static int joint_feroceon_complete_cb(struct cryptop * crp)
{
ipsec_alg_complete_cb_t complete_cb = crp->complete_cb;
void *cb_ctx = crp->cb_ctx;
crypto_freereq(crp);
complete_cb(cb_ctx, 0);
return 0;
}
/****************************************************************************
* ip_hdr_len enc_offset auth_len
* 20B+ 16B 20B+ 2 + pad 12B
* ,-----------,------------,-----------,---------,-------------,----------,
* | IP header | ESP header | IP header | Payload | ESP trailer | ESP Auth |
* '-----------'------------'-----------'---------'-------------'----------'
* ^--IV--^------------Encrypted--------------^
* ^-----------------------Authenticated------------^
* ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
* skb->data data iv_off enc_offset digestOffset
* ^--------------------------------skb->len-------------------------------^
****************************************************************************/
static int joint_feroceon_auth_and_encrypt(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct ipsec_alg_enc *ixt_e, __u8 *j_ctx, const __u8 *data, int len,
int enc_offset, int auth_len, const __u8 *iv, int encrypt,
ipsec_alg_complete_cb_t complete_cb, void *cb_ctx)
{
#define ESP_IV_OFFSET 8
int ret = 1;
u32* context = (u32*)j_ctx;
device_t sc = NULL; /* Currently not in use. */
int crypto_len = len - enc_offset - auth_len;
int ip_hdr_len = data - skb->data;
DEBUG_PRINT("session = %u, skb = %p, data = %p, len = %d, iv = %p, "
"enc_offset = %d, auth_len = %d, encrypt = %d, complete_cb = %p, "
"cb_ctx = %p (skb->len = %d, skb->data= %p)", *context, skb, data, len,
iv, enc_offset, auth_len, encrypt, complete_cb, cb_ctx, skb->len,
skb->data);
if (context)
{
struct cryptop *crp = crypto_getreq(2);
struct cryptodesc *crde, *crda;
if (crp)
{
/* Cesa OCF does not care for the order of the descriptors. */
crde = crp->crp_desc;
crda = crde->crd_next;
crda->crd_skip = ip_hdr_len;
crda->crd_flags = 0;
crda->crd_len = enc_offset + crypto_len;
crda->crd_inject = ip_hdr_len + enc_offset + crypto_len;
crda->crd_alg = CRYPTO_GROUP_AUTH;
crde->crd_skip = ip_hdr_len + enc_offset;
crde->crd_flags = (encrypt ? CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT |
CRD_F_IV_PRESENT_NO_PUT_ASIDE | CRD_F_ENCRYPT : 0);
crde->crd_len = crypto_len;
crde->crd_inject = ip_hdr_len + ESP_IV_OFFSET;
crde->crd_alg = CRYPTO_GROUP_ENC;
crp->crp_ilen = skb->len;
crp->crp_sid = *context;
crp->crp_flags |= CRYPTO_F_SKBUF;
crp->crp_buf = (caddr_t)skb;
crp->crp_callback = joint_feroceon_complete_cb;
crp->complete_cb = (void*)complete_cb;
crp->cb_ctx = cb_ctx;
ret = cesa_ocf_process(sc, crp, 0);
if (ret)
crypto_freereq(crp);
}
}
return ret;
}
static int
ocf_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
{
request_t *r = (request_t *) crp->crp_opaque;
if (crp->crp_etype)
printk("Error in OCF processing: %d\n", crp->crp_etype);
total++;
crypto_freereq(crp);
crp = NULL;
if (total > request_num) {
outstanding--;
return 0;
}
INIT_WORK(&r->work, ocf_request, r);
schedule_work(&r->work);
return 0;
}
static void
des3_encrypt_1(const struct krb5_key_state *ks, struct mbuf *inout,
size_t skip, size_t len, void *ivec, int encdec)
{
struct des3_state *ds = ks->ks_priv;
struct cryptop *crp;
struct cryptodesc *crd;
int error;
crp = crypto_getreq(1);
crd = crp->crp_desc;
crd->crd_skip = skip;
crd->crd_len = len;
crd->crd_flags = CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT | CRD_F_IV_PRESENT | encdec;
if (ivec) {
bcopy(ivec, crd->crd_iv, 8);
} else {
bzero(crd->crd_iv, 8);
}
crd->crd_next = NULL;
crd->crd_alg = CRYPTO_3DES_CBC;
crp->crp_sid = ds->ds_session;
crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF | CRYPTO_F_CBIFSYNC;
crp->crp_buf = (void *) inout;
crp->crp_opaque = (void *) ds;
crp->crp_callback = des3_crypto_cb;
error = crypto_dispatch(crp);
if ((CRYPTO_SESID2CAPS(ds->ds_session) & CRYPTOCAP_F_SYNC) == 0) {
mtx_lock(&ds->ds_lock);
if (!error && !(crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_DONE))
error = msleep(crp, &ds->ds_lock, 0, "gssdes3", 0);
mtx_unlock(&ds->ds_lock);
}
crypto_freereq(crp);
}
static void
aes_encrypt_1(const struct krb5_key_state *ks, int buftype, void *buf,
size_t skip, size_t len, void *ivec, int encdec)
{
struct aes_state *as = ks->ks_priv;
struct cryptop *crp;
struct cryptodesc *crd;
int error;
crp = crypto_getreq(1);
crd = crp->crp_desc;
crd->crd_skip = skip;
crd->crd_len = len;
crd->crd_flags = CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT | CRD_F_IV_PRESENT | encdec;
if (ivec) {
bcopy(ivec, crd->crd_iv, 16);
} else {
bzero(crd->crd_iv, 16);
}
crd->crd_next = NULL;
crd->crd_alg = CRYPTO_AES_CBC;
crp->crp_sid = as->as_session;
crp->crp_flags = buftype | CRYPTO_F_CBIFSYNC;
crp->crp_buf = buf;
crp->crp_opaque = (void *) as;
crp->crp_callback = aes_crypto_cb;
error = crypto_dispatch(crp);
if ((CRYPTO_SESID2CAPS(as->as_session) & CRYPTOCAP_F_SYNC) == 0) {
mtx_lock(&as->as_lock);
if (!error && !(crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_DONE))
error = msleep(crp, &as->as_lock, 0, "gssaes", 0);
mtx_unlock(&as->as_lock);
}
crypto_freereq(crp);
}
static void
aes_checksum(const struct krb5_key_state *ks, int usage,
struct mbuf *inout, size_t skip, size_t inlen, size_t outlen)
{
struct aes_state *as = ks->ks_priv;
struct cryptop *crp;
struct cryptodesc *crd;
int error;
crp = crypto_getreq(1);
crd = crp->crp_desc;
crd->crd_skip = skip;
crd->crd_len = inlen;
crd->crd_inject = skip + inlen;
crd->crd_flags = 0;
crd->crd_next = NULL;
crd->crd_alg = CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC;
crp->crp_sid = as->as_session;
crp->crp_ilen = inlen;
crp->crp_olen = 12;
crp->crp_etype = 0;
crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF | CRYPTO_F_CBIFSYNC;
crp->crp_buf = (void *) inout;
crp->crp_opaque = (void *) as;
crp->crp_callback = aes_crypto_cb;
error = crypto_dispatch(crp);
if ((CRYPTO_SESID2CAPS(as->as_session) & CRYPTOCAP_F_SYNC) == 0) {
mtx_lock(&as->as_lock);
if (!error && !(crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_DONE))
error = msleep(crp, &as->as_lock, 0, "gssaes", 0);
mtx_unlock(&as->as_lock);
}
crypto_freereq(crp);
}
static int
ocf_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
{
request_t *r = (request_t *) crp->crp_opaque;
if (crp->crp_etype)
printk("Error in OCF processing: %d\n", crp->crp_etype);
total++;
crypto_freereq(crp);
crp = NULL;
if (total > request_num) {
outstanding--;
return 0;
}
#if LINUX_VERSION_CODE >= KERNEL_VERSION(2,6,20)
INIT_WORK(&r->work, ocf_request_wq);
#else
INIT_WORK(&r->work, ocf_request, r);
#endif
schedule_work(&r->work);
return 0;
}
static int
ocf_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
{
request_t *r = (request_t *) crp->crp_opaque;
unsigned long flags;
if (crp->crp_etype)
printk("Error in OCF processing: %d\n", crp->crp_etype);
crypto_freereq(crp);
crp = NULL;
/* do all requests but take at least 1 second */
spin_lock_irqsave(&ocfbench_counter_lock, flags);
total++;
if (total > request_num && jstart + HZ < jiffies) {
outstanding--;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ocfbench_counter_lock, flags);
return 0;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ocfbench_counter_lock, flags);
schedule_work(&r->work);
return 0;
}
/*
* ESP output routine, called by ipsec[46]_process_packet().
*/
static int
esp_output(
struct mbuf *m,
struct ipsecrequest *isr,
struct mbuf **mp,
int skip,
int protoff
)
{
struct enc_xform *espx;
struct auth_hash *esph;
int hlen, rlen, plen, padding, blks, alen, i, roff;
struct mbuf *mo = (struct mbuf *) NULL;
struct tdb_crypto *tc;
struct secasvar *sav;
struct secasindex *saidx;
unsigned char *pad;
u_int8_t prot;
int error, maxpacketsize;
struct cryptodesc *crde = NULL, *crda = NULL;
struct cryptop *crp;
SPLASSERT(net, "esp_output");
sav = isr->sav;
KASSERT(sav != NULL, ("esp_output: null SA"));
esph = sav->tdb_authalgxform;
espx = sav->tdb_encalgxform;
KASSERT(espx != NULL, ("esp_output: null encoding xform"));
if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD)
hlen = sizeof (struct esp) + sav->ivlen;
else
hlen = sizeof (struct newesp) + sav->ivlen;
rlen = m->m_pkthdr.len - skip; /* Raw payload length. */
/*
* NB: The null encoding transform has a blocksize of 4
* so that headers are properly aligned.
*/
blks = espx->blocksize; /* IV blocksize */
/* XXX clamp padding length a la KAME??? */
padding = ((blks - ((rlen + 2) % blks)) % blks) + 2;
plen = rlen + padding; /* Padded payload length. */
if (esph)
alen = AH_HMAC_HASHLEN;
else
alen = 0;
espstat.esps_output++;
saidx = &sav->sah->saidx;
/* Check for maximum packet size violations. */
switch (saidx->dst.sa.sa_family) {
#ifdef INET
case AF_INET:
maxpacketsize = IP_MAXPACKET;
break;
#endif /* INET */
#ifdef INET6
case AF_INET6:
maxpacketsize = IPV6_MAXPACKET;
break;
#endif /* INET6 */
default:
DPRINTF(("esp_output: unknown/unsupported protocol "
"family %d, SA %s/%08lx\n",
saidx->dst.sa.sa_family, ipsec_address(&saidx->dst),
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
espstat.esps_nopf++;
error = EPFNOSUPPORT;
goto bad;
}
if (skip + hlen + rlen + padding + alen > maxpacketsize) {
DPRINTF(("esp_output: packet in SA %s/%08lx got too big "
"(len %u, max len %u)\n",
ipsec_address(&saidx->dst), (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi),
skip + hlen + rlen + padding + alen, maxpacketsize));
espstat.esps_toobig++;
error = EMSGSIZE;
goto bad;
}
/* Update the counters. */
espstat.esps_obytes += m->m_pkthdr.len - skip;
m = m_clone(m);
if (m == NULL) {
DPRINTF(("esp_output: cannot clone mbuf chain, SA %s/%08lx\n",
ipsec_address(&saidx->dst), (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
espstat.esps_hdrops++;
error = ENOBUFS;
goto bad;
}
/* Inject ESP header. */
mo = m_makespace(m, skip, hlen, &roff);
if (mo == NULL) {
DPRINTF(("esp_output: failed to inject %u byte ESP hdr for SA "
"%s/%08lx\n",
hlen, ipsec_address(&saidx->dst),
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
espstat.esps_hdrops++; /* XXX diffs from openbsd */
error = ENOBUFS;
goto bad;
}
/* Initialize ESP header. */
bcopy((caddr_t) &sav->spi, mtod(mo, caddr_t) + roff, sizeof(u_int32_t));
if (sav->replay) {
u_int32_t replay = htonl(++(sav->replay->count));
bcopy((caddr_t) &replay,
mtod(mo, caddr_t) + roff + sizeof(u_int32_t),
sizeof(u_int32_t));
}
/*
* Add padding -- better to do it ourselves than use the crypto engine,
* although if/when we support compression, we'd have to do that.
*/
pad = (u_char *) m_pad(m, padding + alen);
if (pad == NULL) {
DPRINTF(("esp_output: m_pad failed for SA %s/%08lx\n",
ipsec_address(&saidx->dst), (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
m = NULL; /* NB: free'd by m_pad */
error = ENOBUFS;
goto bad;
}
/*
* Add padding: random, zero, or self-describing.
