static void
NS(test_main)(void *arg)
{
int retval;
int made_pending;
edge_connection_t *exitconn = create_valid_exitconn();
or_circuit_t *on_circ = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(or_circuit_t));
(void)arg;
NS_MOCK(router_my_exit_policy_is_reject_star);
TO_CONN(exitconn)->address = tor_strdup("invalid#@!.org");
retval = dns_resolve_impl(exitconn, 1, on_circ, NULL, &made_pending,
NULL);
tt_int_op(retval,OP_EQ,-1);
done:
NS_UNMOCK(router_my_exit_policy_is_reject_star);
tor_free(TO_CONN(exitconn)->address);
tor_free(exitconn);
tor_free(on_circ);
return;
}
static void
NS(test_main)(void *arg)
{
int retval;
int made_pending;
const tor_addr_t *resolved_addr;
tor_addr_t addr_to_compare;
(void)arg;
tor_addr_parse(&addr_to_compare, "8.8.8.8");
or_circuit_t *on_circ = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(or_circuit_t));
edge_connection_t *exitconn = create_valid_exitconn();
TO_CONN(exitconn)->address = tor_strdup("8.8.8.8");
retval = dns_resolve_impl(exitconn, 1, on_circ, NULL, &made_pending,
NULL);
resolved_addr = &(exitconn->base_.addr);
tt_int_op(retval,OP_EQ,1);
tt_assert(tor_addr_eq(resolved_addr, (const tor_addr_t *)&addr_to_compare));
tt_int_op(exitconn->address_ttl,OP_EQ,DEFAULT_DNS_TTL);
done:
tor_free(on_circ);
tor_free(TO_CONN(exitconn)->address);
tor_free(exitconn);
return;
}
/* Helper: Do a successful Extended ORPort authentication handshake. */
static void
do_ext_or_handshake(or_connection_t *conn)
{
char b[256];
tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, connection_ext_or_start_auth(conn));
CONTAINS("\x01\x00", 2);
WRITE("\x01", 1);
WRITE("But when I look ahead up the whi", 32);
MOCK(crypto_rand, crypto_rand_return_tse_str);
tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, connection_ext_or_process_inbuf(conn));
UNMOCK(crypto_rand);
tt_int_op(TO_CONN(conn)->state, OP_EQ,
EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_AUTH_WAIT_CLIENT_HASH);
CONTAINS("\xec\x80\xed\x6e\x54\x6d\x3b\x36\xfd\xfc\x22\xfe\x13\x15\x41\x6b"
"\x02\x9f\x1a\xde\x76\x10\xd9\x10\x87\x8b\x62\xee\xb7\x40\x38\x21"
"te road There is always another ", 64);
/* Send the right response this time. */
WRITE("\xab\x39\x17\x32\xdd\x2e\xd9\x68\xcd\x40\xc0\x87\xd1\xb1\xf2\x5b"
"\x33\xb3\xcd\x77\xff\x79\xbd\x80\xc2\x07\x4b\xbf\x43\x81\x19\xa2",
32);
tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, connection_ext_or_process_inbuf(conn));
CONTAINS("\x01", 1);
tt_assert(! TO_CONN(conn)->marked_for_close);
tt_int_op(TO_CONN(conn)->state, OP_EQ, EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN);
done: ;
}
static void
test_conn_get_rend(void *arg)
{
dir_connection_t *conn = DOWNCAST(dir_connection_t, arg);
tt_assert(conn);
assert_connection_ok(&conn->base_, time(NULL));
tt_assert(connection_get_by_type_state_rendquery(
conn->base_.type,
conn->base_.state,
conn->rend_data->onion_address)
== TO_CONN(conn));
tt_assert(connection_get_by_type_state_rendquery(
TEST_CONN_TYPE,
TEST_CONN_STATE,
TEST_CONN_REND_ADDR)
== TO_CONN(conn));
tt_assert(connection_get_by_type_state_rendquery(TEST_CONN_REND_TYPE_2,
!conn->base_.state,
"")
== NULL);
tt_assert(connection_get_by_type_state_rendquery(TEST_CONN_REND_TYPE_2,
!TEST_CONN_STATE,
TEST_CONN_REND_ADDR_2)
== NULL);
done:
;
}
static void
NS(test_main)(void *arg)
{
int retval;
int made_pending = 0;
pending_connection_t *pending_conn = NULL;
edge_connection_t *exitconn = create_valid_exitconn();
or_circuit_t *on_circ = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(or_circuit_t));
cached_resolve_t *cache_entry = NULL;
cached_resolve_t query;
(void)arg;
TO_CONN(exitconn)->address = tor_strdup("torproject.org");
strlcpy(query.address, TO_CONN(exitconn)->address, sizeof(query.address));
NS_MOCK(router_my_exit_policy_is_reject_star);
NS_MOCK(launch_resolve);
dns_init();
retval = dns_resolve_impl(exitconn, 1, on_circ, NULL, &made_pending,
NULL);
tt_int_op(retval,OP_EQ,0);
tt_int_op(made_pending,OP_EQ,1);
cache_entry = dns_get_cache_entry(&query);
tt_assert(cache_entry);
pending_conn = cache_entry->pending_connections;
tt_assert(pending_conn != NULL);
tt_assert(pending_conn->conn == exitconn);
tt_assert(last_launched_resolve == cache_entry);
tt_str_op(cache_entry->address,OP_EQ,TO_CONN(exitconn)->address);
done:
NS_UNMOCK(router_my_exit_policy_is_reject_star);
NS_UNMOCK(launch_resolve);
tor_free(on_circ);
tor_free(TO_CONN(exitconn)->address);
if (cache_entry)
tor_free(cache_entry->pending_connections);
tor_free(cache_entry);
tor_free(exitconn);
return;
}
/** Log, at severity <b>severity</b>, information about each circuit
* that is connected to <b>conn</b>.
*/
void
circuit_dump_by_conn(connection_t *conn, int severity)
{
circuit_t *circ;
edge_connection_t *tmpconn;
for (circ=global_circuitlist;circ;circ = circ->next) {
circid_t n_circ_id = circ->n_circ_id, p_circ_id = 0;
if (circ->marked_for_close)
continue;
if (! CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ))
p_circ_id = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_circ_id;
if (! CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) && TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_conn &&
TO_CONN(TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_conn) == conn)
circuit_dump_details(severity, circ, conn->conn_array_index, "App-ward",
p_circ_id, n_circ_id);
if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
for (tmpconn=TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_streams; tmpconn;
tmpconn=tmpconn->next_stream) {
if (TO_CONN(tmpconn) == conn) {
circuit_dump_details(severity, circ, conn->conn_array_index,
"App-ward", p_circ_id, n_circ_id);
}
}
}
if (circ->n_conn && TO_CONN(circ->n_conn) == conn)
circuit_dump_details(severity, circ, conn->conn_array_index, "Exit-ward",
n_circ_id, p_circ_id);
if (! CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
for (tmpconn=TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_streams; tmpconn;
tmpconn=tmpconn->next_stream) {
if (TO_CONN(tmpconn) == conn) {
circuit_dump_details(severity, circ, conn->conn_array_index,
"Exit-ward", n_circ_id, p_circ_id);
}
}
}
if (!circ->n_conn && circ->n_hop &&
tor_addr_eq(&circ->n_hop->addr, &conn->addr) &&
circ->n_hop->port == conn->port &&
conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR &&
!memcmp(TO_OR_CONN(conn)->identity_digest,
circ->n_hop->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN)) {
circuit_dump_details(severity, circ, conn->conn_array_index,
(circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN &&
!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) ?
"Endpoint" : "Pending",
n_circ_id, p_circ_id);
}
}
}
static void
test_oos_kill_conn_list(void *arg)
{
connection_t *c1, *c2;
or_connection_t *or_c1 = NULL;
dir_connection_t *dir_c2 = NULL;
smartlist_t *l = NULL;
(void)arg;
/* Set up mocks */
mark_calls = 0;
MOCK(connection_mark_for_close_internal_, mark_for_close_oos_mock);
cfe_calls = 0;
MOCK(connection_or_close_for_error, close_for_error_mock);
/* Make fake conns */
or_c1 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*or_c1));
or_c1->base_.magic = OR_CONNECTION_MAGIC;
or_c1->base_.type = CONN_TYPE_OR;
c1 = TO_CONN(or_c1);
dir_c2 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*dir_c2));
dir_c2->base_.magic = DIR_CONNECTION_MAGIC;
dir_c2->base_.type = CONN_TYPE_DIR;
dir_c2->base_.state = DIR_CONN_STATE_MIN_;
dir_c2->base_.purpose = DIR_PURPOSE_MIN_;
c2 = TO_CONN(dir_c2);
tt_assert(c1 != NULL);
tt_assert(c2 != NULL);
/* Make list */
l = smartlist_new();
smartlist_add(l, c1);
smartlist_add(l, c2);
/* Run kill_conn_list_for_oos() */
kill_conn_list_for_oos(l);
/* Check call counters */
tt_int_op(mark_calls, OP_EQ, 1);
tt_int_op(cfe_calls, OP_EQ, 1);
done:
UNMOCK(connection_or_close_for_error);
UNMOCK(connection_mark_for_close_internal_);
if (l) smartlist_free(l);
tor_free(or_c1);
tor_free(dir_c2);
return;
}
/** Create an <b>edge_connection_t</b> instance that is considered a
* valid exit connection by asserts in dns_resolve_impl.
