static void smtp_connect_local(SMTP_STATE *state, const char *path)
{
const char *myname = "smtp_connect_local";
SMTP_ITERATOR *iter = state->iterator;
SMTP_SESSION *session;
DSN_BUF *why = state->why;
/*
* Do not silently ignore an unused setting.
*/
if (*var_fallback_relay)
msg_warn("ignoring \"%s = %s\" setting for non-TCP connections",
VAR_LMTP_FALLBACK, var_fallback_relay);
/*
* It's too painful to weave this code into the SMTP connection
* management routine.
*
* Connection cache management is based on the UNIX-domain pathname, without
* the "unix:" prefix.
*/
smtp_cache_policy(state, path);
/*
* Here we ensure that the iter->addr member refers to a copy of the
* UNIX-domain pathname, so that smtp_save_session() will cache the
* connection using the pathname as the physical endpoint name.
*
* We set dest=path for backwards compatibility.
*/
#define NO_PORT 0
SMTP_ITER_INIT(iter, path, var_myhostname, path, NO_PORT, state);
/*
* Opportunistic TLS for unix domain sockets does not make much sense,
* since the channel is private, mere encryption without authentication
* is just wasted cycles and opportunity for breakage. Since we are not
* willing to retry after TLS handshake failures here, we downgrade "may"
* no "none". Nothing is lost, and much waste is avoided.
*
* We don't know who is authenticating whom, so if a client cert is
* available, "encrypt" may be a sensible policy. Otherwise, we also
* downgrade "encrypt" to "none", this time just to avoid waste.
*
* We use smtp_reuse_nexthop() instead of smtp_reuse_addr(), so that we can
* reuse a SASL-authenticated connection (however unlikely this scenario
* may be). The smtp_reuse_addr() interface currently supports only reuse
* of SASL-unauthenticated connections.
*/
#ifdef USE_TLS
if (!smtp_tls_policy_cache_query(why, state->tls, iter)) {
msg_warn("TLS policy lookup error for %s/%s: %s",
STR(iter->host), STR(iter->addr), STR(why->reason));
return;
}
#endif
if ((state->misc_flags & SMTP_MISC_FLAG_CONN_LOAD) == 0
|| (session = smtp_reuse_nexthop(state,
SMTP_KEY_MASK_SCACHE_DEST_LABEL)) == 0)
session = smtp_connect_unix(iter, why, state->misc_flags);
if ((state->session = session) != 0) {
session->state = state;
#ifdef USE_TLS
session->tls_nexthop = var_myhostname; /* for TLS_LEV_SECURE */
if (state->tls->level == TLS_LEV_MAY) {
msg_warn("%s: opportunistic TLS encryption is not appropriate "
"for unix-domain destinations.", myname);
state->tls->level = TLS_LEV_NONE;
}
#endif
/* All delivery errors bounce or defer. */
state->misc_flags |= SMTP_MISC_FLAG_FINAL_SERVER;
/*
* When a TLS handshake fails, the stream is marked "dead" to avoid
* further I/O over a broken channel.
*/
if ((session->features & SMTP_FEATURE_FROM_CACHE) == 0
&& smtp_helo(state) != 0) {
if (!THIS_SESSION_IS_FORBIDDEN
&& vstream_ferror(session->stream) == 0
&& vstream_feof(session->stream) == 0)
smtp_quit(state);
} else {
smtp_xfer(state);
}
/*
* With opportunistic TLS disabled we don't expect to be asked to
* retry connections without TLS, and so we expect the final server
* flag to stay on.
*/
if ((state->misc_flags & SMTP_MISC_FLAG_FINAL_SERVER) == 0)
msg_panic("%s: unix-domain destination not final!", myname);
smtp_cleanup_session(state);
}
}
static void smtp_connect_local(SMTP_STATE *state, const char *path)
{
const char *myname = "smtp_connect_local";
SMTP_SESSION *session;
DSN_BUF *why = state->why;
/*
* It's too painful to weave this code into the SMTP connection
* management routine.
*
* Connection cache management is based on the UNIX-domain pathname, without
* the "unix:" prefix.
*/
smtp_cache_policy(state, path);
/*
* XXX We assume that the session->addr member refers to a copy of the
* UNIX-domain pathname, so that smtp_save_session() will cache the
* connection using the pathname as the physical endpoint name.
*/
#define NO_PORT 0
/*
* Opportunistic TLS for unix domain sockets does not make much sense,
* since the channel is private, mere encryption without authentication
* is just wasted cycles and opportunity for breakage. Since we are not
* willing to retry after TLS handshake failures here, we downgrade "may"
* no "none". Nothing is lost, and much waste is avoided.
*
* We don't know who is authenticating whom, so if a client cert is
* available, "encrypt" may be a sensible policy. Otherwise, we also
* downgrade "encrypt" to "none", this time just to avoid waste.
*/
if ((state->misc_flags & SMTP_MISC_FLAG_CONN_LOAD) == 0
|| (session = smtp_reuse_addr(state, path, NO_PORT)) == 0)
session = smtp_connect_unix(path, why, state->misc_flags);
if ((state->session = session) != 0) {
session->state = state;
#ifdef USE_TLS
session->tls_nexthop = var_myhostname; /* for TLS_LEV_SECURE */
if (session->tls_level == TLS_LEV_MAY) {
msg_warn("%s: opportunistic TLS encryption is not appropriate "
"for unix-domain destinations.", myname);
session->tls_level = TLS_LEV_NONE;
}
#endif
/* All delivery errors bounce or defer. */
state->misc_flags |= SMTP_MISC_FLAG_FINAL_SERVER;
/*
* When a TLS handshake fails, the stream is marked "dead" to avoid
* further I/O over a broken channel.
*/
if ((session->features & SMTP_FEATURE_FROM_CACHE) == 0
&& smtp_helo(state) != 0) {
if (!THIS_SESSION_IS_DEAD
&& vstream_ferror(session->stream) == 0
&& vstream_feof(session->stream) == 0)
smtp_quit(state);
} else {
smtp_xfer(state);
}
/*
* With opportunistic TLS disabled we don't expect to be asked to
* retry connections without TLS, and so we expect the final server
* flag to stay on.
*/
if ((state->misc_flags & SMTP_MISC_FLAG_FINAL_SERVER) == 0)
msg_panic("%s: unix-domain destination not final!", myname);
smtp_cleanup_session(state);
}
}