/*
* call-seq:
* cipher.iv = string -> string
*
* Sets the cipher IV. Please note that since you should never be using ECB
* mode, an IV is always explicitly required and should be set prior to
* encryption. The IV itself can be safely transmitted in public, but it
* should be unpredictable to prevent certain kinds of attacks. You may use
* Cipher#random_iv to create a secure random IV.
*
* Only call this method after calling Cipher#encrypt or Cipher#decrypt.
*
* If not explicitly set, the OpenSSL default of an all-zeroes ("\\0") IV is
* used.
*/
static VALUE
ossl_cipher_set_iv(VALUE self, VALUE iv)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
StringValue(iv);
GetCipher(self, ctx);
if (RSTRING_LEN(iv) < EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx))
ossl_raise(eCipherError, "iv length too short");
if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, (unsigned char *)RSTRING_PTR(iv), -1) != 1)
ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
return iv;
}
/*
* Exports an IV from the sshcipher_ctx required to export the key
* state back from the unprivileged child to the privileged parent
* process.
*/
int
cipher_get_keyiv_len(const struct sshcipher_ctx *cc)
{
const struct sshcipher *c = cc->cipher;
int ivlen = 0;
if (c->number == SSH_CIPHER_3DES)
ivlen = 24;
else if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0)
ivlen = 0;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
else
ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&cc->evp);
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
return (ivlen);
}
bool crypt_openssl::decode(unsigned char *datain, int lenin, unsigned char *dataout, int lenout)
{
EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, NULL, NULL);
OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) == 16);
OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) == 16);
EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, iv);
if(!EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, dataout, &lenout, datain, lenin))
{
return false;
}
if(!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, dataout, &lenout))
{
return false;
}
}
int EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
{
int i = 0;
unsigned int l;
if (type != NULL) {
l = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(c);
OPENSSL_assert(l <= sizeof(c->iv));
i = ASN1_TYPE_get_octetstring(type, c->oiv, l);
if (i != (int)l)
return (-1);
else if (i > 0)
memcpy(c->iv, c->oiv, l);
}
return (i);
}
void
cipher_set_keyiv(CipherContext *cc, u_char *iv)
{
Cipher *c = cc->cipher;
u_char *div = NULL;
int evplen = 0;
switch (c->number) {
case SSH_CIPHER_SSH2:
case SSH_CIPHER_DES:
case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
evplen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&cc->evp);
if (evplen == 0)
return;
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L
if (c->evptype == evp_rijndael) {
struct ssh_rijndael_ctx *aesc;
aesc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(&cc->evp);
if (aesc == NULL)
fatal("%s: no rijndael context", __func__);
div = aesc->r_iv;
} else
#endif
{
div = cc->evp.iv;
}
break;
case SSH_CIPHER_3DES: {
struct ssh1_3des_ctx *desc;
desc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(&cc->evp);
if (desc == NULL)
fatal("%s: no 3des context", __func__);
debug3("%s: Installed 3DES IV", __func__);
memcpy(desc->k1.iv, iv, 8);
memcpy(desc->k2.iv, iv + 8, 8);
memcpy(desc->k3.iv, iv + 16, 8);
return;
}
default:
fatal("%s: bad cipher %d", __func__, c->number);
}
memcpy(div, iv, evplen);
}
int csf_ctx_init(CSF_CTX **ctx_out, int *fh, unsigned char *key_data, int key_sz, int page_sz) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ectx;
CSF_CTX *ctx;
ctx = csf_malloc(sizeof(CSF_CTX));
ctx->seek_ptr = ctx->file_sz = 0;
ctx->fh = fh;
ctx->key_sz = key_sz;
ctx->key_data = csf_malloc(ctx->key_sz);
memcpy(ctx->key_data, key_data, ctx->key_sz);
EVP_EncryptInit(&ectx, CIPHER, ctx->key_data, NULL);
ctx->block_sz = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(&ectx);
ctx->iv_sz = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ectx);
/* the combined page size includes the size of the initialization
vector, an integer for the count of bytes on page, and the data block */
ctx->page_sz = page_sz;
/* ensure the page header allocation ends on an even block alignment */
ctx->page_header_sz = (sizeof(CSF_PAGE_HEADER) % ctx->block_sz == 0) ? (sizeof(CSF_PAGE_HEADER) / ctx->block_sz) : (sizeof(CSF_PAGE_HEADER) / ctx->block_sz) + ctx->block_sz;
/* determine unused space avaliable for data */
ctx->data_sz = ctx->page_sz - ctx->iv_sz - ctx->page_header_sz;
assert(ctx->iv_sz % ctx->block_sz == 0);
assert(ctx->page_header_sz % ctx->block_sz == 0);
assert(ctx->data_sz % ctx->block_sz == 0);
assert(ctx->page_sz % ctx->block_sz == 0);
ctx->page_buffer = csf_malloc(ctx->page_sz);
ctx->csf_buffer = csf_malloc(ctx->page_sz);
ctx->scratch_buffer = csf_malloc(ctx->page_sz);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ectx);
ctx->encrypted=1;
TRACE6("csf_init() ctx->data_sz=%d, ctx->page_sz=%d, ctx->block_sz=%d, ctx->iv_sz=%d, ctx->key_sz=%d\n", ctx->data_sz, ctx->page_sz, ctx->block_sz, ctx->iv_sz, ctx->key_sz);
*ctx_out = ctx;
return 0;
}
bool CryptFileDevice::initCipher()
{
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_enc_null();
if (m_aesKeyLength == kAesKeyLength128)
cipher = EVP_aes_128_ctr();
else if (m_aesKeyLength == kAesKeyLength192)
cipher = EVP_aes_192_ctr();
else if (m_aesKeyLength == kAesKeyLength256)
cipher = EVP_aes_256_ctr();
else
Q_ASSERT_X(false, Q_FUNC_INFO, "Unknown value of AesKeyLength");
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL);
int keyLength = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(&ctx);
int ivLength = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
unsigned char key[keyLength];
unsigned char iv[ivLength];
int ok = EVP_BytesToKey(cipher,
EVP_sha256(),
m_salt.isEmpty() ? NULL : (unsigned char *)m_salt.data(),
(unsigned char *)m_password.data(),
m_password.length(),
m_numRounds,
key,
iv);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
if (ok == 0)
return false;
int res = AES_set_encrypt_key(key, keyLength * 8, &m_aesKey);
if (res != 0)
return false;
initCtr(&m_ctrState, iv);
return true;
}
void
cipher_get_keyiv(CipherContext *cc, u_char *iv, u_int len)
{
const Cipher *c = cc->cipher;
int evplen;
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) {
if (len != 0)
fatal("%s: wrong iv length %d != %d", __func__, len, 0);
return;
}
switch (c->number) {
#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
case SSH_CIPHER_NONE:
#endif
case SSH_CIPHER_SSH2:
case SSH_CIPHER_DES:
case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
evplen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&cc->evp);
if (evplen <= 0)
return;
if ((u_int)evplen != len)
fatal("%s: wrong iv length %d != %d", __func__,
evplen, len);
#ifdef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL
if (c->evptype == evp_rijndael)
ssh_rijndael_iv(&cc->evp, 0, iv, len);
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR
if (c->evptype == evp_aes_128_ctr)
