/*
Add the given data to the running hash of the handshake messages
*/
int32 sslUpdateHSHash(ssl_t *ssl, unsigned char *in, uint32 len)
{
#ifdef USE_TLS_1_2
/* Keep a running total of each for greatest RFC support when it comes
to the CertificateVerify message. Although, trying to be smart
about MD5 and SHA-2 based on protocol version */
if ((ssl->majVer == 0 && ssl->minVer == 0) ||
ssl->minVer == TLS_1_2_MIN_VER) {
psSha256Update(&ssl->sec.msgHashSha256, in, len);
#ifdef USE_SHA384
psSha384Update(&ssl->sec.msgHashSha384, in, len);
#endif
}
#ifndef USE_ONLY_TLS_1_2
if (ssl->reqMinVer == 0 || ssl->minVer != TLS_1_2_MIN_VER) {
psMd5Update(&ssl->sec.msgHashMd5, in, len);
}
psSha1Update(&ssl->sec.msgHashSha1, in, len);
#endif
#else
psMd5Update(&ssl->sec.msgHashMd5, in, len);
psSha1Update(&ssl->sec.msgHashSha1, in, len);
#endif
return 0;
}
/*
* Generates all key material.
*/
int32 sslDeriveKeys(ssl_t *ssl)
{
psDigestContext_t md5Ctx, sha1Ctx;
unsigned char buf[MD5_HASH_SIZE + SHA1_HASH_SIZE];
unsigned char *tmp;
uint32 i;
/*
If this session is resumed, we want to reuse the master secret to
regenerate the key block with the new random values.
*/
if (ssl->flags & SSL_FLAGS_RESUMED) {
goto skipPremaster;
}
/*
master_secret =
MD5(pre_master_secret + SHA('A' + pre_master_secret +
ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random)) +
MD5(pre_master_secret + SHA('BB' + pre_master_secret +
ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random)) +
MD5(pre_master_secret + SHA('CCC' + pre_master_secret +
ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random));
*/
tmp = ssl->sec.masterSecret;
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
psSha1Init(&sha1Ctx);
psSha1Update(&sha1Ctx, salt[i], i + 1);
psSha1Update(&sha1Ctx, ssl->sec.premaster, ssl->sec.premasterSize);
psSha1Update(&sha1Ctx, ssl->sec.clientRandom, SSL_HS_RANDOM_SIZE);
psSha1Update(&sha1Ctx, ssl->sec.serverRandom, SSL_HS_RANDOM_SIZE);
psSha1Final(&sha1Ctx, buf);
psMd5Init(&md5Ctx);
psMd5Update(&md5Ctx, ssl->sec.premaster, ssl->sec.premasterSize);
psMd5Update(&md5Ctx, buf, SHA1_HASH_SIZE);
psMd5Final(&md5Ctx, tmp);
tmp += MD5_HASH_SIZE;
}
memset(buf, 0x0, MD5_HASH_SIZE + SHA1_HASH_SIZE);
/*
premaster is now allocated for DH reasons. Can free here
*/
psFree(ssl->sec.premaster);
ssl->sec.premaster = NULL;
ssl->sec.premasterSize = 0;
skipPremaster:
if (createKeyBlock(ssl, ssl->sec.clientRandom, ssl->sec.serverRandom,
ssl->sec.masterSecret, SSL_HS_MASTER_SIZE) < 0) {
psTraceInfo("Unable to create key block\n");
return PS_FAILURE;
}
return SSL_HS_MASTER_SIZE;
}
int32 psHmacSha1(unsigned char *key, uint32 keyLen, const unsigned char *buf,
