static int pkey_mac_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src)
{
MAC_PKEY_CTX *sctx, *dctx;
if (!pkey_mac_init(dst))
return 0;
sctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(src);
dctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(dst);
if (!EVP_MAC_CTX_copy(dctx->ctx, sctx->ctx))
goto err;
switch (dctx->type) {
case MAC_TYPE_RAW:
dctx->raw_data.md = sctx->raw_data.md;
if (ASN1_STRING_get0_data(&sctx->raw_data.ktmp) != NULL &&
!ASN1_STRING_copy(&dctx->raw_data.ktmp, &sctx->raw_data.ktmp))
goto err;
break;
case MAC_TYPE_MAC:
/* Nothing more to do */
break;
default:
/* This should be dead code */
return 0;
}
return 1;
err:
pkey_mac_cleanup (dst);
return 0;
}
static int pkey_gost_mac_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src) {
struct te_mac_pmeth_data *dst_data,*src_data;
if (!pkey_gost_mac_init(dst)) return 0;
src_data = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(src);
dst_data = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(dst);
*dst_data = *src_data;
return 1;
}
/* Copies contents of gost_pmeth_data structure */
static int pkey_gost_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src)
{
struct gost_pmeth_data *dst_data, *src_data;
if (!pkey_gost_init(dst)) {
return 0;
}
src_data = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(src);
dst_data = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(dst);
*dst_data = *src_data;
if (src_data->shared_ukm) {
dst_data->shared_ukm = NULL;
}
return 1;
}
static int pkey_mac_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
const char *type, const char *value)
{
MAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx);
return EVP_MAC_ctrl_str(hctx->ctx, type, value);
}
static int pkey_mac_signctx(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
size_t *siglen, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx)
{
MAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx);
return EVP_MAC_final(hctx->ctx, sig, siglen);
}
/*
* EVP_PKEY_METHOD callback derive.
* Implements VKO R 34.10-2001/2012 algorithms
*/
int pkey_gost_ec_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *keylen)
{
/*
* Public key of peer in the ctx field peerkey
* Our private key in the ctx pkey
* ukm is in the algorithm specific context data
*/
EVP_PKEY *my_key = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(ctx);
EVP_PKEY *peer_key = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_peerkey(ctx);
struct gost_pmeth_data *data = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx);
int dgst_nid = NID_undef;
if (!data || !data->shared_ukm) {
GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST_EC_DERIVE, GOST_R_UKM_NOT_SET);
return 0;
}
if (key == NULL) {
*keylen = 32;
return 32;
}
EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(my_key, &dgst_nid);
*keylen =
VKO_compute_key(key, 32,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(EVP_PKEY_get0(peer_key)),
(EC_KEY *)EVP_PKEY_get0(my_key), data->shared_ukm,
dgst_nid);
return (*keylen) ? 1 : 0;
}
/*
* EVP_PKEY_METHOD callback derive. Implements VKO R 34.10-2001
* algorithm
*/
int pkey_gost2001_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key,
size_t *keylen)
{
/*
* Public key of peer in the ctx field peerkey Our private key in the ctx
* pkey ukm is in the algorithm specific context data
*/
EVP_PKEY *my_key = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(ctx);
EVP_PKEY *peer_key = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_peerkey(ctx);
struct gost_pmeth_data *data = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx);
if (!data->shared_ukm) {
GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST2001_DERIVE, GOST_R_UKM_NOT_SET);
return 0;
}
if (key == NULL) {
*keylen = 32;
return 32;
}
*keylen =
VKO_compute_key(key, 32,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(EVP_PKEY_get0(peer_key)),
(EC_KEY *)EVP_PKEY_get0(my_key), data->shared_ukm);
return 1;
}
/* Frees up gost_pmeth_data structure */
static void pkey_gost_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
{
struct gost_pmeth_data *data = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(data->shared_ukm);
OPENSSL_free(data);
}
static int pkey_gost_mac_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
{
struct gost_mac_pmeth_data *data =
(struct gost_mac_pmeth_data*)EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx);
switch (type)
{
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD:
{
if (EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_id_Gost28147_89_MAC)
{
GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST_MAC_CTRL, GOST_R_INVALID_DIGEST_TYPE);
return 0;
}
data->md = (EVP_MD *)p2;
return 1;
}
break;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT:
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_DECRYPT:
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN:
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_MAC_KEY:
if (p1 != 32)
{
GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST_MAC_CTRL,
GOST_R_INVALID_MAC_KEY_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
memcpy(data->key,p2,32);
data->key_set = 1;
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT:
{
EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = p2;
void *key;
if (!data->key_set)
{
EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(ctx);
if (!pkey)
{
GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST_MAC_CTRL,GOST_R_MAC_KEY_NOT_SET);
return 0;
}
key = EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey);
if (!key)
{
GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST_MAC_CTRL,GOST_R_MAC_KEY_NOT_SET);
return 0;
}
} else {
key = &(data->key);
}
return mctx->digest->md_ctrl(mctx,EVP_MD_CTRL_SET_KEY,32,key);
}
}
return -2;
}
static int pkey_gost_mac_signctx_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx)
{
struct gost_mac_pmeth_data *data = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx);
if (data == NULL) {
pkey_gost_mac_init(ctx);
}
data = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx);
if (!data) {
GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST_MAC_SIGNCTX_INIT, GOST_R_MAC_KEY_NOT_SET);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int ossl_int_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
{
OSSL_HMAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(ctx));
if (!HMAC_Update(hctx->ctx, data, count))
return 0;
return 1;
}
static int ossl_hmac_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
{
OSSL_HMAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx);
EVP_PKEY *pk;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *key;
switch (type) {
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_MAC_KEY:
if ((!p2 && p1 > 0) || (p1 < -1))
return 0;
if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(&hctx->ktmp, p2, p1))
return 0;
break;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD:
hctx->md = p2;
break;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT:
pk = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(ctx);
key = EVP_PKEY_get0(pk);
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx->ctx, key->data, key->length, hctx->md, NULL))
return 0;
break;
default:
return -2;
}
return 1;
}
static void ossl_hmac_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
{
OSSL_HMAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx);
HMAC_CTX_free(hctx->ctx);
OPENSSL_clear_free(hctx->ktmp.data, hctx->ktmp.length);
OPENSSL_free(hctx);
}
static int ossl_hmac_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src)
{
OSSL_HMAC_PKEY_CTX *sctx, *dctx;
if (!ossl_hmac_init(dst))
return 0;
sctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(src);
dctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(dst);
dctx->md = sctx->md;
if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(dctx->ctx, sctx->ctx))
return 0;
if (sctx->ktmp.data) {
if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(&dctx->ktmp,
sctx->ktmp.data, sctx->ktmp.length))
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
/* --------------------- control functions ------------------------------*/
static int pkey_gost_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
{
struct gost_pmeth_data *pctx = (struct gost_pmeth_data*)EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx);
switch (type)
{
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD:
{
if (EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_id_GostR3411_94)
{
GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST_CTRL, GOST_R_INVALID_DIGEST_TYPE);
return 0;
}
pctx->md = (EVP_MD *)p2;
return 1;
}
break;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_MD:
*(const EVP_MD **)p2 = pctx->md;
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT:
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_DECRYPT:
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN:
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENCRYPT:
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_DECRYPT:
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN:
#endif
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GOST_PARAMSET:
pctx->sign_param_nid = (int)p1;
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV:
pctx->shared_ukm=OPENSSL_malloc((int)p1);
if (pctx->shared_ukm == NULL)
{
GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
memcpy(pctx->shared_ukm,p2,(int) p1);
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY:
if (p1 == 0 || p1 == 1) /* call from EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer */
return 1;
if (p1 == 2) /* TLS: peer key used? */
return pctx->peer_key_used;
if (p1 == 3) /* TLS: peer key used! */
return (pctx->peer_key_used = 1);
return -2;
}
return -2;
}
static int
pkey_gost_mac_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
{
struct gost_mac_pmeth_data *data = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx);
switch (type) {
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD:
if (EVP_MD_type(p2) != NID_id_Gost28147_89_MAC) {
GOSTerror(GOST_R_INVALID_DIGEST_TYPE);
return 0;
}
data->md = p2;
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_MAC_KEY:
if (p1 != 32) {
GOSTerror(GOST_R_INVALID_MAC_KEY_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
memcpy(data->key, p2, 32);
data->key_set = 1;
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT:
{
EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = p2;
void *key;
if (!data->key_set) {
EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(ctx);
if (pkey == NULL) {
GOSTerror(GOST_R_MAC_KEY_NOT_SET);
return 0;
}
key = EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey);
if (key == NULL) {
GOSTerror(GOST_R_MAC_KEY_NOT_SET);
return 0;
}
} else {
key = &(data->key);
}
if (mctx->digest->md_ctrl == NULL)
return 0;
return mctx->digest->md_ctrl(mctx, EVP_MD_CTRL_SET_KEY, 32 * 8,
key);
}
}
return -2;
}
static int pkey_gost_mac_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
struct gost_mac_pmeth_data *data = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx);
unsigned char *keydata;
if (!data->key_set) {
GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST_MAC_KEYGEN, GOST_R_MAC_KEY_NOT_SET);
return 0;
}
keydata = OPENSSL_malloc(32);
memcpy(keydata, data->key, 32);
EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, NID_id_Gost28147_89_MAC, keydata);
return 1;
}
//Generate or load key. Called very early
static int pkey_gost_mac_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
printf("Keygen requested\n"); //we already have the key (or uid) in the context's data structure
struct te_mac_pmeth_data *data = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx); //now we must copy it to md context
unsigned char *keydata;
if (!data->key_set) {
printf("Error: key isn't set\n");
return 0;
}
keydata = OPENSSL_malloc(data->key_ln);
memcpy(keydata, data->key, data->key_ln);
EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, NID_hmac_sha1, keydata);
return 1;
}
static int ossl_hmac_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *hkey = NULL;
OSSL_HMAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx);
if (!hctx->ktmp.data)
return 0;
hkey = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup(&hctx->ktmp);
if (!hkey)
return 0;
EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, hkey);
return 1;
}
static int ossl_hmac_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src)
{
OSSL_HMAC_PKEY_CTX *sctx, *dctx;
/* allocate memory for dst->data and a new HMAC_CTX in dst->data->ctx */
if (!ossl_hmac_init(dst))
return 0;
sctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(src);
dctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(dst);
dctx->md = sctx->md;
if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(dctx->ctx, sctx->ctx))
goto err;
if (sctx->ktmp.data) {
if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(&dctx->ktmp,
sctx->ktmp.data, sctx->ktmp.length))
goto err;
}
return 1;
err:
/* release HMAC_CTX in dst->data->ctx and memory allocated for dst->data */
ossl_hmac_cleanup(dst);
return 0;
}
//We can control the state of our engine by commands
static int pkey_gost_mac_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2) {
struct te_mac_pmeth_data *data = (struct te_mac_pmeth_data*)EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx);
switch (type) {
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD:
if (EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_hmac_sha1) {
printf("Error: unsupported digest type\n");
return 0;
}
data->md = (EVP_MD*)p2;
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT:
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_DECRYPT:
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN:
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_MAC_KEY: //here we can insert pkey extraction
printf("Got set user id command: %s\n", (char*)p2); //or save user id for further operations
if(strcmp((char*)p2, "123")) {
printf("Error: unknown user (id = %s)\n", (char*)p2);
return 0;
}
memcpy(data->uid, p2, p1);
memcpy(data->key, "user_123_key\0", 13);
data->key_ln = 12;
data->key_set = 1;
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT: { //this request runs in different context (for unknown reason)
printf("Got digest init command\n"); //but has the key that we have installed in keygen request
void *key = 0; //in this request we must transfer the key into digest context
int keyln = 0; //so digest must support control commands
if(!data->key_set) {
EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(ctx);
if (!pkey) {
printf("Error: unable to set key\n");
return 0;
}
key = EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey);
if (!key) {
printf("Error: unable to set key\n");
return 0;
}
keyln = strlen((char *)key); //it's so dangerous
} else {
key = &(data->key);
keyln = data->key_ln;
}
return ((EVP_MD_CTX*)p2)->digest->md_ctrl((EVP_MD_CTX*)p2, EVP_MD_CTRL_SET_KEY, keyln, key);
}
}
return -2;
}
static void pkey_mac_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
{
MAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx);
if (hctx != NULL) {
switch (hctx->type) {
case MAC_TYPE_RAW:
OPENSSL_clear_free(hctx->raw_data.ktmp.data,
hctx->raw_data.ktmp.length);
break;
}
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(hctx->ctx);
OPENSSL_free(hctx);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_data(ctx, NULL);
}
}
static int pkey_gost94_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
struct gost_pmeth_data *data = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx);
DSA *dsa = NULL;
if (data->sign_param_nid == NID_undef) {
GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST94_PARAMGEN, GOST_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET);
return 0;
}
dsa = DSA_new();
if (!fill_GOST94_params(dsa, data->sign_param_nid)) {
DSA_free(dsa);
return 0;
}
EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, NID_id_GostR3410_94, dsa);
return 1;
}
static int pkey_gost_mac_keygen_base(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
EVP_PKEY *pkey, int mac_nid)
{
struct gost_mac_pmeth_data *data = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx);
struct gost_mac_key *keydata;
if (!data || !data->key_set) {
GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST_MAC_KEYGEN, GOST_R_MAC_KEY_NOT_SET);
return 0;
}
keydata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(struct gost_mac_key));
if (keydata == NULL)
return 0;
memcpy(keydata->key, data->key, 32);
keydata->mac_param_nid = data->mac_param_nid;
keydata->mac_size = data->mac_size;
EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, mac_nid, keydata);
return 1;
}
static int pkey_gost2001_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