*/
static edge_connection_t *
create_valid_exitconn(void)
{
edge_connection_t *exitconn = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(edge_connection_t));
TO_CONN(exitconn)->type = CONN_TYPE_EXIT;
TO_CONN(exitconn)->magic = EDGE_CONNECTION_MAGIC;
TO_CONN(exitconn)->purpose = EXIT_PURPOSE_RESOLVE;
TO_CONN(exitconn)->state = EXIT_CONN_STATE_RESOLVING;
exitconn->base_.s = TOR_INVALID_SOCKET;
return exitconn;
}
/* Test connection_or_remove_from_ext_or_id_map and
* connection_or_set_ext_or_identifier */
static void
test_ext_or_id_map(void *arg)
{
or_connection_t *c1 = NULL, *c2 = NULL, *c3 = NULL;
char *idp = NULL, *idp2 = NULL;
(void)arg;
/* pre-initialization */
tt_ptr_op(NULL, OP_EQ,
connection_or_get_by_ext_or_id("xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx"));
c1 = or_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR, AF_INET);
c2 = or_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR, AF_INET);
c3 = or_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_OR, AF_INET);
tt_ptr_op(c1->ext_or_conn_id, OP_NE, NULL);
tt_ptr_op(c2->ext_or_conn_id, OP_NE, NULL);
tt_ptr_op(c3->ext_or_conn_id, OP_EQ, NULL);
tt_ptr_op(c1, OP_EQ, connection_or_get_by_ext_or_id(c1->ext_or_conn_id));
tt_ptr_op(c2, OP_EQ, connection_or_get_by_ext_or_id(c2->ext_or_conn_id));
tt_ptr_op(NULL, OP_EQ,
connection_or_get_by_ext_or_id("xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx"));
idp = tor_memdup(c2->ext_or_conn_id, EXT_OR_CONN_ID_LEN);
/* Give c2 a new ID. */
connection_or_set_ext_or_identifier(c2);
tt_mem_op(idp, OP_NE, c2->ext_or_conn_id, EXT_OR_CONN_ID_LEN);
idp2 = tor_memdup(c2->ext_or_conn_id, EXT_OR_CONN_ID_LEN);
tt_assert(!tor_digest_is_zero(idp2));
tt_ptr_op(NULL, OP_EQ, connection_or_get_by_ext_or_id(idp));
tt_ptr_op(c2, OP_EQ, connection_or_get_by_ext_or_id(idp2));
/* Now remove it. */
connection_or_remove_from_ext_or_id_map(c2);
tt_ptr_op(NULL, OP_EQ, connection_or_get_by_ext_or_id(idp));
tt_ptr_op(NULL, OP_EQ, connection_or_get_by_ext_or_id(idp2));
done:
if (c1)
connection_free_(TO_CONN(c1));
if (c2)
connection_free_(TO_CONN(c2));
if (c3)
connection_free_(TO_CONN(c3));
tor_free(idp);
tor_free(idp2);
connection_or_clear_ext_or_id_map();
}
static void
NS(test_main)(void *arg)
{
int retval;
int made_pending = 0;
edge_connection_t *exitconn = create_valid_exitconn();
or_circuit_t *on_circ = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(or_circuit_t));
cached_resolve_t *resolve_out = NULL;
cached_resolve_t *cache_entry = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(cached_resolve_t));
cache_entry->magic = CACHED_RESOLVE_MAGIC;
cache_entry->state = CACHE_STATE_CACHED;
cache_entry->minheap_idx = -1;
cache_entry->expire = time(NULL) + 60 * 60;
(void)arg;
TO_CONN(exitconn)->address = tor_strdup("torproject.org");
strlcpy(cache_entry->address, TO_CONN(exitconn)->address,
sizeof(cache_entry->address));
NS_MOCK(router_my_exit_policy_is_reject_star);
NS_MOCK(set_exitconn_info_from_resolve);
dns_init();
dns_insert_cache_entry(cache_entry);
retval = dns_resolve_impl(exitconn, 1, on_circ, NULL, &made_pending,
&resolve_out);
tt_int_op(retval,OP_EQ,0);
tt_int_op(made_pending,OP_EQ,0);
tt_assert(resolve_out == cache_entry);
tt_assert(last_exitconn == exitconn);
tt_assert(last_resolve == cache_entry);
done:
NS_UNMOCK(router_my_exit_policy_is_reject_star);
NS_UNMOCK(set_exitconn_info_from_resolve);
tor_free(on_circ);
tor_free(TO_CONN(exitconn)->address);
tor_free(cache_entry->pending_connections);
tor_free(cache_entry);
return;
}
/** Helper function: called whenever the client sends a resolve request to our
* controller. We need to eventually answer the request <b>req</b>.
* Returns 0 if the controller will be getting (or has gotten) an event in
* response; -1 if we couldn't launch the request.
*/
int
dnsserv_launch_request(const char *name, int reverse)
{
entry_connection_t *entry_conn;
edge_connection_t *conn;
char *q_name;
/* Make a new dummy AP connection, and attach the request to it. */
entry_conn = entry_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_AP, AF_INET);
conn = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(entry_conn);
conn->base_.state = AP_CONN_STATE_RESOLVE_WAIT;
if (reverse)
entry_conn->socks_request->command = SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE_PTR;
else
entry_conn->socks_request->command = SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE;
conn->is_dns_request = 1;
strlcpy(entry_conn->socks_request->address, name,
sizeof(entry_conn->socks_request->address));
entry_conn->socks_request->listener_type = CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER;
entry_conn->original_dest_address = tor_strdup(name);
entry_conn->session_group = SESSION_GROUP_CONTROL_RESOLVE;
entry_conn->nym_epoch = get_signewnym_epoch();
entry_conn->isolation_flags = ISO_DEFAULT;
if (connection_add(TO_CONN(conn))<0) {
log_warn(LD_APP, "Couldn't register dummy connection for RESOLVE request");
connection_free(TO_CONN(conn));
return -1;
}
/* Now, unless a controller asked us to leave streams unattached,
* throw the connection over to get rewritten (which will
* answer it immediately if it's in the cache, or completely bogus, or
* automapped), and then attached to a circuit. */
log_info(LD_APP, "Passing request for %s to rewrite_and_attach.",
escaped_safe_str_client(name));
q_name = tor_strdup(name); /* q could be freed in rewrite_and_attach */
connection_ap_rewrite_and_attach_if_allowed(entry_conn, NULL, NULL);
/* Now, the connection is marked if it was bad. */
log_info(LD_APP, "Passed request for %s to rewrite_and_attach_if_allowed.",
escaped_safe_str_client(q_name));
tor_free(q_name);
return 0;
}
/** Process a 'versions' cell. The current link protocol version must be 0
* to indicate that no version has yet been negotiated. We compare the
* versions in the cell to the list of versions we support, pick the
* highest version we have in common, and continue the negotiation from
* there.
