (logging) {
Dict_putDict(preConf, String_CONST("logging"), logging, allocator);
}
struct Message* toAngelMsg = Message_new(0, 1024, allocator);
BencMessageWriter_write(preConf, toAngelMsg, eh);
Interface_sendMessage(&angelPipe->iface, toAngelMsg);
Log_debug(logger, "Sent [%d] bytes to angel process", toAngelMsg->length);
// --------------------- Get Response from Angel --------------------- //
struct Message* fromAngelMsg =
InterfaceWaiter_waitForData(&angelPipe->iface, eventBase, allocator, eh);
Dict* responseFromAngel = BencMessageReader_read(fromAngelMsg, allocator, eh);
// --------------------- Get Admin Addr/Port/Passwd --------------------- //
Dict* responseFromAngelAdmin = Dict_getDict(responseFromAngel, String_CONST("admin"));
adminBind = Dict_getString(responseFromAngelAdmin, String_CONST("bind"));
if (!adminBind) {
Except_throw(eh, "didn't get address and port back from angel");
}
struct Sockaddr_storage adminAddr;
if (Sockaddr_parse(adminBind->bytes, &adminAddr)) {
Except_throw(eh, "Unable to parse [%s] as an ip address port, eg: 127.0.0.1:11234",
adminBind->bytes);
}
// sanity check, Pipe_named() creates 2 events, see above.
Assert_ifParanoid(EventBase_eventCount(eventBase) == 2);
// --------------------- Configuration ------------------------- //
Configurator_config(&config,
&adminAddr.addr,
adminPass,
eventBase,
logger,
allocator);
// --------------------- noBackground ------------------------ //
int64_t* noBackground = Dict_getInt(&config, String_CONST("noBackground"));
if (forceNoBackground || (noBackground && *noBackground)) {
EventBase_beginLoop(eventBase);
}
//Allocator_free(allocator);
return 0;
}
static uint8_t receiveMessage(struct Message* received, struct Interface* interface)
{
struct CryptoAuth_Wrapper* wrapper =
Identity_check((struct CryptoAuth_Wrapper*) interface->receiverContext);
union Headers_CryptoAuth* header = (union Headers_CryptoAuth*) received->bytes;
if (received->length < 20) {
cryptoAuthDebug0(wrapper, "DROP runt");
return Error_UNDERSIZE_MESSAGE;
}
Assert_true(received->padding >= 12 || "need at least 12 bytes of padding in incoming message");
Assert_true(!((uintptr_t)received->bytes % 4) || !"alignment fault");
Message_shift(received, -4, NULL);
uint32_t nonce = Endian_bigEndianToHost32(header->nonce);
if (!wrapper->established) {
if (nonce > 3 && nonce != UINT32_MAX) {
if (wrapper->nextNonce < 3) {
// This is impossible because we have not exchanged hello and key messages.
cryptoAuthDebug0(wrapper, "DROP Received a run message to an un-setup session");
return Error_UNDELIVERABLE;
}
cryptoAuthDebug(wrapper, "Trying final handshake step, nonce=%u\n", nonce);
uint8_t secret[32];
Assert_ifParanoid(!Bits_isZero(wrapper->ourTempPrivKey, 32));
Assert_ifParanoid(!Bits_isZero(wrapper->herTempPubKey, 32));
getSharedSecret(secret,
wrapper->ourTempPrivKey,
wrapper->herTempPubKey,
NULL,
wrapper->context->logger);
// We'll optimistically advance the nextNonce value because decryptMessage()
// passes the message on to the upper level and if this message causes a
// response, we want the CA to be in ESTABLISHED state.
// if the decryptMessage() call fails, we CryptoAuth_reset() it back.