ssh_aes_ctr_iv(&cc->evp, 0, iv, len);
else
#endif
memcpy(iv, cc->evp.iv, len);
break;
case SSH_CIPHER_3DES:
ssh1_3des_iv(&cc->evp, 0, iv, 24);
break;
default:
fatal("%s: bad cipher %d", __func__, c->number);
}
}
int
cipher_get_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_char *iv, size_t len)
{
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
const struct sshcipher *c = cc->cipher;
int evplen;
#endif
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) {
if (len != 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
return 0;
}
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0) {
if (len != sizeof(cc->ac_ctx.ctr))
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
memcpy(iv, cc->ac_ctx.ctr, len);
return 0;
}
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0)
return 0;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
evplen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(cc->evp);
if (evplen == 0)
return 0;
else if (evplen < 0)
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
if ((size_t)evplen != len)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
#ifndef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR
if (c->evptype == evp_aes_128_ctr)
ssh_aes_ctr_iv(cc->evp, 0, iv, len);
else
#endif
if (cipher_authlen(c)) {
if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN,
len, iv))
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
} else if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv(cc->evp, iv, len))
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
#endif
return 0;
}
static int sms4_wrap_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
{
EVP_SMS4_WRAP_CTX *wctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_SMS4_WRAP_CTX,ctx);
if (!iv && !key)
return 1;
if (key) {
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx))
sms4_set_encrypt_key(&wctx->ks.ks, key);
else
sms4_set_decrypt_key(&wctx->ks.ks, key);
if (!iv)
wctx->iv = NULL;
}
if (iv) {
memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx));
wctx->iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx);
}
return 1;
}
int
cipher_set_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, const u_char *iv)
{
const struct sshcipher *c = cc->cipher;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
int evplen = 0;
#endif
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0)
return 0;
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0)
return 0;
switch (c->number) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case SSH_CIPHER_NONE:
case SSH_CIPHER_SSH2:
case SSH_CIPHER_DES:
case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
evplen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(cc->evp);
if (evplen <= 0)
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
if (cipher_authlen(c)) {
/* XXX iv arg is const, but EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl isn't */
if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cc->evp,
EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, -1, __UNCONST(iv)))
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
} else
memcpy(cc->evp->iv, iv, evplen);
break;
#endif
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
case SSH_CIPHER_3DES:
return ssh1_3des_iv(cc->evp, 1, __UNCONST(iv), 24);
#endif
default:
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
return 0;
}
int encrypt(unsigned char* buf_in, int buf_in_len,
unsigned char* buf_out, int* buf_out_len, unsigned char* key, int key_len){
int outlen;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
pad_space(key, key_len);
unsigned char iv[] = {0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0};
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
EVP_CipherInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, NULL, NULL, DO_ENCRYPT);
OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(&ctx) == 16);
OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx) == 16);
EVP_CipherInit_ex(&ctx, NULL, NULL, key, iv, DO_ENCRYPT);
EVP_CipherUpdate(&ctx, buf_out, &outlen, buf_in, buf_in_len);
*buf_out_len = outlen;
EVP_CipherFinal_ex(&ctx, buf_out + outlen, &outlen);
*buf_out_len += outlen;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return 1;
}
static int rc2_get_asn1_type_and_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
{
long num=0;
int i=0,l;
int key_bits;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
if (type != NULL)
{
l=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(c);
i=ASN1_TYPE_get_int_octetstring(type,&num,iv,l);
if (i != l)
return(-1);
key_bits =rc2_magic_to_meth((int)num);
if (!key_bits)
return(-1);
if(i > 0) EVP_CipherInit(c, NULL, NULL, iv, -1);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(c, EVP_CTRL_SET_RC2_KEY_BITS, key_bits, NULL);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(c, key_bits / 8);
}
return(i);
}
int do_crypt(Bank *bank, unsigned char *inbuf, unsigned char *res, int do_encrypt)
{
unsigned char outbuf[10000 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
int outlen, len, inlen = strlen((char*)inbuf);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
EVP_CipherInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, NULL, NULL,
do_encrypt);
OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(&ctx) == 16);
OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx) == 16);
EVP_CipherInit_ex(&ctx, NULL, NULL, bank->key, bank->iv, do_encrypt);
if(!EVP_CipherUpdate(&ctx, outbuf, &outlen, inbuf, inlen))
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return 0;
}
memcpy(res, outbuf, outlen);
len = outlen;
if(!EVP_CipherFinal_ex(&ctx, outbuf, &outlen))
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return 0;
}
memcpy(res+len, outbuf, outlen);
len += outlen;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return len;
}
int
cipher_set_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, const u_char *iv)
{
struct sshcipher *c = cc->cipher;
int evplen = 0;
switch (c->number) {
case SSH_CIPHER_SSH2:
case SSH_CIPHER_DES:
case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
evplen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&cc->evp);
if (evplen <= 0)
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
if (c->evptype == evp_aes_128_ctr)
return ssh_aes_ctr_iv(&cc->evp, 1, (u_char *)iv, evplen);
else
memcpy(cc->evp.iv, iv, evplen);
return 0;
case SSH_CIPHER_3DES:
return ssh1_3des_iv(&cc->evp, 1, (u_char *)iv, 24);
default:
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
}
BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec)
{
BIO *b;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
const EVP_CIPHER *ciph;
X509_ALGOR *calg = ec->contentEncryptionAlgorithm;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH], *piv = NULL;
unsigned char *tkey = NULL;
size_t tkeylen = 0;
int ok = 0;
int enc, keep_key = 0;
enc = ec->cipher ? 1 : 0;
b = BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher());
if (!b) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
BIO_get_cipher_ctx(b, &ctx);
if (enc) {
ciph = ec->cipher;
/*
* If not keeping key set cipher to NULL so subsequent calls decrypt.
