Example #1
0
MODRET wrap_handle_request(cmd_rec *cmd) {

  /* these variables are names expected to be set by the TCP wrapper code
   */
  struct request_info request;

  char *user = NULL;
  config_rec *conf = NULL, *access_conf = NULL, *syslog_conf = NULL;
  hosts_allow_table = NULL;
  hosts_deny_table = NULL;

  /* hide passwords */
  session.hide_password = TRUE;

  /* Sneaky...found in mod_auth.c's cmd_pass() function.  Need to find the
   * login UID in order to resolve the possibly-login-dependent filename.
   */
  user = (char *) get_param_ptr(cmd->server->conf, C_USER, FALSE);

  /* It's possible that a PASS command came before USER.  This is a PRE_CMD
   * handler, so it won't be protected from this case; we'll need to do
   * it manually.
   */
  if (!user)
    return DECLINED(cmd);

  /* Use mod_auth's _auth_resolve_user() [imported for use here] to get the
   * right configuration set, since the user may be logging in anonymously,
   * and the session struct hasn't yet been set for that yet (thus short-
   * circuiting the easiest way to get the right context...the macros.
   */
  conf = wrap_resolve_user(cmd->pool, &user);

  /* Search first for user-specific access files.  Multiple TCPUserAccessFiles
   * directives are allowed.
   */
  if ((access_conf = find_config(conf ? conf->subset : CURRENT_CONF, CONF_PARAM,
      "TCPUserAccessFiles", FALSE)) != NULL) {
    int matched = FALSE;
    array_header *user_array = NULL;

    while (access_conf) {

      user_array = make_array(cmd->tmp_pool, 0, sizeof(char *));
      *((char **) push_array(user_array)) = pstrdup(cmd->tmp_pool, user);

      /* Check the user expression -- don't forget the offset, to skip
       * the access file name strings in argv
       */
      if (wrap_eval_expression(((char **) access_conf->argv) + 2,
          user_array)) {
        pr_log_debug(DEBUG4, MOD_WRAP_VERSION
          ": matched TCPUserAccessFiles expression");
        matched = TRUE;
        break;
      }

      access_conf = find_config_next(access_conf, access_conf->next,
        CONF_PARAM, "TCPUserAccessFiles", FALSE);
    }

    if (!matched)
      access_conf = NULL;
  }

  /* Next, search for group-specific access files.  Multiple
   * TCPGroupAccessFiles directives are allowed.
   */ 
  if (!access_conf && (access_conf = find_config(conf ? conf->subset :
        CURRENT_CONF, CONF_PARAM, "TCPGroupAccessFiles", FALSE)) != NULL) {
    unsigned char matched = FALSE;

    /* NOTE: this gid_array is only necessary until Bug#1461 is fixed */
    array_header *gid_array = make_array(cmd->pool, 0, sizeof(gid_t));

    array_header *group_array = make_array(cmd->pool, 0, sizeof(char *));

    while (access_conf) {
      if (pr_auth_getgroups(cmd->pool, user, &gid_array, &group_array) < 1) {
        pr_log_debug(DEBUG3, MOD_WRAP_VERSION
          ": no supplemental groups found for user '%s'", user);

      } else {

        /* Check the group expression -- don't forget the offset, to skip
         * the access file names strings in argv
         */
        if (wrap_eval_expression(((char **) access_conf->argv) + 2,
            group_array)) {
          pr_log_debug(DEBUG4, MOD_WRAP_VERSION
            ": matched TCPGroupAccessFiles expression");
          matched = TRUE;
          break;
        }
      }

      access_conf = find_config_next(access_conf, access_conf->next,
        CONF_PARAM, "TCPGroupAccessFiles", FALSE);
    }

    if (!matched)
      access_conf = NULL;
  }

  /* Finally for globally-applicable access files.  Only one such directive
   * is allowed.
   */
  if (!access_conf) {
    access_conf = find_config(conf ? conf->subset : CURRENT_CONF,
      CONF_PARAM, "TCPAccessFiles", FALSE);
  }

  if (access_conf) {
    hosts_allow_table = (char *) access_conf->argv[0];
    hosts_deny_table = (char *) access_conf->argv[1];
  }

  /* Now, check the retrieved filename, and see if it requires a login-time
   * file.
   */
  if (hosts_allow_table != NULL && hosts_allow_table[0] == '~' &&
      hosts_allow_table[1] == '/') {
    char *allow_real_table = NULL;

    allow_real_table = wrap_get_user_table(cmd, user, hosts_allow_table);

    if (!wrap_is_usable_file(allow_real_table)) {
      pr_log_pri(PR_LOG_WARNING, MOD_WRAP_VERSION
        ": configured TCPAllowFile %s is unusable", hosts_allow_table);
      hosts_allow_table = NULL;

    } else
      hosts_allow_table = allow_real_table;
  }

  if (hosts_deny_table != NULL && hosts_deny_table[0] == '~' &&
      hosts_deny_table[1] == '/') {
    char *deny_real_table = NULL;

    deny_real_table = dir_realpath(cmd->pool, hosts_deny_table);

    if (!wrap_is_usable_file(deny_real_table)) {
      pr_log_pri(PR_LOG_WARNING, MOD_WRAP_VERSION
        ": configured TCPDenyFile %s is unusable", hosts_deny_table);
      hosts_deny_table = NULL;

