/** Set <b>out</b> to the hex-encoded fingerprint of <b>pkey</b>. */
static int
get_digest(EVP_PKEY *pkey, char *out)
{
int r = 1;
crypto_pk_env_t *pk = _crypto_new_pk_env_rsa(EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey));
if (pk) {
r = crypto_pk_get_digest(pk, out);
crypto_free_pk_env(pk);
}
return r;
}
/** Remove a reference to <b>ctx</b>, and free it if it has no more
* references. */
static void
tor_tls_context_decref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx)
{
tor_assert(ctx);
if (--ctx->refcnt == 0) {
SSL_CTX_free(ctx->ctx);
X509_free(ctx->my_cert);
X509_free(ctx->my_id_cert);
crypto_free_pk_env(ctx->key);
tor_free(ctx);
}
}
static RSA *
generate_key(int bits)
{
RSA *rsa = NULL;
crypto_pk_env_t *env = crypto_new_pk_env();
if (crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits(env,bits)<0)
goto done;
rsa = _crypto_pk_env_get_rsa(env);
rsa = RSAPrivateKey_dup(rsa);
done:
crypto_free_pk_env(env);
return rsa;
}
/** Implement a cpuworker. 'data' is an fdarray as returned by socketpair.
* Read and writes from fdarray[1]. Reads requests, writes answers.
*
* Request format:
* Task type [1 byte, always CPUWORKER_TASK_ONION]
* Opaque tag TAG_LEN
* Onionskin challenge ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN
* Response format:
* Success/failure [1 byte, boolean.]
* Opaque tag TAG_LEN
* Onionskin challenge ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN
* Negotiated keys KEY_LEN*2+DIGEST_LEN*2
*
* (Note: this _should_ be by addr/port, since we're concerned with specific
* connections, not with routers (where we'd use identity).)
*/
static void
cpuworker_main(void *data)
{
char question[ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN];
uint8_t question_type;
int *fdarray = data;
int fd;
/* variables for onion processing */
char keys[CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN];
char reply_to_proxy[ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN];
char buf[LEN_ONION_RESPONSE];
char tag[TAG_LEN];
crypto_pk_env_t *onion_key = NULL, *last_onion_key = NULL;
fd = fdarray[1]; /* this side is ours */
#ifndef TOR_IS_MULTITHREADED
tor_close_socket(fdarray[0]); /* this is the side of the socketpair the
* parent uses */
tor_free_all(1); /* so the child doesn't hold the parent's fd's open */
handle_signals(0); /* ignore interrupts from the keyboard, etc */
#endif
tor_free(data);
dup_onion_keys(&onion_key, &last_onion_key);
for (;;) {
ssize_t r;
if ((r = recv(fd, &question_type, 1, 0)) != 1) {
// log_fn(LOG_ERR,"read type failed. Exiting.");
if (r == 0) {
log_info(LD_OR,
"CPU worker exiting because Tor process closed connection "
"(either rotated keys or died).");
} else {
log_info(LD_OR,
"CPU worker exiting because of error on connection to Tor "
"process.");
log_info(LD_OR,"(Error on %d was %s)",
fd, tor_socket_strerror(tor_socket_errno(fd)));
}
goto end;
}
tor_assert(question_type == CPUWORKER_TASK_ONION);
if (read_all(fd, tag, TAG_LEN, 1) != TAG_LEN) {
log_err(LD_BUG,"read tag failed. Exiting.");
goto end;
}
if (read_all(fd, question, ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN, 1) !=
ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN) {
log_err(LD_BUG,"read question failed. Exiting.");
goto end;
}
if (question_type == CPUWORKER_TASK_ONION) {
if (onion_skin_server_handshake(question, onion_key, last_onion_key,
reply_to_proxy, keys, CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN) < 0) {
/* failure */
log_debug(LD_OR,"onion_skin_server_handshake failed.");
*buf = 0; /* indicate failure in first byte */
memcpy(buf+1,tag,TAG_LEN);
/* send all zeros as answer */
memset(buf+1+TAG_LEN, 0, LEN_ONION_RESPONSE-(1+TAG_LEN));
} else {
/* success */
log_debug(LD_OR,"onion_skin_server_handshake succeeded.");
buf[0] = 1; /* 1 means success */
memcpy(buf+1,tag,TAG_LEN);
memcpy(buf+1+TAG_LEN,reply_to_proxy,ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN);
memcpy(buf+1+TAG_LEN+ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN,keys,CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN);
}
if (write_all(fd, buf, LEN_ONION_RESPONSE, 1) != LEN_ONION_RESPONSE) {
log_err(LD_BUG,"writing response buf failed. Exiting.");
goto end;
}
log_debug(LD_OR,"finished writing response.");
}
}
end:
if (onion_key)
crypto_free_pk_env(onion_key);
if (last_onion_key)
crypto_free_pk_env(last_onion_key);
tor_close_socket(fd);
crypto_thread_cleanup();
spawn_exit();
}
/** Deallocate space associated with circ.
