CK_RV
C_Verify(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
CK_ULONG ulDataLen,
CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,
CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen)
{
struct session_state *state;
struct st_object *o;
const AlgorithmIdentifier *alg;
CK_RV ret;
int hret;
heim_octet_string data, sig;
INIT_CONTEXT();
st_logf("Verify\n");
VERIFY_SESSION_HANDLE(hSession, &state);
if (state->verify_object == -1)
return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
o = soft_token.object.objs[state->verify_object];
switch(state->verify_mechanism->mechanism) {
case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
alg = hx509_signature_rsa_pkcs1_x509();
break;
default:
ret = CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
goto out;
}
sig.data = pData;
sig.length = ulDataLen;
data.data = pSignature;
data.length = ulSignatureLen;
hret = _hx509_verify_signature(context,
o->cert,
alg,
&data,
&sig);
if (hret) {
ret = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
goto out;
}
ret = CKR_OK;
out:
return ret;
}
int
hx509_cms_verify_signed(hx509_context context,
hx509_verify_ctx ctx,
unsigned int flags,
const void *data,
size_t length,
const heim_octet_string *signedContent,
hx509_certs pool,
heim_oid *contentType,
heim_octet_string *content,
hx509_certs *signer_certs)
{
SignerInfo *signer_info;
hx509_cert cert = NULL;
hx509_certs certs = NULL;
SignedData sd;
size_t size;
int ret, found_valid_sig;
size_t i;
*signer_certs = NULL;
content->data = NULL;
content->length = 0;
contentType->length = 0;
contentType->components = NULL;
memset(&sd, 0, sizeof(sd));
ret = decode_SignedData(data, length, &sd, &size);
if (ret) {
hx509_set_error_string(context, 0, ret,
"Failed to decode SignedData");
goto out;
}
if (sd.encapContentInfo.eContent == NULL && signedContent == NULL) {
ret = HX509_CMS_NO_DATA_AVAILABLE;
hx509_set_error_string(context, 0, ret,
"No content data in SignedData");
goto out;
}
if (sd.encapContentInfo.eContent && signedContent) {
ret = HX509_CMS_NO_DATA_AVAILABLE;
hx509_set_error_string(context, 0, ret,
"Both external and internal SignedData");
goto out;
}
if (sd.encapContentInfo.eContent)
ret = der_copy_octet_string(sd.encapContentInfo.eContent, content);
else
ret = der_copy_octet_string(signedContent, content);
if (ret) {
hx509_set_error_string(context, 0, ret, "malloc: out of memory");
goto out;
}
ret = hx509_certs_init(context, "MEMORY:cms-cert-buffer",
0, NULL, &certs);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = hx509_certs_init(context, "MEMORY:cms-signer-certs",
0, NULL, signer_certs);
if (ret)
goto out;
/* XXX Check CMS version */
ret = any_to_certs(context, &sd, certs);
if (ret)
goto out;
if (pool) {
ret = hx509_certs_merge(context, certs, pool);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
for (found_valid_sig = 0, i = 0; i < sd.signerInfos.len; i++) {
heim_octet_string signed_data;
const heim_oid *match_oid;
heim_oid decode_oid;
signer_info = &sd.signerInfos.val[i];
match_oid = NULL;
if (signer_info->signature.length == 0) {
ret = HX509_CMS_MISSING_SIGNER_DATA;
hx509_set_error_string(context, 0, ret,
"SignerInfo %d in SignedData "
"missing sigature", i);
continue;
}
ret = find_CMSIdentifier(context, &signer_info->sid, certs,
_hx509_verify_get_time(ctx), &cert,
HX509_QUERY_KU_DIGITALSIGNATURE);
if (ret) {
/**
* If HX509_CMS_VS_NO_KU_CHECK is set, allow more liberal
* search for matching certificates by not considering
* KeyUsage bits on the certificates.
