int autheph_check_to0(struct sip_msg *_m)
{
str username = {0, 0};
if (eph_auth_api.pre_auth == NULL)
{
LM_ERR("autheph_check_to() with no username parameter "
"cannot be used without the auth module\n");
return CHECK_ERROR;
}
if (_m == NULL)
{
LM_ERR("invalid parameters\n");
return CHECK_ERROR;
}
if (get_cred(_m, &username) < 0)
{
LM_ERR("call autheph_(check|proxy|www) before calling "
" check_to() with no username parameter\n");
return CHECK_ERROR;
}
return check_to(_m, &username);
}
void tasks_test_saved(void)
{
struct task_struct *p;
struct cred *cred =NULL;
struct mm_struct *mm;
unsigned long vsize = 0, vrss = 0;
printk("\nThe following trace is a kernel tasks test and not a bug!\n");
printk("USER\tPID\tVSIZE\tRSS\tSTATE\tNAME\n");
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
for_each_process(p) {
cred = (struct cred *)get_cred((struct cred *) __task_cred(p));
vsize = 0;
vrss = 0;
mm = get_task_mm(p);
if (mm) {
tasks_mem_get(mm, &vsize, &vrss);
}
printk("%d\t%d\t%ld\t%ld\t%s\t%s\n",
cred->uid,
task_pid_nr(p),
vsize,
vrss,
get_task_state(p),
p->comm);
}
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
}
/* Find an unused file structure and return a pointer to it.
* Returns NULL, if there are no more free file structures or
* we run out of memory.
*
* Be very careful using this. You are responsible for
* getting write access to any mount that you might assign
* to this filp, if it is opened for write. If this is not
* done, you will imbalance int the mount's writer count
* and a warning at __fput() time.
*/
struct file *get_empty_filp(void)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
static long old_max;
struct file * f;
int acct;
acct = (get_exec_ub() == get_ub0());
/*
* Privileged users can go above max_files
*/
if (acct && get_nr_files() >= files_stat.max_files &&
!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
/*
* percpu_counters are inaccurate. Do an expensive check before
* we go and fail.
*/
if (percpu_counter_sum_positive(&nr_files) >= files_stat.max_files)
goto over;
}
f = kmem_cache_zalloc(filp_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (f == NULL)
goto fail;
if (ub_file_charge(f))
goto fail_ch;
if (acct)
percpu_counter_inc(&nr_files);
if (security_file_alloc(f))
goto fail_sec;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&f->f_u.fu_list);
atomic_long_set(&f->f_count, 1);
rwlock_init(&f->f_owner.lock);
f->f_cred = get_cred(cred);
spin_lock_init(&f->f_lock);
eventpoll_init_file(f);
/* f->f_version: 0 */
return f;
over:
/* Ran out of filps - report that */
if (get_nr_files() > old_max) {
pr_info("VFS: file-max limit %lu reached\n", get_max_files());
old_max = get_nr_files();
}
goto fail;
fail_sec:
file_free(f);
fail:
return NULL;
fail_ch:
kmem_cache_free(filp_cachep, f);
return NULL;
}
static inline void task_state(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *p)
{
struct group_info *group_info;
int g;
struct fdtable *fdt = NULL;
const struct cred *cred;
pid_t ppid, tpid;
rcu_read_lock();
ppid = pid_alive(p) ?