*/
static void
command_process_versions_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
{
int highest_supported_version = 0;
const char *cp, *end;
if (conn->link_proto != 0 ||
conn->_base.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING ||
(conn->handshake_state && conn->handshake_state->received_versions)) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
"Received a VERSIONS cell on a connection with its version "
"already set to %d; dropping", (int) conn->link_proto);
return;
}
tor_assert(conn->handshake_state);
end = cell->payload + cell->payload_len;
for (cp = cell->payload; cp+1 < end; ++cp) {
uint16_t v = ntohs(get_uint16(cp));
if (is_or_protocol_version_known(v) && v > highest_supported_version)
highest_supported_version = v;
}
if (!highest_supported_version) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
"Couldn't find a version in common between my version list and the "
"list in the VERSIONS cell; closing connection.");
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
return;
} else if (highest_supported_version == 1) {
/* Negotiating version 1 makes no sense, since version 1 has no VERSIONS
* cells. */
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
"Used version negotiation protocol to negotiate a v1 connection. "
"That's crazily non-compliant. Closing connection.");
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
return;
}
conn->link_proto = highest_supported_version;
conn->handshake_state->received_versions = 1;
log_info(LD_OR, "Negotiated version %d with %s:%d; sending NETINFO.",
highest_supported_version, safe_str(conn->_base.address),
conn->_base.port);
tor_assert(conn->link_proto >= 2);
if (connection_or_send_netinfo(conn) < 0) {
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
return;
}
}
static void
test_ext_or_write_command(void *arg)
{
or_connection_t *c1;
char *cp = NULL;
char *buf = NULL;
size_t sz;
(void) arg;
MOCK(connection_write_to_buf_impl_,
connection_write_to_buf_impl_replacement);
c1 = or_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR, AF_INET);
tt_assert(c1);
/* Length too long */
tt_int_op(connection_write_ext_or_command(TO_CONN(c1), 100, "X", 100000),
OP_LT, 0);
/* Empty command */
tt_int_op(connection_write_ext_or_command(TO_CONN(c1), 0x99, NULL, 0),
OP_EQ, 0);
cp = buf_get_contents(TO_CONN(c1)->outbuf, &sz);
tt_int_op(sz, OP_EQ, 4);
tt_mem_op(cp, OP_EQ, "\x00\x99\x00\x00", 4);
tor_free(cp);
/* Medium command. */
tt_int_op(connection_write_ext_or_command(TO_CONN(c1), 0x99,
"Wai\0Hello", 9), OP_EQ, 0);
cp = buf_get_contents(TO_CONN(c1)->outbuf, &sz);
tt_int_op(sz, OP_EQ, 13);
tt_mem_op(cp, OP_EQ, "\x00\x99\x00\x09Wai\x00Hello", 13);
tor_free(cp);
/* Long command */
buf = tor_malloc(65535);
memset(buf, 'x', 65535);
tt_int_op(connection_write_ext_or_command(TO_CONN(c1), 0xf00d,
buf, 65535), OP_EQ, 0);
cp = buf_get_contents(TO_CONN(c1)->outbuf, &sz);
tt_int_op(sz, OP_EQ, 65539);
tt_mem_op(cp, OP_EQ, "\xf0\x0d\xff\xff", 4);
tt_mem_op(cp+4, OP_EQ, buf, 65535);
tor_free(cp);
done:
if (c1)
connection_free_(TO_CONN(c1));
tor_free(cp);
tor_free(buf);
UNMOCK(connection_write_to_buf_impl_);
}
static edge_connection_t *
dummy_edge_conn_new(circuit_t *circ,
int type, size_t in_bytes, size_t out_bytes)
{
edge_connection_t *conn;
generic_buffer_t *inbuf, *outbuf;
if (type == CONN_TYPE_EXIT)
conn = edge_connection_new(type, AF_INET);
else
conn = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(entry_connection_new(type, AF_INET));
#ifdef USE_BUFFEREVENTS
inbuf = bufferevent_get_input(TO_CONN(conn)->bufev);
outbuf = bufferevent_get_output(TO_CONN(conn)->bufev);
#else
inbuf = TO_CONN(conn)->inbuf;
outbuf = TO_CONN(conn)->outbuf;
#endif
/* We add these bytes directly to the buffers, to avoid all the
* edge connection read/write machinery. */
add_bytes_to_buf(inbuf, in_bytes);
add_bytes_to_buf(outbuf, out_bytes);
conn->on_circuit = circ;
if (type == CONN_TYPE_EXIT) {
or_circuit_t *oc = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ);
conn->next_stream = oc->n_streams;
oc->n_streams = conn;
} else {
origin_circuit_t *oc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
conn->next_stream = oc->p_streams;
oc->p_streams = conn;
}
return conn;
}
static int
get_num_circuits_mock(or_connection_t *conn)
{
int circs = 0;
tt_assert(conn != NULL);
if (conns_with_circs &&
smartlist_contains(conns_with_circs, TO_CONN(conn))) {
circs = 1;
}
done:
return circs;
}
/** Called when we've just received a relay data cell, when we've just
* finished flushing all bytes to stream <b>conn</b>, or when we've flushed
* *some* bytes to the stream <b>conn</b>.
*
* If conn->outbuf is not too full, and our deliver window is low, send back a
* suitable number of stream-level sendme cells.
*/
void
sendme_connection_edge_consider_sending(edge_connection_t *conn)
{
tor_assert(conn);
int log_domain = TO_CONN(conn)->type == CONN_TYPE_AP ? LD_APP : LD_EXIT;
/* Don't send it if we still have data to deliver. */
if (connection_outbuf_too_full(TO_CONN(conn))) {
goto end;
}
if (circuit_get_by_edge_conn(conn) == NULL) {
/* This can legitimately happen if the destroy has already arrived and
* torn down the circuit. */
log_info(log_domain, "No circuit associated with edge connection. "
"Skipping sending SENDME.");
goto end;
}
while (conn->deliver_window <=
(STREAMWINDOW_START - STREAMWINDOW_INCREMENT)) {
log_debug(log_domain, "Outbuf %" TOR_PRIuSZ ", queuing stream SENDME.",
TO_CONN(conn)->outbuf_flushlen);
conn->deliver_window += STREAMWINDOW_INCREMENT;
if (connection_edge_send_command(conn, RELAY_COMMAND_SENDME,
NULL, 0) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "connection_edge_send_command failed while sending "
"a SENDME. Circuit probably closed, skipping.");
goto end; /* The circuit's closed, don't continue */
}
}
end:
return;
}
/** Called when we as a server receive an appropriate cell while waiting
* either for a cell or a TLS handshake. Set the connection's state to
* "handshaking_v3', initializes the or_handshake_state field as needed,
* and add the cell to the hash of incoming cells.)
*
* Return 0 on success; return -1 and mark the connection on failure.
*/
static int
enter_v3_handshake_with_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
{
const int started_here = connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(conn);
tor_assert(conn->_base.state == OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING ||
conn->_base.state == OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING);
if (started_here) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
"Received a cell while TLS-handshaking, not in "
"OR_HANDSHAKING_V3, on a connection we originated.");
}
conn->_base.state = OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3;
if (connection_init_or_handshake_state(conn, started_here) < 0) {
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
return -1;
}
or_handshake_state_record_var_cell(conn->handshake_state, cell, 1);
return 0;
}
static int
recv_certs_cleanup(const struct testcase_t *test, void *obj)
{
(void)test;
certs_data_t *d = obj;
UNMOCK(tor_tls_cert_matches_key);
UNMOCK(connection_or_send_netinfo);
UNMOCK(connection_or_close_for_error);
if (d) {
tor_free(d->cell);
certs_cell_free(d->ccell);
connection_free_(TO_CONN(d->c));
circuitmux_free(d->chan->base_.cmux);
tor_free(d->chan);
crypto_pk_free(d->key1);
crypto_pk_free(d->key2);
tor_free(d);
}
return 1;
}
/** Release all storage held by circuits. */
void
circuit_free_all(void)
{
circuit_t *next;
while (global_circuitlist) {
next = global_circuitlist->next;
if (! CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(global_circuitlist)) {
or_circuit_t *or_circ = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(global_circuitlist);
while (or_circ->resolving_streams) {
edge_connection_t *next_conn;
next_conn = or_circ->resolving_streams->next_stream;
connection_free(TO_CONN(or_circ->resolving_streams));
or_circ->resolving_streams = next_conn;
}
}
circuit_free(global_circuitlist);
global_circuitlist = next;
}
if (circuits_pending_or_conns) {
smartlist_free(circuits_pending_or_conns);
circuits_pending_or_conns = NULL;
}
HT_CLEAR(orconn_circid_map, &orconn_circid_circuit_map);
}
/** Process an AUTH_CHALLENGE cell from an OR connection.
