/* Return true if princ is the local krbtgt principal for local_realm. */
static krb5_boolean
is_local_tgt(krb5_principal princ, krb5_data *realm)
{
return princ->length == 2 && data_eq(princ->realm, *realm) &&
data_eq_string(princ->data[0], KRB5_TGS_NAME) &&
data_eq(princ->data[1], *realm);
}
/* Return true if a TGS credential is for the client's local realm. */
static inline int
tgt_is_local_realm(krb5_creds *tgt)
{
return (tgt->server->length == 2
&& data_eq_string(tgt->server->data[0], KRB5_TGS_NAME)
&& data_eq(tgt->server->data[1], tgt->client->realm)
&& data_eq(tgt->server->realm, tgt->client->realm));
}
int
ktest_equal_kkdcp_message(krb5_kkdcp_message *ref, krb5_kkdcp_message *var)
{
int p = TRUE;
if (ref == var) return TRUE;
else if (ref == NULL || var == NULL) return FALSE;
p = p && data_eq(ref->kerb_message, var->kerb_message);
p = p && data_eq(ref->target_domain, var->target_domain);
p = p && (ref->dclocator_hint == var->dclocator_hint);
return p;
}
/* Process a TGS reply and advance the path traversal to get a foreign TGT. */
static krb5_error_code
step_get_tgt(krb5_context context, krb5_tkt_creds_context ctx)
{
krb5_error_code code;
const krb5_data *tgt_realm, *path_realm;
if (ctx->reply_code != 0) {
/* The last request failed. Try the next-closest realm to
* ctx->cur_realm. */
ctx->next_realm--;
if (ctx->next_realm == ctx->cur_realm) {
/* We've tried all the realms we could and couldn't progress beyond
* ctx->cur_realm, so it's time to give up. */
return ctx->reply_code;
}
TRACE_TKT_CREDS_CLOSER_REALM(context, ctx->next_realm);
} else {
/* Verify that we got a TGT. */
if (!IS_TGS_PRINC(context, ctx->reply_creds->server))
return KRB5_KDCREP_MODIFIED;
/* Use this tgt for the next request regardless of what it is. */
krb5_free_creds(context, ctx->cur_tgt);
ctx->cur_tgt = ctx->reply_creds;
ctx->reply_creds = NULL;
/* Remember that we saw this realm. */
tgt_realm = &ctx->cur_tgt->server->data[1];
code = remember_realm(context, ctx, tgt_realm);
if (code != 0)
return code;
/* See where we wound up on the path (or off it). */
path_realm = find_realm_in_path(context, ctx, tgt_realm);
if (path_realm != NULL) {
/* We got a realm on the expected path, so we can cache it. */
(void) krb5_cc_store_cred(context, ctx->ccache, ctx->cur_tgt);
if (path_realm == ctx->last_realm) {
/* We received a TGT for the target realm. */
TRACE_TKT_CREDS_TARGET_TGT(context, ctx->cur_tgt->server);
return end_get_tgt(context, ctx);
} else if (path_realm != NULL) {
/* We still have further to go; advance the traversal. */
TRACE_TKT_CREDS_ADVANCE(context, tgt_realm);
ctx->cur_realm = path_realm;
ctx->next_realm = ctx->last_realm;
}
} else if (data_eq(*tgt_realm, ctx->client->realm)) {
/* We were referred back to the local realm, which is bad. */
return KRB5_KDCREP_MODIFIED;
} else {
/* We went off the path; start the off-path chase. */
TRACE_TKT_CREDS_OFFPATH(context, tgt_realm);
return begin_get_tgt_offpath(context, ctx);
}
}
/* Generate the next request in the path traversal. */
return get_tgt_request(context, ctx);
}
static void
test_insert_entry(void **state)
{
struct entry *e;
krb5_context context = *state;
krb5_data req = string2data("I'm a test request");
krb5_data rep = string2data("I'm a test response");
e = insert_entry(context, &req, &rep, 15);
assert_ptr_equal(k5_hashtab_get(hash_table, req.data, req.length), e);
assert_ptr_equal(K5_TAILQ_FIRST(&expiration_queue), e);
assert_true(data_eq(e->req_packet, req));
assert_true(data_eq(e->reply_packet, rep));
assert_int_equal(e->timein, 15);
}
/* Return true if princ is a local (not cross-realm) krbtgt principal. */
krb5_boolean
is_local_tgt(krb5_principal princ)
{
return princ->length == 2 &&
data_eq_string(princ->data[0], KRB5_TGS_NAME) &&
data_eq(princ->realm, princ->data[1]);
}
static void
test_kdc_check_lookaside_hit_multiple(void **state)
{
struct entry *e1, *e2;
krb5_boolean result;
krb5_data *result_data;
krb5_context context = *state;
krb5_data req1 = string2data("I'm a test request");
krb5_data rep1 = string2data("I'm a test response");
krb5_data req2 = string2data("I'm a different test request");
e1 = insert_entry(context, &req1, &rep1, 0);
e2 = insert_entry(context, &req2, NULL, 0);
result = kdc_check_lookaside(context, &req1, &result_data);
assert_true(result);
assert_true(data_eq(rep1, *result_data));
assert_int_equal(hits, 1);
assert_int_equal(e1->num_hits, 1);
assert_int_equal(e2->num_hits, 0);
krb5_free_data(context, result_data);
/* Set result_data so we can verify that it is reset to NULL. */
result_data = &req1;
result = kdc_check_lookaside(context, &req2, &result_data);
assert_true(result);
assert_null(result_data);
assert_int_equal(hits, 2);
assert_int_equal(e1->num_hits, 1);
assert_int_equal(e2->num_hits, 1);
}
/*
* find_nxt_kdc()
*
* A NXT_TGT gotten from an intermediate KDC might actually be a
* referral. Search KDC_LIST forward starting from CUR_KDC, looking
* for the KDC with the same remote realm as NXT_TGT. If we don't
* find it, the intermediate KDC is leading us off the transit path.
*
* Match on CUR_KDC's remote realm, not local realm, because, among
* other reasons, we can get a referral to the final realm; e.g.,
* given
*
* KDC_LIST == { krbtgt/R1@R1, krbtgt/R2@R1, krbtgt/R3@R2,
* krbtgt/R4@R3, NULL }
* CUR_TGT->SERVER == krbtgt/R2@R1
* NXT_TGT->SERVER == krbtgt/R4@R2
*
* i.e., we got a ticket issued by R2 with remote realm R4, we want to
* find krbtgt/R4@R3, not krbtgt/R3@R2, even though we have no TGT
* with R3 as its local realm.
*
* Set up for next iteration of do_traversal() loop by pointing
* NXT_KDC to one entry forward of the match.
*/
static krb5_error_code
find_nxt_kdc(struct tr_state *ts)
{
krb5_data *r1, *r2;
krb5_principal *kdcptr;
TR_DBG(ts, "find_nxt_kdc");
assert(ts->ntgts > 0);
assert(ts->nxt_tgt == ts->kdc_tgts[ts->ntgts-1]);
if (krb5_princ_size(ts->ctx, ts->nxt_tgt->server) != 2)
return KRB5_KDCREP_MODIFIED;
r1 = krb5_princ_component(ts->ctx, ts->nxt_tgt->server, 1);
for (kdcptr = ts->cur_kdc + 1; *kdcptr != NULL; kdcptr++) {
r2 = krb5_princ_component(ts->ctx, *kdcptr, 1);
if (r1 != NULL && r2 != NULL && data_eq(*r1, *r2)) {
break;
}
}
if (*kdcptr != NULL) {
ts->nxt_kdc = kdcptr;
TR_DBG_RET(ts, "find_nxt_kdc", 0);
return 0;
}
r2 = krb5_princ_component(ts->ctx, ts->kdc_list[0], 1);
if (r1 != NULL && r2 != NULL &&
r1->length == r2->length &&
!memcmp(r1->data, r2->data, r1->length)) {
TR_DBG_RET(ts, "find_nxt_kdc: looped back to local",
KRB5_KDCREP_MODIFIED);
return KRB5_KDCREP_MODIFIED;
}
/*
* Realm is not in our list; we probably got an unexpected realm
* referral.
*/
ts->offpath_tgt = ts->nxt_tgt;
if (ts->cur_kdc == ts->kdc_list) {
/*
* Local KDC referred us off path; trust it for caching
* purposes.