task_tgid_nr_ns(rcu_dereference(p->real_parent), ns) : 0;
tpid = 0;
if (pid_alive(p)) {
struct task_struct *tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
if (tracer)
tpid = task_pid_nr_ns(tracer, ns);
}
cred = get_cred((struct cred *) __task_cred(p));
seq_printf(m,
"State:\t%s\n"
"Tgid:\t%d\n"
"Pid:\t%d\n"
"PPid:\t%d\n"
"TracerPid:\t%d\n"
"Uid:\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%d\n"
"Gid:\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%d\n",
get_task_state(p),
task_tgid_nr_ns(p, ns),
pid_nr_ns(pid, ns),
ppid, tpid,
cred->uid, cred->euid, cred->suid, cred->fsuid,
cred->gid, cred->egid, cred->sgid, cred->fsgid);
task_lock(p);
if (p->files)
fdt = files_fdtable(p->files);
seq_printf(m,
"FDSize:\t%d\n"
"Groups:\t",
fdt ? fdt->max_fds : 0);
rcu_read_unlock();
group_info = cred->group_info;
task_unlock(p);
for (g = 0; g < min(group_info->ngroups, NGROUPS_SMALL); g++)
seq_printf(m, "%d ", GROUP_AT(group_info, g));
put_cred(cred);
seq_printf(m, "\n");
}
struct file *get_empty_filp(void)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
static long old_max;
struct file * f;
/*
*/
if (get_nr_files() >= files_stat.max_files && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
/*
*/
if (percpu_counter_sum_positive(&nr_files) >= files_stat.max_files)
goto over;
}
f = kmem_cache_zalloc(filp_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (f == NULL)
goto fail;
percpu_counter_inc(&nr_files);
f->f_cred = get_cred(cred);
if (security_file_alloc(f))
goto fail_sec;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&f->f_u.fu_list);
atomic_long_set(&f->f_count, 1);
rwlock_init(&f->f_owner.lock);
spin_lock_init(&f->f_lock);
eventpoll_init_file(f);
/* */
return f;
over:
/* */
if (get_nr_files() > old_max) {
pr_info("VFS: file-max limit %lu reached\n", get_max_files());
old_max = get_nr_files();
}
goto fail;
fail_sec:
file_free(f);
fail:
return NULL;
}
cred_t *
crget(void)
{
cred_t *tmp;
tmp = kmalloc(sizeof(cred_t), GFP_NOFS);
if (!tmp)
osi_Panic("crget: No more memory for creds!\n");
#if defined(STRUCT_TASK_STRUCT_HAS_CRED)
get_cred(tmp);
#else
atomic_set(&tmp->cr_ref, 1);
#endif
return tmp;
}
/* Find an unused file structure and return a pointer to it.
* Returns an error pointer if some error happend e.g. we over file
* structures limit, run out of memory or operation is not permitted.
*
* Be very careful using this. You are responsible for
* getting write access to any mount that you might assign
* to this filp, if it is opened for write. If this is not
* done, you will imbalance int the mount's writer count
* and a warning at __fput() time.
*/
struct file *get_empty_filp(void)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
static long old_max;
struct file *f;
int error;
/*
* Privileged users can go above max_files
*/
if (get_nr_files() >= files_stat.max_files && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
/*
* percpu_counters are inaccurate. Do an expensive check before
* we go and fail.
*/
if (percpu_counter_sum_positive(&nr_files) >= files_stat.max_files)
goto over;
}
f = kmem_cache_zalloc(filp_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(!f))
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
percpu_counter_inc(&nr_files);
f->f_cred = get_cred(cred);
error = security_file_alloc(f);
if (unlikely(error)) {
file_free(f);
return ERR_PTR(error);
}
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&f->f_u.fu_list);
atomic_long_set(&f->f_count, 1);
rwlock_init(&f->f_owner.lock);
spin_lock_init(&f->f_lock);
eventpoll_init_file(f);
/* f->f_version: 0 */
return f;
over:
/* Ran out of filps - report that */
if (get_nr_files() > old_max) {
pr_info("VFS: file-max limit %lu reached\n", get_max_files());
old_max = get_nr_files();
}
return ERR_PTR(-ENFILE);
}
/**
* vfs_dup_fc_config: Duplicate a filesystem context.
* @src_fc: The context to copy.
*/
struct fs_context *vfs_dup_fs_context(struct fs_context *src_fc)
{
struct fs_context *fc;
int ret;
if (!src_fc->ops->dup)
return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
fc = kmemdup(src_fc, sizeof(struct fs_context), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!fc)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
mutex_init(&fc->uapi_mutex);
fc->fs_private = NULL;
fc->s_fs_info = NULL;
fc->source = NULL;
fc->security = NULL;
get_filesystem(fc->fs_type);
get_net(fc->net_ns);
get_user_ns(fc->user_ns);
get_cred(fc->cred);
if (fc->log)
refcount_inc(&fc->log->usage);
/* Can't call put until we've called ->dup */
ret = fc->ops->dup(fc, src_fc);
if (ret < 0)
goto err_fc;
ret = security_fs_context_dup(fc, src_fc);
if (ret < 0)
goto err_fc;
return fc;
err_fc:
put_fs_context(fc);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
struct sock *__vsock_create(struct net *net,
struct socket *sock,
struct sock *parent,
gfp_t priority,
unsigned short type,
int kern)
{
struct sock *sk;
struct vsock_sock *psk;
struct vsock_sock *vsk;
sk = sk_alloc(net, AF_VSOCK, priority, &vsock_proto, kern);
if (!sk)
return NULL;
sock_init_data(sock, sk);
/* sk->sk_type is normally set in sock_init_data, but only if sock is
* non-NULL. We make sure that our sockets always have a type by
* setting it here if needed.