*/
if (ec->key)
ec->cipher = NULL;
} else {
ciph = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(calg->algorithm);
if (!ciph) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO, CMS_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER);
goto err;
}
}
if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, ciph, NULL, NULL, NULL, enc) <= 0) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
CMS_R_CIPHER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (enc) {
int ivlen;
calg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type(ctx));
/* Generate a random IV if we need one */
ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
if (ivlen > 0) {
if (RAND_bytes(iv, ivlen) <= 0)
goto err;
piv = iv;
}
} else if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(ctx, calg->parameter) <= 0) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
goto err;
}
tkeylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
/* Generate random session key */
if (!enc || !ec->key) {
tkey = OPENSSL_malloc(tkeylen);
if (!tkey) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(ctx, tkey) <= 0)
goto err;
}
if (!ec->key) {
ec->key = tkey;
ec->keylen = tkeylen;
tkey = NULL;
if (enc)
keep_key = 1;
else
ERR_clear_error();
}
if (ec->keylen != tkeylen) {
/* If necessary set key length */
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, ec->keylen) <= 0) {
/*
* Only reveal failure if debugging so we don't leak information
* which may be useful in MMA.
*/
if (enc || ec->debug) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
goto err;
} else {
/* Use random key */
OPENSSL_clear_free(ec->key, ec->keylen);
ec->key = tkey;
ec->keylen = tkeylen;
tkey = NULL;
ERR_clear_error();
}
}
}
if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, ec->key, piv, enc) <= 0) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
CMS_R_CIPHER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (piv) {
calg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new();
if (!calg->parameter) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(ctx, calg->parameter) <= 0) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
ok = 1;
err:
if (!keep_key) {
OPENSSL_clear_free(ec->key, ec->keylen);
ec->key = NULL;
}
OPENSSL_clear_free(tkey, tkeylen);
if (ok)
return b;
BIO_free(b);
return NULL;
}
/* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
*
* etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
* eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
* sess_id: points at the session ID.
* sesslen: the length of the session ID.
* psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
* point to the resulting session.
*
* Returns:
* -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
* 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
* 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
* 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
*/
static int
tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
{
SSL_SESSION *sess;
unsigned char *sdec;
const unsigned char *p;
int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
HMAC_CTX hctx;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
/*
* The API guarantees EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH bytes of space for
* the iv to tlsext_ticket_key_cb(). Since the total space
* required for a session cookie is never less than this,
* this check isn't too strict. The exact check comes later.
*/
if (eticklen < 16 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH)
return 2;
/* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
if (tctx->internal->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
int rv = tctx->internal->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s,
nctick, nctick + 16, &ctx, &hctx, 0);
if (rv < 0) {
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return -1;
}
if (rv == 0) {
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return 2;
}
if (rv == 2)
renew_ticket = 1;
} else {
/* Check key name matches */
if (timingsafe_memcmp(etick,
tctx->internal->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
return 2;
HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->internal->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
16, tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
tctx->internal->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
}
/*
* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
* integrity checks on ticket.
*/
mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
if (mlen < 0) {
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return -1;
}
/* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
if (eticklen <= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx) + mlen) {
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return 2;
}
eticklen -= mlen;
/* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
if (HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0 ||
HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return -1;
}
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
if (timingsafe_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return 2;
}
/* Attempt to decrypt session data */
/* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
sdec = malloc(eticklen);
if (sdec == NULL ||
EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
free(sdec);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return -1;
}
if (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
free(sdec);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return 2;
}
slen += mlen;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
p = sdec;
sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
free(sdec);
if (sess) {
/* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
* detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
* the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
* as required by standard.