uint32 len, unsigned char *hash, unsigned char *hmacKey,
uint32 *hmacKeyLen)
{
psHmacContext_t ctx;
psDigestContext_t sha;
/*
Support for keys larger than 64 bytes. In this case, we take the
hash of the key itself and use that instead. Inform the caller by
updating the hmacKey and hmacKeyLen outputs
*/
if (keyLen > 64) {
psSha1Init(&sha);
psSha1Update(&sha, key, keyLen);
*hmacKeyLen = psSha1Final(&sha, hash);
memcpy(hmacKey, hash, *hmacKeyLen);
} else {
hmacKey = key;
*hmacKeyLen = keyLen;
}
psHmacSha1Init(&ctx, hmacKey, *hmacKeyLen);
psHmacSha1Update(&ctx, buf, len);
return psHmacSha1Final(&ctx, hash);
}
int32_t psHmacSha1(const unsigned char *key, uint16_t keyLen,
const unsigned char *buf, uint32_t len,
unsigned char hash[SHA1_HASHLEN], unsigned char *hmacKey,
uint16_t *hmacKeyLen)
{
psSha1_t sha;
/*
Support for keys larger than 64 bytes. In this case, we take the
hash of the key itself and use that instead. Inform the caller by
updating the hmacKey and hmacKeyLen outputs
*/
if (keyLen > 64) {
psSha1Init(&sha);
psSha1Update(&sha, key, keyLen);
psSha1Final(&sha, hash);
*hmacKeyLen = SHA1_HASHLEN;
memcpy(hmacKey, hash, *hmacKeyLen);
} else {
hmacKey = (unsigned char*)key;
*hmacKeyLen = keyLen;
}
if (HMAC(EVP_sha1(), hmacKey, *hmacKeyLen, buf, len, hash, NULL) != NULL) {
return PS_SUCCESS;
}
return PS_FAIL;
}
int32_t psHmacSha1Init(psHmacSha1_t *ctx,
const unsigned char *key, uint16_t keyLen)
{
int32_t rc, i;
#ifdef CRYPTO_ASSERT
psAssert(keyLen <= 64);
#endif
for (i = 0; (uint32)i < keyLen; i++) {
ctx->pad[i] = key[i] ^ 0x36;
}
for (i = keyLen; (uint32)i < 64; i++) {
ctx->pad[i] = 0x36;
}
if ((rc = psSha1Init(&ctx->sha1)) < 0) {
return rc;
}
psSha1Update(&ctx->sha1, ctx->pad, 64);
for (i = 0; (uint32)i < keyLen; i++) {
ctx->pad[i] = key[i] ^ 0x5c;
}
for (i = keyLen; i < 64; i++) {
ctx->pad[i] = 0x5c;
}
return PS_SUCCESS;
}
void psHmacSha1Update(psHmacContext_t *ctx, const unsigned char *buf,
uint32 len)
{
psAssert(ctx != NULL && buf != NULL);
psSha1Update(&ctx->u.sha1, buf, len);
}
void psHmacSha1Update(psHmacSha1_t *ctx,
const unsigned char *buf, uint32_t len)
{
#ifdef CRYPTO_ASSERT
psAssert(ctx != NULL && buf != NULL);
#endif
psSha1Update(&ctx->sha1, buf, len);
}
int32 psHmacSha1Final(psHmacContext_t *ctx, unsigned char *hash)
{
psAssert(ctx != NULL);
if (hash == NULL) {
psTraceCrypto("NULL hash storage passed to psHmacSha1Final\n");
return PS_ARG_FAIL;
}
psSha1Final(&ctx->u.sha1, hash);
psSha1Init(&ctx->u.sha1);
psSha1Update(&ctx->u.sha1, ctx->pad, 64);
psSha1Update(&ctx->u.sha1, hash, SHA1_HASH_SIZE);
psSha1Final(&ctx->u.sha1, hash);
memset(ctx->pad, 0x0, 64);
return SHA1_HASH_SIZE;
}
/**
Update MD5 and SHA1 hashes of the same data.