*
* If we weren't supposed to get one (for example, because we're not the
* originator of the connection), or it's ill-formed, or we aren't doing a v3
* handshake, mark the connection. If the cell is well-formed but we don't
* want to authenticate, just drop it. If the cell is well-formed *and* we
* want to authenticate, send an AUTHENTICATE cell and then a NETINFO cell. */
static void
command_process_auth_challenge_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
{
int n_types, i, use_type = -1;
uint8_t *cp;
#define ERR(s) \
do { \
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, \
"Received a bad AUTH_CHALLENGE cell from %s:%d: %s", \
safe_str(conn->_base.address), conn->_base.port, (s)); \
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn)); \
return; \
} while (0)
if (conn->_base.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3)
ERR("We're not currently doing a v3 handshake");
if (conn->link_proto < 3)
ERR("We're not using link protocol >= 3");
if (! conn->handshake_state->started_here)
ERR("We didn't originate this connection");
if (conn->handshake_state->received_auth_challenge)
ERR("We already received one");
if (! conn->handshake_state->received_certs_cell)
ERR("We haven't gotten a CERTS cell yet");
if (cell->payload_len < OR_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN + 2)
ERR("It was too short");
if (cell->circ_id)
ERR("It had a nonzero circuit ID");
n_types = ntohs(get_uint16(cell->payload + OR_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN));
if (cell->payload_len < OR_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN + 2 + 2*n_types)
ERR("It looks truncated");
/* Now see if there is an authentication type we can use */
cp=cell->payload+OR_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN+2;
for (i=0; i < n_types; ++i, cp += 2) {
uint16_t authtype = ntohs(get_uint16(cp));
if (authtype == AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET)
use_type = authtype;
}
conn->handshake_state->received_auth_challenge = 1;
if (! public_server_mode(get_options())) {
/* If we're not a public server then we don't want to authenticate on a
connection we originated, and we already sent a NETINFO cell when we
got the CERTS cell. We have nothing more to do. */
return;
}
if (use_type >= 0) {
log_info(LD_OR, "Got an AUTH_CHALLENGE cell from %s:%d: Sending "
"authentication",
safe_str(conn->_base.address), conn->_base.port);
if (connection_or_send_authenticate_cell(conn, use_type) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_OR, "Couldn't send authenticate cell");
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
return;
}
} else {
log_info(LD_OR, "Got an AUTH_CHALLENGE cell from %s:%d, but we don't "
"know any of its authentication types. Not authenticating.",
safe_str(conn->_base.address), conn->_base.port);
}
if (connection_or_send_netinfo(conn) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_OR, "Couldn't send netinfo cell");
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
return;
}
#undef ERR
}
/** Called when we get an AUTHENTICATE message. Check whether the
* authentication is valid, and if so, update the connection's state to
* OPEN. Reply with DONE or ERROR.
*/
int
handle_control_authenticate(control_connection_t *conn, uint32_t len,
const char *body)
{
int used_quoted_string = 0;
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
const char *errstr = "Unknown error";
char *password;
size_t password_len;
const char *cp;
int i;
int bad_cookie=0, bad_password=0;
smartlist_t *sl = NULL;
if (!len) {
password = tor_strdup("");
password_len = 0;
} else if (TOR_ISXDIGIT(body[0])) {
cp = body;
while (TOR_ISXDIGIT(*cp))
++cp;
i = (int)(cp - body);
tor_assert(i>0);
password_len = i/2;
password = tor_malloc(password_len + 1);
if (base16_decode(password, password_len+1, body, i)
!= (int) password_len) {
connection_write_str_to_buf(
"551 Invalid hexadecimal encoding. Maybe you tried a plain text "
"password? If so, the standard requires that you put it in "
"double quotes.\r\n", conn);
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
tor_free(password);
return 0;
}
} else {
if (!decode_escaped_string(body, len, &password, &password_len)) {
connection_write_str_to_buf("551 Invalid quoted string. You need "
"to put the password in double quotes.\r\n", conn);
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
return 0;
}
used_quoted_string = 1;
}
if (conn->safecookie_client_hash != NULL) {
/* The controller has chosen safe cookie authentication; the only
* acceptable authentication value is the controller-to-server
* response. */
tor_assert(authentication_cookie_is_set);
if (password_len != DIGEST256_LEN) {
log_warn(LD_CONTROL,
"Got safe cookie authentication response with wrong length "
"(%d)", (int)password_len);
errstr = "Wrong length for safe cookie response.";
goto err;
}
if (tor_memneq(conn->safecookie_client_hash, password, DIGEST256_LEN)) {
log_warn(LD_CONTROL,
"Got incorrect safe cookie authentication response");
errstr = "Safe cookie response did not match expected value.";
goto err;
}
tor_free(conn->safecookie_client_hash);
goto ok;
}
if (!options->CookieAuthentication && !options->HashedControlPassword &&
!options->HashedControlSessionPassword) {
/* if Tor doesn't demand any stronger authentication, then
* the controller can get in with anything. */
goto ok;
}
if (options->CookieAuthentication) {
int also_password = options->HashedControlPassword != NULL ||
options->HashedControlSessionPassword != NULL;
if (password_len != AUTHENTICATION_COOKIE_LEN) {
if (!also_password) {
log_warn(LD_CONTROL, "Got authentication cookie with wrong length "
"(%d)", (int)password_len);
errstr = "Wrong length on authentication cookie.";
goto err;
}
bad_cookie = 1;
} else if (tor_memneq(authentication_cookie, password, password_len)) {
if (!also_password) {
log_warn(LD_CONTROL, "Got mismatched authentication cookie");
errstr = "Authentication cookie did not match expected value.";
goto err;
}
bad_cookie = 1;
} else {
goto ok;
}
}
if (options->HashedControlPassword ||
options->HashedControlSessionPassword) {
int bad = 0;
smartlist_t *sl_tmp;
char received[DIGEST_LEN];
int also_cookie = options->CookieAuthentication;
sl = smartlist_new();
if (options->HashedControlPassword) {
sl_tmp = decode_hashed_passwords(options->HashedControlPassword);
if (!sl_tmp)
bad = 1;
else {
smartlist_add_all(sl, sl_tmp);
smartlist_free(sl_tmp);
}
}
if (options->HashedControlSessionPassword) {
sl_tmp = decode_hashed_passwords(options->HashedControlSessionPassword);
if (!sl_tmp)
bad = 1;
else {
smartlist_add_all(sl, sl_tmp);
smartlist_free(sl_tmp);
}
}
if (bad) {
if (!also_cookie) {
log_warn(LD_BUG,
"Couldn't decode HashedControlPassword: invalid base16");
errstr="Couldn't decode HashedControlPassword value in configuration.";
goto err;
}
bad_password = 1;
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl, char *, str, tor_free(str));
smartlist_free(sl);
sl = NULL;
} else {
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl, char *, expected,
{
secret_to_key_rfc2440(received,DIGEST_LEN,
password,password_len,expected);
if (tor_memeq(expected + S2K_RFC2440_SPECIFIER_LEN,
received, DIGEST_LEN))
goto ok;
});
/** Called when we get an AUTHCHALLENGE command. */
int
handle_control_authchallenge(control_connection_t *conn, uint32_t len,
const char *body)
{
const char *cp = body;
char *client_nonce;
size_t client_nonce_len;
char server_hash[DIGEST256_LEN];
char server_hash_encoded[HEX_DIGEST256_LEN+1];
char server_nonce[SAFECOOKIE_SERVER_NONCE_LEN];
char server_nonce_encoded[(2*SAFECOOKIE_SERVER_NONCE_LEN) + 1];
cp += strspn(cp, " \t\n\r");
if (!strcasecmpstart(cp, "SAFECOOKIE")) {
cp += strlen("SAFECOOKIE");
} else {
connection_write_str_to_buf("513 AUTHCHALLENGE only supports SAFECOOKIE "
"authentication\r\n", conn);
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
return -1;
}
if (!authentication_cookie_is_set) {
connection_write_str_to_buf("515 Cookie authentication is disabled\r\n",
conn);
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
return -1;
}
cp += strspn(cp, " \t\n\r");
if (*cp == '"') {
const char *newcp =
decode_escaped_string(cp, len - (cp - body),
&client_nonce, &client_nonce_len);
if (newcp == NULL) {
connection_write_str_to_buf("513 Invalid quoted client nonce\r\n",
conn);
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
return -1;
}
cp = newcp;
} else {
size_t client_nonce_encoded_len = strspn(cp, "0123456789ABCDEFabcdef");
client_nonce_len = client_nonce_encoded_len / 2;
client_nonce = tor_malloc_zero(client_nonce_len);
if (base16_decode(client_nonce, client_nonce_len,
cp, client_nonce_encoded_len)
!= (int) client_nonce_len) {
connection_write_str_to_buf("513 Invalid base16 client nonce\r\n",
conn);
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
tor_free(client_nonce);
return -1;
}
cp += client_nonce_encoded_len;
}
cp += strspn(cp, " \t\n\r");
if (*cp != '\0' ||
cp != body + len) {
connection_write_str_to_buf("513 Junk at end of AUTHCHALLENGE command\r\n",
conn);
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
tor_free(client_nonce);
return -1;
}
crypto_rand(server_nonce, SAFECOOKIE_SERVER_NONCE_LEN);
/* Now compute and send the server-to-controller response, and the
* server's nonce. */
tor_assert(authentication_cookie != NULL);
{
size_t tmp_len = (AUTHENTICATION_COOKIE_LEN +
client_nonce_len +
SAFECOOKIE_SERVER_NONCE_LEN);
char *tmp = tor_malloc_zero(tmp_len);
char *client_hash = tor_malloc_zero(DIGEST256_LEN);
memcpy(tmp, authentication_cookie, AUTHENTICATION_COOKIE_LEN);
memcpy(tmp + AUTHENTICATION_COOKIE_LEN, client_nonce, client_nonce_len);
memcpy(tmp + AUTHENTICATION_COOKIE_LEN + client_nonce_len,
server_nonce, SAFECOOKIE_SERVER_NONCE_LEN);
crypto_hmac_sha256(server_hash,
SAFECOOKIE_SERVER_TO_CONTROLLER_CONSTANT,
strlen(SAFECOOKIE_SERVER_TO_CONTROLLER_CONSTANT),
tmp,
tmp_len);
crypto_hmac_sha256(client_hash,
SAFECOOKIE_CONTROLLER_TO_SERVER_CONSTANT,
strlen(SAFECOOKIE_CONTROLLER_TO_SERVER_CONSTANT),
tmp,
tmp_len);
conn->safecookie_client_hash = client_hash;
tor_free(tmp);
}
base16_encode(server_hash_encoded, sizeof(server_hash_encoded),
server_hash, sizeof(server_hash));
base16_encode(server_nonce_encoded, sizeof(server_nonce_encoded),
server_nonce, sizeof(server_nonce));
connection_printf_to_buf(conn,
"250 AUTHCHALLENGE SERVERHASH=%s "
"SERVERNONCE=%s\r\n",
server_hash_encoded,
server_nonce_encoded);
tor_free(client_nonce);
return 0;
}
/** Helper function: called by evdns whenever the client sends a request to our
* DNSPort. We need to eventually answer the request <b>req</b>.