*/
if (!sock)
sk->sk_type = type;
vsk = vsock_sk(sk);
vsock_addr_init(&vsk->local_addr, VMADDR_CID_ANY, VMADDR_PORT_ANY);
vsock_addr_init(&vsk->remote_addr, VMADDR_CID_ANY, VMADDR_PORT_ANY);
sk->sk_destruct = vsock_sk_destruct;
sk->sk_backlog_rcv = vsock_queue_rcv_skb;
sock_reset_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&vsk->bound_table);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&vsk->connected_table);
vsk->listener = NULL;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&vsk->pending_links);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&vsk->accept_queue);
vsk->rejected = false;
vsk->sent_request = false;
vsk->ignore_connecting_rst = false;
vsk->peer_shutdown = 0;
psk = parent ? vsock_sk(parent) : NULL;
if (parent) {
vsk->trusted = psk->trusted;
vsk->owner = get_cred(psk->owner);
vsk->connect_timeout = psk->connect_timeout;
} else {
vsk->trusted = capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN);
vsk->owner = get_current_cred();
vsk->connect_timeout = VSOCK_DEFAULT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT;
}
if (transport->init(vsk, psk) < 0) {
sk_free(sk);
return NULL;
}
if (sock)
vsock_insert_unbound(vsk);
return sk;
}
/*
* create an authorisation token for /sbin/request-key or whoever to gain
* access to the caller's security data
*/
struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info,
size_t callout_len, struct key *dest_keyring)
{
struct request_key_auth *rka, *irka;
const struct cred *cred = current->cred;
struct key *authkey = NULL;
char desc[20];
int ret;
kenter("%d,", target->serial);
/* allocate a auth record */
rka = kmalloc(sizeof(*rka), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rka) {
kleave(" = -ENOMEM");
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
rka->callout_info = kmalloc(callout_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rka->callout_info) {
kleave(" = -ENOMEM");
kfree(rka);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
/* see if the calling process is already servicing the key request of
* another process */
if (cred->request_key_auth) {
/* it is - use that instantiation context here too */
down_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
/* if the auth key has been revoked, then the key we're
* servicing is already instantiated */
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &cred->request_key_auth->flags))
goto auth_key_revoked;
irka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data;
rka->cred = get_cred(irka->cred);
rka->pid = irka->pid;
up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
}
else {
/* it isn't - use this process as the context */
rka->cred = get_cred(cred);
rka->pid = current->pid;
}
rka->target_key = key_get(target);
rka->dest_keyring = key_get(dest_keyring);
memcpy(rka->callout_info, callout_info, callout_len);
rka->callout_len = callout_len;
/* allocate the auth key */
sprintf(desc, "%x", target->serial);
authkey = key_alloc(&key_type_request_key_auth, desc,
cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred,
KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_READ | KEY_POS_SEARCH |
KEY_USR_VIEW, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
if (IS_ERR(authkey)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(authkey);
goto error_alloc;
}
/* construct the auth key */
ret = key_instantiate_and_link(authkey, rka, 0, NULL, NULL);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_inst;
kleave(" = {%d,%d}", authkey->serial, atomic_read(&authkey->usage));
return authkey;
auth_key_revoked:
up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
kfree(rka->callout_info);
kfree(rka);
kleave("= -EKEYREVOKED");
return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
error_inst:
key_revoke(authkey);
key_put(authkey);
error_alloc:
key_put(rka->target_key);
key_put(rka->dest_keyring);
kfree(rka->callout_info);
kfree(rka);
kleave("= %d", ret);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
} /* end request_key_auth_new() */
/* Find an unused file structure and return a pointer to it.
* Returns NULL, if there are no more free file structures or
* we run out of memory.
*
* Be very careful using this. You are responsible for
* getting write access to any mount that you might assign
* to this filp, if it is opened for write. If this is not
* done, you will imbalance int the mount's writer count
* and a warning at __fput() time.
*/
struct file *get_empty_filp(void)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
static long old_max;
struct file * f;
/*
* Privileged users can go above max_files
*/
if (get_nr_files() >= files_stat.max_files && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
/*
* percpu_counters are inaccurate. Do an expensive check before
* we go and fail.