* XXX catch unexpected setting
*/
switch (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_PMASK) {
case SADB_X_EXT_PRAND:
(void) read_random(pad, padding - 2);
break;
case SADB_X_EXT_PZERO:
bzero(pad, padding - 2);
break;
case SADB_X_EXT_PSEQ:
for (i = 0; i < padding - 2; i++)
pad[i] = i+1;
break;
}
/* Fix padding length and Next Protocol in padding itself. */
pad[padding - 2] = padding - 2;
m_copydata(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), pad + padding - 1);
/* Fix Next Protocol in IPv4/IPv6 header. */
prot = IPPROTO_ESP;
m_copyback(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), (u_char *) &prot);
/* Get crypto descriptors. */
crp = crypto_getreq(esph && espx ? 2 : 1);
if (crp == NULL) {
DPRINTF(("esp_output: failed to acquire crypto descriptors\n"));
espstat.esps_crypto++;
error = ENOBUFS;
goto bad;
}
if (espx) {
crde = crp->crp_desc;
crda = crde->crd_next;
/* Encryption descriptor. */
crde->crd_skip = skip + hlen;
crde->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + hlen + alen);
crde->crd_flags = CRD_F_ENCRYPT;
crde->crd_inject = skip + hlen - sav->ivlen;
/* Encryption operation. */
crde->crd_alg = espx->type;
crde->crd_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_enc);
crde->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_enc);
/* XXX Rounds ? */
} else
crda = crp->crp_desc;
/* IPsec-specific opaque crypto info. */
tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc(sizeof(struct tdb_crypto),
M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO);
if (tc == NULL) {
crypto_freereq(crp);
DPRINTF(("esp_output: failed to allocate tdb_crypto\n"));
espstat.esps_crypto++;
error = ENOBUFS;
goto bad;
}
/* Callback parameters */
tc->tc_isr = isr;
tc->tc_spi = sav->spi;
tc->tc_dst = saidx->dst;
tc->tc_proto = saidx->proto;
/* Crypto operation descriptor. */
crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length. */
crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF;
crp->crp_buf = (caddr_t) m;
crp->crp_callback = esp_output_cb;
crp->crp_opaque = (caddr_t) tc;
crp->crp_sid = sav->tdb_cryptoid;
if (esph) {
/* Authentication descriptor. */
crda->crd_skip = skip;
crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + alen);
crda->crd_inject = m->m_pkthdr.len - alen;
/* Authentication operation. */
crda->crd_alg = esph->type;
crda->crd_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_auth);
crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth);
}
return crypto_dispatch(crp);
bad:
if (m)
m_freem(m);
return (error);
}
static int
ocf_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
{
request_t *r = (request_t *) crp->crp_opaque;
crypto_freereq(crp);
crp = NULL;
total++;
#ifdef DECC
if(r->encrypt == 0)
r->encrypt = 1;
else
r->encrypt = 0;
if ((total > request_num) && r->encrypt) {
#else
if (total > request_num) {
#endif
outstanding--;
return 0;
}
INIT_WORK(&r->work, ocf_request, r);
schedule_work(&r->work);
return 0;
}
static void
ocf_request(void *arg)
{
request_t *r = arg;
#ifdef BOTH
struct cryptop *crp = crypto_getreq(2);
#else
int i;
struct cryptop *crp = crypto_getreq(1);
#endif
struct cryptodesc *crde, *crda;
int timeout = 0;
if (!crp) {
outstanding--;
return;
}
#ifdef BOTH
if(r->encrypt) {
crde = crp->crp_desc;
crda = crde->crd_next;
}
else {
crda = crp->crp_desc;
crde = crda->crd_next;
}
crda->crd_skip = 0;
crda->crd_flags = 0;
crda->crd_len = request_size;
#ifdef DECC
if( r->encrypt )
crda->crd_inject = request_size + 32;
else
crda->crd_inject = request_size + 64;
#else
crda->crd_inject = request_size + 32;
#endif
crda->crd_alg = CRYPTO_MD5_HMAC;
crda->crd_key = "0123456789abcdefghij";
crda->crd_klen = 20 * 8;
#else /* BOTH */
crde = crp->crp_desc;
#endif /* BOTH */
crde->crd_skip = 0;
#ifdef DECC
if( r->encrypt )
crde->crd_flags = CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT | CRD_F_ENCRYPT;
else
crde->crd_flags = CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT;
#else
crde->crd_flags = CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT | CRD_F_ENCRYPT;
#endif
crde->crd_len = request_size;
memset(crde->crd_iv, 'a' ,EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN);
crde->crd_inject = request_size;
crde->crd_alg = CRYPTO_3DES_CBC;
crde->crd_key = "0123456789abcdefghijklmn";
crde->crd_klen = 24 * 8;
crp->crp_ilen = request_size + 128;
crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_CBIMM;
crp->crp_buf = (caddr_t) r->buffer;
crp->crp_callback = ocf_cb;
crp->crp_sid = ocf_cryptoid;
crp->crp_opaque = (caddr_t) r;
while(crypto_dispatch(crp) != 0)
{
if(timeout > 1000)
printk("Failed to insert request \n");
udelay(1);
timeout++;
}
}
/*
* ESP input processing, called (eventually) through the protocol switch.
*/
static int
esp_input(struct mbuf *m, const struct secasvar *sav, int skip, int protoff)
{
const struct auth_hash *esph;
const struct enc_xform *espx;
struct tdb_ident *tdbi;
struct tdb_crypto *tc;
int plen, alen, hlen, error;
struct m_tag *mtag;
struct newesp *esp;
struct cryptodesc *crde;
struct cryptop *crp;
IPSEC_SPLASSERT_SOFTNET("esp_input");
IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("esp_input: null SA"));
IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->tdb_encalgxform != NULL,
("esp_input: null encoding xform"));
IPSEC_ASSERT((skip&3) == 0 && (m->m_pkthdr.len&3) == 0,
("esp_input: misaligned packet, skip %u pkt len %u",
skip, m->m_pkthdr.len));
/* XXX don't pullup, just copy header */
IP6_EXTHDR_GET(esp, struct newesp *, m, skip, sizeof (struct newesp));
esph = sav->tdb_authalgxform;
espx = sav->tdb_encalgxform;
/* Determine the ESP header length */
if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD)
hlen = sizeof (struct esp) + sav->ivlen;
else
hlen = sizeof (struct newesp) + sav->ivlen;
/* Authenticator hash size */
alen = esph ? esph->authsize : 0;
/*
* Verify payload length is multiple of encryption algorithm
* block size.
*
* NB: This works for the null algorithm because the blocksize
* is 4 and all packets must be 4-byte aligned regardless
* of the algorithm.
*/
plen = m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + hlen + alen);
if ((plen & (espx->blocksize - 1)) || (plen <= 0)) {
DPRINTF(("esp_input: "
"payload of %d octets not a multiple of %d octets,"
" SA %s/%08lx\n",
plen, espx->blocksize,
ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst),
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
ESP_STATINC(ESP_STAT_BADILEN);
m_freem(m);
return EINVAL;
}
/*
* Check sequence number.
*/
if (esph && sav->replay && !ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(esp->esp_seq), sav)) {
DPRINTF(("esp_input: packet replay check for %s\n",
ipsec_logsastr(sav))); /*XXX*/
ESP_STATINC(ESP_STAT_REPLAY);
m_freem(m);
return ENOBUFS; /*XXX*/
}
/* Update the counters */
ESP_STATADD(ESP_STAT_IBYTES, m->m_pkthdr.len - skip - hlen - alen);
/* Find out if we've already done crypto */
for (mtag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_IN_CRYPTO_DONE, NULL);
mtag != NULL;
mtag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_IN_CRYPTO_DONE, mtag)) {
tdbi = (struct tdb_ident *) (mtag + 1);
if (tdbi->proto == sav->sah->saidx.proto &&
tdbi->spi == sav->spi &&
!memcmp(&tdbi->dst, &sav->sah->saidx.dst,
sizeof(union sockaddr_union)))
break;
}
/* Get crypto descriptors */
crp = crypto_getreq(esph && espx ? 2 : 1);
if (crp == NULL) {
DPRINTF(("esp_input: failed to acquire crypto descriptors\n"));
ESP_STATINC(ESP_STAT_CRYPTO);
m_freem(m);
return ENOBUFS;
}
/* Get IPsec-specific opaque pointer */
if (esph == NULL || mtag != NULL)
tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc(sizeof(struct tdb_crypto),
M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO);
else
tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc(sizeof(struct tdb_crypto) + alen,
M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO);
if (tc == NULL) {
crypto_freereq(crp);
DPRINTF(("esp_input: failed to allocate tdb_crypto\n"));
ESP_STATINC(ESP_STAT_CRYPTO);
m_freem(m);
return ENOBUFS;
}
error = m_makewritable(&m, 0, m->m_pkthdr.len, M_NOWAIT);
if (error) {
m_freem(m);
free(tc, M_XDATA);
crypto_freereq(crp);
DPRINTF(("esp_input: m_makewritable failed\n"));
ESP_STATINC(ESP_STAT_CRYPTO);
return error;
}
tc->tc_ptr = mtag;
if (esph) {
struct cryptodesc *crda = crp->crp_desc;
IPSEC_ASSERT(crda != NULL, ("esp_input: null ah crypto descriptor"));
/* Authentication descriptor */
crda->crd_skip = skip;
if (espx && espx->type == CRYPTO_AES_GCM_16)
crda->crd_len = hlen - sav->ivlen;
else
crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + alen);
crda->crd_inject = m->m_pkthdr.len - alen;
crda->crd_alg = esph->type;
if (espx && (espx->type == CRYPTO_AES_GCM_16 ||
espx->type == CRYPTO_AES_GMAC)) {
crda->crd_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_enc);
crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_enc);
} else {
crda->crd_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_auth);
crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth);
}
/* Copy the authenticator */
if (mtag == NULL)
m_copydata(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - alen, alen,
(tc + 1));
/* Chain authentication request */
crde = crda->crd_next;
} else {
crde = crp->crp_desc;
}
/* Crypto operation descriptor */
crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length */
crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF;
crp->crp_buf = m;
crp->crp_callback = esp_input_cb;
crp->crp_sid = sav->tdb_cryptoid;
crp->crp_opaque = tc;
/* These are passed as-is to the callback */
tc->tc_spi = sav->spi;
tc->tc_dst = sav->sah->saidx.dst;
tc->tc_proto = sav->sah->saidx.proto;
tc->tc_protoff = protoff;
tc->tc_skip = skip;
/* Decryption descriptor */
if (espx) {
IPSEC_ASSERT(crde != NULL, ("esp_input: null esp crypto descriptor"));
crde->crd_skip = skip + hlen;
if (espx->type == CRYPTO_AES_GMAC)
crde->crd_len = 0;
else
crde->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + hlen + alen);
crde->crd_inject = skip + hlen - sav->ivlen;
crde->crd_alg = espx->type;
crde->crd_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_enc);
crde->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_enc);
/* XXX Rounds ? */
}
if (mtag == NULL)
return crypto_dispatch(crp);
else
return esp_input_cb(crp);
}
/*
* ESP output routine, called by ipsp_process_packet().
*/
int
esp_output(struct mbuf *m, struct tdb *tdb, struct mbuf **mp, int skip,
int protoff)
{
struct enc_xform *espx = (struct enc_xform *) tdb->tdb_encalgxform;
struct auth_hash *esph = (struct auth_hash *) tdb->tdb_authalgxform;
int ilen, hlen, rlen, padding, blks, alen;
struct mbuf *mi, *mo = (struct mbuf *) NULL;
struct tdb_crypto *tc;
unsigned char *pad;
u_int8_t prot;
struct cryptodesc *crde = NULL, *crda = NULL;
struct cryptop *crp;
#if NBPFILTER > 0
struct ifnet *ifn = &(encif[0].sc_if);
ifn->if_opackets++;
ifn->if_obytes += m->m_pkthdr.len;
if (ifn->if_bpf) {
struct enchdr hdr;
bzero (&hdr, sizeof(hdr));
hdr.af = tdb->tdb_dst.sa.sa_family;
hdr.spi = tdb->tdb_spi;
if (espx)
hdr.flags |= M_CONF;
if (esph)
hdr.flags |= M_AUTH;
bpf_mtap_hdr(ifn->if_bpf, (char *)&hdr, ENC_HDRLEN, m,
BPF_DIRECTION_OUT);
}
#endif
if (tdb->tdb_flags & TDBF_NOREPLAY)
hlen = sizeof(u_int32_t) + tdb->tdb_ivlen;
else
hlen = 2 * sizeof(u_int32_t) + tdb->tdb_ivlen;
rlen = m->m_pkthdr.len - skip; /* Raw payload length. */
if (espx)
blks = espx->blocksize;
else
blks = 4; /* If no encryption, we have to be 4-byte aligned. */
padding = ((blks - ((rlen + 2) % blks)) % blks) + 2;
if (esph)
alen = AH_HMAC_HASHLEN;
else
alen = 0;
espstat.esps_output++;
switch (tdb->tdb_dst.sa.sa_family) {
#ifdef INET
case AF_INET:
/* Check for IP maximum packet size violations. */
if (skip + hlen + rlen + padding + alen > IP_MAXPACKET) {
DPRINTF(("esp_output(): packet in SA %s/%08x got "
"too big\n", ipsp_address(tdb->tdb_dst),
ntohl(tdb->tdb_spi)));
m_freem(m);
espstat.esps_toobig++;
return EMSGSIZE;
}
break;
#endif /* INET */
#ifdef INET6
case AF_INET6:
/* Check for IPv6 maximum packet size violations. */
if (skip + hlen + rlen + padding + alen > IPV6_MAXPACKET) {
DPRINTF(("esp_output(): packet in SA %s/%08x got too "
"big\n", ipsp_address(tdb->tdb_dst),
ntohl(tdb->tdb_spi)));
m_freem(m);
espstat.esps_toobig++;
return EMSGSIZE;
}
break;
#endif /* INET6 */
default:
DPRINTF(("esp_output(): unknown/unsupported protocol "
"family %d, SA %s/%08x\n", tdb->tdb_dst.sa.sa_family
, ipsp_address(tdb->tdb_dst), ntohl(tdb->tdb_spi)));
m_freem(m);
espstat.esps_nopf++;
return EPFNOSUPPORT;
}
/* Update the counters. */
tdb->tdb_cur_bytes += m->m_pkthdr.len - skip;
espstat.esps_obytes += m->m_pkthdr.len - skip;
/* Hard byte expiration. */
if (tdb->tdb_flags & TDBF_BYTES &&
tdb->tdb_cur_bytes >= tdb->tdb_exp_bytes) {
pfkeyv2_expire(tdb, SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_HARD);
tdb_delete(tdb);
m_freem(m);
return EINVAL;
}
/* Soft byte expiration. */
if (tdb->tdb_flags & TDBF_SOFT_BYTES &&
tdb->tdb_cur_bytes >= tdb->tdb_soft_bytes) {
pfkeyv2_expire(tdb, SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_SOFT);
tdb->tdb_flags &= ~TDBF_SOFT_BYTES; /* Turn off checking. */
}
/*
* Loop through mbuf chain; if we find a readonly mbuf,
* replace the rest of the chain.