*/
static void
evdns_server_callback(struct evdns_server_request *req, void *data_)
{
const listener_connection_t *listener = data_;
entry_connection_t *entry_conn;
edge_connection_t *conn;
int i = 0;
struct evdns_server_question *q = NULL, *supported_q = NULL;
struct sockaddr_storage addr;
struct sockaddr *sa;
int addrlen;
tor_addr_t tor_addr;
uint16_t port;
int err = DNS_ERR_NONE;
char *q_name;
tor_assert(req);
log_info(LD_APP, "Got a new DNS request!");
req->flags |= 0x80; /* set RA */
/* First, check whether the requesting address matches our SOCKSPolicy. */
if ((addrlen = evdns_server_request_get_requesting_addr(req,
(struct sockaddr*)&addr, (socklen_t)sizeof(addr))) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_APP, "Couldn't get requesting address.");
evdns_server_request_respond(req, DNS_ERR_SERVERFAILED);
return;
}
(void) addrlen;
sa = (struct sockaddr*) &addr;
if (tor_addr_from_sockaddr(&tor_addr, sa, &port)<0) {
log_warn(LD_APP, "Requesting address wasn't recognized.");
evdns_server_request_respond(req, DNS_ERR_SERVERFAILED);
return;
}
if (!socks_policy_permits_address(&tor_addr)) {
log_warn(LD_APP, "Rejecting DNS request from disallowed IP.");
evdns_server_request_respond(req, DNS_ERR_REFUSED);
return;
}
/* Now, let's find the first actual question of a type we can answer in this
* DNS request. It makes us a little noncompliant to act like this; we
* should fix that eventually if it turns out to make a difference for
* anybody. */
if (req->nquestions == 0) {
log_info(LD_APP, "No questions in DNS request; sending back nil reply.");
evdns_server_request_respond(req, 0);
return;
}
if (req->nquestions > 1) {
log_info(LD_APP, "Got a DNS request with more than one question; I only "
"handle one question at a time for now. Skipping the extras.");
}
for (i = 0; i < req->nquestions; ++i) {
if (req->questions[i]->dns_question_class != EVDNS_CLASS_INET)
continue;
switch (req->questions[i]->type) {
case EVDNS_TYPE_A:
case EVDNS_TYPE_AAAA:
case EVDNS_TYPE_PTR:
/* We always pick the first one of these questions, if there is
one. */
if (! supported_q)
supported_q = req->questions[i];
break;
default:
break;
}
}
if (supported_q)
q = supported_q;
if (!q) {
log_info(LD_APP, "None of the questions we got were ones we're willing "
"to support. Sending NOTIMPL.");
evdns_server_request_respond(req, DNS_ERR_NOTIMPL);
return;
}
/* Make sure the name isn't too long: This should be impossible, I think. */
if (err == DNS_ERR_NONE && strlen(q->name) > MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN-1)
err = DNS_ERR_FORMAT;
if (err != DNS_ERR_NONE || !supported_q) {
/* We got an error? There's no question we're willing to answer? Then
* send back an answer immediately; we're done. */
evdns_server_request_respond(req, err);
return;
}
/* Make a new dummy AP connection, and attach the request to it. */
entry_conn = entry_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_AP, AF_INET);
conn = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(entry_conn);
CONNECTION_AP_EXPECT_NONPENDING(entry_conn);
TO_CONN(conn)->state = AP_CONN_STATE_RESOLVE_WAIT;
conn->is_dns_request = 1;
tor_addr_copy(&TO_CONN(conn)->addr, &tor_addr);
TO_CONN(conn)->port = port;
TO_CONN(conn)->address = tor_addr_to_str_dup(&tor_addr);
if (q->type == EVDNS_TYPE_A || q->type == EVDNS_TYPE_AAAA ||
q->type == EVDNS_QTYPE_ALL) {
entry_conn->socks_request->command = SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE;
} else {
tor_assert(q->type == EVDNS_TYPE_PTR);
entry_conn->socks_request->command = SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE_PTR;
}
/* This serves our DNS port so enable DNS request by default. */
entry_conn->entry_cfg.dns_request = 1;
if (q->type == EVDNS_TYPE_A || q->type == EVDNS_QTYPE_ALL) {
entry_conn->entry_cfg.ipv4_traffic = 1;
entry_conn->entry_cfg.ipv6_traffic = 0;
entry_conn->entry_cfg.prefer_ipv6 = 0;
} else if (q->type == EVDNS_TYPE_AAAA) {
entry_conn->entry_cfg.ipv4_traffic = 0;
entry_conn->entry_cfg.ipv6_traffic = 1;
entry_conn->entry_cfg.prefer_ipv6 = 1;
}
strlcpy(entry_conn->socks_request->address, q->name,
sizeof(entry_conn->socks_request->address));
entry_conn->socks_request->listener_type = listener->base_.type;
entry_conn->dns_server_request = req;
entry_conn->entry_cfg.isolation_flags = listener->entry_cfg.isolation_flags;
entry_conn->entry_cfg.session_group = listener->entry_cfg.session_group;
entry_conn->nym_epoch = get_signewnym_epoch();
if (connection_add(ENTRY_TO_CONN(entry_conn)) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_APP, "Couldn't register dummy connection for DNS request");
evdns_server_request_respond(req, DNS_ERR_SERVERFAILED);
connection_free(ENTRY_TO_CONN(entry_conn));
return;
}
control_event_stream_status(entry_conn, STREAM_EVENT_NEW_RESOLVE, 0);
/* Now, unless a controller asked us to leave streams unattached,
* throw the connection over to get rewritten (which will
* answer it immediately if it's in the cache, or completely bogus, or
* automapped), and then attached to a circuit. */
log_info(LD_APP, "Passing request for %s to rewrite_and_attach.",
escaped_safe_str_client(q->name));
q_name = tor_strdup(q->name); /* q could be freed in rewrite_and_attach */
connection_ap_rewrite_and_attach_if_allowed(entry_conn, NULL, NULL);
/* Now, the connection is marked if it was bad. */
log_info(LD_APP, "Passed request for %s to rewrite_and_attach_if_allowed.",
escaped_safe_str_client(q_name));
tor_free(q_name);
}
/** Helper function: called whenever the client sends a resolve request to our
* controller. We need to eventually answer the request <b>req</b>.
* Returns 0 if the controller will be getting (or has gotten) an event in
* response; -1 if we couldn't launch the request.
*/
int
dnsserv_launch_request(const char *name, int reverse,
control_connection_t *control_conn)
{
entry_connection_t *entry_conn;
edge_connection_t *conn;
char *q_name;
/* Make a new dummy AP connection, and attach the request to it. */
entry_conn = entry_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_AP, AF_INET);
conn = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(entry_conn);
CONNECTION_AP_EXPECT_NONPENDING(entry_conn);
conn->base_.state = AP_CONN_STATE_RESOLVE_WAIT;
tor_addr_copy(&TO_CONN(conn)->addr, &control_conn->base_.addr);
#ifdef AF_UNIX
/*
* The control connection can be AF_UNIX and if so tor_addr_to_str_dup will
* unhelpfully say "<unknown address type>"; say "(Tor_internal)"
* instead.