wrapper->nextNonce += 3;
if (decryptMessage(wrapper, nonce, received, secret)) {
cryptoAuthDebug0(wrapper, "Final handshake step succeeded");
Bits_memcpyConst(wrapper->sharedSecret, secret, 32);
// Now we're in run mode, no more handshake packets will be accepted
Bits_memset(wrapper->ourTempPrivKey, 0, 32);
Bits_memset(wrapper->ourTempPubKey, 0, 32);
Bits_memset(wrapper->herTempPubKey, 0, 32);
wrapper->established = true;
return callReceivedMessage(wrapper, received);
}
CryptoAuth_reset(&wrapper->externalInterface);
cryptoAuthDebug0(wrapper, "DROP Final handshake step failed");
return Error_UNDELIVERABLE;
}
Message_shift(received, 4, NULL);
return decryptHandshake(wrapper, nonce, received, header);
} else if (nonce > 3 && nonce != UINT32_MAX) {
Assert_ifParanoid(!Bits_isZero(wrapper->sharedSecret, 32));
if (decryptMessage(wrapper, nonce, received, wrapper->sharedSecret)) {
return callReceivedMessage(wrapper, received);
} else {
cryptoAuthDebug0(wrapper, "DROP Failed to decrypt message");
return Error_UNDELIVERABLE;
}
} else if (nonce < 2) {
cryptoAuthDebug(wrapper, "hello packet during established session nonce=[%d]", nonce);
Message_shift(received, 4, NULL);
return decryptHandshake(wrapper, nonce, received, header);
} else {
// setup keys are already zeroed, not much we can do here.
cryptoAuthDebug(wrapper, "DROP key packet during established session nonce=[%d]", nonce);
return Error_UNDELIVERABLE;
}
Assert_true(0);
}
static uint8_t decryptHandshake(struct CryptoAuth_Wrapper* wrapper,
const uint32_t nonce,
struct Message* message,
union Headers_CryptoAuth* header)
{
if (message->length < Headers_CryptoAuth_SIZE) {
cryptoAuthDebug0(wrapper, "DROP runt");
return Error_UNDERSIZE_MESSAGE;
}
// handshake
// nextNonce 0: recieving hello.
// nextNonce 1: recieving key, we sent hello.
// nextNonce 2: recieving first data packet or duplicate hello.
// nextNonce 3: recieving first data packet.
// nextNonce >3: handshake complete
if (knowHerKey(wrapper)) {
if (Bits_memcmp(wrapper->herPerminentPubKey, header->handshake.publicKey, 32)) {
cryptoAuthDebug0(wrapper, "DROP a packet with different public key than this session");
return Error_AUTHENTICATION;
}
} else if (!Bits_isZero(wrapper->herIp6, 16)) {
uint8_t calculatedIp6[16];
AddressCalc_addressForPublicKey(calculatedIp6, header->handshake.publicKey);
if (Bits_memcmp(wrapper->herIp6, calculatedIp6, 16)) {
cryptoAuthDebug0(wrapper, "DROP packet with public key not matching ip6 for session");
return Error_AUTHENTICATION;
}
}
if (wrapper->nextNonce < 2 && nonce == UINT32_MAX && !wrapper->requireAuth) {
// Reset without knowing key is allowed until state reaches 2.
// this is because we don't know that the other end knows our key until we
// have received a valid packet from them.
// We can't allow the upper layer to see this message because it's not authenticated.
if (!knowHerKey(wrapper)) {
Bits_memcpyConst(wrapper->herPerminentPubKey, header->handshake.publicKey, 32);
}
Message_shift(message, -Headers_CryptoAuth_SIZE, NULL);
message->length = 0;
reset(wrapper);
wrapper->user = NULL;
cryptoAuthDebug0(wrapper, "Got a connect-to-me message, sending a hello");
// Send an empty response (to initiate the connection).
encryptHandshake(message, wrapper, 1);
return Error_NONE;
}
String* user = NULL;
uint8_t passwordHashStore[32];
uint8_t* passwordHash = tryAuth(header, passwordHashStore, wrapper, &user);
if (wrapper->requireAuth && !user) {
cryptoAuthDebug0(wrapper, "DROP message because auth was not given");
return Error_AUTHENTICATION;
}
if (passwordHash == NULL && header->handshake.auth.challenge.type != 0) {
cryptoAuthDebug0(wrapper, "DROP message with unrecognized authenticator");
return Error_AUTHENTICATION;
}
// What the nextNonce will become if this packet is valid.
uint32_t nextNonce;
// The secret for decrypting this message.
uint8_t sharedSecret[32];
uint8_t* herPermKey = NULL;
if (nonce < 2) {
if (nonce == 0) {
cryptoAuthDebug(wrapper, "Received a hello packet, using auth: %d",
(passwordHash != NULL));
} else {
cryptoAuthDebug0(wrapper, "Received a repeat hello packet");
}
// Decrypt message with perminent keys.
