INT_32 procInitFs(VOID)
{
struct proc_dir_entry *prEntry;
if (init_net.proc_net == (struct proc_dir_entry *)NULL) {
pr_err("init proc fs fail: proc_net == NULL\n");
return -ENOENT;
}
/*
* Directory: Root (/proc/net/wlan0)
*/
gprProcRoot = proc_mkdir(PROC_ROOT_NAME, init_net.proc_net);
if (!gprProcRoot) {
pr_err("gprProcRoot == NULL\n");
return -ENOENT;
}
proc_set_user(gprProcRoot, KUIDT_INIT(PROC_UID_SHELL), KGIDT_INIT(PROC_GID_WIFI));
prEntry = proc_create(PROC_DBG_LEVEL_NAME, 0664, gprProcRoot, &dbglevel_ops);
if (prEntry == NULL) {
pr_err("Unable to create /proc entry dbgLevel\n\r");
return -1;
}
proc_set_user(prEntry, KUIDT_INIT(PROC_UID_SHELL), KGIDT_INIT(PROC_GID_WIFI));
return 0;
} /* end of procInitProcfs() */
/*
* Create the trusted keyrings
*/
static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void)
{
pr_notice("Initialise system trusted keyrings\n");
builtin_trusted_keys =
keyring_alloc(".builtin_trusted_keys",
KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), current_cred(),
((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH),
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA,
NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(builtin_trusted_keys))
panic("Can't allocate builtin trusted keyring\n");
#ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
secondary_trusted_keys =
keyring_alloc(".secondary_trusted_keys",
KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), current_cred(),
((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH |
KEY_USR_WRITE),
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA,
get_builtin_and_secondary_restriction(),
NULL);
if (IS_ERR(secondary_trusted_keys))
panic("Can't allocate secondary trusted keyring\n");
if (key_link(secondary_trusted_keys, builtin_trusted_keys) < 0)
panic("Can't link trusted keyrings\n");
#endif
return 0;
}
static void bluesleep_proc_set_uid_gid(struct proc_dir_entry *ent)
{
#if LINUX_VERSION_CODE >= KERNEL_VERSION(3, 5, 0)
proc_set_user(ent, KUIDT_INIT(AID_BLUETOOTH),
KGIDT_INIT(AID_NET_BT_STACK));
#else
ent->uid = AID_BLUETOOTH;
ent->gid = AID_NET_BT_STACK;
#endif
}
/**
* cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability
* @cred: The credentials to use
* @ns: The user namespace in which we need the capability
* @cap: The capability to check for
* @audit: Whether to write an audit message or not
*
* Determine whether the nominated task has the specified capability amongst
* its effective set, returning 0 if it does, -ve if it does not.
*
* NOTE WELL: cap_has_capability() cannot be used like the kernel's capable()
* and has_capability() functions. That is, it has the reverse semantics:
* cap_has_capability() returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the
* kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case.
*/
int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns,
int cap, int audit)
{
struct user_namespace *ns = targ_ns;
#ifdef CONFIG_ANDROID_PARANOID_NETWORK
if (cap == CAP_NET_RAW && in_egroup_p(KGIDT_INIT(AID_NET_RAW)))
return 0;
if (cap == CAP_NET_ADMIN && in_egroup_p(KGIDT_INIT(AID_NET_ADMIN)))
return 0;
#endif
/* See if cred has the capability in the target user namespace
* by examining the target user namespace and all of the target
* user namespace's parents.
*/
for (;;) {
/* Do we have the necessary capabilities? */
if (ns == cred->user_ns)
return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM;
/* Have we tried all of the parent namespaces? */
if (ns == &init_user_ns)
return -EPERM;
/*
* The owner of the user namespace in the parent of the
* user namespace has all caps.
*/
if ((ns->parent == cred->user_ns) && uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid))
return 0;
/*
* If you have a capability in a parent user ns, then you have
* it over all children user namespaces as well.
*/
ns = ns->parent;
}
/* We never get here */
}
/*
* Create the persistent keyring register for the current user namespace.
*
* Called with the namespace's sem locked for writing.