*/
if (sesslen)
memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
*psess = sess;
if (renew_ticket)
return 4;
else
return 3;
}
ERR_clear_error();
/* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
* ticket. */
return 2;
}
bool
crypto_aes_decrypt(struct string *ciphertext, struct string *aes_key, struct string *aes_iv, struct string *decrypted)
{
bool retval = false;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
int decryptspace;
int decryptdone;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
(unsigned char *)string_get(aes_key),
(unsigned char *)string_get(aes_iv))) {
log_err("crypto_aes_decrypt: init failed\n");
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
goto bail_out;
}
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&ctx, 1);
if (string_length(aes_key) != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(&ctx)) {
log_err("crypto_aes_decrypt: invalid key size (%" PRIuPTR " vs expected %d)\n",
string_length(aes_key), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(&ctx));
goto bail_out;
}
if (string_length(aes_iv) != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)) {
log_err("crypto_aes_decrypt: invalid iv size (%" PRIuPTR " vs expected %d)\n",
string_length(aes_iv), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
goto bail_out;
}
decryptspace = string_length(ciphertext) + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH;
string_free(decrypted); /* free previous buffer */
string_init(decrypted, decryptspace, 1024);
if (string_size(decrypted) < decryptspace) {
log_err("crypto_aes_decrypt: decrypt buffer malloc error\n");
goto bail_out;
}
if (EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, (unsigned char*)string_get(decrypted),
&decryptdone, (unsigned char*)string_get(ciphertext),
string_length(ciphertext))) {
/* TODO: need cleaner way: */
decrypted->_u._s.length = decryptdone;
} else {
log_err("crypto_aes_decrypt: decrypt failed\n");
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
goto bail_out;
}
if (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ctx,
(unsigned char*)string_get(decrypted)+string_length(decrypted),
&decryptdone)) {
/* TODO: need cleaner way: */
decrypted->_u._s.length += decryptdone;
} else {
log_err("crypto_aes_decrypt: decrypt final failed\n");
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
goto bail_out;
}
retval = true;
bail_out:
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return retval;
}
int
cipher_ctx_iv_length (const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
{
return EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length (ctx);
}
static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
SSL_SESSION **psess)
{
SSL_SESSION *sess;
unsigned char *sdec;
const unsigned char *p;
int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
HMAC_CTX hctx;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
/* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
if (eticklen < 48)
goto tickerr;
/* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
{
unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
&ctx, &hctx, 0);
if (rv < 0)
return -1;
if (rv == 0)
goto tickerr;
if (rv == 2)
renew_ticket = 1;
}
else
{
/* Check key name matches */
if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
goto tickerr;
HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
}
/* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
* integrity checks on ticket.
*/
mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
eticklen -= mlen;
/* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
goto tickerr;
/* Attempt to decrypt session data */
/* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
if (!sdec)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return -1;
}
EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
goto tickerr;
slen += mlen;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
p = sdec;
sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
OPENSSL_free(sdec);
if (sess)
{
/* The session ID if non-empty is used by some clients to
* detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
* the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
* as required by standard.
*/
if (sesslen)
memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
*psess = sess;
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = renew_ticket;
return 1;
}
/* If session decrypt failure indicate a cache miss and set state to
* send a new ticket
*/
tickerr:
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
return 0;
}
static int afalg_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
{
int ciphertype;
int ret;
afalg_ctx *actx;
char ciphername[ALG_MAX_SALG_NAME];
if (ctx == NULL || key == NULL) {
ALG_WARN("%s: Null Parameter\n", __func__);
return 0;
}
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx) == NULL) {
ALG_WARN("%s: Cipher object NULL\n", __func__);
return 0;
}
actx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx);
if (actx == NULL) {
ALG_WARN("%s: Cipher data NULL\n", __func__);
return 0;
}
ciphertype = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid(ctx);
switch (ciphertype) {
case NID_aes_128_cbc:
strncpy(ciphername, "cbc(aes)", ALG_MAX_SALG_NAME);
break;
default:
ALG_WARN("%s: Unsupported Cipher type %d\n", __func__, ciphertype);
return 0;
}
ciphername[ALG_MAX_SALG_NAME-1]='\0';
if (ALG_AES_IV_LEN != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx)) {
ALG_WARN("%s: Unsupported IV length :%d\n", __func__,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx));
return 0;
}
/* Setup AFALG socket for crypto processing */
ret = afalg_create_sk(actx, "skcipher", ciphername);
if (ret < 1)
return 0;
ret = afalg_set_key(actx, key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx));
if (ret < 1)
goto err;
/* Setup AIO ctx to allow async AFALG crypto processing */
if (afalg_init_aio(&actx->aio) == 0)
goto err;
# ifdef ALG_ZERO_COPY
pipe(actx->zc_pipe);
# endif
actx->init_done = MAGIC_INIT_NUM;
return 1;
err:
close(actx->sfd);
close(actx->bfd);
return 0;
}
/*-
* tls13_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| in |recs|.
*
* Returns:
* 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
* short etc).
* 1: if the record encryption was successful.
* -1: if the record's AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
* an internal error occurred.
*/
int tls13_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs, int sending)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
size_t ivlen, taglen, offset, loop;
unsigned char *staticiv;
unsigned char *seq;
int lenu, lenf;
SSL3_RECORD *rec = &recs[0];
uint32_t alg_enc;
if (n_recs != 1) {
/* Should not happen */
/* TODO(TLS1.3): Support pipelining */
return -1;
}
if (sending) {
ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
staticiv = s->write_iv;
seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
} else {
ctx = s->enc_read_ctx;
staticiv = s->read_iv;
seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
}
if (ctx == NULL) {
memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length);
rec->input = rec->data;
return 1;
}
ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
|| s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY) {
alg_enc = s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc;
} else {
/*
* To get here we must have selected a ciphersuite - otherwise ctx would
* be NULL
*/
assert(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL);
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
return -1;
alg_enc = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc;
}
if (alg_enc & SSL_AESCCM) {
if (alg_enc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8))
taglen = EVP_CCM8_TLS_TAG_LEN;
else
taglen = EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
if (sending && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, taglen,
NULL) <= 0)
return -1;
} else if (alg_enc & SSL_AESGCM) {
taglen = EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
} else if (alg_enc & SSL_CHACHA20) {
taglen = EVP_CHACHAPOLY_TLS_TAG_LEN;
} else {
return -1;
}
if (!sending) {
/*
* Take off tag. There must be at least one byte of content type as
* well as the tag
*/
if (rec->length < taglen + 1)
return 0;
rec->length -= taglen;
}
/* Set up IV */
if (ivlen < SEQ_NUM_SIZE) {
/* Should not happen */
return -1;
}
offset = ivlen - SEQ_NUM_SIZE;
memcpy(iv, staticiv, offset);
for (loop = 0; loop < SEQ_NUM_SIZE; loop++)
iv[offset + loop] = staticiv[offset + loop] ^ seq[loop];
/* Increment the sequence counter */
for (loop = SEQ_NUM_SIZE; loop > 0; loop--) {
++seq[loop - 1];
if (seq[loop - 1] != 0)
break;
}
if (loop == 0) {
/* Sequence has wrapped */
return -1;
}
/* TODO(size_t): lenu/lenf should be a size_t but EVP doesn't support it */
if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv, sending) <= 0
|| (!sending && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG,
taglen,
rec->data + rec->length) <= 0)
|| EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, rec->data, &lenu, rec->input,
(unsigned int)rec->length) <= 0
|| EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx, rec->data + lenu, &lenf) <= 0
|| (size_t)(lenu + lenf) != rec->length) {
return -1;
}
if (sending) {
/* Add the tag */
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG, taglen,
rec->data + rec->length) <= 0)
return -1;
rec->length += taglen;
}
return 1;
}
/*-
* tls13_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| in |recs|. Will call SSLfatal() for
* internal errors, but not otherwise.