*/
if (control_conn->base_.socket_family == AF_UNIX) {
TO_CONN(conn)->port = 0;
TO_CONN(conn)->address = tor_strdup("(Tor_internal)");
} else {
TO_CONN(conn)->port = control_conn->base_.port;
TO_CONN(conn)->address = tor_addr_to_str_dup(&control_conn->base_.addr);
}
#else
TO_CONN(conn)->port = control_conn->base_.port;
TO_CONN(conn)->address = tor_addr_to_str_dup(&control_conn->base_.addr);
#endif
if (reverse)
entry_conn->socks_request->command = SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE_PTR;
else
entry_conn->socks_request->command = SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE;
conn->is_dns_request = 1;
strlcpy(entry_conn->socks_request->address, name,
sizeof(entry_conn->socks_request->address));
entry_conn->socks_request->listener_type = CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER;
entry_conn->original_dest_address = tor_strdup(name);
entry_conn->entry_cfg.session_group = SESSION_GROUP_CONTROL_RESOLVE;
entry_conn->nym_epoch = get_signewnym_epoch();
entry_conn->entry_cfg.isolation_flags = ISO_DEFAULT;
if (connection_add(TO_CONN(conn))<0) {
log_warn(LD_APP, "Couldn't register dummy connection for RESOLVE request");
connection_free(TO_CONN(conn));
return -1;
}
control_event_stream_status(entry_conn, STREAM_EVENT_NEW_RESOLVE, 0);
/* Now, unless a controller asked us to leave streams unattached,
* throw the connection over to get rewritten (which will
* answer it immediately if it's in the cache, or completely bogus, or
* automapped), and then attached to a circuit. */
log_info(LD_APP, "Passing request for %s to rewrite_and_attach.",
escaped_safe_str_client(name));
q_name = tor_strdup(name); /* q could be freed in rewrite_and_attach */
connection_ap_rewrite_and_attach_if_allowed(entry_conn, NULL, NULL);
/* Now, the connection is marked if it was bad. */
log_info(LD_APP, "Passed request for %s to rewrite_and_attach_if_allowed.",
escaped_safe_str_client(q_name));
tor_free(q_name);
return 0;
}
static void
test_oos_pick_oos_victims(void *arg)
{
(void)arg;
or_connection_t *ortmp;
dir_connection_t *dirtmp;
smartlist_t *picked;
/* Set up mocks */
conns_for_mock = smartlist_new();
MOCK(get_connection_array, get_conns_mock);
conns_with_circs = smartlist_new();
MOCK(connection_or_get_num_circuits, get_num_circuits_mock);
/* Make some fake connections */
ortmp = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*ortmp));
ortmp->base_.magic = OR_CONNECTION_MAGIC;
ortmp->base_.type = CONN_TYPE_OR;
smartlist_add(conns_for_mock, TO_CONN(ortmp));
/* We'll pretend this one has a circuit too */
smartlist_add(conns_with_circs, TO_CONN(ortmp));
/* Next one */
ortmp = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*ortmp));
ortmp->base_.magic = OR_CONNECTION_MAGIC;
ortmp->base_.type = CONN_TYPE_OR;
smartlist_add(conns_for_mock, TO_CONN(ortmp));
/* Next one is moribund */
ortmp = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*ortmp));
ortmp->base_.magic = OR_CONNECTION_MAGIC;
ortmp->base_.type = CONN_TYPE_OR;
ortmp->base_.marked_for_close = 1;
smartlist_add(conns_for_mock, TO_CONN(ortmp));
/* Last one isn't an orconn */
dirtmp = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*dirtmp));
dirtmp->base_.magic = DIR_CONNECTION_MAGIC;
dirtmp->base_.type = CONN_TYPE_DIR;
smartlist_add(conns_for_mock, TO_CONN(dirtmp));
/* Try picking one */
picked = pick_oos_victims(1);
/* It should be the one with circuits */
tt_assert(picked != NULL);
tt_int_op(smartlist_len(picked), OP_EQ, 1);
tt_assert(smartlist_contains(picked, smartlist_get(conns_for_mock, 0)));
smartlist_free(picked);
/* Try picking none */
picked = pick_oos_victims(0);
/* We should get an empty list */
tt_assert(picked != NULL);
tt_int_op(smartlist_len(picked), OP_EQ, 0);
smartlist_free(picked);
/* Try picking two */
picked = pick_oos_victims(2);
/* We should get both active orconns */
tt_assert(picked != NULL);
tt_int_op(smartlist_len(picked), OP_EQ, 2);
tt_assert(smartlist_contains(picked, smartlist_get(conns_for_mock, 0)));
tt_assert(smartlist_contains(picked, smartlist_get(conns_for_mock, 1)));
smartlist_free(picked);
/* Try picking three - only two are eligible */
picked = pick_oos_victims(3);
tt_int_op(smartlist_len(picked), OP_EQ, 2);
tt_assert(smartlist_contains(picked, smartlist_get(conns_for_mock, 0)));
tt_assert(smartlist_contains(picked, smartlist_get(conns_for_mock, 1)));
smartlist_free(picked);
done:
/* Free leftover stuff */
if (conns_with_circs) {
smartlist_free(conns_with_circs);
conns_with_circs = NULL;
}
UNMOCK(connection_or_get_num_circuits);
if (conns_for_mock) {
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(conns_for_mock, connection_t *, c, tor_free(c));
smartlist_free(conns_for_mock);
conns_for_mock = NULL;
}
UNMOCK(get_connection_array);
return;
}
/** Test that we will use our directory guards to fetch mds even if we don't
* have any dirinfo (tests bug #23862). */
static void
test_directory_guard_fetch_with_no_dirinfo(void *arg)
{
int retval;
char *consensus_text_md = NULL;
or_options_t *options = get_options_mutable();
time_t now = time(NULL);
(void) arg;
hibernate_set_state_for_testing_(HIBERNATE_STATE_LIVE);
/* Initialize the SRV subsystem */
MOCK(get_my_v3_authority_cert, get_my_v3_authority_cert_m);
mock_cert = authority_cert_parse_from_string(AUTHORITY_CERT_1,
strlen(AUTHORITY_CERT_1),
NULL);
sr_init(0);
UNMOCK(get_my_v3_authority_cert);
/* Initialize the entry node configuration from the ticket */
options->UseEntryGuards = 1;
options->StrictNodes = 1;
get_options_mutable()->EntryNodes = routerset_new();
routerset_parse(get_options_mutable()->EntryNodes,
"2121212121212121212121212121212121212121", "foo");
/* Mock some functions */
dummy_state = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(or_state_t));
MOCK(get_or_state, get_or_state_replacement);
MOCK(directory_initiate_request, mock_directory_initiate_request);
/* we need to mock this one to avoid memleaks */
MOCK(circuit_guard_state_new, mock_circuit_guard_state_new);
/* Call guards_update_all() to simulate loading our state file (see
* entry_guards_load_guards_from_state() and ticket #23989). */
guards_update_all();
/* Test logic: Simulate the arrival of a new consensus when we have no
* dirinfo at all. Tor will need to fetch the mds from the consensus. Make
* sure that Tor will use the specified entry guard instead of relying on the
* fallback directories. */
/* Fixup the dirconn that will deliver the consensus */
dir_connection_t *conn = dir_connection_new(AF_INET);
tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&conn->base_.addr, 0x7f000001);
conn->base_.port = 8800;
TO_CONN(conn)->address = tor_strdup("127.0.0.1");
conn->base_.purpose = DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_CONSENSUS;
conn->requested_resource = tor_strdup("ns");
/* Construct a consensus */
construct_consensus(&consensus_text_md, now);
tt_assert(consensus_text_md);
/* Place the consensus in the dirconn */
response_handler_args_t args;
memset(&args, 0, sizeof(response_handler_args_t));
args.status_code = 200;
args.body = consensus_text_md;
args.body_len = strlen(consensus_text_md);
/* Update approx time so that the consensus is considered live */
update_approx_time(now+1010);
setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_DEBUG);
/* Now handle the consensus */
retval = handle_response_fetch_consensus(conn, &args);
tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
/* Make sure that our primary guard was chosen */
expect_log_msg_containing("Selected primary guard router3");
done:
tor_free(consensus_text_md);
tor_free(dummy_state);
connection_free_minimal(TO_CONN(conn));
entry_guards_free_all();
teardown_capture_of_logs();
}
/** Process a 'versions' cell. The current link protocol version must be 0
* to indicate that no version has yet been negotiated. We compare the
* versions in the cell to the list of versions we support, pick the
* highest version we have in common, and continue the negotiation from
* there.
