Example #1
0
DocumentThreadableLoader::DocumentThreadableLoader(Document& document, ThreadableLoaderClient& client, BlockingBehavior blockingBehavior, const ResourceRequest& request, const ThreadableLoaderOptions& options, std::unique_ptr<ContentSecurityPolicy>&& contentSecurityPolicy)
    : m_client(&client)
    , m_document(document)
    , m_options(options)
    , m_sameOriginRequest(securityOrigin()->canRequest(request.url()))
    , m_simpleRequest(true)
    , m_async(blockingBehavior == LoadAsynchronously)
    , m_contentSecurityPolicy(WTFMove(contentSecurityPolicy))
{
    // Setting an outgoing referer is only supported in the async code path.
    ASSERT(m_async || request.httpReferrer().isEmpty());

    ASSERT_WITH_SECURITY_IMPLICATION(isAllowedByContentSecurityPolicy(request.url()));

    if (m_sameOriginRequest || m_options.crossOriginRequestPolicy == AllowCrossOriginRequests) {
        loadRequest(request, DoSecurityCheck);
        return;
    }

    if (m_options.crossOriginRequestPolicy == DenyCrossOriginRequests) {
        m_client->didFail(ResourceError(errorDomainWebKitInternal, 0, request.url(), "Cross origin requests are not supported."));
        return;
    }

    makeCrossOriginAccessRequest(request);
}
DocumentThreadableLoader::DocumentThreadableLoader(Document* document, ThreadableLoaderClient* client, BlockingBehavior blockingBehavior, const ResourceRequest& request, const ThreadableLoaderOptions& options)
    : m_client(client)
    , m_document(document)
    , m_options(options)
    , m_sameOriginRequest(securityOrigin()->canRequest(request.url()))
    , m_simpleRequest(true)
    , m_async(blockingBehavior == LoadAsynchronously)
#if ENABLE(INSPECTOR)
    , m_preflightRequestIdentifier(0)
#endif
{
    ASSERT(document);
    ASSERT(client);
    // Setting an outgoing referer is only supported in the async code path.
    ASSERT(m_async || request.httpReferrer().isEmpty());

    if (m_sameOriginRequest || m_options.crossOriginRequestPolicy == AllowCrossOriginRequests) {
        loadRequest(request, DoSecurityCheck);
        return;
    }

    if (m_options.crossOriginRequestPolicy == DenyCrossOriginRequests) {
        m_client->didFail(ResourceError(errorDomainWebKitInternal, 0, request.url().string(), "Cross origin requests are not supported."));
        return;
    }

    makeCrossOriginAccessRequest(request);
}
Example #3
0
void XMLHttpRequest::createRequest(ExceptionCode& ec)
{
    // Upload event listeners should be disallowed for simple cross-origin requests, because POSTing to an URL that does not
    // permit cross origin requests should look exactly like POSTing to an URL that does not respond at all. If a listener exists
    // when creating the request, it will force preflight.
    // Also, only async requests support upload progress events.
    m_uploadEventsAllowed = false;
    if (m_async) {
        dispatchLoadStartEvent();
        if (m_requestEntityBody && m_upload) {
            m_uploadEventsAllowed = m_upload->hasListeners();
            m_upload->dispatchLoadStartEvent();
        }
    }

    m_sameOriginRequest = scriptExecutionContext()->securityOrigin()->canRequest(m_url);

    if (!m_sameOriginRequest) {
        makeCrossOriginAccessRequest(ec);
        return;
    }

    m_uploadEventsAllowed = true;

    makeSameOriginRequest(ec);
}
Example #4
0
void DocumentThreadableLoader::redirectReceived(CachedResource* resource, ResourceRequest& request, const ResourceResponse& redirectResponse)
{
    ASSERT(m_client);
    ASSERT_UNUSED(resource, resource == m_resource);

    Ref<DocumentThreadableLoader> protectedThis(*this);
    if (!isAllowedByContentSecurityPolicy(request.url(), !redirectResponse.isNull())) {
        m_client->didFailRedirectCheck();
        request = ResourceRequest();
        return;
    }

