static void
lka_imsg(struct mproc *p, struct imsg *imsg)
{
struct rule *rule;
struct table *table;
void *tmp;
int ret;
const char *key, *val;
struct ssl *ssl;
struct iovec iov[3];
static struct dict *ssl_dict;
static struct dict *tables_dict;
static struct table *table_last;
static struct ca_vrfy_req_msg *req_ca_vrfy_smtp = NULL;
static struct ca_vrfy_req_msg *req_ca_vrfy_mta = NULL;
struct ca_vrfy_req_msg *req_ca_vrfy_chain;
struct ca_vrfy_resp_msg resp_ca_vrfy;
struct ca_cert_req_msg *req_ca_cert;
struct ca_cert_resp_msg resp_ca_cert;
struct sockaddr_storage ss;
struct userinfo userinfo;
struct addrname addrname;
struct envelope evp;
struct msg m;
union lookup lk;
char buf[SMTPD_MAXLINESIZE];
const char *tablename, *username, *password, *label;
uint64_t reqid;
size_t i;
int v;
if (imsg->hdr.type == IMSG_DNS_HOST ||
imsg->hdr.type == IMSG_DNS_PTR ||
imsg->hdr.type == IMSG_DNS_MX ||
imsg->hdr.type == IMSG_DNS_MX_PREFERENCE) {
dns_imsg(p, imsg);
return;
}
if (p->proc == PROC_SMTP) {
switch (imsg->hdr.type) {
case IMSG_LKA_EXPAND_RCPT:
m_msg(&m, imsg);
m_get_id(&m, &reqid);
m_get_envelope(&m, &evp);
m_end(&m);
lka_session(reqid, &evp);
return;
case IMSG_LKA_SSL_INIT:
req_ca_cert = imsg->data;
resp_ca_cert.reqid = req_ca_cert->reqid;
ssl = dict_get(env->sc_ssl_dict, req_ca_cert->name);
if (ssl == NULL) {
resp_ca_cert.status = CA_FAIL;
m_compose(p, IMSG_LKA_SSL_INIT, 0, 0, -1, &resp_ca_cert,
sizeof(resp_ca_cert));
return;
}
resp_ca_cert.status = CA_OK;
resp_ca_cert.cert_len = ssl->ssl_cert_len;
resp_ca_cert.key_len = ssl->ssl_key_len;
iov[0].iov_base = &resp_ca_cert;
iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(resp_ca_cert);
iov[1].iov_base = ssl->ssl_cert;
iov[1].iov_len = ssl->ssl_cert_len;
iov[2].iov_base = ssl->ssl_key;
iov[2].iov_len = ssl->ssl_key_len;
m_composev(p, IMSG_LKA_SSL_INIT, 0, 0, -1, iov, nitems(iov));
return;
case IMSG_LKA_SSL_VERIFY_CERT:
req_ca_vrfy_smtp = xmemdup(imsg->data, sizeof *req_ca_vrfy_smtp, "lka:ca_vrfy");
if (req_ca_vrfy_smtp == NULL)
fatal(NULL);
req_ca_vrfy_smtp->cert = xmemdup((char *)imsg->data +
sizeof *req_ca_vrfy_smtp, req_ca_vrfy_smtp->cert_len, "lka:ca_vrfy");
req_ca_vrfy_smtp->chain_cert = xcalloc(req_ca_vrfy_smtp->n_chain,
sizeof (unsigned char *), "lka:ca_vrfy");
req_ca_vrfy_smtp->chain_cert_len = xcalloc(req_ca_vrfy_smtp->n_chain,
sizeof (off_t), "lka:ca_vrfy");
return;
case IMSG_LKA_SSL_VERIFY_CHAIN:
if (req_ca_vrfy_smtp == NULL)
fatalx("lka:ca_vrfy: chain without a certificate");
req_ca_vrfy_chain = imsg->data;
req_ca_vrfy_smtp->chain_cert[req_ca_vrfy_smtp->chain_offset] = xmemdup((char *)imsg->data +
