int oauth_verify_rsa_sha1 (const char *m, const char *c, const char *sig) {
PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL;
SECKEYPublicKey *pkey = NULL;
CERTCertificate *cert = NULL;
SECItem signature;
SECStatus s;
SECItem der;
int rv=0;
char *key = oauth_strip_pkcs(c, NS_CERT_HEADER, NS_CERT_TRAILER);
if (!key) return 0;
oauth_init_nss();
s = ATOB_ConvertAsciiToItem(&signature, (char*) sig); // XXX cast (const char*) -> (char*)
if (s != SECSuccess) goto looser;
slot = PK11_GetInternalKeySlot();
if (!slot) goto looser;
s = ATOB_ConvertAsciiToItem(&der, key);
if (s != SECSuccess) goto looser;
cert = __CERT_DecodeDERCertificate(&der, PR_TRUE, NULL);
SECITEM_FreeItem(&der, PR_FALSE);
if (!cert) goto looser;
pkey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(cert);
if (!pkey) goto looser;
if (pkey->keyType != rsaKey) goto looser;
s = VFY_VerifyData((unsigned char*) m, strlen(m), pkey, &signature, SEC_OID_ISO_SHA1_WITH_RSA_SIGNATURE, NULL);
if (s == SECSuccess) rv=1;
#if 0
else if (PR_GetError()!= SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE) rv=-1;
#endif
looser:
if (pkey) SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pkey);
if (slot) PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
free(key);
return rv;
}
OSStatus
SecCmsSignerInfoVerifyWithPolicy(SecCmsSignerInfoRef signerinfo,CFTypeRef timeStampPolicy, CSSM_DATA_PTR digest, CSSM_DATA_PTR contentType)
{
SecPublicKeyRef publickey = NULL;
SecCmsAttribute *attr;
CSSM_DATA encoded_attrs;
SecCertificateRef cert;
SecCmsVerificationStatus vs = SecCmsVSUnverified;
PLArenaPool *poolp;
SECOidTag digestAlgTag, digestEncAlgTag;
if (signerinfo == NULL)
return SECFailure;
/* SecCmsSignerInfoGetSigningCertificate will fail if 2nd parm is NULL and */
/* cert has not been verified */
if ((cert = SecCmsSignerInfoGetSigningCertificate(signerinfo, NULL)) == NULL) {
dprintf("SecCmsSignerInfoVerify: no signing cert\n");
vs = SecCmsVSSigningCertNotFound;
goto loser;
}
dprintfRC("SecCmsSignerInfoVerify top: cert %p cert.rc %d\n", cert, (int)CFGetRetainCount(cert));
debugShowSigningCertificate(signerinfo);
OSStatus status;
if ((status = SecCertificateCopyPublicKey(cert, &publickey))) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "SecCmsSignerInfoVerifyWithPolicy: copy public key failed %d", (int)status);
vs = SecCmsVSProcessingError;
goto loser;
}
digestAlgTag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&(signerinfo->digestAlg));
digestEncAlgTag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&(signerinfo->digestEncAlg));
/*
* Gross hack necessitated by RFC 3278 section 2.1.1, which states
* that the signature algorithm (here, digestEncAlg) contains ecdsa_with-SHA1,
* *not* (as in all other algorithms) the raw signature algorithm, e.g.
* pkcs1RSAEncryption.
*/
if(digestEncAlgTag == SEC_OID_ECDSA_WithSHA1) {
digestEncAlgTag = SEC_OID_EC_PUBLIC_KEY;
}
if (!SecCmsArrayIsEmpty((void **)signerinfo->authAttr)) {
if (contentType) {
/*
* Check content type
*
* RFC2630 sez that if there are any authenticated attributes,
* then there must be one for content type which matches the
* content type of the content being signed, and there must
* be one for message digest which matches our message digest.
* So check these things first.