    // Allow same origin requests to continue after allowing clients to audit the redirect.
    if (isAllowedRedirect(request.url()))
        return;

    // When using access control, only simple cross origin requests are allowed to redirect. The new request URL must have a supported
    // scheme and not contain the userinfo production. In addition, the redirect response must pass the access control check if the
    // original request was not same-origin.
    if (m_options.crossOriginRequestPolicy == UseAccessControl) {
        bool allowRedirect = false;
        if (m_simpleRequest) {
            String accessControlErrorDescription;
            allowRedirect = isValidCrossOriginRedirectionURL(request.url())
                            && (m_sameOriginRequest || passesAccessControlCheck(redirectResponse, m_options.allowCredentials(), securityOrigin(), accessControlErrorDescription));
        }

        if (allowRedirect) {
            if (m_resource)
                clearResource();

            RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> originalOrigin = SecurityOrigin::createFromString(redirectResponse.url());
            RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> requestOrigin = SecurityOrigin::createFromString(request.url());
            // If the original request wasn't same-origin, then if the request URL origin is not same origin with the original URL origin,
            // set the source origin to a globally unique identifier. (If the original request was same-origin, the origin of the new request
            // should be the original URL origin.)
            if (!m_sameOriginRequest && !originalOrigin->isSameSchemeHostPort(requestOrigin.get()))
                m_options.securityOrigin = SecurityOrigin::createUnique();
            // Force any subsequent request to use these checks.
            m_sameOriginRequest = false;

            // Since the request is no longer same-origin, if the user didn't request credentials in
            // the first place, update our state so we neither request them nor expect they must be allowed.
            if (m_options.credentialRequest() == ClientDidNotRequestCredentials)
                m_options.setAllowCredentials(DoNotAllowStoredCredentials);

            cleanRedirectedRequestForAccessControl(request);

            makeCrossOriginAccessRequest(request);
            return;
        }
    }

    m_client->didFailRedirectCheck();
    request = ResourceRequest();
}
void DocumentThreadableLoader::dispatchInitialRequest(const ResourceRequest& request)
{
    if (m_sameOriginRequest || m_options.crossOriginRequestPolicy == AllowCrossOriginRequests) {
        loadRequest(request, m_resourceLoaderOptions);
        return;
    }

    ASSERT(m_options.crossOriginRequestPolicy == UseAccessControl);

    makeCrossOriginAccessRequest(request);
    // |this| may be dead here in async mode.
}
void DocumentThreadableLoader::redirectReceived(CachedResource* resource, ResourceRequest& request, const ResourceResponse& redirectResponse)
{
    ASSERT(m_client);
    ASSERT_UNUSED(resource, resource == m_resource);

    RefPtr<DocumentThreadableLoader> protect(this);
    // Allow same origin requests to continue after allowing clients to audit the redirect.
    if (isAllowedRedirect(request.url())) {
        if (m_client->isDocumentThreadableLoaderClient())
            static_cast<DocumentThreadableLoaderClient*>(m_client)->willSendRequest(request, redirectResponse);
        return;
    }

    // When using access control, only simple cross origin requests are allowed to redirect. The new request URL must have a supported
    // scheme and not contain the userinfo production. In addition, the redirect response must pass the access control check.
    if (m_options.crossOriginRequestPolicy == UseAccessControl) {
        bool allowRedirect = false;
        if (m_simpleRequest) {
            String accessControlErrorDescription;
            allowRedirect = SchemeRegistry::shouldTreatURLSchemeAsCORSEnabled(request.url().protocol())
                            && request.url().user().isEmpty()
                            && request.url().pass().isEmpty()
                            && passesAccessControlCheck(redirectResponse, m_options.allowCredentials, securityOrigin(), accessControlErrorDescription);
        }

        if (allowRedirect) {
            if (m_resource)
                clearResource();

            RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> originalOrigin = SecurityOrigin::createFromString(redirectResponse.url());
            RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> requestOrigin = SecurityOrigin::createFromString(request.url());
            // If the request URL origin is not same origin with the original URL origin, set source origin to a globally unique identifier.
            if (!originalOrigin->isSameSchemeHostPort(requestOrigin.get()))
                m_options.securityOrigin = SecurityOrigin::createUnique();
            // Force any subsequent requests to use these checks.
            m_sameOriginRequest = false;

