int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int rc; int type = check_ttyname(); if (type == IS_UNK) type = check_devnode(); puts(tty_names[type]); if (argc > 1 && strcmp(argv[1], "stdout") == 0) rc = 0; else rc = type; return rc; }
int main(int argc, char **argv) { extern int optind; extern char *optarg, **environ; register int ch; register char *p; int ask, fflag, hflag, pflag, cnt, errsv; int quietlog, passwd_req; char *domain, *ttyn; char tbuf[MAXPATHLEN + 2], tname[sizeof(_PATH_TTY) + 10]; char *termenv; char *childArgv[10]; char *buff; int childArgc = 0; char *salt, *pp; pid = getpid(); signal(SIGALRM, timedout); alarm((unsigned int)timeout); signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN); signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN); setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, 0, 0); /* * -p is used by getty to tell login not to destroy the environment * -f is used to skip a second login authentication * -h is used by other servers to pass the name of the remote * host to login so that it may be placed in utmp and wtmp */ gethostname(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf)); xstrncpy(thishost, tbuf, sizeof(thishost)); domain = index(tbuf, '.'); username = tty_name = hostname = NULL; fflag = hflag = pflag = 0; passwd_req = 1; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "fh:p")) != -1) switch (ch) { case 'f': fflag = 1; break; case 'h': if (getuid()) { fprintf(stderr, "login: -h for super-user only.\n"); exit(1); } hflag = 1; if (domain && (p = index(optarg, '.')) && strcasecmp(p, domain) == 0) *p = 0; hostname = strdup(optarg); /* strdup: Ambrose C. Li */ { struct hostent *he = gethostbyname(hostname); /* he points to static storage; copy the part we use */ hostaddress[0] = 0; if (he && he->h_addr_list && he->h_addr_list[0]) memcpy(hostaddress, he->h_addr_list[0], sizeof(hostaddress)); } break; case 'p': pflag = 1; break; case '?': default: fprintf(stderr, "usage: login [-fp] [username]\n"); exit(1); } argc -= optind; argv += optind; if (*argv) { char *p = *argv; username = strdup(p); ask = 0; /* wipe name - some people mistype their password here */ /* (of course we are too late, but perhaps this helps a little ..) */ while(*p) *p++ = ' '; } else ask = 1; for (cnt = getdtablesize(); cnt > 2; cnt--) close(cnt); ttyn = ttyname(0); if (ttyn == NULL || *ttyn == '\0') { /* no snprintf required - see definition of tname */ sprintf(tname, "%s??", _PATH_TTY); ttyn = tname; } check_ttyname(ttyn); if (strncmp(ttyn, "/dev/", 5) == 0) tty_name = ttyn+5; else tty_name = ttyn; if (strncmp(ttyn, "/dev/tty", 8) == 0) tty_number = ttyn+8; else { char *p = ttyn; while (*p && !isdigit(*p)) p++; tty_number = p; } /* set pgid to pid */ setpgrp(); /* this means that setsid() will fail */ { struct termios tt, ttt; tcgetattr(0, &tt); ttt = tt; ttt.c_cflag &= ~HUPCL; /* These can fail, e.g. with ttyn on a read-only filesystem */ chown(ttyn, 0, 0); chmod(ttyn, TTY_MODE); /* Kill processes left on this tty */ tcsetattr(0,TCSAFLUSH,&ttt); signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); /* so vhangup() wont kill us */ //vhangup(); signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL); /* open stdin,stdout,stderr to the tty */ opentty(ttyn); /* restore tty modes */ tcsetattr(0,TCSAFLUSH,&tt); } openlog("login", LOG_ODELAY, LOG_AUTHPRIV); #if 0 /* other than iso-8859-1 */ printf("\033(K"); fprintf(stderr,"\033(K"); #endif for (cnt = 0;; ask = 1) { if (ask) { fflag = 0; getloginname(); } /* Dirty patch to fix a gigantic security hole when using yellow pages. This problem should be solved by the libraries, and not by programs, but this must be fixed urgently! If the first char of the username is '+', we avoid login success. Feb 95 <*****@*****.