*/
static void
circuit_free(circuit_t *circ)
{
void *mem;
size_t memlen;
tor_assert(circ);
if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
mem = ocirc;
memlen = sizeof(origin_circuit_t);
tor_assert(circ->magic == ORIGIN_CIRCUIT_MAGIC);
if (ocirc->build_state) {
if (ocirc->build_state->chosen_exit)
extend_info_free(ocirc->build_state->chosen_exit);
if (ocirc->build_state->pending_final_cpath)
circuit_free_cpath_node(ocirc->build_state->pending_final_cpath);
}
tor_free(ocirc->build_state);
circuit_free_cpath(ocirc->cpath);
if (ocirc->intro_key)
crypto_free_pk_env(ocirc->intro_key);
if (ocirc->rend_data)
rend_data_free(ocirc->rend_data);
} else {
or_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ);
mem = ocirc;
memlen = sizeof(or_circuit_t);
tor_assert(circ->magic == OR_CIRCUIT_MAGIC);
if (ocirc->p_crypto)
crypto_free_cipher_env(ocirc->p_crypto);
if (ocirc->p_digest)
crypto_free_digest_env(ocirc->p_digest);
if (ocirc->n_crypto)
crypto_free_cipher_env(ocirc->n_crypto);
if (ocirc->n_digest)
crypto_free_digest_env(ocirc->n_digest);
if (ocirc->rend_splice) {
or_circuit_t *other = ocirc->rend_splice;
tor_assert(other->_base.magic == OR_CIRCUIT_MAGIC);
other->rend_splice = NULL;
}
/* remove from map. */
circuit_set_p_circid_orconn(ocirc, 0, NULL);
/* Clear cell queue _after_ removing it from the map. Otherwise our
* "active" checks will be violated. */
cell_queue_clear(ô->p_conn_cells);
}
if (circ->n_hop)
extend_info_free(circ->n_hop);
tor_free(circ->n_conn_onionskin);
/* Remove from map. */
circuit_set_n_circid_orconn(circ, 0, NULL);
/* Clear cell queue _after_ removing it from the map. Otherwise our
* "active" checks will be violated. */
cell_queue_clear(&circ->n_conn_cells);
memset(circ, 0xAA, memlen); /* poison memory */
tor_free(mem);
}
/** Create a new TLS context for use with Tor TLS handshakes.
* <b>identity</b> should be set to the identity key used to sign the
* certificate, and <b>nickname</b> set to the nickname to use.
*
* You can call this function multiple times. Each time you call it,
* it generates new certificates; all new connections will use
* the new SSL context.
*/
int
tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_env_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime)
{
crypto_pk_env_t *rsa = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
tor_tls_context_t *result = NULL;
X509 *cert = NULL, *idcert = NULL;
char *nickname = NULL, *nn2 = NULL;
tor_tls_init();
nickname = crypto_random_hostname(8, 20, "www.", ".net");
nn2 = crypto_random_hostname(8, 20, "www.", ".net");
/* Generate short-term RSA key. */
if (!(rsa = crypto_new_pk_env()))
goto error;
if (crypto_pk_generate_key(rsa)<0)
goto error;
/* Create certificate signed by identity key. */
cert = tor_tls_create_certificate(rsa, identity, nickname, nn2,
key_lifetime);
/* Create self-signed certificate for identity key. */
idcert = tor_tls_create_certificate(identity, identity, nn2, nn2,
IDENTITY_CERT_LIFETIME);
if (!cert || !idcert) {
log(LOG_WARN, LD_CRYPTO, "Error creating certificate");
goto error;
}
result = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_context_t));
result->refcnt = 1;
result->my_cert = X509_dup(cert);
result->my_id_cert = X509_dup(idcert);
result->key = crypto_pk_dup_key(rsa);
#ifdef EVERYONE_HAS_AES
/* Tell OpenSSL to only use TLS1 */
if (!(result->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_method())))
goto error;
#else
/* Tell OpenSSL to use SSL3 or TLS1 but not SSL2. */
if (!(result->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method())))
goto error;
SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
#endif
SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx,
SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION);
#endif
/* Yes, we know what we are doing here. No, we do not treat a renegotiation
* as authenticating any earlier-received data.