if (!knowHerKey(wrapper) || wrapper->nextNonce == 0) {
herPermKey = header->handshake.publicKey;
#ifdef Log_DEBUG
if (Bits_isZero(header->handshake.publicKey, 32)) {
cryptoAuthDebug0(wrapper, "Node sent public key of ZERO!");
}
#endif
} else {
herPermKey = wrapper->herPerminentPubKey;
if (Bits_memcmp(header->handshake.publicKey, herPermKey, 32)) {
cryptoAuthDebug0(wrapper, "DROP packet contains different perminent key");
return Error_AUTHENTICATION;
}
}
getSharedSecret(sharedSecret,
wrapper->context->privateKey,
herPermKey,
passwordHash,
wrapper->context->logger);
nextNonce = 2;
} else {
if (nonce == 2) {
cryptoAuthDebug0(wrapper, "Received a key packet");
} else if (nonce == 3) {
cryptoAuthDebug0(wrapper, "Received a repeat key packet");
} else {
cryptoAuthDebug(wrapper, "Received a packet of unknown type! nonce=%u", nonce);
}
if (Bits_memcmp(header->handshake.publicKey, wrapper->herPerminentPubKey, 32)) {
cryptoAuthDebug0(wrapper, "DROP packet contains different perminent key");
return Error_AUTHENTICATION;
}
if (!wrapper->isInitiator) {
cryptoAuthDebug0(wrapper, "DROP a stray key packet");
return Error_AUTHENTICATION;
}
// We sent the hello, this is a key
getSharedSecret(sharedSecret,
wrapper->ourTempPrivKey,
wrapper->herPerminentPubKey,
passwordHash,
wrapper->context->logger);
nextNonce = 4;
}
// Shift it on top of the authenticator before the encrypted public key
Message_shift(message, 48 - Headers_CryptoAuth_SIZE, NULL);
#ifdef Log_KEYS
uint8_t sharedSecretHex[65];
printHexKey(sharedSecretHex, sharedSecret);
uint8_t nonceHex[49];
Hex_encode(nonceHex, 49, header->handshake.nonce, 24);
uint8_t cipherHex[65];
printHexKey(cipherHex, message->bytes);
Log_keys(wrapper->context->logger,
"Decrypting message with:\n"
" nonce: %s\n"
" secret: %s\n"
" cipher: %s\n",
nonceHex, sharedSecretHex, cipherHex);
#endif
// Decrypt her temp public key and the message.
if (decryptRndNonce(header->handshake.nonce, message, sharedSecret) != 0) {
// just in case
Bits_memset(header, 0, Headers_CryptoAuth_SIZE);
cryptoAuthDebug(wrapper, "DROP message with nonce [%d], decryption failed", nonce);
return Error_AUTHENTICATION;
}
Assert_ifParanoid(!Bits_isZero(header->handshake.encryptedTempKey, 32));
#ifdef Log_KEYS
uint8_t tempKeyHex[65];
Hex_encode(tempKeyHex, 65, header->handshake.encryptedTempKey, 32);
Log_keys(wrapper->context->logger,
"Unwrapping temp public key:\n"
" %s\n",
tempKeyHex);
#endif
Message_shift(message, -32, NULL);
// Post-decryption checking
if (nonce == 0) {
// A new hello packet
if (!Bits_memcmp(wrapper->herTempPubKey, header->handshake.encryptedTempKey, 32)) {
// possible replay attack or duped packet
cryptoAuthDebug0(wrapper, "DROP dupe hello packet with same temp key");
return Error_AUTHENTICATION;
}
} else if (nonce == 2 && wrapper->nextNonce >= 4) {
// we accept a new key packet and let it change the session since the other end might have
// killed off the session while it was in the midst of setting up.
if (!Bits_memcmp(wrapper->herTempPubKey, header->handshake.encryptedTempKey, 32)) {
Assert_true(!Bits_isZero(wrapper->herTempPubKey, 32));
cryptoAuthDebug0(wrapper, "DROP dupe key packet with same temp key");
return Error_AUTHENTICATION;
}
} else if (nonce == 3 && wrapper->nextNonce >= 4) {
// Got a repeat key packet, make sure the temp key is the same as the one we know.
if (Bits_memcmp(wrapper->herTempPubKey, header->handshake.encryptedTempKey, 32)) {
Assert_true(!Bits_isZero(wrapper->herTempPubKey, 32));
cryptoAuthDebug0(wrapper, "DROP repeat key packet with different temp key");
return Error_AUTHENTICATION;
}
}
// If Alice sent a hello packet then Bob sent a hello packet and they crossed on the wire,
// somebody has to yield and the other has to stand firm otherwise they will either deadlock
// each believing their hello packet is superior or they will livelock, each switching to the
// other's session and never synchronizing.
