/*! * @brief Authenticate and decrypt a (CCM) stream. * * @param user_ctx The user's context * @param auth_ctx Info on this Auth operation * @param cipher_key_info Key to encrypt payload * @param auth_key_info (unused - same key in CCM) * @param auth_data_length Length in bytes of @a auth_data * @param auth_data Any auth-only data * @param payload_length Length in bytes of @a payload * @param ct The encrypted data * @param auth_value The authentication code to validate * @param[out] payload The location to store decrypted data * * @return A return code of type #fsl_shw_return_t. */ fsl_shw_return_t fsl_shw_auth_decrypt(fsl_shw_uco_t * user_ctx, fsl_shw_acco_t * auth_ctx, fsl_shw_sko_t * cipher_key_info, fsl_shw_sko_t * auth_key_info, uint32_t auth_data_length, const uint8_t * auth_data, uint32_t payload_length, const uint8_t * ct, const uint8_t * auth_value, uint8_t * payload) { SAH_SF_DCLS; uint8_t *calced_auth = NULL; unsigned blocking = user_ctx->flags & FSL_UCO_BLOCKING_MODE; SAH_SF_USER_CHECK(); /* Only support INIT and FINALIZE flags right now. */ if (auth_ctx->mode != FSL_ACC_MODE_CCM) { ret = FSL_RETURN_BAD_MODE_S; goto out; } if ((auth_ctx->flags & (FSL_ACCO_CTX_INIT | FSL_ACCO_CTX_LOAD | FSL_ACCO_CTX_SAVE | FSL_ACCO_CTX_FINALIZE)) != (FSL_ACCO_CTX_INIT | FSL_ACCO_CTX_FINALIZE)) { ret = FSL_RETURN_BAD_FLAG_S; goto out; } ret = load_ctr_key(&desc_chain, user_ctx, auth_ctx, cipher_key_info); if (ret != FSL_RETURN_OK_S) { goto out; } /* Decrypt the MAC which the user passed in */ header = SAH_HDR_SKHA_ENC_DEC; DESC_IN_OUT(header, auth_ctx->mac_length, auth_value, auth_ctx->mac_length, auth_ctx->unencrypted_mac); #ifndef NO_ZERO_IV_LOAD ret = load_dummy_iv(&desc_chain, user_ctx, 1, auth_ctx->auth_info.CCM_ctx_info.block_size_bytes); #endif if (auth_data_length > 0) { ret = add_assoc_preamble(&desc_chain, user_ctx, auth_ctx, auth_data, auth_data_length); if (ret != FSL_RETURN_OK_S) { goto out; } } /* if auth_data_length > 0 */ ret = process_payload(&desc_chain, user_ctx, 0, payload_length, ct, payload); if (ret != FSL_RETURN_OK_S) { goto out; } /* Now pull CBC context (unencrypted MAC) out for comparison. */ /* Need to allocate a place for it, to handle non-blocking mode * when this stack frame will disappear! */ calced_auth = DESC_TEMP_ALLOC(auth_ctx->mac_length); ret = extract_mac(&desc_chain, user_ctx, auth_ctx->mac_length, calced_auth); if (ret != FSL_RETURN_OK_S) { goto out; } if (!blocking) { /* get_results will need this for comparison */ desc_chain->out1_ptr = calced_auth; desc_chain->out2_ptr = auth_ctx->unencrypted_mac; desc_chain->out_len = auth_ctx->mac_length; } SAH_SF_EXECUTE(); if (blocking && (ret == FSL_RETURN_OK_S)) { unsigned i; /* Validate the auth code */ for (i = 0; i < auth_ctx->mac_length; i++) { if (calced_auth[i] != auth_ctx->unencrypted_mac[i]) { ret = FSL_RETURN_AUTH_FAILED_S; break; } } } out: SAH_SF_DESC_CLEAN(); DESC_TEMP_FREE(calced_auth); (void)auth_key_info; return ret; } /* fsl_shw_gen_decrypt() */
