static int
verify_krb4(struct passwd *pwd,
char *password,
int32_t *exp,
int quiet)
{
int ret = 1;
char lrealm[REALM_SZ];
if (krb_get_lrealm (lrealm, 1) != KFAILURE) {
set_krbtkfile(pwd->pw_uid);
ret = krb_verify_user (pwd->pw_name, "", lrealm, password,
KRB_VERIFY_SECURE, NULL);
if (ret == KSUCCESS) {
if (!pag_set && k_hasafs()) {
k_setpag ();
pag_set = 1;
}
if (pag_set)
krb_afslog_uid_home (0, 0, pwd->pw_uid, pwd->pw_dir);
} else if (!quiet)
printf ("%s\n", krb_get_err_text (ret));
}
return ret;
}
/*
* Convert 'identifier' into canonical form.
* Returns a pointer to a static buffer containing the canonical form
* or NULL if 'identifier' is invalid.
*/
static char *afspts_canonifyid(const char *identifier, size_t len)
{
static char retbuf[MAX_K_NAME_SZ+1];
char aname[ANAME_SZ];
char inst[INST_SZ];
char realm[REALM_SZ];
char lrealm[REALM_SZ];
char krbhst[MAX_HSTNM];
char *canon_buf;
char *p;
if(!len) len = strlen(identifier);
canon_buf = xmalloc(len + 1);
memcpy(canon_buf, identifier, len);
canon_buf[len] = '\0';
aname[0] = inst[0] = realm[0] = '\0';
if (kname_parse(aname, inst, realm, canon_buf) != 0) {
free(canon_buf);
return 0;
}
free(canon_buf);
/* Upcase realm name */
for (p = realm; *p; p++) {
if (Uislower(*p)) *p = toupper(*p);
}
if (*realm) {
if (krb_get_lrealm(lrealm,1) == 0 &&
strcmp(lrealm, realm) == 0) {
*realm = 0;
}
else if (krb_get_krbhst(krbhst, realm, 1)) {
return 0; /* Unknown realm */
}
}
/* Check for krb.equiv remappings. */
p = auth_map_krbid(aname, inst, realm);
if (p) {
strcpy(retbuf, p);
return retbuf;
}
strcpy(retbuf, aname);
if (*inst) {
strcat(retbuf, ".");
strcat(retbuf, inst);
}
if (*realm && !is_local_realm(realm)) {
strcat(retbuf, "@");
strcat(retbuf, realm);
}
return retbuf;
}
int /* R: -1 on failure, else 0 */
auth_krb4_init (
/* PARAMETERS */
void /* no parameters */
/* END PARAMETERS */
)
{
#ifdef AUTH_KRB4
/* VARIABLES */
int rc; /* return code holder */
char *configname = 0;
/* END VARIABLES */
if (mech_option)
configname = mech_option;
else if (access(SASLAUTHD_CONF_FILE_DEFAULT, F_OK) == 0)
configname = SASLAUTHD_CONF_FILE_DEFAULT;
if (configname) {
char complaint[1024];
config = cfile_read(configname, complaint, sizeof(complaint));
if (!config) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "auth_krb4_init %s", complaint);
return -1;
}
}
if (config) {
srvtabname = cfile_getstring(config, "krb4_srvtab", srvtabname);
verify_principal = cfile_getstring(config, "krb4_verify_principal",
verify_principal);
}
if (krbtf_init() == -1) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "auth_krb4_init krbtf_init failed");
return -1;
}
rc = krb_get_lrealm(default_realm, 1);
if (rc) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "auth_krb4: krb_get_lrealm: %s",
krb_get_err_text(rc));
return -1;
}
if (gethostname(myhostname, sizeof(myhostname)) < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "auth_krb4: gethoanem(): %m");
return -1;
}
myhostname[sizeof(myhostname) - 1] = '\0';
return 0;
#else /* ! AUTH_KRB4 */
return -1;
#endif /* ! AUTH_KRB4 */
}
int
login_kerberos(const char *username, const char *password)
{
char realm[REALM_SZ];
(void) krb_get_lrealm(realm, 1);
if (password != 0)
(void) krb_get_pw_in_tkt(username, "", realm, "krbtgt",
realm, DEFAULT_TKT_LIFE, password);
}
/*
* Function: Intialize name fields in the Kerberos dialog.
*
* Parameters:
* hwnd - the window recieving the message.
*
* fullname - the full kerberos name to initialize with
*/
void
kwin_init_name(HWND hwnd, char *fullname)
{
char name[ANAME_SZ];
char instance[INST_SZ];
char realm[REALM_SZ];
int krc;
#ifdef KRB5
krb5_error_code code;
char *ptr;
#endif
if (fullname == NULL || fullname[0] == 0) {
#ifdef KRB4
strcpy(name, krb_get_default_user());
strcpy(instance, cns_res.instance);
krc = krb_get_lrealm(realm, 1);
if (krc != KSUCCESS)
realm[0] = 0;
strcpy(realm, cns_res.realm);
#endif /* KRB4 */
#ifdef KRB5
strcpy(name, cns_res.name);
*realm = '\0';
code = krb5_get_default_realm(k5_context, &ptr);
if (!code) {
strcpy(realm, ptr);
/* free(ptr); XXX */
}
strcpy(realm, cns_res.realm);
#endif /* KRB5 */
} else {
#ifdef KRB4
kname_parse(name, instance, realm, fullname);
SetDlgItemText(hwnd, IDD_LOGIN_INSTANCE, instance);
#endif
#ifdef KRB5
krc = k5_kname_parse(name, realm, fullname);
*instance = '\0';
#endif
}
SetDlgItemText(hwnd, IDD_LOGIN_NAME, name);
SetDlgItemText(hwnd, IDD_LOGIN_REALM, realm);
}
static int Krb4CommonInit(void)
{
char default_realm[REALM_SZ];
codaconf_init("venus.conf");
codaconf_init("vice.conf");
codaconf_init("auth2.conf");
CODACONF_STR(kerberos4service, "kerberos4service", "host");
CODACONF_STR(kerberos4realm, "kerberos4realm", NULL)
/* When no realm has been specified, use the default realm */
if (!kerberos4realm) {
krb_get_lrealm(default_realm, 1);
kerberos4realm = strdup(default_realm);
}
return 0; /* success */
}
int
kerb4_init(struct passwd *pw, char **promptp, sudo_auth *auth)
{
static char realm[REALM_SZ];
/* Don't try to verify root */
if (pw->pw_uid == 0)
return AUTH_FAILURE;
/* Get the local realm, or retrun failure (no krb.conf) */
if (krb_get_lrealm(realm, 1) != KSUCCESS)
return AUTH_FAILURE;
/* Stash a pointer to the realm (used in kerb4_verify) */
auth->data = (void *) realm;
return AUTH_SUCCESS;
}
static int
verify_pass(pam_handle_t *pamh,
const char *name,
const char *inst,
const char *pass)
{
char realm[REALM_SZ];
int ret, krb_verify, old_euid, old_ruid;
krb_get_lrealm(realm, 1);
if (ctrl_on(KRB4_NO_VERIFY))
krb_verify = KRB_VERIFY_SECURE_FAIL;
else
krb_verify = KRB_VERIFY_SECURE;
old_ruid = getuid();
old_euid = geteuid();
setreuid(0, 0);
ret = krb_verify_user(name, inst, realm, pass, krb_verify, NULL);
pdeb("krb_verify_user(`%s', `%s', `%s', pw, %d, NULL) returns %s",
name, inst, realm, krb_verify,
krb_get_err_text(ret));
setreuid(old_ruid, old_euid);
if (getuid() != old_ruid || geteuid() != old_euid)
{
psyslog(LOG_ALERT , "setreuid(%d, %d) failed at line %d",
old_ruid, old_euid, __LINE__);
exit(1);
}
switch(ret) {
case KSUCCESS:
return PAM_SUCCESS;
case KDC_PR_UNKNOWN:
return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
case SKDC_CANT:
case SKDC_RETRY:
case RD_AP_TIME:
return PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL;
default:
return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
}
}
/*******************************************************************
check on Kerberos authentication
********************************************************************/
static BOOL krb4_auth(char *this_user,char *password)
{
char realm[REALM_SZ];
char tkfile[MAXPATHLEN];
if (krb_get_lrealm(realm, 1) != KSUCCESS)
(void) strncpy(realm, KRB_REALM, sizeof (realm));
(void) slprintf(tkfile, sizeof(tkfile)-1, "/tmp/samba_tkt_%d", getpid());
krb_set_tkt_string(tkfile);
if (krb_verify_user(this_user, "", realm,
password, 0,
"rmcd") == KSUCCESS) {
unlink(tkfile);
return 1;
}
unlink(tkfile);
return 0;
}
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_context context;
krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
HDB *db = NULL;
int optind = 0;
int type = 0;
if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind))
usage(1);
if(help_flag)
usage(0);
if(version_flag){
print_version(NULL);
exit(0);
}
ret = krb5_init_context(&context);
if(ret)
exit(1);
if(local_realm)
krb5_set_default_realm(context, local_realm);
if(v4_realm == NULL) {
ret = krb5_get_default_realm(context, &v4_realm);
if(ret)
krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_get_default_realm");
}
if(afs_cell == NULL) {
afs_cell = strdup(v4_realm);
if(afs_cell == NULL)
krb5_errx(context, 1, "out of memory");
strlwr(afs_cell);
}
if(encrypt_flag && decrypt_flag)
krb5_errx(context, 1,
"only one of `--encrypt' and `--decrypt' is meaningful");
if(source_type != NULL) {
type = parse_source_type(source_type);
if(type == 0)
krb5_errx(context, 1, "unknown source type `%s'", source_type);
} else if(type == 0)
type = HPROP_HEIMDAL;
if(!to_stdout)
get_creds(context, &ccache);
if(decrypt_flag || encrypt_flag) {
ret = hdb_read_master_key(context, mkeyfile, &mkey5);
if(ret && ret != ENOENT)
krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "hdb_read_master_key");
if(ret)
krb5_errx(context, 1, "No master key file found");
}
#ifdef KRB4
if (IS_TYPE_V4(type)) {
int e;
if (v4_realm == NULL) {
e = krb_get_lrealm(realm_buf, 1);
if(e)
krb5_errx(context, 1, "krb_get_lrealm: %s",
krb_get_err_text(e));
v4_realm = realm_buf;
}
}
#endif
switch(type) {
#ifdef KRB4
case HPROP_KRB4_DB:
if (database == NULL)
krb5_errx(context, 1, "no database specified");
break;
#endif
case HPROP_KASERVER:
if (database == NULL)
database = DEFAULT_DATABASE;
ka_use_null_salt = krb5_config_get_bool_default(context, NULL, FALSE,
"hprop",
"afs_uses_null_salt",
NULL);
break;
case HPROP_KRB4_DUMP:
if (database == NULL)
krb5_errx(context, 1, "no dump file specified");
break;
case HPROP_MIT_DUMP:
if (database == NULL)
krb5_errx(context, 1, "no dump file specified");
break;
case HPROP_HEIMDAL:
ret = hdb_create (context, &db, database);
if(ret)
krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "hdb_create: %s", database);
ret = db->hdb_open(context, db, O_RDONLY, 0);
if(ret)
krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "db->hdb_open");
break;
default:
krb5_errx(context, 1, "unknown dump type `%d'", type);
break;
}
if (to_stdout)
dump_database (context, type, database, db);
else
propagate_database (context, type, database,
db, ccache, optind, argc, argv);
if(ccache != NULL)
krb5_cc_destroy(context, ccache);
if(db != NULL)
(*db->hdb_destroy)(context, db);
krb5_free_context(context);
return 0;
}
/*
* send_to_kdc() sends a message to the Kerberos authentication
* server(s) in the given realm and returns the reply message.
* The "pkt" argument points to the message to be sent to Kerberos;
* the "rpkt" argument will be filled in with Kerberos' reply.
* The "realm" argument indicates the realm of the Kerberos server(s)
* to transact with. If the realm is null, the local realm is used.
*
* If more than one Kerberos server is known for a given realm,
* different servers will be queried until one of them replies.
* Several attempts (retries) are made for each server before
* giving up entirely.