// In this event whoever has the lower permanent public key wins.
// If we receive a (possibly repeat) key packet
if (nextNonce == 4) {
if (wrapper->nextNonce <= 4) {
// and have not yet begun sending "run" data
Assert_true(wrapper->nextNonce <= nextNonce);
wrapper->nextNonce = nextNonce;
wrapper->user = user;
Bits_memcpyConst(wrapper->herTempPubKey, header->handshake.encryptedTempKey, 32);
} else {
// It's a (possibly repeat) key packet and we have begun sending run data.
// We will change the shared secret to the one specified in the new key packet but
// intentionally avoid de-incrementing the nonce just in case
getSharedSecret(wrapper->sharedSecret,
wrapper->ourTempPrivKey,
header->handshake.encryptedTempKey,
NULL,
wrapper->context->logger);
cryptoAuthDebug0(wrapper, "New key packet but we are already sending data");
}
} else if (nextNonce == 2 && (!wrapper->isInitiator || wrapper->established)) {
// This is a hello packet and we are either in ESTABLISHED state or we are
// not the initiator of the connection.
// If the case is that we are in ESTABLISHED state, the other side tore down the session
// and we have not so lets tear it down.
// If we are not in ESTABLISHED state then we don't allow resetting of the session unless
// they are the sender of the hello packet or their permanent public key is lower.
// this is a tie-breaker in case hello packets cross on the wire.
if (wrapper->established) {
reset(wrapper);
}
// We got a (possibly repeat) hello packet and we have not sent any hello packet,
// new session.
if (wrapper->nextNonce == 3 && nextNonce == 2) {
// We sent a key packet so the next packet is a repeat key but we got another hello
// We'll just keep steaming along sending repeat key packets
nextNonce = 3;
}
Assert_true(wrapper->nextNonce <= nextNonce);
wrapper->nextNonce = nextNonce;
wrapper->user = user;
Bits_memcpyConst(wrapper->herTempPubKey, header->handshake.encryptedTempKey, 32);
} else if (nextNonce == 2
&& Bits_memcmp(header->handshake.publicKey, wrapper->context->pub.publicKey, 32) < 0)
{
// It's a hello and we are the initiator but their permant public key is numerically lower
// than ours, this is so that in the event of two hello packets crossing on the wire, the
// nodes will agree on who is the initiator.
cryptoAuthDebug0(wrapper, "Incoming hello from node with lower key, resetting");
reset(wrapper);
Assert_true(wrapper->nextNonce <= nextNonce);
wrapper->nextNonce = nextNonce;
wrapper->user = user;
Bits_memcpyConst(wrapper->herTempPubKey, header->handshake.encryptedTempKey, 32);
} else {
cryptoAuthDebug0(wrapper, "Incoming hello from node with higher key, not resetting");
}
if (herPermKey && herPermKey != wrapper->herPerminentPubKey) {
Bits_memcpyConst(wrapper->herPerminentPubKey, herPermKey, 32);
}
// If this is a handshake which was initiated in reverse because we
// didn't know the other node's key, now send what we were going to send.
if (wrapper->bufferedMessage) {
// This can only happen when we have received a (maybe repeat) hello packet.
Assert_true(wrapper->nextNonce == 2);
struct Message* bm = wrapper->bufferedMessage;
wrapper->bufferedMessage = NULL;
cryptoAuthDebug0(wrapper, "Sending buffered message");
sendMessage(bm, &wrapper->externalInterface);
Allocator_free(bm->alloc);
}
if (message->length == 0 && Headers_isSetupPacket(&header->handshake.auth)) {
return Error_NONE;
}
Bits_memset(&wrapper->replayProtector, 0, sizeof(struct ReplayProtector));
setRequiredPadding(wrapper);
return callReceivedMessage(wrapper, message);
}
static uint8_t encryptHandshake(struct Message* message,
struct CryptoAuth_Wrapper* wrapper,
int setupMessage)
{
Message_shift(message, sizeof(union Headers_CryptoAuth), NULL);
union Headers_CryptoAuth* header = (union Headers_CryptoAuth*) message->bytes;
// garbage the auth challenge and set the nonce which follows it
Random_bytes(wrapper->context->rand, (uint8_t*) &header->handshake.auth,
sizeof(union Headers_AuthChallenge) + 24);
// set the permanent key
Bits_memcpyConst(&header->handshake.publicKey, wrapper->context->pub.publicKey, 32);
if (!knowHerKey(wrapper)) {
return genReverseHandshake(message, wrapper, header);
} else if (!Bits_isZero(wrapper->herIp6, 16)) {
// If someone starts a CA session and then discovers the key later and memcpy's it into the
// result of getHerPublicKey() then we want to make sure they didn't memcpy in an invalid
// key.