/*! * Perform unwrapping of a black key into a RED slot * * @param user_ctx A user context from #fsl_shw_register_user(). * @param[in,out] key_info The information about the key to be which will * be unwrapped... key length, slot info, etc. * @param black_key Encrypted key * * @return A return code of type #fsl_shw_return_t. */ static fsl_shw_return_t unwrap(fsl_shw_uco_t * user_ctx, fsl_shw_sko_t * key_info, const uint8_t * black_key) { SAH_SF_DCLS; uint8_t *hmac = NULL; fsl_shw_sko_t t_key_info; sah_Link *link1 = NULL; sah_Link *link2 = NULL; unsigned i; unsigned rounded_key_length; unsigned original_key_length = key_info->key_length; hmac = DESC_TEMP_ALLOC(ICV_LENGTH); /* Set up key_info for "T" - use same slot as eventual key */ fsl_shw_sko_init(&t_key_info, FSL_KEY_ALG_AES); t_key_info.userid = key_info->userid; t_key_info.handle = key_info->handle; t_key_info.flags = key_info->flags; t_key_info.key_length = T_LENGTH; t_key_info.keystore = key_info->keystore; /* Validate SW flags to prevent misuse */ if ((key_info->flags & FSL_SKO_KEY_SW_KEY) && !(black_key[FLAGS_OFFSET] & FLAGS_SW_KEY)) { ret = FSL_RETURN_BAD_FLAG_S; goto out; } /* Compute T = SLID_decrypt(T'); leave in RED slot */ if (key_info->keystore == NULL) { /* Key goes in system keystore */ ret = do_system_keystore_slot_decrypt(user_ctx, key_info->userid, t_key_info.handle, T_LENGTH, black_key + T_PRIME_OFFSET); } else { /* Key goes in user keystore */ ret = keystore_slot_decrypt(user_ctx, key_info->keystore, key_info->userid, t_key_info.handle, T_LENGTH, black_key + T_PRIME_OFFSET); } if (ret != FSL_RETURN_OK_S) { goto out; } /* Compute ICV = HMAC(T, ownerid | len | alg | key' */ ret = create_icv_calc(user_ctx, &desc_chain, &t_key_info, black_key, original_key_length, hmac); if (ret != FSL_RETURN_OK_S) { #ifdef DIAG_SECURITY_FUNC LOG_DIAG("Creation of sah_Key_Link failed due to bad key" " flag!\n"); #endif /*DIAG_SECURITY_FUNC */ goto out; } #ifdef DIAG_SECURITY_FUNC LOG_DIAG("Validating MAC of wrapped key"); #endif SAH_SF_EXECUTE(); if (ret != FSL_RETURN_OK_S) { goto out; } SAH_SF_DESC_CLEAN(); /* Check computed ICV against value in Black Key */ for (i = 0; i < ICV_LENGTH; i++) { if (black_key[ICV_OFFSET + i] != hmac[i]) { #ifdef DIAG_SECURITY_FUNC LOG_DIAG_ARGS("computed ICV fails at offset %i\n", i); { char buff[300]; int a; for (a = 0; a < ICV_LENGTH; a++) sprintf(&(buff[a * 2]), "%02x", black_key[ICV_OFFSET + a]); buff[a * 2 + 1] = 0; LOG_DIAG_ARGS("black key: %s", buff); for (a = 0; a < ICV_LENGTH; a++) sprintf(&(buff[a * 2]), "%02x", hmac[a]); buff[a * 2 + 1] = 0; LOG_DIAG_ARGS("hmac: %s", buff); } #endif ret = FSL_RETURN_AUTH_FAILED_S; goto out; } } /* This is no longer needed. */ DESC_TEMP_FREE(hmac); /* Compute KEK = SHA256(T | ownerid). Rewrite slot with value */ header = (SAH_HDR_MDHA_SET_MODE_HASH /* #8 */ ^ sah_insert_mdha_init ^ sah_insert_mdha_algorithm_sha256 ^ sah_insert_mdha_pdata); /* Input - Start with T */ ret = sah_Create_Key_Link(user_ctx->mem_util, &link1, &t_key_info); if (ret != FSL_RETURN_OK_S) { goto out; } /* Still input - append ownerid */ ret = sah_Append_Link(user_ctx->mem_util, link1, (void *)&key_info->userid, sizeof(key_info->userid), SAH_USES_LINK_DATA); if (ret != FSL_RETURN_OK_S) { goto out; } /* Output - KEK goes into RED slot */ ret = sah_Create_Key_Link(user_ctx->mem_util, &link2, &t_key_info); if (ret != FSL_RETURN_OK_S) { goto out; } /* Put the Hash calculation into the chain. */ ret = sah_Append_Desc(user_ctx->mem_util, &desc_chain, header, link1, link2); if (ret != FSL_RETURN_OK_S) { goto out; } /* Compute KEY = AES-decrypt(KEK, KEY') */ header = (SAH_HDR_SKHA_SET_MODE_IV_KEY /* #1 */ ^ sah_insert_skha_mode_ctr ^ sah_insert_skha_algorithm_aes ^ sah_insert_skha_modulus_128); /* Load KEK in as the key to use */ DESC_IN_KEY(header, 0, NULL, &t_key_info); rounded_key_length = ROUND_LENGTH(original_key_length); key_info->key_length = rounded_key_length; /* Now set up for computation. Result in RED */ header = SAH_HDR_SKHA_ENC_DEC; /* #4 */ DESC_IN_KEY(header, rounded_key_length, black_key + KEY_PRIME_OFFSET, key_info); /* Perform the operation */ #ifdef DIAG_SECURITY_FUNC LOG_DIAG("Decrypting key with KEK"); #endif SAH_SF_EXECUTE(); out: key_info->key_length = original_key_length; SAH_SF_DESC_CLEAN(); DESC_TEMP_FREE(hmac); /* Erase tracks */ t_key_info.userid = 0xdeadbeef; t_key_info.handle = 0xdeadbeef; return ret; } /* unwrap */
/*! * @brief Authenticate and decrypt a (CCM) stream. * * @param user_ctx The user's context * @param auth_ctx Info on this Auth operation * @param cipher_key_info Key to encrypt payload * @param auth_key_info (unused - same key in CCM) * @param auth_data_length Length in bytes of @a auth_data * @param auth_data Any auth-only data * @param payload_length Length in bytes of @a payload * @param ct The encrypted data * @param auth_value The authentication code to validate * @param[out] payload The location to store decrypted data * * @return A return code of type #fsl_shw_return_t. */ fsl_shw_return_t fsl_shw_auth_decrypt(fsl_shw_uco_t * user_ctx, fsl_shw_acco_t * auth_ctx, fsl_shw_sko_t * cipher_key_info, fsl_shw_sko_t * auth_key_info, uint32_t auth_data_length, const uint8_t * auth_data, uint32_t payload_length, const uint8_t * ct, const uint8_t * auth_value, uint8_t * payload) { SAH_SF_DCLS; #if defined(FSL_HAVE_SAHARA2) || defined(USE_S2_CCM_DECRYPT_CHAIN) uint8_t *calced_auth = NULL; unsigned blocking = user_ctx->flags & FSL_UCO_BLOCKING_MODE; #endif SAH_SF_USER_CHECK(); /* Only support CCM */ if (auth_ctx->mode != FSL_ACC_MODE_CCM) { ret = FSL_RETURN_BAD_MODE_S; goto out; } /* Only support INIT and FINALIZE flags right now. */ if ((auth_ctx->flags & (FSL_ACCO_CTX_INIT | FSL_ACCO_CTX_LOAD | FSL_ACCO_CTX_SAVE | FSL_ACCO_CTX_FINALIZE)) != (FSL_ACCO_CTX_INIT | FSL_ACCO_CTX_FINALIZE)) { ret = FSL_RETURN_BAD_FLAG_S; goto out; } /* Load CTR0 and Key */ header = SAH_HDR_SKHA_SET_MODE_IV_KEY ^ sah_insert_skha_mode_ctr ^ sah_insert_skha_modulus_128; #if defined (FSL_HAVE_SAHARA4) && !defined (USE_S2_CCM_DECRYPT_CHAIN) header ^= sah_insert_skha_aux0; #endif DESC_IN_KEY(header, auth_ctx->cipher_ctx_info.block_size_bytes, auth_ctx->cipher_ctx_info.context, cipher_key_info); /* Decrypt