*
* If an answer was received from a Kerberos host, KSUCCESS is
* returned. The following errors can be returned:
*
* SKDC_CANT - can't get local realm
* - can't find "kerberos" in /etc/services database
* - can't open socket
* - can't bind socket
* - all ports in use
* - couldn't find any Kerberos host
*
* SKDC_RETRY - couldn't get an answer from any Kerberos server,
* after several retries
*/
int
send_to_kdc(
KTEXT pkt,
KTEXT rpkt,
char *realm
)
{
int i;
SOCKET f = INVALID_SOCKET;
int no_host; /* was a kerberos host found? */
int retry;
int n_hosts;
int retval;
struct sockaddr_in to;
struct hostent *host, *hostlist, *fphost, *temp_hostlist;
int *portlist, *temp_portlist;
char *cp;
char krbhst[MAX_HSTNM];
char lrealm[REALM_SZ];
hostlist = 0;
portlist = 0;
/*
* If "realm" is non-null, use that, otherwise get the
* local realm.
*/
if (realm && realm[0]) {
strncpy(lrealm, realm, REALM_SZ);
lrealm[REALM_SZ] = 0;
}
else
if (krb_get_lrealm(lrealm, 1)) {
if (krb_debug)
kdebug("%s: can't get local realm\n", prog);
return(SKDC_CANT);
}
if (krb_debug)
kdebug("lrealm is %s\n", lrealm);
if (krb_udp_port_conf == 0) {
register struct servent FAR *sp;
if (sp = getservbyname("kerberos", "udp")) {
krb_udp_port_conf = sp->s_port;
} else if (KRB_PORT) {
if (krb_debug)
kdebug("%s: Can't get kerberos/udp service -- "
"using default port\n", prog);
krb_udp_port_conf = htons(KRB_PORT);
} else {
if (krb_debug)
kdebug("%s: Can't get kerberos/udp service at all\n", prog);
return(SKDC_CANT);
}
if (krb_debug)
kdebug("krb_udp_port_conf is %d\n", ntohs(krb_udp_port_conf));
}
/* from now on, exit through rtn label for cleanup */
memset((char *)&to, 0, S_AD_SZ);
hostlist = (struct hostent *) malloc(sizeof(struct hostent));
if (!hostlist) {
retval = SKDC_CANT;
goto rtn;
}
memset(hostlist, 0, sizeof(struct hostent));
f = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
if (f == INVALID_SOCKET) {
if (krb_debug)
kdebug("%s: Can't open socket (error %d)\n", prog,
WSAGetLastError());
retval = SKDC_CANT;
goto rtn;
}
/* make the socket non-blocking */
{
u_long onOff = TRUE;
if (ioctlsocket(f, FIONBIO, (u_long FAR*)&onOff))
{
if (krb_debug)
kdebug("%s: Can't make socket non-blocking (error %d)\n",
prog, WSAGetLastError());
retval = SKDC_CANT;
goto rtn;
}
}
/*
** FTP Software's WINSOCK implmentation insists that
** a socket be bound before it can receive datagrams.
** This is outside specs. Since it shouldn't hurt any
** other implementations we'll go ahead and do it for
** now.
*/
{
struct sockaddr_in from;
memset ((char *)&from, 0, S_AD_SZ);
from.sin_family = AF_INET;
from.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
if ( bind(f, (struct sockaddr *)&from, S_AD_SZ) == SOCKET_ERROR ) {
if (krb_debug)
kdebug("%s : Can't bind\n", prog);
retval = SKDC_CANT;
goto rtn;
}
}
/* End of kludge for FTP Software WinSock stack. */
no_host = 1;
/* get an initial allocation */
n_hosts = 0;
for (i = 1; krb_get_krbhst(krbhst, lrealm, i) == KSUCCESS; ++i) {
#ifdef USE_DNS
int krb_udp_port = krb_udp_port_dns?krb_udp_port_dns:krb_udp_port_conf;
if (krb_debug) {
kdebug("krb_udp_port is %d\n", ntohs(krb_udp_port));
}
#else /* !USE_DNS */
int krb_udp_port = krb_udp_port_conf;
#endif /* !USE_DNS */
if (krb_debug) {
kdebug("Getting host entry for %s...", krbhst);
}
fphost = /* host = */ GETHOSTBYNAME(krbhst);
if (krb_debug) {
kdebug("%s.\n",
fphost ? "Got it" : "Didn't get it");
}
if (!fphost){
continue;
}
no_host = 0; /* found at least one */
n_hosts++;
/* preserve host network address to check later
* (would be better to preserve *all* addresses,
* take care of that later)
*/
temp_portlist = portlist;
portlist = (int *) realloc(portlist, n_hosts*sizeof(int));
if (!portlist) {
portlist = temp_portlist;
retval = SKDC_CANT;
goto rtn;
}
portlist[n_hosts-1] = krb_udp_port;
temp_hostlist = hostlist;
hostlist = (struct hostent *)
realloc((char *)hostlist,
(unsigned)
sizeof(struct hostent)*(n_hosts+1));
if (!hostlist){
hostlist = temp_hostlist;
retval = SKDC_CANT;
goto rtn;
}
hostlist[n_hosts-1] = *fphost;
memset(&hostlist[n_hosts], 0, sizeof(struct hostent));
host = &hostlist[n_hosts-1];
cp = (char*)malloc((unsigned)host->h_length);
if (!cp) {
retval = SKDC_CANT;
goto rtn;
}
memcpy(cp, host->h_addr, host->h_length);
host->h_addr_list = (char **)malloc(sizeof(char *));
if (!host->h_addr_list) {
retval = SKDC_CANT;
goto rtn;
}
host->h_addr = cp;
to.sin_family = host->h_addrtype;
memcpy((char *)&to.sin_addr, host->h_addr,
host->h_length);
to.sin_port = krb_udp_port;
if (send_recv(pkt, rpkt, f, &to, hostlist)) {
retval = KSUCCESS;
goto rtn;
}
if (krb_debug) {
kdebug("Timeout, error, or wrong descriptor\n");
}
}
if (no_host) {
if (krb_debug)
kdebug("%s: can't find any Kerberos host.\n", prog);
retval = SKDC_CANT;
goto rtn;
}
/* retry each host in sequence */
for (retry = 0; retry < CLIENT_KRB_RETRY; ++retry) {
i = 0;
for (host = hostlist; host->h_name != 0; host++) {
to.sin_family = host->h_addrtype;
to.sin_port = portlist[i++];
memcpy((char *)&to.sin_addr, host->h_addr,
host->h_length);
if (send_recv(pkt, rpkt, f, &to, hostlist)) {
retval = KSUCCESS;
goto rtn;
}
}
}
retval = SKDC_RETRY;
rtn:
if (f != INVALID_SOCKET)
if (closesocket(f) == SOCKET_ERROR)
if (krb_debug)
kdebug("%s: Could not close socket (error %d)\n",
prog, WSAGetLastError());
if (hostlist) {
register struct hostent *hp;
for (hp = hostlist; hp->h_name; hp++)
if (hp->h_addr_list) {
if (hp->h_addr)
free(hp->h_addr);
free(hp->h_addr_list);
}
free(hostlist);
}
if (portlist)
free(portlist);
return(retval);
}
/*
* Map a remote kerberos principal to a local username. If a mapping
* is found, a pointer to the local username is returned. Otherwise,
* a NULL pointer is returned.
* Eventually, this may be more sophisticated than a simple file scan.
*/
static char *auth_map_krbid(const char *real_aname,
const char *real_inst,
const char *real_realm)
{
static char localuser[MAX_K_NAME_SZ + 1];
char principal[MAX_K_NAME_SZ + 1];
char aname[ANAME_SZ];
char inst[INST_SZ];
char realm[REALM_SZ];
char lrealm[REALM_SZ];
char krbhst[MAX_HSTNM];
char *p;
char buf[1024];
FILE *mapfile;
if (!(mapfile = fopen(KRB_MAPNAME, "r"))) {
/* If the file can't be opened, don't do mappings */
return 0;
}
for (;;) {
if (!fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), mapfile)) break;
if (parse_krbequiv_line(buf, principal, localuser) == 0 ||
kname_parse(aname, inst, realm, principal) != 0) {
/* Ignore badly formed lines */
continue;
}
if (!strcmp(aname, real_aname) && !strcmp(inst, real_inst) &&
!strcmp(realm, real_realm)) {
fclose(mapfile);
aname[0] = inst[0] = realm[0] = '\0';
if (kname_parse(aname, inst, realm, localuser) != 0) {
return 0;
}
/* Upcase realm name */
for (p = realm; *p; p++) {
if (Uislower(*p)) *p = toupper(*p);
}
if (*realm) {
if (krb_get_lrealm(lrealm,1) == 0 &&
strcmp(lrealm, realm) == 0) {
*realm = 0;
}
else if (krb_get_krbhst(krbhst, realm, 1)) {
return 0; /* Unknown realm */
}
}
strcpy(localuser, aname);
if (*inst) {
strcat(localuser, ".");
strcat(localuser, inst);
}
if (*realm) {
strcat(localuser, "@");
strcat(localuser, realm);
}
return localuser;
}
}
fclose(mapfile);
return 0;
}
int
krb4int_send_to_kdc_addr(
KTEXT pkt, KTEXT rpkt, char *realm,
struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t *addrlen)
{
struct addrlist al = ADDRLIST_INIT;
char lrealm[REALM_SZ];
krb5int_access internals;
krb5_error_code retval;
struct servent *sp;
int krb_udp_port = 0;
int krbsec_udp_port = 0;
char krbhst[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
char *scol;
int i;
int err;
krb5_data message, reply;
/*
* If "realm" is non-null, use that, otherwise get the
* local realm.