*/
return 0;
}
/*
* Unlink the off-path TGT from KDC_TGTS but don't free it,
* because we should return it.
*/
ts->kdc_tgts[--ts->ntgts] = NULL;
ts->nxt_tgt = ts->cur_tgt;
TR_DBG_RET(ts, "find_nxt_kdc", 0);
return 0;
}
krb5_boolean KRB5_CALLCONV
krb5_realm_compare(krb5_context context, krb5_const_principal princ1, krb5_const_principal princ2)
{
if (!data_eq(*krb5_princ_realm(context, princ1),
*krb5_princ_realm(context, princ2)))
return FALSE;
return TRUE;
}
static void
test_kdc_insert_lookaside_no_reply(void **state)
{
krb5_context context = *state;
krb5_data req = string2data("I'm a test request");
struct entry *hash_ent, *exp_ent;
time_return(0, 0);
kdc_insert_lookaside(context, &req, NULL);
hash_ent = k5_hashtab_get(hash_table, req.data, req.length);
assert_non_null(hash_ent);
assert_true(data_eq(hash_ent->req_packet, req));
assert_int_equal(hash_ent->reply_packet.length, 0);
exp_ent = K5_TAILQ_FIRST(&expiration_queue);
assert_true(data_eq(exp_ent->req_packet, req));
assert_int_equal(exp_ent->reply_packet.length, 0);
assert_int_equal(num_entries, 1);
assert_int_equal(total_size, entry_size(&req, NULL));
}
static krb5_key
find_cached_dkey(struct derived_key *list, const krb5_data *constant)
{
for (; list; list = list->next) {
if (data_eq(list->constant, *constant)) {
krb5_k_reference_key(NULL, list->dkey);
return list->dkey;
}
}
return NULL;
}
/* Find realm within the portion of ctx->realm_path following
* ctx->cur_realm. Return NULL if it is not found. */
static const krb5_data *
find_realm_in_path(krb5_context context, krb5_tkt_creds_context ctx,
const krb5_data *realm)
{
const krb5_data *r;
for (r = ctx->cur_realm + 1; r->data != NULL; r++) {
if (data_eq(*r, *realm))
return r;
}
return NULL;
}
static krb5_boolean
data_match(const krb5_data *data1, const krb5_data *data2)
{
if (!data1) {
if (!data2)
return TRUE;
else
return FALSE;
}
if (!data2) return FALSE;
return data_eq(*data1, *data2) ? TRUE : FALSE;
}
static krb5_error_code
check_reply_server(krb5_context context, krb5_flags kdcoptions,
krb5_creds *in_cred, krb5_kdc_rep *dec_rep)
{
if (!krb5_principal_compare(context, dec_rep->ticket->server,
dec_rep->enc_part2->server))
return KRB5_KDCREP_MODIFIED;
/* Reply is self-consistent. */
if (krb5_principal_compare(context, dec_rep->ticket->server,
in_cred->server))
return 0;
/* Server in reply differs from what we requested. */
if (kdcoptions & KDC_OPT_CANONICALIZE) {
/* in_cred server differs from ticket returned, but ticket
returned is consistent and we requested canonicalization. */
#if 0
#ifdef DEBUG_REFERRALS
printf("gc_via_tkt: in_cred and encoding don't match but referrals requested\n");
krb5int_dbgref_dump_principal("gc_via_tkt: in_cred",in_cred->server);
krb5int_dbgref_dump_principal("gc_via_tkt: encoded server",dec_rep->enc_part2->server);
#endif
#endif
return 0;
}
/* We didn't request canonicalization. */
if (!IS_TGS_PRINC(context, in_cred->server) ||
!IS_TGS_PRINC(context, dec_rep->ticket->server)) {
/* Canonicalization not requested, and not a TGS referral. */
return KRB5_KDCREP_MODIFIED;
}
#if 0
/*
* Is this check needed? find_nxt_kdc() in gc_frm_kdc.c already
* effectively checks this.
*/
if (krb5_realm_compare(context, in_cred->client, in_cred->server) &&
data_eq(*in_cred->server->data[1], *in_cred->client->realm)) {
/* Attempted to rewrite local TGS. */
return KRB5_KDCREP_MODIFIED;
}
#endif
return 0;
}
/* Return TRUE if realm appears to ctx->realms_seen. */
static krb5_boolean
seen_realm_before(krb5_context context, krb5_tkt_creds_context ctx,
const krb5_data *realm)
{
size_t i;
if (ctx->realms_seen != NULL) {
for (i = 0; ctx->realms_seen[i].data != NULL; i++) {
if (data_eq(ctx->realms_seen[i], *realm))
return TRUE;
}
}
return FALSE;
}
static krb5_error_code
check_realm_in_list (krb5_data *realm, void *data)
{
struct check_data *cdata = data;
int i;
Tprintf ((".. checking '%.*s'\n", (int) realm->length, realm->data));
for (i = 0; cdata->tgs[i]; i++) {
if (data_eq (cdata->tgs[i]->realm, *realm))
return 0;
}
Tprintf (("BAD!\n"));
return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_ILL_CR_TKT;
}
/*
* See if two data entries match. If e1 is a wildcard (matching a whole
* component only) and targetflag is false, save an alias to e2 into
* ws->backref. If e1 is a back-reference and targetflag is true, compare the
* appropriate entry in ws->backref to e2. If ws is NULL, do not store or
* match back-references.
*/
static krb5_boolean
match_data(const krb5_data *e1, const krb5_data *e2, krb5_boolean targetflag,
struct wildstate *ws)
{
int n;
if (data_eq_string(*e1, "*")) {
if (ws != NULL && !targetflag) {
if (ws->nwild < 9)
ws->backref[ws->nwild++] = e2;
}
return TRUE;
}
if (ws != NULL && targetflag && e1->length == 2 && e1->data[0] == '*' &&
e1->data[1] >= '1' && e1->data[1] <= '9') {
n = e1->data[1] - '1';
if (n >= ws->nwild)
return FALSE;
return data_eq(*e2, *ws->backref[n]);
} else {
return data_eq(*e2, *e1);
}
}
static krb5_error_code
s4u2proxy_set_attribute(krb5_context kcontext,
krb5_authdata_context context,
void *plugin_context,
void *request_context,
krb5_boolean complete,
const krb5_data *attribute,
const krb5_data *value)
{
/* Only the KDC can set this attribute. */
if (!data_eq(*attribute, s4u2proxy_transited_services_attr))
return ENOENT;
return EPERM;
}
krb5_error_code
krb5int_dk_cmac_decrypt(const struct krb5_keytypes *ktp, krb5_key key,
krb5_keyusage usage, const krb5_data *ivec,
krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data)
{
const struct krb5_enc_provider *enc = ktp->enc;
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_crypto_iov *header, *trailer;
krb5_data cksum;
krb5_key ke = NULL, ki = NULL;
/* E(Confounder | Plaintext | Pad) | Checksum */
/* Validate header and trailer lengths. */
header = krb5int_c_locate_iov(data, num_data, KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_HEADER);
if (header == NULL || header->data.length != enc->block_size)
return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
trailer = krb5int_c_locate_iov(data, num_data, KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_TRAILER);
if (trailer == NULL || trailer->data.length != enc->block_size)
return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
/* Derive the encryption and integrity keys. */
ret = derive_keys(enc, key, usage, &ke, &ki);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
/* Decrypt the plaintext (header | data | padding). */
ret = enc->decrypt(ke, ivec, data, num_data);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
/* Verify the hash. */
ret = alloc_data(&cksum, enc->block_size);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
ret = krb5int_cmac_checksum(enc, ki, data, num_data, &cksum);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
if (!data_eq(cksum, trailer->data))
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
cleanup:
krb5_k_free_key(NULL, ke);
krb5_k_free_key(NULL, ki);
zapfree(cksum.data, cksum.length);
return ret;
}
static krb5_error_code
check_reply_server(krb5_context context, krb5_flags kdcoptions,
krb5_creds *in_cred, krb5_kdc_rep *dec_rep)
{
if (!krb5_principal_compare(context, dec_rep->ticket->server,
dec_rep->enc_part2->server))
return KRB5_KDCREP_MODIFIED;
/* Reply is self-consistent. */
if (krb5_principal_compare(context, dec_rep->ticket->server,
in_cred->server))
return 0;
/* Server in reply differs from what we requested. */
if (kdcoptions & KDC_OPT_CANONICALIZE) {
/* in_cred server differs from ticket returned, but ticket
returned is consistent and we requested canonicalization. */
TRACE_CHECK_REPLY_SERVER_DIFFERS(context, in_cred->server,
dec_rep->enc_part2->server);
return 0;
}
/* We didn't request canonicalization. */
if (!IS_TGS_PRINC(in_cred->server) ||
!IS_TGS_PRINC(dec_rep->ticket->server)) {
/* Canonicalization not requested, and not a TGS referral. */
return KRB5_KDCREP_MODIFIED;
}
#if 0
/*
* Is this check needed? find_nxt_kdc() in gc_frm_kdc.c already
* effectively checks this.
