/*
* Set up the signature parameters in an X.509 certificate. This involves
* digesting the signed data and extracting the signature.
*/
int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert)
{
struct crypto_shash *tfm;
struct shash_desc *desc;
size_t digest_size, desc_size;
void *digest;
int ret;
pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
if (cert->unsupported_crypto)
return -ENOPKG;
if (cert->sig.rsa.s)
return 0;
cert->sig.rsa.s = mpi_read_raw_data(cert->raw_sig, cert->raw_sig_size);
if (!cert->sig.rsa.s)
return -ENOMEM;
cert->sig.nr_mpi = 1;
/* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
* big the hash operational data will be.
*/
tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo], 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
if (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) {
cert->unsupported_crypto = true;
return -ENOPKG;
}
return PTR_ERR(tfm);
}
desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
/* We allocate the hash operational data storage on the end of the
* digest storage space.
*/
ret = -ENOMEM;
digest = kzalloc(digest_size + desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!digest)
goto error;
cert->sig.digest = digest;
cert->sig.digest_size = digest_size;
desc = digest + digest_size;
desc->tfm = tfm;
desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
might_sleep();
ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, cert->tbs, cert->tbs_size, digest);
error:
crypto_free_shash(tfm);
pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
}
static int padlock_sha1_finup(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *in,
unsigned int count, u8 *out)
{
/* We can't store directly to *out as it may be unaligned. */
/* BTW Don't reduce the buffer size below 128 Bytes!
* PadLock microcode needs it that big. */
char buf[128 + PADLOCK_ALIGNMENT - STACK_ALIGN] __attribute__
((aligned(STACK_ALIGN)));
char *result = PTR_ALIGN(&buf[0], PADLOCK_ALIGNMENT);
struct padlock_sha_desc *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
struct sha1_state state;
unsigned int space;
unsigned int leftover;
int ts_state;
int err;
dctx->fallback.flags = desc->flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
err = crypto_shash_export(&dctx->fallback, &state);
if (err)
goto out;
if (state.count + count > ULONG_MAX)
return crypto_shash_finup(&dctx->fallback, in, count, out);
leftover = ((state.count - 1) & (SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE - 1)) + 1;
space = SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE - leftover;
if (space) {
if (count > space) {
err = crypto_shash_update(&dctx->fallback, in, space) ?:
crypto_shash_export(&dctx->fallback, &state);
if (err)
goto out;
count -= space;
in += space;
} else {
/*
* Digest the module contents.
*/
static struct public_key_signature *mod_make_digest(enum pkey_hash_algo hash,
const void *mod,
unsigned long modlen)
{
struct public_key_signature *pks;
struct crypto_shash *tfm;
struct shash_desc *desc;
size_t digest_size, desc_size;
int ret;
pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
/* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
* big the hash operational data will be.
*/
tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pkey_hash_algo[hash], 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(tfm))
return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? ERR_PTR(-ENOPKG) : ERR_CAST(tfm);
desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
/* We allocate the hash operational data storage on the end of our
* context data and the digest output buffer on the end of that.
*/
ret = -ENOMEM;
pks = kzalloc(digest_size + sizeof(*pks) + desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pks)
goto error_no_pks;
pks->pkey_hash_algo = hash;
pks->digest = (u8 *)pks + sizeof(*pks) + desc_size;
pks->digest_size = digest_size;
desc = (void *)pks + sizeof(*pks);
desc->tfm = tfm;
desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, mod, modlen, pks->digest);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
crypto_free_shash(tfm);
pr_devel("<==%s() = ok\n", __func__);
return pks;
error:
kfree(pks);
error_no_pks:
crypto_free_shash(tfm);
pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
/*
* Check the signature on a certificate using the provided public key
*/
static int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub,
const struct x509_certificate *cert)
{
struct public_key_signature *sig;
struct crypto_shash *tfm;
struct shash_desc *desc;
size_t digest_size, desc_size;
int ret;
pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
/* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
* big the hash operational data will be.
*/
tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pkey_hash_algo[cert->sig_hash_algo], 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(tfm))
return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm);
desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
/* We allocate the hash operational data storage on the end of our
* context data.