struct gost_pmeth_data *data = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx);
EC_KEY *ec = NULL;
if (!data || data->sign_param_nid == NID_undef) {
GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST01_PARAMGEN, GOST_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET);
return 0;
}
ec = EC_KEY_new();
if (!fill_GOST_EC_params(ec, data->sign_param_nid)
|| !EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, NID_id_GostR3410_2001, ec)) {
EC_KEY_free(ec);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int ossl_hmac_signctx(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
size_t *siglen, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx)
{
unsigned int hlen;
OSSL_HMAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx);
int l = EVP_MD_CTX_size(mctx);
if (l < 0)
return 0;
*siglen = l;
if (!sig)
return 1;
if (!HMAC_Final(hctx->ctx, sig, &hlen))
return 0;
*siglen = (size_t)hlen;
return 1;
}
static int pkey_gost2012_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
struct gost_pmeth_data *data = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx);
EC_KEY *ec;
int result = 0;
if (!data || data->sign_param_nid == NID_undef) {
GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST12_PARAMGEN, GOST_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET);
return 0;
}
ec = EC_KEY_new();
if (!fill_GOST_EC_params(ec, data->sign_param_nid)) {
EC_KEY_free(ec);
return 0;
}
switch (data->sign_param_nid) {
case NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA:
case NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB:
result =
(EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, ec)) ? 1 : 0;
break;
case NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet:
case NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet:
case NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet:
case NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet:
case NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet:
case NID_id_GostR3410_2001_TestParamSet:
result =
(EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, ec)) ? 1 : 0;
break;
default:
result = 0;
break;
}
if (result == 0)
EC_KEY_free(ec);
return result;
}
static int pkey_gost_mac_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
struct gost_mac_pmeth_data *data = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx);
uint8_t *keydata;
if (!data->key_set) {
GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST_MAC_KEYGEN, GOST_R_MAC_KEY_NOT_SET);
return 0;
}
keydata = malloc(32);
if (keydata == NULL) {
GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST_MAC_KEYGEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
memcpy(keydata, data->key, 32);
EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, NID_id_Gost28147_89_MAC, keydata);
return 1;
}
/* --------------------- control functions ------------------------------*/
static int pkey_gost_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
{
struct gost_pmeth_data *pctx = (struct gost_pmeth_data*)EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx);
switch (type)
{
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD:
{
if (EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_id_GostR3411_94)
{
GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST_CTRL, GOST_R_INVALID_DIGEST_TYPE);
return 0;
}
pctx->md = (EVP_MD *)p2;
return 1;
}
break;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT:
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_DECRYPT:
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN:
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GOST_PARAMSET:
pctx->sign_param_nid = (int)p1;
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV:
pctx->shared_ukm=(unsigned char*)OPENSSL_malloc((int)p1);
TINYCLR_SSL_MEMCPY(pctx->shared_ukm,p2,(int) p1);
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY:
if (p1 == 0 || p1 == 1) /* call from EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer */
return 1;
if (p1 == 2) /* TLS: peer key used? */
return pctx->peer_key_used;
if (p1 == 3) /* TLS: peer key used! */
return (pctx->peer_key_used = 1);
return -2;
}
return -2;
}
static int pkey_mac_signctx_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx)
{
MAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx);
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *key = NULL;
int rv = 1;
/*
* For MACs with the EVP_PKEY_FLAG_SIGCTX_CUSTOM flag set and that
* gets the key passed as an ASN.1 OCTET STRING, we set the key here,
* as this may be only time it's set during a DigestSign.
*
* MACs that pass around the key in form of EVP_MAC_CTX are setting
* the key through other mechanisms. (this is only CMAC for now)
*/
int set_key =
hctx->type == MAC_TYPE_RAW
&& (ctx->pmeth->flags & EVP_PKEY_FLAG_SIGCTX_CUSTOM) != 0;
if (set_key) {
if (EVP_PKEY_id(EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(ctx))
!= EVP_MAC_nid(EVP_MAC_CTX_mac(hctx->ctx)))
return 0;
key = EVP_PKEY_get0(EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(ctx));
if (key == NULL)
return 0;
}
/* Some MACs don't support this control... that's fine */
EVP_MAC_ctrl(hctx->ctx, EVP_MAC_CTRL_SET_FLAGS,
EVP_MD_CTX_test_flags(mctx, ~EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NO_INIT));
EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(mctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NO_INIT);
EVP_MD_CTX_set_update_fn(mctx, int_update);
if (set_key)
rv = EVP_MAC_ctrl(hctx->ctx, EVP_MAC_CTRL_SET_KEY, key->data,
key->length);
return rv > 0;
}
