/**
* @brief Bootloader "C" entry point
*
* @param none
*
* @returns Nothing. Will launch/restart image if successful, halt if not.
*/
void bootrom_main(void) {
chip_init();
dbginit();
init_last_error();
dbgprint("gbboot Server\n");
chip_wait_for_link_up();
chip_unipro_attr_write(DME_ARA_BOOT_CONTROL,
FORCE_UNIPRO_BOOT,
0,
ATTR_PEER);
while(1) {
server_loop();
}
}
/**
* @brief Stage 2 loader "C" entry point. Started from Stage 1
* bootloader. Primary function is to load, validate, and start
* executing a stage 3 image. Also will (when fully implemented)
* perform startup negotiations with AP, cryptographic initialzations
* and tests, module authentication, flash update, and other housekeeping.
* Image load and validation are essntially identical to the crresponding
* functions in stage 1, although different keys are used for signature
* validation.
*
* @param none
*
* @returns Nothing. Will launch/restart image if successful, halt if not.
*/
void bootrom_main(void) {
int rc;
/* TA-20 R/W data in bufRAM */
uint32_t boot_status = INIT_STATUS_OPERATING;
bool boot_from_spi = true;
bool fallback_boot_unipro = false;
uint32_t is_secure_image;
secondstage_cfgdata *cfgdata;
chip_init();
dbginit();
/* Ensure that we start each boot with an assumption of success */
init_last_error();
crypto_init();
dbgprint("\nHello world from s2fw\n");
if (!get_2ndstage_cfgdata(&cfgdata)) {
dbgprint("found valid config data\n");
if (cfgdata->use_fake_ims) {
/**
* We don't really need to handle all the efuses as boot ROM
* does. But we do want to update the EPUID according to the
* fake IMS. And the rest of the efuse handling do no harm
* anyway.
*/
if (efuse_init() != 0) {
halt_and_catch_fire(boot_status);
}
}
}
uint8_t ims[TSB_ISAA_NUM_IMS_BYTES];
tsb_get_ims(ims, TSB_ISAA_NUM_IMS_BYTES);
key_generation(ims);
chip_unipro_init();
boot_control(&boot_from_spi);
/* Advertise our boot status */
chip_advertise_boot_status(boot_status);
/* Advertise our initialization type */
rc = chip_advertise_boot_type();
if (rc) {
halt_and_catch_fire(boot_status);
}
if (boot_from_spi) {
dbgprint("Boot from SPIROM\n");
spi_ops.init();
/**
* Call locate_ffff_element_on_storage to locate next stage FW.
* Do not care about the image length here so pass NULL.
*/
if (locate_ffff_element_on_storage(&spi_ops,
FFFF_ELEMENT_STAGE_3_FW,
NULL) == 0) {
boot_status = INIT_STATUS_SPI_BOOT_STARTED;
chip_advertise_boot_status(boot_status);
if (!load_tftf_image(&spi_ops, &is_secure_image)) {
spi_ops.finish(true, is_secure_image);
if (is_secure_image) {
boot_status = INIT_STATUS_TRUSTED_SPI_FLASH_BOOT_FINISHED;
dbgprintx32("SPI Trusted: (",
merge_errno_with_boot_status(boot_status),
")\n");
} else {
boot_status = INIT_STATUS_UNTRUSTED_SPI_FLASH_BOOT_FINISHED;
dbgprintx32("SPI Untrusted: (",
merge_errno_with_boot_status(boot_status),
")\n");
/*
* Disable IMS, CMS access before starting untrusted image.
* NB. JTAG continues to be not enabled at this point
*/
efuse_rig_for_untrusted();
}
/* Log that we're starting the boot-from-SPIROM */
chip_advertise_boot_status(merge_errno_with_boot_status(boot_status));
/* TA-16 jump to SPI code (BOOTRET_o = 0 && SPIBOOT_N = 0) */
jump_to_image();
}
}
spi_ops.finish(false, false);
/* Fallback to UniPro boot */
boot_from_spi = false;
fallback_boot_unipro = true;
chip_clear_image_loading_ram();
} else {
/* (Not boot-from-spi, */
fallback_boot_unipro = false;
}
if (greybus_init()) {
set_last_error(BRE_BOU_GBCTRL_CPORT);
halt_and_catch_fire(boot_status);
}
/* Boot-Over-UniPro...
* We get here if directed to do so by the bootselector, or as a fallback
* for a failed SPIROM boot.
*/
if (!boot_from_spi) {
/* Boot over Unipro */
if (fallback_boot_unipro) {
boot_status = merge_errno_with_boot_status(
INIT_STATUS_FALLLBACK_UNIPRO_BOOT_STARTED);
dbgprintx32("Spi boot failed (", boot_status, "), ");
} else {
boot_status = INIT_STATUS_UNIPRO_BOOT_STARTED;
}
chip_advertise_boot_status(boot_status);
dbgprintx32("Boot over UniPro (",
merge_errno_with_boot_status(boot_status),
")\n");
advertise_ready();
#if RUN_SPI_TEST
spi_gb_init();
dbgprint("Running in loop to perform as SPI over Greybus\n");
while (1) {
if (greybus_loop()) {
dbgprint("ERROR in greuybus loop\n");
halt_and_catch_fire(boot_status);
}
}
#endif
dbgprint("Ready-poked; download-ready\n");
if (greybus_ops.init() != 0) {
halt_and_catch_fire(boot_status);
}
if (!load_tftf_image(&greybus_ops, &is_secure_image)) {
if (greybus_ops.finish(true, is_secure_image) != 0) {
halt_and_catch_fire(boot_status);
}
if (is_secure_image) {
boot_status = fallback_boot_unipro ?
INIT_STATUS_FALLLBACK_TRUSTED_UNIPRO_BOOT_FINISHED :
INIT_STATUS_TRUSTED_UNIPRO_BOOT_FINISHED;
dbgprintx32("UP Trusted: (",
merge_errno_with_boot_status(boot_status),
")\n");
} else {
boot_status = fallback_boot_unipro ?
INIT_STATUS_FALLLBACK_UNTRUSTED_UNIPRO_BOOT_FINISHED :
INIT_STATUS_UNTRUSTED_UNIPRO_BOOT_FINISHED;
dbgprintx32("UP Trusted: (",
merge_errno_with_boot_status(boot_status),
")\n");
/*
* Disable IMS, CMS access before starting
* untrusted image
* NB. JTAG continues to be not enabled at this point
*/
efuse_rig_for_untrusted();
}
/* Log that we're starting the boot-from-UniPro */
chip_advertise_boot_status(boot_status);
/* TA-17 jump to Workram code (BOOTRET_o = 0 && SPIM_BOOT_N = 1) */
jump_to_image();
}
if (greybus_ops.finish(false, is_secure_image) != 0) {
halt_and_catch_fire(boot_status);
}
}
/* If we reach here, we didn't find an image to boot - stop while we're
* ahead...
*/
halt_and_catch_fire(boot_status);
}