*/
if (use_unsafe_renegotiation_op) {
SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx,
SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION);
}
/* Don't actually allow compression; it uses ram and time, but the data
* we transmit is all encrypted anyway. */
if (result->ctx->comp_methods)
result->ctx->comp_methods = NULL;
#ifdef SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
SSL_CTX_set_mode(result->ctx, SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS);
#endif
if (cert && !SSL_CTX_use_certificate(result->ctx,cert))
goto error;
X509_free(cert); /* We just added a reference to cert. */
cert=NULL;
if (idcert) {
X509_STORE *s = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(result->ctx);
tor_assert(s);
X509_STORE_add_cert(s, idcert);
X509_free(idcert); /* The context now owns the reference to idcert */
idcert = NULL;
}
SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(result->ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF);
tor_assert(rsa);
if (!(pkey = _crypto_pk_env_get_evp_pkey(rsa,1)))
goto error;
if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(result->ctx, pkey))
goto error;
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
pkey = NULL;
if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(result->ctx))
goto error;
{
crypto_dh_env_t *dh = crypto_dh_new();
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(result->ctx, _crypto_dh_env_get_dh(dh));
crypto_dh_free(dh);
}
SSL_CTX_set_verify(result->ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER,
always_accept_verify_cb);
/* let us realloc bufs that we're writing from */
SSL_CTX_set_mode(result->ctx, SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER);
/* Free the old context if one exists. */
if (global_tls_context) {
/* This is safe even if there are open connections: OpenSSL does
* reference counting with SSL and SSL_CTX objects. */
tor_tls_context_decref(global_tls_context);
}
global_tls_context = result;
if (rsa)
crypto_free_pk_env(rsa);
tor_free(nickname);
tor_free(nn2);
return 0;
error:
tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, "creating TLS context");
tor_free(nickname);
tor_free(nn2);
if (pkey)
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
if (rsa)
crypto_free_pk_env(rsa);
if (result)
tor_tls_context_decref(result);
if (cert)
X509_free(cert);
if (idcert)
X509_free(idcert);
return -1;
}
/** Respond to an ESTABLISH_INTRO cell by checking the signed data and
* setting the circuit's purpose and service pk digest.
*/
int
rend_mid_establish_intro(or_circuit_t *circ, const char *request,
size_t request_len)
{
crypto_pk_env_t *pk = NULL;
char buf[DIGEST_LEN+9];
char expected_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
char pk_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
size_t asn1len;
or_circuit_t *c;
char serviceid[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1];
int reason = END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL;
log_info(LD_REND,
"Received an ESTABLISH_INTRO request on circuit %d",
circ->p_circ_id);
if (circ->_base.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR || circ->_base.n_conn) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
"Rejecting ESTABLISH_INTRO on non-OR or non-edge circuit.");
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
goto err;
}
if (request_len < 2+DIGEST_LEN)
goto truncated;
/* First 2 bytes: length of asn1-encoded key. */
asn1len = ntohs(get_uint16(request));
/* Next asn1len bytes: asn1-encoded key. */
if (request_len < 2+DIGEST_LEN+asn1len)
goto truncated;
pk = crypto_pk_asn1_decode(request+2, asn1len);
if (!pk) {
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Couldn't decode public key.");
goto err;
}
/* Next 20 bytes: Hash of handshake_digest | "INTRODUCE" */
memcpy(buf, circ->handshake_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
memcpy(buf+DIGEST_LEN, "INTRODUCE", 9);
if (crypto_digest(expected_digest, buf, DIGEST_LEN+9) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error computing digest.");
goto err;
}
if (memcmp(expected_digest, request+2+asn1len, DIGEST_LEN)) {
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Hash of session info was not as expected.");