*
* Returns:
* 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
* short etc).
* 1: if the record encryption was successful.
* -1: if the record's AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
* an internal error occurred.
*/
int tls13_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs, int sending)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH], recheader[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH];
size_t ivlen, taglen, offset, loop, hdrlen;
unsigned char *staticiv;
unsigned char *seq;
int lenu, lenf;
SSL3_RECORD *rec = &recs[0];
uint32_t alg_enc;
WPACKET wpkt;
if (n_recs != 1) {
/* Should not happen */
/* TODO(TLS1.3): Support pipelining */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_ENC,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
if (sending) {
ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
staticiv = s->write_iv;
seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
} else {
ctx = s->enc_read_ctx;
staticiv = s->read_iv;
seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
}
/*
* If we're sending an alert and ctx != NULL then we must be forcing
* plaintext alerts. If we're reading and ctx != NULL then we allow
* plaintext alerts at certain points in the handshake. If we've got this
* far then we have already validated that a plaintext alert is ok here.
*/
if (ctx == NULL || rec->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length);
rec->input = rec->data;
return 1;
}
ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
|| s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY) {
if (s->session != NULL && s->session->ext.max_early_data > 0) {
alg_enc = s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc;
} else {
if (!ossl_assert(s->psksession != NULL
&& s->psksession->ext.max_early_data > 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_ENC,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
alg_enc = s->psksession->cipher->algorithm_enc;
}
} else {
/*
* To get here we must have selected a ciphersuite - otherwise ctx would
* be NULL
*/
if (!ossl_assert(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_ENC,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
alg_enc = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc;
}
if (alg_enc & SSL_AESCCM) {
if (alg_enc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8))
taglen = EVP_CCM8_TLS_TAG_LEN;
else
taglen = EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
if (sending && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, taglen,
NULL) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_ENC,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
} else if (alg_enc & SSL_AESGCM) {
taglen = EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
} else if (alg_enc & SSL_CHACHA20) {
taglen = EVP_CHACHAPOLY_TLS_TAG_LEN;
} else {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_ENC,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
if (!sending) {
/*
* Take off tag. There must be at least one byte of content type as
* well as the tag
*/
if (rec->length < taglen + 1)
return 0;
rec->length -= taglen;
}
/* Set up IV */
if (ivlen < SEQ_NUM_SIZE) {
/* Should not happen */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_ENC,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
offset = ivlen - SEQ_NUM_SIZE;
memcpy(iv, staticiv, offset);
for (loop = 0; loop < SEQ_NUM_SIZE; loop++)
iv[offset + loop] = staticiv[offset + loop] ^ seq[loop];
/* Increment the sequence counter */
for (loop = SEQ_NUM_SIZE; loop > 0; loop--) {
++seq[loop - 1];
if (seq[loop - 1] != 0)
break;
}
if (loop == 0) {
/* Sequence has wrapped */
return -1;
}
/* TODO(size_t): lenu/lenf should be a size_t but EVP doesn't support it */
if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv, sending) <= 0
|| (!sending && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG,
taglen,
rec->data + rec->length) <= 0)) {
return -1;
}
/* Set up the AAD */
if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&wpkt, recheader, sizeof(recheader), 0)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&wpkt, rec->type)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&wpkt, rec->rec_version)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&wpkt, rec->length + taglen)
|| !WPACKET_get_total_written(&wpkt, &hdrlen)
|| hdrlen != SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
|| !WPACKET_finish(&wpkt)) {
WPACKET_cleanup(&wpkt);
return -1;
}
/*
* For CCM we must explicitly set the total plaintext length before we add
* any AAD.