uint8_t calculatedIp6[16];
AddressCalc_addressForPublicKey(calculatedIp6, wrapper->herPerminentPubKey);
Assert_true(!Bits_memcmp(wrapper->herIp6, calculatedIp6, 16));
}
if (wrapper->bufferedMessage) {
// We wanted to send a message but we didn't know the peer's key so we buffered it
// and sent a connectToMe.
// Now we just discovered their key and we're sending a hello packet.
// Lets send 2 hello packets instead and on one will attach our buffered message.
// This can never happen when the machine is beyond the first hello packet because
// it should have been sent either by this or in the recipet of a hello packet from
// the other node.
Assert_true(wrapper->nextNonce == 0);
struct Message* bm = wrapper->bufferedMessage;
wrapper->bufferedMessage = NULL;
cryptoAuthDebug0(wrapper, "Sending buffered message");
sendMessage(bm, &wrapper->externalInterface);
Allocator_free(bm->alloc);
}
// Password auth
uint8_t* passwordHash = NULL;
struct CryptoAuth_Auth auth;
if (wrapper->password != NULL) {
passwordHash = hashPassword(&auth, wrapper->password, wrapper->authType);
Bits_memcpyConst(header->handshake.auth.bytes,
&auth.challenge,
sizeof(union Headers_AuthChallenge));
}
header->handshake.auth.challenge.type = wrapper->authType;
// Packet authentication option is deprecated, it must always be enabled.
Headers_setPacketAuthRequired(&header->handshake.auth, 1);
// This is a special packet which the user should never see.
Headers_setSetupPacket(&header->handshake.auth, setupMessage);
// Set the session state
uint32_t sessionState_be = Endian_hostToBigEndian32(wrapper->nextNonce);
header->nonce = sessionState_be;
if (wrapper->nextNonce == 0 || wrapper->nextNonce == 2) {
// If we're sending a hello or a key
// Here we make up a temp keypair
Random_bytes(wrapper->context->rand, wrapper->ourTempPrivKey, 32);
crypto_scalarmult_curve25519_base(wrapper->ourTempPubKey, wrapper->ourTempPrivKey);
#ifdef Log_KEYS
uint8_t tempPrivateKeyHex[65];
Hex_encode(tempPrivateKeyHex, 65, wrapper->ourTempPrivKey, 32);
uint8_t tempPubKeyHex[65];
Hex_encode(tempPubKeyHex, 65, header->handshake.encryptedTempKey, 32);
Log_keys(wrapper->context->logger, "Generating temporary keypair\n"
" myTempPrivateKey=%s\n"
" myTempPublicKey=%s\n",
tempPrivateKeyHex, tempPubKeyHex);
#endif
}
Bits_memcpyConst(header->handshake.encryptedTempKey, wrapper->ourTempPubKey, 32);
#ifdef Log_KEYS
uint8_t tempKeyHex[65];
Hex_encode(tempKeyHex, 65, header->handshake.encryptedTempKey, 32);
Log_keys(wrapper->context->logger,
"Wrapping temp public key:\n"
" %s\n",
tempKeyHex);
#endif
cryptoAuthDebug(wrapper, "Sending %s%s packet",
((wrapper->nextNonce & 1) ? "repeat " : ""),
((wrapper->nextNonce < 2) ? "hello" : "key"));
uint8_t sharedSecret[32];
if (wrapper->nextNonce < 2) {
getSharedSecret(sharedSecret,
wrapper->context->privateKey,
wrapper->herPerminentPubKey,
passwordHash,
wrapper->context->logger);
wrapper->isInitiator = true;
Assert_true(wrapper->nextNonce <= 1);
wrapper->nextNonce = 1;
} else {
// Handshake2
// herTempPubKey was set by receiveMessage()
Assert_ifParanoid(!Bits_isZero(wrapper->herTempPubKey, 32));
getSharedSecret(sharedSecret,
wrapper->context->privateKey,
wrapper->herTempPubKey,
passwordHash,
wrapper->context->logger);
Assert_true(wrapper->nextNonce <= 3);
wrapper->nextNonce = 3;
#ifdef Log_KEYS
uint8_t tempKeyHex[65];
Hex_encode(tempKeyHex, 65, wrapper->herTempPubKey, 32);
Log_keys(wrapper->context->logger,
"Using their temp public key:\n"
" %s\n",
tempKeyHex);
#endif
}
// Shift message over the encryptedTempKey field.