*/
if ((flags & HX509_CMS_VS_NO_KU_CHECK) == 0)
continue;
ret = find_CMSIdentifier(context, &signer_info->sid, certs,
_hx509_verify_get_time(ctx), &cert,
0);
if (ret)
continue;
}
if (signer_info->signedAttrs) {
const Attribute *attr;
CMSAttributes sa;
heim_octet_string os;
sa.val = signer_info->signedAttrs->val;
sa.len = signer_info->signedAttrs->len;
/* verify that sigature exists */
attr = find_attribute(&sa, &asn1_oid_id_pkcs9_messageDigest);
if (attr == NULL) {
ret = HX509_CRYPTO_SIGNATURE_MISSING;
hx509_set_error_string(context, 0, ret,
"SignerInfo have signed attributes "
"but messageDigest (signature) "
"is missing");
goto next_sigature;
}
if (attr->value.len != 1) {
ret = HX509_CRYPTO_SIGNATURE_MISSING;
hx509_set_error_string(context, 0, ret,
"SignerInfo have more then one "
"messageDigest (signature)");
goto next_sigature;
}
ret = decode_MessageDigest(attr->value.val[0].data,
attr->value.val[0].length,
&os,
&size);
if (ret) {
hx509_set_error_string(context, 0, ret,
"Failed to decode "
"messageDigest (signature)");
goto next_sigature;
}
ret = _hx509_verify_signature(context,
NULL,
&signer_info->digestAlgorithm,
content,
&os);
der_free_octet_string(&os);
if (ret) {
hx509_set_error_string(context, HX509_ERROR_APPEND, ret,
"Failed to verify messageDigest");
goto next_sigature;
}
/*
* Fetch content oid inside signedAttrs or set it to
* id-pkcs7-data.
*/
attr = find_attribute(&sa, &asn1_oid_id_pkcs9_contentType);
if (attr == NULL) {
match_oid = &asn1_oid_id_pkcs7_data;
} else {
if (attr->value.len != 1) {
ret = HX509_CMS_DATA_OID_MISMATCH;
hx509_set_error_string(context, 0, ret,
"More then one oid in signedAttrs");
goto next_sigature;
}
ret = decode_ContentType(attr->value.val[0].data,
attr->value.val[0].length,
&decode_oid,
&size);
if (ret) {
hx509_set_error_string(context, 0, ret,
"Failed to decode "
"oid in signedAttrs");
goto next_sigature;
}
match_oid = &decode_oid;
}
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(CMSAttributes,
signed_data.data,
signed_data.length,
&sa,
&size, ret);
if (ret) {
if (match_oid == &decode_oid)
der_free_oid(&decode_oid);
hx509_clear_error_string(context);
goto next_sigature;
}
if (size != signed_data.length)
_hx509_abort("internal ASN.1 encoder error");
} else {
signed_data.data = content->data;
signed_data.length = content->length;
match_oid = &asn1_oid_id_pkcs7_data;
}
/**
* If HX509_CMS_VS_ALLOW_DATA_OID_MISMATCH, allow
* encapContentInfo mismatch with the oid in signedAttributes
* (or if no signedAttributes where use, pkcs7-data oid).
* This is only needed to work with broken CMS implementations
* that doesn't follow CMS signedAttributes rules.
*/
if (der_heim_oid_cmp(match_oid, &sd.encapContentInfo.eContentType) &&
(flags & HX509_CMS_VS_ALLOW_DATA_OID_MISMATCH) == 0) {
ret = HX509_CMS_DATA_OID_MISMATCH;
hx509_set_error_string(context, 0, ret,
"Oid in message mismatch from the expected");
}
if (match_oid == &decode_oid)
der_free_oid(&decode_oid);
if (ret == 0) {
ret = hx509_verify_signature(context,
cert,
&signer_info->signatureAlgorithm,
&signed_data,
&signer_info->signature);
if (ret)
hx509_set_error_string(context, HX509_ERROR_APPEND, ret,
"Failed to verify signature in "
"CMS SignedData");
}
if (signer_info->signedAttrs)
free(signed_data.data);
if (ret)
goto next_sigature;
/**
* If HX509_CMS_VS_NO_VALIDATE flags is set, do not verify the
* signing certificates and leave that up to the caller.
*/
if ((flags & HX509_CMS_VS_NO_VALIDATE) == 0) {
ret = hx509_verify_path(context, ctx, cert, certs);
if (ret)
goto next_sigature;
}
ret = hx509_certs_add(context, *signer_certs, cert);
if (ret)
goto next_sigature;
found_valid_sig++;
next_sigature:
if (cert)
hx509_cert_free(cert);
cert = NULL;
}
/**
* If HX509_CMS_VS_ALLOW_ZERO_SIGNER is set, allow empty
* SignerInfo (no signatures). If SignedData have no signatures,
* the function will return 0 with signer_certs set to NULL. Zero
* signers is allowed by the standard, but since its only useful
* in corner cases, it make into a flag that the caller have to
* turn on.