*/
if (krb5_realm_compare(context, in_cred->client, in_cred->server) &&
data_eq(*in_cred->server->data[1], *in_cred->client->realm)) {
/* Attempted to rewrite local TGS. */
return KRB5_KDCREP_MODIFIED;
}
#endif
return 0;
}
/*
* Point *TGT at an allocated credentials structure containing a TGT for realm
* retrieved from ctx->ccache. If we are retrieving a foreign TGT, accept any
* issuing realm (i.e. match only the service principal name). If the TGT is
* not found in the cache, return successfully but set *tgt to NULL.
*/
static krb5_error_code
get_cached_tgt(krb5_context context, krb5_tkt_creds_context ctx,
const krb5_data *realm, krb5_creds **tgt)
{
krb5_creds mcreds;
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_principal tgtname = NULL;
krb5_flags flags;
krb5_boolean local_realm = data_eq(*realm, ctx->client->realm);
*tgt = NULL;
/* Construct the principal krbtgt/<realm>@<client realm>. The realm
* won't matter if we're getting a foreign TGT. */
code = krb5int_tgtname(context, realm, &ctx->client->realm, &tgtname);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
/* Don't match the TGT realm if we're getting a foreign TGT. */
flags = KRB5_TC_SUPPORTED_KTYPES;
if (!local_realm)
flags |= KRB5_TC_MATCH_SRV_NAMEONLY;
/* Construct a matching cred for the ccache query. */
memset(&mcreds, 0, sizeof(mcreds));
mcreds.client = ctx->client;
mcreds.server = tgtname;
/* Fetch the TGT credential. */
context->use_conf_ktypes = TRUE;
code = cache_get(context, ctx->ccache, flags, &mcreds, tgt);
context->use_conf_ktypes = FALSE;
/* Handle not-found errors. Make a note if we couldn't find a local TGT
* because of enctypes. */
if (local_realm && code == KRB5_CC_NOT_KTYPE)
ctx->cache_code = KRB5_CC_NOT_KTYPE;
if (code != 0 && code != KRB5_CC_NOTFOUND && code != KRB5_CC_NOT_KTYPE)
goto cleanup;
code = 0;
cleanup:
krb5_free_principal(context, tgtname);
return code;
}
static krb5_error_code
realm_choose(krb5_context context, krb5_ccselect_moddata data,
krb5_principal server, krb5_ccache *cache_out,
krb5_principal *princ_out)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_cccol_cursor cursor;
krb5_ccache cache;
krb5_principal princ;
*cache_out = NULL;
*princ_out = NULL;
if (krb5_is_referral_realm(&server->realm))
return KRB5_PLUGIN_NO_HANDLE;
/* Scan the collection for a cache with a client principal in the same
* realm as the server principal. */
ret = krb5_cccol_cursor_new(context, &cursor);
if (ret)
return ret;
while ((ret = krb5_cccol_cursor_next(context, cursor, &cache)) == 0 &&
cache != NULL) {
ret = krb5_cc_get_principal(context, cache, &princ);
if (ret == 0) {
if (data_eq(princ->realm, server->realm))
break;
krb5_free_principal(context, princ);
}
krb5_cc_close(context, cache);
}
krb5_cccol_cursor_free(context, &cursor);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (cache == NULL)
return KRB5_PLUGIN_NO_HANDLE;
*cache_out = cache;
*princ_out = princ;
return 0;
}
static void
test_kdc_check_lookaside_hit(void **state)
{
struct entry *e;
krb5_boolean result;
krb5_data *result_data;
krb5_context context = *state;
krb5_data req = string2data("I'm a test request");
krb5_data rep = string2data("I'm a test response");
e = insert_entry(context, &req, &rep, 0);
result = kdc_check_lookaside(context, &req, &result_data);
assert_true(result);
assert_true(data_eq(rep, *result_data));
assert_int_equal(hits, 1);
assert_int_equal(e->num_hits, 1);
krb5_free_data(context, result_data);
}
krb5_boolean KRB5_CALLCONV
krb5_principal_compare(krb5_context context, krb5_const_principal princ1, krb5_const_principal princ2)
{
register int i;
krb5_int32 nelem;
nelem = krb5_princ_size(context, princ1);
if (nelem != krb5_princ_size(context, princ2))
return FALSE;
if (! krb5_realm_compare(context, princ1, princ2))
return FALSE;
for (i = 0; i < (int) nelem; i++) {
register const krb5_data *p1 = krb5_princ_component(context, princ1, i);
register const krb5_data *p2 = krb5_princ_component(context, princ2, i);
if (!data_eq(*p1, *p2))
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
static void
test_kdc_insert_lookaside_cache_expire(void **state)
{
struct entry *e;
krb5_context context = *state;
krb5_data req1 = string2data("I'm a test request");
krb5_data rep1 = string2data("I'm a test response");
size_t e1_size = entry_size(&req1, &rep1);
krb5_data req2 = string2data("I'm a different test request");
size_t e2_size = entry_size(&req2, NULL);
struct entry *hash1_ent, *hash2_ent, *exp_ent;
time_return(0, 0);
kdc_insert_lookaside(context, &req1, &rep1);
hash1_ent = k5_hashtab_get(hash_table, req1.data, req1.length);
assert_non_null(hash1_ent);
assert_true(data_eq(hash1_ent->req_packet, req1));
assert_true(data_eq(hash1_ent->reply_packet, rep1));
exp_ent = K5_TAILQ_FIRST(&expiration_queue);
assert_true(data_eq(exp_ent->req_packet, req1));
assert_true(data_eq(exp_ent->reply_packet, rep1));
assert_int_equal(num_entries, 1);
assert_int_equal(total_size, e1_size);
/* Increase hits on entry */
e = k5_hashtab_get(hash_table, req1.data, req1.length);
assert_non_null(e);
e->num_hits = 5;
time_return(STALE_TIME + 1, 0);
kdc_insert_lookaside(context, &req2, NULL);
assert_null(k5_hashtab_get(hash_table, req1.data, req1.length));
assert_int_equal(max_hits_per_entry, 5);
hash2_ent = k5_hashtab_get(hash_table, req2.data, req2.length);
assert_non_null(hash2_ent);
assert_true(data_eq(hash2_ent->req_packet, req2));
assert_int_equal(hash2_ent-> reply_packet.length, 0);
exp_ent = K5_TAILQ_FIRST(&expiration_queue);
assert_true(data_eq(exp_ent->req_packet, req2));
assert_int_equal(exp_ent->reply_packet.length, 0);
assert_int_equal(num_entries, 1);
assert_int_equal(total_size, e2_size);
}
/* Advance the process of chasing off-path TGTs. */
static krb5_error_code
step_get_tgt_offpath(krb5_context context, krb5_tkt_creds_context ctx)
{
krb5_error_code code;
const krb5_data *tgt_realm;
/* We have no fallback if the last request failed, so just give up. */
if (ctx->reply_code != 0)
return ctx->reply_code;
/* Verify that we got a TGT. */
if (!IS_TGS_PRINC(context, ctx->reply_creds->server))
return KRB5_KDCREP_MODIFIED;
/* Use this tgt for the next request. */
krb5_free_creds(context, ctx->cur_tgt);
ctx->cur_tgt = ctx->reply_creds;
ctx->reply_creds = NULL;
/* Check if we've seen this realm before, and remember it. */
tgt_realm = &ctx->cur_tgt->server->data[1];
if (seen_realm_before(context, ctx, tgt_realm))
return KRB5_KDC_UNREACH;
code = remember_realm(context, ctx, tgt_realm);
if (code != 0)
return code;
if (data_eq(*tgt_realm, ctx->server->realm)) {
/* We received the server realm TGT we asked for. */
TRACE_TKT_CREDS_TARGET_TGT_OFFPATH(context, ctx->cur_tgt->server);
return end_get_tgt(context, ctx);
} else if (ctx->offpath_count++ >= KRB5_REFERRAL_MAXHOPS) {
/* Time to give up. */
return KRB5_KDCREP_MODIFIED;
}
return make_request_for_tgt(context, ctx, &ctx->server->realm);
}
static void
test_kdc_insert_lookaside_multiple(void **state)
{
krb5_context context = *state;
krb5_data req1 = string2data("I'm a test request");
krb5_data rep1 = string2data("I'm a test response");
size_t e1_size = entry_size(&req1, &rep1);
krb5_data req2 = string2data("I'm a different test request");
size_t e2_size = entry_size(&req2, NULL);
struct entry *hash1_ent, *hash2_ent, *exp_first, *exp_last;
time_return(0, 0);
kdc_insert_lookaside(context, &req1, &rep1);