*/
void psMd5Sha1Update(psMd5Sha1_t *md, const unsigned char *buf,
uint32_t len)
{
# ifdef CRYPTO_ASSERT
psAssert(md && buf);
# endif
psMd5Update(&md->md5, buf, len);
psSha1Update(&md->sha1, buf, len);
}
/**
Add entropy to the PRNG state
@param in The data to add
@param inlen Length of the data to add
@param prng PRNG state to update
*/
int32 psYarrowAddEntropy(unsigned char *in, uint32 inlen, psYarrow_t *prng)
{
psDigestContext_t md;
int32 err;
if (in == NULL || prng == NULL) {
return PS_ARG_FAIL;
}
#ifdef USE_SHA256
/* start the hash */
psSha256Init(&md);
/* hash the current pool */
psSha256Update(&md, prng->pool, SHA256_HASH_SIZE);
/* add the new entropy */
psSha256Update(&md, in, inlen);
/* store result */
if ((err = psSha256Final(&md, prng->pool)) != SHA256_HASH_SIZE) {
return err;
}
#else
/* start the hash */
psSha1Init(&md);
/* hash the current pool */
psSha1Update(&md, prng->pool, SHA1_HASH_SIZE);
/* add the new entropy */
psSha1Update(&md, in, inlen);
/* store result */
if ((err = psSha1Final(&md, prng->pool)) != SHA1_HASH_SIZE) {
return err;
}
#endif
return PS_SUCCESS;
}
void psHmacSha1Final(psHmacSha1_t *ctx, unsigned char hash[SHA1_HASHLEN])
{
int32_t rc;
#ifdef CRYPTO_ASSERT
psAssert(ctx != NULL);
if (hash == NULL) {
psTraceCrypto("NULL hash storage passed to psHmacSha1Final\n");
return;
}
#endif
psSha1Final(&ctx->sha1, hash);
if ((rc = psSha1Init(&ctx->sha1)) < 0) {
psAssert(rc >= 0);
return;
}
psSha1Update(&ctx->sha1, ctx->pad, 64);
psSha1Update(&ctx->sha1, hash, SHA1_HASHLEN);
psSha1Final(&ctx->sha1, hash);
memset(ctx->pad, 0x0, sizeof(ctx->pad));
}
/*
SSLv3 uses a method similar to HMAC to generate the SHA1 message MAC.
For SHA1, 40 bytes of the pad are used.
SHA1(MAC_write_secret + pad2 +
SHA1(MAC_write_secret + pad1 + seq_num + length + content));
*/
int32 ssl3HMACSha1(ssl_t *ssl, int32 mode, unsigned char *key, unsigned char *seq,
unsigned char type, unsigned char *data, uint32 len,
unsigned char *mac)
{
psDigestContext_t sha1;
unsigned char ihash[SHA1_HASH_SIZE];
int32 i;
psDigestContext_t* psha = &sha1;
#ifdef USE_APP_DATA_PARTIAL_PARSING
if(ssl->rec.type == SSL_RECORD_TYPE_APPLICATION_DATA && mode == HMAC_VERIFY && ssl->deBlockSize <= 1)
psha = &ssl->hmac_ctx;
if(ssl->rec.type != SSL_RECORD_TYPE_APPLICATION_DATA || mode == HMAC_CREATE || ssl->deBlockSize > 1 || (data == NULL && len > 0)){
#endif
psSha1Init(psha);
psSha1Update(psha, key, SHA1_HASH_SIZE);
psSha1Update(psha, pad1, 40);
psSha1Update(psha, seq, 8);
ihash[0] = type;
ihash[1] = (len & 0xFF00) >> 8;
ihash[2] = len & 0xFF;
psSha1Update(psha, ihash, 3);
#ifdef USE_APP_DATA_PARTIAL_PARSING
}
void psHmacSha1Init(psHmacContext_t *ctx, unsigned char *key, uint32 keyLen)
{
int32 i;
psAssert(keyLen <= 64);
for (i = 0; (uint32)i < keyLen; i++) {
ctx->pad[i] = key[i] ^ 0x36;
}
for (i = keyLen; (uint32)i < 64; i++) {
ctx->pad[i] = 0x36;
}
psSha1Init(&ctx->u.sha1);
psSha1Update(&ctx->u.sha1, ctx->pad, 64);
for (i = 0; (uint32)i < keyLen; i++) {
ctx->pad[i] = key[i] ^ 0x5c;
}
for (i = keyLen; i < 64; i++) {
ctx->pad[i] = 0x5c;
}
}
/*
Combine the running hash of the handshake mesages with some constants
and mix them up a bit more. Output the result to the given buffer.
