static void
sig_fuzz(struct sshkey *k, const char *sig_alg)
{
	struct fuzz *fuzz;
	u_char *sig, c[] = "some junk to be signed";
	size_t l;
	u_int fuzzers = FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP | FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP | FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP |
	    FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END;

	if (test_is_fast())
		fuzzers &= ~FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP;
	if (test_is_slow())
		fuzzers |= FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP;

	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &l, c, sizeof(c), sig_alg, 0), 0);
	ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(l, 0);
	fuzz = fuzz_begin(fuzzers, sig, l);
	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, l, c, sizeof(c), NULL, 0), 0);
	free(sig);
	TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
	for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
		/* Ensure 1-bit difference at least */
		if (fuzz_matches_original(fuzz))
			continue;
		ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz),
		    c, sizeof(c), NULL, 0), 0);
	}
	fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
}
Example #2
0
static void
signature_test(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *bad, const u_char *d, size_t l)
{
	size_t len;
	u_char *sig;

	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, 0), 0);
	ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(len, 8);
	ASSERT_PTR_NE(sig, NULL);
	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, 0), 0);
	ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(bad, sig, len, d, l, 0), 0);
	/* Fuzz test is more comprehensive, this is just a smoke test */
	sig[len - 5] ^= 0x10;
	ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, 0), 0);
	free(sig);
}
Example #3
0
static void
sig_fuzz(struct sshkey *k)
{
	struct fuzz *fuzz;
	u_char *sig, c[] = "some junk to be signed";
	size_t l;

	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &l, c, sizeof(c), 0), 0);
	ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(l, 0);
	fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP | /* too slow FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP | */
	    FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP | FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP |
	    FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END, sig, l);
	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, l, c, sizeof(c), 0), 0);
	free(sig);
	TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
	for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
		sshkey_verify(k, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz),
		    c, sizeof(c), 0);
	}
	fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
}
Example #4
0
int
key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
    const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
{
	int r;

	if ((r = sshkey_verify(key, signature, signaturelen,
	    data, datalen, datafellows)) != 0) {
		fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, 0);
		error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
		return r == SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID ? 0 : -1;
	}
	return 1;
}
Example #5
0
static int
input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
	Kex *kex = ssh->kex;
	BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL, *shared_secret = NULL;
	struct sshkey *server_host_key;
	u_char *kbuf = NULL, *hash, *signature = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
	size_t klen = 0, slen, sbloblen, hashlen;
	int kout, r;

	debug("got SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY");
	if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL) {
		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
		goto out;
	}
	/* key, cert */
	if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &server_host_key_blob,
	    &sbloblen)) != 0 ||
	    (r = sshkey_from_blob(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
	    &server_host_key)) != 0)
		goto out;
	if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type) {
		r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
		goto out;
	}
	if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key, ssh) == -1) {
		r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
		goto out;
	}
	/* DH parameter f, server public DH key */
	if ((dh_server_pub = BN_new()) == NULL) {
		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
		goto out;
	}
	/* signed H */
	if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, dh_server_pub)) != 0 ||
	    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &signature, &slen)) != 0 ||
	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
		goto out;
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
	fprintf(stderr, "dh_server_pub= ");
	BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_server_pub);
	fprintf(stderr, "\n");
	debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_server_pub));
#endif
	if (!dh_pub_is_valid(kex->dh, dh_server_pub)) {
		sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "bad server public DH value");
		r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
		goto out;
	}

	klen = DH_size(kex->dh);
	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
	    (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
		goto out;
	}
	if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, kex->dh)) < 0 ||
	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) {
		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
		goto out;
	}
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
#endif
	if (ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_DHGEX)
		kex->min = kex->max = -1;

	/* calc and verify H */
	if ((r = kexgex_hash(
	    kex->evp_md,
	    kex->client_version_string,
	    kex->server_version_string,
	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my),
	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer),
	    server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
	    kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max,
	    kex->dh->p, kex->dh->g,
	    kex->dh->pub_key,
	    dh_server_pub,
	    shared_secret,
	    &hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
		goto out;

	if ((r = sshkey_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash,
	    hashlen, ssh->compat)) != 0)
		goto out;

	/* save session id */
	if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
		kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
		kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len);
		if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
			goto out;
		}
		memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
	}

	if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
		r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
 out:
	DH_free(kex->dh);
	kex->dh = NULL;
	if (server_host_key_blob)
		free(server_host_key_blob);
	if (server_host_key)
		sshkey_free(server_host_key);
	if (dh_server_pub)
		BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
	if (kbuf) {
		bzero(kbuf, klen);
		free(kbuf);
	}
	if (shared_secret)
		BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
	if (signature)
		free(signature);
	return r;
}
Example #6
0
static int
input_kex_ecdh_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
	struct ssh *ssh = ctxt;
	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
	const EC_GROUP *group;
	EC_POINT *server_public = NULL;
	EC_KEY *client_key;
	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
	struct sshkey *server_host_key = NULL;
	u_char *server_host_key_blob = NULL, *signature = NULL;
	u_char *kbuf = NULL;
	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
	size_t slen, sbloblen;
	size_t klen = 0, hashlen;
	int r;

	if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL) {
		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
		goto out;
	}
	group = kex->ec_group;
	client_key = kex->ec_client_key;

