Result
MultiLogCTVerifier::AddLog(Input publicKey)
{
CTLogVerifier log;
Result rv = log.Init(publicKey);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
if (!mLogs.append(Move(log))) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
}
return Success;
}
Result
MultiLogCTVerifier::VerifySingleSCT(SignedCertificateTimestamp&& sct,
const LogEntry& expectedEntry,
Time time,
CTVerifyResult& result)
{
CTLogVerifier* matchingLog = nullptr;
for (auto& log : mLogs) {
if (log.keyId() == sct.logId) {
matchingLog = &log;
break;
}
}
if (!matchingLog) {
// SCT does not match any known log.
return StoreVerifiedSct(result, Move(sct),
SignedCertificateTimestamp::VerificationStatus::UnknownLog);
}
if (!matchingLog->SignatureParametersMatch(sct.signature)) {
// SCT signature parameters do not match the log's.
return StoreVerifiedSct(result, Move(sct),
SignedCertificateTimestamp::VerificationStatus::InvalidSignature);
}
Result rv = matchingLog->Verify(expectedEntry, sct);
if (rv != Success) {
if (rv == Result::ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE) {
return StoreVerifiedSct(result, Move(sct),
SignedCertificateTimestamp::VerificationStatus::InvalidSignature);
}
return rv;
}
// |sct.timestamp| is measured in milliseconds since the epoch,
// ignoring leap seconds. When converting it to a second-level precision
// pkix::Time, we need to round it either up or down. In our case, rounding up
// is more "secure", although practically it does not matter.
Time sctTime = TimeFromEpochInSeconds((sct.timestamp + 999u) / 1000u);
// SCT verified ok, just make sure the timestamp is legitimate.
if (sctTime > time) {
return StoreVerifiedSct(result, Move(sct),
SignedCertificateTimestamp::VerificationStatus::InvalidTimestamp);
}
return StoreVerifiedSct(result, Move(sct),
SignedCertificateTimestamp::VerificationStatus::OK);
}
Result
MultiLogCTVerifier::VerifySingleSCT(SignedCertificateTimestamp&& sct,
const LogEntry& expectedEntry,
uint64_t time,
CTVerifyResult& result)
{
CTLogVerifier* matchingLog = nullptr;
for (auto& log : mLogs) {
if (log.keyId() == sct.logId) {
matchingLog = &log;
break;
}
}
if (!matchingLog) {
// SCT does not match any known log.
return StoreVerifiedSct(result, Move(sct), SCTVerifyStatus::UnknownLog);
}
if (!matchingLog->SignatureParametersMatch(sct.signature)) {
// SCT signature parameters do not match the log's.
return StoreVerifiedSct(result, Move(sct), SCTVerifyStatus::Invalid);
}
Result rv = matchingLog->Verify(expectedEntry, sct);
if (rv != Success) {
if (rv == Result::ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE) {
return StoreVerifiedSct(result, Move(sct), SCTVerifyStatus::Invalid);
}
return rv;
}
// SCT verified ok, just make sure the timestamp is legitimate.
if (sct.timestamp > time) {
return StoreVerifiedSct(result, Move(sct), SCTVerifyStatus::Invalid);
}
return StoreVerifiedSct(result, Move(sct), SCTVerifyStatus::OK);
}