*/
mo = NULL;
mi = m;
while (mi != NULL && !M_READONLY(mi)) {
mo = mi;
mi = mi->m_next;
}
if (mi != NULL) {
/* Replace the rest of the mbuf chain. */
struct mbuf *n = m_copym2(mi, 0, M_COPYALL, M_DONTWAIT);
if (n == NULL) {
DPRINTF(("esp_output(): bad mbuf chain, SA %s/%08x\n",
ipsp_address(tdb->tdb_dst), ntohl(tdb->tdb_spi)));
espstat.esps_hdrops++;
m_freem(m);
return ENOBUFS;
}
if (mo != NULL)
mo->m_next = n;
else
m = n;
m_freem(mi);
}
/* Inject ESP header. */
mo = m_inject(m, skip, hlen, M_DONTWAIT);
if (mo == NULL) {
DPRINTF(("esp_output(): failed to inject ESP header for "
"SA %s/%08x\n", ipsp_address(tdb->tdb_dst),
ntohl(tdb->tdb_spi)));
m_freem(m);
espstat.esps_hdrops++;
return ENOBUFS;
}
/* Initialize ESP header. */
bcopy((caddr_t) &tdb->tdb_spi, mtod(mo, caddr_t), sizeof(u_int32_t));
if (!(tdb->tdb_flags & TDBF_NOREPLAY)) {
u_int32_t replay = htonl(tdb->tdb_rpl++);
bcopy((caddr_t) &replay, mtod(mo, caddr_t) + sizeof(u_int32_t),
sizeof(u_int32_t));
#if NPFSYNC > 0
pfsync_update_tdb(tdb,1);
#endif
}
/*
* Add padding -- better to do it ourselves than use the crypto engine,
* although if/when we support compression, we'd have to do that.
*/
mo = m_inject(m, m->m_pkthdr.len, padding + alen, M_DONTWAIT);
if (mo == NULL) {
DPRINTF(("esp_output(): m_inject failed for SA %s/%08x\n",
ipsp_address(tdb->tdb_dst), ntohl(tdb->tdb_spi)));
m_freem(m);
return ENOBUFS;
}
pad = mtod(mo, u_char *);
/* Self-describing or random padding ? */
if (!(tdb->tdb_flags & TDBF_RANDOMPADDING))
for (ilen = 0; ilen < padding - 2; ilen++)
pad[ilen] = ilen + 1;
else
arc4random_buf((void *) pad, padding - 2);
/* Fix padding length and Next Protocol in padding itself. */
pad[padding - 2] = padding - 2;
m_copydata(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), pad + padding - 1);
/* Fix Next Protocol in IPv4/IPv6 header. */
prot = IPPROTO_ESP;
m_copyback(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), &prot);
/* Get crypto descriptors. */
crp = crypto_getreq(esph && espx ? 2 : 1);
if (crp == NULL) {
m_freem(m);
DPRINTF(("esp_output(): failed to acquire crypto "
"descriptors\n"));
espstat.esps_crypto++;
return ENOBUFS;
}
if (espx) {
crde = crp->crp_desc;
crda = crde->crd_next;
/* Encryption descriptor. */
crde->crd_skip = skip + hlen;
crde->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + hlen + alen);
crde->crd_flags = CRD_F_ENCRYPT;
crde->crd_inject = skip + hlen - tdb->tdb_ivlen;
if (tdb->tdb_flags & TDBF_HALFIV) {
/* Copy half-iv in the packet. */
m_copyback(m, crde->crd_inject, tdb->tdb_ivlen,
tdb->tdb_iv);
/* Cook half-iv. */
bcopy(tdb->tdb_iv, crde->crd_iv, tdb->tdb_ivlen);
for (ilen = 0; ilen < tdb->tdb_ivlen; ilen++)
crde->crd_iv[tdb->tdb_ivlen + ilen] =
~crde->crd_iv[ilen];
crde->crd_flags |=
CRD_F_IV_PRESENT | CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT;
}
/* Encryption operation. */
crde->crd_alg = espx->type;
crde->crd_key = tdb->tdb_emxkey;
crde->crd_klen = tdb->tdb_emxkeylen * 8;
/* XXX Rounds ? */
} else
crda = crp->crp_desc;
/* IPsec-specific opaque crypto info. */
tc = malloc(sizeof(*tc), M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT | M_ZERO);
if (tc == NULL) {
m_freem(m);
crypto_freereq(crp);
DPRINTF(("esp_output(): failed to allocate tdb_crypto\n"));
espstat.esps_crypto++;
return ENOBUFS;
}
tc->tc_spi = tdb->tdb_spi;
tc->tc_proto = tdb->tdb_sproto;
bcopy(&tdb->tdb_dst, &tc->tc_dst, sizeof(union sockaddr_union));
/* Crypto operation descriptor. */
crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length. */
crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF;
crp->crp_buf = (caddr_t) m;
crp->crp_callback = (int (*) (struct cryptop *)) esp_output_cb;
crp->crp_opaque = (caddr_t) tc;
crp->crp_sid = tdb->tdb_cryptoid;
if (esph) {
/* Authentication descriptor. */
crda->crd_skip = skip;
crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + alen);
crda->crd_inject = m->m_pkthdr.len - alen;
/* Authentication operation. */
crda->crd_alg = esph->type;
crda->crd_key = tdb->tdb_amxkey;
crda->crd_klen = tdb->tdb_amxkeylen * 8;
}
if ((tdb->tdb_flags & TDBF_SKIPCRYPTO) == 0)
return crypto_dispatch(crp);
else
return esp_output_cb(crp);
}
/*
* ESP input callback from the crypto driver.
*/
static int
esp_input_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
{
u_int8_t lastthree[3], aalg[AH_ALEN_MAX];
int s, hlen, skip, protoff, error;
struct mbuf *m;
struct cryptodesc *crd;
const struct auth_hash *esph;
const struct enc_xform *espx;
struct tdb_crypto *tc;
struct m_tag *mtag;
struct secasvar *sav;
struct secasindex *saidx;
void *ptr;
u_int16_t dport;
u_int16_t sport;
crd = crp->crp_desc;
IPSEC_ASSERT(crd != NULL, ("esp_input_cb: null crypto descriptor!"));
tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) crp->crp_opaque;
IPSEC_ASSERT(tc != NULL, ("esp_input_cb: null opaque crypto data area!"));
skip = tc->tc_skip;
protoff = tc->tc_protoff;
mtag = (struct m_tag *) tc->tc_ptr;
m = (struct mbuf *) crp->crp_buf;
/* find the source port for NAT-T */
nat_t_ports_get(m, &dport, &sport);
s = splsoftnet();
mutex_enter(softnet_lock);
sav = KEY_ALLOCSA(&tc->tc_dst, tc->tc_proto, tc->tc_spi, sport, dport);
if (sav == NULL) {
ESP_STATINC(ESP_STAT_NOTDB);
DPRINTF(("esp_input_cb: SA expired while in crypto "
"(SA %s/%08lx proto %u)\n", ipsec_address(&tc->tc_dst),
(u_long) ntohl(tc->tc_spi), tc->tc_proto));
error = ENOBUFS; /*XXX*/
goto bad;
}
saidx = &sav->sah->saidx;
IPSEC_ASSERT(saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET ||
saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6,
("esp_input_cb: unexpected protocol family %u",
saidx->dst.sa.sa_family));
esph = sav->tdb_authalgxform;
espx = sav->tdb_encalgxform;
/* Check for crypto errors */
if (crp->crp_etype) {
/* Reset the session ID */
if (sav->tdb_cryptoid != 0)
sav->tdb_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid;
if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) {
KEY_FREESAV(&sav);
mutex_exit(softnet_lock);
splx(s);
return crypto_dispatch(crp);
}
ESP_STATINC(ESP_STAT_NOXFORM);
DPRINTF(("esp_input_cb: crypto error %d\n", crp->crp_etype));
error = crp->crp_etype;
goto bad;
}
/* Shouldn't happen... */
if (m == NULL) {
ESP_STATINC(ESP_STAT_CRYPTO);
DPRINTF(("esp_input_cb: bogus returned buffer from crypto\n"));
error = EINVAL;
goto bad;
}
ESP_STATINC(ESP_STAT_HIST + sav->alg_enc);
/* If authentication was performed, check now. */
if (esph != NULL) {
/*
* If we have a tag, it means an IPsec-aware NIC did
* the verification for us. Otherwise we need to
* check the authentication calculation.
*/
AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HIST + sav->alg_auth);
if (mtag == NULL) {
/* Copy the authenticator from the packet */
m_copydata(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - esph->authsize,
esph->authsize, aalg);
ptr = (tc + 1);
/* Verify authenticator */
if (!consttime_memequal(ptr, aalg, esph->authsize)) {
DPRINTF(("esp_input_cb: "
"authentication hash mismatch for packet in SA %s/%08lx\n",
ipsec_address(&saidx->dst),
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
ESP_STATINC(ESP_STAT_BADAUTH);
error = EACCES;
goto bad;
}
}
/* Remove trailing authenticator */
m_adj(m, -(esph->authsize));
}
/* Release the crypto descriptors */
free(tc, M_XDATA), tc = NULL;
crypto_freereq(crp), crp = NULL;
/*
* Packet is now decrypted.
*/
m->m_flags |= M_DECRYPTED;
/*
* Update replay sequence number, if appropriate.
*/
if (sav->replay) {
u_int32_t seq;
m_copydata(m, skip + offsetof(struct newesp, esp_seq),
sizeof (seq), &seq);
if (ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(seq), sav)) {
DPRINTF(("%s: packet replay check for %s\n", __func__,
ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
ESP_STATINC(ESP_STAT_REPLAY);
error = ENOBUFS;
goto bad;
}
}
/*
* ESP input processing, called (eventually) through the protocol switch.
*/
static int
esp_input(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip, int protoff)
{
char buf[128];
struct auth_hash *esph;
struct enc_xform *espx;
struct tdb_crypto *tc;
uint8_t *ivp;
int plen, alen, hlen;
struct newesp *esp;
struct cryptodesc *crde;
struct cryptop *crp;
IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("null SA"));
IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->tdb_encalgxform != NULL, ("null encoding xform"));
/* Valid IP Packet length ? */
if ( (skip&3) || (m->m_pkthdr.len&3) ){
DPRINTF(("%s: misaligned packet, skip %u pkt len %u",
__func__, skip, m->m_pkthdr.len));
ESPSTAT_INC(esps_badilen);
m_freem(m);
return EINVAL;
}
/* XXX don't pullup, just copy header */
IP6_EXTHDR_GET(esp, struct newesp *, m, skip, sizeof (struct newesp));
esph = sav->tdb_authalgxform;
espx = sav->tdb_encalgxform;
/* Determine the ESP header and auth length */
if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD)
hlen = sizeof (struct esp) + sav->ivlen;
else
hlen = sizeof (struct newesp) + sav->ivlen;
alen = xform_ah_authsize(esph);
/*
* Verify payload length is multiple of encryption algorithm
* block size.
*
* NB: This works for the null algorithm because the blocksize
* is 4 and all packets must be 4-byte aligned regardless
* of the algorithm.
*/
plen = m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + hlen + alen);
if ((plen & (espx->blocksize - 1)) || (plen <= 0)) {
DPRINTF(("%s: payload of %d octets not a multiple of %d octets,"
" SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__, plen, espx->blocksize,
ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)),
(u_long)ntohl(sav->spi)));
ESPSTAT_INC(esps_badilen);
m_freem(m);
return EINVAL;
}
/*
* Check sequence number.