*/
if (realm)
strncpy(lrealm, realm, sizeof(lrealm) - 1);
else {
if (krb_get_lrealm(lrealm, 1)) {
DEB (("%s: can't get local realm\n", prog));
return SKDC_CANT;
}
}
lrealm[sizeof(lrealm) - 1] = '\0';
DEB (("lrealm is %s\n", lrealm));
retval = krb5int_accessor(&internals, KRB5INT_ACCESS_VERSION);
if (retval)
return KFAILURE;
/* The first time, decide what port to use for the KDC. */
if (cached_krb_udp_port == 0) {
sp = getservbyname("kerberos","udp");
if (sp)
cached_krb_udp_port = sp->s_port;
else
cached_krb_udp_port = htons(KERBEROS_PORT); /* kerberos/udp */
DEB (("cached_krb_udp_port is %d\n", cached_krb_udp_port));
}
/* If kerberos/udp isn't 750, try using kerberos-sec/udp (or 750)
as a fallback. */
if (cached_krbsec_udp_port == 0 &&
cached_krb_udp_port != htons(KERBEROS_PORT)) {
sp = getservbyname("kerberos-sec","udp");
if (sp)
cached_krbsec_udp_port = sp->s_port;
else
cached_krbsec_udp_port = htons(KERBEROS_PORT); /* kerberos/udp */
DEB (("cached_krbsec_udp_port is %d\n", cached_krbsec_udp_port));
}
for (i = 1; krb_get_krbhst(krbhst, lrealm, i) == KSUCCESS; ++i) {
#ifdef DEBUG
if (krb_debug) {
DEB (("Getting host entry for %s...",krbhst));
(void) fflush(stdout);
}
#endif
if (0 != (scol = strchr(krbhst,':'))) {
krb_udp_port = htons(atoi(scol+1));
*scol = 0;
if (krb_udp_port == 0) {
#ifdef DEBUG
if (krb_debug) {
DEB (("bad port number %s\n",scol+1));
(void) fflush(stdout);
}
#endif
continue;
}
krbsec_udp_port = 0;
} else {
krb_udp_port = cached_krb_udp_port;
krbsec_udp_port = cached_krbsec_udp_port;
}
err = internals.add_host_to_list(&al, krbhst,
krb_udp_port, krbsec_udp_port,
SOCK_DGRAM, PF_INET);
if (err) {
retval = SKDC_CANT;
goto free_al;
}
}
if (al.naddrs == 0) {
DEB (("%s: can't find any Kerberos host.\n", prog));
retval = SKDC_CANT;
}
message.length = pkt->length;
message.data = (char *)pkt->dat; /* XXX yuck */
retval = internals.sendto_udp(NULL, &message, &al, NULL, &reply, addr,
addrlen, NULL, 0, NULL);
DEB(("sendto_udp returns %d\n", retval));
free_al:
internals.free_addrlist(&al);
if (retval)
return SKDC_CANT;
DEB(("reply.length=%d\n", reply.length));
if (reply.length > sizeof(rpkt->dat))
retval = SKDC_CANT;
rpkt->length = 0;
if (!retval) {
memcpy(rpkt->dat, reply.data, reply.length);
rpkt->length = reply.length;
}
krb5_free_data_contents(NULL, &reply);
return retval;
}
static int
#if defined(USE_PAM) || defined(_AIX)
isNoPassAllowed( const char *un )
{
struct passwd *pw = 0;
# ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM /* (sic!) - not USESHADOW */
struct spwd *spw;
# endif
#else
isNoPassAllowed( const char *un, struct passwd *pw )
{
#endif
struct group *gr;
char **fp;
int hg;
if (!*un)
return 0;
if (cursource != PWSRC_MANUAL)
return 1;
for (hg = 0, fp = td->noPassUsers; *fp; fp++)
if (**fp == '@')
hg = 1;
else if (!strcmp( un, *fp ))
return 1;
else if (!strcmp( "*", *fp )) {
#if defined(USE_PAM) || defined(_AIX)
if (!(pw = getpwnam( un )))
return 0;
if (pw->pw_passwd[0] == '!' || pw->pw_passwd[0] == '*')
continue;
# ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM /* (sic!) - not USESHADOW */
if ((spw = getspnam( un )) &&
(spw->sp_pwdp[0] == '!' || spw->sp_pwdp[0] == '*'))
continue;
# endif
#endif
if (pw->pw_uid)
return 1;
}
#if defined(USE_PAM) || defined(_AIX)
if (hg && (pw || (pw = getpwnam( un )))) {
#else
if (hg) {
#endif
for (setgrent(); (gr = getgrent()); )
for (fp = td->noPassUsers; *fp; fp++)
if (**fp == '@' && !strcmp( gr->gr_name, *fp + 1 )) {
if (pw->pw_gid == gr->gr_gid) {
endgrent();
return 1;
}
for (; *gr->gr_mem; gr->gr_mem++)
if (!strcmp( un, *gr->gr_mem )) {
endgrent();
return 1;
}
}
endgrent();
}
return 0;
}
#if !defined(USE_PAM) && !defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETUSERCONTEXT)
# define LC_RET0 do { login_close(lc); return 0; } while(0)
#else
# define LC_RET0 return 0
#endif
int
verify( GConvFunc gconv, int rootok )
{
#ifdef USE_PAM
const char *psrv;
struct pam_data pdata;
int pretc, pnopass;
char psrvb[64];
#elif defined(_AIX)
char *msg, *curret;
int i, reenter;
#else
struct stat st;
const char *nolg;
char *buf;
int fd;
# ifdef HAVE_GETUSERSHELL
char *s;
# endif
# if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE) || defined(USESHADOW)
int tim, expir, warntime, quietlog;
# endif
#endif
debug( "verify ...\n" );
#ifdef USE_PAM
pnopass = FALSE;
if (!strcmp( curtype, "classic" )) {
if (!gconv( GCONV_USER, 0 ))
return 0;
if (isNoPassAllowed( curuser )) {
gconv( GCONV_PASS_ND, 0 );
if (!*curpass) {
pnopass = TRUE;
sprintf( psrvb, "%.31s-np", PAMService );
psrv = psrvb;
} else
psrv = PAMService;
} else
psrv = PAMService;
pdata.usecur = TRUE;
} else {
sprintf( psrvb, "%.31s-%.31s", PAMService, curtype );
psrv = psrvb;
pdata.usecur = FALSE;
}
pdata.gconv = gconv;
if (!doPAMAuth( psrv, &pdata ))
return 0;
#elif defined(_AIX)
if ((td->displayType & d_location) == dForeign) {
char *tmpch;
strncpy( hostname, td->name, sizeof(hostname) - 1 );
hostname[sizeof(hostname)-1] = '\0';
if ((tmpch = strchr( hostname, ':' )))
*tmpch = '\0';
} else
hostname[0] = '\0';
/* tty names should only be 15 characters long */
# if 0
for (i = 0; i < 15 && td->name[i]; i++) {
if (td->name[i] == ':' || td->name[i] == '.')
tty[i] = '_';
else
tty[i] = td->name[i];
}
tty[i] = '\0';
# else
memcpy( tty, "/dev/xdm/", 9 );
for (i = 0; i < 6 && td->name[i]; i++) {
if (td->name[i] == ':' || td->name[i] == '.')
tty[9 + i] = '_';
else
tty[9 + i] = td->name[i];
}
tty[9 + i] = '\0';
# endif
if (!strcmp( curtype, "classic" )) {
if (!gconv( GCONV_USER, 0 ))
return 0;
if (isNoPassAllowed( curuser )) {
gconv( GCONV_PASS_ND, 0 );
if (!*curpass) {
debug( "accepting despite empty password\n" );
goto done;
}
} else
if (!gconv( GCONV_PASS, 0 ))
return 0;
enduserdb();
msg = NULL;
if ((i = authenticate( curuser, curpass, &reenter, &msg ))) {
debug( "authenticate() failed: %s\n", msg );
if (msg)
free( msg );
loginfailed( curuser, hostname, tty );
if (i == ENOENT || i == ESAD)
V_RET_AUTH;
else
V_RET_FAIL( 0 );
}
if (reenter) {
logError( "authenticate() requests more data: %s\n", msg );
free( msg );
V_RET_FAIL( 0 );
}
} else if (!strcmp( curtype, "generic" )) {
if (!gconv( GCONV_USER, 0 ))
return 0;
for (curret = 0;;) {
msg = NULL;
if ((i = authenticate( curuser, curret, &reenter, &msg ))) {
debug( "authenticate() failed: %s\n", msg );
if (msg)
free( msg );
loginfailed( curuser, hostname, tty );
if (i == ENOENT || i == ESAD)
V_RET_AUTH;
else
V_RET_FAIL( 0 );
}
if (curret)
free( curret );
if (!reenter)
break;
if (!(curret = gconv( GCONV_HIDDEN, msg )))
return 0;
free( msg );
}
} else {
logError( "Unsupported authentication type %\"s requested\n", curtype );
V_RET_FAIL( 0 );
}
if (msg) {
displayStr( V_MSG_INFO, msg );
free( msg );
}
done:
#else
if (strcmp( curtype, "classic" )) {
logError( "Unsupported authentication type %\"s requested\n", curtype );
V_RET_FAIL( 0 );
}
if (!gconv( GCONV_USER, 0 ))
return 0;
if (!(p = getpwnam( curuser ))) {
debug( "getpwnam() failed.\n" );
gconv( GCONV_PASS, 0 );
V_RET_AUTH;
}
if (p->pw_passwd[0] == '!' || p->pw_passwd[0] == '*') {
debug( "account is locked\n" );
gconv( GCONV_PASS, 0 );
V_RET_AUTH;
}
# ifdef USESHADOW
if ((sp = getspnam( curuser ))) {
p->pw_passwd = sp->sp_pwdp;
if (p->pw_passwd[0] == '!' || p->pw_passwd[0] == '*') {
debug( "account is locked\n" );
gconv( GCONV_PASS, 0 );
V_RET_AUTH;
}
} else
debug( "getspnam() failed: %m. Are you root?\n" );
# endif
if (!*p->pw_passwd) {
if (!td->allowNullPasswd) {
debug( "denying user with empty password\n" );
gconv( GCONV_PASS, 0 );
V_RET_AUTH;
}
goto nplogin;
}
if (isNoPassAllowed( curuser, p )) {
nplogin:
gconv( GCONV_PASS_ND, 0 );
if (!*curpass) {
debug( "accepting password-less login\n" );
goto done;
}
} else
if (!gconv( GCONV_PASS, 0 ))
return 0;
# ifdef KERBEROS
if (p->pw_uid) {
int ret;
char realm[REALM_SZ];
if (krb_get_lrealm( realm, 1 )) {
logError( "Cannot get KerberosIV realm.\n" );
V_RET_FAIL( 0 );
}
sprintf( krbtkfile, "%s.%.*s", TKT_ROOT, MAXPATHLEN - strlen( TKT_ROOT ) - 2, td->name );
krb_set_tkt_string( krbtkfile );
unlink( krbtkfile );
ret = krb_verify_user( curuser, "", realm, curpass, 1, "rcmd" );
if (ret == KSUCCESS) {
chown( krbtkfile, p->pw_uid, p->pw_gid );
debug( "KerberosIV verify succeeded\n" );
goto done;
} else if (ret != KDC_PR_UNKNOWN && ret != SKDC_CANT) {
logError( "KerberosIV verification failure %\"s for %s\n",
krb_get_err_text( ret ), curuser );
krbtkfile[0] = '\0';
V_RET_FAIL( 0 );
}
debug( "KerberosIV verify failed: %s\n", krb_get_err_text( ret ) );
}
krbtkfile[0] = '\0';
# endif /* KERBEROS */
# if defined(ultrix) || defined(__ultrix__)
if (authenticate_user( p, curpass, NULL ) < 0)
# elif defined(HAVE_PW_ENCRYPT)
if (strcmp( pw_encrypt( curpass, p->pw_passwd ), p->pw_passwd ))
# elif defined(HAVE_CRYPT)
if (strcmp( crypt( curpass, p->pw_passwd ), p->pw_passwd ))
# else
if (strcmp( curpass, p->pw_passwd ))
# endif
{
debug( "password verify failed\n" );
V_RET_AUTH;
}
done:
#endif /* !defined(USE_PAM) && !defined(_AIX) */
debug( "restrict %s ...\n", curuser );
#if defined(USE_PAM) || defined(_AIX)
if (!(p = getpwnam( curuser ))) {
logError( "getpwnam(%s) failed.\n", curuser );
V_RET_FAIL( 0 );
}
#endif
if (!p->pw_uid) {
if (!rootok && !td->allowRootLogin)
V_RET_FAIL( "Root logins are not allowed" );
return 1; /* don't deny root to log in */
}
#ifdef USE_PAM
debug( " pam_acct_mgmt() ...\n" );
pretc = pam_acct_mgmt( pamh, 0 );
reInitErrorLog();
debug( " pam_acct_mgmt() returned: %s\n", pam_strerror( pamh, pretc ) );
if (pretc == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) {
pdata.usecur = FALSE;
pdata.gconv = conv_interact;
/* pam will have output a message already, so no prepareErrorGreet() */
if (gconv != conv_interact || pnopass) {
pam_end( pamh, PAM_SUCCESS );
pamh = 0;
gSendInt( V_CHTOK_AUTH );
/* this cannot auth the wrong user, as only classic auths get here */
while (!doPAMAuth( PAMService, &pdata ))
if (pdata.abort)
return 0;
gSendInt( V_PRE_OK );
} else
gSendInt( V_CHTOK );
for (;;) {
debug( " pam_chauthtok() ...\n" );
pretc = pam_chauthtok( pamh, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK );
reInitErrorLog();
debug( " pam_chauthtok() returned: %s\n", pam_strerror( pamh, pretc ) );
if (pdata.abort) {
pam_end( pamh, PAM_SUCCESS );
pamh = 0;
return 0;
}
if (pretc == PAM_SUCCESS)
break;
/* effectively there is only PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR */
gSendInt( V_FAIL );
}
if (curpass)
free( curpass );
curpass = newpass;
newpass = 0;
} else if (pretc != PAM_SUCCESS) {
pam_end( pamh, pretc );
pamh = 0;
V_RET_AUTH;
}
#elif defined(_AIX) /* USE_PAM */
msg = NULL;
if (loginrestrictions( curuser,
((td->displayType & d_location) == dForeign) ? S_RLOGIN : S_LOGIN,
tty, &msg ) == -1)
{
debug( "loginrestrictions() - %s\n", msg ? msg : "error" );
loginfailed( curuser, hostname, tty );
prepareErrorGreet();
if (msg) {
displayStr( V_MSG_ERR, msg );
free( msg );
}
gSendInt( V_AUTH );
return 0;
}
if (msg)
free( (void *)msg );
#endif /* USE_PAM || _AIX */
#ifndef _AIX
# ifdef HAVE_SETUSERCONTEXT
# ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_GETCLASS
lc = login_getclass( p->pw_class );
# else
lc = login_getpwclass( p );
# endif
if (!lc)
V_RET_FAIL( 0 );
p->pw_shell = login_getcapstr( lc, "shell", p->pw_shell, p->pw_shell );
# endif
# ifndef USE_PAM
/* restrict_expired */
# if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE) || defined(USESHADOW)
# if !defined(HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE) || (!defined(HAVE_SETUSERCONTEXT) && defined(USESHADOW))
if (sp)
# endif
{
# define DEFAULT_WARN (2L * 7L) /* Two weeks */
tim = time( NULL ) / 86400L;
# ifdef HAVE_SETUSERCONTEXT
quietlog = login_getcapbool( lc, "hushlogin", 0 );
warntime = login_getcaptime( lc, "warnexpire",
DEFAULT_WARN * 86400L,
DEFAULT_WARN * 86400L ) / 86400L;
# else
quietlog = 0;
# ifdef USESHADOW
warntime = sp->sp_warn != -1 ? sp->sp_warn : DEFAULT_WARN;
# else
warntime = DEFAULT_WARN;
# endif
# endif
# ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE
if (p->pw_expire) {
expir = p->pw_expire / 86400L;
# else
if (sp->sp_expire != -1) {
expir = sp->sp_expire;
# endif
if (tim > expir) {
displayStr( V_MSG_ERR,
"Your account has expired;"
" please contact your system administrator" );
gSendInt( V_FAIL );
LC_RET0;
} else if (tim > (expir - warntime) && !quietlog) {
displayMsg( V_MSG_INFO,
"Warning: your account will expire in %d day(s)",
expir - tim );
}
}
# ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE
if (p->pw_change) {
expir = p->pw_change / 86400L;
# else
if (!sp->sp_lstchg) {
displayStr( V_MSG_ERR,
"You are required to change your password immediately"
" (root enforced)" );
/* XXX todo password change */
gSendInt( V_FAIL );
LC_RET0;
} else if (sp->sp_max != -1) {
expir = sp->sp_lstchg + sp->sp_max;
if (sp->sp_inact != -1 && tim > expir + sp->sp_inact) {
displayStr( V_MSG_ERR,
"Your account has expired;"
" please contact your system administrator" );
gSendInt( V_FAIL );
LC_RET0;
}
# endif
if (tim > expir) {
displayStr( V_MSG_ERR,
"You are required to change your password immediately"
" (password aged)" );
/* XXX todo password change */
gSendInt( V_FAIL );
LC_RET0;
} else if (tim > (expir - warntime) && !quietlog) {
displayMsg( V_MSG_INFO,
"Warning: your password will expire in %d day(s)",
expir - tim );
}
}
}
# endif /* HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE || USESHADOW */
/* restrict_nologin */
# ifndef _PATH_NOLOGIN
# define _PATH_NOLOGIN "/etc/nologin"
# endif
if ((
# ifdef HAVE_SETUSERCONTEXT
/* Do we ignore a nologin file? */
!login_getcapbool( lc, "ignorenologin", 0 )) &&
(!stat( (nolg = login_getcapstr( lc, "nologin", "", NULL )), &st ) ||
# endif
!stat( (nolg = _PATH_NOLOGIN), &st )))
{
if (st.st_size && (fd = open( nolg, O_RDONLY )) >= 0) {
if ((buf = Malloc( st.st_size + 1 ))) {
if (read( fd, buf, st.st_size ) == st.st_size) {
close( fd );
buf[st.st_size] = 0;
displayStr( V_MSG_ERR, buf );
free( buf );
gSendInt( V_FAIL );
LC_RET0;
}
free( buf );
}
close( fd );
}
displayStr( V_MSG_ERR,
"Logins are not allowed at the moment.\nTry again later" );
gSendInt( V_FAIL );
LC_RET0;
}
/* restrict_time */
# if defined(HAVE_SETUSERCONTEXT) && defined(HAVE_AUTH_TIMEOK)
if (!auth_timeok( lc, time( NULL ) )) {
displayStr( V_MSG_ERR,
"You are not allowed to login at the moment" );
gSendInt( V_FAIL );
LC_RET0;
}
# endif
# ifdef HAVE_GETUSERSHELL
for (;;) {
if (!(s = getusershell())) {
debug( "shell not in /etc/shells\n" );
endusershell();
V_RET_FAIL( "Your login shell is not listed in /etc/shells" );
}
if (!strcmp( s, p->pw_shell )) {
endusershell();
break;
}
}
# endif
# endif /* !USE_PAM */
/* restrict_nohome */
# ifdef HAVE_SETUSERCONTEXT
if (login_getcapbool( lc, "requirehome", 0 )) {
struct stat st;
if (!*p->pw_dir || stat( p->pw_dir, &st ) || st.st_uid != p->pw_uid) {
displayStr( V_MSG_ERR, "Home folder not available" );
gSendInt( V_FAIL );
LC_RET0;
}
}
# endif
#endif /* !_AIX */
return 1;
}
static const char *envvars[] = {
"TZ", /* SYSV and SVR4, but never hurts */
#ifdef _AIX
"AUTHSTATE", /* for kerberos */
#endif
NULL
};
#if defined(USE_PAM) && defined(HAVE_INITGROUPS)
static int num_saved_gids;
static gid_t *saved_gids;
static int
saveGids( void )
{
num_saved_gids = getgroups( 0, 0 );
if (!(saved_gids = Malloc( sizeof(gid_t) * num_saved_gids )))
return 0;
if (getgroups( num_saved_gids, saved_gids ) < 0) {
logError( "saving groups failed: %m\n" );
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int
restoreGids( void )
{
if (setgroups( num_saved_gids, saved_gids ) < 0) {
logError( "restoring groups failed: %m\n" );
return 0;
}
if (setgid( p->pw_gid ) < 0) {
logError( "restoring gid failed: %m\n" );
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
#endif /* USE_PAM && HAVE_INITGROUPS */
static int
resetGids( void )
{
#ifdef HAVE_INITGROUPS
if (setgroups( 0, &p->pw_gid /* anything */ ) < 0) {
logError( "restoring groups failed: %m\n" );
return 0;
}
#endif
if (setgid( 0 ) < 0) {
logError( "restoring gid failed: %m\n" );
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int
setGid( const char *name, int gid )
{
if (setgid( gid ) < 0) {
logError( "setgid(%d) (user %s) failed: %m\n", gid, name );
return 0;
}
#ifdef HAVE_INITGROUPS
if (initgroups( name, gid ) < 0) {
logError( "initgroups for %s failed: %m\n", name );
setgid( 0 );
return 0;
}
#endif /* QNX4 doesn't support multi-groups, no initgroups() */
return 1;
}
static int
setUid( const char *name, int uid )
{
if (setuid( uid ) < 0) {
logError( "setuid(%d) (user %s) failed: %m\n", uid, name );
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int
setUser( const char *name, int uid, int gid )
{
if (setGid( name, gid )) {
if (setUid( name, uid ))
return 1;
resetGids();
}
return 0;
}
#if defined(SECURE_RPC) || defined(K5AUTH)
static void
nukeAuth( int len, const char *name )
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < td->authNum; i++)
if (td->authorizations[i]->name_length == len &&
!memcmp( td->authorizations[i]->name, name, len ))
{
memcpy( &td->authorizations[i], &td->authorizations[i+1],
sizeof(td->authorizations[i]) * (--td->authNum - i) );
break;
}
}
#endif
static void
mergeSessionArgs( int cansave )
{
char *mfname;
const char *fname;
int i, needsave;
mfname = 0;
fname = ".dmrc";
if ((!curdmrc || newdmrc) && *dmrcDir)
if (strApp( &mfname, dmrcDir, "/", curuser, fname, (char *)0 ))
fname = mfname;
needsave = 0;
if (!curdmrc) {
curdmrc = iniLoad( fname );
if (!curdmrc) {
strDup( &curdmrc, "[Desktop]\nSession=default\n" );
needsave = 1;
}
}
if (newdmrc) {
curdmrc = iniMerge( curdmrc, newdmrc );
needsave = 1;
}
if (needsave && cansave)
if (!iniSave( curdmrc, fname ) && errno == ENOENT && mfname) {
for (i = 0; mfname[i]; i++)
if (mfname[i] == '/') {
mfname[i] = 0;
mkdir( mfname, 0755 );
mfname[i] = '/';
}
iniSave( curdmrc, mfname );
}
if (mfname)
free( mfname );
}
static int
createClientLog( const char *log )
{
char randstr[32], *randstrp = 0, *lname;
int lfd;
for (;;) {
struct expando macros[] = {
{ 'd', 0, td->name },
{ 'u', 0, curuser },
{ 'r', 0, randstrp },
{ 0, 0, 0 }
};
if (!(lname = expandMacros( log, macros )))
exit( 1 );
unlink( lname );
if ((lfd = open( lname, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0600 )) >= 0) {
dup2( lfd, 1 );
dup2( lfd, 2 );
close( lfd );
free( lname );
return TRUE;
}
if (errno != EEXIST || !macros[2].uses) {
free( lname );
return FALSE;
}
logInfo( "Session log file %s not usable, trying another one.\n",
lname );
free( lname );
sprintf( randstr, "%d", secureRandom() );
randstrp = randstr;
}
}
Code_t ZInitialize()
{
struct servent *hmserv;
struct hostent *hostent;
char addr[4], hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
struct in_addr servaddr;
struct sockaddr_in sin;
int s;
socklen_t sinsize = sizeof(sin);
Code_t code;
ZNotice_t notice;
#ifdef ZEPHYR_USES_KERBEROS
char *krealm = NULL;
int krbval;
char d1[ANAME_SZ], d2[INST_SZ];
/* initialize_krb_error_table(); */
#endif
initialize_zeph_error_table();
(void) memset((char *)&__HM_addr, 0, sizeof(__HM_addr));
__HM_addr.sin_family = AF_INET;
/* Set up local loopback address for HostManager */
addr[0] = 127;
addr[1] = 0;
addr[2] = 0;
addr[3] = 1;
hmserv = (struct servent *)getservbyname(HM_SVCNAME, "udp");
__HM_addr.sin_port = (hmserv) ? hmserv->s_port : HM_SVC_FALLBACK;
(void) memcpy((char *)&__HM_addr.sin_addr, addr, 4);
__HM_set = 0;
/* Initialize the input queue */
__Q_Tail = NULL;
__Q_Head = NULL;
/* if the application is a server, there might not be a zhm. The
code will fall back to something which might not be "right",
but this is is ok, since none of the servers call krb_rd_req. */
servaddr.s_addr = INADDR_NONE;
if (! __Zephyr_server) {
if ((code = ZOpenPort(NULL)) != ZERR_NONE)
return(code);
if ((code = ZhmStat(NULL, ¬ice)) != ZERR_NONE)
return(code);
ZClosePort();
/* the first field, which is NUL-terminated, is the server name.
If this code ever support a multiplexing zhm, this will have to
be made smarter, and probably per-message */
#ifdef ZEPHYR_USES_KERBEROS
krealm = krb_realmofhost(notice.z_message);
#endif
hostent = gethostbyname(notice.z_message);
if (hostent && hostent->h_addrtype == AF_INET)
memcpy(&servaddr, hostent->h_addr, sizeof(servaddr));
ZFreeNotice(¬ice);
}
#ifdef ZEPHYR_USES_KERBEROS
if (krealm) {
g_strlcpy(__Zephyr_realm, krealm, REALM_SZ);
} else if ((krb_get_tf_fullname(TKT_FILE, d1, d2, __Zephyr_realm)
!= KSUCCESS) &&
((krbval = krb_get_lrealm(__Zephyr_realm, 1)) != KSUCCESS)) {
return (krbval);
}
#else
g_strlcpy(__Zephyr_realm, "local-realm", REALM_SZ);
#endif
__My_addr.s_addr = INADDR_NONE;
if (servaddr.s_addr != INADDR_NONE) {
/* Try to get the local interface address by connecting a UDP
* socket to the server address and getting the local address.