*/
ret = -ENOMEM;
sig = kzalloc(sizeof(*sig) + desc_size + digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sig)
goto error_no_sig;
sig->pkey_hash_algo = cert->sig_hash_algo;
sig->digest = (u8 *)sig + sizeof(*sig) + desc_size;
sig->digest_size = digest_size;
desc = (void *)sig + sizeof(*sig);
desc->tfm = tfm;
desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
ret = -ENOMEM;
sig->rsa.s = mpi_read_raw_data(cert->sig, cert->sig_size);
if (!sig->rsa.s)
goto error;
ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, cert->tbs, cert->tbs_size, sig->digest);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_mpi;
ret = pub->algo->verify_signature(pub, sig);
pr_debug("Cert Verification: %d\n", ret);
error_mpi:
mpi_free(sig->rsa.s);
error:
kfree(sig);
error_no_sig:
crypto_free_shash(tfm);
pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
}
static int chap_server_compute_md5(
struct iscsi_conn *conn,
struct iscsi_node_auth *auth,
char *nr_in_ptr,
char *nr_out_ptr,
unsigned int *nr_out_len)
{
unsigned long id;
unsigned char id_as_uchar;
unsigned char digest[MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE];
unsigned char type, response[MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE * 2 + 2];
unsigned char identifier[10], *challenge = NULL;
unsigned char *challenge_binhex = NULL;
unsigned char client_digest[MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE];
unsigned char server_digest[MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE];
unsigned char chap_n[MAX_CHAP_N_SIZE], chap_r[MAX_RESPONSE_LENGTH];
size_t compare_len;
struct iscsi_chap *chap = conn->auth_protocol;
struct crypto_shash *tfm = NULL;
struct shash_desc *desc = NULL;
int auth_ret = -1, ret, challenge_len;
memset(identifier, 0, 10);
memset(chap_n, 0, MAX_CHAP_N_SIZE);
memset(chap_r, 0, MAX_RESPONSE_LENGTH);
memset(digest, 0, MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
memset(response, 0, MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE * 2 + 2);
memset(client_digest, 0, MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
memset(server_digest, 0, MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
challenge = kzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!challenge) {
pr_err("Unable to allocate challenge buffer\n");
goto out;
}
challenge_binhex = kzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!challenge_binhex) {
pr_err("Unable to allocate challenge_binhex buffer\n");
goto out;
}
/*
* Extract CHAP_N.
*/
if (extract_param(nr_in_ptr, "CHAP_N", MAX_CHAP_N_SIZE, chap_n,
&type) < 0) {
pr_err("Could not find CHAP_N.\n");
goto out;
}
if (type == HEX) {
pr_err("Could not find CHAP_N.\n");
goto out;
}
/* Include the terminating NULL in the compare */
compare_len = strlen(auth->userid) + 1;
if (strncmp(chap_n, auth->userid, compare_len) != 0) {
pr_err("CHAP_N values do not match!\n");
goto out;
}
pr_debug("[server] Got CHAP_N=%s\n", chap_n);
/*
* Extract CHAP_R.
*/
if (extract_param(nr_in_ptr, "CHAP_R", MAX_RESPONSE_LENGTH, chap_r,
&type) < 0) {
pr_err("Could not find CHAP_R.\n");
goto out;
}
if (type != HEX) {
pr_err("Could not find CHAP_R.\n");
goto out;
}
pr_debug("[server] Got CHAP_R=%s\n", chap_r);
chap_string_to_hex(client_digest, chap_r, strlen(chap_r));
tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("md5", 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
tfm = NULL;
pr_err("Unable to allocate struct crypto_shash\n");
goto out;
}
desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(tfm), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!desc) {
pr_err("Unable to allocate struct shash_desc\n");
goto out;
}
desc->tfm = tfm;
desc->flags = 0;
ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("crypto_shash_init() failed\n");
goto out;
}
ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, &chap->id, 1);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("crypto_shash_update() failed for id\n");
goto out;
}
ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, (char *)&auth->password,
strlen(auth->password));
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("crypto_shash_update() failed for password\n");
goto out;
}
ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, chap->challenge,
CHAP_CHALLENGE_LENGTH, server_digest);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("crypto_shash_finup() failed for challenge\n");
goto out;
}
chap_binaryhex_to_asciihex(response, server_digest, MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
pr_debug("[server] MD5 Server Digest: %s\n", response);
if (memcmp(server_digest, client_digest, MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE) != 0) {
pr_debug("[server] MD5 Digests do not match!\n\n");
goto out;
} else
pr_debug("[server] MD5 Digests match, CHAP connection"
" successful.\n\n");
/*
* One way authentication has succeeded, return now if mutual
* authentication is not enabled.
*/
if (!auth->authenticate_target) {
auth_ret = 0;
goto out;
}
/*
* Get CHAP_I.
*/
if (extract_param(nr_in_ptr, "CHAP_I", 10, identifier, &type) < 0) {
pr_err("Could not find CHAP_I.\n");
goto out;
}
if (type == HEX)
ret = kstrtoul(&identifier[2], 0, &id);
else
ret = kstrtoul(identifier, 0, &id);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("kstrtoul() failed for CHAP identifier: %d\n", ret);
goto out;
}
if (id > 255) {
pr_err("chap identifier: %lu greater than 255\n", id);
goto out;
}
/*
* RFC 1994 says Identifier is no more than octet (8 bits).
*/
pr_debug("[server] Got CHAP_I=%lu\n", id);
/*
* Get CHAP_C.