*/
if (percpu_counter_sum_positive(&nr_files) >= files_stat.max_files)
goto over;
}
f = kmem_cache_zalloc(filp_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (f == NULL)
goto fail;
percpu_counter_inc(&nr_files);
f->f_cred = get_cred(cred);
if (security_file_alloc(f))
goto fail_sec;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&f->f_u.fu_list);
atomic_long_set(&f->f_count, 1);
rwlock_init(&f->f_owner.lock);
spin_lock_init(&f->f_lock);
eventpoll_init_file(f);
/* f->f_version: 0 */
return f;
over:
/* Ran out of filps - report that */
if (get_nr_files() > old_max) {
#ifdef FILE_OVER_MAX
static int fd_dump_all_files = 0;
if(!fd_dump_all_files) {
struct task_struct *p;
xlog_printk(ANDROID_LOG_INFO, FS_TAG, "(PID:%d)files %d over old_max:%d", current->pid, get_nr_files(), old_max);
for_each_process(p) {
pid_t pid = p->pid;
struct files_struct *files = p->files;
struct fdtable *fdt = files_fdtable(files);
if(files && fdt) {
fd_show_open_files(pid, files, fdt);
}
}
fd_dump_all_files = 0x1;
}
#endif
pr_info("VFS: file-max limit %lu reached\n", get_max_files());
old_max = get_nr_files();
}
goto fail;
fail_sec:
file_free(f);
fail:
return NULL;
}
/* Hold a reference on the credential and group info */
void
crhold(cred_t *cr)
{
(void)get_cred((const cred_t *)cr);
(void)get_group_info(cr->group_info);
}
/*
* Log to a cell. If the cell has already been logged to, return without
* doing anything. Otherwise, log to it and mark that it has been logged
* to. */
static int auth_to_cell(krb5_context context, char *cell, char *realm)
{
int status = AKLOG_SUCCESS;
char username[BUFSIZ]; /* To hold client username structure */
char name[ANAME_SZ]; /* Name of afs key */
char instance[INST_SZ]; /* Instance of afs key */
char realm_of_user[REALM_SZ]; /* Kerberos realm of user */
char realm_of_cell[REALM_SZ]; /* Kerberos realm of cell */
char local_cell[MAXCELLCHARS+1];
char cell_to_use[MAXCELLCHARS+1]; /* Cell to authenticate to */
krb5_creds *v5cred = NULL;
#ifdef HAVE_KRB4
CREDENTIALS c;
#endif
struct ktc_principal aserver;
struct ktc_principal aclient;
struct ktc_token atoken, btoken;
struct afsconf_cell ak_cellconfig; /* General information about the cell */
int i;
int getLinkedCell = 0;
/* try to avoid an expensive call to get_cellconfig */
if (cell && ll_string_check(&authedcells, cell))
{
if (dflag)
printf("Already authenticated to %s (or tried to)\n", cell);
return(AKLOG_SUCCESS);
}
memset(name, 0, sizeof(name));
memset(instance, 0, sizeof(instance));
memset(realm_of_user, 0, sizeof(realm_of_user));
memset(realm_of_cell, 0, sizeof(realm_of_cell));
memset(&ak_cellconfig, 0, sizeof(ak_cellconfig));
/* NULL or empty cell returns information on local cell */
if (status = get_cellconfig(cell, &ak_cellconfig, local_cell))
return(status);
linkedCell:
if (getLinkedCell)
strncpy(cell_to_use, ak_cellconfig.linkedCell, MAXCELLCHARS);
else
strncpy(cell_to_use, ak_cellconfig.name, MAXCELLCHARS);
cell_to_use[MAXCELLCHARS] = 0;
if (ll_string_check(&authedcells, cell_to_use))
{
if (dflag)
printf("Already authenticated to %s (or tried to)\n", cell_to_use);
status = AKLOG_SUCCESS;
goto done2;
}
/*
* Record that we have attempted to log to this cell. We do this
* before we try rather than after so that we will not try
* and fail repeatedly for one cell.
*/
(void)ll_add_string(&authedcells, cell_to_use);
if (dflag)
printf("Authenticating to cell %s.\n", cell_to_use);
/* We use the afs.<cellname> convention here... */
strcpy(name, AFSKEY);
strncpy(instance, cell_to_use, sizeof(instance));
instance[sizeof(instance)-1] = '\0';
/*
* Extract the session key from the ticket file and hand-frob an
* afs style authenticator.