	/* hostkey */
	if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &server_host_key_blob,
	    &sbloblen)) != 0 ||
	    (r = sshkey_from_blob(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
	    &server_host_key)) != 0)
		goto out;
	if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type ||
	    (kex->hostkey_type == KEY_ECDSA &&
	    server_host_key->ecdsa_nid != kex->hostkey_nid)) {
		r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
		goto out;
	}
	if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key, ssh) == -1) {
		r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
		goto out;
	}

	/* Q_S, server public key */
	/* signed H */
	if ((server_public = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
		goto out;
	}
	if ((r = sshpkt_get_ec(ssh, server_public, group)) != 0 ||
	    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &signature, &slen)) != 0 ||
	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
		goto out;

#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
	fputs("server public key:\n", stderr);
	sshkey_dump_ec_point(group, server_public);
#endif
	if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(group, server_public) != 0) {
		sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "invalid server public key");
		r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
		goto out;
	}

	klen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
	    (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
		goto out;
	}
	if (ECDH_compute_key(kbuf, klen, server_public,
	    client_key, NULL) != (int)klen ||
	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) {
		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
		goto out;
	}

#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
#endif
	/* calc and verify H */
	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
	if ((r = kex_ecdh_hash(
	    kex->hash_alg,
	    group,
	    kex->client_version_string,
	    kex->server_version_string,
	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my),
	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer),
	    server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
	    EC_KEY_get0_public_key(client_key),
	    server_public,
	    shared_secret,
	    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
		goto out;

	if ((r = sshkey_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash,
	    hashlen, ssh->compat)) != 0)
		goto out;

	/* save session id */
	if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
		kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
		kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len);
		if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
			goto out;
		}
		memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
	}

	if ((r = kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
		r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
 out:
	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
	if (kex->ec_client_key) {
		EC_KEY_free(kex->ec_client_key);
		kex->ec_client_key = NULL;
	}
	if (server_public)
		EC_POINT_clear_free(server_public);
	if (kbuf) {
		explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen);
		free(kbuf);
	}
	if (shared_secret)
		BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
	sshkey_free(server_host_key);
	free(server_host_key_blob);
	free(signature);
	return r;
}
Example #7
0
static int
input_kex_c25519_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
	struct sshkey *server_host_key = NULL;
	struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
	u_char *server_pubkey = NULL;
	u_char *server_host_key_blob = NULL, *signature = NULL;
	u_char *hash;
	size_t slen, pklen, sbloblen, hashlen;
	int r;

	if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL) {
		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
		goto out;
	}

	/* hostkey */
	if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &server_host_key_blob,
	    &sbloblen)) != 0 ||
	    (r = sshkey_from_blob(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
	    &server_host_key)) != 0)
		goto out;
	if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type) {
		r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
		goto out;
	}
	if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key, ssh) == -1) {
		r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
		goto out;
	}

	/* Q_S, server public key */
	/* signed H */
	if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &server_pubkey, &pklen)) != 0 ||
	    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &signature, &slen)) != 0 ||
	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
		goto out;
	if (pklen != CURVE25519_SIZE) {
		r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
		goto out;
	}

#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
	dump_digest("server public key:", server_pubkey, CURVE25519_SIZE);
#endif

	if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
		goto out;
	}
	if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key(kex->c25519_client_key, server_pubkey,
	    shared_secret)) < 0)
		goto out;

	/* calc and verify H */
	if ((r = kex_c25519_hash(
	    kex->hash_alg,
	    kex->client_version_string,
	    kex->server_version_string,
	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my),
	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer),
	    server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
	    kex->c25519_client_pubkey,
	    server_pubkey,
	    sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret),
	    &hash, &hashlen)) < 0)
		goto out;

	if ((r = sshkey_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash, hashlen,
	    ssh->compat)) != 0)
		goto out;