sizeof *req_ca_vrfy_chain, req_ca_vrfy_chain->cert_len, "lka:ca_vrfy");
req_ca_vrfy_smtp->chain_cert_len[req_ca_vrfy_smtp->chain_offset] = req_ca_vrfy_chain->cert_len;
req_ca_vrfy_smtp->chain_offset++;
return;
case IMSG_LKA_SSL_VERIFY:
if (req_ca_vrfy_smtp == NULL)
fatalx("lka:ca_vrfy: verify without a certificate");
resp_ca_vrfy.reqid = req_ca_vrfy_smtp->reqid;
if (! lka_X509_verify(req_ca_vrfy_smtp, CA_FILE, NULL))
resp_ca_vrfy.status = CA_FAIL;
else
resp_ca_vrfy.status = CA_OK;
m_compose(p, IMSG_LKA_SSL_VERIFY, 0, 0, -1, &resp_ca_vrfy,
sizeof resp_ca_vrfy);
for (i = 0; i < req_ca_vrfy_smtp->n_chain; ++i)
free(req_ca_vrfy_smtp->chain_cert[i]);
free(req_ca_vrfy_smtp->chain_cert);
free(req_ca_vrfy_smtp->chain_cert_len);
free(req_ca_vrfy_smtp->cert);
free(req_ca_vrfy_smtp);
return;
case IMSG_LKA_AUTHENTICATE:
m_msg(&m, imsg);
m_get_id(&m, &reqid);
m_get_string(&m, &tablename);
m_get_string(&m, &username);
m_get_string(&m, &password);
m_end(&m);
if (!tablename[0]) {
m_create(p_parent, IMSG_LKA_AUTHENTICATE,
0, 0, -1);
m_add_id(p_parent, reqid);
m_add_string(p_parent, username);
m_add_string(p_parent, password);
m_close(p_parent);
return;
}
ret = lka_authenticate(tablename, username, password);
m_create(p, IMSG_LKA_AUTHENTICATE, 0, 0, -1);
m_add_id(p, reqid);
m_add_int(p, ret);
m_close(p);
return;
}
}
if (p->proc == PROC_MDA) {
switch (imsg->hdr.type) {
case IMSG_LKA_USERINFO:
m_msg(&m, imsg);
m_get_string(&m, &tablename);
m_get_string(&m, &username);
m_end(&m);
ret = lka_userinfo(tablename, username, &userinfo);
m_create(p, IMSG_LKA_USERINFO, 0, 0, -1);
m_add_string(p, tablename);
m_add_string(p, username);
m_add_int(p, ret);
if (ret == LKA_OK)
m_add_data(p, &userinfo, sizeof(userinfo));
m_close(p);
return;
}
}
if (p->proc == PROC_MTA) {
switch (imsg->hdr.type) {
case IMSG_LKA_SSL_INIT:
req_ca_cert = imsg->data;
resp_ca_cert.reqid = req_ca_cert->reqid;
ssl = dict_get(env->sc_ssl_dict, req_ca_cert->name);
if (ssl == NULL) {
resp_ca_cert.status = CA_FAIL;
m_compose(p, IMSG_LKA_SSL_INIT, 0, 0, -1, &resp_ca_cert,
sizeof(resp_ca_cert));
return;
}
resp_ca_cert.status = CA_OK;
resp_ca_cert.cert_len = ssl->ssl_cert_len;
resp_ca_cert.key_len = ssl->ssl_key_len;
iov[0].iov_base = &resp_ca_cert;
iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(resp_ca_cert);
iov[1].iov_base = ssl->ssl_cert;
iov[1].iov_len = ssl->ssl_cert_len;
iov[2].iov_base = ssl->ssl_key;
iov[2].iov_len = ssl->ssl_key_len;
m_composev(p, IMSG_LKA_SSL_INIT, 0, 0, -1, iov, nitems(iov));
return;
case IMSG_LKA_SSL_VERIFY_CERT:
req_ca_vrfy_mta = xmemdup(imsg->data, sizeof *req_ca_vrfy_mta, "lka:ca_vrfy");
if (req_ca_vrfy_mta == NULL)
fatal(NULL);
req_ca_vrfy_mta->cert = xmemdup((char *)imsg->data +
sizeof *req_ca_vrfy_mta, req_ca_vrfy_mta->cert_len, "lka:ca_vrfy");
req_ca_vrfy_mta->chain_cert = xcalloc(req_ca_vrfy_mta->n_chain,
sizeof (unsigned char *), "lka:ca_vrfy");
req_ca_vrfy_mta->chain_cert_len = xcalloc(req_ca_vrfy_mta->n_chain,
sizeof (off_t), "lka:ca_vrfy");
return;
case IMSG_LKA_SSL_VERIFY_CHAIN:
if (req_ca_vrfy_mta == NULL)
fatalx("lka:ca_vrfy: verify without a certificate");
req_ca_vrfy_chain = imsg->data;
req_ca_vrfy_mta->chain_cert[req_ca_vrfy_mta->chain_offset] = xmemdup((char *)imsg->data +
sizeof *req_ca_vrfy_chain, req_ca_vrfy_chain->cert_len, "lka:ca_vrfy");
req_ca_vrfy_mta->chain_cert_len[req_ca_vrfy_mta->chain_offset] = req_ca_vrfy_chain->cert_len;
req_ca_vrfy_mta->chain_offset++;
return;
case IMSG_LKA_SSL_VERIFY:
if (req_ca_vrfy_mta == NULL)
fatalx("lka:ca_vrfy: verify without a certificate");
resp_ca_vrfy.reqid = req_ca_vrfy_mta->reqid;
if (! lka_X509_verify(req_ca_vrfy_mta, CA_FILE, NULL))
resp_ca_vrfy.status = CA_FAIL;
else
resp_ca_vrfy.status = CA_OK;
m_compose(p, IMSG_LKA_SSL_VERIFY, 0, 0, -1, &resp_ca_vrfy,
sizeof resp_ca_vrfy);
for (i = 0; i < req_ca_vrfy_mta->n_chain; ++i)
free(req_ca_vrfy_mta->chain_cert[i]);
free(req_ca_vrfy_mta->chain_cert);
free(req_ca_vrfy_mta->chain_cert_len);
free(req_ca_vrfy_mta->cert);
free(req_ca_vrfy_mta);
return;
case IMSG_LKA_SECRET:
m_msg(&m, imsg);
m_get_id(&m, &reqid);
m_get_string(&m, &tablename);
m_get_string(&m, &label);
m_end(&m);
lka_credentials(tablename, label, buf, sizeof(buf));
m_create(p, IMSG_LKA_SECRET, 0, 0, -1);
m_add_id(p, reqid);
m_add_string(p, buf);
m_close(p);
return;
case IMSG_LKA_SOURCE:
m_msg(&m, imsg);
m_get_id(&m, &reqid);
m_get_string(&m, &tablename);
table = table_find(tablename, NULL);
m_create(p, IMSG_LKA_SOURCE, 0, 0, -1);
m_add_id(p, reqid);
if (table == NULL) {
log_warn("warn: source address table %s missing",
tablename);
m_add_int(p, LKA_TEMPFAIL);
}
else {
ret = table_fetch(table, K_SOURCE, &lk);
if (ret == -1)
m_add_int(p, LKA_TEMPFAIL);
else if (ret == 0)
m_add_int(p, LKA_PERMFAIL);
else {
m_add_int(p, LKA_OK);
m_add_sockaddr(p,
(struct sockaddr *)&lk.source.addr);
}
}
m_close(p);
return;
case IMSG_LKA_HELO:
m_msg(&m, imsg);
m_get_id(&m, &reqid);
m_get_string(&m, &tablename);
m_get_sockaddr(&m, (struct sockaddr *)&ss);
m_end(&m);
ret = lka_addrname(tablename, (struct sockaddr*)&ss,
&addrname);
m_create(p, IMSG_LKA_HELO, 0, 0, -1);
m_add_id(p, reqid);
m_add_int(p, ret);
if (ret == LKA_OK)
m_add_string(p, addrname.name);