the MAC which the user passed in */ header = SAH_HDR_SKHA_ENC_DEC; DESC_IN_OUT(header, auth_ctx->mac_length, auth_value, auth_ctx->mac_length, auth_ctx->unencrypted_mac); #if defined(FSL_HAVE_SAHARA2) || defined(USE_S2_CCM_DECRYPT_CHAIN) #ifndef NO_ZERO_IV_LOAD header = (SAH_HDR_SKHA_SET_MODE_IV_KEY ^ sah_insert_skha_encrypt ^ sah_insert_skha_mode_cbc); DESC_IN_IN(header, auth_ctx->auth_info.CCM_ctx_info.block_size_bytes, block_zeros, 0, NULL); #endif #endif ret = add_assoc_preamble(&desc_chain, user_ctx, auth_ctx, 0, auth_data, auth_data_length); if (ret != FSL_RETURN_OK_S) { goto out; } /* Process the payload */ header = (SAH_HDR_SKHA_SET_MODE_ENC_DEC ^ sah_insert_skha_mode_ccm ^ sah_insert_skha_modulus_128); #if defined (FSL_HAVE_SAHARA4) && !defined (USE_S2_CCM_DECRYPT_CHAIN) header ^= sah_insert_skha_aux0; #endif if (payload_length != 0) { DESC_IN_OUT(header, payload_length, ct, payload_length, payload); } else { DESC_IN_OUT(header, 0, NULL, 0, NULL); } #if defined (FSL_HAVE_SAHARA2) || defined (USE_S2_CCM_DECRYPT_CHAIN) /* Now pull CBC context (unencrypted MAC) out for comparison. */ /* Need to allocate a place for it, to handle non-blocking mode * when this stack frame will disappear! */ calced_auth = DESC_TEMP_ALLOC(auth_ctx->mac_length); header = SAH_HDR_SKHA_READ_CONTEXT_IV; DESC_OUT_OUT(header, 0, NULL, auth_ctx->mac_length, calced_auth); if (!blocking) { /* get_results will need this for comparison */ desc_chain->out1_ptr = calced_auth; desc_chain->out2_ptr = auth_ctx->unencrypted_mac; desc_chain->out_len = auth_ctx->mac_length; } #endif SAH_SF_EXECUTE(); #if defined (FSL_HAVE_SAHARA2) || defined (USE_S2_CCM_DECRYPT_CHAIN) if (blocking && (ret == FSL_RETURN_OK_S)) { unsigned i; /* Validate the auth code */ for (i = 0; i < auth_ctx->mac_length; i++) { if (calced_auth[i] != auth_ctx->unencrypted_mac[i]) { ret = FSL_RETURN_AUTH_FAILED_S; break; } } } #endif out: SAH_SF_DESC_CLEAN(); #if defined (FSL_HAVE_SAHARA2) || defined (USE_S2_CCM_DECRYPT_CHAIN) DESC_TEMP_FREE(calced_auth); #endif (void)auth_key_info; return ret; } /* fsl_shw_gen_decrypt() */
/*! * Create and run the chain for a symmetric-key operation. * * @param user_ctx Who the user is * @param key_info What key is to be used * @param sym_ctx Info details about algorithm * @param encrypt 0 = decrypt, non-zero = encrypt * @param length Number of octets at @a in and @a out * @param in Pointer to input data * @param out Location to store output data * * @return The status of handing chain to driver, * or an earlier argument/flag or allocation * error. */ static fsl_shw_return_t do_symmetric(fsl_shw_uco_t * user_ctx, fsl_shw_sko_t * key_info, fsl_shw_scco_t * sym_ctx, cipher_direction_t encrypt, uint32_t length, const uint8_t * in, uint8_t * out) { SAH_SF_DCLS; uint8_t *sink = NULL; sah_Link *link1 = NULL; sah_Link *link2 = NULL; sah_Oct_Str ptr1; uint32_t size1 = sym_ctx->block_size_bytes; SAH_SF_USER_CHECK(); /* Two different sets of chains, depending on algorithm */ if (key_info->algorithm == FSL_KEY_ALG_ARC4) { if (sym_ctx->flags & FSL_SYM_CTX_INIT) { /* Desc. #35 