*/
if (extract_param(nr_in_ptr, "CHAP_C", CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN,
challenge, &type) < 0) {
pr_err("Could not find CHAP_C.\n");
goto out;
}
if (type != HEX) {
pr_err("Could not find CHAP_C.\n");
goto out;
}
pr_debug("[server] Got CHAP_C=%s\n", challenge);
challenge_len = chap_string_to_hex(challenge_binhex, challenge,
strlen(challenge));
if (!challenge_len) {
pr_err("Unable to convert incoming challenge\n");
goto out;
}
if (challenge_len > 1024) {
pr_err("CHAP_C exceeds maximum binary size of 1024 bytes\n");
goto out;
}
/*
* During mutual authentication, the CHAP_C generated by the
* initiator must not match the original CHAP_C generated by
* the target.
*/
if (!memcmp(challenge_binhex, chap->challenge, CHAP_CHALLENGE_LENGTH)) {
pr_err("initiator CHAP_C matches target CHAP_C, failing"
" login attempt\n");
goto out;
}
/*
* Generate CHAP_N and CHAP_R for mutual authentication.
*/
ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("crypto_shash_init() failed\n");
goto out;
}
/* To handle both endiannesses */
id_as_uchar = id;
ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, &id_as_uchar, 1);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("crypto_shash_update() failed for id\n");
goto out;
}
ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, auth->password_mutual,
strlen(auth->password_mutual));
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("crypto_shash_update() failed for"
" password_mutual\n");
goto out;
}
/*
* Convert received challenge to binary hex.
*/
ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, challenge_binhex, challenge_len,
digest);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("crypto_shash_finup() failed for ma challenge\n");
goto out;
}
/*
* Generate CHAP_N and CHAP_R.
*/
*nr_out_len = sprintf(nr_out_ptr, "CHAP_N=%s", auth->userid_mutual);
*nr_out_len += 1;
pr_debug("[server] Sending CHAP_N=%s\n", auth->userid_mutual);
/*
* Convert response from binary hex to ascii hext.
*/
chap_binaryhex_to_asciihex(response, digest, MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
*nr_out_len += sprintf(nr_out_ptr + *nr_out_len, "CHAP_R=0x%s",
response);
*nr_out_len += 1;
pr_debug("[server] Sending CHAP_R=0x%s\n", response);
auth_ret = 0;
out:
kzfree(desc);
if (tfm)
crypto_free_shash(tfm);
kfree(challenge);
kfree(challenge_binhex);
return auth_ret;
}
/*
* Digest the relevant parts of the PKCS#7 data
*/
static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
{
struct crypto_shash *tfm;
struct shash_desc *desc;
size_t digest_size, desc_size;
void *digest;
int ret;
kenter(",%u,%u", sinfo->index, sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo);
if (sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo >= PKEY_HASH__LAST ||
!hash_algo_name[sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo])
return -ENOPKG;
/* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
* big the hash operational data will be.
*/
tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo],
0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(tfm))
return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm);
desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
sinfo->sig.digest_size = digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
ret = -ENOMEM;
digest = kzalloc(ALIGN(digest_size, __alignof__(*desc)) + desc_size,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!digest)
goto error_no_desc;
desc = PTR_ALIGN(digest + digest_size, __alignof__(*desc));
desc->tfm = tfm;
desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
/* Digest the message [RFC2315 9.3] */
ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, pkcs7->data, pkcs7->data_len, digest);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
pr_devel("MsgDigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, digest);
/* However, if there are authenticated attributes, there must be a
* message digest attribute amongst them which corresponds to the
* digest we just calculated.
*/
if (sinfo->authattrs) {
u8 tag;
if (!sinfo->msgdigest) {
pr_warn("Sig %u: No messageDigest\n", sinfo->index);
ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
goto error;
}
if (sinfo->msgdigest_len != sinfo->sig.digest_size) {
pr_debug("Sig %u: Invalid digest size (%u)\n",
sinfo->index, sinfo->msgdigest_len);
ret = -EBADMSG;
goto error;
}
if (memcmp(digest, sinfo->msgdigest, sinfo->msgdigest_len) != 0) {
pr_debug("Sig %u: Message digest doesn't match\n",
sinfo->index);
ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
goto error;
}
/* We then calculate anew, using the authenticated attributes
* as the contents of the digest instead. Note that we need to
* convert the attributes from a CONT.0 into a SET before we
* hash it.
*/
memset(digest, 0, sinfo->sig.digest_size);
ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
tag = ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SET;
ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, &tag, 1);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, sinfo->authattrs,
sinfo->authattrs_len, digest);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
pr_devel("AADigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, digest);
}
sinfo->sig.digest = digest;
digest = NULL;
error:
kfree(digest);
error_no_desc:
crypto_free_shash(tfm);
kleave(" = %d", ret);
return ret;
}