*/
static void
command_process_versions_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
{
int highest_supported_version = 0;
const uint8_t *cp, *end;
const int started_here = connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(conn);
if (conn->link_proto != 0 ||
(conn->handshake_state && conn->handshake_state->received_versions)) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
"Received a VERSIONS cell on a connection with its version "
"already set to %d; dropping", (int) conn->link_proto);
return;
}
switch (conn->_base.state)
{
case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2:
case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3:
break;
case OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING:
case OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING:
default:
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
"VERSIONS cell while in unexpected state");
return;
}
tor_assert(conn->handshake_state);
end = cell->payload + cell->payload_len;
for (cp = cell->payload; cp+1 < end; ++cp) {
uint16_t v = ntohs(get_uint16(cp));
if (is_or_protocol_version_known(v) && v > highest_supported_version)
highest_supported_version = v;
}
if (!highest_supported_version) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
"Couldn't find a version in common between my version list and the "
"list in the VERSIONS cell; closing connection.");
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
return;
} else if (highest_supported_version == 1) {
/* Negotiating version 1 makes no sense, since version 1 has no VERSIONS
* cells. */
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
"Used version negotiation protocol to negotiate a v1 connection. "
"That's crazily non-compliant. Closing connection.");
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
return;
} else if (highest_supported_version < 3 &&
conn->_base.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
"Negotiated link protocol 2 or lower after doing a v3 TLS "
"handshake. Closing connection.");
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
return;
}
conn->link_proto = highest_supported_version;
conn->handshake_state->received_versions = 1;
if (conn->link_proto == 2) {
log_info(LD_OR, "Negotiated version %d with %s:%d; sending NETINFO.",
highest_supported_version,
safe_str_client(conn->_base.address),
conn->_base.port);
if (connection_or_send_netinfo(conn) < 0) {
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
return;
}
} else {
const int send_versions = !started_here;
/* If we want to authenticate, send a CERTS cell */
const int send_certs = !started_here || public_server_mode(get_options());
/* If we're a relay that got a connection, ask for authentication. */
const int send_chall = !started_here && public_server_mode(get_options());
/* If our certs cell will authenticate us, or if we have no intention of
* authenticating, send a netinfo cell right now. */
const int send_netinfo =
!(started_here && public_server_mode(get_options()));
const int send_any =
send_versions || send_certs || send_chall || send_netinfo;
tor_assert(conn->link_proto >= 3);
log_info(LD_OR, "Negotiated version %d with %s:%d; %s%s%s%s%s",
highest_supported_version,
safe_str_client(conn->_base.address),
conn->_base.port,
send_any ? "Sending cells:" : "Waiting for CERTS cell",
send_versions ? " VERSIONS" : "",
send_certs ? " CERTS" : "",
send_chall ? " AUTH_CHALLENGE" : "",
send_netinfo ? " NETINFO" : "");
#ifdef DISABLE_V3_LINKPROTO_SERVERSIDE
if (1) {
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
return;
}
#endif
if (send_versions) {
if (connection_or_send_versions(conn, 1) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_OR, "Couldn't send versions cell");
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
return;
}
}
if (send_certs) {
if (connection_or_send_certs_cell(conn) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_OR, "Couldn't send certs cell");
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
return;
}
}
if (send_chall) {
if (connection_or_send_auth_challenge_cell(conn) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_OR, "Couldn't send auth_challenge cell");
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
return;
}
}
if (send_netinfo) {
if (connection_or_send_netinfo(conn) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_OR, "Couldn't send netinfo cell");
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
return;
}
}
}
}
/* Test good certs cells */
static void
test_link_handshake_certs_ok(void *arg)
{
(void) arg;
or_connection_t *c1 = or_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_OR, AF_INET);
or_connection_t *c2 = or_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_OR, AF_INET);
var_cell_t *cell1 = NULL, *cell2 = NULL;
certs_cell_t *cc1 = NULL, *cc2 = NULL;
channel_tls_t *chan1 = NULL, *chan2 = NULL;
crypto_pk_t *key1 = NULL, *key2 = NULL;
scheduler_init();
MOCK(tor_tls_cert_matches_key, mock_tls_cert_matches_key);
MOCK(connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf, mock_write_var_cell);
MOCK(connection_or_send_netinfo, mock_send_netinfo);
key1 = pk_generate(2);
key2 = pk_generate(3);
/* We need to make sure that our TLS certificates are set up before we can
* actually generate a CERTS cell.
*/
tt_int_op(tor_tls_context_init(TOR_TLS_CTX_IS_PUBLIC_SERVER,
key1, key2, 86400), ==, 0);
c1->base_.state = OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3;
c1->link_proto = 3;
tt_int_op(connection_init_or_handshake_state(c1, 1), ==, 0);
c2->base_.state = OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3;
c2->link_proto = 3;
tt_int_op(connection_init_or_handshake_state(c2, 0), ==, 0);
tt_int_op(0, ==, connection_or_send_certs_cell(c1));
tt_assert(mock_got_var_cell);
cell1 = mock_got_var_cell;
tt_int_op(0, ==, connection_or_send_certs_cell(c2));
tt_assert(mock_got_var_cell);
cell2 = mock_got_var_cell;
tt_int_op(cell1->command, ==, CELL_CERTS);
tt_int_op(cell1->payload_len, >, 1);
tt_int_op(cell2->command, ==, CELL_CERTS);
tt_int_op(cell2->payload_len, >, 1);
tt_int_op(cell1->payload_len, ==,
certs_cell_parse(&cc1, cell1->payload, cell1->payload_len));
tt_int_op(cell2->payload_len, ==,
certs_cell_parse(&cc2, cell2->payload, cell2->payload_len));
tt_int_op(2, ==, cc1->n_certs);
tt_int_op(2, ==, cc2->n_certs);
tt_int_op(certs_cell_get_certs(cc1, 0)->cert_type, ==,
CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_AUTH);
tt_int_op(certs_cell_get_certs(cc1, 1)->cert_type, ==,
CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_ID);
tt_int_op(certs_cell_get_certs(cc2, 0)->cert_type, ==,
CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_LINK);
tt_int_op(certs_cell_get_certs(cc2, 1)->cert_type, ==,
CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_ID);
chan1 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*chan1));
channel_tls_common_init(chan1);
c1->chan = chan1;
chan1->conn = c1;
c1->base_.address = tor_strdup("C1");
c1->tls = tor_tls_new(-1, 0);
c1->link_proto = 4;
c1->base_.conn_array_index = -1;
crypto_pk_get_digest(key2, c1->identity_digest);
channel_tls_process_certs_cell(cell2, chan1);
tt_assert(c1->handshake_state->received_certs_cell);
tt_assert(c1->handshake_state->auth_cert == NULL);
tt_assert(c1->handshake_state->id_cert);
tt_assert(! tor_mem_is_zero(
(char*)c1->handshake_state->authenticated_peer_id, 20));
chan2 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*chan2));
channel_tls_common_init(chan2);
c2->chan = chan2;
chan2->conn = c2;
c2->base_.address = tor_strdup("C2");
c2->tls = tor_tls_new(-1, 1);
c2->link_proto = 4;
c2->base_.conn_array_index = -1;
crypto_pk_get_digest(key1, c2->identity_digest);
channel_tls_process_certs_cell(cell1, chan2);
tt_assert(c2->handshake_state->received_certs_cell);
tt_assert(c2->handshake_state->auth_cert);
tt_assert(c2->handshake_state->id_cert);
tt_assert(tor_mem_is_zero(
(char*)c2->handshake_state->authenticated_peer_id, 20));
done:
UNMOCK(tor_tls_cert_matches_key);
UNMOCK(connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf);
UNMOCK(connection_or_send_netinfo);
connection_free_(TO_CONN(c1));
connection_free_(TO_CONN(c2));
tor_free(cell1);
tor_free(cell2);
certs_cell_free(cc1);
certs_cell_free(cc2);
if (chan1)
circuitmux_free(chan1->base_.cmux);
tor_free(chan1);
if (chan2)
circuitmux_free(chan2->base_.cmux);
tor_free(chan2);
crypto_pk_free(key1);
crypto_pk_free(key2);
}
/** Process a 'netinfo' cell: read and act on its contents, and set the
* connection state to "open". */
static void
command_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
{
time_t timestamp;
uint8_t my_addr_type;
uint8_t my_addr_len;
const uint8_t *my_addr_ptr;
const uint8_t *cp, *end;
uint8_t n_other_addrs;
time_t now = time(NULL);
long apparent_skew = 0;
uint32_t my_apparent_addr = 0;
if (conn->link_proto < 2) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
"Received a NETINFO cell on %s connection; dropping.",
conn->link_proto == 0 ? "non-versioned" : "a v1");
return;
}
if (conn->_base.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2 &&
conn->_base.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
"Received a NETINFO cell on non-handshaking connection; dropping.");
return;
}
tor_assert(conn->handshake_state &&