*/
if ((attr = SecCmsAttributeArrayFindAttrByOidTag(signerinfo->authAttr,
SEC_OID_PKCS9_CONTENT_TYPE, PR_TRUE)) == NULL)
{
vs = SecCmsVSMalformedSignature;
goto loser;
}
if (SecCmsAttributeCompareValue(attr, contentType) == PR_FALSE) {
vs = SecCmsVSMalformedSignature;
goto loser;
}
}
/*
* Check digest
*/
if ((attr = SecCmsAttributeArrayFindAttrByOidTag(signerinfo->authAttr, SEC_OID_PKCS9_MESSAGE_DIGEST, PR_TRUE)) == NULL)
{
vs = SecCmsVSMalformedSignature;
goto loser;
}
if (SecCmsAttributeCompareValue(attr, digest) == PR_FALSE) {
vs = SecCmsVSDigestMismatch;
goto loser;
}
if ((poolp = PORT_NewArena (1024)) == NULL) {
vs = SecCmsVSProcessingError;
goto loser;
}
/*
* Check signature
*
* The signature is based on a digest of the DER-encoded authenticated
* attributes. So, first we encode and then we digest/verify.
* we trust the decoder to have the attributes in the right (sorted) order
*/
encoded_attrs.Data = NULL;
encoded_attrs.Length = 0;
if (SecCmsAttributeArrayEncode(poolp, &(signerinfo->authAttr), &encoded_attrs) == NULL ||
encoded_attrs.Data == NULL || encoded_attrs.Length == 0)
{
vs = SecCmsVSProcessingError;
goto loser;
}
vs = (VFY_VerifyData (encoded_attrs.Data, (int)encoded_attrs.Length,
publickey, &(signerinfo->encDigest),
digestAlgTag, digestEncAlgTag,
signerinfo->cmsg->pwfn_arg) != SECSuccess) ? SecCmsVSBadSignature : SecCmsVSGoodSignature;
dprintf("VFY_VerifyData (authenticated attributes): %s\n",
(vs == SecCmsVSGoodSignature)?"SecCmsVSGoodSignature":"SecCmsVSBadSignature");
PORT_FreeArena(poolp, PR_FALSE); /* awkward memory management :-( */
} else {
CSSM_DATA_PTR sig;
/* No authenticated attributes. The signature is based on the plain message digest. */
sig = &(signerinfo->encDigest);
if (sig->Length == 0)
goto loser;
vs = (VFY_VerifyDigest(digest, publickey, sig,
digestAlgTag, digestEncAlgTag,
signerinfo->cmsg->pwfn_arg) != SECSuccess) ? SecCmsVSBadSignature : SecCmsVSGoodSignature;
dprintf("VFY_VerifyData (plain message digest): %s\n",
(vs == SecCmsVSGoodSignature)?"SecCmsVSGoodSignature":"SecCmsVSBadSignature");
}
if (!SecCmsArrayIsEmpty((void **)signerinfo->unAuthAttr))
{
dprintf("found an unAuthAttr\n");
OSStatus rux = SecCmsSignerInfoVerifyUnAuthAttrsWithPolicy(signerinfo,timeStampPolicy);
dprintf("SecCmsSignerInfoVerifyUnAuthAttrs Status: %ld\n", (long)rux);
if (rux) {
goto loser;
}
}
if (vs == SecCmsVSBadSignature) {
/*
* XXX Change the generic error into our specific one, because
* in that case we get a better explanation out of the Security
* Advisor. This is really a bug in our error strings (the
* "generic" error has a lousy/wrong message associated with it
* which assumes the signature verification was done for the
* purposes of checking the issuer signature on a certificate)
* but this is at least an easy workaround and/or in the
* Security Advisor, which specifically checks for the error
* SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE and gives more explanation
* in that case but does not similarly check for
* SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE. It probably should, but then would
* probably say the wrong thing in the case that it *was* the
* certificate signature check that failed during the cert
* verification done above. Our error handling is really a mess.
*/
if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE)
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE);
}
if (publickey != NULL)
CFRelease(publickey);
signerinfo->verificationStatus = vs;
dprintfRC("SecCmsSignerInfoVerify end: cerp %p cert.rc %d\n",
cert, (int)CFGetRetainCount(cert));
dprintf("verificationStatus: %d\n", vs);
return (vs == SecCmsVSGoodSignature) ? SECSuccess : SECFailure;
loser:
if (publickey != NULL)
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey (publickey);
dprintf("verificationStatus2: %d\n", vs);
signerinfo->verificationStatus = vs;
PORT_SetError (SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE);
return SECFailure;
}