**> */ if (username[0] == '+') { puts("Illegal username"); badlogin(username); sleepexit(1); } /* (void)strcpy(tbuf, username); why was this here? */ if ((pwd = getpwnam(username))) { salt = pwd->pw_passwd; } else salt = (char *) "xx"; if (pwd) { initgroups(username, pwd->pw_gid); } /* if user not super-user, check for disabled logins */ if (pwd == NULL || pwd->pw_uid) checknologin(); /* * Disallow automatic login to root; if not invoked by * root, disallow if the uid's differ. */ if (fflag && pwd) { int uid = getuid(); passwd_req = pwd->pw_uid == 0 || (uid && uid != pwd->pw_uid); } /* * If no pre-authentication and a password exists * for this user, prompt for one and verify it. */ if (!passwd_req || (pwd && !*pwd->pw_passwd)) break; setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, 0, -4); pp = getpass("Password: "******"Login incorrect\n"); badlogin(username); /* log ALL bad logins */ failures++; /* we allow 10 tries, but after 3 we start backing off */ if (++cnt > 3) { if (cnt >= 10) { sleepexit(1); } sleep((unsigned int)((cnt - 3) * 5)); } } /* committed to login -- turn off timeout */ alarm((unsigned int)0); endpwent(); /* This requires some explanation: As root we may not be able to read the directory of the user if it is on an NFS mounted filesystem. We temporarily set our effective uid to the user-uid making sure that we keep root privs. in the real uid. A portable solution would require a fork(), but we rely on Linux having the BSD setreuid() */ quietlog = 0; dolastlog(quietlog); chown(ttyn, pwd->pw_uid, pwd->pw_gid); chmod(ttyn, TTY_MODE); setgid(pwd->pw_gid); if (*pwd->pw_shell == '\0') pwd->pw_shell = (char *)_PATH_BSHELL; /* preserve TERM even without -p flag */ { char *ep; if(!((ep = getenv("TERM")) && (termenv = strdup(ep)))) termenv = (char *) "dumb"; } /* destroy environment unless user has requested preservation */ if (!pflag) { environ = (char**)malloc(sizeof(char*)); memset(environ, 0, sizeof(char*)); } setenv("HOME", pwd->pw_dir, 0); /* legal to override */ if(pwd->pw_uid) setenv("PATH", _PATH_DEFPATH, 1); else setenv("PATH", _PATH_DEFPATH_ROOT, 1); setenv("SHELL", pwd->pw_shell, 1); setenv("TERM", termenv, 1); /* mailx will give a funny error msg if you forget this one */ { char tmp[MAXPATHLEN]; /* avoid snprintf */ if (sizeof(_PATH_MAILDIR) + strlen(pwd->pw_name) + 1 < MAXPATHLEN) { sprintf(tmp, "%s/%s", _PATH_MAILDIR, pwd->pw_name); setenv("MAIL",tmp,0); } } /* LOGNAME is not documented in login(1) but HP-UX 6.5 does it. We'll not allow modifying it. */ setenv("LOGNAME", pwd->pw_name, 1); if (!strncmp(tty_name, "ttyS", 4)) syslog(LOG_INFO, "DIALUP AT %s BY %s", tty_name, pwd->pw_name); /* allow tracking of good logins. -steve philp ([email protected]) */ if (pwd->pw_uid == 0) { if (hostname) syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "ROOT LOGIN ON %s FROM %s", tty_name, hostname); else syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "ROOT LOGIN ON %s", tty_name); } else { if (hostname) syslog(LOG_INFO, "LOGIN ON %s BY %s FROM %s", tty_name, pwd->pw_name, hostname); else syslog(LOG_INFO, "LOGIN ON %s BY %s", tty_name, pwd->pw_name); } if (!quietlog) { struct stat st; char *mail; mail = getenv("MAIL"); if (mail && stat(mail, &st) == 0 && st.st_size != 0) { if (st.st_mtime > st.st_atime) printf("You have new mail.\n"); else printf("You have mail.