    } else 
      hosts_deny_table = deny_real_table;
  }

  /* Make sure that _both_ allow and deny TCPAccessFiles are present.
   * If not, log the missing file, and by default allow request to succeed.
   */
  if (hosts_allow_table != NULL && hosts_deny_table != NULL) {

    /* Most common case...nothing more necessary */

  } else if (hosts_allow_table == NULL && hosts_deny_table != NULL) {

    /* Log the missing file */
    pr_log_pri(PR_LOG_INFO, MOD_WRAP_VERSION ": no usable allow access file -- "
      "allowing connection");

    return DECLINED(cmd);

  } else if (hosts_allow_table != NULL && hosts_deny_table == NULL) {

    /* log the missing file */
    pr_log_pri(PR_LOG_INFO, MOD_WRAP_VERSION ": no usable deny access file -- "
      "allowing connection");

    return DECLINED(cmd);

  } else {

    /* Neither set -- assume the admin hasn't configured these directives
     * at all.
     */
    return DECLINED(cmd);
  }

  /* Log the names of the allow/deny files being used. */
  pr_log_pri(PR_LOG_DEBUG, MOD_WRAP_VERSION ": using access files: %s, %s",
    hosts_allow_table, hosts_deny_table);

  /* retrieve the user-defined syslog priorities, if any.  Fall back to the
   * defaults as seen in tcpd.h if not defined.
   */
  syslog_conf = find_config(main_server->conf, CONF_PARAM,
    "TCPAccessSyslogLevels", FALSE);

  if (syslog_conf) {
    allow_severity = (int) syslog_conf->argv[1];
    deny_severity = (int) syslog_conf->argv[2];

  } else {

    allow_severity = PR_LOG_INFO;
    deny_severity = PR_LOG_WARNING;
  }

  pr_log_debug(DEBUG4, MOD_WRAP_VERSION ": checking under service name '%s'",
    wrap_service_name);
  request_init(&request, RQ_DAEMON, wrap_service_name, RQ_FILE,
    session.c->rfd, 0);

  fromhost(&request);

  if (STR_EQ(eval_hostname(request.client), paranoid) ||
      !hosts_access(&request)) {
    char *denymsg = NULL;

    /* log the denied connection */
    wrap_log_request_denied(deny_severity, &request);

    /* check for AccessDenyMsg */
    if ((denymsg = (char *) get_param_ptr(TOPLEVEL_CONF, "AccessDenyMsg",
        FALSE)) != NULL)
      denymsg = sreplace(cmd->tmp_pool, denymsg, "%u", user, NULL);

    if (denymsg)
      return ERROR_MSG(cmd, R_530, denymsg);
    else
      return ERROR_MSG(cmd, R_530, "Access denied.");
  }

  /* If request is allowable, return DECLINED (for engine to act as if this
   * handler was never called, else ERROR (for engine to abort processing and
   * deny request.
   */
  wrap_log_request_allowed(allow_severity, &request);

  return DECLINED(cmd);
}
Example #2
0
File: tcpd.c Project: bingos/bitrig
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    struct request_info request;
    char    path[MAXPATHNAMELEN];

    /* Attempt to prevent the creation of world-writable files. */

#ifdef DAEMON_UMASK
    umask(DAEMON_UMASK);
#endif

    /*
     * If argv[0] is an absolute path name, ignore REAL_DAEMON_DIR, and strip
     * argv[0] to its basename.
     */

    if (argv[0][0] == '/') {
	strlcpy(path, argv[0], sizeof path);
	argv[0] = strrchr(argv[0], '/') + 1;
    } else {
	snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/%s", REAL_DAEMON_DIR, argv[0]);
    }

    /*
     * Open a channel to the syslog daemon. Older versions of openlog()
     * require only two arguments.
     */

#ifdef LOG_MAIL
    (void) openlog(argv[0], LOG_PID, FACILITY);
#else
    (void) openlog(argv[0], LOG_PID);
#endif

    /*
     * Find out the endpoint addresses of this conversation. Host name
     * lookups and double checks will be done on demand.
     */

    request_init(&request, RQ_DAEMON, argv[0], RQ_FILE, STDIN_FILENO, 0);
    fromhost(&request);

    /*
     * Optionally look up and double check the remote host name. Sites
     * concerned with security may choose to refuse connections from hosts
     * that pretend to have someone elses host name.
     */

#ifdef PARANOID
    if (STR_EQ(eval_hostname(request.client), paranoid))
	refuse(&request);
#endif

    /*
     * The BSD rlogin and rsh daemons that came out after 4.3 BSD disallow
     * socket options at the IP level. They do so for a good reason.
     * Unfortunately, we cannot use this with SunOS 4.1.x because the
     * getsockopt() system call can panic the system.
     */

#ifdef KILL_IP_OPTIONS
    fix_options(&request);
#endif

    /*
     * Check whether this host can access the service in argv[0]. The
     * access-control code invokes optional shell commands as specified in
     * the access-control tables.
     */

#ifdef HOSTS_ACCESS
    if (!hosts_access(&request))
	refuse(&request);
#endif

    /* Report request and invoke the real daemon program. */

    syslog(allow_severity, "connect from %s", eval_client(&request));
    closelog();
    (void) execv(path, argv);
    syslog(LOG_ERR, "error: cannot execute %s: %m", path);
    clean_exit(&request);
    /* NOTREACHED */
}