w/ARC4 - start from key */ header = SAH_HDR_ARC4_SET_MODE_KEY ^ sah_insert_skha_algorithm_arc4; DESC_IN_KEY(header, 0, NULL, key_info); } else { /* load SBox */ /* Desc. #33 w/ARC4 and NO PERMUTE */ header = SAH_HDR_ARC4_SET_MODE_SBOX ^ sah_insert_skha_no_permute ^ sah_insert_skha_algorithm_arc4; DESC_IN_IN(header, 256, sym_ctx->context, 3, sym_ctx->context + 256); } /* load SBox */ /* Add in-out data descriptor to process the data */ if (length != 0) { DESC_IN_OUT(SAH_HDR_SKHA_ENC_DEC, length, in, length, out); } /* Operation is done ... save what came out? */ if (sym_ctx->flags & FSL_SYM_CTX_SAVE) { /* Desc. #34 - Read SBox, pointers */ header = SAH_HDR_ARC4_READ_SBOX; DESC_OUT_OUT(header, 256, sym_ctx->context, 3, sym_ctx->context + 256); } } else { /* not ARC4 */ /* Doing 1- or 2- descriptor chain. */ /* Desc. #1 and algorithm and mode */ header = SAH_HDR_SKHA_SET_MODE_IV_KEY ^ sah_insert_skha_mode[sym_ctx->mode] ^ sah_insert_skha_algorithm[key_info->algorithm]; /* Honor 'no key parity checking' for DES and TDES */ if ((key_info->flags & FSL_SKO_KEY_IGNORE_PARITY) && ((key_info->algorithm == FSL_KEY_ALG_DES) || (key_info->algorithm == FSL_KEY_ALG_TDES))) { header ^= sah_insert_skha_no_key_parity; } /* Header by default is decrypting, so... */ if (encrypt == SYM_ENCRYPT) { header ^= sah_insert_skha_encrypt; } if (sym_ctx->mode == FSL_SYM_MODE_CTR) { header ^= sah_insert_skha_modulus[sym_ctx->modulus_exp]; } if (sym_ctx->mode == FSL_SYM_MODE_ECB) { ptr1 = NULL; size1 = 0; } else if (sym_ctx->flags & FSL_SYM_CTX_INIT) { ptr1 = (uint8_t *) block_zeros; } else { ptr1 = sym_ctx->context; } DESC_IN_KEY(header, sym_ctx->block_size_bytes, ptr1, key_info); /* Add in-out data descriptor */ if (length != 0) { header = SAH_HDR_SKHA_ENC_DEC; if (LENGTH_PATCH && (sym_ctx->mode == FSL_SYM_MODE_CTR) && ((length & LENGTH_PATCH_MASK) != 0)) { sink = DESC_TEMP_ALLOC(LENGTH_PATCH); ret = sah_Create_Link(user_ctx->mem_util, &link1, (uint8_t *) in, length, SAH_USES_LINK_DATA); ret = sah_Append_Link(user_ctx->mem_util, link1, (uint8_t *) sink, LENGTH_PATCH - (length & LENGTH_PATCH_MASK), SAH_USES_LINK_DATA); if (ret != FSL_RETURN_OK_S) { goto out; } ret = sah_Create_Link(user_ctx->mem_util, &link2, out, length, SAH_USES_LINK_DATA | SAH_OUTPUT_LINK); if (ret != FSL_RETURN_OK_S) { goto out; } ret = sah_Append_Link(user_ctx->mem_util, link2, sink, LENGTH_PATCH - (length & LENGTH_PATCH_MASK), SAH_USES_LINK_DATA); if (ret != FSL_RETURN_OK_S) { goto out; } ret = sah_Append_Desc(user_ctx->mem_util, &desc_chain, header, link1, link2); if (ret != FSL_RETURN_OK_S) { goto out; } link1 = link2 = NULL; } else { DESC_IN_OUT(header, length, in, length, out); } } /* Unload any desired context */ if (sym_ctx->flags & FSL_SYM_CTX_SAVE) { DESC_OUT_OUT(SAH_HDR_SKHA_READ_CONTEXT_IV, 0, NULL, sym_ctx->block_size_bytes, sym_ctx->context); } } /* not ARC4 */ SAH_SF_EXECUTE(); out: SAH_SF_DESC_CLEAN(); DESC_TEMP_FREE(sink); if (LENGTH_PATCH) { sah_Destroy_Link(user_ctx->mem_util, link1); sah_Destroy_Link(user_ctx->mem_util, link2); } return ret; }