\n"); } } signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL); signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL); signal(SIGTSTP, SIG_IGN); signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL); /* discard permissions last so can't get killed and drop core */ if(setuid(pwd->pw_uid) < 0 && pwd->pw_uid) { syslog(LOG_ALERT, "setuid() failed"); exit(1); } /* wait until here to change directory! */ if (chdir(pwd->pw_dir) < 0) { printf("No directory %s!\n", pwd->pw_dir); if (chdir("/")) exit(0); pwd->pw_dir = (char *) "/"; printf("Logging in with home = \"/\".\n"); } /* if the shell field has a space: treat it like a shell script */ if (strchr(pwd->pw_shell, ' ')) { buff = malloc(strlen(pwd->pw_shell) + 6); if (!buff) { fprintf(stderr, "login: no memory for shell script.\n"); exit(0); } strcpy(buff, "exec "); strcat(buff, pwd->pw_shell); childArgv[childArgc++] = (char *) "/bin/sh"; childArgv[childArgc++] = (char *) "-sh"; childArgv[childArgc++] = (char *) "-c"; childArgv[childArgc++] = buff; } else { tbuf[0] = '-'; xstrncpy(tbuf + 1, ((p = rindex(pwd->pw_shell, '/')) ? p + 1 : pwd->pw_shell), sizeof(tbuf)-1); childArgv[childArgc++] = pwd->pw_shell; childArgv[childArgc++] = tbuf; } childArgv[childArgc++] = NULL; execvp(childArgv[0], childArgv + 1); errsv = errno; if (!strcmp(childArgv[0], "/bin/sh")) fprintf(stderr, "login: couldn't exec shell script: %s.\n", strerror(errsv)); else fprintf(stderr, "login: no shell: %s.\n", strerror(errsv)); exit(0); }
int main(int argc, char **argv) { extern int optind; extern char *optarg, **environ; struct group *gr; register int ch; register char *p; int ask, fflag, hflag, pflag, cnt, errsv; int quietlog, passwd_req; char *domain, *ttyn; char tbuf[MAXPATHLEN + 2], tname[sizeof(_PATH_TTY) + 10]; char *termenv; char *childArgv[10]; char *buff; int childArgc = 0; #ifdef HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_MISC_H int retcode; pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL; struct pam_conv conv = { misc_conv, NULL }; pid_t childPid; #else char *salt, *pp; #endif #ifdef LOGIN_CHOWN_VCS char vcsn[20], vcsan[20]; #endif pid = getpid(); signal(SIGALRM, timedout); alarm((unsigned int)timeout); signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN); signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN); setlocale(LC_ALL, ""); bindtextdomain(PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR); textdomain(PACKAGE); setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, 0, 0); initproctitle(argc, argv); /* * -p is used by getty to tell login not to destroy the environment * -f is used to skip a second login authentication * -h is used by other servers to pass the name of the remote * host to login so that it may be placed in utmp and wtmp */ gethostname(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf)); xstrncpy(thishost, tbuf, sizeof(thishost)); domain = index(tbuf, '.'); username = tty_name = hostname = NULL; fflag = hflag = pflag = 0; passwd_req = 1; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "fh:p")) != -1) switch (ch) { case 'f': fflag = 1; break; case 'h': if (getuid()) { fprintf(stderr, _("login: -h for super-user only.