            // Remove any headers that may have been added by the network layer that cause access control to fail.
            request.clearHTTPContentType();
            request.clearHTTPReferrer();
            request.clearHTTPOrigin();
            request.clearHTTPUserAgent();
            request.clearHTTPAccept();
            makeCrossOriginAccessRequest(request);
            return;
        }
    }

    m_client->didFailRedirectCheck();
    request = ResourceRequest();
}
Example #7
0
void DocumentThreadableLoader::dispatchInitialRequest(
    const ResourceRequest& request) {
  if (!request.isExternalRequest() &&
      (m_sameOriginRequest ||
       m_options.crossOriginRequestPolicy == AllowCrossOriginRequests)) {
    loadRequest(request, m_resourceLoaderOptions);
    return;
  }

  DCHECK(m_options.crossOriginRequestPolicy == UseAccessControl ||
         request.isExternalRequest());

  makeCrossOriginAccessRequest(request);
}
Example #8
0
// In this method, we can clear |request| to tell content::WebURLLoaderImpl of
// Chromium not to follow the redirect. This works only when this method is
// called by RawResource::willSendRequest(). If called by
// RawResource::didAddClient(), clearing |request| won't be propagated to
// content::WebURLLoaderImpl. So, this loader must also get detached from the
// resource by calling clearResource().
bool DocumentThreadableLoader::redirectReceived(
    Resource* resource,
    const ResourceRequest& request,
    const ResourceResponse& redirectResponse) {
  DCHECK(m_client);
  DCHECK_EQ(resource, this->resource());
  DCHECK(m_async);

  m_checker.redirectReceived();

  if (!m_actualRequest.isNull()) {
    reportResponseReceived(resource->identifier(), redirectResponse);

    handlePreflightFailure(redirectResponse.url().getString(),
                           "Response for preflight is invalid (redirect)");

    return false;
  }

  if (m_redirectMode == WebURLRequest::FetchRedirectModeManual) {
    // We use |m_redirectMode| to check the original redirect mode. |request| is
    // a new request for redirect. So we don't set the redirect mode of it in
    // WebURLLoaderImpl::Context::OnReceivedRedirect().
    DCHECK(request.useStreamOnResponse());
    // There is no need to read the body of redirect response because there is
    // no way to read the body of opaque-redirect filtered response's internal
    // response.
    // TODO(horo): If we support any API which expose the internal body, we will
    // have to read the body. And also HTTPCache changes will be needed because
    // it doesn't store the body of redirect responses.
    responseReceived(resource, redirectResponse,
                     WTF::makeUnique<EmptyDataHandle>());

    if (m_client) {
      DCHECK(m_actualRequest.isNull());
      notifyFinished(resource);
    }

    return false;
  }

  if (m_redirectMode == WebURLRequest::FetchRedirectModeError) {
    ThreadableLoaderClient* client = m_client;
    clear();
    client->didFailRedirectCheck();

    return false;
  }

  // Allow same origin requests to continue after allowing clients to audit the
  // redirect.
  if (isAllowedRedirect(request.url())) {
    m_client->didReceiveRedirectTo(request.url());
    if (m_client->isDocumentThreadableLoaderClient()) {
      return static_cast<DocumentThreadableLoaderClient*>(m_client)
          ->willFollowRedirect(request, redirectResponse);
    }
    return true;
  }

  if (m_corsRedirectLimit <= 0) {
    ThreadableLoaderClient* client = m_client;
    clear();
    client->didFailRedirectCheck();
    return false;
  }

  --m_corsRedirectLimit;