*/
if (esph != NULL && sav->replay != NULL &&
!ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(esp->esp_seq), sav)) {
DPRINTF(("%s: packet replay check for %s\n", __func__,
ipsec_logsastr(sav, buf, sizeof(buf)))); /*XXX*/
ESPSTAT_INC(esps_replay);
m_freem(m);
return ENOBUFS; /*XXX*/
}
/* Update the counters */
ESPSTAT_ADD(esps_ibytes, m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + hlen + alen));
/* Get crypto descriptors */
crp = crypto_getreq(esph && espx ? 2 : 1);
if (crp == NULL) {
DPRINTF(("%s: failed to acquire crypto descriptors\n",
__func__));
ESPSTAT_INC(esps_crypto);
m_freem(m);
return ENOBUFS;
}
/* Get IPsec-specific opaque pointer */
tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc(sizeof(struct tdb_crypto) + alen,
M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT | M_ZERO);
if (tc == NULL) {
crypto_freereq(crp);
DPRINTF(("%s: failed to allocate tdb_crypto\n", __func__));
ESPSTAT_INC(esps_crypto);
m_freem(m);
return ENOBUFS;
}
if (esph != NULL) {
struct cryptodesc *crda = crp->crp_desc;
IPSEC_ASSERT(crda != NULL, ("null ah crypto descriptor"));
/* Authentication descriptor */
crda->crd_skip = skip;
if (SAV_ISGCM(sav))
crda->crd_len = 8; /* RFC4106 5, SPI + SN */
else
crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + alen);
crda->crd_inject = m->m_pkthdr.len - alen;
crda->crd_alg = esph->type;
/* Copy the authenticator */
m_copydata(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - alen, alen,
(caddr_t) (tc + 1));
/* Chain authentication request */
crde = crda->crd_next;
} else {
crde = crp->crp_desc;
}
/* Crypto operation descriptor */
crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length */
crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF | CRYPTO_F_CBIFSYNC;
crp->crp_buf = (caddr_t) m;
crp->crp_callback = esp_input_cb;
crp->crp_sid = sav->tdb_cryptoid;
crp->crp_opaque = (caddr_t) tc;
/* These are passed as-is to the callback */
tc->tc_spi = sav->spi;
tc->tc_dst = sav->sah->saidx.dst;
tc->tc_proto = sav->sah->saidx.proto;
tc->tc_protoff = protoff;
tc->tc_skip = skip;
KEY_ADDREFSA(sav);
tc->tc_sav = sav;
/* Decryption descriptor */
IPSEC_ASSERT(crde != NULL, ("null esp crypto descriptor"));
crde->crd_skip = skip + hlen;
crde->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + hlen + alen);
crde->crd_inject = skip + hlen - sav->ivlen;
if (SAV_ISCTRORGCM(sav)) {
ivp = &crde->crd_iv[0];
/* GCM IV Format: RFC4106 4 */
/* CTR IV Format: RFC3686 4 */
/* Salt is last four bytes of key, RFC4106 8.1 */
/* Nonce is last four bytes of key, RFC3686 5.1 */
memcpy(ivp, sav->key_enc->key_data +
_KEYLEN(sav->key_enc) - 4, 4);
if (SAV_ISCTR(sav)) {
/* Initial block counter is 1, RFC3686 4 */
be32enc(&ivp[sav->ivlen + 4], 1);
}
m_copydata(m, skip + hlen - sav->ivlen, sav->ivlen, &ivp[4]);
crde->crd_flags |= CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT;
}
crde->crd_alg = espx->type;
return (crypto_dispatch(crp));
}
enum ipsec_rcv_value ipsec_ocf_rcv(struct ipsec_rcv_state *irs)
{
struct cryptop *crp;
struct cryptodesc *crde = NULL, *crda = NULL, *crdc = NULL;
struct ipsec_sa *ipsp;
int req_count = 0;
int rc, err;
KLIPS_PRINT(debug_rcv, "klips_debug:ipsec_ocf_rcv\n");
ipsp = irs->ipsp;
if (!ipsp) {
KLIPS_PRINT(debug_rcv, "klips_debug:ipsec_ocf_rcv: "
"no SA for rcv processing\n");
return IPSEC_RCV_SAIDNOTFOUND;
}
if (!irs->skb) {
KLIPS_PRINT(debug_rcv, "klips_debug:ipsec_ocf_rcv: no skb\n");
return IPSEC_RCV_SAIDNOTFOUND;
}
switch (ipsp->ips_said.proto) {
case IPPROTO_COMP:
rc = ipsec_ocf_ipcomp_copy_expand(irs);
if (rc != IPSEC_RCV_OK) {
KLIPS_PRINT(debug_rcv, "klips_debug:ipsec_ocf_rcv: "
"growing skb for ipcomp failed, rc=%d\n",
rc);
return rc;
}
break;
case IPPROTO_ESP:
case IPPROTO_AH:
break;
default:
KLIPS_PRINT(debug_rcv & DB_RX_XF, "klips_debug:ipsec_ocf_rcv: "
"bad protocol %d\n", ipsp->ips_said.proto);
return IPSEC_RCV_BADPROTO;
}
req_count = (ipsp->ips_authalg ? 1 : 0) +
(ipsp->ips_encalg ? 1 : 0);
crp = crypto_getreq(req_count);
if (!crp) {
KLIPS_PRINT(debug_rcv, "klips_debug:ipsec_ocf_rcv: "
"crypto_getreq returned NULL\n");
return IPSEC_RCV_REALLYBAD;
}
/* we currently don't support any chaining across protocols */
switch (ipsp->ips_said.proto) {
case IPPROTO_ESP:
/*
* we are decrypting, from the setup in ipsec_ocf_sa_init above, we
* need to flip the order of hash/cipher for recieve so that it is
* hash first then decrypt. Transmit is ok.
*/
if (crp->crp_desc && crp->crp_desc->crd_next) {
crda = crp->crp_desc;
crde = crda->crd_next;
} else {
crde = crp->crp_desc;
crda = crde->crd_next;
}
break;
case IPPROTO_COMP:
crdc = crp->crp_desc;
break;
case IPPROTO_AH:
crda = crp->crp_desc;
break;
}
if (crda) {
/* Authentication descriptor */
crda->crd_alg = ipsec_ocf_authalg(ipsp->ips_authalg);
if (!crda->crd_alg) {
KLIPS_PRINT(debug_rcv, "klips_debug:ipsec_ocf_rcv: "
"bad auth alg 0x%x\n", ipsp->ips_authalg);
crypto_freereq(crp);
return IPSEC_RCV_BADPROTO;
}
if (!crde) { /* assuming AH processing */
/* push the IP header so we can authenticate it */
skb_push(irs->skb,
((unsigned char *)irs->protostuff.ahstuff.ahp) -
((unsigned char *)irs->iph));
}
crda->crd_key = ipsp->ips_key_a;
crda->crd_klen = ipsp->ips_key_bits_a;
crda->crd_inject = irs->authenticator - irs->skb->data;
/* OCF needs cri_mlen initialized in order to properly migrate the
* session to another driver */
crda->crd_mlen = 12;
/* Copy the authenticator to check aganinst later */
memcpy(irs->hash, irs->authenticator, 12);
if (!crde) { /* assume AH processing */
/* AH processing, save fields we have to zero */
if (lsw_ip_hdr_version(irs) == 4) {
irs->ttl =
lsw_ip4_hdr(irs)->ttl;
irs->check =
lsw_ip4_hdr(irs)->check;
irs->frag_off =
lsw_ip4_hdr(irs)->frag_off;
irs->tos =
lsw_ip4_hdr(irs)->tos;
lsw_ip4_hdr(irs)->ttl = 0;
lsw_ip4_hdr(irs)->check = 0;
lsw_ip4_hdr(irs)->frag_off = 0;
lsw_ip4_hdr(irs)->tos = 0;
}
crda->crd_len = irs->skb->len;
crda->crd_skip = ((unsigned char *)irs->iph) -
irs->skb->data;
memset(irs->authenticator, 0, 12);
} else {
crda->crd_len = irs->ilen;
crda->crd_skip =
((unsigned char *) irs->protostuff.espstuff.
espp) -
irs->skb->data;
/*
* It would be nice to clear the authenticator here
* to be sure we do not see it again later when checking.
* We cannot. Some HW actually expects to check the in-data
* hash and and flag an error if it is incorrect.
*
* What we do to allow this is to pass in the current in-data
* value. Your OCF driver must ensure that it fails a request
* for hash+decrypt with an invalid hash value, or returns the
* computed in-data hash as requested.
*
* If your driver does not check the in-data hash but just
* computes it value, you must ensure that it does not return
* the original in-data hash by accident. It must invalidate the
* in-data hash itself to force an auth check error.
*
* All existing drivers that do not care about the current
* in-data hash do this by clearing the in-data hash before
* processing, either directly or via their implementation.
*/
#if 0
memset(irs->authenticator, 0, 12);
#endif
}
}
if (crde) {
crde->crd_alg = ipsec_ocf_encalg(ipsp->ips_encalg);
if (!crde->crd_alg) {
KLIPS_PRINT(debug_rcv, "klips_debug:ipsec_ocf_rcv: "
"bad enc alg 0x%x\n", ipsp->ips_encalg);
crypto_freereq(crp);
return IPSEC_RCV_BADPROTO;
}
irs->esphlen = ESP_HEADER_LEN + ipsp->ips_iv_size;
irs->ilen -= irs->esphlen;
crde->crd_skip =
(skb_transport_header(irs->skb) -
irs->skb->data) + irs->esphlen;
crde->crd_len = irs->ilen;
crde->crd_inject = crde->crd_skip - ipsp->ips_iv_size;
crde->crd_klen = ipsp->ips_key_bits_e;
crde->crd_key = ipsp->ips_key_e;
}
if (crdc) {
struct ipcomphdr *cmph;
int compalg = ipsp->ips_encalg;
/* Decompression descriptor */
crdc->crd_alg = ipsec_ocf_compalg(compalg);
if (!crdc->crd_alg) {
KLIPS_PRINT(debug_rcv, "klips_debug:ipsec_ocf_rcv: "
"bad decomp alg 0x%x\n",
ipsp->ips_encalg);
crypto_freereq(crp);
return IPSEC_RCV_BADPROTO;
}
crdc->crd_flags = 0;
/* this is where the current ipcomp header is */
cmph = (struct ipcomphdr*)((char*)irs->iph + irs->iphlen);
/* store the nested protocol */
irs->next_header = cmph->ipcomp_nh;
/* start decompressing after ip header and the ipcomp header */
crdc->crd_skip = ((unsigned char*)irs->iph) + irs->iphlen +
sizeof(struct ipcomphdr) - irs->skb->data;
/* decompress all ip data past the ipcomp header */
if (lsw_ip_hdr_version(irs) == 6) {
crdc->crd_len =
(ntohs(lsw_ip6_hdr(irs)->payload_len) +
sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)) -
irs->iphlen -
sizeof(struct ipcomphdr);
} else {
crdc->crd_len = ntohs(lsw_ip4_hdr(irs)->tot_len) -
irs->iphlen -
sizeof(struct ipcomphdr);
}
/* decompress inplace (some hardware can only do inplace) */
crdc->crd_inject = crdc->crd_skip;
}
crp->crp_ilen = irs->skb->len; /* Total input length */
crp->crp_olen = irs->skb->len; /* Total output length */
crp->crp_flags =
CRYPTO_F_SKBUF |
(ipsec_ocf_cbimm ? CRYPTO_F_BATCH : 0) |
(ipsec_ocf_batch ? CRYPTO_F_BATCH : 0) |
0;
crp->crp_buf = (caddr_t) irs->skb;
crp->crp_callback = ipsec_ocf_rcv_cb;
crp->crp_sid = ipsp->ocf_cryptoid;
crp->crp_opaque = (caddr_t) irs;
rcv_migrate:
if ((err = crypto_dispatch(crp))) {
KLIPS_PRINT(debug_rcv, "crypto_dispatch rcv failure %u\n",
err);
crypto_freereq(crp);
return IPSEC_RCV_REALLYBAD;
}
if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) {
/* Session has been migrated. Store the new session id and retry */
ipsp->ocf_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid;
goto rcv_migrate;
}
return IPSEC_RCV_PENDING;
}
/*
* ESP input processing, called (eventually) through the protocol switch.
*/
static int
esp_input(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip, int protoff)
{
struct auth_hash *esph;
struct enc_xform *espx;
struct tdb_ident *tdbi;
struct tdb_crypto *tc;
int plen, alen, hlen;
struct m_tag *mtag;
struct newesp *esp;
struct cryptodesc *crde;
struct cryptop *crp;
IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("null SA"));
IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->tdb_encalgxform != NULL, ("null encoding xform"));
/* Valid IP Packet length ? */
if ( (skip&3) || (m->m_pkthdr.len&3) ){
DPRINTF(("%s: misaligned packet, skip %u pkt len %u",
__func__, skip, m->m_pkthdr.len));
ESPSTAT_INC(esps_badilen);
m_freem(m);
return EINVAL;
}
/* XXX don't pullup, just copy header */
IP6_EXTHDR_GET(esp, struct newesp *, m, skip, sizeof (struct newesp));
esph = sav->tdb_authalgxform;
espx = sav->tdb_encalgxform;
/* Determine the ESP header length */
if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD)
hlen = sizeof (struct esp) + sav->ivlen;
else
hlen = sizeof (struct newesp) + sav->ivlen;
/* Authenticator hash size */
if (esph != NULL) {
switch (esph->type) {
case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC:
alen = esph->hashsize/2;
break;
default:
alen = AH_HMAC_HASHLEN;
break;
}
}else
alen = 0;
/*
* Verify payload length is multiple of encryption algorithm
* block size.
