int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
NTL::ZZ p(NTL::INIT_VAL, argv[1]);
NTL::ZZ q(NTL::INIT_VAL, argv[2]);
rsa_keys_tuple keys;
if (argc == 5) {
keys = gen_keys(p, q, atoi(argv[4]));
} else {
keys = gen_keys(p, q);
}
rsa_key private_key, public_key;
public_key = std::get<0>(keys);
private_key = std::get<1>(keys);
std::cout << "Public Key: ";
print_rsa_key(public_key);
std::cout << "Private Key: ";
print_rsa_key(private_key);
return 0;
}
/* write_new_hid_file - generates a new HID and save to @filename.
*
* In fact, all that is genereaged is a private key.
*
* File is flushed before being closed to guarantee that
* it is written.
*
* RETURN
* returns zero on success; otherwise a negative number.
*/
static int write_new_hid_file(const char *filename)
{
FILE *f;
PPK_KEY *pkey;
int fd, rc;
fd = creat(filename, 0600);
if (fd < 0) {
perror("Couldn't create new HID file");
return -1;
}
f = fdopen(fd, "w");
assert(f);
pkey = gen_keys();
if (!pkey) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto close_f;
}
rc = write_prvpem(pkey, f);
if (rc)
goto pkey;
assert(!fflush(f));
pkey:
ppk_free_key(pkey);
close_f:
fclose(f);
return rc;
}
char *test_distribution()
{
int i = 0;
int stats[3][BUCKETS] = { {0} };
DArray *keys = DArray_create(0, NUM_KEYS);
mu_assert(gen_keys(keys, NUM_KEYS) == 0,
"Failed to generate random keys.");
fill_distribution(stats[ALGO_FNV1A], keys, Hashmap_fnv1a_hash);
fill_distribution(stats[ALGO_ADLER32], keys, Hashmap_adler32_hash);
fill_distribution(stats[ALGO_DJB], keys, Hashmap_djb_hash);
fprintf(stderr, "FNV\tA32\tDJB\n");
for (i = 0; i < BUCKETS; i++) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d\t%d\t%d\n",
stats[ALGO_FNV1A][i],
stats[ALGO_ADLER32][i], stats[ALGO_DJB][i]);
}
destroy_keys(keys);
return NULL;
}
void CRainDes::cipher(BYTE* key_ptr, BYTE* input, BYTE* output, BYTE mode)
{
BYTE i;
BYTE last[8], temp[4];
memcpy (m_key, key_ptr, 8 );
gen_keys();
/* perform 'Initial Permutation' */
do_ip(input, last, m_ip_table);
/* Generate 'Preoutput' */
for (i=0; i<16; i++)
{
if (mode)
function_rk(&last[4], temp, m_perm_keys[15-i]);
else
function_rk(&last[4], temp, m_perm_keys[i]);
/* XOR result with lower bits of last iteration */
temp[0] ^= last[0];
temp[1] ^= last[1];
temp[2] ^= last[2];
temp[3] ^= last[3];
/* copy high 32 bits of previous iteration to low bits */
last[0] = last[4];
last[1] = last[5];
last[2] = last[6];
last[3] = last[7];
/* copy result of XOR to high bits */
last[4] = temp[0];
last[5] = temp[1];
last[6] = temp[2];
last[7] = temp[3];
}
i = last[4];
last[4] = last[0];
last[0] = i;
i = last[5];
last[5] = last[1];
last[1] = i;
i = last[6];
last[6] = last[2];
last[2] = i;
i = last[7];
last[7] = last[3];
last[3] = i;
/* perform 'Inverse Initial Permutation' */
do_ip(last, output, m_inv_ip_table);
}
void main()
{
int pt[8]={0},i;
printf("Enter plain text binary bits:");
for(i=0;i<8;i++)
scanf("%d",&pt[i]);
gen_keys(); // Generating Keys key1 & key2
En_De(pt,0);
printf("\nCipher Text :");
for(i=0;i<8;i++)
printf("%d",ct[i]);
//Decrypting - - -
En_De(ct,1);
printf("\nPlain Text (After Decrypting):");
for(i=0;i<8;i++)
printf("%d",ct[i]);
}
int main()
{
EVP_PKEY * priv_key = 0;
EVP_PKEY * pub_key = 0;
char * data = "Hello World";
int data_len = strlen(data);
unsigned char * sig = 0;
int sig_len = 0;
gen_keys( "priv.pem", "pub.pem" );
priv_key = load_private_key( "priv.pem" );
pub_key = load_public_key2( "pub.pem" );
if (!priv_key || !pub_key)
{
printf("failed to load keys\n");
return 1;
}
sig = sign_it( priv_key, EVP_sha1(), data, data_len, &sig_len );
if (!sig)
{
printf("Failed to generate signature\n");
return 1;
}
if ( verify_sig( pub_key, EVP_sha1(), data, data_len, sig, sig_len ) )
printf("Signature matches!!\n");