  InspectorInstrumentation::didReceiveCORSRedirectResponse(
      document().frame(), resource->identifier(),
      document().frame()->loader().documentLoader(), redirectResponse,
      resource);

  bool allowRedirect = false;
  String accessControlErrorDescription;

  if (!CrossOriginAccessControl::isLegalRedirectLocation(
          request.url(), accessControlErrorDescription)) {
    accessControlErrorDescription =
        "Redirect from '" + redirectResponse.url().getString() +
        "' has been blocked by CORS policy: " + accessControlErrorDescription;
  } else if (!m_sameOriginRequest &&
             !passesAccessControlCheck(
                 redirectResponse, effectiveAllowCredentials(),
                 getSecurityOrigin(), accessControlErrorDescription,
                 m_requestContext)) {
    // The redirect response must pass the access control check if the original
    // request was not same-origin.
    accessControlErrorDescription =
        "Redirect from '" + redirectResponse.url().getString() + "' to '" +
        request.url().getString() + "' has been blocked by CORS policy: " +
        accessControlErrorDescription;
  } else {
    allowRedirect = true;
  }

  if (!allowRedirect) {
    ThreadableLoaderClient* client = m_client;
    clear();
    client->didFailAccessControlCheck(ResourceError(
        errorDomainBlinkInternal, 0, redirectResponse.url().getString(),
        accessControlErrorDescription));
    return false;
  }

  m_client->didReceiveRedirectTo(request.url());

  // FIXME: consider combining this with CORS redirect handling performed by
  // CrossOriginAccessControl::handleRedirect().
  clearResource();

  // If the original request wasn't same-origin, then if the request URL origin
  // is not same origin with the original URL origin, set the source origin to a
  // globally unique identifier. (If the original request was same-origin, the
  // origin of the new request should be the original URL origin.)
  if (!m_sameOriginRequest) {
    RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> originalOrigin =
        SecurityOrigin::create(redirectResponse.url());
    RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> requestOrigin =
        SecurityOrigin::create(request.url());
    if (!originalOrigin->isSameSchemeHostPort(requestOrigin.get()))
      m_securityOrigin = SecurityOrigin::createUnique();
  }
  // Force any subsequent requests to use these checks.
  m_sameOriginRequest = false;

  // Since the request is no longer same-origin, if the user didn't request
  // credentials in the first place, update our state so we neither request them
  // nor expect they must be allowed.
  if (m_resourceLoaderOptions.credentialsRequested ==
      ClientDidNotRequestCredentials)
    m_forceDoNotAllowStoredCredentials = true;

  // Save the referrer to use when following the redirect.
  m_overrideReferrer = true;
  m_referrerAfterRedirect =
      Referrer(request.httpReferrer(), request.getReferrerPolicy());

  ResourceRequest crossOriginRequest(request);

  // Remove any headers that may have been added by the network layer that cause
  // access control to fail.
  crossOriginRequest.clearHTTPReferrer();
  crossOriginRequest.clearHTTPOrigin();
  crossOriginRequest.clearHTTPUserAgent();
  // Add any request headers which we previously saved from the
  // original request.
  for (const auto& header : m_requestHeaders)
    crossOriginRequest.setHTTPHeaderField(header.key, header.value);
  makeCrossOriginAccessRequest(crossOriginRequest);

  return false;
}
// In this method, we can clear |request| to tell content::WebURLLoaderImpl of
// Chromium not to follow the redirect. This works only when this method is
// called by RawResource::willSendRequest(). If called by
// RawResource::didAddClient(), clearing |request| won't be propagated
// to content::WebURLLoaderImpl. So, this loader must also get detached from
// the resource by calling clearResource().
void DocumentThreadableLoader::redirectReceived(Resource* resource, ResourceRequest& request, const ResourceResponse& redirectResponse)
{
    ASSERT(m_client);
    ASSERT_UNUSED(resource, resource == this->resource());
    ASSERT(m_async);

    if (!m_actualRequest.isNull()) {
        reportResponseReceived(resource->identifier(), redirectResponse);

        handlePreflightFailure(redirectResponse.url().string(), "Response for preflight is invalid (redirect)");
        // |this| may be dead here.

        request = ResourceRequest();

        return;
    }

    if (m_redirectMode == WebURLRequest::FetchRedirectModeManual) {
        // Keep |this| alive even if the client release a reference in
        // responseReceived().
        RefPtr<DocumentThreadableLoader> protect(this);