This data will be part of the Finished handshake message.
*/
int32 sslGenerateFinishedHash(psDigestContext_t *md5, psDigestContext_t *sha1,
unsigned char *masterSecret,
unsigned char *out, int32 sender)
{
psDigestContext_t omd5,osha1;
unsigned char ihash[SHA1_HASH_SIZE];
/*
md5Hash = MD5(master_secret + pad2 +
MD5(handshake_messages + sender + master_secret + pad1));
*/
if (sender >= 0) {
psMd5Update(md5,
(sender & SSL_FLAGS_SERVER) ? SENDER_SERVER : SENDER_CLIENT, 4);
}
psMd5Update(md5, masterSecret, SSL_HS_MASTER_SIZE);
psMd5Update(md5, pad1, sizeof(pad1));
psMd5Final(md5, ihash);
psMd5Init(&omd5);
psMd5Update(&omd5, masterSecret, SSL_HS_MASTER_SIZE);
psMd5Update(&omd5, pad2, sizeof(pad2));
psMd5Update(&omd5, ihash, MD5_HASH_SIZE);
psMd5Final(&omd5, out);
/*
The SHA1 hash is generated in the same way, except only 40 bytes
of pad1 and pad2 are used.
sha1Hash = SHA1(master_secret + pad2 +
SHA1(handshake_messages + sender + master_secret + pad1));
*/
if (sender >= 0) {
psSha1Update(sha1,
(sender & SSL_FLAGS_SERVER) ? SENDER_SERVER : SENDER_CLIENT, 4);
}
psSha1Update(sha1, masterSecret, SSL_HS_MASTER_SIZE);
psSha1Update(sha1, pad1, 40);
psSha1Final(sha1, ihash);
psSha1Init(&osha1);
psSha1Update(&osha1, masterSecret, SSL_HS_MASTER_SIZE);
psSha1Update(&osha1, pad2, 40);
psSha1Update(&osha1, ihash, SHA1_HASH_SIZE);
psSha1Final(&osha1, out + MD5_HASH_SIZE);
return MD5_HASH_SIZE + SHA1_HASH_SIZE;
}
int32_t psHmacSha1(const unsigned char *key, uint16_t keyLen,
const unsigned char *buf, uint32_t len,
unsigned char hash[SHA1_HASHLEN],
unsigned char *hmacKey, uint16_t *hmacKeyLen)
{
int32_t rc;
union {
psHmacSha1_t mac;
psSha1_t md;
} u;
psHmacSha1_t *mac = &u.mac;
psSha1_t *md = &u.md;
/*
Support for keys larger than 64 bytes. In this case, we take the
hash of the key itself and use that instead. Inform the caller by
updating the hmacKey and hmacKeyLen outputs
*/
if (keyLen > 64) {
if ((rc = psSha1Init(md)) < 0) {
return rc;
}
psSha1Update(md, key, keyLen);
psSha1Final(md, hash);
*hmacKeyLen = SHA1_HASHLEN;
memcpy(hmacKey, hash, *hmacKeyLen);
} else {
hmacKey = (unsigned char *)key; /* @note typecasting from const */
*hmacKeyLen = keyLen;
}
if ((rc = psHmacSha1Init(mac, hmacKey, *hmacKeyLen)) < 0) {
return rc;
}
psHmacSha1Update(mac, buf, len);
psHmacSha1Final(mac, hash);
return PS_SUCCESS;
}
/*
Parse DER encoded asn.1 RSA public key out of a certificate stream.
We reach here with 'pp' pointing to the byte after the algorithm identifier.