Message_shift(message, 32 - Headers_CryptoAuth_SIZE, NULL);
encryptRndNonce(header->handshake.nonce, message, sharedSecret);
#ifdef Log_KEYS
uint8_t sharedSecretHex[65];
printHexKey(sharedSecretHex, sharedSecret);
uint8_t nonceHex[49];
Hex_encode(nonceHex, 49, header->handshake.nonce, 24);
uint8_t cipherHex[65];
printHexKey(cipherHex, message->bytes);
Log_keys(wrapper->context->logger,
"Encrypting message with:\n"
" nonce: %s\n"
" secret: %s\n"
" cipher: %s\n",
nonceHex, sharedSecretHex, cipherHex);
#endif
// Shift it back -- encryptRndNonce adds 16 bytes of authenticator.
Message_shift(message, Headers_CryptoAuth_SIZE - 32 - 16, NULL);
return wrapper->wrappedInterface->sendMessage(message, wrapper->wrappedInterface);
}
/** @return 0 on success, -1 otherwise. */
int CryptoAuth_decrypt(struct CryptoAuth_Session* sessionPub, struct Message* msg)
{
struct CryptoAuth_Session_pvt* session =
Identity_check((struct CryptoAuth_Session_pvt*) sessionPub);
union CryptoHeader* header = (union CryptoHeader*) msg->bytes;
if (msg->length < 20) {
cryptoAuthDebug0(session, "DROP runt");
return -1;
}
Assert_true(msg->padding >= 12 || "need at least 12 bytes of padding in incoming message");
Assert_true(!((uintptr_t)msg->bytes % 4) || !"alignment fault");
Assert_true(!(msg->capacity % 4) || !"length fault");
Message_shift(msg, -4, NULL);
uint32_t nonce = Endian_bigEndianToHost32(header->nonce);
if (!session->established) {
if (nonce > 3) {
if (session->nextNonce < 3) {
// This is impossible because we have not exchanged hello and key messages.
cryptoAuthDebug0(session, "DROP Received a run message to an un-setup session");
return -1;
}
cryptoAuthDebug(session, "Trying final handshake step, nonce=%u\n", nonce);
uint8_t secret[32];
Assert_ifParanoid(!Bits_isZero(session->ourTempPrivKey, 32));
Assert_ifParanoid(!Bits_isZero(session->herTempPubKey, 32));
getSharedSecret(secret,
session->ourTempPrivKey,
session->herTempPubKey,
NULL,
session->context->logger);
if (decryptMessage(session, nonce, msg, secret)) {
cryptoAuthDebug0(session, "Final handshake step succeeded");
Bits_memcpyConst(session->sharedSecret, secret, 32);
// Now we're in run mode, no more handshake packets will be accepted
Bits_memset(session->ourTempPrivKey, 0, 32);
Bits_memset(session->ourTempPubKey, 0, 32);
Bits_memset(session->herTempPubKey, 0, 32);
session->established = true;
session->nextNonce += 3;
updateTime(session, msg);
return 0;
}
cryptoAuthDebug0(session, "DROP Final handshake step failed");
return -1;
}
Message_shift(msg, 4, NULL);
return decryptHandshake(session, nonce, msg, header);
} else if (nonce > 3) {
Assert_ifParanoid(!Bits_isZero(session->sharedSecret, 32));
if (decryptMessage(session, nonce, msg, session->sharedSecret)) {
updateTime(session, msg);
return 0;
} else {
cryptoAuthDebug0(session, "DROP Failed to decrypt message");
return -1;
}
} else if (nonce < 2) {
cryptoAuthDebug(session, "hello packet during established session nonce=[%d]", nonce);
Message_shift(msg, 4, NULL);
return decryptHandshake(session, nonce, msg, header);
} else {
// setup keys are already zeroed, not much we can do here.