\n")); exit(1); } hflag = 1; if (domain && (p = index(optarg, '.')) && strcasecmp(p, domain) == 0) *p = 0; hostname = strdup(optarg); /* strdup: Ambrose C. Li */ { struct hostent *he = gethostbyname(hostname); /* he points to static storage; copy the part we use */ hostaddress[0] = 0; if (he && he->h_addr_list && he->h_addr_list[0]) memcpy(hostaddress, he->h_addr_list[0], sizeof(hostaddress)); } break; case 'p': pflag = 1; break; case '?': default: fprintf(stderr, _("usage: login [-fp] [username]\n")); exit(1); } argc -= optind; argv += optind; if (*argv) { char *p = *argv; username = strdup(p); ask = 0; /* wipe name - some people mistype their password here */ /* (of course we are too late, but perhaps this helps a little ..) */ while(*p) *p++ = ' '; } else ask = 1; for (cnt = getdtablesize(); cnt > 2; cnt--) close(cnt); ttyn = ttyname(0); if (ttyn == NULL || *ttyn == '\0') { /* no snprintf required - see definition of tname */ sprintf(tname, "%s??", _PATH_TTY); ttyn = tname; } check_ttyname(ttyn); if (strncmp(ttyn, "/dev/", 5) == 0) tty_name = ttyn+5; else tty_name = ttyn; if (strncmp(ttyn, "/dev/tty", 8) == 0) tty_number = ttyn+8; else { char *p = ttyn; while (*p && !isdigit(*p)) p++; tty_number = p; } #ifdef LOGIN_CHOWN_VCS /* find names of Virtual Console devices, for later mode change */ snprintf(vcsn, sizeof(vcsn), "/dev/vcs%s", tty_number); snprintf(vcsan, sizeof(vcsan), "/dev/vcsa%s", tty_number); #endif /* set pgid to pid */ setpgrp(); /* this means that setsid() will fail */ { struct termios tt, ttt; tcgetattr(0, &tt); ttt = tt; ttt.c_cflag &= ~HUPCL; /* These can fail, e.g. with ttyn on a read-only filesystem */ chown(ttyn, 0, 0); chmod(ttyn, TTY_MODE); /* Kill processes left on this tty */ tcsetattr(0,TCSAFLUSH,&ttt); signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); /* so vhangup() wont kill us */ vhangup(); signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL); /* open stdin,stdout,stderr to the tty */ opentty(ttyn); /* restore tty modes */ tcsetattr(0,TCSAFLUSH,&tt); } openlog("login", LOG_ODELAY, LOG_AUTHPRIV); #if 0 /* other than iso-8859-1 */ printf("\033(K"); fprintf(stderr,"\033(K"); #endif #ifdef HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_MISC_H /* * username is initialized to NULL * and if specified on the command line it is set. * Therefore, we are safe not setting it to anything */ retcode = pam_start("login",username, &conv, &pamh); if(retcode != PAM_SUCCESS) { fprintf(stderr, _("login: PAM Failure, aborting: %s\n"), pam_strerror(pamh, retcode)); syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Couldn't initialize PAM: %s"), pam_strerror(pamh, retcode)); exit(99); } /* hostname & tty are either set to NULL or their correct values, depending on how much we know */ retcode = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_RHOST, hostname); PAM_FAIL_CHECK; retcode = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, tty_name); PAM_FAIL_CHECK; /* * [email protected]: Provide a user prompt to PAM * so that the "login: "******"Password: "******"login: "******"\033(K"); fprintf(stderr,"\033(K"); #endif /* if fflag == 1, then the user has already been authenticated */ if (fflag && (getuid() == 0)) passwd_req = 0; else passwd_req = 1; if(passwd_req == 1) { int failcount=0; /* if we didn't get a user on the command line, set it to NULL */ pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (const void **) &username); if (!username) pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_USER, NULL); /* there may be better ways to deal with some of these conditions, but at least this way I don't think we'll be giving away information... */ /* Perhaps someday we can trust that all PAM modules will pay attention to failure count and get rid of MAX_LOGIN_TRIES? */ retcode = pam_authenticate(pamh, 0); while((failcount++ < PAM_MAX_LOGIN_TRIES) && ((retcode == PAM_AUTH_ERR) || (retcode == PAM_USER_UNKNOWN) || (retcode == PAM_CRED_INSUFFICIENT) || (retcode == PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL))) { pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (const void **) &username); syslog(LOG_NOTICE,_("FAILED LOGIN %d FROM %s FOR %s, %s"), failcount, hostname, username, pam_strerror(pamh, retcode)); logbtmp(tty_name, username, hostname); fprintf(stderr,_("Login incorrect\n\n")); pam_set_item(pamh,PAM_USER,NULL); retcode = pam_authenticate(pamh, 0); } if (retcode != PAM_SUCCESS) { pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (const void **) &username); if (retcode == PAM_MAXTRIES) syslog(LOG_NOTICE,_("TOO MANY LOGIN TRIES (%d) FROM %s FOR " "%s, %s"), failcount, hostname, username, pam_strerror(pamh, retcode)); else syslog(LOG_NOTICE,_("FAILED LOGIN SESSION FROM %s FOR %s, %s"), hostname, username, pam_strerror(pamh, retcode)); logbtmp(tty_name, username, hostname); fprintf(stderr,_("\nLogin incorrect\n")); pam_end(pamh, retcode); exit(0); } retcode = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, 0); if(retcode == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) { retcode = pam_chauthtok(pamh, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK); } PAM_FAIL_CHECK; } /* * Grab the user information out of the password file for future usage * First get the username that we are actually using, though. */ retcode = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (const void **) &username); PAM_FAIL_CHECK; if (!username || !*username) { fprintf(stderr, _("\nSession setup problem, abort.\n")); syslog(LOG_ERR, _("NULL user name in %s:%d. Abort."), __FUNCTION__, __LINE__); pam_end(pamh, PAM_SYSTEM_ERR); exit(1); } if (!(pwd = getpwnam(username))) { fprintf(stderr, _("\nSession setup problem, abort.\n")); syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Invalid user name \"%s\" in %s:%d. Abort."), username, __FUNCTION__, __LINE__); pam_end(pamh, PAM_SYSTEM_ERR); exit(1); } /* * Create a copy of the pwd struct - otherwise it may get * clobbered by PAM */ memcpy(&pwdcopy, pwd, sizeof(*pwd)); pwd = &pwdcopy; pwd->pw_name = strdup(pwd->pw_name); pwd->pw_passwd = strdup(pwd->pw_passwd); pwd->pw_gecos = strdup(pwd->pw_gecos); pwd->pw_dir = strdup(pwd->pw_dir); pwd->pw_shell = strdup(pwd->pw_shell); if (!pwd->pw_name || !pwd->pw_passwd || !pwd->pw_gecos || !pwd->pw_dir || !pwd->pw_shell) { fprintf(stderr, _("login: Out of memory\n")); syslog(LOG_ERR, "Out of memory"); pam_end(pamh, PAM_SYSTEM_ERR); exit(1); } username = pwd->pw_name; /* * Initialize the supplementary group list. * This should be done before pam_setcred because * the PAM modules might add groups during pam_setcred. */ if (initgroups(username, pwd->pw_gid) < 0) { syslog(LOG_ERR, "initgroups: %m"); fprintf(stderr, _("\nSession setup problem, abort.\n")); pam_end(pamh, PAM_SYSTEM_ERR); exit(1); } retcode = pam_open_session(pamh, 0); PAM_FAIL_CHECK; retcode = pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED); PAM_FAIL_CHECK; #else /* ! HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_MISC_H */ for (cnt = 0;; ask = 1) { if (ask) { fflag = 0; getloginname(); } /* Dirty patch to fix a gigantic security hole when using yellow pages. This problem should be solved by the libraries, and not by programs, but this must be fixed urgently! If the first char of the username is '+', we avoid login success. Feb 95 <*****@*****.