hash1_ent = k5_hashtab_get(hash_table, req1.data, req1.length);
assert_non_null(hash1_ent);
assert_true(data_eq(hash1_ent->req_packet, req1));
assert_true(data_eq(hash1_ent->reply_packet, rep1));
exp_first = K5_TAILQ_FIRST(&expiration_queue);
assert_true(data_eq(exp_first->req_packet, req1));
assert_true(data_eq(exp_first->reply_packet, rep1));
assert_int_equal(num_entries, 1);
assert_int_equal(total_size, e1_size);
time_return(0, 0);
kdc_insert_lookaside(context, &req2, NULL);
hash2_ent = k5_hashtab_get(hash_table, req2.data, req2.length);
assert_non_null(hash2_ent);
assert_true(data_eq(hash2_ent->req_packet, req2));
assert_int_equal(hash2_ent->reply_packet.length, 0);
exp_last = K5_TAILQ_LAST(&expiration_queue, entry_queue);
assert_true(data_eq(exp_last->req_packet, req2));
assert_int_equal(exp_last->reply_packet.length, 0);
assert_int_equal(num_entries, 2);
assert_int_equal(total_size, e1_size + e2_size);
}
/*ARGSUSED*/
krb5_error_code
process_tgs_req(krb5_data *pkt, const krb5_fulladdr *from,
krb5_data **response)
{
krb5_keyblock * subkey = 0;
krb5_kdc_req *request = 0;
krb5_db_entry server;
krb5_kdc_rep reply;
krb5_enc_kdc_rep_part reply_encpart;
krb5_ticket ticket_reply, *header_ticket = 0;
int st_idx = 0;
krb5_enc_tkt_part enc_tkt_reply;
krb5_transited enc_tkt_transited;
int newtransited = 0;
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
krb5_keyblock encrypting_key;
int nprincs = 0;
krb5_boolean more;
krb5_timestamp kdc_time, authtime=0;
krb5_keyblock session_key;
krb5_timestamp until, rtime;
krb5_keyblock *reply_key = NULL;
krb5_keyblock *mkey_ptr;
krb5_key_data *server_key;
char *cname = 0, *sname = 0, *altcname = 0;
krb5_last_req_entry *nolrarray[2], nolrentry;
krb5_enctype useenctype;
int errcode, errcode2;
register int i;
int firstpass = 1;
const char *status = 0;
krb5_enc_tkt_part *header_enc_tkt = NULL; /* ticket granting or evidence ticket */
krb5_db_entry client, krbtgt;
int c_nprincs = 0, k_nprincs = 0;
krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user *s4u_x509_user = NULL; /* protocol transition request */
krb5_authdata **kdc_issued_auth_data = NULL; /* auth data issued by KDC */
unsigned int c_flags = 0, s_flags = 0; /* client/server KDB flags */
char *s4u_name = NULL;
krb5_boolean is_referral, db_ref_done = FALSE;
const char *emsg = NULL;
krb5_data *tgs_1 =NULL, *server_1 = NULL;
krb5_principal krbtgt_princ;
krb5_kvno ticket_kvno = 0;
struct kdc_request_state *state = NULL;
krb5_pa_data *pa_tgs_req; /*points into request*/
krb5_data scratch;
session_key.contents = NULL;
retval = decode_krb5_tgs_req(pkt, &request);
if (retval)
return retval;
/*
* setup_server_realm() sets up the global realm-specific data pointer.
*/
if ((retval = setup_server_realm(request->server))) {
krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, request);
return retval;
}
errcode = kdc_process_tgs_req(request, from, pkt, &header_ticket,
&krbtgt, &k_nprincs, &subkey, &pa_tgs_req);
if (header_ticket && header_ticket->enc_part2 &&
(errcode2 = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context,
header_ticket->enc_part2->client,
&cname))) {
status = "UNPARSING CLIENT";
errcode = errcode2;
goto cleanup;
}
limit_string(cname);
if (errcode) {
status = "PROCESS_TGS";
goto cleanup;
}
if (!header_ticket) {
errcode = KRB5_NO_TKT_SUPPLIED; /* XXX? */
status="UNEXPECTED NULL in header_ticket";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = kdc_make_rstate(&state);
if (errcode !=0) {
status = "making state";
goto cleanup;
}
scratch.length = pa_tgs_req->length;
scratch.data = (char *) pa_tgs_req->contents;
errcode = kdc_find_fast(&request, &scratch, subkey, header_ticket->enc_part2->session, state);
if (errcode !=0) {
status = "kdc_find_fast";
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Pointer to the encrypted part of the header ticket, which may be
* replaced to point to the encrypted part of the evidence ticket
* if constrained delegation is used. This simplifies the number of
* special cases for constrained delegation.
*/
header_enc_tkt = header_ticket->enc_part2;
/*
* We've already dealt with the AP_REQ authentication, so we can
* use header_ticket freely. The encrypted part (if any) has been
* decrypted with the session key.
*/
/* XXX make sure server here has the proper realm...taken from AP_REQ
header? */
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CANONICALIZE)) {
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE);
setflag(s_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE);
}
db_ref_done = FALSE;
ref_tgt_again:
nprincs = 1;
if ((errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, request->server, &sname))) {
status = "UNPARSING SERVER";
goto cleanup;
}
limit_string(sname);
errcode = krb5_db_get_principal_ext(kdc_context,
request->server,
s_flags,
&server,
&nprincs,
&more);
if (errcode) {
status = "LOOKING_UP_SERVER";
nprincs = 0;
goto cleanup;
}
tgt_again:
if (more) {
status = "NON_UNIQUE_PRINCIPAL";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_PRINCIPAL_NOT_UNIQUE;
goto cleanup;
} else if (nprincs != 1) {
/*
* might be a request for a TGT for some other realm; we
* should do our best to find such a TGS in this db
*/
if (firstpass ) {
if ( krb5_is_tgs_principal(request->server) == TRUE) { /* Principal is a name of krb ticket service */
if (krb5_princ_size(kdc_context, request->server) == 2) {
server_1 = krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, request->server, 1);
tgs_1 = krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, tgs_server, 1);
if (!tgs_1 || !data_eq(*server_1, *tgs_1)) {
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, nprincs);
find_alternate_tgs(request, &server, &more, &nprincs);
firstpass = 0;
goto tgt_again;
}
}
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, nprincs);
status = "UNKNOWN_SERVER";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto cleanup;
} else if ( db_ref_done == FALSE) {
retval = prep_reprocess_req(request, &krbtgt_princ);
if (!retval) {
krb5_free_principal(kdc_context, request->server);
retval = krb5_copy_principal(kdc_context, krbtgt_princ, &(request->server));
if (!retval) {
db_ref_done = TRUE;
if (sname != NULL)
free(sname);
goto ref_tgt_again;
}
}
}
}
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, nprincs);
status = "UNKNOWN_SERVER";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto cleanup;
}
if ((errcode = krb5_timeofday(kdc_context, &kdc_time))) {
status = "TIME_OF_DAY";
goto cleanup;
}
if ((retval = validate_tgs_request(request, server, header_ticket,
kdc_time, &status))) {
if (!status)
status = "UNKNOWN_REASON";
errcode = retval + ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
goto cleanup;
}
if (!is_local_principal(header_enc_tkt->client))
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM);
is_referral = krb5_is_tgs_principal(server.princ) &&
!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, tgs_server, server.princ);
/* Check for protocol transition */
errcode = kdc_process_s4u2self_req(kdc_context,
request,
header_enc_tkt->client,
&server,
subkey,
header_enc_tkt->session,
kdc_time,
&s4u_x509_user,
&client,
&c_nprincs,
&status);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
if (s4u_x509_user != NULL)
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION);
/*
* We pick the session keytype here....