* Some broken operating systems (e.g. Solaris 2.0-2.5) yield
* INADDR_ANY (zero), so we have to check for that. */
s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
if (s != -1) {
memset(&sin, 0, sizeof(sin));
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
memcpy(&sin.sin_addr, &servaddr, sizeof(servaddr));
sin.sin_port = HM_SRV_SVC_FALLBACK;
if (connect(s, (struct sockaddr *) &sin, sizeof(sin)) == 0
&& getsockname(s, (struct sockaddr *) &sin, &sinsize) == 0
&& sin.sin_addr.s_addr != 0)
memcpy(&__My_addr, &sin.sin_addr, sizeof(__My_addr));
close(s);
}
}
if (__My_addr.s_addr == INADDR_NONE) {
/* We couldn't figure out the local interface address by the
* above method. Try by resolving the local hostname. (This
* is a pretty broken thing to do, and unfortunately what we
* always do on server machines.) */
if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) == 0) {
hostent = gethostbyname(hostname);
if (hostent && hostent->h_addrtype == AF_INET)
memcpy(&__My_addr, hostent->h_addr, sizeof(__My_addr));
}
}
/* If the above methods failed, zero out __My_addr so things will
* sort of kind of work. */
if (__My_addr.s_addr == INADDR_NONE)
__My_addr.s_addr = 0;
/* Get the sender so we can cache it */
(void) ZGetSender();
return (ZERR_NONE);
}
static int chk_kerberos(
const struct berval *sc,
const struct berval * passwd,
const struct berval * cred,
const char **text )
{
unsigned int i;
int rtn;
for( i=0; i<cred->bv_len; i++) {
if(cred->bv_val[i] == '\0') {
return LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR; /* NUL character in password */
}
}
if( cred->bv_val[i] != '\0' ) {
return LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR; /* cred must behave like a string */
}
for( i=0; i<passwd->bv_len; i++) {
if(passwd->bv_val[i] == '\0') {
return LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR; /* NUL character in password */
}
}
if( passwd->bv_val[i] != '\0' ) {
return LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR; /* passwd must behave like a string */
}
rtn = LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR;
#ifdef HAVE_KRB5 /* HAVE_HEIMDAL_KRB5 */
{
/* Portions:
* Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska H\xf6gskolan
* (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
krb5_context context;
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_creds creds;
krb5_get_init_creds_opt get_options;
krb5_verify_init_creds_opt verify_options;
krb5_principal client, server;
#ifdef notdef
krb5_preauthtype pre_auth_types[] = {KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP};
#endif
ret = krb5_init_context( &context );
if (ret) {
return LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR;
}
#ifdef notdef
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_preauth_list(&get_options,
pre_auth_types, 1);
#endif
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_init( &get_options );
krb5_verify_init_creds_opt_init( &verify_options );
ret = krb5_parse_name( context, passwd->bv_val, &client );
if (ret) {
krb5_free_context( context );
return LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR;
}
ret = krb5_get_init_creds_password( context,
&creds, client, cred->bv_val, NULL,
NULL, 0, NULL, &get_options );
if (ret) {
krb5_free_principal( context, client );
krb5_free_context( context );
return LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR;
}
{
char *host = ldap_pvt_get_fqdn( NULL );
if( host == NULL ) {
krb5_free_principal( context, client );
krb5_free_context( context );
return LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR;
}
ret = krb5_sname_to_principal( context,
host, "ldap", KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &server );
ber_memfree( host );
}
if (ret) {
krb5_free_principal( context, client );
krb5_free_context( context );
return LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR;
}
ret = krb5_verify_init_creds( context,
&creds, server, NULL, NULL, &verify_options );
krb5_free_principal( context, client );
krb5_free_principal( context, server );
krb5_free_cred_contents( context, &creds );
krb5_free_context( context );
rtn = ret ? LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR : LUTIL_PASSWD_OK;
}
#elif defined(HAVE_KRB4)
{
/* Borrowed from Heimdal kpopper */
/* Portions:
* Copyright (c) 1989 Regents of the University of California.
* All rights reserved. The Berkeley software License Agreement
* specifies the terms and conditions for redistribution.
*/
int status;
char lrealm[REALM_SZ];
char tkt[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
status = krb_get_lrealm(lrealm,1);
if (status == KFAILURE) {
return LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR;
}
snprintf(tkt, sizeof(tkt), "%s_slapd.%u",
TKT_ROOT, (unsigned)getpid());
krb_set_tkt_string (tkt);
status = krb_verify_user( passwd->bv_val, "", lrealm,
cred->bv_val, 1, "ldap");
dest_tkt(); /* no point in keeping the tickets */
return status == KFAILURE ? LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR : LUTIL_PASSWD_OK;
}
#endif
return rtn;
}
/*
* try krb4 authentication,
* return 1 on success, 0 on failure, -1 if krb4 is not available
*/
int
auth_krb4_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
{
AUTH_DAT adata;
KTEXT_ST tkt;
struct hostent *hp;
struct passwd *pw;
char localhost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN], phost[INST_SZ], realm[REALM_SZ];
u_int32_t faddr;
int r;
if ((pw = authctxt->pw) == NULL)
return (0);
/*
* Try Kerberos password authentication only for non-root
* users and only if Kerberos is installed.
*/
if (pw->pw_uid != 0 && krb_get_lrealm(realm, 1) == KSUCCESS) {
/* Set up our ticket file. */
if (!krb4_init(authctxt)) {
log("Couldn't initialize Kerberos ticket file for %s!",
pw->pw_name);
goto failure;
}
/* Try to get TGT using our password. */
r = krb_get_pw_in_tkt((char *) pw->pw_name, "", realm,
"krbtgt", realm, DEFAULT_TKT_LIFE, (char *)password);
if (r != INTK_OK) {
debug("Kerberos v4 password authentication for %s "
"failed: %s", pw->pw_name, krb_err_txt[r]);
goto failure;
}
/* Successful authentication. */
chown(tkt_string(), pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid);
/*
* Now that we have a TGT, try to get a local
* "rcmd" ticket to ensure that we are not talking
* to a bogus Kerberos server.
*/
gethostname(localhost, sizeof(localhost));
strlcpy(phost, (char *)krb_get_phost(localhost),
sizeof(phost));
r = krb_mk_req(&tkt, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, phost, realm, 33);
if (r == KSUCCESS) {
if ((hp = gethostbyname(localhost)) == NULL) {
log("Couldn't get local host address!");
goto failure;
}
memmove((void *)&faddr, (void *)hp->h_addr,
sizeof(faddr));
/* Verify our "rcmd" ticket. */
r = krb_rd_req(&tkt, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, phost,
faddr, &adata, "");
if (r == RD_AP_UNDEC) {
/*
* Probably didn't have a srvtab on
* localhost. Disallow login.
*/
log("Kerberos v4 TGT for %s unverifiable, "
"no srvtab installed? krb_rd_req: %s",
pw->pw_name, krb_err_txt[r]);
goto failure;
} else if (r != KSUCCESS) {
log("Kerberos v4 %s ticket unverifiable: %s",
KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, krb_err_txt[r]);
goto failure;
}
} else if (r == KDC_PR_UNKNOWN) {
/*
* Disallow login if no rcmd service exists, and
* log the error.
*/
log("Kerberos v4 TGT for %s unverifiable: %s; %s.%s "
"not registered, or srvtab is wrong?", pw->pw_name,
krb_err_txt[r], KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, phost);
goto failure;
} else {
/*
* TGT is bad, forget it. Possibly spoofed!
*/
debug("WARNING: Kerberos v4 TGT possibly spoofed "
"for %s: %s", pw->pw_name, krb_err_txt[r]);
goto failure;
}
/* Authentication succeeded. */
return (1);
} else
/* Logging in as root or no local Kerberos realm. */
debug("Unable to authenticate to Kerberos.");
failure:
krb4_cleanup_proc(authctxt);
if (!options.kerberos_or_local_passwd)
return (0);
/* Fall back to ordinary passwd authentication. */
return (-1);
}
int krb_sendauth_udp(long options, int fd, KTEXT_FP ticket,
const LPSTR service, const LPSTR inst, LPSTR realm, LONG checksum,
MSG_DAT *msg_data, CREDENTIALS *cred, Key_schedule *schedule,
struct sockaddr_in *laddr, struct sockaddr_in *faddr, LPSTR version,
LPSTR buffer, int sz)
{
int rem, i, cc;
char srv_inst[INST_SZ];
char krb_realm[REALM_SZ];
char buf[BUFSIZ];
long tkt_len;
u_char priv_buf[1024];
u_long cksum;
rem = KSUCCESS;
/* get current realm if not passed in */
if (!realm) {
rem = krb_get_lrealm(krb_realm,1);
if (rem != KSUCCESS)
return (rem);
realm = krb_realm;
}
/* Copy instance into local storage, canonicalizing if desired */
if (options & KOPT_DONT_CANON)
(void) strncpy(srv_inst, inst, INST_SZ);
else
(void) strncpy((LPSTR)srv_inst, (LPSTR)krb_get_phost(inst), INST_SZ);
/* Get the ticket if desired */
if (!(options & KOPT_DONT_MK_REQ)) {
rem = krb_mk_req(ticket, service, srv_inst, realm, checksum);
if (rem != KSUCCESS)
return (rem);
}
#ifdef ATHENA_COMPAT
/* this is only for compatibility with old servers */
if (options & KOPT_DO_OLDSTYLE) {
(void) sprintf(buf, "%d ", ticket->length);
(void) write(fd, buf, strlen(buf));
(void) write(fd, (char *) ticket->dat, ticket->length);
return (rem);
}
#endif /* ATHENA_COMPAT */
/* if the mutual auth, get credentials so we have service session
* keys for decryption below
*/
if (options & KOPT_DO_MUTUAL)
{
/*if (cc == 1)
*{
* krb_get_cred(service, srv_inst, realm, cred);
* return (cc);
*}
*/
krb_get_cred(service, srv_inst, realm, cred);
}
/* Zero the buffer */
(void) bzero(buf, BUFSIZ);
/* insert version strings */
(void) strncpy(buf, KRB_SENDAUTH_VERS, KRB_SENDAUTH_VLEN);
/* increment past version strings */
i = 2*KRB_SENDAUTH_VLEN;
/* put ticket length into buffer */
tkt_len = htonl((unsigned long) ticket->length);
(void) bcopy((char *) &tkt_len, buf+i, ticket->length);
i += ticket->length;