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
goto err;
}
/* Rest of body: signature of previous data */
note_crypto_pk_op(REND_MID);
if (crypto_pk_public_checksig_digest(pk, request, 2+asn1len+DIGEST_LEN,
request+2+DIGEST_LEN+asn1len,
request_len-(2+DIGEST_LEN+asn1len))<0) {
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,
"Incorrect signature on ESTABLISH_INTRO cell; rejecting.");
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
goto err;
}
/* The request is valid. First, compute the hash of Bob's PK.*/
if (crypto_pk_get_digest(pk, pk_digest)<0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't hash public key.");
goto err;
}
crypto_free_pk_env(pk); /* don't need it anymore */
pk = NULL; /* so we don't free it again if err */
base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1,
pk_digest, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN);
/* Close any other intro circuits with the same pk. */
c = NULL;
while ((c = circuit_get_intro_point(pk_digest))) {
log_info(LD_REND, "Replacing old circuit for service %s",
safe_str(serviceid));
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(c), END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
/* Now it's marked, and it won't be returned next time. */
}
/* Acknowledge the request. */
if (relay_send_command_from_edge(0, TO_CIRCUIT(circ),
RELAY_COMMAND_INTRO_ESTABLISHED,
"", 0, NULL)<0) {
log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't send INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell.");
goto err;
}
/* Now, set up this circuit. */
circ->_base.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_INTRO_POINT;
memcpy(circ->rend_token, pk_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
log_info(LD_REND,
"Established introduction point on circuit %d for service %s",
circ->p_circ_id, safe_str(serviceid));
return 0;
truncated:
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Rejecting truncated ESTABLISH_INTRO cell.");
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
err:
if (pk) crypto_free_pk_env(pk);
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), reason);
return -1;
}
/** Run unit tests for our public key crypto functions */
static void
test_crypto_pk(void)
{
crypto_pk_env_t *pk1 = NULL, *pk2 = NULL;
char *encoded = NULL;
char data1[1024], data2[1024], data3[1024];
size_t size;
int i, j, p, len;
/* Public-key ciphers */
pk1 = pk_generate(0);
pk2 = crypto_new_pk_env();
test_assert(pk1 && pk2);
test_assert(! crypto_pk_write_public_key_to_string(pk1, &encoded, &size));
test_assert(! crypto_pk_read_public_key_from_string(pk2, encoded, size));
test_eq(0, crypto_pk_cmp_keys(pk1, pk2));
test_eq(128, crypto_pk_keysize(pk1));
test_eq(1024, crypto_pk_num_bits(pk1));
test_eq(128, crypto_pk_keysize(pk2));
test_eq(1024, crypto_pk_num_bits(pk2));
test_eq(128, crypto_pk_public_encrypt(pk2, data1, sizeof(data1),
"Hello whirled.", 15,
PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING));
test_eq(128, crypto_pk_public_encrypt(pk1, data2, sizeof(data1),
"Hello whirled.", 15,
PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING));
/* oaep padding should make encryption not match */
test_memneq(data1, data2, 128);
test_eq(15, crypto_pk_private_decrypt(pk1, data3, sizeof(data3), data1, 128,
PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING,1));
test_streq(data3, "Hello whirled.");
memset(data3, 0, 1024);
test_eq(15, crypto_pk_private_decrypt(pk1, data3, sizeof(data3), data2, 128,
PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING,1));
test_streq(data3, "Hello whirled.");
/* Can't decrypt with public key. */
test_eq(-1, crypto_pk_private_decrypt(pk2, data3, sizeof(data3), data2, 128,
PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING,1));
/* Try again with bad padding */
memcpy(data2+1, "XYZZY", 5); /* This has fails ~ once-in-2^40 */
test_eq(-1, crypto_pk_private_decrypt(pk1, data3, sizeof(data3), data2, 128,
PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING,1));
/* File operations: save and load private key */
test_assert(! crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_filename(pk1,
get_fname("pkey1")));
/* failing case for read: can't read. */