*/
if (((alg_enc & SSL_AESCCM) != 0
&& EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, NULL, &lenu, NULL,
(unsigned int)rec->length) <= 0)
|| EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, NULL, &lenu, recheader,
sizeof(recheader)) <= 0
|| EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, rec->data, &lenu, rec->input,
(unsigned int)rec->length) <= 0
|| EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx, rec->data + lenu, &lenf) <= 0
|| (size_t)(lenu + lenf) != rec->length) {
return -1;
}
if (sending) {
/* Add the tag */
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG, taglen,
rec->data + rec->length) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_ENC,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
rec->length += taglen;
}
return 1;
}
int AesFileEnc::do_crypt(FILE *in, FILE *out, int do_encrypt)
{
/* Allow enough space in output buffer for additional block */
unsigned char inbuf[1024], outbuf[1024 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
int inlen, outlen;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
std::cout << "tutaj";
unsigned char* key = this->key();
// std::cout <<key<<std::endl;
//unsigned char key[] = "0123456789abcdeF";
std::cout <<key<< std::endl;
//unsigned char iv[] = "1234567887654321";
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
switch(this->type)
{
case cbc128:
EVP_CipherInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, NULL, NULL,
do_encrypt);
break;
case cbc192:
EVP_CipherInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_192_cbc(), NULL, NULL, NULL,
do_encrypt);
break;
case cbc256:
EVP_CipherInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL, NULL, NULL,
do_encrypt);
break;
case ecb128:
EVP_CipherInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_ecb(), NULL, NULL, NULL,
do_encrypt);
break;
case ecb192:
EVP_CipherInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_192_ecb(), NULL, NULL, NULL,
do_encrypt);
break;
case ecb256:
EVP_CipherInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_256_ecb(), NULL, NULL, NULL,
do_encrypt);
break;
case cfb128:
EVP_CipherInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cfb(), NULL, NULL, NULL,
do_encrypt);
break;
case cfb192:
EVP_CipherInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_192_cfb(), NULL, NULL, NULL,
do_encrypt);
break;
case cfb256:
EVP_CipherInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_256_cfb(), NULL, NULL, NULL,
do_encrypt);
break;
case ofb128:
EVP_CipherInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_ofb(), NULL, NULL, NULL,
do_encrypt);
break;
case ofb192:
EVP_CipherInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_192_ofb(), NULL, NULL, NULL,
do_encrypt);
break;
case ofb256:
EVP_CipherInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_256_ofb(), NULL, NULL, NULL,
do_encrypt);
break;
}
unsigned char *iv = this->iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
std::cout<< this->keyLength << std::endl;
std::cout<< EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx) <<std::endl;
OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(&ctx) == this->keyLength);
//OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx) == this->keyLength);
EVP_CipherInit_ex(&ctx, NULL, NULL, key, iv, do_encrypt);
for(;;)
{
inlen = fread(inbuf, 1, 1024, in);
if(inlen <= 0) break;
if(!EVP_CipherUpdate(&ctx, outbuf, &outlen, inbuf, inlen))
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return 0;
}
fwrite(outbuf, 1, outlen, out);
}
if(!EVP_CipherFinal_ex(&ctx, outbuf, &outlen))
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return 0;
}
fwrite(outbuf, 1, outlen, out);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return 1;
}
static int sms4_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
{
EVP_SMS4_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_SMS4_GCM_CTX,c);
switch (type) {
case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
gctx->key_set = 0;
gctx->iv_set = 0;
gctx->ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(c);
gctx->iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c);
gctx->taglen = -1;
gctx->iv_gen = 0;
gctx->tls_aad_len = -1;
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN:
if (arg <= 0)
return 0;
/* Allocate memory for IV if needed */
if ((arg > EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) && (arg > gctx->ivlen)) {
if (gctx->iv != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c))
OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv);
gctx->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(arg);
if (gctx->iv == NULL)
return 0;
}
gctx->ivlen = arg;
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG:
if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c))
return 0;
memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), ptr, arg);
gctx->taglen = arg;
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG:
if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c)
|| gctx->taglen < 0)
return 0;
memcpy(ptr, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), arg);
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED:
/* Special case: -1 length restores whole IV */
if (arg == -1) {
memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, gctx->ivlen);
gctx->iv_gen = 1;
return 1;
}
/*
* Fixed field must be at least 4 bytes and invocation field at least
* 8.
*/
if ((arg < 4) || (gctx->ivlen - arg) < 8)
return 0;
if (arg)
memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, arg);
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c)
&& RAND_bytes(gctx->iv + arg, gctx->ivlen - arg) <= 0)
return 0;
gctx->iv_gen = 1;
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN:
if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0)
return 0;
CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
if (arg <= 0 || arg > gctx->ivlen)
arg = gctx->ivlen;
memcpy(ptr, gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, arg);
/*
* Invocation field will be at least 8 bytes in size and so no need
* to check wrap around or increment more than last 8 bytes.
*/
ctr64_inc(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - 8);
gctx->iv_set = 1;
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV:
if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0
|| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c))
return 0;
memcpy(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, ptr, arg);
CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
gctx->iv_set = 1;
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD:
/* Save the AAD for later use */
if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
return 0;
memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), ptr, arg);
gctx->tls_aad_len = arg;
{
unsigned int len =
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 2] << 8
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 1];
/* Correct length for explicit IV */
len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
/* If decrypting correct for tag too */
if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c))
len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 2] = len >> 8;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 1] = len & 0xff;
}
/* Extra padding: tag appended to record */
return EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
case EVP_CTRL_COPY:
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr;
EVP_SMS4_GCM_CTX *gctx_out = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_SMS4_GCM_CTX,out);
if (gctx->gcm.key) {
if (gctx->gcm.key != &gctx->ks)
return 0;
gctx_out->gcm.key = &gctx_out->ks;
}
if (gctx->iv == EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c))