/* Normally, we write the request to the server
** For udp, esp. TechNotify type protocols, we
** just return the buffer.
*/
if (sz < i)
return HEY_PAUL_WHAT_ERROR; /* Buffer not big enough */
bcopy(buf, buffer, i);
return (KSUCCESS);
}
void
kerberos4_is(Authenticator *ap, unsigned char *data, int cnt)
{
struct sockaddr_in addr;
char realm[REALM_SZ];
char instance[INST_SZ];
int r;
int addr_len;
if (cnt-- < 1)
return;
switch (*data++) {
case KRB_AUTH:
if (krb_get_lrealm(realm, 1) != KSUCCESS) {
Data(ap, KRB_REJECT, (void *)"No local V4 Realm.", -1);
auth_finished(ap, AUTH_REJECT);
if (auth_debug_mode)
printf("No local realm\r\n");
return;
}
memmove(auth.dat, data, auth.length = cnt);
if (auth_debug_mode) {
printf("Got %d bytes of authentication data\r\n", cnt);
printf("CK: %d:", kerberos4_cksum(auth.dat, auth.length));
printd(auth.dat, auth.length);
printf("\r\n");
}
k_getsockinst(0, instance, sizeof(instance));
addr_len = sizeof(addr);
if(getpeername(0, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addr_len) < 0) {
if(auth_debug_mode)
printf("getpeername failed\r\n");
Data(ap, KRB_REJECT, "getpeername failed", -1);
auth_finished(ap, AUTH_REJECT);
return;
}
r = krb_rd_req(&auth, KRB_SERVICE_NAME,
instance, addr.sin_addr.s_addr, &adat, "");
if (r) {
if (auth_debug_mode)
printf("Kerberos failed him as %s\r\n", name);
Data(ap, KRB_REJECT, (void *)krb_get_err_text(r), -1);
auth_finished(ap, AUTH_REJECT);
return;
}
/* save the session key */
memmove(session_key, adat.session, sizeof(adat.session));
krb_kntoln(&adat, name);
if (UserNameRequested && !kuserok(&adat, UserNameRequested)){
char ts[MAXPATHLEN];
struct passwd *pw = getpwnam(UserNameRequested);
if(pw){
snprintf(ts, sizeof(ts),
"%s%u",
TKT_ROOT,
(unsigned)pw->pw_uid);
setenv("KRBTKFILE", ts, 1);
}
Data(ap, KRB_ACCEPT, NULL, 0);
} else {
char *msg;
asprintf (&msg, "user `%s' is not authorized to "
"login as `%s'",
krb_unparse_name_long(adat.pname,
adat.pinst,
adat.prealm),
UserNameRequested ? UserNameRequested : "<nobody>");
if (msg == NULL)
Data(ap, KRB_REJECT, NULL, 0);
else {
Data(ap, KRB_REJECT, (void *)msg, -1);
free(msg);
}
}
auth_finished(ap, AUTH_USER);
break;
case KRB_CHALLENGE:
#ifndef ENCRYPTION
Data(ap, KRB_RESPONSE, NULL, 0);
#else
if(!VALIDKEY(session_key)){
Data(ap, KRB_RESPONSE, NULL, 0);
break;
}
des_key_sched(&session_key, sched);
{
des_cblock d_block;
int i;
Session_Key skey;
memmove(d_block, data, sizeof(d_block));
/* make a session key for encryption */
des_ecb_encrypt(&d_block, &session_key, sched, 1);
skey.type=SK_DES;
skey.length=8;
skey.data=session_key;
encrypt_session_key(&skey, 1);
/* decrypt challenge, add one and encrypt it */
des_ecb_encrypt(&d_block, &challenge, sched, 0);
for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--)
if(++challenge[i] != 0)
break;
des_ecb_encrypt(&challenge, &challenge, sched, 1);
Data(ap, KRB_RESPONSE, (void *)challenge, sizeof(challenge));
}
#endif
break;
case KRB_FORWARD:
{
des_key_schedule ks;
unsigned char netcred[sizeof(CREDENTIALS)];
CREDENTIALS cred;
int ret;
if(cnt > sizeof(cred))
abort();
des_set_key(&session_key, ks);
des_pcbc_encrypt((void*)data, (void*)netcred, cnt,
ks, &session_key, DES_DECRYPT);
unpack_cred(netcred, cnt, &cred);
{
if(strcmp(cred.service, KRB_TICKET_GRANTING_TICKET) ||
strncmp(cred.instance, cred.realm, sizeof(cred.instance)) ||
cred.lifetime < 0 || cred.lifetime > 255 ||
cred.kvno < 0 || cred.kvno > 255 ||
cred.issue_date < 0 ||
cred.issue_date > time(0) + CLOCK_SKEW ||
strncmp(cred.pname, adat.pname, sizeof(cred.pname)) ||
strncmp(cred.pinst, adat.pinst, sizeof(cred.pname))){
Data(ap, KRB_FORWARD_REJECT, "Bad credentials", -1);
}else{
if((ret = tf_setup(&cred,
cred.pname,
cred.pinst)) == KSUCCESS){
struct passwd *pw = getpwnam(UserNameRequested);
if (pw)
chown(tkt_string(), pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid);
Data(ap, KRB_FORWARD_ACCEPT, 0, 0);
} else{
Data(ap, KRB_FORWARD_REJECT,
krb_get_err_text(ret), -1);
}
}
}
memset(data, 0, cnt);
memset(ks, 0, sizeof(ks));
memset(&cred, 0, sizeof(cred));
}
break;
default:
if (auth_debug_mode)
printf("Unknown Kerberos option %d\r\n", data[-1]);
Data(ap, KRB_REJECT, 0, 0);
break;
}
}
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
extern int optind;
extern char *optarg, **environ;
struct group *gr;
register int ch;
register char *p;
int ask, fflag, hflag, pflag, cnt, errsv;
int quietlog, passwd_req;
char *domain, *ttyn;
char tbuf[MAXPATHLEN + 2], tname[sizeof(_PATH_TTY) + 10];
char *termenv;
char *childArgv[10];
char *buff;
int childArgc = 0;
#ifdef HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_MISC_H
int retcode;
pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
struct pam_conv conv = { misc_conv, NULL };
pid_t childPid;
#else
char *salt, *pp;
#endif
#ifdef LOGIN_CHOWN_VCS
char vcsn[20], vcsan[20];
#endif
pid = getpid();
signal(SIGALRM, timedout);
alarm((unsigned int)timeout);
signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN);
signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
setlocale(LC_ALL, "");
bindtextdomain(PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
textdomain(PACKAGE);
setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, 0, 0);
initproctitle(argc, argv);
/*
* -p is used by getty to tell login not to destroy the environment
* -f is used to skip a second login authentication
* -h is used by other servers to pass the name of the remote
* host to login so that it may be placed in utmp and wtmp
*/
gethostname(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf));
xstrncpy(thishost, tbuf, sizeof(thishost));
domain = index(tbuf, '.');
username = tty_name = hostname = NULL;
fflag = hflag = pflag = 0;
passwd_req = 1;
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "fh:p")) != -1)
switch (ch) {
case 'f':
fflag = 1;
break;
case 'h':
if (getuid()) {
fprintf(stderr,
_("login: -h for super-user only.\n"));
exit(1);
}
hflag = 1;
if (domain && (p = index(optarg, '.')) &&
strcasecmp(p, domain) == 0)
*p = 0;
hostname = strdup(optarg); /* strdup: Ambrose C. Li */
{
struct hostent *he = gethostbyname(hostname);
/* he points to static storage; copy the part we use */
hostaddress[0] = 0;
if (he && he->h_addr_list && he->h_addr_list[0])
memcpy(hostaddress, he->h_addr_list[0],
sizeof(hostaddress));
}
break;
case 'p':
pflag = 1;
break;
case '?':
default:
fprintf(stderr,
_("usage: login [-fp] [username]\n"));
exit(1);
}
argc -= optind;
argv += optind;
if (*argv) {
char *p = *argv;
username = strdup(p);
ask = 0;
/* wipe name - some people mistype their password here */
/* (of course we are too late, but perhaps this helps a little ..) */
while(*p)
*p++ = ' ';
} else
ask = 1;
for (cnt = getdtablesize(); cnt > 2; cnt--)
close(cnt);
ttyn = ttyname(0);
if (ttyn == NULL || *ttyn == '\0') {
/* no snprintf required - see definition of tname */
sprintf(tname, "%s??", _PATH_TTY);
ttyn = tname;
}
check_ttyname(ttyn);
if (strncmp(ttyn, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
tty_name = ttyn+5;
else
tty_name = ttyn;
if (strncmp(ttyn, "/dev/tty", 8) == 0)
tty_number = ttyn+8;
else {
char *p = ttyn;
while (*p && !isdigit(*p)) p++;
tty_number = p;
}
#ifdef LOGIN_CHOWN_VCS
/* find names of Virtual Console devices, for later mode change */
snprintf(vcsn, sizeof(vcsn), "/dev/vcs%s", tty_number);
snprintf(vcsan, sizeof(vcsan), "/dev/vcsa%s", tty_number);
#endif
/* set pgid to pid */
setpgrp();
/* this means that setsid() will fail */
{
struct termios tt, ttt;
tcgetattr(0, &tt);
ttt = tt;
ttt.c_cflag &= ~HUPCL;
/* These can fail, e.g. with ttyn on a read-only filesystem */
chown(ttyn, 0, 0);
chmod(ttyn, TTY_MODE);
/* Kill processes left on this tty */
tcsetattr(0,TCSAFLUSH,&ttt);
signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); /* so vhangup() wont kill us */
vhangup();
signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL);
/* open stdin,stdout,stderr to the tty */
opentty(ttyn);
/* restore tty modes */
tcsetattr(0,TCSAFLUSH,&tt);
}
openlog("login", LOG_ODELAY, LOG_AUTHPRIV);
#if 0
/* other than iso-8859-1 */
printf("\033(K");
fprintf(stderr,"\033(K");
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_MISC_H
/*
* username is initialized to NULL
* and if specified on the command line it is set.
* Therefore, we are safe not setting it to anything
*/
retcode = pam_start("login",username, &conv, &pamh);
if(retcode != PAM_SUCCESS) {
fprintf(stderr, _("login: PAM Failure, aborting: %s\n"),
pam_strerror(pamh, retcode));
syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Couldn't initialize PAM: %s"),
pam_strerror(pamh, retcode));
exit(99);
}
/* hostname & tty are either set to NULL or their correct values,
depending on how much we know */
retcode = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_RHOST, hostname);
PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
retcode = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, tty_name);
PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
/*
* [email protected]: Provide a user prompt to PAM
* so that the "login: "******"Password: "******"login: "******"\033(K");
fprintf(stderr,"\033(K");
#endif
/* if fflag == 1, then the user has already been authenticated */
if (fflag && (getuid() == 0))
passwd_req = 0;
else
passwd_req = 1;
if(passwd_req == 1) {
int failcount=0;
/* if we didn't get a user on the command line, set it to NULL */
pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (const void **) &username);
if (!username)
pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_USER, NULL);
/* there may be better ways to deal with some of these
conditions, but at least this way I don't think we'll
be giving away information... */
/* Perhaps someday we can trust that all PAM modules will
pay attention to failure count and get rid of MAX_LOGIN_TRIES? */
retcode = pam_authenticate(pamh, 0);
while((failcount++ < PAM_MAX_LOGIN_TRIES) &&
((retcode == PAM_AUTH_ERR) ||
(retcode == PAM_USER_UNKNOWN) ||
(retcode == PAM_CRED_INSUFFICIENT) ||
(retcode == PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL))) {
pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (const void **) &username);
syslog(LOG_NOTICE,_("FAILED LOGIN %d FROM %s FOR %s, %s"),
failcount, hostname, username, pam_strerror(pamh, retcode));
logbtmp(tty_name, username, hostname);
fprintf(stderr,_("Login incorrect\n\n"));
pam_set_item(pamh,PAM_USER,NULL);
retcode = pam_authenticate(pamh, 0);
}
if (retcode != PAM_SUCCESS) {
pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (const void **) &username);
if (retcode == PAM_MAXTRIES)
syslog(LOG_NOTICE,_("TOO MANY LOGIN TRIES (%d) FROM %s FOR "
"%s, %s"), failcount, hostname, username,
pam_strerror(pamh, retcode));
else
syslog(LOG_NOTICE,_("FAILED LOGIN SESSION FROM %s FOR %s, %s"),
hostname, username, pam_strerror(pamh, retcode));
logbtmp(tty_name, username, hostname);
fprintf(stderr,_("\nLogin incorrect\n"));
pam_end(pamh, retcode);
exit(0);
}
retcode = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, 0);
if(retcode == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) {
retcode = pam_chauthtok(pamh, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK);
}
PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
}
/*
* Grab the user information out of the password file for future usage
* First get the username that we are actually using, though.
*/
retcode = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (const void **) &username);
PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
if (!username || !*username) {
fprintf(stderr, _("\nSession setup problem, abort.\n"));
syslog(LOG_ERR, _("NULL user name in %s:%d. Abort."),
__FUNCTION__, __LINE__);
pam_end(pamh, PAM_SYSTEM_ERR);
exit(1);
}
if (!(pwd = getpwnam(username))) {
fprintf(stderr, _("\nSession setup problem, abort.\n"));
syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Invalid user name \"%s\" in %s:%d. Abort."),
username, __FUNCTION__, __LINE__);
pam_end(pamh, PAM_SYSTEM_ERR);
exit(1);
}
/*
* Create a copy of the pwd struct - otherwise it may get
* clobbered by PAM
*/
memcpy(&pwdcopy, pwd, sizeof(*pwd));
pwd = &pwdcopy;
pwd->pw_name = strdup(pwd->pw_name);
pwd->pw_passwd = strdup(pwd->pw_passwd);
pwd->pw_gecos = strdup(pwd->pw_gecos);
pwd->pw_dir = strdup(pwd->pw_dir);
pwd->pw_shell = strdup(pwd->pw_shell);
if (!pwd->pw_name || !pwd->pw_passwd || !pwd->pw_gecos ||
!pwd->pw_dir || !pwd->pw_shell) {
fprintf(stderr, _("login: Out of memory\n"));
syslog(LOG_ERR, "Out of memory");
pam_end(pamh, PAM_SYSTEM_ERR);
exit(1);
}
username = pwd->pw_name;
/*
* Initialize the supplementary group list.
* This should be done before pam_setcred because
* the PAM modules might add groups during pam_setcred.
*/
if (initgroups(username, pwd->pw_gid) < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "initgroups: %m");
fprintf(stderr, _("\nSession setup problem, abort.\n"));
pam_end(pamh, PAM_SYSTEM_ERR);
exit(1);
}
retcode = pam_open_session(pamh, 0);
PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
retcode = pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED);
PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
#else /* ! HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_MISC_H */
for (cnt = 0;; ask = 1) {
if (ask) {
fflag = 0;
getloginname();
}
/* Dirty patch to fix a gigantic security hole when using
yellow pages. This problem should be solved by the
libraries, and not by programs, but this must be fixed
urgently! If the first char of the username is '+', we
avoid login success.