*
* NB: This works for the null algorithm because the blocksize
* is 4 and all packets must be 4-byte aligned regardless
* of the algorithm.
*/
plen = m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + hlen + alen);
if ((plen & (espx->blocksize - 1)) || (plen <= 0)) {
DPRINTF(("%s: payload of %d octets not a multiple of %d octets,"
" SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
plen, espx->blocksize,
ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst),
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
ESPSTAT_INC(esps_badilen);
m_freem(m);
return EINVAL;
}
/*
* Check sequence number.
*/
if (esph && sav->replay && !ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(esp->esp_seq), sav)) {
DPRINTF(("%s: packet replay check for %s\n", __func__,
ipsec_logsastr(sav))); /*XXX*/
ESPSTAT_INC(esps_replay);
m_freem(m);
return ENOBUFS; /*XXX*/
}
/* Update the counters */
ESPSTAT_ADD(esps_ibytes, m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + hlen + alen));
/* Find out if we've already done crypto */
for (mtag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_IN_CRYPTO_DONE, NULL);
mtag != NULL;
mtag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_IN_CRYPTO_DONE, mtag)) {
tdbi = (struct tdb_ident *) (mtag + 1);
if (tdbi->proto == sav->sah->saidx.proto &&
tdbi->spi == sav->spi &&
!bcmp(&tdbi->dst, &sav->sah->saidx.dst,
sizeof(union sockaddr_union)))
break;
}
/* Get crypto descriptors */
crp = crypto_getreq(esph && espx ? 2 : 1);
if (crp == NULL) {
DPRINTF(("%s: failed to acquire crypto descriptors\n",
__func__));
ESPSTAT_INC(esps_crypto);
m_freem(m);
return ENOBUFS;
}
/* Get IPsec-specific opaque pointer */
if (esph == NULL || mtag != NULL)
tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc(sizeof(struct tdb_crypto),
M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO);
else
tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc(sizeof(struct tdb_crypto) + alen,
M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO);
if (tc == NULL) {
crypto_freereq(crp);
DPRINTF(("%s: failed to allocate tdb_crypto\n", __func__));
ESPSTAT_INC(esps_crypto);
m_freem(m);
return ENOBUFS;
}
tc->tc_ptr = (caddr_t) mtag;
if (esph) {
struct cryptodesc *crda = crp->crp_desc;
IPSEC_ASSERT(crda != NULL, ("null ah crypto descriptor"));
/* Authentication descriptor */
crda->crd_skip = skip;
crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + alen);
crda->crd_inject = m->m_pkthdr.len - alen;
crda->crd_alg = esph->type;
crda->crd_key = sav->key_auth->key_data;
crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth);
/* Copy the authenticator */
if (mtag == NULL)
m_copydata(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - alen, alen,
(caddr_t) (tc + 1));
/* Chain authentication request */
crde = crda->crd_next;
} else {
crde = crp->crp_desc;
}
/* Crypto operation descriptor */
crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length */
crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF | CRYPTO_F_CBIFSYNC;
crp->crp_buf = (caddr_t) m;
crp->crp_callback = esp_input_cb;
crp->crp_sid = sav->tdb_cryptoid;
crp->crp_opaque = (caddr_t) tc;
/* These are passed as-is to the callback */
tc->tc_spi = sav->spi;
tc->tc_dst = sav->sah->saidx.dst;
tc->tc_proto = sav->sah->saidx.proto;
tc->tc_protoff = protoff;
tc->tc_skip = skip;
KEY_ADDREFSA(sav);
tc->tc_sav = sav;
/* Decryption descriptor */
if (espx) {
IPSEC_ASSERT(crde != NULL, ("null esp crypto descriptor"));
crde->crd_skip = skip + hlen;
crde->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + hlen + alen);
crde->crd_inject = skip + hlen - sav->ivlen;
crde->crd_alg = espx->type;
crde->crd_key = sav->key_enc->key_data;
crde->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_enc);
/* XXX Rounds ? */
}
if (mtag == NULL)
return crypto_dispatch(crp);
else
return esp_input_cb(crp);
}
/*
* ESP input callback from the crypto driver.
*/
static int
esp_input_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
{
u_int8_t lastthree[3], aalg[AH_HMAC_HASHLEN];
int s, hlen, skip, protoff, error;
struct mbuf *m;
struct cryptodesc *crd;
struct auth_hash *esph;
struct enc_xform *espx;
struct tdb_crypto *tc;
struct m_tag *mtag;
struct secasvar *sav;
struct secasindex *saidx;
caddr_t ptr;
crd = crp->crp_desc;
KASSERT(crd != NULL, ("esp_input_cb: null crypto descriptor!"));
tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) crp->crp_opaque;
KASSERT(tc != NULL, ("esp_input_cb: null opaque crypto data area!"));
skip = tc->tc_skip;
protoff = tc->tc_protoff;
mtag = (struct m_tag *) tc->tc_ptr;
m = (struct mbuf *) crp->crp_buf;
s = splnet();
sav = KEY_ALLOCSA(&tc->tc_dst, tc->tc_proto, tc->tc_spi);
if (sav == NULL) {
espstat.esps_notdb++;
DPRINTF(("esp_input_cb: SA expired while in crypto "
"(SA %s/%08lx proto %u)\n", ipsec_address(&tc->tc_dst),
(u_long) ntohl(tc->tc_spi), tc->tc_proto));
error = ENOBUFS; /*XXX*/
goto bad;
}
saidx = &sav->sah->saidx;
KASSERT(saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET ||
saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6,
("ah_input_cb: unexpected protocol family %u",
saidx->dst.sa.sa_family));
esph = sav->tdb_authalgxform;
espx = sav->tdb_encalgxform;
/* Check for crypto errors */
if (crp->crp_etype) {
/* Reset the session ID */
if (sav->tdb_cryptoid != 0)
sav->tdb_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid;
if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) {
KEY_FREESAV(&sav);
splx(s);
return crypto_dispatch(crp);
}
espstat.esps_noxform++;
DPRINTF(("esp_input_cb: crypto error %d\n", crp->crp_etype));
error = crp->crp_etype;
goto bad;
}
/* Shouldn't happen... */
if (m == NULL) {
espstat.esps_crypto++;
DPRINTF(("esp_input_cb: bogus returned buffer from crypto\n"));
error = EINVAL;
goto bad;
}
espstat.esps_hist[sav->alg_enc]++;
/* If authentication was performed, check now. */
if (esph != NULL) {
/*
* If we have a tag, it means an IPsec-aware NIC did
* the verification for us. Otherwise we need to
* check the authentication calculation.
*/
ahstat.ahs_hist[sav->alg_auth]++;
if (mtag == NULL) {
/* Copy the authenticator from the packet */
m_copydata(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - esph->authsize,
esph->authsize, aalg);
ptr = (caddr_t) (tc + 1);
/* Verify authenticator */
if (bcmp(ptr, aalg, esph->authsize) != 0) {
DPRINTF(("esp_input_cb: "
"authentication hash mismatch for packet in SA %s/%08lx\n",
ipsec_address(&saidx->dst),
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
espstat.esps_badauth++;
error = EACCES;
goto bad;
}
}
/* Remove trailing authenticator */
m_adj(m, -(esph->authsize));
}
/* Release the crypto descriptors */
free(tc, M_XDATA), tc = NULL;
crypto_freereq(crp), crp = NULL;
/*
* Packet is now decrypted.
*/
m->m_flags |= M_DECRYPTED;
/* Determine the ESP header length */
if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD)
hlen = sizeof (struct esp) + sav->ivlen;
else
hlen = sizeof (struct newesp) + sav->ivlen;
/* Remove the ESP header and IV from the mbuf. */
error = m_striphdr(m, skip, hlen);
if (error) {
espstat.esps_hdrops++;
DPRINTF(("esp_input_cb: bad mbuf chain, SA %s/%08lx\n",
ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst),
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
goto bad;
}
/* Save the last three bytes of decrypted data */
m_copydata(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - 3, 3, lastthree);
/* Verify pad length */
if (lastthree[1] + 2 > m->m_pkthdr.len - skip) {
espstat.esps_badilen++;
DPRINTF(("esp_input_cb: invalid padding length %d "
"for %u byte packet in SA %s/%08lx\n",
lastthree[1], m->m_pkthdr.len - skip,
ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst),
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
error = EINVAL;
goto bad;
}
/* Verify correct decryption by checking the last padding bytes */
if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_PMASK) != SADB_X_EXT_PRAND) {
if (lastthree[1] != lastthree[0] && lastthree[1] != 0) {
espstat.esps_badenc++;
DPRINTF(("esp_input_cb: decryption failed "
"for packet in SA %s/%08lx\n",
ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst),
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
DPRINTF(("esp_input_cb: %x %x\n", lastthree[0], lastthree[1]));
error = EINVAL;
goto bad;
}
}
/* Trim the mbuf chain to remove trailing authenticator and padding */
m_adj(m, -(lastthree[1] + 2));
/* Restore the Next Protocol field */
m_copyback(m, protoff, sizeof (u_int8_t), lastthree + 2);
IPSEC_COMMON_INPUT_CB(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag);
KEY_FREESAV(&sav);
splx(s);
return error;
bad:
if (sav)
KEY_FREESAV(&sav);
splx(s);
if (m != NULL)
m_freem(m);
if (tc != NULL)
free(tc, M_XDATA);
if (crp != NULL)
crypto_freereq(crp);
return error;
}
/*
* ESP input callback from the crypto driver.
*/
static int
esp_input_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
{
u_int8_t lastthree[3], aalg[AH_HMAC_MAXHASHLEN];
int hlen, skip, protoff, error, alen;
struct mbuf *m;
struct cryptodesc *crd;
struct auth_hash *esph;
struct enc_xform *espx;
struct tdb_crypto *tc;
struct m_tag *mtag;
struct secasvar *sav;
struct secasindex *saidx;
caddr_t ptr;
crd = crp->crp_desc;
IPSEC_ASSERT(crd != NULL, ("null crypto descriptor!"));
tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) crp->crp_opaque;
IPSEC_ASSERT(tc != NULL, ("null opaque crypto data area!"));
skip = tc->tc_skip;
protoff = tc->tc_protoff;
mtag = (struct m_tag *) tc->tc_ptr;
m = (struct mbuf *) crp->crp_buf;
sav = tc->tc_sav;
IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("null SA!"));
saidx = &sav->sah->saidx;
IPSEC_ASSERT(saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET ||
saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6,
("unexpected protocol family %u", saidx->dst.sa.sa_family));
esph = sav->tdb_authalgxform;
espx = sav->tdb_encalgxform;
/* Check for crypto errors */
if (crp->crp_etype) {
/* Reset the session ID */
if (sav->tdb_cryptoid != 0)
sav->tdb_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid;
if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN)
return (crypto_dispatch(crp));
V_espstat.esps_noxform++;
DPRINTF(("%s: crypto error %d\n", __func__, crp->crp_etype));
error = crp->crp_etype;
goto bad;
}
/* Shouldn't happen... */
if (m == NULL) {
V_espstat.esps_crypto++;
DPRINTF(("%s: bogus returned buffer from crypto\n", __func__));
error = EINVAL;
goto bad;
}
V_espstat.esps_hist[sav->alg_enc]++;
/* If authentication was performed, check now. */
if (esph != NULL) {
switch (esph->type) {
case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC:
alen = esph->hashsize/2;
break;
default:
alen = AH_HMAC_HASHLEN;
break;
}
/*
* If we have a tag, it means an IPsec-aware NIC did
* the verification for us. Otherwise we need to
* check the authentication calculation.
*/
V_ahstat.ahs_hist[sav->alg_auth]++;
if (mtag == NULL) {
/* Copy the authenticator from the packet */
m_copydata(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - alen,
alen, aalg);
ptr = (caddr_t) (tc + 1);
/* Verify authenticator */
if (bcmp(ptr, aalg, alen) != 0) {
DPRINTF(("%s: "
"authentication hash mismatch for packet in SA %s/%08lx\n",
__func__,
ipsec_address(&saidx->dst),
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
V_espstat.esps_badauth++;
error = EACCES;
goto bad;
}
}
/* Remove trailing authenticator */
m_adj(m, -alen);
}
/* Release the crypto descriptors */
free(tc, M_XDATA), tc = NULL;
crypto_freereq(crp), crp = NULL;
/*
* Packet is now decrypted.
*/
m->m_flags |= M_DECRYPTED;
/*
* Update replay sequence number, if appropriate.