        // We use |m_redirectMode| to check the original redirect mode.
        // |request| is a new request for redirect. So we don't set the redirect
        // mode of it in WebURLLoaderImpl::Context::OnReceivedRedirect().
        ASSERT(request.useStreamOnResponse());
        // There is no need to read the body of redirect response because there
        // is no way to read the body of opaque-redirect filtered response's
        // internal response.
        // TODO(horo): If we support any API which expose the internal body, we
        // will have to read the body. And also HTTPCache changes will be needed
        // because it doesn't store the body of redirect responses.
        responseReceived(resource, redirectResponse, adoptPtr(new EmptyDataHandle()));

        if (m_client) {
            ASSERT(m_actualRequest.isNull());
            notifyFinished(resource);
        }

        request = ResourceRequest();

        return;
    }

    if (m_redirectMode == WebURLRequest::FetchRedirectModeError || !isAllowedByContentSecurityPolicy(request.url(), ContentSecurityPolicy::DidRedirect)) {
        ThreadableLoaderClient* client = m_client;
        clear();
        client->didFailRedirectCheck();
        // |this| may be dead here.

        request = ResourceRequest();

        return;
    }

    // Allow same origin requests to continue after allowing clients to audit the redirect.
    if (isAllowedRedirect(request.url())) {
        if (m_client->isDocumentThreadableLoaderClient())
            static_cast<DocumentThreadableLoaderClient*>(m_client)->willFollowRedirect(request, redirectResponse);
        return;
    }

    if (m_corsRedirectLimit <= 0) {
        ThreadableLoaderClient* client = m_client;
        clear();
        client->didFailRedirectCheck();
        // |this| may be dead here.
    } else if (m_options.crossOriginRequestPolicy == UseAccessControl) {
        --m_corsRedirectLimit;

        InspectorInstrumentation::didReceiveCORSRedirectResponse(document().frame(), resource->identifier(), document().frame()->loader().documentLoader(), redirectResponse, 0);

        bool allowRedirect = false;
        String accessControlErrorDescription;

        // Non-simple cross origin requests (both preflight and actual one) are
        // not allowed to follow redirect.
        if (m_crossOriginNonSimpleRequest) {
            accessControlErrorDescription = "The request was redirected to '"+ request.url().string() + "', which is disallowed for cross-origin requests that require preflight.";
        } else {
            // The redirect response must pass the access control check if the
            // original request was not same-origin.
            allowRedirect = CrossOriginAccessControl::isLegalRedirectLocation(request.url(), accessControlErrorDescription)
                && (m_sameOriginRequest || passesAccessControlCheck(redirectResponse, effectiveAllowCredentials(), securityOrigin(), accessControlErrorDescription, m_requestContext));
        }

        if (allowRedirect) {
            // FIXME: consider combining this with CORS redirect handling performed by
            // CrossOriginAccessControl::handleRedirect().
            clearResource();

            RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> originalOrigin = SecurityOrigin::create(redirectResponse.url());
            RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> requestOrigin = SecurityOrigin::create(request.url());
            // If the original request wasn't same-origin, then if the request URL origin is not same origin with the original URL origin,
            // set the source origin to a globally unique identifier. (If the original request was same-origin, the origin of the new request
            // should be the original URL origin.)
            if (!m_sameOriginRequest && !originalOrigin->isSameSchemeHostPort(requestOrigin.get()))
                m_securityOrigin = SecurityOrigin::createUnique();
            // Force any subsequent requests to use these checks.
            m_sameOriginRequest = false;

            // Since the request is no longer same-origin, if the user didn't request credentials in
            // the first place, update our state so we neither request them nor expect they must be allowed.
            if (m_resourceLoaderOptions.credentialsRequested == ClientDidNotRequestCredentials)
                m_forceDoNotAllowStoredCredentials = true;

            // Remove any headers that may have been added by the network layer that cause access control to fail.
            request.clearHTTPReferrer();
            request.clearHTTPOrigin();
            request.clearHTTPUserAgent();
            // Add any CORS simple request headers which we previously saved from the original request.
            for (const auto& header : m_simpleRequestHeaders)
                request.setHTTPHeaderField(header.key, header.value);
            makeCrossOriginAccessRequest(request);
            // |this| may be dead here.
            return;
        }