Feb 95 <*****@*****.**> */
if (username[0] == '+') {
puts(_("Illegal username"));
badlogin(username);
sleepexit(1);
}
/* (void)strcpy(tbuf, username); why was this here? */
if ((pwd = getpwnam(username))) {
# ifdef SHADOW_PWD
struct spwd *sp;
if ((sp = getspnam(username)))
pwd->pw_passwd = sp->sp_pwdp;
# endif
salt = pwd->pw_passwd;
} else
salt = "xx";
if (pwd) {
initgroups(username, pwd->pw_gid);
checktty(username, tty_name, pwd); /* in checktty.c */
}
/* if user not super-user, check for disabled logins */
if (pwd == NULL || pwd->pw_uid)
checknologin();
/*
* Disallow automatic login to root; if not invoked by
* root, disallow if the uid's differ.
*/
if (fflag && pwd) {
int uid = getuid();
passwd_req = pwd->pw_uid == 0 ||
(uid && uid != pwd->pw_uid);
}
/*
* If trying to log in as root, but with insecure terminal,
* refuse the login attempt.
*/
if (pwd && pwd->pw_uid == 0 && !rootterm(tty_name)) {
fprintf(stderr,
_("%s login refused on this terminal.\n"),
pwd->pw_name);
if (hostname)
syslog(LOG_NOTICE,
_("LOGIN %s REFUSED FROM %s ON TTY %s"),
pwd->pw_name, hostname, tty_name);
else
syslog(LOG_NOTICE,
_("LOGIN %s REFUSED ON TTY %s"),
pwd->pw_name, tty_name);
continue;
}
/*
* If no pre-authentication and a password exists
* for this user, prompt for one and verify it.
*/
if (!passwd_req || (pwd && !*pwd->pw_passwd))
break;
setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, 0, -4);
pp = getpass(_("Password: "******"CRYPTO", 6) == 0) {
if (pwd && cryptocard()) break;
}
# endif /* CRYPTOCARD */
p = crypt(pp, salt);
setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, 0, 0);
# ifdef KERBEROS
/*
* If not present in pw file, act as we normally would.
* If we aren't Kerberos-authenticated, try the normal
* pw file for a password. If that's ok, log the user
* in without issueing any tickets.
*/
if (pwd && !krb_get_lrealm(realm,1)) {
/*
* get TGT for local realm; be careful about uid's
* here for ticket file ownership
*/
setreuid(geteuid(),pwd->pw_uid);
kerror = krb_get_pw_in_tkt(pwd->pw_name, "", realm,
"krbtgt", realm, DEFAULT_TKT_LIFE, pp);
setuid(0);
if (kerror == INTK_OK) {
memset(pp, 0, strlen(pp));
notickets = 0; /* user got ticket */
break;
}
}
# endif /* KERBEROS */
memset(pp, 0, strlen(pp));
if (pwd && !strcmp(p, pwd->pw_passwd))
break;
printf(_("Login incorrect\n"));
badlogin(username); /* log ALL bad logins */
failures++;
/* we allow 10 tries, but after 3 we start backing off */
if (++cnt > 3) {
if (cnt >= 10) {
sleepexit(1);
}
sleep((unsigned int)((cnt - 3) * 5));
}
}
#endif /* !HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_MISC_H */
/* committed to login -- turn off timeout */
alarm((unsigned int)0);
endpwent();
/* This requires some explanation: As root we may not be able to
read the directory of the user if it is on an NFS mounted
filesystem. We temporarily set our effective uid to the user-uid
making sure that we keep root privs. in the real uid.
A portable solution would require a fork(), but we rely on Linux
having the BSD setreuid() */
{
char tmpstr[MAXPATHLEN];
uid_t ruid = getuid();
gid_t egid = getegid();
/* avoid snprintf - old systems do not have it, or worse,
have a libc in which snprintf is the same as sprintf */
if (strlen(pwd->pw_dir) + sizeof(_PATH_HUSHLOGIN) + 2 > MAXPATHLEN)
quietlog = 0;
else {
sprintf(tmpstr, "%s/%s", pwd->pw_dir, _PATH_HUSHLOGIN);
setregid(-1, pwd->pw_gid);
setreuid(0, pwd->pw_uid);
quietlog = (access(tmpstr, R_OK) == 0);
setuid(0); /* setreuid doesn't do it alone! */
setreuid(ruid, 0);
setregid(-1, egid);
}
}
/* for linux, write entries in utmp and wtmp */
{
struct utmp ut;
struct utmp *utp;
utmpname(_PATH_UTMP);
setutent();
/* Find pid in utmp.
login sometimes overwrites the runlevel entry in /var/run/utmp,
confusing sysvinit. I added a test for the entry type, and the problem
was gone. (In a runlevel entry, st_pid is not really a pid but some number
calculated from the previous and current runlevel).
Michael Riepe <*****@*****.**>
*/
while ((utp = getutent()))
if (utp->ut_pid == pid
&& utp->ut_type >= INIT_PROCESS
&& utp->ut_type <= DEAD_PROCESS)
break;
/* If we can't find a pre-existing entry by pid, try by line.
BSD network daemons may rely on this. (anonymous) */
if (utp == NULL) {
setutent();
ut.ut_type = LOGIN_PROCESS;
strncpy(ut.ut_line, tty_name, sizeof(ut.ut_line));
utp = getutline(&ut);
}
if (utp) {
memcpy(&ut, utp, sizeof(ut));
} else {
/* some gettys/telnetds don't initialize utmp... */
memset(&ut, 0, sizeof(ut));
}
if (ut.ut_id[0] == 0)
strncpy(ut.ut_id, tty_number, sizeof(ut.ut_id));
strncpy(ut.ut_user, username, sizeof(ut.ut_user));
xstrncpy(ut.ut_line, tty_name, sizeof(ut.ut_line));
#ifdef _HAVE_UT_TV /* in <utmpbits.h> included by <utmp.h> */
gettimeofday(&ut.ut_tv, NULL);
#else
{
time_t t;
time(&t);
ut.ut_time = t; /* ut_time is not always a time_t */
/* glibc2 #defines it as ut_tv.tv_sec */
}
#endif
ut.ut_type = USER_PROCESS;
ut.ut_pid = pid;
if (hostname) {
xstrncpy(ut.ut_host, hostname, sizeof(ut.ut_host));
if (hostaddress[0])
memcpy(&ut.ut_addr, hostaddress, sizeof(ut.ut_addr));
}
pututline(&ut);
endutent();
#if HAVE_UPDWTMP
updwtmp(_PATH_WTMP, &ut);
#else
#if 0
/* The O_APPEND open() flag should be enough to guarantee
atomic writes at end of file. */
{
int wtmp;
if((wtmp = open(_PATH_WTMP, O_APPEND|O_WRONLY)) >= 0) {
write(wtmp, (char *)&ut, sizeof(ut));
close(wtmp);
}
}
#else
/* Probably all this locking below is just nonsense,
and the short version is OK as well. */
{
int lf, wtmp;
if ((lf = open(_PATH_WTMPLOCK, O_CREAT|O_WRONLY, 0660)) >= 0) {
flock(lf, LOCK_EX);
if ((wtmp = open(_PATH_WTMP, O_APPEND|O_WRONLY)) >= 0) {
write(wtmp, (char *)&ut, sizeof(ut));
close(wtmp);
}
flock(lf, LOCK_UN);
close(lf);
}
}
#endif
#endif
}
dolastlog(quietlog);
chown(ttyn, pwd->pw_uid,
(gr = getgrnam(TTYGRPNAME)) ? gr->gr_gid : pwd->pw_gid);
chmod(ttyn, TTY_MODE);
#ifdef LOGIN_CHOWN_VCS
/* if tty is one of the VC's then change owner and mode of the
special /dev/vcs devices as well */
if (consoletty(0)) {
chown(vcsn, pwd->pw_uid, (gr ? gr->gr_gid : pwd->pw_gid));
chown(vcsan, pwd->pw_uid, (gr ? gr->gr_gid : pwd->pw_gid));
chmod(vcsn, TTY_MODE);
chmod(vcsan, TTY_MODE);
}
#endif
setgid(pwd->pw_gid);
if (*pwd->pw_shell == '\0')
pwd->pw_shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
/* preserve TERM even without -p flag */
{
char *ep;
if(!((ep = getenv("TERM")) && (termenv = strdup(ep))))
termenv = "dumb";
}
/* destroy environment unless user has requested preservation */
if (!pflag)
{
environ = (char**)malloc(sizeof(char*));
memset(environ, 0, sizeof(char*));
}
setenv("HOME", pwd->pw_dir, 0); /* legal to override */
if(pwd->pw_uid)
setenv("PATH", _PATH_DEFPATH, 1);
else
setenv("PATH", _PATH_DEFPATH_ROOT, 1);
setenv("SHELL", pwd->pw_shell, 1);
setenv("TERM", termenv, 1);
/* mailx will give a funny error msg if you forget this one */
{
char tmp[MAXPATHLEN];
/* avoid snprintf */
if (sizeof(_PATH_MAILDIR) + strlen(pwd->pw_name) + 1 < MAXPATHLEN) {
sprintf(tmp, "%s/%s", _PATH_MAILDIR, pwd->pw_name);
setenv("MAIL",tmp,0);
}
}
/* LOGNAME is not documented in login(1) but
HP-UX 6.5 does it. We'll not allow modifying it.
*/
setenv("LOGNAME", pwd->pw_name, 1);
#ifdef HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_MISC_H
{
int i;
char ** env = pam_getenvlist(pamh);
if (env != NULL) {
for (i=0; env[i]; i++) {
putenv(env[i]);
/* D(("env[%d] = %s", i,env[i])); */
}
}
}
#endif
setproctitle("login", username);
if (!strncmp(tty_name, "ttyS", 4))
syslog(LOG_INFO, _("DIALUP AT %s BY %s"), tty_name, pwd->pw_name);
/* allow tracking of good logins.
-steve philp ([email protected]) */
if (pwd->pw_uid == 0) {
if (hostname)
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, _("ROOT LOGIN ON %s FROM %s"),
tty_name, hostname);
else
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, _("ROOT LOGIN ON %s"), tty_name);
} else {
if (hostname)
syslog(LOG_INFO, _("LOGIN ON %s BY %s FROM %s"), tty_name,
pwd->pw_name, hostname);
else
syslog(LOG_INFO, _("LOGIN ON %s BY %s"), tty_name,
pwd->pw_name);
}
if (!quietlog) {
motd();
#ifdef LOGIN_STAT_MAIL
/*
* This turns out to be a bad idea: when the mail spool
* is NFS mounted, and the NFS connection hangs, the
* login hangs, even root cannot login.
* Checking for mail should be done from the shell.
*/
{
struct stat st;
char *mail;
mail = getenv("MAIL");
if (mail && stat(mail, &st) == 0 && st.st_size != 0) {
if (st.st_mtime > st.st_atime)
printf(_("You have new mail.\n"));
else
printf(_("You have mail.\n"));
}
}
#endif
}
signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL);
signal(SIGTSTP, SIG_IGN);
#ifdef HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_MISC_H
/*
* We must fork before setuid() because we need to call
* pam_close_session() as root.
*/
childPid = fork();
if (childPid < 0) {
int errsv = errno;
/* error in fork() */
fprintf(stderr, _("login: failure forking: %s"), strerror(errsv));
PAM_END;
exit(0);
}
if (childPid) {
/* parent - wait for child to finish, then cleanup session */
signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN);
signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN);
signal(SIGTSTP, SIG_IGN);
signal(SIGTTIN, SIG_IGN);
signal(SIGTTOU, SIG_IGN);
wait(NULL);
PAM_END;
exit(0);
}
/* child */
/*
* Problem: if the user's shell is a shell like ash that doesnt do
* setsid() or setpgrp(), then a ctrl-\, sending SIGQUIT to every
* process in the pgrp, will kill us.
*/
/* start new session */
setsid();
/* make sure we have a controlling tty */
opentty(ttyn);
openlog("login", LOG_ODELAY, LOG_AUTHPRIV); /* reopen */
/*
* TIOCSCTTY: steal tty from other process group.