	/* save session id */
	if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
		kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
		kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len);
		if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
			goto out;
		}
		memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
	}

	if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret),
	    sshbuf_len(shared_secret))) == 0)
		r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);

	r = 0;
out:
	explicit_bzero(kex->c25519_client_key, sizeof(kex->c25519_client_key));
	free(server_host_key_blob);
	free(server_pubkey);
	free(signature);
	sshkey_free(server_host_key);
	sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
	return r;
}
Example #8
0
static int
userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
{
	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
	struct sshbuf *b;
	struct sshkey *key = NULL;
	char *pkalg, *cuser, *chost;
	u_char *pkblob, *sig;
	size_t alen, blen, slen;
	int r, pktype, authenticated = 0;

	if (!authctxt->valid) {
		debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user", __func__);
		return 0;
	}
	/* XXX use sshkey_froms() */
	if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &pkalg, &alen)) != 0 ||
	    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0 ||
	    (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &chost, NULL)) != 0 ||
	    (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &cuser, NULL)) != 0 ||
	    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &sig, &slen)) != 0)
		fatal("%s: packet parsing: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));

	debug("%s: cuser %s chost %s pkalg %s slen %zu", __func__,
	    cuser, chost, pkalg, slen);
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
	debug("signature:");
	sshbuf_dump_data(sig, siglen, stderr);
#endif
	pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg);
	if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
		/* this is perfectly legal */
		logit("%s: unsupported public key algorithm: %s",
		    __func__, pkalg);
		goto done;
	}
	if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
		error("%s: key_from_blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
		goto done;
	}
	if (key == NULL) {
		error("%s: cannot decode key: %s", __func__, pkalg);
		goto done;
	}
	if (key->type != pktype) {
		error("%s: type mismatch for decoded key "
		    "(received %d, expected %d)", __func__, key->type, pktype);
		goto done;
	}
	if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
	    (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
		error("Refusing RSA key because peer uses unsafe "
		    "signature format");
		goto done;
	}
	if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
	    options.hostbased_key_types, 0) != 1) {
		logit("%s: key type %s not in HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes",
		    __func__, sshkey_type(key));
		goto done;
	}

	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
	/* reconstruct packet */
	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2, session_id2_len)) != 0 ||
	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->user)) != 0 ||
	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "hostbased")) != 0 ||
	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkalg, alen)) != 0 ||
	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0 ||
	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, chost)) != 0 ||
	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, cuser)) != 0)
		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
	sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
#endif

	auth2_record_info(authctxt,
	    "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"", cuser, chost);

	/* test for allowed key and correct signature */
	authenticated = 0;
	if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key)) &&
	    PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
	    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), pkalg, ssh->compat)) == 0)
		authenticated = 1;

	auth2_record_key(authctxt, authenticated, key);
	sshbuf_free(b);
done:
	debug2("%s: authenticated %d", __func__, authenticated);
	sshkey_free(key);
	free(pkalg);
	free(pkblob);
	free(cuser);
	free(chost);
	free(sig);
	return authenticated;
}
Example #9
0
int
mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
	struct sshkey *key;
	u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
	size_t signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
	int r, ret, valid_data = 0;

	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &blob, &bloblen)) != 0 ||
	    (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &signature, &signaturelen)) != 0 ||
	    (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &data, &datalen)) != 0)
		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));

	if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
	  !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
		fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);

	if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, bloblen, &key)) != 0)
		fatal("%s: bad public key blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));

	switch (key_blobtype) {
	case MM_USERKEY:
		valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen);
		break;
	case MM_HOSTKEY:
		valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen,
		    hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost);
		break;
	default:
		valid_data = 0;
		break;
	}
	if (!valid_data)
		fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);

	ret = sshkey_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen,
	    active_state->compat);
	debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
	    __func__, key, (r == 0) ? "verified" : "unverified");

	/* If auth was successful then record key to ensure it isn't reused */
	if (ret == 0)
		auth2_record_userkey(authctxt, key);
	else
		sshkey_free(key);

	free(blob);
	free(signature);
	free(data);

	auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "publickey" : "hostbased";

	monitor_reset_key_state();

	sshbuf_reset(m);
	
	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0)
		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);

	return ret == 0;
}
Example #10
0
int
mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
	struct sshkey *key;
	u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
	size_t signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
	int r, ret, valid_data = 0, encoded_ret;

	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &blob, &bloblen)) != 0 ||
	    (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &signature, &signaturelen)) != 0 ||
	    (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &data, &datalen)) != 0)
		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));

	if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
	  !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
		fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);

	/* XXX use sshkey_froms here; need to change key_blob, etc. */
	if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, bloblen, &key)) != 0)
		fatal("%s: bad public key blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));

	switch (key_blobtype) {
	case MM_USERKEY:
		valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen);
		auth_method = "publickey";
		break;
	case MM_HOSTKEY:
		valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen,
		    hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost);
		auth_method = "hostbased";
		break;
	default:
		valid_data = 0;
		break;
	}
	if (!valid_data)
		fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);

	ret = sshkey_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen,
	    active_state->compat);
	debug3("%s: %s %p signature %s", __func__, auth_method, key,
	    (ret == 0) ? "verified" : "unverified");
	auth2_record_key(authctxt, ret == 0, key);

	free(blob);
	free(signature);
	free(data);

	monitor_reset_key_state();

	sshkey_free(key);
	sshbuf_reset(m);

	/* encode ret != 0 as positive integer, since we're sending u32 */
	encoded_ret = (ret != 0);
	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, encoded_ret)) != 0)
		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);

	return ret == 0;
}