**> */ if (username[0] == '+') { puts(_("Illegal username")); badlogin(username); sleepexit(1); } /* (void)strcpy(tbuf, username); why was this here? */ if ((pwd = getpwnam(username))) { # ifdef SHADOW_PWD struct spwd *sp; if ((sp = getspnam(username))) pwd->pw_passwd = sp->sp_pwdp; # endif salt = pwd->pw_passwd; } else salt = "xx"; if (pwd) { initgroups(username, pwd->pw_gid); checktty(username, tty_name, pwd); /* in checktty.c */ } /* if user not super-user, check for disabled logins */ if (pwd == NULL || pwd->pw_uid) checknologin(); /* * Disallow automatic login to root; if not invoked by * root, disallow if the uid's differ. */ if (fflag && pwd) { int uid = getuid(); passwd_req = pwd->pw_uid == 0 || (uid && uid != pwd->pw_uid); } /* * If trying to log in as root, but with insecure terminal, * refuse the login attempt. */ if (pwd && pwd->pw_uid == 0 && !rootterm(tty_name)) { fprintf(stderr, _("%s login refused on this terminal.\n"), pwd->pw_name); if (hostname) syslog(LOG_NOTICE, _("LOGIN %s REFUSED FROM %s ON TTY %s"), pwd->pw_name, hostname, tty_name); else syslog(LOG_NOTICE, _("LOGIN %s REFUSED ON TTY %s"), pwd->pw_name, tty_name); continue; } /* * If no pre-authentication and a password exists * for this user, prompt for one and verify it. */ if (!passwd_req || (pwd && !*pwd->pw_passwd)) break; setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, 0, -4); pp = getpass(_("Password: "******"CRYPTO", 6) == 0) { if (pwd && cryptocard()) break; } # endif /* CRYPTOCARD */ p = crypt(pp, salt); setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, 0, 0); # ifdef KERBEROS /* * If not present in pw file, act as we normally would. * If we aren't Kerberos-authenticated, try the normal * pw file for a password. If that's ok, log the user * in without issueing any tickets. */ if (pwd && !krb_get_lrealm(realm,1)) { /* * get TGT for local realm; be careful about uid's * here for ticket file ownership */ setreuid(geteuid(),pwd->pw_uid); kerror = krb_get_pw_in_tkt(pwd->pw_name, "", realm, "krbtgt", realm, DEFAULT_TKT_LIFE, pp); setuid(0); if (kerror == INTK_OK) { memset(pp, 0, strlen(pp)); notickets = 0; /* user got ticket */ break; } } # endif /* KERBEROS */ memset(pp, 0, strlen(pp)); if (pwd && !strcmp(p, pwd->pw_passwd)) break; printf(_("Login incorrect\n")); badlogin(username); /* log ALL bad logins */ failures++; /* we allow 10 tries, but after 3 we start backing off */ if (++cnt > 3) { if (cnt >= 10) { sleepexit(1); } sleep((unsigned int)((cnt - 3) * 5)); } } #endif /* !HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_MISC_H */ /* committed to login -- turn off timeout */ alarm((unsigned int)0); endpwent(); /* This requires some explanation: As root we may not be able to read the directory of the user if it is on an NFS mounted filesystem. We temporarily set our effective uid to the user-uid making sure that we keep root privs. in the real uid. A portable solution would require a fork(), but we rely on Linux having the BSD setreuid() */ { char tmpstr[MAXPATHLEN]; uid_t ruid = getuid(); gid_t egid = getegid(); /* avoid snprintf - old systems do not have it, or worse, have a libc in which snprintf is the same as sprintf */ if (strlen(pwd->pw_dir) + sizeof(_PATH_HUSHLOGIN) + 2 > MAXPATHLEN) quietlog = 0; else { sprintf(tmpstr, "%s/%s", pwd->pw_dir, _PATH_HUSHLOGIN); setregid(-1, pwd->pw_gid); setreuid(0, pwd->pw_uid); quietlog = (access(tmpstr, R_OK) == 0); setuid(0); /* setreuid doesn't do it alone! */ setreuid(ruid, 0); setregid(-1, egid); } } /* for linux, write entries in utmp and wtmp */ { struct utmp ut; struct utmp *utp; utmpname(_PATH_UTMP); setutent(); /* Find pid in utmp. login sometimes overwrites the runlevel entry in /var/run/utmp, confusing sysvinit. I added a test for the entry type, and the problem was gone. (In a runlevel entry, st_pid is not really a pid but some number calculated from the previous and current runlevel). Michael Riepe <*****@*****.