m_close(p);
return;
}
}
if (p->proc == PROC_PARENT) {
switch (imsg->hdr.type) {
case IMSG_CONF_START:
env->sc_rules_reload = xcalloc(1,
sizeof *env->sc_rules, "lka:sc_rules_reload");
tables_dict = xcalloc(1,
sizeof *tables_dict, "lka:tables_dict");
ssl_dict = calloc(1, sizeof *ssl_dict);
if (ssl_dict == NULL)
fatal(NULL);
dict_init(ssl_dict);
dict_init(tables_dict);
TAILQ_INIT(env->sc_rules_reload);
return;
case IMSG_CONF_SSL:
ssl = calloc(1, sizeof *ssl);
if (ssl == NULL)
fatal(NULL);
*ssl = *(struct ssl *)imsg->data;
ssl->ssl_cert = xstrdup((char *)imsg->data +
sizeof *ssl, "smtp:ssl_cert");
ssl->ssl_key = xstrdup((char *)imsg->data +
sizeof *ssl + ssl->ssl_cert_len, "smtp:ssl_key");
if (ssl->ssl_dhparams_len) {
ssl->ssl_dhparams = xstrdup((char *)imsg->data
+ sizeof *ssl + ssl->ssl_cert_len +
ssl->ssl_key_len, "smtp:ssl_dhparams");
}
if (ssl->ssl_ca_len) {
ssl->ssl_ca = xstrdup((char *)imsg->data
+ sizeof *ssl + ssl->ssl_cert_len +
ssl->ssl_key_len + ssl->ssl_dhparams_len,
"smtp:ssl_ca");
}
dict_set(ssl_dict, ssl->ssl_name, ssl);
return;
case IMSG_CONF_RULE:
rule = xmemdup(imsg->data, sizeof *rule, "lka:rule");
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(env->sc_rules_reload, rule, r_entry);
return;
case IMSG_CONF_TABLE:
table_last = table = xmemdup(imsg->data, sizeof *table,
"lka:table");
dict_init(&table->t_dict);
dict_set(tables_dict, table->t_name, table);
return;
case IMSG_CONF_RULE_SOURCE:
rule = TAILQ_LAST(env->sc_rules_reload, rulelist);
tmp = env->sc_tables_dict;
env->sc_tables_dict = tables_dict;
rule->r_sources = table_find(imsg->data, NULL);
if (rule->r_sources == NULL)
fatalx("lka: tables inconsistency");
env->sc_tables_dict = tmp;
return;
case IMSG_CONF_RULE_SENDER:
rule = TAILQ_LAST(env->sc_rules_reload, rulelist);
tmp = env->sc_tables_dict;
env->sc_tables_dict = tables_dict;
rule->r_senders = table_find(imsg->data, NULL);
if (rule->r_senders == NULL)
fatalx("lka: tables inconsistency");
env->sc_tables_dict = tmp;
return;
case IMSG_CONF_RULE_DESTINATION:
rule = TAILQ_LAST(env->sc_rules_reload, rulelist);
tmp = env->sc_tables_dict;
env->sc_tables_dict = tables_dict;
rule->r_destination = table_find(imsg->data, NULL);
if (rule->r_destination == NULL)
fatalx("lka: tables inconsistency");
env->sc_tables_dict = tmp;
return;
case IMSG_CONF_RULE_MAPPING:
rule = TAILQ_LAST(env->sc_rules_reload, rulelist);
tmp = env->sc_tables_dict;
env->sc_tables_dict = tables_dict;
rule->r_mapping = table_find(imsg->data, NULL);
if (rule->r_mapping == NULL)
fatalx("lka: tables inconsistency");
env->sc_tables_dict = tmp;