*
* Some special care needs to be taken in the user-to-user
* case, since we don't know what keytypes the application server
* which is doing user-to-user authentication can support. We
* know that it at least must be able to support the encryption
* type of the session key in the TGT, since otherwise it won't be
* able to decrypt the U2U ticket! So we use that in preference
* to anything else.
*/
useenctype = 0;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY |
KDC_OPT_CNAME_IN_ADDL_TKT)) {
krb5_keyblock * st_sealing_key;
krb5_kvno st_srv_kvno;
krb5_enctype etype;
krb5_db_entry st_client;
int st_nprincs = 0;
/*
* Get the key for the second ticket, and decrypt it.
*/
if ((errcode = kdc_get_server_key(request->second_ticket[st_idx],
c_flags,
TRUE, /* match_enctype */
&st_client,
&st_nprincs,
&st_sealing_key,
&st_srv_kvno))) {
status = "2ND_TKT_SERVER";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = krb5_decrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, st_sealing_key,
request->second_ticket[st_idx]);
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, st_sealing_key);
if (errcode) {
status = "2ND_TKT_DECRYPT";
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &st_client, st_nprincs);
goto cleanup;
}
etype = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2->session->enctype;
if (!krb5_c_valid_enctype(etype)) {
status = "BAD_ETYPE_IN_2ND_TKT";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &st_client, st_nprincs);
goto cleanup;
}
for (i = 0; i < request->nktypes; i++) {
if (request->ktype[i] == etype) {
useenctype = etype;
break;
}
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CNAME_IN_ADDL_TKT)) {
/* Do constrained delegation protocol and authorization checks */
errcode = kdc_process_s4u2proxy_req(kdc_context,
request,
request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2,
&st_client,
header_ticket->enc_part2->client,
request->server,
&status);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION);
assert(krb5_is_tgs_principal(header_ticket->server));
/* From now on, use evidence ticket as header ticket */
header_enc_tkt = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
assert(c_nprincs == 0); /* assured by kdc_process_s4u2self_req() */
client = st_client;
c_nprincs = st_nprincs;
} else {
/* "client" is not used for user2user */
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &st_client, st_nprincs);
}
}
/*
* Select the keytype for the ticket session key.
*/
if ((useenctype == 0) &&
(useenctype = select_session_keytype(kdc_context, &server,
request->nktypes,
request->ktype)) == 0) {
/* unsupported ktype */
status = "BAD_ENCRYPTION_TYPE";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = krb5_c_make_random_key(kdc_context, useenctype, &session_key);
if (errcode) {
/* random key failed */
status = "RANDOM_KEY_FAILED";
goto cleanup;
}
authtime = header_enc_tkt->times.authtime;
if (is_referral)
ticket_reply.server = server.princ;
else
ticket_reply.server = request->server; /* XXX careful for realm... */
enc_tkt_reply.flags = 0;
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
if (isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_OK_AS_DELEGATE))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_OK_AS_DELEGATE);
/*
* Fix header_ticket's starttime; if it's zero, fill in the
* authtime's value.
*/
if (!(header_enc_tkt->times.starttime))
header_enc_tkt->times.starttime = header_enc_tkt->times.authtime;
/* don't use new addresses unless forwarded, see below */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = header_enc_tkt->caddrs;
/* noaddrarray[0] = 0; */
reply_encpart.caddrs = 0;/* optional...don't put it in */
reply_encpart.enc_padata = NULL;
/* It should be noted that local policy may affect the */
/* processing of any of these flags. For example, some */
/* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets */
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDABLE)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION)) {
/*
* If S4U2Self principal is not forwardable, then mark ticket as
* unforwardable. This behaviour matches Windows, but it is
* different to the MIT AS-REQ path, which returns an error
* (KDC_ERR_POLICY) if forwardable tickets cannot be issued.
*
* Consider this block the S4U2Self equivalent to
* validate_forwardable().
*/
if (c_nprincs &&
isflagset(client.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
/*
* OK_TO_AUTH_AS_DELEGATE must be set on the service requesting
* S4U2Self in order for forwardable tickets to be returned.
*/
else if (!is_referral &&
!isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_OK_TO_AUTH_AS_DELEGATE))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
}
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDED)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED);
/* include new addresses in ticket & reply */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = request->addresses;
reply_encpart.caddrs = request->addresses;
}
if (isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXIABLE))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PROXIABLE);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXY)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PROXY);
/* include new addresses in ticket & reply */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = request->addresses;
reply_encpart.caddrs = request->addresses;
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ALLOW_POSTDATE))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_MAY_POSTDATE);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_POSTDATED)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_POSTDATED);
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = request->from;
} else
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_VALIDATE)) {
assert(isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U) == 0);
/* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs
to the caller */
ticket_reply = *(header_ticket);
enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2);
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEW)) {
krb5_deltat old_life;
assert(isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U) == 0);
/* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs
to the caller */
ticket_reply = *(header_ticket);
enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2);
old_life = enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime - enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime;
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime =
min(header_ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till,
kdc_time + old_life);
} else {
/* not a renew request */
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
until = (request->till == 0) ? kdc_infinity : request->till;
enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime =
min(until, min(enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime + server.max_life,
min(enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime + max_life_for_realm,
header_enc_tkt->times.endtime)));
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE_OK) &&
(enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime < request->till) &&
isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_RENEWABLE)) {
setflag(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE);
request->rtime =
min(request->till, header_enc_tkt->times.renew_till);
}
}
rtime = (request->rtime == 0) ? kdc_infinity : request->rtime;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE)) {
/* already checked above in policy check to reject request for a
renewable ticket using a non-renewable ticket */
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_RENEWABLE);
enc_tkt_reply.times.renew_till =
min(rtime,
min(header_enc_tkt->times.renew_till,
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime +
min(server.max_renewable_life,
max_renewable_life_for_realm)));
} else {
enc_tkt_reply.times.renew_till = 0;
}
/*
* Set authtime to be the same as header_ticket's
*/
enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime = header_enc_tkt->times.authtime;
/*
* Propagate the preauthentication flags through to the returned ticket.
*/
if (isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH);
if (isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH);
/* starttime is optional, and treated as authtime if not present.
so we can nuke it if it matches */
if (enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime == enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime)
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION)) {
errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, s4u_x509_user->user_id.user, &s4u_name);
} else if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION)) {
errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client, &s4u_name);
} else {
errcode = 0;
}
if (errcode) {
status = "UNPARSING S4U CLIENT";
goto cleanup;
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
encrypting_key = *(t2enc->session);
} else {
/*
* Find the server key
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, &server,
-1, /* ignore keytype */
-1, /* Ignore salttype */
0,/* Get highest kvno */
&server_key))) {
status = "FINDING_SERVER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_mkey(kdc_context, master_keylist, &server,
&mkey_ptr))) {
krb5_keylist_node *tmp_mkey_list;
/* try refreshing master key list */
/* XXX it would nice if we had the mkvno here for optimization */
if (krb5_db_fetch_mkey_list(kdc_context, master_princ,
&master_keyblock, 0, &tmp_mkey_list) == 0) {
krb5_dbe_free_key_list(kdc_context, master_keylist);
master_keylist = tmp_mkey_list;
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_mkey(kdc_context, master_keylist,
&server, &mkey_ptr))) {
status = "FINDING_MASTER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
} else {
status = "FINDING_MASTER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
}
/* convert server.key into a real key (it may be encrypted
* in the database) */
if ((errcode = krb5_dbekd_decrypt_key_data(kdc_context,
mkey_ptr,
server_key, &encrypting_key,
NULL))) {
status = "DECRYPT_SERVER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION)) {
/*
* Don't allow authorization data to be disabled if constrained
* delegation is requested. We don't want to deny the server
* the ability to validate that delegation was used.
*/
clear(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED);
}
if (isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED) == 0) {
/*
* If we are not doing protocol transition/constrained delegation
* and there was no authorization data included, try to lookup
* the client principal as it may be mapped to a local account.