*/
if (usev5)
{ /* using krb5 */
int retry = 1;
int realm_fallback = 0;
if ((status = get_v5_user_realm(context, realm_of_user)) != KSUCCESS) {
char * msg;
if (pkrb5_get_error_message)
msg = pkrb5_get_error_message(context, status);
else
msg = (char *)error_message(status);
fprintf(stderr, "%s: Couldn't determine realm of user: %s\n",
progname, msg);
if (pkrb5_free_error_message)
pkrb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
status = AKLOG_KERBEROS;
goto done;
}
if ( strchr(name,'.') != NULL ) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: Can't support principal names including a dot.\n",
progname);
status = AKLOG_MISC;
goto done;
}
try_v5:
if (realm && realm[0]) {
if (dflag)
printf("Getting v5 tickets: %s/%s@%s\n", name, instance, realm);
status = get_v5cred(context, name, instance, realm,
#ifdef HAVE_KRB4
use524 ? &c : NULL,
#else
NULL,
#endif
&v5cred);
strcpy(realm_of_cell, realm);
} else {
strcpy(realm_of_cell,
afs_realm_of_cell5(context, &ak_cellconfig, realm_fallback));
if (retry == 1 && realm_fallback == 0) {
/* Only try the realm_of_user once */
status = -1;
if (dflag)
printf("Getting v5 tickets: %s/%s@%s\n", name, instance, realm_of_user);
status = get_v5cred(context, name, instance, realm_of_user,
#ifdef HAVE_KRB4
use524 ? &c : NULL,
#else
NULL,
#endif
&v5cred);
if (status == 0) {
/* we have determined that the client realm
* is a valid cell realm
*/
strcpy(realm_of_cell, realm_of_user);
}
}
if (status != 0 && (!retry || retry && strcmp(realm_of_user,realm_of_cell))) {
if (dflag)
printf("Getting v5 tickets: %s/%s@%s\n", name, instance, realm_of_cell);
status = get_v5cred(context, name, instance, realm_of_cell,
#ifdef HAVE_KRB4
use524 ? &c : NULL,
#else
NULL,
#endif
&v5cred);
if (!status && !strlen(realm_of_cell))
copy_realm_of_ticket(context, realm_of_cell, sizeof(realm_of_cell), v5cred);
}
}
if (!realm_fallback && status == KRB5_ERR_HOST_REALM_UNKNOWN) {
realm_fallback = 1;
goto try_v5;
} else if (status == KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN) {
if (!realm_fallback && !realm_of_cell[0]) {
realm_fallback = 1;
goto try_v5;
}
if (dflag)
printf("Getting v5 tickets: %s@%s\n", name, realm_of_cell);
status = get_v5cred(context, name, "", realm_of_cell,
#ifdef HAVE_KRB4
use524 ? &c : NULL,
#else
NULL,
#endif
&v5cred);
if (!status && !strlen(realm_of_cell))
copy_realm_of_ticket(context, realm_of_cell, sizeof(realm_of_cell), v5cred);
}
if ( status == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE && retry ) {
retry = 0;
realm_fallback = 0;
goto try_v5;
}
}
else
{
#ifdef HAVE_KRB4
if (realm && realm[0])
strcpy(realm_of_cell, realm);
else
strcpy(realm_of_cell, afs_realm_of_cell(&ak_cellconfig));
/*
* Try to obtain AFS tickets. Because there are two valid service
* names, we will try both, but trying the more specific first.
*
* afs.<cell>@<realm>
* afs@<realm>
*/
if (dflag)
printf("Getting tickets: %s.%s@%s\n", name, instance, realm_of_cell);
status = get_cred(name, instance, realm_of_cell, &c);
if (status == KDC_PR_UNKNOWN)
{
if (dflag)
printf("Getting tickets: %s@%s\n", name, realm_of_cell);
status = get_cred(name, "", realm_of_cell, &c);
}
#else
status = AKLOG_MISC;
goto done;
#endif
}
if (status != KSUCCESS)
{
char * msg = NULL;
if (dflag)
printf("Kerberos error code returned by get_cred: %d\n", status);
if (usev5) {
if (pkrb5_get_error_message)
msg = pkrb5_get_error_message(context, status);
else
msg = (char *)error_message(status);
}
#ifdef HAVE_KRB4
else
msg = krb_err_text(status);
#endif
fprintf(stderr, "%s: Couldn't get %s AFS tickets: %s\n",
progname, cell_to_use, msg?msg:"(unknown error)");
if (usev5 && pkrb5_free_error_message)
pkrb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
status = AKLOG_KERBEROS;
goto done;
}