conn->handshake_state->received_versions);
if (conn->_base.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3) {
tor_assert(conn->link_proto >= 3);
if (conn->handshake_state->started_here) {
if (!conn->handshake_state->authenticated) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, "Got a NETINFO cell from server, "
"but no authentication. Closing the connection.");
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
return;
}
} else {
/* we're the server. If the client never authenticated, we have
some housekeeping to do.*/
if (!conn->handshake_state->authenticated) {
tor_assert(tor_digest_is_zero(
(const char*)conn->handshake_state->authenticated_peer_id));
connection_or_set_circid_type(conn, NULL);
connection_or_init_conn_from_address(conn,
&conn->_base.addr,
conn->_base.port,
(const char*)conn->handshake_state->authenticated_peer_id,
0);
}
}
}
/* Decode the cell. */
timestamp = ntohl(get_uint32(cell->payload));
if (labs(now - conn->handshake_state->sent_versions_at) < 180) {
apparent_skew = now - timestamp;
}
my_addr_type = (uint8_t) cell->payload[4];
my_addr_len = (uint8_t) cell->payload[5];
my_addr_ptr = (uint8_t*) cell->payload + 6;
end = cell->payload + CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE;
cp = cell->payload + 6 + my_addr_len;
if (cp >= end) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
"Addresses too long in netinfo cell; closing connection.");
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
return;
} else if (my_addr_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4 && my_addr_len == 4) {
my_apparent_addr = ntohl(get_uint32(my_addr_ptr));
}
n_other_addrs = (uint8_t) *cp++;
while (n_other_addrs && cp < end-2) {
/* Consider all the other addresses; if any matches, this connection is
* "canonical." */
tor_addr_t addr;
const uint8_t *next =
decode_address_from_payload(&addr, cp, (int)(end-cp));
if (next == NULL) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
"Bad address in netinfo cell; closing connection.");
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
return;
}
if (tor_addr_eq(&addr, &conn->real_addr)) {
conn->is_canonical = 1;
break;
}
cp = next;
--n_other_addrs;
}
/* Act on apparent skew. */
/** Warn when we get a netinfo skew with at least this value. */
#define NETINFO_NOTICE_SKEW 3600
if (labs(apparent_skew) > NETINFO_NOTICE_SKEW &&
router_get_by_id_digest(conn->identity_digest)) {
char dbuf[64];
int severity;
/*XXXX be smarter about when everybody says we are skewed. */
if (router_digest_is_trusted_dir(conn->identity_digest))
severity = LOG_WARN;
else
severity = LOG_INFO;
format_time_interval(dbuf, sizeof(dbuf), apparent_skew);
log_fn(severity, LD_GENERAL, "Received NETINFO cell with skewed time from "
"server at %s:%d. It seems that our clock is %s by %s, or "
"that theirs is %s. Tor requires an accurate clock to work: "
"please check your time and date settings.",
conn->_base.address, (int)conn->_base.port,
apparent_skew>0 ? "ahead" : "behind", dbuf,
apparent_skew>0 ? "behind" : "ahead");
if (severity == LOG_WARN) /* only tell the controller if an authority */
control_event_general_status(LOG_WARN,
"CLOCK_SKEW SKEW=%ld SOURCE=OR:%s:%d",
apparent_skew,
conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port);
}
/* XXX maybe act on my_apparent_addr, if the source is sufficiently
* trustworthy. */
(void)my_apparent_addr;
if (connection_or_set_state_open(conn)<0) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, "Got good NETINFO cell from %s:%d; but "
"was unable to make the OR connection become open.",
safe_str_client(conn->_base.address),
conn->_base.port);
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
} else {
log_info(LD_OR, "Got good NETINFO cell from %s:%d; OR connection is now "
"open, using protocol version %d. Its ID digest is %s",
safe_str_client(conn->_base.address),
conn->_base.port, (int)conn->link_proto,
hex_str(conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN));
}
assert_connection_ok(TO_CONN(conn),time(NULL));
}
/** Mark <b>circ</b> to be closed next time we call
* circuit_close_all_marked(). Do any cleanup needed:
* - If state is onionskin_pending, remove circ from the onion_pending
* list.
* - If circ isn't open yet: call circuit_build_failed() if we're
* the origin, and in either case call circuit_rep_hist_note_result()
* to note stats.
* - If purpose is C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT, remove the intro point we
* just tried from our list of intro points for that service
* descriptor.
* - Send appropriate destroys and edge_destroys for conns and
* streams attached to circ.
* - If circ->rend_splice is set (we are the midpoint of a joined
* rendezvous stream), then mark the other circuit to close as well.
*/
void
_circuit_mark_for_close(circuit_t *circ, int reason, int line,
const char *file)
{
int orig_reason = reason; /* Passed to the controller */
assert_circuit_ok(circ);
tor_assert(line);
tor_assert(file);
if (circ->marked_for_close) {
log(LOG_WARN,LD_BUG,
"Duplicate call to circuit_mark_for_close at %s:%d"
" (first at %s:%d)", file, line,
circ->marked_for_close_file, circ->marked_for_close);
return;
}
if (reason == END_CIRC_AT_ORIGIN) {
if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Specified 'at-origin' non-reason for ending circuit, "
"but circuit was not at origin. (called %s:%d, purpose=%d)",
file, line, circ->purpose);
}
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_NONE;
}
if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
/* We don't send reasons when closing circuits at the origin. */
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_NONE;
}
if (reason & END_CIRC_REASON_FLAG_REMOTE)
reason &= ~END_CIRC_REASON_FLAG_REMOTE;
if (reason < _END_CIRC_REASON_MIN || reason > _END_CIRC_REASON_MAX) {
if (!(orig_reason & END_CIRC_REASON_FLAG_REMOTE))
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Reason %d out of range at %s:%d", reason, file, line);
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_NONE;
}
if (circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_ONIONSKIN_PENDING) {
onion_pending_remove(TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ));
}
/* If the circuit ever became OPEN, we sent it to the reputation history
* module then. If it isn't OPEN, we send it there now to remember which
* links worked and which didn't.
*/
if (circ->state != CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN) {
if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
circuit_build_failed(ocirc); /* take actions if necessary */
circuit_rep_hist_note_result(ocirc);
}
}
if (circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OR_WAIT) {
if (circuits_pending_or_conns)
smartlist_remove(circuits_pending_or_conns, circ);
}
if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
control_event_circuit_status(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ),
(circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN)?CIRC_EVENT_CLOSED:CIRC_EVENT_FAILED,
orig_reason);
}
if (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT) {
origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
tor_assert(circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN);
tor_assert(ocirc->build_state->chosen_exit);
tor_assert(ocirc->rend_data);
/* treat this like getting a nack from it */
log_info(LD_REND, "Failed intro circ %s to %s (awaiting ack). "
"Removing from descriptor.",
safe_str(ocirc->rend_data->onion_address),
safe_str(build_state_get_exit_nickname(ocirc->build_state)));
rend_client_remove_intro_point(ocirc->build_state->chosen_exit,
ocirc->rend_data);
}
if (circ->n_conn)
connection_or_send_destroy(circ->n_circ_id, circ->n_conn, reason);
if (! CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
or_circuit_t *or_circ = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ);
edge_connection_t *conn;
for (conn=or_circ->n_streams; conn; conn=conn->next_stream)
connection_edge_destroy(or_circ->p_circ_id, conn);
while (or_circ->resolving_streams) {
conn = or_circ->resolving_streams;
or_circ->resolving_streams = conn->next_stream;
if (!conn->_base.marked_for_close) {
/* The client will see a DESTROY, and infer that the connections
* are closing because the circuit is getting torn down. No need
* to send an end cell. */
conn->edge_has_sent_end = 1;
conn->end_reason = END_STREAM_REASON_DESTROY;
conn->end_reason |= END_STREAM_REASON_FLAG_ALREADY_SENT_CLOSED;
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
}
conn->on_circuit = NULL;
}
if (or_circ->p_conn)
connection_or_send_destroy(or_circ->p_circ_id, or_circ->p_conn, reason);
} else {
origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
edge_connection_t *conn;
for (conn=ocirc->p_streams; conn; conn=conn->next_stream)
connection_edge_destroy(circ->n_circ_id, conn);
}
circ->marked_for_close = line;
circ->marked_for_close_file = file;
if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
or_circuit_t *or_circ = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ);
if (or_circ->rend_splice) {
if (!or_circ->rend_splice->_base.marked_for_close) {
/* do this after marking this circuit, to avoid infinite recursion. */
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(or_circ->rend_splice), reason);
}
or_circ->rend_splice = NULL;
}
}
}