return;
case IMSG_CONF_RULE_USERS:
rule = TAILQ_LAST(env->sc_rules_reload, rulelist);
tmp = env->sc_tables_dict;
env->sc_tables_dict = tables_dict;
rule->r_userbase = table_find(imsg->data, NULL);
if (rule->r_userbase == NULL)
fatalx("lka: tables inconsistency");
env->sc_tables_dict = tmp;
return;
case IMSG_CONF_TABLE_CONTENT:
table = table_last;
if (table == NULL)
fatalx("lka: tables inconsistency");
key = imsg->data;
if (table->t_type == T_HASH)
val = key + strlen(key) + 1;
else
val = NULL;
dict_set(&table->t_dict, key,
val ? xstrdup(val, "lka:dict_set") : NULL);
return;
case IMSG_CONF_END:
if (env->sc_rules)
purge_config(PURGE_RULES);
if (env->sc_tables_dict) {
table_close_all();
purge_config(PURGE_TABLES);
}
env->sc_rules = env->sc_rules_reload;
env->sc_ssl_dict = ssl_dict;
env->sc_tables_dict = tables_dict;
if (verbose & TRACE_TABLES)
table_dump_all();
table_open_all();
ssl_dict = NULL;
table_last = NULL;
tables_dict = NULL;
/* Start fulfilling requests */
mproc_enable(p_mda);
mproc_enable(p_mta);
mproc_enable(p_smtp);
return;
case IMSG_CTL_VERBOSE:
m_msg(&m, imsg);
m_get_int(&m, &v);
m_end(&m);
log_verbose(v);
return;
case IMSG_CTL_PROFILE:
m_msg(&m, imsg);
m_get_int(&m, &v);
m_end(&m);
profiling = v;
return;
case IMSG_PARENT_FORWARD_OPEN:
lka_session_forward_reply(imsg->data, imsg->fd);
return;
case IMSG_LKA_AUTHENTICATE:
m_forward(p_smtp, imsg);
return;
}
}
if (p->proc == PROC_CONTROL) {
switch (imsg->hdr.type) {
case IMSG_LKA_UPDATE_TABLE:
table = table_find(imsg->data, NULL);
if (table == NULL) {
log_warnx("warn: Lookup table not found: "
"\"%s\"", (char *)imsg->data);
return;
}
table_update(table);
return;
}
}
errx(1, "lka_imsg: unexpected %s imsg", imsg_to_str(imsg->hdr.type));
}
static void
lka_imsg(struct imsgev *iev, struct imsg *imsg)
{
struct submit_status *ss;
struct secret *secret;
struct mapel *mapel;
struct rule *rule;
struct map *map;
struct map *mp;
void *tmp;
if (imsg->hdr.type == IMSG_DNS_HOST || imsg->hdr.type == IMSG_DNS_MX ||
imsg->hdr.type == IMSG_DNS_PTR) {
dns_async(iev, imsg->hdr.type, imsg->data);
return;
}
if (iev->proc == PROC_MFA) {
switch (imsg->hdr.type) {
case IMSG_LKA_MAIL:
ss = imsg->data;
ss->code = 530;
if (ss->u.maddr.user[0] == '\0' &&
ss->u.maddr.domain[0] == '\0')
ss->code = 250;
else if (lka_verify_mail(&ss->u.maddr))
ss->code = 250;
imsg_compose_event(iev, IMSG_LKA_MAIL, 0, 0, -1, ss,
sizeof *ss);
return;
case IMSG_LKA_RULEMATCH:
ss = imsg->data;
rule = ruleset_match(&ss->envelope);
if (rule == NULL)
ss->code = (errno == EAGAIN) ? 451 : 530;
else
ss->code = (rule->r_decision == R_ACCEPT) ?