*
* Always validate authorization data for constrained delegation
* because we must validate the KDC signatures.
*/
if (!isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U) &&
header_enc_tkt->authorization_data == NULL) {
/* Generate authorization data so we can include it in ticket */
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_INCLUDE_PAC);
/* Map principals from foreign (possibly non-AD) realms */
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_MAP_PRINCIPALS);
assert(c_nprincs == 0); /* should not have been looked up already */
c_nprincs = 1;
errcode = krb5_db_get_principal_ext(kdc_context,
header_enc_tkt->client,
c_flags,
&client,
&c_nprincs,
&more);
/*
* We can ignore errors because the principal may be a
* valid cross-realm principal for which we have no local
* mapping. But we do want to check that at most one entry
* was returned.
*/
if (errcode == 0 && (more || c_nprincs > 1)) {
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_PRINCIPAL_NOT_UNIQUE;
goto cleanup;
} else if (errcode) {
c_nprincs = 0;
}
}
}
enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL;
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION) &&
!isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM))
enc_tkt_reply.client = s4u_x509_user->user_id.user;
else
enc_tkt_reply.client = header_enc_tkt->client;
enc_tkt_reply.session = &session_key;
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents = empty_string; /* equivalent of "" */
errcode = handle_authdata(kdc_context,
c_flags,
(c_nprincs != 0) ? &client : NULL,
&server,
(k_nprincs != 0) ? &krbtgt : NULL,
subkey != NULL ? subkey :
header_ticket->enc_part2->session,
&encrypting_key, /* U2U or server key */
pkt,
request,
s4u_x509_user ?
s4u_x509_user->user_id.user : NULL,
header_enc_tkt,
&enc_tkt_reply);
if (errcode) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, "TGS_REQ : handle_authdata (%d)", errcode);
status = "HANDLE_AUTHDATA";
goto cleanup;
}
if (is_referral && isflagset(s_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE)) {
errcode = return_svr_referral_data(kdc_context,
&server, &reply_encpart);
if (errcode) {
status = "KDC_RETURN_ENC_PADATA";
goto cleanup;
}
}
/*
* Only add the realm of the presented tgt to the transited list if
* it is different than the local realm (cross-realm) and it is different
* than the realm of the client (since the realm of the client is already
* implicitly part of the transited list and should not be explicitly
* listed).
*/
/* realm compare is like strcmp, but knows how to deal with these args */
if (realm_compare(header_ticket->server, tgs_server) ||
realm_compare(header_ticket->server, enc_tkt_reply.client)) {
/* tgt issued by local realm or issued by realm of client */
enc_tkt_reply.transited = header_enc_tkt->transited;
} else {
/* tgt issued by some other realm and not the realm of the client */
/* assemble new transited field into allocated storage */
if (header_enc_tkt->transited.tr_type !=
KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS) {
status = "BAD_TRTYPE";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
enc_tkt_transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
enc_tkt_transited.magic = 0;
enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.magic = 0;
enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.data = 0;
enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.length = 0;
enc_tkt_reply.transited = enc_tkt_transited;
if ((errcode =
add_to_transited(&header_enc_tkt->transited.tr_contents,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents,
header_ticket->server,
enc_tkt_reply.client,
request->server))) {
status = "ADD_TR_FAIL";
goto cleanup;
}
newtransited = 1;
}
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM)) {
errcode = validate_transit_path(kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client,
&server,
(k_nprincs != 0) ? &krbtgt : NULL);
if (errcode) {
status = "NON_TRANSITIVE";
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (!isflagset (request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK)) {
unsigned int tlen;
char *tdots;
errcode = kdc_check_transited_list (kdc_context,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents,
krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client),
krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, request->server));
tlen = enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.length;
tdots = tlen > 125 ? "..." : "";
tlen = tlen > 125 ? 125 : tlen;
if (errcode == 0) {
setflag (enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED);
} else if (errcode == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_ILL_CR_TKT)
krb5_klog_syslog (LOG_INFO,
"bad realm transit path from '%s' to '%s' "
"via '%.*s%s'",
cname ? cname : "<unknown client>",
sname ? sname : "<unknown server>",
tlen,
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data,
tdots);
else {
emsg = krb5_get_error_message(kdc_context, errcode);
krb5_klog_syslog (LOG_ERR,
"unexpected error checking transit from "
"'%s' to '%s' via '%.*s%s': %s",
cname ? cname : "<unknown client>",
sname ? sname : "<unknown server>",
tlen,
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data,
tdots, emsg);
krb5_free_error_message(kdc_context, emsg);
emsg = NULL;
}
} else
krb5_klog_syslog (LOG_INFO, "not checking transit path");
if (reject_bad_transit
&& !isflagset (enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED)) {
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
status = "BAD_TRANSIT";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.enc_part2 = &enc_tkt_reply;
/*
* If we are doing user-to-user authentication, then make sure
* that the client for the second ticket matches the request
* server, and then encrypt the ticket using the session key of
* the second ticket.
*/
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
/*
* Make sure the client for the second ticket matches
* requested server.
*/
krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
krb5_principal client2 = t2enc->client;
if (!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, request->server, client2)) {
if ((errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, client2, &altcname)))
altcname = 0;
if (altcname != NULL)
limit_string(altcname);
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH;
status = "2ND_TKT_MISMATCH";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_kvno = 0;
ticket_reply.enc_part.enctype = t2enc->session->enctype;
st_idx++;
} else {
ticket_kvno = server_key->key_data_kvno;
}
errcode = krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, &encrypting_key,
&ticket_reply);
if (!isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY))
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &encrypting_key);
if (errcode) {
status = "TKT_ENCRYPT";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.enc_part.kvno = ticket_kvno;
/* Start assembling the response */
reply.msg_type = KRB5_TGS_REP;
reply.padata = 0;/* always */
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION) &&
find_pa_data(request->padata, KRB5_PADATA_S4U_X509_USER) != NULL) {
errcode = kdc_make_s4u2self_rep(kdc_context,
subkey,
header_ticket->enc_part2->session,
s4u_x509_user,
&reply,
&reply_encpart);
if (errcode) {
status = "KDC_RETURN_S4U2SELF_PADATA";
goto cleanup;
}
}
reply.client = enc_tkt_reply.client;
reply.enc_part.kvno = 0;/* We are using the session key */
reply.ticket = &ticket_reply;
reply_encpart.session = &session_key;
reply_encpart.nonce = request->nonce;
/* copy the time fields EXCEPT for authtime; its location
is used for ktime */
reply_encpart.times = enc_tkt_reply.times;
reply_encpart.times.authtime = header_enc_tkt->times.authtime;
/* starttime is optional, and treated as authtime if not present.