gctx_out->iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(out);
else {
gctx_out->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(gctx->ivlen);
if (gctx_out->iv == NULL)
return 0;
memcpy(gctx_out->iv, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
}
return 1;
}
default:
return -1;
}
}
static int cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
{
struct cipher_ctx *cipher_ctx =
(struct cipher_ctx *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx);
struct crypt_op cryp;
unsigned char *iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx);
#if !defined(COP_FLAG_WRITE_IV)
unsigned char saved_iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
const unsigned char *ivptr;
size_t nblocks, ivlen;
#endif
memset(&cryp, 0, sizeof(cryp));
cryp.ses = cipher_ctx->sess.ses;
cryp.len = inl;
cryp.src = (void *)in;
cryp.dst = (void *)out;
cryp.iv = (void *)iv;
cryp.op = cipher_ctx->op;
#if !defined(COP_FLAG_WRITE_IV)
cryp.flags = 0;
ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
if (ivlen > 0)
switch (cipher_ctx->mode) {
case EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE:
assert(inl >= ivlen);
if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
ivptr = in + inl - ivlen;
memcpy(saved_iv, ivptr, ivlen);
}
break;
case EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE:
break;
default: /* should not happen */
return 0;
}
#else
cryp.flags = COP_FLAG_WRITE_IV;
#endif
if (ioctl(cfd, CIOCCRYPT, &cryp) < 0) {
SYSerr(SYS_F_IOCTL, errno);
return 0;
}
#if !defined(COP_FLAG_WRITE_IV)
if (ivlen > 0)
switch (cipher_ctx->mode) {
case EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE:
assert(inl >= ivlen);
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx))
ivptr = out + inl - ivlen;
else
ivptr = saved_iv;
memcpy(iv, ivptr, ivlen);
break;
case EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE:
nblocks = (inl + cipher_ctx->blocksize - 1)
/ cipher_ctx->blocksize;
do {
ivlen--;
nblocks += iv[ivlen];
iv[ivlen] = (uint8_t) nblocks;
nblocks >>= 8;
} while (ivlen);
break;
default: /* should not happen */
return 0;
}
#endif
return 1;
}
static int ssl_encrypt_ticket_with_cipher_ctx(SSL *ssl, CBB *out,
const uint8_t *session_buf,
size_t session_len) {
int ret = 0;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
HMAC_CTX hctx;
HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
/* If the session is too long, emit a dummy value rather than abort the
* connection. */
static const size_t kMaxTicketOverhead =
16 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE;
if (session_len > 0xffff - kMaxTicketOverhead) {
static const char kTicketPlaceholder[] = "TICKET TOO LARGE";
if (CBB_add_bytes(out, (const uint8_t *)kTicketPlaceholder,
strlen(kTicketPlaceholder))) {
ret = 1;
}
goto err;
}
/* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does all the
* work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. */
SSL_CTX *tctx = ssl->session_ctx;
uint8_t iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
uint8_t key_name[16];
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb != NULL) {
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(ssl, key_name, iv, &ctx, &hctx,
1 /* encrypt */) < 0) {
goto err;
}
} else {
if (!RAND_bytes(iv, 16) ||
!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv) ||
!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, tlsext_tick_md(),
NULL)) {
goto err;
}
OPENSSL_memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
}
uint8_t *ptr;
if (!CBB_add_bytes(out, key_name, 16) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(out, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)) ||
!CBB_reserve(out, &ptr, session_len + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH)) {
goto err;
}
size_t total = 0;
#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
OPENSSL_memcpy(ptr, session_buf, session_len);
total = session_len;
#else
int len;
if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, ptr + total, &len, session_buf, session_len)) {
goto err;
}
total += len;
if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ctx, ptr + total, &len)) {
goto err;
}
total += len;
#endif
if (!CBB_did_write(out, total)) {
goto err;
}
unsigned hlen;
if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, CBB_data(out), CBB_len(out)) ||
!CBB_reserve(out, &ptr, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE) ||
!HMAC_Final(&hctx, ptr, &hlen) ||
!CBB_did_write(out, hlen)) {
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
return ret;
}
int EVP_CipherInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, ENGINE *impl,
const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
{
if (enc == -1)
enc = ctx->encrypt;
else
{
if (enc)
enc = 1;
ctx->encrypt = enc;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_FIPS
if(FIPS_selftest_failed())
{
FIPSerr(FIPS_F_EVP_CIPHERINIT_EX,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
ctx->cipher = &bad_cipher;
return 0;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
/* Whether it's nice or not, "Inits" can be used on "Final"'d contexts
* so this context may already have an ENGINE! Try to avoid releasing
* the previous handle, re-querying for an ENGINE, and having a
* reinitialisation, when it may all be unecessary. */
if (ctx->engine && ctx->cipher && (!cipher ||
(cipher && (cipher->nid == ctx->cipher->nid))))
goto skip_to_init;
#endif
if (cipher)
{
/* Ensure a context left lying around from last time is cleared
* (the previous check attempted to avoid this if the same
* ENGINE and EVP_CIPHER could be used). */
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
/* Restore encrypt field: it is zeroed by cleanup */
ctx->encrypt = enc;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
if (!do_evp_enc_engine(ctx, &cipher, impl))
return 0;
#endif
ctx->cipher=cipher;
if (ctx->cipher->ctx_size)
{
ctx->cipher_data=OPENSSL_malloc(ctx->cipher->ctx_size);
if (!ctx->cipher_data)
{
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHERINIT_EX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
}
else
{
ctx->cipher_data = NULL;
}
ctx->key_len = cipher->key_len;
ctx->flags = 0;
if(ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT)
{
if(!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_INIT, 0, NULL))
{
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHERINIT_EX, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
}
else if(!ctx->cipher)
{
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHERINIT_EX, EVP_R_NO_CIPHER_SET);
return 0;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
skip_to_init:
#endif
/* we assume block size is a power of 2 in *cryptUpdate */
OPENSSL_assert(ctx->cipher->block_size == 1
|| ctx->cipher->block_size == 8
|| ctx->cipher->block_size == 16);
if(!(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_flags(ctx) & EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV)) {
switch(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx)) {
case EVP_CIPH_STREAM_CIPHER:
case EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE:
break;
case EVP_CIPH_CFB_MODE:
case EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE:
ctx->num = 0;
case EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE:
OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) <=
(int)sizeof(ctx->iv));
if(iv) memcpy(ctx->oiv, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx));
memcpy(ctx->iv, ctx->oiv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx));
break;
default:
return 0;
break;
}
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
/* After 'key' is set no further parameters changes are permissible.
* So only check for non FIPS enabling at this point.