strncpy(aserver.name, AFSKEY, MAXKTCNAMELEN - 1);
strncpy(aserver.instance, AFSINST, MAXKTCNAMELEN - 1);
strncpy(aserver.cell, cell_to_use, MAXKTCREALMLEN - 1);
if (usev5 && !use524) {
/* This code inserts the entire K5 ticket into the token
* No need to perform a krb524 translation which is
* commented out in the code below
*/
char * p;
int len;
len = min(v5cred->client->data[0].length,MAXKTCNAMELEN - 1);
strncpy(username, v5cred->client->data[0].data, len);
username[len] = '\0';
if ( v5cred->client->length > 1 ) {
strcat(username, ".");
p = username + strlen(username);
len = min(v5cred->client->data[1].length, (unsigned int)(MAXKTCNAMELEN - strlen(username) - 1));
strncpy(p, v5cred->client->data[1].data, len);
p[len] = '\0';
}
memset(&atoken, '\0', sizeof(atoken));
atoken.kvno = RXKAD_TKT_TYPE_KERBEROS_V5;
atoken.startTime = v5cred->times.starttime;
atoken.endTime = v5cred->times.endtime;
memcpy(&atoken.sessionKey, v5cred->keyblock.contents, v5cred->keyblock.length);
atoken.ticketLen = v5cred->ticket.length;
memcpy(atoken.ticket, v5cred->ticket.data, atoken.ticketLen);
} else {
#ifdef HAVE_KRB4
strcpy (username, c.pname);
if (c.pinst[0])
{
strcat(username, ".");
strcat(username, c.pinst);
}
atoken.kvno = c.kvno;
atoken.startTime = c.issue_date;
/* ticket lifetime is in five-minutes blocks. */
atoken.endTime = c.issue_date + ((unsigned char)c.lifetime * 5 * 60);
memcpy(&atoken.sessionKey, c.session, 8);
atoken.ticketLen = c.ticket_st.length;
memcpy(atoken.ticket, c.ticket_st.dat, atoken.ticketLen);
#else
status = AKLOG_MISC;
goto done;
#endif
}
if (!force &&
!ktc_GetToken(&aserver, &btoken, sizeof(btoken), &aclient) &&
atoken.kvno == btoken.kvno &&
atoken.ticketLen == btoken.ticketLen &&
!memcmp(&atoken.sessionKey, &btoken.sessionKey, sizeof(atoken.sessionKey)) &&
!memcmp(atoken.ticket, btoken.ticket, atoken.ticketLen))
{
if (dflag)
printf("Identical tokens already exist; skipping.\n");
status = AKLOG_SUCCESS;
goto done2;
}
if (noprdb)
{
if (dflag)
printf("Not resolving name %s to id (-noprdb set)\n", username);
}
else
{
if (!usev5) {
#ifdef HAVE_KRB4
if ((status = krb_get_tf_realm(TKT_FILE, realm_of_user)) != KSUCCESS)
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s: Couldn't determine realm of user: %s)",
progname, krb_err_text(status));
status = AKLOG_KERBEROS;
goto done;
}
#else
status = AKLOG_MISC;
goto done;
#endif
}
/* For Network Identity Manager append the realm to the name */
strcat(username, "@");
strcat(username, realm_of_user);
ViceIDToUsername(username, realm_of_user, realm_of_cell, cell_to_use,
#ifdef HAVE_KRB4
&c,
#else
NULL,
#endif
&status, &aclient, &aserver, &atoken);
}
if (dflag)
printf("Set username to %s\n", username);
/* Reset the "aclient" structure before we call ktc_SetToken.
* This structure was first set by the ktc_GetToken call when
* we were comparing whether identical tokens already existed.
*/
strncpy(aclient.name, username, MAXKTCNAMELEN - 1);
strcpy(aclient.instance, "");
if (usev5 && !use524) {
int len = min(v5cred->client->realm.length,MAXKTCNAMELEN - 1);
strncpy(aclient.cell, v5cred->client->realm.data, len);
aclient.cell[len] = '\0';
}
#ifdef HAVE_KRB4
else
strncpy(aclient.cell, c.realm, MAXKTCREALMLEN - 1);
#endif
for ( i=0; aclient.cell[i]; i++ ) {
if ( islower(aclient.cell[i]) )
aclient.cell[i] = toupper(aclient.cell[i]);
}
if (dflag)
printf("Getting tokens.\n");
if (status = ktc_SetToken(&aserver, &atoken, &aclient, 0))
{
afs_com_err(progname, status,
"while obtaining tokens for cell %s\n",
cell_to_use);
status = AKLOG_TOKEN;
}
done2:
if (ak_cellconfig.linkedCell && !getLinkedCell) {
getLinkedCell = 1;
goto linkedCell;
}
done:
#if 0
/*
* intentionally leak the linkedCell field because it was allocated
* using a different C RTL version.