*/
if (sd.signerInfos.len == 0 && (flags & HX509_CMS_VS_ALLOW_ZERO_SIGNER)) {
if (*signer_certs)
hx509_certs_free(signer_certs);
} else if (found_valid_sig == 0) {
if (ret == 0) {
ret = HX509_CMS_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND;
hx509_set_error_string(context, 0, ret,
"No signers where found");
}
goto out;
}
ret = der_copy_oid(&sd.encapContentInfo.eContentType, contentType);
if (ret) {
hx509_clear_error_string(context);
goto out;
}
out:
free_SignedData(&sd);
if (certs)
hx509_certs_free(&certs);
if (ret) {
if (content->data)
der_free_octet_string(content);
if (*signer_certs)
hx509_certs_free(signer_certs);
der_free_oid(contentType);
der_free_octet_string(content);
}
return ret;
}
int
hx509_revoke_verify(hx509_context context,
hx509_revoke_ctx ctx,
hx509_certs certs,
time_t now,
hx509_cert cert,
hx509_cert parent_cert)
{
const Certificate *c = _hx509_get_cert(cert);
const Certificate *p = _hx509_get_cert(parent_cert);
unsigned long i, j, k;
int ret;
hx509_clear_error_string(context);
for (i = 0; i < ctx->ocsps.len; i++) {
struct revoke_ocsp *ocsp = &ctx->ocsps.val[i];
struct stat sb;
/* check this ocsp apply to this cert */
/* check if there is a newer version of the file */
ret = stat(ocsp->path, &sb);
if (ret == 0 && ocsp->last_modfied != sb.st_mtime) {
ret = load_ocsp(context, ocsp);
if (ret)
continue;
}
/* verify signature in ocsp if not already done */
if (ocsp->signer == NULL) {
ret = verify_ocsp(context, ocsp, now, certs, parent_cert);
if (ret)
continue;
}
for (j = 0; j < ocsp->ocsp.tbsResponseData.responses.len; j++) {
heim_octet_string os;
ret = der_heim_integer_cmp(&ocsp->ocsp.tbsResponseData.responses.val[j].certID.serialNumber,
&c->tbsCertificate.serialNumber);
if (ret != 0)
continue;
/* verify issuer hashes hash */
ret = _hx509_verify_signature(context,
NULL,
&ocsp->ocsp.tbsResponseData.responses.val[i].certID.hashAlgorithm,
&c->tbsCertificate.issuer._save,
&ocsp->ocsp.tbsResponseData.responses.val[i].certID.issuerNameHash);
if (ret != 0)
continue;
os.data = p->tbsCertificate.subjectPublicKeyInfo.subjectPublicKey.data;
os.length = p->tbsCertificate.subjectPublicKeyInfo.subjectPublicKey.length / 8;
ret = _hx509_verify_signature(context,
NULL,
&ocsp->ocsp.tbsResponseData.responses.val[j].certID.hashAlgorithm,
&os,
&ocsp->ocsp.tbsResponseData.responses.val[j].certID.issuerKeyHash);
if (ret != 0)
continue;
switch (ocsp->ocsp.tbsResponseData.responses.val[j].certStatus.element) {
case choice_OCSPCertStatus_good:
break;
case choice_OCSPCertStatus_revoked:
hx509_set_error_string(context, 0,
HX509_CERT_REVOKED,
"Certificate revoked by issuer in OCSP");
return HX509_CERT_REVOKED;
case choice_OCSPCertStatus_unknown:
continue;
}
/* don't allow the update to be in the future */
if (ocsp->ocsp.tbsResponseData.responses.val[j].thisUpdate >
now + context->ocsp_time_diff)
continue;
/* don't allow the next update to be in the past */
if (ocsp->ocsp.tbsResponseData.responses.val[j].nextUpdate) {
if (*ocsp->ocsp.tbsResponseData.responses.val[j].nextUpdate < now)
continue;
} /* else should force a refetch, but can we ? */
return 0;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < ctx->crls.len; i++) {
struct revoke_crl *crl = &ctx->crls.val[i];
struct stat sb;
int diff;
/* check if cert.issuer == crls.val[i].crl.issuer */
ret = _hx509_name_cmp(&c->tbsCertificate.issuer,
&crl->crl.tbsCertList.issuer, &diff);
if (ret || diff)
continue;
ret = stat(crl->path, &sb);
if (ret == 0 && crl->last_modfied != sb.st_mtime) {
CRLCertificateList cl;
ret = load_crl(crl->path, &crl->last_modfied, &cl);
if (ret == 0) {
free_CRLCertificateList(&crl->crl);
crl->crl = cl;
crl->verified = 0;
crl->failed_verify = 0;