*/
int32_t psRsaParseAsnPubKey(psPool_t *pool,
const unsigned char **pp, psSize_t len,
psRsaKey_t *key, unsigned char sha1KeyHash[SHA1_HASH_SIZE])
{
# ifdef USE_SHA1
psDigestContext_t dc;
# endif
const unsigned char *p = *pp;
RSA *rsa;
psSize_t keylen;
# ifndef USE_D2I
psSize_t seqlen;
# endif
if (len < 1 || (*(p++) != ASN_BIT_STRING) ||
getAsnLength(&p, len - 1, &keylen))
{
goto L_FAIL;
}
/* ignored bits field should be zero */
if (*p++ != 0)
{
goto L_FAIL;
}
keylen--;
# ifdef USE_SHA1
/* A public key hash is used in PKI tools (OCSP, Trusted CA indication).
Standard RSA form - SHA-1 hash of the value of the BIT STRING
subjectPublicKey [excluding the tag, length, and number of unused
bits] */
psSha1Init(&dc.sha1);
psSha1Update(&dc.sha1, p, keylen);
psSha1Final(&dc.sha1, sha1KeyHash);
# endif
# ifdef USE_D2I
/* OpenSSL expects to parse after the ignored bits field */
if ((rsa = d2i_RSAPublicKey(NULL, &p, keylen)) == NULL)
{
goto L_FAIL;
}
# else
/* We can manually create the structures as OpenSSL would */
rsa = RSA_new();
if (getAsnSequence(&p, keylen, &seqlen) < 0 ||
getBig(&p, seqlen, &rsa->n) < 0 ||
getBig(&p, seqlen, &rsa->e) < 0)
{
RSA_free(rsa);
goto L_FAIL;
}
# endif
/* RSA_print_fp(stdout, rsa, 0); */
*pp = p;
*key = rsa;
return PS_SUCCESS;
L_FAIL:
psTraceIntCrypto("psRsaParseAsnPubKey error on byte %d\n", p - *pp);
return PS_PARSE_FAIL;
}
void runDigestTime(psDigestContext_t *ctx, int32 chunk, int32 alg)
{
psTime_t start, end;
unsigned char *dataChunk;
unsigned char hashout[64];
int32 bytesSent, bytesToSend, round;
#ifdef USE_HIGHRES_TIME
int32 mod;
int64 diffu;
#else
int32 diffm;
#endif
dataChunk = psMalloc(NULL, chunk);
bytesToSend = (DATABYTES_AMOUNT / chunk) * chunk;
bytesSent = 0;
switch (alg) {
#ifdef USE_SHA1
case SHA1_ALG:
psGetTime(&start, NULL);
while (bytesSent < bytesToSend) {
psSha1Update(&ctx->sha1, dataChunk, chunk);
bytesSent += chunk;
}
psSha1Final(&ctx->sha1, hashout);
psGetTime(&end, NULL);
break;
#endif
#ifdef USE_SHA256
case SHA256_ALG:
psGetTime(&start, NULL);
while (bytesSent < bytesToSend) {
psSha256Update(&ctx->sha256, dataChunk, chunk);
bytesSent += chunk;
}
psSha256Final(&ctx->sha256, hashout);
psGetTime(&end, NULL);
break;
#endif
#ifdef USE_SHA384
case SHA384_ALG:
psGetTime(&start, NULL);
while (bytesSent < bytesToSend) {
psSha384Update(&ctx->sha384, dataChunk, chunk);
bytesSent += chunk;
}
psSha384Final(&ctx->sha384, hashout);
psGetTime(&end, NULL);
break;
#endif
#ifdef USE_SHA512
case SHA512_ALG:
psGetTime(&start, NULL);
while (bytesSent < bytesToSend) {
psSha512Update(&ctx->sha512, dataChunk, chunk);
bytesSent += chunk;
}
psSha512Final(&ctx->sha512, hashout);
psGetTime(&end, NULL);
break;
#endif
#ifdef USE_MD5
case MD5_ALG:
psGetTime(&start, NULL);
while (bytesSent < bytesToSend) {
psMd5Update(&ctx->md5, dataChunk, chunk);
bytesSent += chunk;
}
psMd5Final(&ctx->md5, hashout);
psGetTime(&end, NULL);
break;
#endif
default:
printf("Skipping Digest Tests\n");
return;
}
#ifdef USE_HIGHRES_TIME
diffu = psDiffUsecs(start, end);
round = (bytesToSend / diffu);
mod = (bytesToSend % diffu);
printf("%d byte chunks in %lld usecs total for rate of %d.%d MB/sec\n",
chunk, (unsigned long long)diffu, round, mod);
#else
diffm = psDiffMsecs(start, end, NULL);
round = (bytesToSend / diffm) / 1000;
printf("%d byte chunks in %d msecs total for rate of %d MB/sec\n",
chunk, diffm, round);
#endif
}
/*
Generate the key block as follows. '+' indicates concatination.