*/
if (ak_cellconfig.linkedCell)
free(ak_cellconfig.linkedCell);
#endif
return(status);
}
/* Find an unused file structure and return a pointer to it.
* Returns an error pointer if some error happend e.g. we over file
* structures limit, run out of memory or operation is not permitted.
*
* Be very careful using this. You are responsible for
* getting write access to any mount that you might assign
* to this filp, if it is opened for write. If this is not
* done, you will imbalance int the mount's writer count
* and a warning at __fput() time.
*/
struct file *get_empty_filp(void)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
static long old_max;
struct file *f;
int error;
/*
* Privileged users can go above max_files
*/
if (get_nr_files() >= files_stat.max_files && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
/*
* percpu_counters are inaccurate. Do an expensive check before
* we go and fail.
*/
if (percpu_counter_sum_positive(&nr_files) >= files_stat.max_files)
goto over;
}
f = kmem_cache_zalloc(filp_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(!f))
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
percpu_counter_inc(&nr_files);
f->f_cred = get_cred(cred);
error = security_file_alloc(f);
if (unlikely(error)) {
file_free(f);
return ERR_PTR(error);
}
atomic_long_set(&f->f_count, 1);
rwlock_init(&f->f_owner.lock);
spin_lock_init(&f->f_lock);
mutex_init(&f->f_pos_lock);
eventpoll_init_file(f);
/* f->f_version: 0 */
return f;
over:
/* Ran out of filps - report that */
if (get_nr_files() > old_max) {
#ifdef FD_OVER_CHECK
static int fd_dump_all_files;
if (!fd_dump_all_files) {
struct task_struct *p;
struct files_struct *files;
pid_t pid;
fd_dump_all_files = 0x1;
for_each_process(p) {
if (p->flags & PF_KTHREAD)
continue;
files = p->files;
if (files) {
struct fdtable *fdt = files_fdtable(files);
if (fdt) {
pid = p->pid;
pr_err("[FDLEAK]dump FDs for [%d:%s]\n", pid, p->comm);
fd_show_open_files(pid, files, fdt);
}
}
}
}
#endif
pr_info("VFS: file-max limit %lu reached\n", get_max_files());
old_max = get_nr_files();
}
return ERR_PTR(-ENFILE);
}
/*
* Log to a cell. If the cell has already been logged to, return without
* doing anything. Otherwise, log to it and mark that it has been logged
* to. */
static int auth_to_cell(char *cell, char *realm)
{
int status = AKLOG_SUCCESS;
char username[BUFSIZ]; /* To hold client username structure */
long viceId; /* AFS uid of user */
char name[ANAME_SZ]; /* Name of afs key */
char instance[INST_SZ]; /* Instance of afs key */
char realm_of_user[REALM_SZ]; /* Kerberos realm of user */
char realm_of_cell[REALM_SZ]; /* Kerberos realm of cell */
char local_cell[MAXCELLCHARS+1];
char cell_to_use[MAXCELLCHARS+1]; /* Cell to authenticate to */
int i,j;
CREDENTIALS c;
struct ktc_principal aserver;
struct ktc_principal aclient;
struct ktc_token atoken, btoken;
/* try to avoid an expensive call to get_cellconfig */
if (cell && ll_string_check(&authedcells, cell))
{
if (dflag)
printf("Already authenticated to %s (or tried to)\n", cell);
return(AKLOG_SUCCESS);
}
memset(name, 0, sizeof(name));
memset(instance, 0, sizeof(instance));
memset(realm_of_user, 0, sizeof(realm_of_user));
memset(realm_of_cell, 0, sizeof(realm_of_cell));
/* NULL or empty cell returns information on local cell */
if (status = get_cellconfig(cell, &ak_cellconfig, local_cell))
return(status);
strncpy(cell_to_use, ak_cellconfig.name, MAXCELLCHARS);
cell_to_use[MAXCELLCHARS] = 0;
if (ll_string_check(&authedcells, cell_to_use))
{
if (dflag)
printf("Already authenticated to %s (or tried to)\n", cell_to_use);
return(AKLOG_SUCCESS);
}
/*
* Record that we have attempted to log to this cell. We do this
* before we try rather than after so that we will not try
* and fail repeatedly for one cell.
*/
(void)ll_add_string(&authedcells, cell_to_use);
if (dflag)
printf("Authenticating to cell %s.\n", cell_to_use);
if (realm && realm[0])
strcpy(realm_of_cell, realm);
else
strcpy(realm_of_cell, afs_realm_of_cell(&ak_cellconfig));
/* We use the afs.<cellname> convention here... */
strcpy(name, AFSKEY);
strncpy(instance, cell_to_use, sizeof(instance));
instance[sizeof(instance)-1] = '\0';
/*
* Extract the session key from the ticket file and hand-frob an
* afs style authenticator.
