void API minijail_enter(const struct minijail *j)
{
if (j->flags.pids)
die("tried to enter a pid-namespaced jail;"
"try minijail_run()?");
if (j->flags.usergroups && !j->user)
die("usergroup inheritance without username");
/*
* We can't recover from failures if we've dropped privileges partially,
* so we don't even try. If any of our operations fail, we abort() the
* entire process.
*/
if (j->flags.vfs && unshare(CLONE_NEWNS))
pdie("unshare(vfs)");
if (j->flags.net && unshare(CLONE_NEWNET))
pdie("unshare(net)");
if (j->flags.chroot && enter_chroot(j))
pdie("chroot");
if (j->flags.chroot && j->flags.mount_tmp && mount_tmp())
pdie("mount_tmp");
if (j->flags.readonly && remount_readonly(j))
pdie("remount");
if (j->flags.caps) {
/*
* POSIX capabilities are a bit tricky. If we drop our
* capability to change uids, our attempt to use setuid()
* below will fail. Hang on to root caps across setuid(), then
* lock securebits.
*/
if (prctl(PR_SET_KEEPCAPS, 1))
pdie("prctl(PR_SET_KEEPCAPS)");
if (prctl
(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, SECURE_ALL_BITS | SECURE_ALL_LOCKS))
pdie("prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS)");
}
/*
* If we're setting no_new_privs, we can drop privileges
* before setting seccomp filter. This way filter policies
* don't need to allow privilege-dropping syscalls.
*/
if (j->flags.no_new_privs) {
drop_ugid(j);
if (j->flags.caps)
drop_caps(j);
set_seccomp_filter(j);
} else {
/*
* If we're not setting no_new_privs,
* we need to set seccomp filter *before* dropping privileges.
* WARNING: this means that filter policies *must* allow
* setgroups()/setresgid()/setresuid() for dropping root and
* capget()/capset()/prctl() for dropping caps.
*/
set_seccomp_filter(j);
drop_ugid(j);
if (j->flags.caps)
drop_caps(j);
}
/*
* seccomp has to come last since it cuts off all the other
* privilege-dropping syscalls :)
*/
if (j->flags.seccomp && prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, 1))
pdie("prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP)");
}
void run_hooks_in_chroot()
{
ensure_we_can_find_in_chroot_hooks();
g_assert(enter_chroot());
run_hooks(&in_chroot_info);
}