so we can nuke it if it matches */
if (enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime == enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime)
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
nolrentry.lr_type = KRB5_LRQ_NONE;
nolrentry.value = 0;
nolrarray[0] = &nolrentry;
nolrarray[1] = 0;
reply_encpart.last_req = nolrarray; /* not available for TGS reqs */
reply_encpart.key_exp = 0;/* ditto */
reply_encpart.flags = enc_tkt_reply.flags;
reply_encpart.server = ticket_reply.server;
/* use the session key in the ticket, unless there's a subsession key
in the AP_REQ */
reply.enc_part.enctype = subkey ? subkey->enctype :
header_ticket->enc_part2->session->enctype;
errcode = kdc_fast_response_handle_padata(state, request, &reply,
subkey?subkey->enctype:header_ticket->enc_part2->session->enctype);
if (errcode !=0 ) {
status = "Preparing FAST padata";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode =kdc_fast_handle_reply_key(state, subkey?subkey:header_ticket->enc_part2->session, &reply_key);
if (errcode) {
status = "generating reply key";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = krb5_encode_kdc_rep(kdc_context, KRB5_TGS_REP, &reply_encpart,
subkey ? 1 : 0,
reply_key,
&reply, response);
if (errcode) {
status = "ENCODE_KDC_REP";
} else {
status = "ISSUE";
}
memset(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
/* these parts are left on as a courtesy from krb5_encode_kdc_rep so we
can use them in raw form if needed. But, we don't... */
memset(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
cleanup:
assert(status != NULL);
if (reply_key)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, reply_key);
if (errcode)
emsg = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode);
log_tgs_req(from, request, &reply, cname, sname, altcname, authtime,
c_flags, s4u_name, status, errcode, emsg);
if (errcode) {
krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, emsg);
emsg = NULL;
}
if (errcode) {
int got_err = 0;
if (status == 0) {
status = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode);
got_err = 1;
}
errcode -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
if (errcode < 0 || errcode > 128)
errcode = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
retval = prepare_error_tgs(state, request, header_ticket, errcode,
nprincs ? server.princ : NULL,
response, status);
if (got_err) {
krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, status);
status = 0;
}
}
if (header_ticket != NULL)
krb5_free_ticket(kdc_context, header_ticket);
if (request != NULL)
krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, request);
if (state)
kdc_free_rstate(state);
if (cname != NULL)
free(cname);
if (sname != NULL)
free(sname);
if (nprincs != 0)
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, 1);
if (session_key.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &session_key);
if (newtransited)
free(enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data);
if (k_nprincs)
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &krbtgt, k_nprincs);
if (c_nprincs)
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &client, c_nprincs);
if (s4u_x509_user != NULL)
krb5_free_pa_s4u_x509_user(kdc_context, s4u_x509_user);
if (kdc_issued_auth_data != NULL)
krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context, kdc_issued_auth_data);
if (s4u_name != NULL)
free(s4u_name);
if (subkey != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, subkey);
if (reply.padata)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, reply.padata);
if (reply_encpart.enc_padata)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, reply_encpart.enc_padata);
return retval;
}
static krb5_error_code
krb5_get_cred_from_kdc_opt(krb5_context context, krb5_ccache ccache,
krb5_creds *in_cred, krb5_creds **out_cred,
krb5_creds ***tgts, int kdcopt)
{
krb5_error_code retval, subretval;
krb5_principal client, server, supplied_server, out_supplied_server;
krb5_creds tgtq, cc_tgt, *tgtptr, *referral_tgts[KRB5_REFERRAL_MAXHOPS];
krb5_creds *otgtptr = NULL;
int tgtptr_isoffpath = 0;
krb5_boolean old_use_conf_ktypes;
char **hrealms;
unsigned int referral_count, i;
/*
* Set up client and server pointers. Make a fresh and modifyable
* copy of the in_cred server and save the supplied version.
*/
client = in_cred->client;
if ((retval=krb5_copy_principal(context, in_cred->server, &server)))
return retval;
/* We need a second copy for the output creds. */
if ((retval = krb5_copy_principal(context, server,
&out_supplied_server)) != 0 ) {
krb5_free_principal(context, server);
return retval;
}
supplied_server = in_cred->server;
in_cred->server=server;
DUMP_PRINC("gc_from_kdc initial client", client);
DUMP_PRINC("gc_from_kdc initial server", server);
memset(&cc_tgt, 0, sizeof(cc_tgt));
memset(&tgtq, 0, sizeof(tgtq));
memset(&referral_tgts, 0, sizeof(referral_tgts));
tgtptr = NULL;
*tgts = NULL;
*out_cred=NULL;
old_use_conf_ktypes = context->use_conf_ktypes;
/* Copy client realm to server if no hint. */
if (krb5_is_referral_realm(&server->realm)) {
/* Use the client realm. */
DPRINTF(("gc_from_kdc: no server realm supplied, "
"using client realm.\n"));
krb5_free_data_contents(context, &server->realm);
if (!( server->realm.data = (char *)malloc(client->realm.length+1)))
return ENOMEM;
memcpy(server->realm.data, client->realm.data, client->realm.length);
server->realm.length = client->realm.length;
server->realm.data[server->realm.length] = 0;
}
/*
* Retreive initial TGT to match the specified server, either for the
* local realm in the default (referral) case or for the remote
* realm if we're starting someplace non-local.
*/
retval = tgt_mcred(context, client, server, client, &tgtq);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
/* Fast path: Is it in the ccache? */
context->use_conf_ktypes = 1;
retval = krb5_cc_retrieve_cred(context, ccache, RETR_FLAGS,
&tgtq, &cc_tgt);
if (!retval) {
tgtptr = &cc_tgt;
} else if (!HARD_CC_ERR(retval)) {
DPRINTF(("gc_from_kdc: starting do_traversal to find "
"initial TGT for referral\n"));
tgtptr_isoffpath = 0;
otgtptr = NULL;
retval = do_traversal(context, ccache, client, server,
&cc_tgt, &tgtptr, tgts, &tgtptr_isoffpath);
}
if (retval) {
DPRINTF(("gc_from_kdc: failed to find initial TGT for referral\n"));
goto cleanup;
}
DUMP_PRINC("gc_from_kdc: server as requested", supplied_server);
/*
* Try requesting a service ticket from our local KDC with referrals
* turned on. If the first referral succeeds, follow a referral-only
* path, otherwise fall back to old-style assumptions.
*/
/*
* Save TGTPTR because we rewrite it in the referral loop, and
* we might need to explicitly free it later.
*/
otgtptr = tgtptr;
for (referral_count = 0;
referral_count < KRB5_REFERRAL_MAXHOPS;
referral_count++) {
#if 0
DUMP_PRINC("gc_from_kdc: referral loop: tgt in use", tgtptr->server);
DUMP_PRINC("gc_from_kdc: referral loop: request is for", server);
#endif
retval = krb5_get_cred_via_tkt(context, tgtptr,
KDC_OPT_CANONICALIZE |
FLAGS2OPTS(tgtptr->ticket_flags) |
kdcopt |
(in_cred->second_ticket.length ?
KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY : 0),
tgtptr->addresses, in_cred, out_cred);
if (retval) {
DPRINTF(("gc_from_kdc: referral TGS-REQ request failed: <%s>\n",
error_message(retval)));
/* If we haven't gone anywhere yet, fail through to the
non-referral case. */
if (referral_count==0) {
DPRINTF(("gc_from_kdc: initial referral failed; "
"punting to fallback.\n"));
break;
}
/* Otherwise, try the same query without canonicalization
set, and fail hard if that doesn't work. */
DPRINTF(("gc_from_kdc: referral #%d failed; "
"retrying without option.\n", referral_count + 1));
retval = krb5_get_cred_via_tkt(context, tgtptr,
FLAGS2OPTS(tgtptr->ticket_flags) |
kdcopt |
(in_cred->second_ticket.length ?
KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY : 0),
tgtptr->addresses,
in_cred, out_cred);
/* Whether or not that succeeded, we're done. */
goto cleanup;
}
/* Referral request succeeded; let's see what it is. */
if (krb5_principal_compare(context, in_cred->server,
(*out_cred)->server)) {
DPRINTF(("gc_from_kdc: request generated ticket "
"for requested server principal\n"));
DUMP_PRINC("gc_from_kdc final referred reply",
in_cred->server);
/*
* Check if the return enctype is one that we requested if
* needed.
*/
if (old_use_conf_ktypes || context->tgs_ktype_count == 0)
goto cleanup;
for (i = 0; i < context->tgs_ktype_count; i++) {
if ((*out_cred)->keyblock.enctype == context->tgs_ktypes[i]) {
/* Found an allowable etype, so we're done */
goto cleanup;
}
}
/*
* We need to try again, but this time use the
* tgs_ktypes in the context. At this point we should
* have all the tgts to succeed.
*/
/* Free "wrong" credential */
krb5_free_creds(context, *out_cred);
*out_cred = NULL;
/* Re-establish tgs etypes */
context->use_conf_ktypes = old_use_conf_ktypes;
retval = krb5_get_cred_via_tkt(context, tgtptr,
KDC_OPT_CANONICALIZE |
FLAGS2OPTS(tgtptr->ticket_flags) |
kdcopt |
(in_cred->second_ticket.length ?
KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY : 0),
tgtptr->addresses,
in_cred, out_cred);
goto cleanup;
}
else if (IS_TGS_PRINC(context, (*out_cred)->server)) {
krb5_data *r1, *r2;
DPRINTF(("gc_from_kdc: request generated referral tgt\n"));
DUMP_PRINC("gc_from_kdc credential received",
(*out_cred)->server);
if (referral_count == 0)
r1 = &tgtptr->server->data[1];
else
r1 = &referral_tgts[referral_count-1]->server->data[1];
r2 = &(*out_cred)->server->data[1];
if (data_eq(*r1, *r2)) {
DPRINTF(("gc_from_kdc: referred back to "
"previous realm; fall back\n"));
krb5_free_creds(context, *out_cred);
*out_cred = NULL;
break;
}
/* Check for referral routing loop. */
for (i=0;i<referral_count;i++) {
#if 0
DUMP_PRINC("gc_from_kdc: loop compare #1",
(*out_cred)->server);
DUMP_PRINC("gc_from_kdc: loop compare #2",
referral_tgts[i]->server);
#endif
if (krb5_principal_compare(context,
(*out_cred)->server,
referral_tgts[i]->server)) {
DFPRINTF((stderr,
"krb5_get_cred_from_kdc_opt: "
"referral routing loop - "
"got referral back to hop #%d\n", i));
retval=KRB5_KDC_UNREACH;
goto cleanup;
}
}
/* Point current tgt pointer at newly-received TGT. */
if (tgtptr == &cc_tgt)
krb5_free_cred_contents(context, tgtptr);
tgtptr=*out_cred;
/* Save pointer to tgt in referral_tgts. */
referral_tgts[referral_count]=*out_cred;
*out_cred = NULL;
/* Copy krbtgt realm to server principal. */
krb5_free_data_contents(context, &server->realm);
retval = krb5int_copy_data_contents(context,
&tgtptr->server->data[1],
&server->realm);
if (retval)
return retval;
/*
* Future work: rewrite server principal per any
* supplied padata.
*/
} else {
/* Not a TGT; punt to fallback. */
krb5_free_creds(context, *out_cred);
*out_cred = NULL;
break;
}
}
DUMP_PRINC("gc_from_kdc client at fallback", client);
DUMP_PRINC("gc_from_kdc server at fallback", server);
/*
* At this point referrals have been tried and have failed. Go
* back to the server principal as originally issued and try the
* conventional path.
*/
/*
* Referrals have failed. Look up fallback realm if not
* originally provided.
*/
if (krb5_is_referral_realm(&supplied_server->realm)) {
if (server->length >= 2) {
retval=krb5_get_fallback_host_realm(context, &server->data[1],
&hrealms);
if (retval) goto cleanup;
#if 0
DPRINTF(("gc_from_kdc: using fallback realm of %s\n",
hrealms[0]));
#endif
krb5_free_data_contents(context,&in_cred->server->realm);
server->realm.data=hrealms[0];
server->realm.length=strlen(hrealms[0]);
free(hrealms);
}
else {
/*
* Problem case: Realm tagged for referral but apparently not
* in a <type>/<host> format that
* krb5_get_fallback_host_realm can deal with.
*/
DPRINTF(("gc_from_kdc: referral specified "
"but no fallback realm avaiable!\n"));
return KRB5_ERR_HOST_REALM_UNKNOWN;
}
}
DUMP_PRINC("gc_from_kdc server at fallback after fallback rewrite",
server);
/*
* Get a TGT for the target realm.
*/
krb5_free_cred_contents(context, &tgtq);
retval = tgt_mcred(context, client, server, client, &tgtq);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
/* Fast path: Is it in the ccache? */
/* Free tgtptr data if reused from above. */
if (tgtptr == &cc_tgt)
krb5_free_cred_contents(context, tgtptr);
tgtptr = NULL;
/* Free saved TGT in OTGTPTR if it was off-path. */
if (tgtptr_isoffpath)
krb5_free_creds(context, otgtptr);
otgtptr = NULL;
/* Free TGTS if previously filled by do_traversal() */
if (*tgts != NULL) {
for (i = 0; (*tgts)[i] != NULL; i++) {
krb5_free_creds(context, (*tgts)[i]);
}
free(*tgts);
*tgts = NULL;
}
context->use_conf_ktypes = 1;
retval = krb5_cc_retrieve_cred(context, ccache, RETR_FLAGS,
&tgtq, &cc_tgt);
if (!retval) {
tgtptr = &cc_tgt;
} else if (!HARD_CC_ERR(retval)) {
tgtptr_isoffpath = 0;
retval = do_traversal(context, ccache, client, server,
&cc_tgt, &tgtptr, tgts, &tgtptr_isoffpath);
}
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
otgtptr = tgtptr;
/*
* Finally have TGT for target realm! Try using it to get creds.
*/
if (!krb5_c_valid_enctype(tgtptr->keyblock.enctype)) {
retval = KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
context->use_conf_ktypes = old_use_conf_ktypes;
retval = krb5_get_cred_via_tkt(context, tgtptr,
FLAGS2OPTS(tgtptr->ticket_flags) |
kdcopt |
(in_cred->second_ticket.length ?
KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY : 0),
tgtptr->addresses, in_cred, out_cred);
cleanup:
krb5_free_cred_contents(context, &tgtq);
if (tgtptr == &cc_tgt)
krb5_free_cred_contents(context, tgtptr);
if (tgtptr_isoffpath)
krb5_free_creds(context, otgtptr);
context->use_conf_ktypes = old_use_conf_ktypes;
/* Drop the original principal back into in_cred so that it's cached
in the expected format. */
DUMP_PRINC("gc_from_kdc: final hacked server principal at cleanup",
server);
krb5_free_principal(context, server);
in_cred->server = supplied_server;
if (*out_cred && !retval) {
/* Success: free server, swap supplied server back in. */
krb5_free_principal (context, (*out_cred)->server);
(*out_cred)->server= out_supplied_server;
}
else {
/*
* Failure: free out_supplied_server. Don't free out_cred here
* since it's either null or a referral TGT that we free below,
* and we may need it to return.
*/
krb5_free_principal (context, out_supplied_server);
}
DUMP_PRINC("gc_from_kdc: final server after reversion", in_cred->server);
/*
* Deal with ccache TGT management: If tgts has been set from
* initial non-referral TGT discovery, leave it alone. Otherwise, if
* referral_tgts[0] exists return it as the only entry in tgts.
* (Further referrals are never cached, only the referral from the
* local KDC.) This is part of cleanup because useful received TGTs
* should be cached even if the main request resulted in failure.
*/
if (*tgts == NULL) {
if (referral_tgts[0]) {
#if 0
/*
* This should possibly be a check on the candidate return
* credential against the cache, in the circumstance where we
* don't want to clutter the cache with near-duplicate
* credentials on subsequent iterations. For now, it is
* disabled.
*/
subretval=...?;
if (subretval) {
#endif
/* Allocate returnable TGT list. */
if (!(*tgts=calloc(sizeof (krb5_creds *), 2)))
return ENOMEM;
subretval=krb5_copy_creds(context, referral_tgts[0], &((*tgts)[0]));
if(subretval)
return subretval;
(*tgts)[1]=NULL;
DUMP_PRINC("gc_from_kdc: returning referral TGT for ccache",
(*tgts)[0]->server);
#if 0
}
#endif
}
}
/* Free referral TGTs list. */
for (i=0;i<KRB5_REFERRAL_MAXHOPS;i++) {
if(referral_tgts[i]) {
krb5_free_creds(context, referral_tgts[i]);
}
}
DPRINTF(("gc_from_kdc finishing with %s\n",
retval ? error_message(retval) : "no error"));
return retval;
}
static krb5_error_code
s4u2proxy_get_attribute(krb5_context kcontext,
krb5_authdata_context context,
void *plugin_context,
void *request_context,
const krb5_data *attribute,
krb5_boolean *authenticated,
krb5_boolean *complete,
krb5_data *value,
krb5_data *display_value,
int *more)
{
struct s4u2proxy_context *s4uctx = (struct s4u2proxy_context *)request_context;
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_principal principal;
int i;
if (display_value != NULL) {
display_value->data = NULL;
display_value->length = 0;
}
if (!data_eq(*attribute, s4u2proxy_transited_services_attr))
return ENOENT;
i = -(*more) - 1;
if (i < 0)
return EINVAL;
else if (i >= s4uctx->count)
return ENOENT;
principal = s4uctx->delegated[i];
assert(principal != NULL);
code = krb5_unparse_name_flags(kcontext, principal, 0, &value->data);
if (code != 0)
return code;
value->length = strlen(value->data);
if (display_value != NULL) {
code = krb5_unparse_name_flags(kcontext, principal,
KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_DISPLAY,
&display_value->data);
if (code != 0)
return code;
display_value->length = strlen(display_value->data);
}
i++;
if (i == s4uctx->count)
*more = 0;
else
*more = -(i + 1);
*authenticated = s4uctx->authenticated;
*complete = TRUE;
return 0;
}