*/
if (ioctl(0, TIOCSCTTY, 1))
syslog(LOG_ERR, _("TIOCSCTTY failed: %m"));
#endif
signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL);
/* discard permissions last so can't get killed and drop core */
if(setuid(pwd->pw_uid) < 0 && pwd->pw_uid) {
syslog(LOG_ALERT, _("setuid() failed"));
exit(1);
}
/* wait until here to change directory! */
if (chdir(pwd->pw_dir) < 0) {
printf(_("No directory %s!\n"), pwd->pw_dir);
if (chdir("/"))
exit(0);
pwd->pw_dir = "/";
printf(_("Logging in with home = \"/\".\n"));
}
/* if the shell field has a space: treat it like a shell script */
if (strchr(pwd->pw_shell, ' ')) {
buff = malloc(strlen(pwd->pw_shell) + 6);
if (!buff) {
fprintf(stderr, _("login: no memory for shell script.\n"));
exit(0);
}
strcpy(buff, "exec ");
strcat(buff, pwd->pw_shell);
childArgv[childArgc++] = "/bin/sh";
childArgv[childArgc++] = "-sh";
childArgv[childArgc++] = "-c";
childArgv[childArgc++] = buff;
} else {
tbuf[0] = '-';
xstrncpy(tbuf + 1, ((p = rindex(pwd->pw_shell, '/')) ?
p + 1 : pwd->pw_shell),
sizeof(tbuf)-1);
childArgv[childArgc++] = pwd->pw_shell;
childArgv[childArgc++] = tbuf;
}
childArgv[childArgc++] = NULL;
execvp(childArgv[0], childArgv + 1);
errsv = errno;
if (!strcmp(childArgv[0], "/bin/sh"))
fprintf(stderr, _("login: couldn't exec shell script: %s.\n"),
strerror(errsv));
else
fprintf(stderr, _("login: no shell: %s.\n"), strerror(errsv));
exit(0);
}
int
Verify (struct display *d, struct greet_info *greet, struct verify_info *verify)
{
struct passwd *p;
login_cap_t *lc;
auth_session_t *as;
char *style, *shell, *home, *s, **argv;
char path[MAXPATHLEN];
int authok;
/* User may have specified an authentication style. */
if ((style = strchr(greet->name, ':')) != NULL)
*style++ = '\0';
Debug ("Verify %s, style %s ...\n", greet->name,
style ? style : "default");
p = getpwnam (greet->name);
endpwent();
if (!p || strlen (greet->name) == 0) {
Debug("getpwnam() failed.\n");
bzero(greet->password, strlen(greet->password));
return 0;
}
if ((lc = login_getclass(p->pw_class)) == NULL) {
Debug("login_getclass() failed.\n");
bzero(greet->password, strlen(greet->password));
return 0;
}
if ((style = login_getstyle(lc, style, "xdm")) == NULL) {
Debug("login_getstyle() failed.\n");
bzero(greet->password, strlen(greet->password));
return 0;
}
if ((as = auth_open()) == NULL) {
Debug("auth_open() failed.\n");
login_close(lc);
bzero(greet->password, strlen(greet->password));
return 0;
}
if (auth_setoption(as, "login", "yes") == -1) {
Debug("auth_setoption() failed.\n");
login_close(lc);
bzero(greet->password, strlen(greet->password));
return 0;
}
/* Set up state for no challenge, just check a response. */
auth_setstate(as, 0);
auth_setdata(as, "", 1);
auth_setdata(as, greet->password, strlen(greet->password) + 1);
/* Build path of the auth script and call it */
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), _PATH_AUTHPROG "%s", style);
auth_call(as, path, style, "-s", "response", greet->name,
lc->lc_class, (void *)NULL);
authok = auth_getstate(as);
if ((authok & AUTH_ALLOW) == 0) {
Debug("password verify failed\n");
bzero(greet->password, strlen(greet->password));
auth_close(as);
login_close(lc);
return 0;
}
/* Run the approval script */
if (!auth_approval(as, lc, greet->name, "auth-xdm")) {
Debug("login not approved\n");
bzero(greet->password, strlen(greet->password));
auth_close(as);
login_close(lc);
return 0;
}
auth_close(as);
login_close(lc);
/* Check empty passwords against allowNullPasswd */
if (!greet->allow_null_passwd && strlen(greet->password) == 0) {
Debug("empty password not allowed\n");
return 0;
}
/* Only accept root logins if allowRootLogin resource is set */
if (p->pw_uid == 0 && !greet->allow_root_login) {
Debug("root logins not allowed\n");
bzero(greet->password, strlen(greet->password));
return 0;
}
/*
* Shell must be in /etc/shells
*/
for (;;) {
s = getusershell();
if (s == NULL) {
/* did not found the shell in /etc/shells
-> failure */
Debug("shell not in /etc/shells\n");
bzero(greet->password, strlen(greet->password));
endusershell();
return 0;
}
if (strcmp(s, p->pw_shell) == 0) {
/* found the shell in /etc/shells */
endusershell();
break;
}
}
#else /* !USE_BSDAUTH */
int
Verify (struct display *d, struct greet_info *greet, struct verify_info *verify)
{
struct passwd *p;
#ifdef USE_PAM
pam_handle_t **pamhp = thepamhp();
#else
#ifdef USESHADOW
struct spwd *sp;
#endif
char *user_pass = NULL;
#endif
#ifdef __OpenBSD__
char *s;
struct timeval tp;
#endif
char *shell, *home;
char **argv;
Debug ("Verify %s ...\n", greet->name);
#if defined(sun) && defined(SVR4)
/* Solaris: If CONSOLE is set to /dev/console in /etc/default/login,
then root can only login on system console */
# define SOLARIS_LOGIN_DEFAULTS "/etc/default/login"
if (strcmp(greet->name, "root") == 0) {
char *console = NULL, *tmp = NULL;
FILE *fs;
if ((fs= fopen(SOLARIS_LOGIN_DEFAULTS, "r")) != NULL)
{
char str[120];
while (!feof(fs))
{
fgets(str, 120, fs);
if(str[0] == '#' || strlen(str) < 8)
continue;
if((tmp = strstr(str, "CONSOLE=")) != NULL)
console = strdup((tmp+8));
}
fclose(fs);
if ( console != NULL &&
(strncmp(console, "/dev/console", 12) == 0) &&
(strncmp(d->name,":0",2) != 0) )
{
Debug("Not on system console\n");
bzero(greet->password, strlen(greet->password));
XFree(console);
return 0;
}
XFree(console);
}
else
{
Debug("Could not open %s\n", SOLARIS_LOGIN_DEFAULTS);
}
}
#endif
#ifndef USE_PAM
p = getpwnam (greet->name);
endpwent();
if (!p || strlen (greet->name) == 0) {
Debug ("getpwnam() failed.\n");
bzero(greet->password, strlen(greet->password));
return 0;
} else {
#ifdef linux
if (!strcmp(p->pw_passwd, "!") || !strcmp(p->pw_passwd, "*")) {
Debug ("The account is locked, no login allowed.\n");
bzero(greet->password, strlen(greet->password));
return 0;
}
#endif
user_pass = p->pw_passwd;
}
#endif
#ifdef KERBEROS
if(strcmp(greet->name, "root") != 0){
char name[ANAME_SZ];
char realm[REALM_SZ];
char *q;
int ret;
if(krb_get_lrealm(realm, 1)){
Debug ("Can't get Kerberos realm.\n");
} else {
sprintf(krbtkfile, "%s.%s", TKT_ROOT, d->name);
krb_set_tkt_string(krbtkfile);
unlink(krbtkfile);
ret = krb_verify_user(greet->name, "", realm,
greet->password, 1, "rcmd");
if(ret == KSUCCESS){
chown(krbtkfile, p->pw_uid, p->pw_gid);
Debug("kerberos verify succeeded\n");
if (k_hasafs()) {
if (k_setpag() == -1)
LogError ("setpag() failed for %s\n",
greet->name);
if((ret = k_afsklog(NULL, NULL)) != KSUCCESS)
LogError("Warning %s\n",
krb_get_err_text(ret));
}
goto done;
} else if(ret != KDC_PR_UNKNOWN && ret != SKDC_CANT){
/* failure */
Debug("kerberos verify failure %d\n", ret);
krbtkfile[0] = '\0';
}
}
}
#endif
#ifndef USE_PAM
#ifdef USESHADOW
errno = 0;
sp = getspnam(greet->name);
if (sp == NULL) {
Debug ("getspnam() failed, errno=%d. Are you root?\n", errno);
} else {
user_pass = sp->sp_pwdp;
}
#ifndef QNX4
endspent();
#endif /* QNX4 doesn't need endspent() to end shadow passwd ops */
#endif
#if defined(ultrix) || defined(__ultrix__)
if (authenticate_user(p, greet->password, NULL) < 0)
#else
if (strcmp (crypt (greet->password, user_pass), user_pass))
#endif
{
if(!greet->allow_null_passwd || strlen(p->pw_passwd) > 0) {
Debug ("password verify failed\n");
bzero(greet->password, strlen(greet->password));
return 0;
} /* else: null passwd okay */
}
#ifdef KERBEROS
done:
#endif
#ifdef __OpenBSD__
/*
* Only accept root logins if allowRootLogin resource is set
*/
if ((p->pw_uid == 0) && !greet->allow_root_login) {
Debug("root logins not allowed\n");
bzero(greet->password, strlen(greet->password));
return 0;
}
/*
* Shell must be in /etc/shells
*/
for (;;) {
s = getusershell();
if (s == NULL) {
/* did not found the shell in /etc/shells
-> failure */
Debug("shell not in /etc/shells\n");
bzero(greet->password, strlen(greet->password));
endusershell();
return 0;
}
if (strcmp(s, p->pw_shell) == 0) {
/* found the shell in /etc/shells */
endusershell();
break;
}
}
/*
* Test for expired password
*/
if (p->pw_change || p->pw_expire)
(void)gettimeofday(&tp, (struct timezone *)NULL);
if (p->pw_change) {
if (tp.tv_sec >= p->pw_change) {
Debug("Password has expired.\n");
bzero(greet->password, strlen(greet->password));
return 0;
}
}
if (p->pw_expire) {
if (tp.tv_sec >= p->pw_expire) {
Debug("account has expired.\n");
bzero(greet->password, strlen(greet->password));
return 0;
}
}
#endif /* __OpenBSD__ */
bzero(user_pass, strlen(user_pass)); /* in case shadow password */
#else /* USE_PAM */
#define PAM_BAIL \
if (pam_error != PAM_SUCCESS) goto pam_failed;
PAM_password = greet->password;
pam_error = pam_start("xdm", greet->name, &PAM_conversation, pamhp);
PAM_BAIL;
pam_error = pam_set_item(*pamhp, PAM_TTY, d->name);
PAM_BAIL;
pam_error = pam_set_item(*pamhp, PAM_RHOST, "");
PAM_BAIL;
pam_error = pam_authenticate(*pamhp, 0);
PAM_BAIL;
pam_error = pam_acct_mgmt(*pamhp, 0);
/* really should do password changing, but it doesn't fit well */
PAM_BAIL;
pam_error = pam_setcred(*pamhp, 0);
PAM_BAIL;
p = getpwnam (greet->name);
endpwent();
if (!p || strlen (greet->name) == 0) {
Debug ("getpwnam() failed.\n");
bzero(greet->password, strlen(greet->password));
return 0;
}
if (pam_error != PAM_SUCCESS) {
pam_failed:
pam_end(*pamhp, PAM_SUCCESS);
*pamhp = NULL;
return 0;
}
#undef PAM_BAIL
#endif /* USE_PAM */
#endif /* USE_BSDAUTH */
Debug ("verify succeeded\n");
/* The password is passed to StartClient() for use by user-based
authorization schemes. It is zeroed there. */
verify->uid = p->pw_uid;
verify->gid = p->pw_gid;
home = p->pw_dir;
shell = p->pw_shell;
argv = 0;
if (d->session)
argv = parseArgs (argv, d->session);
if (greet->string)
argv = parseArgs (argv, greet->string);
if (!argv)
argv = parseArgs (argv, "xsession");
verify->argv = argv;
verify->userEnviron = userEnv (d, p->pw_uid == 0,
greet->name, home, shell);
Debug ("user environment:\n");
printEnv (verify->userEnviron);
verify->systemEnviron = systemEnv (d, greet->name, home);
Debug ("system environment:\n");
printEnv (verify->systemEnviron);
Debug ("end of environments\n");
return 1;
}