**> */ while ((utp = getutent())) if (utp->ut_pid == pid && utp->ut_type >= INIT_PROCESS && utp->ut_type <= DEAD_PROCESS) break; /* If we can't find a pre-existing entry by pid, try by line. BSD network daemons may rely on this. (anonymous) */ if (utp == NULL) { setutent(); ut.ut_type = LOGIN_PROCESS; strncpy(ut.ut_line, tty_name, sizeof(ut.ut_line)); utp = getutline(&ut); } if (utp) { memcpy(&ut, utp, sizeof(ut)); } else { /* some gettys/telnetds don't initialize utmp... */ memset(&ut, 0, sizeof(ut)); } if (ut.ut_id[0] == 0) strncpy(ut.ut_id, tty_number, sizeof(ut.ut_id)); strncpy(ut.ut_user, username, sizeof(ut.ut_user)); xstrncpy(ut.ut_line, tty_name, sizeof(ut.ut_line)); #ifdef _HAVE_UT_TV /* in <utmpbits.h> included by <utmp.h> */ gettimeofday(&ut.ut_tv, NULL); #else { time_t t; time(&t); ut.ut_time = t; /* ut_time is not always a time_t */ /* glibc2 #defines it as ut_tv.tv_sec */ } #endif ut.ut_type = USER_PROCESS; ut.ut_pid = pid; if (hostname) { xstrncpy(ut.ut_host, hostname, sizeof(ut.ut_host)); if (hostaddress[0]) memcpy(&ut.ut_addr, hostaddress, sizeof(ut.ut_addr)); } pututline(&ut); endutent(); #if HAVE_UPDWTMP updwtmp(_PATH_WTMP, &ut); #else #if 0 /* The O_APPEND open() flag should be enough to guarantee atomic writes at end of file. */ { int wtmp; if((wtmp = open(_PATH_WTMP, O_APPEND|O_WRONLY)) >= 0) { write(wtmp, (char *)&ut, sizeof(ut)); close(wtmp); } } #else /* Probably all this locking below is just nonsense, and the short version is OK as well. */ { int lf, wtmp; if ((lf = open(_PATH_WTMPLOCK, O_CREAT|O_WRONLY, 0660)) >= 0) { flock(lf, LOCK_EX); if ((wtmp = open(_PATH_WTMP, O_APPEND|O_WRONLY)) >= 0) { write(wtmp, (char *)&ut, sizeof(ut)); close(wtmp); } flock(lf, LOCK_UN); close(lf); } } #endif #endif } dolastlog(quietlog); chown(ttyn, pwd->pw_uid, (gr = getgrnam(TTYGRPNAME)) ? gr->gr_gid : pwd->pw_gid); chmod(ttyn, TTY_MODE); #ifdef LOGIN_CHOWN_VCS /* if tty is one of the VC's then change owner and mode of the special /dev/vcs devices as well */ if (consoletty(0)) { chown(vcsn, pwd->pw_uid, (gr ? gr->gr_gid : pwd->pw_gid)); chown(vcsan, pwd->pw_uid, (gr ? gr->gr_gid : pwd->pw_gid)); chmod(vcsn, TTY_MODE); chmod(vcsan, TTY_MODE); } #endif setgid(pwd->pw_gid); if (*pwd->pw_shell == '\0') pwd->pw_shell = _PATH_BSHELL; /* preserve TERM even without -p flag */ { char *ep; if(!((ep = getenv("TERM")) && (termenv = strdup(ep)))) termenv = "dumb"; } /* destroy environment unless user has requested preservation */ if (!pflag) { environ = (char**)malloc(sizeof(char*)); memset(environ, 0, sizeof(char*)); } setenv("HOME", pwd->pw_dir, 0); /* legal to override */ if(pwd->pw_uid) setenv("PATH", _PATH_DEFPATH, 1); else setenv("PATH", _PATH_DEFPATH_ROOT, 1); setenv("SHELL", pwd->pw_shell, 1); setenv("TERM", termenv, 1); /* mailx will give a funny error msg if you forget this one */ { char tmp[MAXPATHLEN]; /* avoid snprintf */ if (sizeof(_PATH_MAILDIR) + strlen(pwd->pw_name) + 1 < MAXPATHLEN) { sprintf(tmp, "%s/%s", _PATH_MAILDIR, pwd->pw_name); setenv("MAIL",tmp,0); } } /* LOGNAME is not documented in login(1) but HP-UX 6.5 does it. We'll not allow modifying it. */ setenv("LOGNAME", pwd->pw_name, 1); #ifdef HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_MISC_H { int i; char ** env = pam_getenvlist(pamh); if (env != NULL) { for (i=0; env[i]; i++) { putenv(env[i]); /* D(("env[%d] = %s", i,env[i])); */ } } } #endif setproctitle("login", username); if (!strncmp(tty_name, "ttyS", 4)) syslog(LOG_INFO, _("DIALUP AT %s BY %s"), tty_name, pwd->pw_name); /* allow tracking of good logins. -steve philp ([email protected]) */ if (pwd->pw_uid == 0) { if (hostname) syslog(LOG_NOTICE, _("ROOT LOGIN ON %s FROM %s"), tty_name, hostname); else syslog(LOG_NOTICE, _("ROOT LOGIN ON %s"), tty_name); } else { if (hostname) syslog(LOG_INFO, _("LOGIN ON %s BY %s FROM %s"), tty_name, pwd->pw_name, hostname); else syslog(LOG_INFO, _("LOGIN ON %s BY %s"), tty_name, pwd->pw_name); } if (!quietlog) { motd(); #ifdef LOGIN_STAT_MAIL /* * This turns out to be a bad idea: when the mail spool * is NFS mounted, and the NFS connection hangs, the * login hangs, even root cannot login. * Checking for mail should be done from the shell. */ { struct stat st; char *mail; mail = getenv("MAIL"); if (mail && stat(mail, &st) == 0 && st.st_size != 0) { if (st.st_mtime > st.st_atime) printf(_("You have new mail.\n")); else printf(_("You have mail.\n")); } } #endif } signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL); signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL); signal(SIGTSTP, SIG_IGN); #ifdef HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_MISC_H /* * We must fork before setuid() because we need to call * pam_close_session() as root. */ childPid = fork(); if (childPid < 0) { int errsv = errno; /* error in fork() */ fprintf(stderr, _("login: failure forking: %s"), strerror(errsv)); PAM_END; exit(0); } if (childPid) { /* parent - wait for child to finish, then cleanup session */ signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN); signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN); signal(SIGTSTP, SIG_IGN); signal(SIGTTIN, SIG_IGN); signal(SIGTTOU, SIG_IGN); wait(NULL); PAM_END; exit(0); } /* child */ /* * Problem: if the user's shell is a shell like ash that doesnt do * setsid() or setpgrp(), then a ctrl-\, sending SIGQUIT to every * process in the pgrp, will kill us. */ /* start new session */ setsid(); /* make sure we have a controlling tty */ opentty(ttyn); openlog("login", LOG_ODELAY, LOG_AUTHPRIV); /* reopen */ /* * TIOCSCTTY: steal tty from other process group. */ if (ioctl(0, TIOCSCTTY, 1)) syslog(LOG_ERR, _("TIOCSCTTY failed: %m")); #endif signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL); /* discard permissions last so can't get killed and drop core */ if(setuid(pwd->pw_uid) < 0 && pwd->pw_uid) { syslog(LOG_ALERT, _("setuid() failed")); exit(1); } /* wait until here to change directory! */ if (chdir(pwd->pw_dir) < 0) { printf(_("No directory %s!\n"), pwd->pw_dir); if (chdir("/")) exit(0); pwd->pw_dir = "/"; printf(_("Logging in with home = \"/\".\n")); } /* if the shell field has a space: treat it like a shell script */ if (strchr(pwd->pw_shell, ' ')) { buff = malloc(strlen(pwd->pw_shell) + 6); if (!buff) { fprintf(stderr, _("login: no memory for shell script.\n")); exit(0); } strcpy(buff, "exec "); strcat(buff, pwd->pw_shell); childArgv[childArgc++] = "/bin/sh"; childArgv[childArgc++] = "-sh"; childArgv[childArgc++] = "-c"; childArgv[childArgc++] = buff; } else { tbuf[0] = '-'; xstrncpy(tbuf + 1, ((p = rindex(pwd->pw_shell, '/')) ? p + 1 : pwd->pw_shell), sizeof(tbuf)-1); childArgv[childArgc++] = pwd->pw_shell; childArgv[childArgc++] = tbuf; } childArgv[childArgc++] = NULL; execvp(childArgv[0], childArgv + 1); errsv = errno; if (!strcmp(childArgv[0], "/bin/sh")) fprintf(stderr, _("login: couldn't exec shell script: %s.\n"), strerror(errsv)); else fprintf(stderr, _("login: no shell: %s.\n"), strerror(errsv)); exit(0); }