*/
if (sav->replay) {
u_int32_t seq;
m_copydata(m, skip + offsetof(struct newesp, esp_seq),
sizeof (seq), (caddr_t) &seq);
if (ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(seq), sav)) {
DPRINTF(("%s: packet replay check for %s\n", __func__,
ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
V_espstat.esps_replay++;
error = ENOBUFS;
goto bad;
}
}
static int ipsec_ocf_rcv_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
{
struct ipsec_rcv_state *irs =
(struct ipsec_rcv_state *)crp->crp_opaque;
struct iphdr *newiph;
unsigned orig_len, decomp_len;
struct cryptodesc *crdc = NULL;
KLIPS_PRINT(debug_rcv, "klips_debug:ipsec_ocf_rcv_cb\n");
if (irs == NULL) {
KLIPS_PRINT(debug_rcv, "klips_debug:ipsec_ocf_rcv_cb: "
"NULL irs in callback\n");
return 0;
}
/*
* we must update the state before returning to the state machine.
* if we have an error, terminate the processing by moving to the DONE
* state
*/
irs->state = IPSEC_RSM_DONE; /* assume it went badly */
if (crp->crp_etype) {
ptrdiff_t ptr_delta;
if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) {
/* Session has been migrated. Store the new session id and retry */
KLIPS_PRINT(debug_rcv,
"klips_debug:ipsec_ocf_rcv_cb: crypto session migrated\n");
irs->ipsp->ocf_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid;
/* resubmit request */
if (crypto_dispatch(crp) == 0)
return 0;
/* resubmit failed */
}
KLIPS_PRINT(debug_rcv, "klips_debug:ipsec_ocf_rcv_cb: "
"error in processing 0x%x\n", crp->crp_etype);
switch (irs->ipsp->ips_said.proto) {
case IPPROTO_COMP:
/*
* we restore the previous skb on error and pretend nothing
* happened, just no compression
*/
ptr_delta = irs->pre_ipcomp_skb->data - irs->skb->data;
irs->authenticator =
(void*)((char*)irs->authenticator + ptr_delta);
irs->iph =
(void*)((char*)irs->iph + ptr_delta);
kfree_skb(irs->skb);
irs->skb = irs->pre_ipcomp_skb;
irs->pre_ipcomp_skb = NULL;
break;
}
goto bail;
}
switch (irs->ipsp->ips_said.proto) {
case IPPROTO_ESP:
/* ESP, process it */
if (ipsec_rcv_esp_post_decrypt(irs) == IPSEC_RCV_OK) {
/* this one came up good, set next state */
irs->state = IPSEC_RSM_DECAP_CONT;
}
break;
case IPPROTO_AH:
/* AH post processing, put back fields we had to zero */
if (lsw_ip_hdr_version(irs) == 4) {
lsw_ip4_hdr(irs)->ttl = irs->ttl;
lsw_ip4_hdr(irs)->check = irs->check;
lsw_ip4_hdr(irs)->frag_off = irs->frag_off;
lsw_ip4_hdr(irs)->tos = irs->tos;
}
irs->state = IPSEC_RSM_AUTH_CHK;
/* pull up the IP header again after processing */
skb_pull(irs->skb,
((unsigned char *)irs->protostuff.ahstuff.ahp) -
((unsigned char *)irs->iph));
break;
case IPPROTO_COMP:
crdc = crp->crp_desc;
KLIPS_PRINT(debug_rcv, "comp before adjustments:\n");
KLIPS_IP_PRINT(debug_rcv & DB_TN_XMIT, irs->iph);
orig_len = irs->skb->len - sizeof(struct ipcomphdr);
decomp_len = crp->crp_olen;
newiph =
(struct iphdr*)((char*)irs->iph +
sizeof(struct ipcomphdr));
KLIPS_PRINT(debug_rcv,
"comp results: olen: %u, inject: %u (len=%d) iph->totlen=%u\n",
crp->crp_olen, crdc->crd_inject, decomp_len,
ntohs(newiph->tot_len));
/*
* move the ip header to consume room previously taken by
* the ipcomp header
*/
skb_pull(irs->skb, sizeof(struct ipcomphdr));
memmove(newiph, irs->iph, irs->iphlen);
/* adjust the ipp pointer to point to the header we decoded */
irs->iph = newiph;
skb_set_network_header(irs->skb, ipsec_skb_offset(irs->skb,
((unsigned
char *)
skb_network_header(
irs
->
skb))
+
sizeof(struct
ipcomphdr)));
skb_set_transport_header(irs->skb, ipsec_skb_offset(irs->skb,
((unsigned
char *)
skb_transport_header(
irs
->
skb))
+
sizeof(
struct
ipcomphdr)));
if (lsw_ip_hdr_version(irs) == 6) {
lsw_ip6_hdr(irs)->nexthdr = irs->next_header;
} else {
lsw_ip4_hdr(irs)->protocol = irs->next_header;
lsw_ip4_hdr(irs)->tot_len = htons(
irs->iphlen + decomp_len);
lsw_ip4_hdr(irs)->check = 0;
lsw_ip4_hdr(irs)->check = ip_fast_csum(irs->iph, lsw_ip4_hdr(
irs)->ihl);
}
KLIPS_PRINT(debug_rcv, "comp after len adjustments:\n");
KLIPS_IP_PRINT(debug_rcv & DB_TN_XMIT, irs->iph);
/* Update skb length/tail by "putting" the growth */
safe_skb_put(irs->skb, decomp_len - crp->crp_olen);
/* set the new header in the skb */
skb_set_network_header(irs->skb,
ipsec_skb_offset(irs->skb, irs->iph));
KLIPS_IP_PRINT(debug_rcv & DB_RX_PKTRX, ip_hdr(irs->skb));
/* relese the backup copy */
if (irs->pre_ipcomp_skb) {
kfree_skb(irs->pre_ipcomp_skb);
irs->pre_ipcomp_skb = NULL;
}
/* IPcomp finished, continue processing */
irs->state = IPSEC_RSM_DECAP_CONT;
break;
}
bail:
crypto_freereq(crp);
crp = NULL;
ipsec_ocf_queue_task(ipsec_rsm, irs);
return 0;
}
/*
* ESP output callback from the crypto driver.
*/
static int
esp_output_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
{
struct tdb_crypto *tc;
struct ipsecrequest *isr;
struct secasvar *sav;
struct mbuf *m;
int s, err, error;
tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) crp->crp_opaque;
KASSERT(tc != NULL, ("esp_output_cb: null opaque data area!"));
m = (struct mbuf *) crp->crp_buf;
s = splnet();
isr = tc->tc_isr;
sav = KEY_ALLOCSA(&tc->tc_dst, tc->tc_proto, tc->tc_spi);
if (sav == NULL) {
espstat.esps_notdb++;
DPRINTF(("esp_output_cb: SA expired while in crypto "
"(SA %s/%08lx proto %u)\n", ipsec_address(&tc->tc_dst),
(u_long) ntohl(tc->tc_spi), tc->tc_proto));
error = ENOBUFS; /*XXX*/
goto bad;
}
KASSERT(isr->sav == sav,
("esp_output_cb: SA changed was %p now %p\n", isr->sav, sav));
/* Check for crypto errors. */
if (crp->crp_etype) {
/* Reset session ID. */
if (sav->tdb_cryptoid != 0)
sav->tdb_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid;
if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) {
KEY_FREESAV(&sav);
splx(s);
return crypto_dispatch(crp);
}
espstat.esps_noxform++;
DPRINTF(("esp_output_cb: crypto error %d\n", crp->crp_etype));
error = crp->crp_etype;
goto bad;
}
/* Shouldn't happen... */
if (m == NULL) {
espstat.esps_crypto++;
DPRINTF(("esp_output_cb: bogus returned buffer from crypto\n"));
error = EINVAL;
goto bad;
}
espstat.esps_hist[sav->alg_enc]++;
if (sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL)
ahstat.ahs_hist[sav->alg_auth]++;
/* Release crypto descriptors. */
free(tc, M_XDATA);
crypto_freereq(crp);
/* NB: m is reclaimed by ipsec_process_done. */
err = ipsec_process_done(m, isr);
KEY_FREESAV(&sav);
splx(s);
return err;
bad:
if (sav)
KEY_FREESAV(&sav);
splx(s);
if (m)
m_freem(m);
free(tc, M_XDATA);
crypto_freereq(crp);
return error;
}
static int ipsec_ocf_xmit_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
{
struct ipsec_xmit_state *ixs =
(struct ipsec_xmit_state *)crp->crp_opaque;
struct iphdr *newiph;
struct ipcomphdr *cmph;
unsigned orig_len, comp_len;
struct cryptodesc *crdc = NULL;
KLIPS_PRINT(debug_tunnel & DB_TN_XMIT,
"klips_debug:ipsec_ocf_xmit_cb\n");
if (ixs == NULL) {
KLIPS_PRINT(debug_tunnel & DB_TN_XMIT, "klips_debug:ipsec_ocf_xmit_cb: "
"NULL ixs in callback\n");
return 0;
}
/*
* we must update the state before returning to the state machine.
* if we have an error, terminate the processing by moving to the DONE
* state
*/
ixs->state = IPSEC_XSM_DONE; /* assume bad xmit */
if (crp->crp_etype) {
ptrdiff_t ptr_delta;
if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) {
/* Session has been migrated. Store the new session id and retry */
KLIPS_PRINT(debug_tunnel & DB_TN_XMIT,
"klips_debug:ipsec_ocf_xmit_cb: crypto session migrated\n");
ixs->ipsp->ocf_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid;
/* resubmit request */
if (crypto_dispatch(crp) == 0)
return 0;
/* resubmit failed */
}
KLIPS_PRINT(debug_tunnel & DB_TN_XMIT, "klips_debug:ipsec_ocf_xmit_cb: "
"error in processing 0x%x\n",
crp->crp_etype);
switch (ixs->ipsp->ips_said.proto) {
case IPPROTO_COMP:
/*
* It's ok for compression to fail... we made a clone
* of the packet, so we just revert it now...
*/
if (!ixs->pre_ipcomp_skb) {
KLIPS_PRINT(debug_tunnel & DB_TN_XMIT,
"klips_debug:ipsec_ocf_xmit_cb: "
"IPcomp on %u bytes failed, "
"but we have no clone!\n",
(unsigned int)
(lsw_ip_hdr_version(ixs) == 6 ?
(ntohs(lsw_ip6_hdr(ixs)->
payload_len) +
sizeof(struct ipv6hdr))
:
ntohs(lsw_ip4_hdr(
ixs)->tot_len)) -
ixs->iphlen);
/* this is a fail. */
break;
}
KLIPS_PRINT(debug_tunnel & DB_TN_XMIT,
"klips_debug:ipsec_ocf_xmit_cb: "
"IPcomp on %u bytes failed, "
"using backup clone.\n",
(unsigned int)
(lsw_ip_hdr_version(ixs) == 6 ?
(ntohs(lsw_ip6_hdr(ixs)->payload_len) +
sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)) :
ntohs(lsw_ip4_hdr(ixs)->tot_len)) -
ixs->iphlen);
ptr_delta = ixs->pre_ipcomp_skb->data - ixs->skb->data;
ixs->iph =
(void*)((char*)ixs->iph + ptr_delta);
/*
* can not free it here, because we are under
* IRQ, potentially, so queue it for later
*/
kfree_skb(ixs->skb);
ixs->skb = ixs->pre_ipcomp_skb;
ixs->pre_ipcomp_skb = NULL;
skb_set_network_header(ixs->skb,
ipsec_skb_offset(ixs->skb,
((
void
*)
skb_network_header(
ixs->
skb))
+
ptr_delta));
skb_set_transport_header(ixs->skb,
ipsec_skb_offset(ixs->skb,
((
void
*)
skb_transport_header(
ixs
->
skb))
+
ptr_delta));
KLIPS_IP_PRINT(debug_tunnel & DB_TN_XMIT, ixs->iph);
/* this means we don't compress */
ixs->state = IPSEC_XSM_CONT;
break;
}
goto bail;
}
switch (ixs->ipsp->ips_said.proto) {
case IPPROTO_ESP:
/* ESP, nothing to do */
break;
case IPPROTO_AH:
/* AH post processing, put back fields we had to zero */
if (lsw_ip_hdr_version(ixs) == 4) {
lsw_ip4_hdr(ixs)->ttl = ixs->ttl;
lsw_ip4_hdr(ixs)->check = ixs->check;
lsw_ip4_hdr(ixs)->frag_off = ixs->frag_off;
lsw_ip4_hdr(ixs)->tos = ixs->tos;
}
break;
case IPPROTO_COMP:
/* IPcomp fill in the header */
crdc = crp->crp_desc;
KLIPS_PRINT(debug_tunnel & DB_TN_XMIT,
"klips_debug:ipsec_ocf_xmit_cb: "
"after <%s%s%s>, SA:%s:\n",
IPS_XFORM_NAME(ixs->ipsp),
ixs->sa_len ? ixs->sa_txt : " (error)");
KLIPS_IP_PRINT(debug_tunnel & DB_TN_XMIT, ixs->iph);
orig_len = (lsw_ip_hdr_version(ixs) == 6 ?