else
printf("*** SIG FAILED ***\n");
free(sig);
EVP_PKEY_free (priv_key);
EVP_PKEY_free (pub_key);
return 0;
}
static void print_keypair(bool pub, bool priv)
{
secp256k1_context *ctx;
struct seckey seckey;
struct compressed_pubkey pubkey;
char sechex[hex_str_size(sizeof(seckey))];
char pubhex[hex_str_size(sizeof(pubkey))];
assert(pub || priv);
ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN);
gen_keys(ctx, &seckey, &pubkey);
hex_encode(&seckey, sizeof(seckey), sechex, sizeof(sechex));
hex_encode(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey), pubhex, sizeof(pubhex));
if (pub && priv) {
printf("%s:%s\n", sechex, pubhex);
} else {
printf("%s\n", (priv ? sechex : pubhex));
}
}
static bool create_onion(const secp256k1_pubkey pubkey[],
char *const msg[],
size_t num,
struct onion *onion)
{
int i;
struct seckey seckeys[MAX_HOPS];
struct onion_pubkey pubkeys[MAX_HOPS];
struct enckey enckeys[MAX_HOPS];
struct hmackey hmackeys[MAX_HOPS];
struct iv ivs[MAX_HOPS];
struct iv pad_ivs[MAX_HOPS];
HMAC_CTX padding_hmac[MAX_HOPS];
struct hop padding[MAX_HOPS];
size_t junk_hops;
secp256k1_context *ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN);
bool ok = false;
if (num > MAX_HOPS)
goto fail;
/* FIXME: I think it would be safe to reuse a single disposable key
* here? */
/* First generate all the keys. */
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
unsigned char secret[32];
gen_keys(ctx, &seckeys[i], &pubkeys[i]);
/* Make shared secret. */
if (!secp256k1_ecdh(ctx, secret, &pubkey[i], seckeys[i].u.u8))
goto fail;
hmackeys[i] = hmackey_from_secret(memcheck(secret, 32));
enckeys[i] = enckey_from_secret(secret);
ivs_from_secret(secret, &ivs[i], &pad_ivs[i]);
}
/*
* Building the onion is a little tricky.
*
* First, there is the padding. That's generated by previous nodes,
* and "decrypted" by the others. So we have to generate that
* forwards.
*/
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
if (i > 0) {
/* Previous node decrypts padding before passing on. */
aes_decrypt(padding, padding, sizeof(struct hop)*(i-1),
&enckeys[i-1], &ivs[i-1]);
memmove(padding + 1, padding,
sizeof(struct hop)*(i-1));
}
/* And generates more padding for next node. */
add_padding(&padding[0], &enckeys[i-1], &pad_ivs[i-1]);
HMAC_CTX_init(&padding_hmac[i]);
HMAC_Init_ex(&padding_hmac[i],
hmackeys[i].k.u.u8, sizeof(hmackeys[i].k),
EVP_sha256(), NULL);
HMAC_Update(&padding_hmac[i],
memcheck((unsigned char *)padding,
i * sizeof(struct hop)),
i * sizeof(struct hop));
}
/*
* Now the normal onion is generated backwards.
*/
/* Unused hops filled with random, so even recipient can't tell
* how many were used. */
junk_hops = MAX_HOPS - num;
random_bytes(onion->hop, junk_hops * sizeof(struct hop));
for (i = num - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
size_t other_hops, len;
struct hop *myhop;
other_hops = num - i - 1 + junk_hops;
/* Our entry is at tail of onion. */
myhop = onion->hop + other_hops;
/* Now populate our hop. */
myhop->pubkey = pubkeys[i];
/* Set message. */
assert(strlen(msg[i]) < MESSAGE_SIZE);
memset(myhop->msg, 0, MESSAGE_SIZE);
strcpy((char *)myhop->msg, msg[i]);
/* Encrypt whole thing, including our message, but we
* aware it will be offset by the prepended padding. */
if (!aes_encrypt_offset(i * sizeof(struct hop),
onion, onion,
other_hops * sizeof(struct hop)
+ sizeof(myhop->msg),
&enckeys[i], &ivs[i]))
goto fail;
/* HMAC covers entire thing except hmac itself. */
len = (other_hops + 1)*sizeof(struct hop) - sizeof(myhop->hmac);
HMAC_Update(&padding_hmac[i],
memcheck((unsigned char *)onion, len), len);
HMAC_Final(&padding_hmac[i], myhop->hmac.u.u8, NULL);
}
ok = true;
fail:
secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx);
return ok;
}