        ThreadableLoaderClient* client = m_client;
        clear();
        client->didFailAccessControlCheck(ResourceError(errorDomainBlinkInternal, 0, redirectResponse.url().string(), accessControlErrorDescription));
        // |this| may be dead here.
    } else {
        ThreadableLoaderClient* client = m_client;
        clear();
        client->didFailRedirectCheck();
        // |this| may be dead here.
    }

    request = ResourceRequest();
}
void DocumentThreadableLoader::redirectReceived(Resource* resource, ResourceRequest& request, const ResourceResponse& redirectResponse)
{
    ASSERT(m_client);
    ASSERT_UNUSED(resource, resource == this->resource());

    RefPtr<DocumentThreadableLoader> protect(this);
    if (!isAllowedByPolicy(request.url())) {
        m_client->didFailRedirectCheck();
        request = ResourceRequest();
        return;
    }

    // Allow same origin requests to continue after allowing clients to audit the redirect.
    if (isAllowedRedirect(request.url())) {
        if (m_client->isDocumentThreadableLoaderClient())
            static_cast<DocumentThreadableLoaderClient*>(m_client)->willSendRequest(request, redirectResponse);
        return;
    }

    // When using access control, only simple cross origin requests are allowed to redirect. The new request URL must have a supported
    // scheme and not contain the userinfo production. In addition, the redirect response must pass the access control check if the
    // original request was not same-origin.
    if (m_options.crossOriginRequestPolicy == UseAccessControl) {

        InspectorInstrumentation::didReceiveCORSRedirectResponse(m_document->frame(), resource->identifier(), m_document->frame()->loader().documentLoader(), redirectResponse, 0);

        bool allowRedirect = false;
        String accessControlErrorDescription;

        if (m_simpleRequest) {
            allowRedirect = CrossOriginAccessControl::isLegalRedirectLocation(request.url(), accessControlErrorDescription)
                            && (m_sameOriginRequest || passesAccessControlCheck(redirectResponse, m_options.allowCredentials, securityOrigin(), accessControlErrorDescription));
        } else {
            accessControlErrorDescription = "The request was redirected to '"+ request.url().string() + "', which is disallowed for cross-origin requests that require preflight.";
        }

        if (allowRedirect) {
            // FIXME: consider combining this with CORS redirect handling performed by
            // CrossOriginAccessControl::handleRedirect().
            clearResource();

            RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> originalOrigin = SecurityOrigin::create(redirectResponse.url());
            RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> requestOrigin = SecurityOrigin::create(request.url());
            // If the original request wasn't same-origin, then if the request URL origin is not same origin with the original URL origin,
            // set the source origin to a globally unique identifier. (If the original request was same-origin, the origin of the new request
            // should be the original URL origin.)
            if (!m_sameOriginRequest && !originalOrigin->isSameSchemeHostPort(requestOrigin.get()))
                m_options.securityOrigin = SecurityOrigin::createUnique();
            // Force any subsequent requests to use these checks.
            m_sameOriginRequest = false;

            // Since the request is no longer same-origin, if the user didn't request credentials in
            // the first place, update our state so we neither request them nor expect they must be allowed.
            if (m_options.credentialsRequested == ClientDidNotRequestCredentials)
                m_options.allowCredentials = DoNotAllowStoredCredentials;

            // Remove any headers that may have been added by the network layer that cause access control to fail.
            request.clearHTTPContentType();
            request.clearHTTPReferrer();
            request.clearHTTPOrigin();
            request.clearHTTPUserAgent();
            request.clearHTTPAccept();
            makeCrossOriginAccessRequest(request);
            return;
        }

        ResourceError error(errorDomainBlinkInternal, 0, redirectResponse.url().string(), accessControlErrorDescription);
        m_client->didFailAccessControlCheck(error);
    } else {
        m_client->didFailRedirectCheck();
    }
    request = ResourceRequest();
}