cryptoAuthDebug(session, "DROP key packet during established session nonce=[%d]", nonce);
return -1;
}
Assert_true(0);
}
static void encryptHandshake(struct Message* message,
struct CryptoAuth_Session_pvt* session,
int setupMessage)
{
Message_shift(message, sizeof(union CryptoHeader), NULL);
union CryptoHeader* header = (union CryptoHeader*) message->bytes;
// garbage the auth challenge and set the nonce which follows it
Random_bytes(session->context->rand, (uint8_t*) &header->handshake.auth,
sizeof(union CryptoHeader_Challenge) + 24);
// set the permanent key
Bits_memcpyConst(&header->handshake.publicKey, session->context->pub.publicKey, 32);
Assert_true(knowHerKey(session));
uint8_t calculatedIp6[16];
AddressCalc_addressForPublicKey(calculatedIp6, session->pub.herPublicKey);
if (!Bits_isZero(session->pub.herIp6, 16)) {
// If someone starts a CA session and then discovers the key later and memcpy's it into the
// result of getHerPublicKey() then we want to make sure they didn't memcpy in an invalid
// key.
Assert_true(!Bits_memcmp(session->pub.herIp6, calculatedIp6, 16));
}
// Password auth
uint8_t* passwordHash = NULL;
uint8_t passwordHashStore[32];
if (session->password != NULL) {
hashPassword(passwordHashStore,
&header->handshake.auth,
session->login,
session->password,
session->authType);
passwordHash = passwordHashStore;
} else {
header->handshake.auth.challenge.type = session->authType;
header->handshake.auth.challenge.additional = 0;
}
// Set the session state
header->nonce = Endian_hostToBigEndian32(session->nextNonce);
if (session->nextNonce == 0 || session->nextNonce == 2) {
// If we're sending a hello or a key
// Here we make up a temp keypair
Random_bytes(session->context->rand, session->ourTempPrivKey, 32);
crypto_scalarmult_curve25519_base(session->ourTempPubKey, session->ourTempPrivKey);
if (Defined(Log_KEYS)) {
uint8_t tempPrivateKeyHex[65];
Hex_encode(tempPrivateKeyHex, 65, session->ourTempPrivKey, 32);
uint8_t tempPubKeyHex[65];
Hex_encode(tempPubKeyHex, 65, session->ourTempPubKey, 32);
Log_keys(session->context->logger, "Generating temporary keypair\n"
" myTempPrivateKey=%s\n"
" myTempPublicKey=%s\n",
tempPrivateKeyHex, tempPubKeyHex);
}
}
Bits_memcpyConst(header->handshake.encryptedTempKey, session->ourTempPubKey, 32);
if (Defined(Log_KEYS)) {
uint8_t tempKeyHex[65];
Hex_encode(tempKeyHex, 65, header->handshake.encryptedTempKey, 32);
Log_keys(session->context->logger,
"Wrapping temp public key:\n"
" %s\n",
tempKeyHex);
}
cryptoAuthDebug(session, "Sending %s%s packet",
((session->nextNonce & 1) ? "repeat " : ""),
((session->nextNonce < 2) ? "hello" : "key"));
uint8_t sharedSecret[32];
if (session->nextNonce < 2) {
getSharedSecret(sharedSecret,
session->context->privateKey,
session->pub.herPublicKey,
passwordHash,
session->context->logger);
session->isInitiator = true;
Assert_true(session->nextNonce <= 1);
session->nextNonce = 1;
} else {
// Handshake2
// herTempPubKey was set by decryptHandshake()
Assert_ifParanoid(!Bits_isZero(session->herTempPubKey, 32));
getSharedSecret(sharedSecret,
session->context->privateKey,
session->herTempPubKey,
passwordHash,
session->context->logger);
Assert_true(session->nextNonce <= 3);
session->nextNonce = 3;
if (Defined(Log_KEYS)) {
uint8_t tempKeyHex[65];
Hex_encode(tempKeyHex, 65, session->herTempPubKey, 32);
Log_keys(session->context->logger,
"Using their temp public key:\n"
" %s\n",
tempKeyHex);
}
}
// Shift message over the encryptedTempKey field.
Message_shift(message, 32 - CryptoHeader_SIZE, NULL);
encryptRndNonce(header->handshake.nonce, message, sharedSecret);
if (Defined(Log_KEYS)) {
uint8_t sharedSecretHex[65];
printHexKey(sharedSecretHex, sharedSecret);
uint8_t nonceHex[49];
Hex_encode(nonceHex, 49, header->handshake.nonce, 24);
uint8_t cipherHex[65];
printHexKey(cipherHex, message->bytes);
Log_keys(session->context->logger,
"Encrypting message with:\n"
" nonce: %s\n"
" secret: %s\n"
" cipher: %s\n",
nonceHex, sharedSecretHex, cipherHex);
}
// Shift it back -- encryptRndNonce adds 16 bytes of authenticator.