*/
/*
* Try to obtain AFS tickets. Because there are two valid service
* names, we will try both, but trying the more specific first.
*
* afs.<cell>@<realm>
* afs@<realm>
*/
if (dflag)
printf("Getting tickets: %s.%s@%s\n", name, instance, realm_of_cell);
status = get_cred(name, instance, realm_of_cell, &c);
if (status == KDC_PR_UNKNOWN)
{
if (dflag)
printf("Getting tickets: %s@%s\n", name, realm_of_cell);
status = get_cred(name, "", realm_of_cell, &c);
}
if (status != KSUCCESS)
{
if (dflag)
printf("Kerberos error code returned by get_cred: %d\n", status);
fprintf(stderr, "%s: Couldn't get %s AFS tickets: %s\n",
progname, cell_to_use, krb_err_txt[status]);
return(AKLOG_KERBEROS);
}
strncpy(aserver.name, AFSKEY, MAXKTCNAMELEN - 1);
strncpy(aserver.instance, AFSINST, MAXKTCNAMELEN - 1);
strncpy(aserver.cell, cell_to_use, MAXKTCREALMLEN - 1);
strcpy (username, c.pname);
if (c.pinst[0])
{
strcat(username, ".");
strcat(username, c.pinst);
}
atoken.kvno = c.kvno;
atoken.startTime = c.issue_date;
/* ticket lifetime is in five-minutes blocks. */
atoken.endTime = c.issue_date + ((unsigned char)c.lifetime * 5 * 60);
memcpy(&atoken.sessionKey, c.session, 8);
atoken.ticketLen = c.ticket_st.length;
memcpy(atoken.ticket, c.ticket_st.dat, atoken.ticketLen);
if (!force &&
!ktc_GetToken(&aserver, &btoken, sizeof(btoken), &aclient) &&
atoken.kvno == btoken.kvno &&
atoken.ticketLen == btoken.ticketLen &&
!memcmp(&atoken.sessionKey, &btoken.sessionKey, sizeof(atoken.sessionKey)) &&
!memcmp(atoken.ticket, btoken.ticket, atoken.ticketLen))
{
if (dflag)
printf("Identical tokens already exist; skipping.\n");
return 0;
}
if (noprdb)
{
if (dflag)
printf("Not resolving name %s to id (-noprdb set)\n", username);
}
else
{
if ((status = krb_get_tf_realm(TKT_FILE, realm_of_user)) != KSUCCESS)
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s: Couldn't determine realm of user: %s)",
progname, krb_err_txt[status]);
return(AKLOG_KERBEROS);
}
if (strcmp(realm_of_user, realm_of_cell))
{
strcat(username, "@");
strcat(username, realm_of_user);
}
if (dflag)
printf("About to resolve name %s to id\n", username);
if (!pr_Initialize (0, AFSDIR_CLIENT_ETC_DIRPATH, aserver.cell))
status = pr_SNameToId (username, &viceId);
if (dflag)
{
if (status)
printf("Error %d\n", status);
else
printf("Id %d\n", viceId);
}
/*
* This is a crock, but it is Transarc's crock, so
* we have to play along in order to get the
* functionality. The way the afs id is stored is
* as a string in the username field of the token.
* Contrary to what you may think by looking at
* the code for tokens, this hack (AFS ID %d) will
* not work if you change %d to something else.
*/
if ((status == 0) && (viceId != ANONYMOUSID))
sprintf (username, "AFS ID %d", viceId);
}
if (dflag)
printf("Set username to %s\n", username);
/* Reset the "aclient" structure before we call ktc_SetToken.
* This structure was first set by the ktc_GetToken call when
* we were comparing whether identical tokens already existed.
*/
strncpy(aclient.name, username, MAXKTCNAMELEN - 1);
strcpy(aclient.instance, "");
strncpy(aclient.cell, c.realm, MAXKTCREALMLEN - 1);
if (dflag)
printf("Getting tokens.\n");
if (status = ktc_SetToken(&aserver, &atoken, &aclient, 0))
{
fprintf(stderr,
"%s: unable to obtain tokens for cell %s (status: %d).\n",
progname, cell_to_use, status);
status = AKLOG_TOKEN;
}
return(status);
}
/* Hold a reference on the credential */
void
crhold(cred_t *cr)
{
(void) get_cred((const cred_t *)cr);
}