key_block =
MD5(master_secret + SHA(`A' + master_secret +
ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random)) +
MD5(master_secret + SHA(`BB' + master_secret +
ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random)) +
MD5(master_secret + SHA(`CCC' + master_secret +
ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random)) +
[...];
*/
static int32 createKeyBlock(ssl_t *ssl, unsigned char *clientRandom,
unsigned char *serverRandom,
unsigned char *masterSecret, uint32 secretLen)
{
psDigestContext_t md5Ctx, sha1Ctx;
unsigned char buf[MD5_HASH_SIZE + SHA1_HASH_SIZE];
unsigned char *tmp;
int32 ret = 0;
uint32 i, keyIter, reqKeyLen;
/*
We must generate enough key material to fill the various keys
*/
reqKeyLen = 2 * ssl->cipher->macSize +
2 * ssl->cipher->keySize +
2 * ssl->cipher->ivSize;
/*
Find the right number of iterations to make the requested length key block
*/
keyIter = 1;
while (MD5_HASH_SIZE * keyIter < reqKeyLen) {
keyIter++;
}
if (keyIter > sizeof(salt)/sizeof(char*)) {
psTraceIntInfo("Error: Not enough salt for key length %d\n", reqKeyLen);
return PS_FAILURE;
}
tmp = ssl->sec.keyBlock;
for (i = 0; i < keyIter; i++) {
psSha1Init(&sha1Ctx);
psSha1Update(&sha1Ctx, salt[i], i + 1);
psSha1Update(&sha1Ctx, masterSecret, secretLen);
psSha1Update(&sha1Ctx, serverRandom, SSL_HS_RANDOM_SIZE);
psSha1Update(&sha1Ctx, clientRandom, SSL_HS_RANDOM_SIZE);
psSha1Final(&sha1Ctx, buf);
psMd5Init(&md5Ctx);
psMd5Update(&md5Ctx, masterSecret, secretLen);
psMd5Update(&md5Ctx, buf, SHA1_HASH_SIZE);
psMd5Final(&md5Ctx, tmp);
tmp += MD5_HASH_SIZE;
ret += MD5_HASH_SIZE;
}
memset(buf, 0x0, MD5_HASH_SIZE + SHA1_HASH_SIZE);
/*
Client and server use different read/write values, with the Client
write value being the server read value.
*/
if (ssl->flags & SSL_FLAGS_SERVER) {
ssl->sec.rMACptr = ssl->sec.keyBlock;
ssl->sec.wMACptr = ssl->sec.rMACptr + ssl->cipher->macSize;
ssl->sec.rKeyptr = ssl->sec.wMACptr + ssl->cipher->macSize;
ssl->sec.wKeyptr = ssl->sec.rKeyptr + ssl->cipher->keySize;
ssl->sec.rIVptr = ssl->sec.wKeyptr + ssl->cipher->keySize;
ssl->sec.wIVptr = ssl->sec.rIVptr + ssl->cipher->ivSize;
} else {
ssl->sec.wMACptr = ssl->sec.keyBlock;
ssl->sec.rMACptr = ssl->sec.wMACptr + ssl->cipher->macSize;
ssl->sec.wKeyptr = ssl->sec.rMACptr + ssl->cipher->macSize;
ssl->sec.rKeyptr = ssl->sec.wKeyptr + ssl->cipher->keySize;
ssl->sec.wIVptr = ssl->sec.rKeyptr + ssl->cipher->keySize;
ssl->sec.rIVptr = ssl->sec.wIVptr + ssl->cipher->ivSize;
}
return ret;
}