Message_shift(message, CryptoHeader_SIZE - 32 - 16, NULL);
}
int main(int argc, char** argv)
{
Assert_ifParanoid(argc > 0);
struct Allocator* allocator = MallocAllocator_new(1<<23);
if (argc != 6 || (argc == 2 &&
(!(CString_strcmp(argv[1], "--help") == 0) || (CString_strcmp(argv[1], "-h") == 0)))) {
return usage(allocator, argv[0]);
}
struct Except* eh = NULL;
struct EventBase* eventBase = EventBase_new(allocator);
struct Log* logger = FileWriterLog_new(stdout, allocator);
String* privateKey = String_new(argv[3], allocator);
String* adminBind = String_new(argv[4], allocator);
String* adminPass = String_new(argv[5], allocator);
String* logTo = String_new("stdout", allocator);
// --------------------- Welcome to cjdns ---------------------- //
char* sysInfo = SysInfo_describe(SysInfo_detect(), allocator);
Log_info(logger, "Cjdns %s %s", ArchInfo_getArchStr(), sysInfo);
// --------------------- Setup Pipes to Angel --------------------- //
struct Allocator* corePipeAlloc = Allocator_child(allocator);
String* corePipeDir = String_new(argv[1], allocator);
String* corePipeName = String_new(argv[2], allocator);
if (!Defined(win32) && access(corePipeDir->bytes, W_OK)) {
Except_throw(eh, "Don't have write permission to [%s].", corePipeDir->bytes);
}
Assert_ifParanoid(EventBase_eventCount(eventBase) == 0);
struct Pipe* corePipe = Pipe_named(corePipeDir->bytes, corePipeName->bytes,
eventBase, eh, corePipeAlloc);
Assert_ifParanoid(EventBase_eventCount(eventBase) == 2);
corePipe->logger = logger;
// --------------------- Pre-Configure Core ------------------------- //
Dict* preConf = Dict_new(allocator);
Dict* adminPreConf = Dict_new(allocator);
Dict* logPreConf = Dict_new(allocator);
Dict_putDict(preConf, String_CONST("admin"), adminPreConf, allocator);
Dict_putDict(preConf, String_CONST("logging"), logPreConf, allocator);
Dict_putString(preConf, String_CONST("privateKey"), privateKey, allocator);
Dict_putString(adminPreConf, String_CONST("bind"), adminBind, allocator);
Dict_putString(adminPreConf, String_CONST("pass"), adminPass, allocator);
Dict_putString(logPreConf, String_CONST("logTo"), logTo, allocator);
struct Message* toCoreMsg = Message_new(0, 1024, allocator);
BencMessageWriter_write(preConf, toCoreMsg, eh);
Iface_CALL(corePipe->iface.send, toCoreMsg, &corePipe->iface);
Log_debug(logger, "Sent [%d] bytes to core.", toCoreMsg->length);
// --------------------- Get Response from Core --------------------- //
struct Message* fromCoreMsg =
InterfaceWaiter_waitForData(&corePipe->iface, eventBase, allocator, eh);
Dict* responseFromCore = BencMessageReader_read(fromCoreMsg, allocator, eh);
// --------------------- Close the Core Pipe --------------------- //
Allocator_free(corePipeAlloc);
corePipe = NULL;
// --------------------- Get Admin Addr/Port/Passwd --------------------- //
Dict* responseFromCoreAdmin = Dict_getDict(responseFromCore, String_CONST("admin"));
adminBind = Dict_getString(responseFromCoreAdmin, String_CONST("bind"));
if (!adminBind) {
Except_throw(eh, "Didn't get ADMIN_BIND back from cjdroute.");
}
struct Sockaddr_storage adminAddr;
if (Sockaddr_parse(adminBind->bytes, &adminAddr)) {
Except_throw(eh, "Unable to parse [%s] as an IP address:port.",
adminBind->bytes);
}
Assert_ifParanoid(EventBase_eventCount(eventBase) == 0);
Log_info(logger, "Admin API ready at [%s].", adminBind->bytes);
return 0;
}