test_assert(crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_filename(pk2,
get_fname("xyzzy")) < 0);
write_str_to_file(get_fname("xyzzy"), "foobar", 6);
/* Failing case for read: no key. */
test_assert(crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_filename(pk2,
get_fname("xyzzy")) < 0);
test_assert(! crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_filename(pk2,
get_fname("pkey1")));
test_eq(15, crypto_pk_private_decrypt(pk2, data3, sizeof(data3), data1, 128,
PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING,1));
/* Now try signing. */
strlcpy(data1, "Ossifrage", 1024);
test_eq(128, crypto_pk_private_sign(pk1, data2, sizeof(data2), data1, 10));
test_eq(10,
crypto_pk_public_checksig(pk1, data3, sizeof(data3), data2, 128));
test_streq(data3, "Ossifrage");
/* Try signing digests. */
test_eq(128, crypto_pk_private_sign_digest(pk1, data2, sizeof(data2),
data1, 10));
test_eq(20,
crypto_pk_public_checksig(pk1, data3, sizeof(data3), data2, 128));
test_eq(0, crypto_pk_public_checksig_digest(pk1, data1, 10, data2, 128));
test_eq(-1, crypto_pk_public_checksig_digest(pk1, data1, 11, data2, 128));
/*XXXX test failed signing*/
/* Try encoding */
crypto_free_pk_env(pk2);
pk2 = NULL;
i = crypto_pk_asn1_encode(pk1, data1, 1024);
test_assert(i>0);
pk2 = crypto_pk_asn1_decode(data1, i);
test_assert(crypto_pk_cmp_keys(pk1,pk2) == 0);
/* Try with hybrid encryption wrappers. */
crypto_rand(data1, 1024);
for (i = 0; i < 3; ++i) {
for (j = 85; j < 140; ++j) {
memset(data2,0,1024);
memset(data3,0,1024);
if (i == 0 && j < 129)
continue;
p = (i==0)?PK_NO_PADDING:
(i==1)?PK_PKCS1_PADDING:PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
len = crypto_pk_public_hybrid_encrypt(pk1,data2,sizeof(data2),
data1,j,p,0);
test_assert(len>=0);
len = crypto_pk_private_hybrid_decrypt(pk1,data3,sizeof(data3),
data2,len,p,1);
test_eq(len,j);
test_memeq(data1,data3,j);
}
}
/* Try copy_full */
crypto_free_pk_env(pk2);
pk2 = crypto_pk_copy_full(pk1);
test_assert(pk2 != NULL);
test_neq_ptr(pk1, pk2);
test_assert(crypto_pk_cmp_keys(pk1,pk2) == 0);
done:
if (pk1)
crypto_free_pk_env(pk1);
if (pk2)
crypto_free_pk_env(pk2);
tor_free(encoded);
}
/** Deallocate space associated with circ.
*/
static void
circuit_free(circuit_t *circ)
{
void *mem;
size_t memlen;
if (!circ)
return;
if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
mem = ocirc;
memlen = sizeof(origin_circuit_t);
tor_assert(circ->magic == ORIGIN_CIRCUIT_MAGIC);
if (ocirc->build_state) {
extend_info_free(ocirc->build_state->chosen_exit);
circuit_free_cpath_node(ocirc->build_state->pending_final_cpath);
}
tor_free(ocirc->build_state);
circuit_free_cpath(ocirc->cpath);
crypto_free_pk_env(ocirc->intro_key);
rend_data_free(ocirc->rend_data);
tor_free(ocirc->dest_address);
if (ocirc->socks_username) {
memset(ocirc->socks_username, 0x12, ocirc->socks_username_len);
tor_free(ocirc->socks_username);
}
if (ocirc->socks_password) {
memset(ocirc->socks_password, 0x06, ocirc->socks_password_len);
tor_free(ocirc->socks_password);
}
} else {
or_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ);
/* Remember cell statistics for this circuit before deallocating. */
if (get_options()->CellStatistics)
rep_hist_buffer_stats_add_circ(circ, time(NULL));
mem = ocirc;
memlen = sizeof(or_circuit_t);
tor_assert(circ->magic == OR_CIRCUIT_MAGIC);
crypto_free_cipher_env(ocirc->p_crypto);
crypto_free_digest_env(ocirc->p_digest);
crypto_free_cipher_env(ocirc->n_crypto);
crypto_free_digest_env(ocirc->n_digest);
if (ocirc->rend_splice) {
or_circuit_t *other = ocirc->rend_splice;
tor_assert(other->_base.magic == OR_CIRCUIT_MAGIC);
other->rend_splice = NULL;
}
/* remove from map. */
circuit_set_p_circid_orconn(ocirc, 0, NULL);
/* Clear cell queue _after_ removing it from the map. Otherwise our
* "active" checks will be violated. */
cell_queue_clear(ô->p_conn_cells);
}
extend_info_free(circ->n_hop);
tor_free(circ->n_conn_onionskin);
/* Remove from map. */
circuit_set_n_circid_orconn(circ, 0, NULL);
/* Clear cell queue _after_ removing it from the map. Otherwise our
* "active" checks will be violated. */
cell_queue_clear(&circ->n_conn_cells);
memset(mem, 0xAA, memlen); /* poison memory */
tor_free(mem);
}