(ntohs(lsw_ip6_hdr(ixs)->payload_len) +
sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)) :
ntohs(lsw_ip4_hdr(ixs)->tot_len)) -
ixs->iphlen;
comp_len = crp->crp_olen;
if (sysctl_ipsec_debug_ipcomp && sysctl_ipsec_debug_verbose) {
ipsec_dmp_block("compress after",
((unsigned char*)ixs->iph) + ixs->iphlen,
comp_len);
}
newiph =
(struct iphdr *)((char*)ixs->iph -
sizeof(struct ipcomphdr));
cmph = (struct ipcomphdr *)((char*)newiph + ixs->iphlen);
/* move the ip header to make room for the new ipcomp header */
memmove(((unsigned char *) ixs->skb->data) -
sizeof(struct ipcomphdr),
ixs->skb->data,
(((unsigned char *) ixs->iph) + ixs->iphlen) -
((unsigned char *) ixs->skb->data));
/* DAVIDM check for head room */
skb_push(ixs->skb, sizeof(struct ipcomphdr));
ixs->iph = newiph;
skb_set_network_header(ixs->skb,
ipsec_skb_offset(ixs->skb, newiph));
skb_set_transport_header(ixs->skb,
ipsec_skb_offset(ixs->skb,
newiph) +
ixs->iphlen);
/* now we can fill in the ipcomp header */
cmph->ipcomp_nh = ixs->next_header;
cmph->ipcomp_flags = 0;
cmph->ipcomp_cpi =
htons((__u16)(ntohl(ixs->ipsp->ips_said.spi) &
0x0000ffff));
/* update the ip header to reflect the compression */
if (lsw_ip_hdr_version(ixs) == 6) {
lsw_ip6_hdr(ixs)->nexthdr = IPPROTO_COMP;
lsw_ip6_hdr(ixs)->payload_len = htons(ixs->iphlen +
sizeof(struct
ipcomphdr) + comp_len -
sizeof(struct
ipv6hdr));
} else {
lsw_ip4_hdr(ixs)->protocol = IPPROTO_COMP;
lsw_ip4_hdr(ixs)->tot_len = htons(ixs->iphlen +
sizeof(struct
ipcomphdr) +
comp_len);
lsw_ip4_hdr(ixs)->check = 0;
lsw_ip4_hdr(ixs)->check =
ip_fast_csum((char *) ixs->iph, lsw_ip4_hdr(
ixs)->ihl);
}
/* Update skb length/tail by "unputting" the shrinkage */
safe_skb_put(ixs->skb, comp_len - orig_len);
ixs->ipsp->ips_comp_adapt_skip = 0;
ixs->ipsp->ips_comp_adapt_tries = 0;
/* release the backup copy */
if (ixs->pre_ipcomp_skb) {
kfree_skb(ixs->pre_ipcomp_skb);
ixs->pre_ipcomp_skb = NULL;
}
KLIPS_PRINT(debug_tunnel & DB_TN_XMIT,
"klips_debug:ipsec_ocf_xmit_cb: "
"after <%s%s%s>, SA:%s:\n",
IPS_XFORM_NAME(ixs->ipsp),
ixs->sa_len ? ixs->sa_txt : " (error)");
KLIPS_IP_PRINT(debug_tunnel & DB_TN_XMIT, ixs->iph);
break;
}
/* all good */
ixs->state = IPSEC_XSM_CONT;
bail:
crypto_freereq(crp);
crp = NULL;
ipsec_ocf_queue_task(ipsec_xsm, ixs);
return 0;
}
/*
* ESP output callback, called directly by the crypto driver.
*/
int
esp_output_cb(void *op)
{
struct cryptop *crp = (struct cryptop *) op;
struct tdb_crypto *tc;
struct tdb *tdb;
struct mbuf *m;
int error, s;
tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) crp->crp_opaque;
m = (struct mbuf *) crp->crp_buf;
if (m == NULL) {
/* Shouldn't happen... */
free(tc, M_XDATA);
crypto_freereq(crp);
espstat.esps_crypto++;
DPRINTF(("esp_output_cb(): bogus returned buffer from "
"crypto\n"));
return (EINVAL);
}
s = spltdb();
tdb = gettdb(tc->tc_spi, &tc->tc_dst, tc->tc_proto);
if (tdb == NULL) {
free(tc, M_XDATA);
espstat.esps_notdb++;
DPRINTF(("esp_output_cb(): TDB is expired while in crypto\n"));
error = EPERM;
goto baddone;
}
/* Check for crypto errors. */
if (crp->crp_etype) {
if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) {
/* Reset the session ID */
if (tdb->tdb_cryptoid != 0)
tdb->tdb_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid;
splx(s);
return crypto_dispatch(crp);
}
free(tc, M_XDATA);
espstat.esps_noxform++;
DPRINTF(("esp_output_cb(): crypto error %d\n",
crp->crp_etype));
error = crp->crp_etype;
goto baddone;
}
free(tc, M_XDATA);
/* Release crypto descriptors. */
crypto_freereq(crp);
/*
* If we're doing half-iv, keep a copy of the last few bytes of the
* encrypted part, for use as the next IV. Note that HALF-IV is only
* supposed to be used without authentication (the old ESP specs).
*/
if (tdb->tdb_flags & TDBF_HALFIV)
m_copydata(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - tdb->tdb_ivlen, tdb->tdb_ivlen,
tdb->tdb_iv);
/* Call the IPsec input callback. */
error = ipsp_process_done(m, tdb);
splx(s);
return error;
baddone:
splx(s);
if (m != NULL)
m_freem(m);
crypto_freereq(crp);
return error;
}
/*
* ESP input callback from the crypto driver.
*/
static int
esp_input_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
{
char buf[128];
u_int8_t lastthree[3], aalg[AH_HMAC_MAXHASHLEN];
int hlen, skip, protoff, error, alen;
struct mbuf *m;
struct cryptodesc *crd;
struct auth_hash *esph;
struct enc_xform *espx;
struct tdb_crypto *tc;
struct secasvar *sav;
struct secasindex *saidx;
caddr_t ptr;
crd = crp->crp_desc;
IPSEC_ASSERT(crd != NULL, ("null crypto descriptor!"));
tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) crp->crp_opaque;
IPSEC_ASSERT(tc != NULL, ("null opaque crypto data area!"));
skip = tc->tc_skip;
protoff = tc->tc_protoff;
m = (struct mbuf *) crp->crp_buf;
sav = tc->tc_sav;
IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("null SA!"));
saidx = &sav->sah->saidx;
IPSEC_ASSERT(saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET ||
saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6,
("unexpected protocol family %u", saidx->dst.sa.sa_family));
esph = sav->tdb_authalgxform;
espx = sav->tdb_encalgxform;
/* Check for crypto errors */
if (crp->crp_etype) {
/* Reset the session ID */
if (sav->tdb_cryptoid != 0)
sav->tdb_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid;
if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN)
return (crypto_dispatch(crp));
ESPSTAT_INC(esps_noxform);
DPRINTF(("%s: crypto error %d\n", __func__, crp->crp_etype));
error = crp->crp_etype;
goto bad;
}
/* Shouldn't happen... */
if (m == NULL) {
ESPSTAT_INC(esps_crypto);
DPRINTF(("%s: bogus returned buffer from crypto\n", __func__));
error = EINVAL;
goto bad;
}
ESPSTAT_INC(esps_hist[sav->alg_enc]);
/* If authentication was performed, check now. */
if (esph != NULL) {
alen = xform_ah_authsize(esph);
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_hist[sav->alg_auth]);
/* Copy the authenticator from the packet */
m_copydata(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - alen, alen, aalg);
ptr = (caddr_t) (tc + 1);
/* Verify authenticator */
if (timingsafe_bcmp(ptr, aalg, alen) != 0) {
DPRINTF(("%s: authentication hash mismatch for "
"packet in SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
ipsec_address(&saidx->dst, buf, sizeof(buf)),
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
ESPSTAT_INC(esps_badauth);
error = EACCES;
goto bad;
}
/* Remove trailing authenticator */
m_adj(m, -alen);
}
/* Release the crypto descriptors */
free(tc, M_XDATA), tc = NULL;
crypto_freereq(crp), crp = NULL;
/*
* Packet is now decrypted.
*/
m->m_flags |= M_DECRYPTED;
/*
* Update replay sequence number, if appropriate.
*/
if (sav->replay) {
u_int32_t seq;
m_copydata(m, skip + offsetof(struct newesp, esp_seq),
sizeof (seq), (caddr_t) &seq);
if (ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(seq), sav)) {
DPRINTF(("%s: packet replay check for %s\n", __func__,
ipsec_logsastr(sav, buf, sizeof(buf))));
ESPSTAT_INC(esps_replay);
error = ENOBUFS;
goto bad;
}
}
/*
* ESP input processing, called (eventually) through the protocol switch.
*/
int
esp_input(struct mbuf *m, struct tdb *tdb, int skip, int protoff)
{
struct auth_hash *esph = (struct auth_hash *) tdb->tdb_authalgxform;
struct enc_xform *espx = (struct enc_xform *) tdb->tdb_encalgxform;
struct tdb_crypto *tc;
int plen, alen, hlen;
struct m_tag *mtag;
u_int32_t btsx;
struct cryptodesc *crde = NULL, *crda = NULL;
struct cryptop *crp;
/* Determine the ESP header length */
if (tdb->tdb_flags & TDBF_NOREPLAY)
hlen = sizeof(u_int32_t) + tdb->tdb_ivlen; /* "old" ESP */
else
hlen = 2 * sizeof(u_int32_t) + tdb->tdb_ivlen; /* "new" ESP */
if (esph)
alen = AH_HMAC_HASHLEN;
else
alen = 0;
plen = m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + hlen + alen);
if (plen <= 0) {
DPRINTF(("esp_input: invalid payload length\n"));
espstat.esps_badilen++;
m_freem(m);
return EINVAL;
}
if (espx) {
/*
* Verify payload length is multiple of encryption algorithm
* block size.
*/
if (plen & (espx->blocksize - 1)) {
DPRINTF(("esp_input(): payload of %d octets not a multiple of %d octets, SA %s/%08x\n", plen, espx->blocksize, ipsp_address(tdb->tdb_dst), ntohl(tdb->tdb_spi)));
espstat.esps_badilen++;
m_freem(m);
return EINVAL;
}
}
/* Replay window checking, if appropriate -- no value commitment. */
if ((tdb->tdb_wnd > 0) && (!(tdb->tdb_flags & TDBF_NOREPLAY))) {
m_copydata(m, skip + sizeof(u_int32_t), sizeof(u_int32_t),
(unsigned char *) &btsx);
btsx = ntohl(btsx);
switch (checkreplaywindow32(btsx, 0, &(tdb->tdb_rpl),
tdb->tdb_wnd, &(tdb->tdb_bitmap), 0)) {
case 0: /* All's well */
break;
case 1:
m_freem(m);
DPRINTF(("esp_input(): replay counter wrapped for SA %s/%08x\n", ipsp_address(tdb->tdb_dst), ntohl(tdb->tdb_spi)));
espstat.esps_wrap++;
return EACCES;
case 2:
case 3:
DPRINTF(("esp_input(): duplicate packet received in SA %s/%08x\n", ipsp_address(tdb->tdb_dst), ntohl(tdb->tdb_spi)));
m_freem(m);
return EACCES;
default:
m_freem(m);
DPRINTF(("esp_input(): bogus value from checkreplaywindow32() in SA %s/%08x\n", ipsp_address(tdb->tdb_dst), ntohl(tdb->tdb_spi)));
espstat.esps_replay++;
return EACCES;
}
}
/* Update the counters */
tdb->tdb_cur_bytes += m->m_pkthdr.len - skip - hlen - alen;
espstat.esps_ibytes += m->m_pkthdr.len - skip - hlen - alen;
/* Hard expiration */
if ((tdb->tdb_flags & TDBF_BYTES) &&
(tdb->tdb_cur_bytes >= tdb->tdb_exp_bytes)) {
pfkeyv2_expire(tdb, SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_HARD);
tdb_delete(tdb);
m_freem(m);
return ENXIO;
}
/* Notify on soft expiration */
if ((tdb->tdb_flags & TDBF_SOFT_BYTES) &&
(tdb->tdb_cur_bytes >= tdb->tdb_soft_bytes)) {
pfkeyv2_expire(tdb, SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_SOFT);
tdb->tdb_flags &= ~TDBF_SOFT_BYTES; /* Turn off checking */
}
#ifdef notyet
/* Find out if we've already done crypto */
for (mtag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_IN_CRYPTO_DONE, NULL);
mtag != NULL;
mtag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_IN_CRYPTO_DONE, mtag)) {
struct tdb_ident *tdbi;
tdbi = (struct tdb_ident *) (mtag + 1);
if (tdbi->proto == tdb->tdb_sproto && tdbi->spi == tdb->tdb_spi &&
!bcmp(&tdbi->dst, &tdb->tdb_dst, sizeof(union sockaddr_union)))
break;
}
#else
mtag = NULL;
#endif
/* Get crypto descriptors */
crp = crypto_getreq(esph && espx ? 2 : 1);
if (crp == NULL) {
m_freem(m);
DPRINTF(("esp_input(): failed to acquire crypto descriptors\n"));
espstat.esps_crypto++;
return ENOBUFS;
}
/* Get IPsec-specific opaque pointer */
if (esph == NULL || mtag != NULL)
tc = malloc(sizeof(*tc), M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT | M_ZERO);
else
tc = malloc(sizeof(*tc) + alen, M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT | M_ZERO);
if (tc == NULL) {
m_freem(m);
crypto_freereq(crp);
DPRINTF(("esp_input(): failed to allocate tdb_crypto\n"));
espstat.esps_crypto++;
return ENOBUFS;
}
tc->tc_ptr = (caddr_t) mtag;
if (esph) {
crda = crp->crp_desc;
crde = crda->crd_next;
/* Authentication descriptor */
crda->crd_skip = skip;
crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + alen);
crda->crd_inject = m->m_pkthdr.len - alen;
crda->crd_alg = esph->type;
crda->crd_key = tdb->tdb_amxkey;
crda->crd_klen = tdb->tdb_amxkeylen * 8;
/* Copy the authenticator */
if (mtag == NULL)
m_copydata(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - alen, alen, (caddr_t) (tc + 1));
} else
crde = crp->crp_desc;
/* Crypto operation descriptor */
crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length */
crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF;
crp->crp_buf = (caddr_t) m;
crp->crp_callback = (int (*) (struct cryptop *)) esp_input_cb;
crp->crp_sid = tdb->tdb_cryptoid;
crp->crp_opaque = (caddr_t) tc;
/* These are passed as-is to the callback */
tc->tc_skip = skip;
tc->tc_protoff = protoff;
tc->tc_spi = tdb->tdb_spi;
tc->tc_proto = tdb->tdb_sproto;
bcopy(&tdb->tdb_dst, &tc->tc_dst, sizeof(union sockaddr_union));
/* Decryption descriptor */
if (espx) {
crde->crd_skip = skip + hlen;
crde->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + hlen + alen);
crde->crd_inject = skip + hlen - tdb->tdb_ivlen;
if (tdb->tdb_flags & TDBF_HALFIV) {
/* Copy half-IV from packet */
m_copydata(m, crde->crd_inject, tdb->tdb_ivlen, crde->crd_iv);
/* Cook IV */
for (btsx = 0; btsx < tdb->tdb_ivlen; btsx++)
crde->crd_iv[tdb->tdb_ivlen + btsx] = ~crde->crd_iv[btsx];
crde->crd_flags |= CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT;
}
crde->crd_alg = espx->type;
crde->crd_key = tdb->tdb_emxkey;
crde->crd_klen = tdb->tdb_emxkeylen * 8;
/* XXX Rounds ? */
}
if (mtag == NULL)
return crypto_dispatch(crp);
else
return esp_input_cb(crp);
}
/*
* ESP input callback, called directly by the crypto driver.