*/
if (key && FIPS_mode())
{
if (!(ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS)
& !(ctx->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW))
{
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHERINIT_EX, EVP_R_DISABLED_FOR_FIPS);
#if 0
ERR_add_error_data(2, "cipher=",
EVP_CIPHER_name(ctx->cipher));
#endif
ctx->cipher = &bad_cipher;
return 0;
}
}
#endif
if(key || (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT)) {
if(!ctx->cipher->init(ctx,key,iv,enc)) return 0;
}
ctx->buf_len=0;
ctx->final_used=0;
ctx->block_mask=ctx->cipher->block_size-1;
return 1;
}
CMS_RecipientInfo *
CMS_add0_recipient_password(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, int iter, int wrap_nid,
int pbe_nid, unsigned char *pass, ssize_t passlen,
const EVP_CIPHER *kekciph)
{
CMS_RecipientInfo *ri = NULL;
CMS_EnvelopedData *env;
CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo *pwri;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
X509_ALGOR *encalg = NULL;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
int ivlen;
env = cms_get0_enveloped(cms);
if (!env)
return NULL;
if (wrap_nid <= 0)
wrap_nid = NID_id_alg_PWRI_KEK;
if (pbe_nid <= 0)
pbe_nid = NID_id_pbkdf2;
/* Get from enveloped data */
if (kekciph == NULL)
kekciph = env->encryptedContentInfo->cipher;
if (kekciph == NULL) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, CMS_R_NO_CIPHER);
return NULL;
}
if (wrap_nid != NID_id_alg_PWRI_KEK) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD,
CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM);
return NULL;
}
/* Setup algorithm identifier for cipher */
encalg = X509_ALGOR_new();
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, kekciph, NULL, NULL, NULL) <= 0) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
if (ivlen > 0) {
arc4random_buf(iv, ivlen);
if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv) <= 0) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD,
ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
encalg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new();
if (!encalg->parameter) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(&ctx, encalg->parameter) <= 0) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD,
CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
encalg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type(&ctx));
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
/* Initialize recipient info */
ri = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientInfo);
if (!ri)
goto merr;
ri->d.pwri = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo);
if (!ri->d.pwri)
goto merr;
ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS;
pwri = ri->d.pwri;
/* Since this is overwritten, free up empty structure already there */
X509_ALGOR_free(pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm);
pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm = X509_ALGOR_new();
if (!pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm)
goto merr;
pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(wrap_nid);
pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new();
if (!pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->parameter)
goto merr;
if (!ASN1_item_pack(encalg, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_ALGOR),
&pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->parameter->value.sequence))
goto merr;
pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->parameter->type = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
X509_ALGOR_free(encalg);
encalg = NULL;
/* Setup PBE algorithm */
pwri->keyDerivationAlgorithm = PKCS5_pbkdf2_set(iter, NULL, 0, -1, -1);
if (!pwri->keyDerivationAlgorithm)
goto err;
CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_password(ri, pass, passlen);
pwri->version = 0;
if (!sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_push(env->recipientInfos, ri))
goto merr;
return ri;
merr:
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
err:
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
if (ri)
M_ASN1_free_of(ri, CMS_RecipientInfo);
if (encalg)
X509_ALGOR_free(encalg);
return NULL;
}
/** Encrypt some data.
* \param key_count Number of keys in the \a target array.
* \param target Array of keys. Anyone who owns any of these keys will be
* able to decrypt the data. These keys must include public key data.
* \param data Group to encrypt. Will be replaced by an encrypted group.
* \return Nonzero iff the operation succeeded.
* \sa gale_crypto_target(), gale_crypto_open() */
int gale_crypto_seal(
int key_count,const struct gale_group *target,
struct gale_group *data)
{
struct gale_fragment frag;
struct gale_data plain,cipher;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *context = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
int i,*session_key_length;
unsigned char **session_key,iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
struct gale_text *raw_name;
EVP_PKEY **public_key;
RSA *rsa;
int good_count = 0,is_successful = 0;
plain.p = gale_malloc(gale_group_size(*data) + gale_u32_size());
plain.l = 0;
gale_pack_u32(&plain,0); /* version identifier? */
gale_pack_group(&plain,*data);
*data = gale_group_empty();
gale_create_array(raw_name,key_count);
gale_create_array(public_key,key_count);
for (i = 0; i < key_count; ++i) public_key[i] = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < key_count; ++i) {
public_key[good_count] = EVP_PKEY_new();
EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(public_key[good_count],RSA_new());
rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(public_key[good_count]);
raw_name[good_count] = key_i_swizzle(crypto_i_rsa(
target[i],rsa));
if (0 != raw_name[good_count].l
&& crypto_i_public_valid(rsa))
++good_count;
else
EVP_PKEY_free(public_key[good_count]);
}
gale_create_array(session_key_length,good_count);
gale_create_array(session_key,good_count);
for (i = 0; i < good_count; ++i)
gale_create_array(session_key[i],EVP_PKEY_size(public_key[i]));
crypto_i_seed();
if (!EVP_SealInit(context,EVP_des_ede3_cbc(),
session_key,session_key_length,iv,public_key,good_count)) {
crypto_i_error();
goto cleanup;
}
cipher.l = gale_copy_size(sizeof(magic2))
+ gale_copy_size(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(context))
+ gale_u32_size()
+ plain.l + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(context) - 1;
for (i = 0; i < good_count; ++i)
cipher.l += gale_text_size(raw_name[i])
+ gale_u32_size()
+ gale_copy_size(session_key_length[i]);
cipher.p = gale_malloc(cipher.l);
cipher.l = 0;
assert(IV_LEN == EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(context));
gale_pack_copy(&cipher,magic2,sizeof(magic2));
gale_pack_copy(&cipher,iv,IV_LEN);
gale_pack_u32(&cipher,good_count);
for (i = 0; i < good_count; ++i) {
gale_pack_text(&cipher,raw_name[i]);
gale_pack_u32(&cipher,session_key_length[i]);
gale_pack_copy(&cipher,session_key[i],session_key_length[i]);
}
EVP_SealUpdate(context,cipher.p + cipher.l,&i,plain.p,plain.l);
cipher.l += i;
EVP_SealFinal(context,cipher.p + cipher.l,&i);
cipher.l += i;
frag.type = frag_data;
frag.name = G_("security/encryption");
frag.value.data = cipher;
gale_group_add(data,frag);
is_successful = 1;
cleanup:
for (i = 0; i < good_count; ++i)
if (NULL != public_key[i]) EVP_PKEY_free(public_key[i]);
return is_successful;
}