*/
static int key_create_persistent_register(struct user_namespace *ns)
{
struct key *reg = keyring_alloc(".persistent_register",
KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0),
current_cred(),
((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(reg))
return PTR_ERR(reg);
ns->persistent_keyring_register = reg;
return 0;
}
/*
* Load the compiled-in keys
*/
static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void)
{
pr_notice("Initialise system trusted keyring\n");
system_trusted_keyring =
keyring_alloc(".system_keyring",
KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), current_cred(),
((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH),
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(system_trusted_keyring))
panic("Can't allocate system trusted keyring\n");
set_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &system_trusted_keyring->flags);
return 0;
}
/*
* Load the compiled-in keys
*/
static __init int module_verify_init(void)
{
pr_notice("Initialise module verification\n");
modsign_keyring = key_alloc(&key_type_keyring, ".module_sign",
KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0),
current_cred(),
(KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
if (IS_ERR(modsign_keyring))
panic("Can't allocate module signing keyring\n");
if (key_instantiate_and_link(modsign_keyring, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) < 0)
panic("Can't instantiate module signing keyring\n");
return 0;
}
static int __integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id, key_perm_t perm,
struct key_restriction *restriction)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
int err = 0;
keyring[id] = keyring_alloc(keyring_name[id], KUIDT_INIT(0),
KGIDT_INIT(0), cred, perm,
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, restriction, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring[id])) {
err = PTR_ERR(keyring[id]);
pr_info("Can't allocate %s keyring (%d)\n",
keyring_name[id], err);
keyring[id] = NULL;
}
return err;
}
int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
int err = 0;
keyring[id] = keyring_alloc(keyring_name[id], KUIDT_INIT(0),
KGIDT_INIT(0), cred,
((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ |
KEY_USR_WRITE | KEY_USR_SEARCH),
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
if (!IS_ERR(keyring[id]))
set_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &keyring[id]->flags);
else {
err = PTR_ERR(keyring[id]);
pr_info("Can't allocate %s keyring (%d)\n",
keyring_name[id], err);
keyring[id] = NULL;
}
return err;
}
kgid_t make_kgid(struct user_namespace *ns, gid_t gid)
{
/* Map the gid to a global kernel gid */
return KGIDT_INIT(gid);
}
/* static unsigned long cl_shutdown_state[MAX_NUM_INSTANCE_MTK_COOLER_SHUTDOWN] = { 0 }; */
static struct sd_state cl_sd_state[MAX_NUM_INSTANCE_MTK_COOLER_SHUTDOWN];
#if defined(MTK_COOLER_SHUTDOWN_SIGNAL)
static unsigned int tm_pid;
static unsigned int tm_input_pid;
static unsigned int mtk_cl_sd_rst;
static struct task_struct g_task;
static struct task_struct *pg_task = &g_task;
static int sd_debouncet = 1;
/* static int sd_cnt = 0; */
static int sd_happened;
static kuid_t uid = KUIDT_INIT(0);
static kgid_t gid = KGIDT_INIT(1000);
static ssize_t _mtk_cl_sd_rst_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf, size_t len,
loff_t *data)
{
int ret = 0;
char tmp[MAX_LEN] = { 0 };
/* write data to the buffer */
if (copy_from_user(tmp, buf, len))
return -EFAULT;
ret = kstrtouint(tmp, 10, &mtk_cl_sd_rst);
if (ret)
WARN_ON(1);
static int _stp_create_procfs(const char *path, int num,
const struct file_operations *fops, int perm,
void *data)
{
const char *p; char *next;
struct proc_dir_entry *last_dir, *de;
if (num >= STP_MAX_PROCFS_FILES) {
_stp_error("Requested file number %d is larger than max (%d)\n",
num, STP_MAX_PROCFS_FILES);
return -1;
}
last_dir = _stp_proc_root;
/* if no path, use default one */
if (strlen(path) == 0)
p = "command";
else
p = path;
#ifdef _STP_ALLOW_PROCFS_PATH_SUBDIRS
while ((next = strchr(p, '/'))) {
if (_stp_num_pde == STP_MAX_PROCFS_FILES)
goto too_many;
*next = 0;
de = _stp_procfs_lookup(p, last_dir);
if (de == NULL) {
last_dir = proc_mkdir(p, last_dir);
if (!last_dir) {
_stp_error("Could not create directory \"%s\"\n", p);
goto err;
}
_stp_pde[_stp_num_pde++] = last_dir;
#ifdef STAPCONF_PROCFS_OWNER
last_dir->owner = THIS_MODULE;
#endif
proc_set_user(last_dir, KUIDT_INIT(_stp_uid),
KGIDT_INIT(_stp_gid));
}
else {
last_dir = de;
}
p = next + 1;
}
#else /* !_STP_ALLOW_PROCFS_PATH_SUBDIRS */
if (strchr(p, '/') != NULL) {
_stp_error("Could not create path \"%s\","
" contains subdirectories\n", p);
goto err;
}
#endif /* !_STP_ALLOW_PROCFS_PATH_SUBDIRS */
if (_stp_num_pde == STP_MAX_PROCFS_FILES)
goto too_many;
de = proc_create_data(p, perm, last_dir, fops, data);
if (de == NULL) {
_stp_error("Could not create file \"%s\" in path \"%s\"\n",
p, path);
goto err;
}
#ifdef STAPCONF_PROCFS_OWNER
de->owner = THIS_MODULE;
#endif
proc_set_user(de, KUIDT_INIT(_stp_uid), KGIDT_INIT(_stp_gid));
_stp_pde[_stp_num_pde++] = de;
return 0;
too_many:
_stp_error("Attempted to open too many procfs files. Maximum is %d\n",
STP_MAX_PROCFS_FILES);
err:
_stp_close_procfs();
return -1;
}