}
}
if (crl->failed_verify)
continue;
/* verify signature in crl if not already done */
if (crl->verified == 0) {
ret = verify_crl(context, ctx, &crl->crl, now, certs, parent_cert);
if (ret) {
crl->failed_verify = 1;
continue;
}
crl->verified = 1;
}
if (crl->crl.tbsCertList.crlExtensions) {
for (j = 0; j < crl->crl.tbsCertList.crlExtensions->len; j++) {
if (crl->crl.tbsCertList.crlExtensions->val[j].critical) {
hx509_set_error_string(context, 0,
HX509_CRL_UNKNOWN_EXTENSION,
"Unknown CRL extension");
return HX509_CRL_UNKNOWN_EXTENSION;
}
}
}
if (crl->crl.tbsCertList.revokedCertificates == NULL)
return 0;
/* check if cert is in crl */
for (j = 0; j < crl->crl.tbsCertList.revokedCertificates->len; j++) {
time_t t;
ret = der_heim_integer_cmp(&crl->crl.tbsCertList.revokedCertificates->val[j].userCertificate,
&c->tbsCertificate.serialNumber);
if (ret != 0)
continue;
t = _hx509_Time2time_t(&crl->crl.tbsCertList.revokedCertificates->val[j].revocationDate);
if (t > now)
continue;
if (crl->crl.tbsCertList.revokedCertificates->val[j].crlEntryExtensions)
for (k = 0; k < crl->crl.tbsCertList.revokedCertificates->val[j].crlEntryExtensions->len; k++)
if (crl->crl.tbsCertList.revokedCertificates->val[j].crlEntryExtensions->val[k].critical)
return HX509_CRL_UNKNOWN_EXTENSION;
hx509_set_error_string(context, 0,
HX509_CERT_REVOKED,
"Certificate revoked by issuer in CRL");
return HX509_CERT_REVOKED;
}
return 0;
}
if (context->flags & HX509_CTX_VERIFY_MISSING_OK)
return 0;
hx509_set_error_string(context, HX509_ERROR_APPEND,
HX509_REVOKE_STATUS_MISSING,
"No revoke status found for "
"certificates");
return HX509_REVOKE_STATUS_MISSING;
}
int
hx509_ocsp_verify(hx509_context context,
time_t now,
hx509_cert cert,
int flags,
const void *data, size_t length,
time_t *expiration)
{
const Certificate *c = _hx509_get_cert(cert);
OCSPBasicOCSPResponse basic;
int ret;
size_t i;
if (now == 0)
now = time(NULL);
*expiration = 0;
ret = parse_ocsp_basic(data, length, &basic);
if (ret) {
hx509_set_error_string(context, 0, ret,
"Failed to parse OCSP response");
return ret;
}
for (i = 0; i < basic.tbsResponseData.responses.len; i++) {
ret = der_heim_integer_cmp(&basic.tbsResponseData.responses.val[i].certID.serialNumber,
&c->tbsCertificate.serialNumber);
if (ret != 0)
continue;
/* verify issuer hashes hash */
ret = _hx509_verify_signature(context,
NULL,
&basic.tbsResponseData.responses.val[i].certID.hashAlgorithm,
&c->tbsCertificate.issuer._save,
&basic.tbsResponseData.responses.val[i].certID.issuerNameHash);
if (ret != 0)
continue;
switch (basic.tbsResponseData.responses.val[i].certStatus.element) {
case choice_OCSPCertStatus_good:
break;
case choice_OCSPCertStatus_revoked:
case choice_OCSPCertStatus_unknown:
continue;
}
/* don't allow the update to be in the future */
if (basic.tbsResponseData.responses.val[i].thisUpdate >
now + context->ocsp_time_diff)
continue;
/* don't allow the next update to be in the past */
if (basic.tbsResponseData.responses.val[i].nextUpdate) {
if (*basic.tbsResponseData.responses.val[i].nextUpdate < now)
continue;
*expiration = *basic.tbsResponseData.responses.val[i].nextUpdate;
} else
*expiration = now;
free_OCSPBasicOCSPResponse(&basic);
return 0;
}
free_OCSPBasicOCSPResponse(&basic);
{
hx509_name name;
char *subject;
ret = hx509_cert_get_subject(cert, &name);
if (ret) {
hx509_clear_error_string(context);
goto out;
}
ret = hx509_name_to_string(name, &subject);
hx509_name_free(&name);
if (ret) {
hx509_clear_error_string(context);
goto out;
}
hx509_set_error_string(context, 0, HX509_CERT_NOT_IN_OCSP,
"Certificate %s not in OCSP response "
"or not good",
subject);
free(subject);
}
out:
return HX509_CERT_NOT_IN_OCSP;
}