*/
int
esp_input_cb(void *op)
{
u_int8_t lastthree[3], aalg[AH_HMAC_HASHLEN];
int s, hlen, roff, skip, protoff, error;
struct mbuf *m1, *mo, *m;
struct auth_hash *esph;
struct tdb_crypto *tc;
struct cryptop *crp;
struct m_tag *mtag;
struct tdb *tdb;
u_int32_t btsx;
caddr_t ptr;
crp = (struct cryptop *) op;
tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) crp->crp_opaque;
skip = tc->tc_skip;
protoff = tc->tc_protoff;
mtag = (struct m_tag *) tc->tc_ptr;
m = (struct mbuf *) crp->crp_buf;
if (m == NULL) {
/* Shouldn't happen... */
free(tc, M_XDATA);
crypto_freereq(crp);
espstat.esps_crypto++;
DPRINTF(("esp_input_cb(): bogus returned buffer from crypto\n"));
return (EINVAL);
}
s = spltdb();
tdb = gettdb(tc->tc_spi, &tc->tc_dst, tc->tc_proto);
if (tdb == NULL) {
free(tc, M_XDATA);
espstat.esps_notdb++;
DPRINTF(("esp_input_cb(): TDB is expired while in crypto"));
error = EPERM;
goto baddone;
}
esph = (struct auth_hash *) tdb->tdb_authalgxform;
/* Check for crypto errors */
if (crp->crp_etype) {
if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) {
/* Reset the session ID */
if (tdb->tdb_cryptoid != 0)
tdb->tdb_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid;
splx(s);
return crypto_dispatch(crp);
}
free(tc, M_XDATA);
espstat.esps_noxform++;
DPRINTF(("esp_input_cb(): crypto error %d\n", crp->crp_etype));
error = crp->crp_etype;
goto baddone;
}
/* If authentication was performed, check now. */
if (esph != NULL) {
/*
* If we have a tag, it means an IPsec-aware NIC did the verification
* for us.
*/
if (mtag == NULL) {
/* Copy the authenticator from the packet */
m_copydata(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - esph->authsize,
esph->authsize, aalg);
ptr = (caddr_t) (tc + 1);
/* Verify authenticator */
if (bcmp(ptr, aalg, esph->authsize)) {
free(tc, M_XDATA);
DPRINTF(("esp_input_cb(): authentication failed for packet in SA %s/%08x\n", ipsp_address(tdb->tdb_dst), ntohl(tdb->tdb_spi)));
espstat.esps_badauth++;
error = EACCES;
goto baddone;
}
}
/* Remove trailing authenticator */
m_adj(m, -(esph->authsize));
}
free(tc, M_XDATA);
/* Replay window checking, if appropriate */
if ((tdb->tdb_wnd > 0) && (!(tdb->tdb_flags & TDBF_NOREPLAY))) {
m_copydata(m, skip + sizeof(u_int32_t), sizeof(u_int32_t),
(unsigned char *) &btsx);
btsx = ntohl(btsx);
switch (checkreplaywindow32(btsx, 0, &(tdb->tdb_rpl),
tdb->tdb_wnd, &(tdb->tdb_bitmap), 1)) {
case 0: /* All's well */
#if NPFSYNC > 0
pfsync_update_tdb(tdb,0);
#endif
break;
case 1:
DPRINTF(("esp_input_cb(): replay counter wrapped for SA %s/%08x\n", ipsp_address(tdb->tdb_dst), ntohl(tdb->tdb_spi)));
espstat.esps_wrap++;
error = EACCES;
goto baddone;
case 2:
case 3:
DPRINTF(("esp_input_cb(): duplicate packet received in SA %s/%08x\n", ipsp_address(tdb->tdb_dst), ntohl(tdb->tdb_spi)));
error = EACCES;
goto baddone;
default:
DPRINTF(("esp_input_cb(): bogus value from checkreplaywindow32() in SA %s/%08x\n", ipsp_address(tdb->tdb_dst), ntohl(tdb->tdb_spi)));
espstat.esps_replay++;
error = EACCES;
goto baddone;
}
}
/* Release the crypto descriptors */
crypto_freereq(crp);
/* Determine the ESP header length */
if (tdb->tdb_flags & TDBF_NOREPLAY)
hlen = sizeof(u_int32_t) + tdb->tdb_ivlen; /* "old" ESP */
else
hlen = 2 * sizeof(u_int32_t) + tdb->tdb_ivlen; /* "new" ESP */
/* Find beginning of ESP header */
m1 = m_getptr(m, skip, &roff);
if (m1 == NULL) {
espstat.esps_hdrops++;
splx(s);
DPRINTF(("esp_input_cb(): bad mbuf chain, SA %s/%08x\n",
ipsp_address(tdb->tdb_dst), ntohl(tdb->tdb_spi)));
m_freem(m);
return EINVAL;
}
/* Remove the ESP header and IV from the mbuf. */
if (roff == 0) {
/* The ESP header was conveniently at the beginning of the mbuf */
m_adj(m1, hlen);
if (!(m1->m_flags & M_PKTHDR))
m->m_pkthdr.len -= hlen;
} else if (roff + hlen >= m1->m_len) {
/*
* Part or all of the ESP header is at the end of this mbuf, so
* first let's remove the remainder of the ESP header from the
* beginning of the remainder of the mbuf chain, if any.
*/
if (roff + hlen > m1->m_len) {
/* Adjust the next mbuf by the remainder */
m_adj(m1->m_next, roff + hlen - m1->m_len);
/* The second mbuf is guaranteed not to have a pkthdr... */
m->m_pkthdr.len -= (roff + hlen - m1->m_len);
}
/* Now, let's unlink the mbuf chain for a second...*/
mo = m1->m_next;
m1->m_next = NULL;
/* ...and trim the end of the first part of the chain...sick */
m_adj(m1, -(m1->m_len - roff));
if (!(m1->m_flags & M_PKTHDR))
m->m_pkthdr.len -= (m1->m_len - roff);
/* Finally, let's relink */
m1->m_next = mo;
} else {
/*
* The ESP header lies in the "middle" of the mbuf...do an
* overlapping copy of the remainder of the mbuf over the ESP
* header.
*/
bcopy(mtod(m1, u_char *) + roff + hlen,
mtod(m1, u_char *) + roff, m1->m_len - (roff + hlen));
m1->m_len -= hlen;
m->m_pkthdr.len -= hlen;
}
/* Save the last three bytes of decrypted data */
m_copydata(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - 3, 3, lastthree);
/* Verify pad length */
if (lastthree[1] + 2 > m->m_pkthdr.len - skip) {
espstat.esps_badilen++;
splx(s);
DPRINTF(("esp_input_cb(): invalid padding length %d for packet in SA %s/%08x\n", lastthree[1], ipsp_address(tdb->tdb_dst), ntohl(tdb->tdb_spi)));
m_freem(m);
return EINVAL;
}
/* Verify correct decryption by checking the last padding bytes */
if (!(tdb->tdb_flags & TDBF_RANDOMPADDING)) {
if ((lastthree[1] != lastthree[0]) && (lastthree[1] != 0)) {
espstat.esps_badenc++;
splx(s);
DPRINTF(("esp_input(): decryption failed for packet in SA %s/%08x\n", ipsp_address(tdb->tdb_dst), ntohl(tdb->tdb_spi)));
m_freem(m);
return EINVAL;
}
}
/* Trim the mbuf chain to remove the trailing authenticator and padding */
m_adj(m, -(lastthree[1] + 2));
/* Restore the Next Protocol field */
m_copyback(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), lastthree + 2);
/* Back to generic IPsec input processing */
error = ipsec_common_input_cb(m, tdb, skip, protoff, mtag);
splx(s);
return (error);
baddone:
splx(s);
if (m != NULL)
m_freem(m);
crypto_freereq(crp);
return (error);
}
/*
* ESP input callback from the crypto driver.
*/
static int
esp_input_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
{
IPSEC_DEBUG_DECLARE(char buf[128]);
u_int8_t lastthree[3], aalg[AH_HMAC_MAXHASHLEN];
const struct auth_hash *esph;
const struct enc_xform *espx;
struct mbuf *m;
struct cryptodesc *crd;
struct xform_data *xd;
struct secasvar *sav;
struct secasindex *saidx;
caddr_t ptr;
uint64_t cryptoid;
int hlen, skip, protoff, error, alen;
crd = crp->crp_desc;
IPSEC_ASSERT(crd != NULL, ("null crypto descriptor!"));
m = (struct mbuf *) crp->crp_buf;
xd = (struct xform_data *) crp->crp_opaque;
sav = xd->sav;
skip = xd->skip;
protoff = xd->protoff;
cryptoid = xd->cryptoid;
saidx = &sav->sah->saidx;
esph = sav->tdb_authalgxform;
espx = sav->tdb_encalgxform;
/* Check for crypto errors */
if (crp->crp_etype) {
if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) {
/* Reset the session ID */
if (ipsec_updateid(sav, &crp->crp_sid, &cryptoid) != 0)
crypto_freesession(cryptoid);
xd->cryptoid = crp->crp_sid;
return (crypto_dispatch(crp));
}
ESPSTAT_INC(esps_noxform);
DPRINTF(("%s: crypto error %d\n", __func__, crp->crp_etype));
error = crp->crp_etype;
goto bad;
}
/* Shouldn't happen... */
if (m == NULL) {
ESPSTAT_INC(esps_crypto);
DPRINTF(("%s: bogus returned buffer from crypto\n", __func__));
error = EINVAL;
goto bad;
}
ESPSTAT_INC(esps_hist[sav->alg_enc]);
/* If authentication was performed, check now. */
if (esph != NULL) {
alen = xform_ah_authsize(esph);
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_hist[sav->alg_auth]);
/* Copy the authenticator from the packet */
m_copydata(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - alen, alen, aalg);
ptr = (caddr_t) (xd + 1);
/* Verify authenticator */
if (timingsafe_bcmp(ptr, aalg, alen) != 0) {
DPRINTF(("%s: authentication hash mismatch for "
"packet in SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
ipsec_address(&saidx->dst, buf, sizeof(buf)),
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
ESPSTAT_INC(esps_badauth);
error = EACCES;
goto bad;
}
m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPDGM;
/* Remove trailing authenticator */
m_adj(m, -alen);
}
/* Release the crypto descriptors */
free(xd, M_XDATA), xd = NULL;
crypto_freereq(crp), crp = NULL;
/*
* Packet is now decrypted.
*/
m->m_flags |= M_DECRYPTED;
/*
* Update replay sequence number, if appropriate.
*/
if (sav->replay) {
u_int32_t seq;
m_copydata(m, skip + offsetof(struct newesp, esp_seq),
sizeof (seq), (caddr_t) &seq);
SECASVAR_LOCK(sav);
if (ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(seq), sav)) {
SECASVAR_UNLOCK(sav);
DPRINTF(("%s: packet replay check for %s\n", __func__,
ipsec_sa2str(sav, buf, sizeof(buf))));
ESPSTAT_INC(esps_replay);
error = EACCES;
goto bad;
}
SECASVAR_UNLOCK(sav);
}