250 : 530;
imsg_compose_event(iev, IMSG_LKA_RULEMATCH, 0, 0, -1,
ss, sizeof *ss);
return;
case IMSG_LKA_RCPT:
lka_session(imsg->data);
return;
}
}
if (iev->proc == PROC_MTA) {
switch (imsg->hdr.type) {
case IMSG_LKA_SECRET: {
struct map_credentials *map_credentials;
secret = imsg->data;
map = map_findbyname(secret->mapname);
if (map == NULL) {
log_warn("warn: lka: credentials map %s is missing",
secret->mapname);
imsg_compose_event(iev, IMSG_LKA_SECRET, 0, 0,
-1, secret, sizeof *secret);
return;
}
map_credentials = map_lookup(map->m_id, secret->host,
K_CREDENTIALS);
log_debug("debug: lka: %s credentials lookup (%d)", secret->host,
map_credentials != NULL);
secret->secret[0] = '\0';
if (map_credentials == NULL)
log_warnx("warn: %s credentials not found",
secret->host);
else if (lka_encode_credentials(secret->secret,
sizeof secret->secret, map_credentials) == 0)
log_warnx("warn: %s credentials parse fail",
secret->host);
imsg_compose_event(iev, IMSG_LKA_SECRET, 0, 0, -1, secret,
sizeof *secret);
free(map_credentials);
return;
}
}
}
if (iev->proc == PROC_PARENT) {
switch (imsg->hdr.type) {
case IMSG_CONF_START:
env->sc_rules_reload = xcalloc(1, sizeof *env->sc_rules,
"lka:sc_rules_reload");
env->sc_maps_reload = xcalloc(1, sizeof *env->sc_maps,
"lka:sc_maps_reload");
TAILQ_INIT(env->sc_rules_reload);
TAILQ_INIT(env->sc_maps_reload);
return;
case IMSG_CONF_RULE:
rule = xmemdup(imsg->data, sizeof *rule, "lka:rule");
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(env->sc_rules_reload, rule, r_entry);
return;
case IMSG_CONF_MAP:
map = xmemdup(imsg->data, sizeof *map, "lka:map");
TAILQ_INIT(&map->m_contents);
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(env->sc_maps_reload, map, m_entry);
tmp = env->sc_maps;
env->sc_maps = env->sc_maps_reload;
mp = map_open(map);
if (mp == NULL)
errx(1, "lka: could not open map \"%s\"", map->m_name);
map_close(map, mp);
env->sc_maps = tmp;
return;
case IMSG_CONF_RULE_SOURCE:
rule = TAILQ_LAST(env->sc_rules_reload, rulelist);
tmp = env->sc_maps;
env->sc_maps = env->sc_maps_reload;
rule->r_sources = map_findbyname(imsg->data);
if (rule->r_sources == NULL)
fatalx("lka: maps inconsistency");
env->sc_maps = tmp;
return;
case IMSG_CONF_MAP_CONTENT:
map = TAILQ_LAST(env->sc_maps_reload, maplist);
mapel = xmemdup(imsg->data, sizeof *mapel, "lka:mapel");
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&map->m_contents, mapel, me_entry);
return;
case IMSG_CONF_END:
if (env->sc_rules)
purge_config(PURGE_RULES);
if (env->sc_maps)
purge_config(PURGE_MAPS);
env->sc_rules = env->sc_rules_reload;
env->sc_maps = env->sc_maps_reload;
/* start fulfilling requests */
event_add(&env->sc_ievs[PROC_MTA]->ev, NULL);
event_add(&env->sc_ievs[PROC_MFA]->ev, NULL);
event_add(&env->sc_ievs[PROC_SMTP]->ev, NULL);
return;
case IMSG_CTL_VERBOSE:
log_verbose(*(int *)imsg->data);
return;
case IMSG_PARENT_FORWARD_OPEN:
lka_session_forward_reply(imsg->data, imsg->fd);
return;
}
}
if (iev->proc == PROC_CONTROL) {
switch (imsg->hdr.type) {
case IMSG_LKA_UPDATE_MAP:
map = map_findbyname(imsg->data);
if (map == NULL) {
log_warnx("warn: lka: no such map \"%s\"",
(char *)imsg->data);
return;
}
map_update(map);
return;
}
}
errx(1, "lka_imsg: unexpected %s imsg", imsg_to_str(imsg->hdr.type));
}
